SOURCE: "The Realistic Conceptualism of William Ockham," Traditio, Vol. IV, 1946, pp. 307-14.

[In the following excerpt, Bȯhner argues that Ockham's doctrine concerning universals is a realistic conceptualism, and that attacks on Ockham for practicing idealistic conceptualism are therefore unfounded.]

Students of medieval scholasticism are accustomed to apply the name 'conceptualism' to Ockham's doctrine concerning the nature and scope of universals. This seems to be an apt designation, provided that its meaning is not burdened with idealistic connotations. Unfortunately, quite a number of neo-scholastics qualify conceptualism as a doctrine which severs the bond between thought and reality, and is therefore essentially idealistic. Small wonder, then, that such a conceptualism imputed to William Ockham falls an easy prey to their violent, and to a large extent justified, attack against idealism in general. However, as far as Ockham's conceptualism is concerned, their victory in this regard is an illusion, for the simple reason that his alleged idealistic conceptualism does not exist. Hence it appears to us that Ockham's genuine conceptualism enjoys, for the time being, a relative security from neo-scholastic criticism.

It is the aim of the following paper to prove that Ockham's doctrine as regards universals is a realistic conceptualism. As additional evidence, a revised edition of a comparatively inaccessible text will be offered.

I. Universals and Reality According to William Ockham

Father Bittle's Epistemology (with the title: Reality and the Mind) is outstanding for the sober position it adopts amongst conflicting neo-scholastic theories, as well as for its clarity of expression. According to this distinguished author, the main point in conceptualism

'is the contention that the content of our universal ideas is not realized in any form whatever in the individual sense-objects; there is no foundation in the things themselves which would justify the intellect in forming universal ideas. Our universal ideas are thus purely subjective products of the mind without a correlative in nature; in other words, there is nothing in the individuals in nature which is genuinely represented by these universal ideas. This, of course, gives to the universals only a strictly intra-mental significance; as "universals" they have no objective value.¹

In this illuminating passage the connection between conceptualism and idealism is made as explicit as could be desired. And when Fr. Bittle, a few lines later, says that at least Ockham's doctrine was really conceptualism, we are left in no doubt that he thinks the ockhamistic conceptualism to be of the idealistic type. For this unambiguous statement Fr. Bittle has apparently relied on the customary treatment of Ockham's doctrine in our textbooks which, as it happens, have been led astray by certain medievalists. We have no intention of blaming him for this. However, we consider it our duty to rectify an injury—not in order to save Ockham or to exculpate him (for the guilt of Ockham has still to be proved), but to serve truth, a task which, in our opinion, is included in the virtue of religion.

Let us first state that Ockham, far from being an idealist, has not even a place in his system for the critical aporia from which idealism has started its subjective journey; for the problem, whether and how we can know anything of reality by conceptual knowledge, does not even enter Ockham's system, since in his system the immediacy of cognition and the firm causal nexus between object and thought does not admit of any separation between thought and reality. Hence he is remarkably innocent of the 'philosophical sin' committed, according to certain neo-scholastics, by many of their brethren who have suffered under the critical aporia and who have, in the spirit of St. Thomas, refuted idealism by granting, and not by simply denying, the critical aporia. We, for our part, side with the latter, amongst whom are very eminent names. Hence we do not consider the lack of this aporia in Ockham as something to be praised.

On the other hand, there can be no doubt that Ockham radically denied the existence of any universality in singular things.² The universale in re, even as common nature, or in any other form which entails any real existence of the universal in individuals, is eliminated by him on metaphysical grounds.³ However, we are unable to see how idealism follows from such a denial of a universale in re, since such a careful distinction between thought and reality is not equivalent to a divorce of thought from reality. The 'idealistic Ockham' is a historical monstrosity. If idealism is characterized at least by the denial of a correspondence of our thought with reality, and so that our thought is not determined by reality but at most occasioned by reality, then Ock-ham is remarklaby free from any idealistic tendencies.

Of course, we cannot expect from him an ex professo refutation of idealism, since idealism was unknown to him. But he has implicitly denied the thesis of idealism by affirming the following theses:

FIRST THESIS: The content of our concepts is the conception or grasping of reality.

According to Ockham, the starting point of all our knowledge is intuitive cognition. Intuitive knowledge—naturally speaking—is the immediate intellectual grasp of an existing and present thing. The object which is sensibly known is likewise known immediately by the intellect. This intellectual knowledge of a singular is the notitia intuitiva intellectiva, which is a proper, simple and incomplex cognition of a singular fact. This knowledge or this intellection is caused by two partial causes—: the object which is known or rather makes itself known, and the intellect which knows or becomes 'knowing-the-object'. The object is the active cause, which as causa univoca produces an effect similar to itself.⁴

Besides this intellective intuitive cognition, an abstractive cognition of the same singular object is caused, either immediately by the object itself, or mediately by the object and immediately by the first intuitive cognition. This abstractive knowledge remains as habitual knowledge in the intellect.⁵

Again, besides these two cognitions, which concern only singular facts, the intellect forms another cognition, based on the former, which is not proper to one singular fact, but which is common to an indefinite number of singular facts of the same kind, since it does not concern this individual more than that individual. This abstractive cognition is universal cognition, also called common or confused cognition. Thus the common intellection or the universal concept 'man' does not concern Sortes more than Plato or any other real or possible man, since it concerns all men equally, being so common or generalized or universalized that it does not regard their individual differences.⁶

The transition from simple and proper knowledge of singulars to simple and common knowledge of universals is in any case a natural one and does not involve a special activity of the intellect.⁷ However, Ockham does not give detailed information about this psychological process of forming universals by 'abstraction'.⁸

At any rate, it can be safely affirmed that, according to Ockham, universal conceptual knowledge, which is based ultimately on intuitive knowledge, or on a knowledge which is at least as immediate as intuitive knowledge, by a natural and therefore necessary process, is conception of reality.⁹

SECOND THESIS: The content of our thought is in the relation of similitude with reality.

The similarity or similitude, or the correspondence between thought or universal intellection and reality follows immediately from the causal relation in which thought stands with reality. We have already quoted a text in which the object is called a univocal cause as regards cognition: this means that the object causes an effect similar to it. The similarity between concept and reality is very often affirmed by the Venerabilis Inceptor, so that it is superfluous to quote texts in direct support of this statement. We prefer to present texts in indirect support of it. In anticipation of certain critics who understand the similarity between concept and thing too crudely as a physical mirroring of reality in the mind, and in consequence ridicule such a similitude, Ockham is clear-sighted enough to stress the limits of this similarity. For, as far as sensible reality is concerned, its similitude in the mind is of another type of being, namely, of intellectual or spiritual being.¹⁰ For this reason, Ockham prefers to make himself clear on this point by using terms which refer directly to the peculiar intellectual grasp of reality. In his Summa logicae he describes this relation, in the particular case of universal concepts of substances (species, genus, etc.), by saying: 'The universal concept expresses or explains, declares, imports and signifies the substances of things, or the essence of things—i.e., their nature, which is their substance.'¹¹

It is therefore Ockham's genuine teaching that universal concepts are in the relation of similarity with reality, that there is a correspondence between them and a representation of the one by the other.

In order to make as explicit as possible the true nature of Ockham's conceptualism, it may suffice to paraphrase Fr. Bittle's definition of conceptualism, so that it can apply to Ockham: The content of our universal ideas is realized in individual sense-objects, if they concern such objects and not psychic objects; there is a foundation in the things themselves which does justify the intellect in forming universal ideas. Our universal ideas are by no means purely subjective products of the mind without a correlative in nature; in other words, there is something in nature, namely the individual essence or nature, not something or some nature different from the individuals, which is genuinely represented by these universal ideas. This, of course, gives to the universals a strictly extra-mental significance; as 'universals' they have objective value. However, only the content, not the universality (i.e., predicability of many), corresponds to reality; and finally, only the content grasped by the intellect, not the peculiar status of universals as psychic realities, corresponds to reality (if the universal concerns sensible facts). The character of universality and spirituality applies only to universal concepts and by no means to extra-mental sense-objects.

Since conceptualism is characterized by the affirmation of universals in the mind and by the denial of any universality outside the mind, Ockham's theory is conceptualism. Since, however, realism can be characterized by the affirmation of a correspondence or similarity between concepts and reality, or by the intentionality of concepts as regards reality—a correspondence which is either denied or at least not affirmed by idealism—, Ockham's conceptualism has to be qualified as realistic conceptualism, and not as idealistic conceptualism. Its connection with idealistic conceptualism seems to be not justified and, hence, unjust.

II. Hochstetter's After-Thought

What we have stated above is in general affirmed by Hochstetter,¹² who gives additional documentary evidence. However, his interpretation of some of these texts is biased by the distinguished author's urge to find traces of idealism in Ockham's doctrine. Still, he has to confess that Ockham apparently never felt himself to be involved in the critical aporia concerning the similarity between thing and concept,¹³ though Ockham has seen this difficulty, according to Hochstetter, in the species-theory.¹⁴ And, indeed, Ockham's doctrine on intuitive knowledge leaves no room for the critical doubt. However, Hochstetter thinks that this absence of the critical doubt in Ockham is only apparent. In a seemingly thorough manner he tries to convince his readers that Ockham has made some limitations as regards the similarity between thought and reality. In one instance he even discovers that Ockham goes so far as to state that in an act of cognition the object is no more given than is Caesar (whom we have never seen) through his image.¹⁵

This inaccurate interpretation will be rectified on another occasion. Here it may suffice to state that without any doubt a universal is a natural sign of reality and that, as such, it does not represent one individual more than another, and that in this it is like the statue of the unknown Caesar or Hercules which to me represents all unknown men equally, neither one more than the other. But here the analogy ends. For the natural sign which is a universal is gained from intuitive knowledge. Hence, at least one object corresponding to such a universal (which is simple knowledge and not composed) is, or was, known. The other objects or individuals of the same class are not known individually by this common knowledge—i.e., not by a proper and not-common concept—, but only by a common concept, for the simple reason that they are not known individually—i.e., by intuitive knowledge. Since, as regards the natural signs which are concepts, we have a special case of semantics, Ockham (and this was certainly overlooked by Hochstetter and, as far as I know, by others as well), in his characterization of signs which are terms or concepts, drops the requirement or qualification that they lead only to recordative knowledge.¹⁶ That is to say, the sign-relation between concept and object is not the same as between an effect and a cause, since the concept as effect is the very cognition, and not the cognition of a cognition which calls to mind a former cognition. We consider this distinction (which, by the way, is obvious) as pivotal in Ockham's semantics and theory of knowledge.

Unfortunately, idealistic prejudices have pushed Hochstetter to a rather desperate interpretation of a text found in the Quodlibeta. Here the distinguished author is convinced that the separation between thought and reality is most clearly and definitely expressed by Ockham. We shall first present the text:

Ad istam quaestionem dico, quod repraesentare multipliciter accipitur:

Uno modo accipitur pro illo, quo aliquid cognoscitur, et sic repraesentans est cognitio et repraesentare est esse illud, quo aliquid cognoscitur, sicut cognitione aliquid cognoscitur.

Secundo modo repraesentare est cognoscere aliquid, quo cognito aliquid aliud cognoscitur, sicut imago repraesentat illud, cuius est imago, per actum recordandi.

Tertio modo accipitur repraesentare pro aliquo causante cognitionem, sicut objectum (vel intel-lectus) causat cognitionem (Quodl. IV, q. 3).

Of this very innocent text Hochstetter gives the following interpretation:

In den Quodlibeta (IV, q. 3) stellt er bei dem Versuch einer Gliederung der Repraesentantia neben der Repräsentation durch Objekte (bei der er vielleicht an willkürliche objektive Zeichen, wie z. B. den "circulus", der den Weinausschank in der Taverne ankündigt (Logik I, cap. 1), oder natürliche Zeichen, wie z. B. den Rauch, der das Feuer zu erkennen gibt, denkt), die repräsentative Funktion der cognitio ausdrücklich der Repräsentation durch ein Abbild, die eine Erinnerung an das früher wahngenommene Repraesentatum erfordere, gegenüber. Die auf andere Fragen abzielende Untersuchung selbst zieht die hierin unausweichliche erkenntnistheoretische Konsequenz nicht; dass demzufolge die cognitio oder intellectio zwar eine Repräsentation, aber nicht die eines Objektes durch ein anderes ihm naturaliter zugeordnetes und auch nicht mehr eine similitudo objecti ist (Op. cit. 105).

I am at a loss to understand this. Hochstetter intends to give the gist of the above-quoted text. He suggests (if I understand him correctly) that Ockham, by the second mode of representation, has in mind representation by arbitrary signs, and by the third mode of representation understands representation by objective signs—i.e., by natural signs (smoke, a sign of fire). These two kinds of representation are distinguished from the re-presentation of cognition. If this is the case, Hoch-stetter concludes, then cognition is neither an arbitrary sign nor a natural sign of that which is represented by it.¹⁷ Hence the representation of a cognition is that of an unknown X—i.e., of an unknown cause.

The best answer to Hochstetter is a correct interpretation of this text which, according to Hochstetter himself, is basic. Ockham says that the term repraesentare can be understood in a threefold manner. He does not say that the three meanings of repraesentare are exclusive. Then he goes on to distinguish the three meanings:

1. In the first sense, 'to represent' is applied (i.e., is predicated) to that by which something is known. Hence we can use this word in the following proposition: Cognitio est repraesentans; and this again means that by a cognition something is known. Where in this text does Ockham say that the object of this cognition is not the cause of the cognition or that the cognition is not similar to the object?
2. In the second sense, 'to represent' means a special kind of cognition, namely, the cognition of something by something else which is a sign of it, either an arbitrary or a natural sign. Such a case of representation is given, for instance, when an image represents something else; for it recalls to my mind recordative knowledge of what is represented by it. The representation by a cognition or intellection of objects as such is different from the representation by which a man, through his image, is recalled to my mind. These two cases have to be distinguished, as they were always distinguished by Ockham from the earliest days of his literary activity; for his criticism of the species theory is based on this distinction.
3. In the third sense, 'to represent' is applied to that which causes a cognition. As we know, according to Ockham the cognition is caused by the object and by the intellect; as causes of cognition, or because they make something to be represented, both object and intellect can be said to represent, or it can be said that through them something is present to the mind. This too is in perfect agreement with Ockham's teachings from his earliest scholastic days.

I am afraid that Hochstetter has here offered a gratuitous construction. Certain prejudices have lead him to read something into a text because he wished to find it in that text, but he did not faithfully follow the text of Ockham himself. The 'basic' text of Hochstetter not only does not contradict our denial of idealism, or even of idealistic traces in Ockham, but rather it confirms our denial.¹⁸…

Notes

¹ C. N. Bittle, O.M.Cap., Reality and the Mind, Epistemology (New York 1938) 237. Cfr. also J. Gredt, O.S.B., Elementa philosophiae Aristotelico-Thomistica (7th ed. Freiburg i. Br. 1937) I, 94: 'Conceptualistae (veteres Stoici, Conceptualistae saeculi XIV et XV: Guilelmus Ockham…, tandem Kant… et Kantiani) admittunt quidem conceptus universales, quos tamen merum mentis figmentum esse docent, cui nihil in rerum natura respondeat.'

² Cfr. in the text edited below, N and Y.

³ Cfr. Ockham's extensive criticism of any kind of such a realism in Ordinatio (I Sent. d. 2, qq. 4-7; especially q. 7 S: 'Ideo aliter dico ad quaestionem, quod nulla res extra animam nec per se nec per aliquod additum reale vel rationis, nec qualitercumque consideretur vel intelligatur, est universalis; ita quod tanta est impossibilitas, quod aliqua res extra animam sit quocumque modo universalis, nisi forte per institutionem voluntariam, quomodo ista vox: Homo, quae est vox singularis, est universalis, quanta impossibilitas est, quod homo per quamcumque considerationem vel secundum quodcumque esse sit asinus' (Revised text).

⁴Reportatio II, q. 15 EE; ed. Traditio 1 (1943) 263.

⁵ Cfr. ibid. G-M; ed. cit. 250-253.

⁶ Cfr. the text edited below, E. Note that 'confused cognition' has a technical meaning, since it refers to universal concepts, which are 'common' and capable of 'confused' supposition. The universals are not confused cognitions in the modern sense of the word. Cfr. the unedited Expositio super libros Physicorum, lib. I, ad textum 4: 'Et ideo, cum universalia sint simplicia, sicut alias ostendi, proprie non cognoscuntur confuse, et ita proprie non sunt confusa.… '

⁷ Cfr. Ordinatio d. 2, q. 7 CC: 'Ad septimum dico, quod natura occulte operatur in universalibus, non quod producat ipsa universalia extra animam tamquam aliqua realia, sed quia producendo cognitionem suam in anima quasi occulte saltem mediate (vel immediate [addition of the second redaction]) producit illa universalia illo modo, quo nata sunt produci. Et ideo omnis communitas isto modo est naturalis et a singularitate procedit; nec oportet illud, quod isto modo fit a natura, esse extra animam, sed potest esse in anima' (Revised text).

⁸ Ockham has given some indications of this transition on the basis of the fictum-theory in Reportatio II, q. 25 O (this question is missing in some manuscripts, but seems to be authentic): 'Ad aliud dico, quod universalia et intentiones secundae causantur naturaliter sine omni activitate intellectus et voluntatis a notitiis incomplexis terminorum per istam viam: Quia primo cognosco aliqua singularia in particulari intuitive vel abstractive; et hoc causatur ab obiecto vel habitu derelicto ex primo actu; et habita notitia statim ad eius praesentiam, si non sit impedimentum, sequitur naturaliter alius actus distinctus a primo terminatus ad aliquid tale esse obiectivum, quale prius vidit in esse subiectivo; et ille actus secundus producit universalia et intentiones secundas et non praesupponit eas. Exemplum: Aliquis videns albedinem intuitive vel duas albedines abstrahit ab eis albedinem in communi ut est species, et non est aliud nisi illae duae notitiae incomplexae terminatae ad albedinem in singulari, sive intuitivae sive abstractivae, causantur naturaliter, sicut ignis calorem, unam tertiam notitiam distinctam ab illis, quae producit talem albedinem in esse obiectivo, qualis prius fuit visa in esse subiectivo, sine omni activitate intellectus vel voluntatis, quia talia naturaliter causantur.' As to the intellectio-theory cfr. the text edited below, E. This same text is found with significant variants in Quaestiones super libros Physicorum (unedited) q. 7 where we read: 'Respondeo, iste est modus ponendi: Intellectus apprehendens intuitive (intentionem?) rem singularem elicit unam cognitionem intuitivam in se, quae est tantum cognitio illius rei singularis.…' For a more detailed explanation of this process ad mentem Ockham, see in Gabriel Biel, Collectorium I, d. 3, q. 5 B (Tübingen 1501).

⁹ The immediacy of intuitive and abstractive cognition with the exclusion of any 'medium' between the cognition and its object is strongly emphasized by Ockham in Ordinatio d. 27, q. 3 J. Here he affirms such an immediacy as probable also for the universal abstractive cognition (that is, for a concept). It seems that he affirmed it as certain in his later period. This should dispose of all objections raised against Ockham's theory of cognition which are based on the causal relation between object and cognition. For the cognition of the object is immediately caused; but the cognition is not the effect from which or by which a cognition of the object is obtained. There are not two or even three cognitions necessary in order to know the object; there is only one cognition, viz. immediate cognition of reality. For this reason Ockham could not place on the same level the natural signs which are concepts and the natural signs found in nature or instituted by man. Cfr. note 16.

¹⁰This is certainly the case according to the intellectio-theory as regards concepts. According to the fictum-theory the dissimilitude between concept and reality is even greater. Nevertheless Ockham affirms the similitude between concept and reality, also, and even more—for obvious reasons—on the basis of the fictum-theory. Cfr. my edition of Ordinatio d. 2, q. 8 E: 'The Text Tradition of Ockham's Ordinatio,' The New Scholasticism 16 (1942) 227. Cfr. also in the text edited below, L. As to the dissimilarity between a universal concept and reality Ockham says, expressing at the same time also the similarity, in Ordinatio d. 2, q. 8 J (ed. cit. 234): 'Ad secundum dico, quod talia ficta non sunt realiter similia, sed magis dissimilantur et distant quam accidentia, tamen sunt talia in esse obiectivo, qualia sunt alia in esse subiectivo.…' Realiter similia here means something which is similar in the manner of a real being. However, ficta are no real beings. Consequently the intellectio-theory, according to which universals are real beings (that is real accidents of the mind), grants more similarity between concept and reality, as is expressly stated by Ockham. Cfr. M in the text edited below.

¹¹Summa logicae I, 17: 'Sed magis proprie loquendo debet concedi, quod universale exprimit vel explicat essentiam substantiae, hoc est naturam quae est substantia… Unde omnes auctoritates, quae sonat, universalia esse de essentia substantiarum vel esse in substantiis vel esse partes ipsarum, debent sic intelligi, quod auctoritates non aliud intendunt, nisi quod talia universalia declarant, exprimunt, explicant, important et significant substantias rerum.'

¹² E. Hochstetter, Studien zur Metaphysik und Erkenntnislehre Wilhelms von Ockham (Berlin-Leipzig 1927).

¹³Op. cit. 103: 'Sieht man Ockham grob-realistisch immer wieder die similitudo von Ding und Begriff hervorheben, so hat man zunächst den Eindruck, dass er sich ihr gegenüber niemals in der bekannten kritischen "Verlegenheit wegen der Art, wie ich a priori hiervon etwas wissen könne" (Kant, Kr. d. r. Vemn. Vorrede S. XVII) befunden hat.'

¹⁴Op. cit. 44; cfr. here the reference to Reportatio II, q. 15 S, T.

¹⁵Op. cit. 104: 'Einmal geht er, wie wir oben sahen (S. 48), schliesslich so weit zu sagen, dass bei einem Erkenntnisakt (der ja für ihn gleichfalls stets similitudo rei ist [here Hochstetter adds a note referring the reader to Sent. I, d. 27, q. 3 X; Sent. II, q. 15 EE]), das Objekt uns nicht mehr gegeben sei als Caesar (den wir nie sahen) durch sein Bild.'

¹⁶Summa logicae I, 1: 'Propter tamen protervos est sciendum, quod signum accipitur dupliciter: Uno modo pro omni illo quod apprehensum aliquid aliud in cognitionem facit venire, quamvis non faciat mentem venire in primam cognitionem [that is, only in secundam vel recordativam] eius, sicut alibi est ostensum, sed in actualem post habitualem eius.… Aliter accipitur signum pro illo quod aliquid facit in cognitionem venire et natum est pro illo supponere vel addi in propositione.…' I shall deal with Ockham's semantics in a forthcoming article in Franciscan Studies.

¹⁷ That this is Hochstetter's intention is confirmed by the words immediately following (Op. cit. 105): 'Die Übereinstimmung mit dem Grundgedanken des Bildgleichnisses in der Kritik der Speziestheorie (S.o.S. 44) ist unverkennbar. Ebenso ist die Erweiterung des Repräsentationsbegriffs. Dort fusst der Einwand ausschliesslich auf dem Gedanken der Abbildreprasentation, an anderen Stellen ruht die repräsentative Zuordnung auf der Kausalrelation.' And now it comes: 'Hier ist die cognitio ausdrüicklich aus beiden Gruppen herausgenommen und als eine Sonderart hingestellt, die sowohl von der genannten Kritik nicht mehr getroffen wird, wie auch unabhangig vom Kau-salproblem ist. Ueber das "Wie" und die Möglichkeit dieser Repräsentation schweigt Ockham.'

¹⁸ It is not without satisfaction that we draw the attention of medievalists to the outstanding study on scholastic semantics by John A. Oesterle: 'Another Approach to the Problem of Meaning,' The Thomist 7 (1944) 233-63, which briefly discusses the notion of repraesentare according to the Thomistic tradition in John of St. Thomas, on page 241f. We read on page 242: 'Repraesentare—which concerns everything by which something is made present to the knowing power—embraces three of the causes, the objective, formal and instrumental.' These three causes are found in the three meanings assigned by Ockham to the term repraesentare.…