SOURCE: "Ockham on Nature and God," The Thomist, Vol. XXXVII, No. 1, January, 1973, pp. 69-87.

[In the following essay, Woods examines Ockham's proof for the existence of a first cause and discusses how this proof differs from Aristotle's proof for the existence of God.]

I

I should like to discuss the Ockhamist argument for the existence of God from efficient causality. In particular, I intend to focus on the relation, in Ockham, between the universe and God, insofar as that relation can be elaborated by reason without the aid of Revelation. Briefly, I desire to indicate the kind of being in which Ockham's proof for the existence of God terminates.

The principal philosophical enterprise of the Middle Ages is usually referred to as Fides quaerens intellectum. This means, I take it, that mediaeval thinkers, possessing the Christian faith, desired to penetrate it, to draw out its implications, and to discover in their experience the vestiges and traces of that of which the faith speaks. The mediaeval thinker, at least up to the fourteenth century, wanted to illuminate his experience by the light of his faith and to understand his faith through the reflection of its object in his experience. Knowing by faith that the world was related to God in certain ways, he wanted to discover in his experience evidence of these relations, and, in general, the manifestation of this God in whom he put his faith. The principal means used to accomplish this was philosophy. Now, of course, the term "philosophy" had a pagan connotation for these men. The ancient philosophers tried to attain by the power of human reason the beatitude that was attainable only through the grace of God. The question confronting the mediaeval theologian, to call him by his proper name (and this includes Ockham), was how much of Divine Things can human reason know. How much can the mind unillumined by Revelation know of the origin of the world, the existence and nature of God, and the destiny of man? Our task here is to bring out the answer to one of these questions by one mediaeval theologian.

Concerning the proofs for the existence of God, it is important, especially for the Christian thinker, to determine as precisely as possible what sort of being he would denominate as "God"; that is, one must first ask what kind of being one would recognize as God. For the Christian thinker, it is not sufficient simply to arrive at a first cause in some order or at an ultimate principle of explanation beyond which it is not necessary to go. If that were all there was to it, then this area might not be the subject of dispute it is. It is quite conceivable that the atheist or materialist could admit the existence of some such first principle, although he would deny that it is God in any usual sense of that term; it could be the universe as a whole, or some primaeval cloud of gas rotating in space, or some elementary particle. If naturalism (namely, the position which holds that "nature is all there is") is to be avoided, then more than a mere first cause or ultimate ground is required. The real task is to identify such a cause or ground. One must show that it is neither nature nor a part of nature. The mediaevals for the most part held that transcendence was necessary. It is with this in mind that I should like to examine Ockham's proof for the existence of God. Do the principles upon which his argument rests enable him to transcend the limits of nature? Can the first cause at which he arrives be readily identifiable with the Christian God?

II

Ockham's philosophy has been the subject of considerable controversy. This is especially the case with regard to the question as to what place he should be assigned in the development of mediaeval philosophy. Is he a radical innovator or the representative of a well-established tradition? Is his thought a sign of the breakdown of mediaeval philosophy or no? Both sides of the controversy are provided with eminent representatives. It is sufficient to note that in his Unity of Philosophical Experience, E. Gilson discusses Ockham in a chapter entitled "The Road to Scepticism."¹ B. Geyer characterizes the thought of the Venerable Inceptor as critical and sceptical.² On the other hand, E. Moody insists on the Aristotelian character of Ockham's thought.³ Further, P. Boehner maintains that Ockham is carrying on a venerable Franciscan tradition going back to St. Bonaventure.⁴ Although the adjudication of this dispute is beyond the limits of this article, I should like to suggest that both sides are defensible. It would appear that the kind of God at which Ockham's proof for the existence of God arrives is remarkably Aristotelian. This means that his alleged scepticism is nothing other than a manifestation of his view that philosophy (largely the philosophy of the Philosopher) is really quite inadequate when it turns to the consideration of Divine Things. This is not to say that the Venerable Inceptor is an unquestioning disciple of Aristotle; on the contrary, Ockham, like many other mediaeval theologians, re-thought and interpreted the principles of the Philosopher in some striking and original ways. Moreover, Ockham was not backward about criticizing Aristotle when he thought he deserved criticism. Nevertheless, I mean to suggest that the universe open to human reason in Ockham is a universe which is adequately describable in terms of change; it is a universe in which there is a constant succession of forms in matter; and that the only first principle or God that is discoverable is a first cause of the products of change. This, I take it, is essentially the universe of Aristotle. This is why I designate the being, which Ockham's proof for the existence of God attains, as Aristotelian. If this is so, then we may say, I think, that Ockham is clearly in line with those thinkers who took to heart the Condemnation of 1277 and its warnings about the limitations of Aristotelianism. It is even possible to think of Ockham's natural theology as an extended comment on the words of Scotus in his Ordinatio:

Note, nothing supernatural can be, by human reason, shown to be in the wayfarer; nor can anything supernatural be shown to be necessarily required for his perfection. … It is therefore impossible to use human reason against Aristotle.…⁵

Ockham therefore may be considered in some sense to be a part of the Franciscan tradition of St. Bonaventure, John Peckham, and others, whose attitude toward Aristotelianism was decidedly reserved. They did not think highly of its prospects for contributing to an understanding of the faith. Ockham, I believe, would agree. The difference between Ockham and the others was that, for him, there was really no philosophical alternative to Aristotelianism. The old Augustinian tradition, which had been the mainstay of the earlier Franciscans, was in a bad way, and, in any event, Ockham had little time for many of its characteristic positions. Aristotelianism was just the best philosophical tradition around, and if it was not of much use in the elucidation of the Christian faith, that merely indicates the limits of human reason. So we can perhaps say that Ockham was both sceptical⁶ and traditional; indeed, in his case, the latter entailed the former.

This then is what I should like to show in this article. The Ockhamist approach to God is similar to Aristotle's in the sense that both can only attain to a first cause of change. I say their proofs are similar, but not identical. Whereas, in Aristotle, we perhaps do arrive at a being that is not a part of nature, in Ockham, it is by no means clear that we do so. This is in fact the second conclusion I wish to suggest: in Ockham, we do not necessarily transcend nature in proving the existence of a first cause. Ockham therefore does not avoid naturalism. Ockham is able to prove the existence of a first cause but not the existence of God in anything like the Christian notion of the Divine.

In this fashion therefore can we perhaps resolve the dispute among scholars as to whether Ockham has a proof for the existence of God. On the one hand, there have been those who have denied that there is such a proof;⁷ on the other hand, it has been pointed out, quite correctly, that Ockham explicitly presents an argument for God's existence.⁸ Both sides are right to a certain extent. This is evident from the works of Ockham himself. In the Ordinatio, d.2, q. 10, he asks and answers in the affirmative, the question "Utrum sit tantum unus Deus?"⁹ In a later work, the Quaestiones super octos libros Physicorum, q. 136, the question is formulated "Utrum possit sufficienter probari primum efficiens esse per conservationem?"¹⁰ He replies affirmatively with the same proof as in the Ordinatio; but it is to be noted that in the later work the term "Deus" occurs neither in the question nor in the discussion. In Quod. II, 1,¹¹ Ockham makes his whole attitude quite clear by admitting that, while we can arrive at a first cause, we have to recognize that that cause could be a heavenly body. Our task is to show how the Venerable Inceptor arrives at such a conclusion.

Let me now outline my procedure. Ockham defines efficient causality in terms of being, as we shall see. This means that in order to understand the principle of efficient causality in Ockham we must know something of his analysis of being. We will find that the only analysis of being he admits is in terms of change. Consequently, causality for Ockham, as in Aristotle, is a principle of changing being, not of being per se. Naturally, as a Christian, he admits creation, but this is only known de fide. First, therefore, we will consider Ockham's analysis of being, then his doctrine of efficient causality, and finally, the implications of all this for his proof of God's existence.

III

Since the proof for the existence of God in Ockham is through efficient causality, and as he defines causality in terms of being,¹² let us see something of Ockham's analysis of being. There is no question of a full presentation of Ockhamistic metaphysics, for that is beyond the scope of this article.¹³ Our purpose here is to show that Ockham's analysis of being is similar to Aristotle's. It is essentially an analysis of being as changing and not of being per se. Ockham does not admit of any principles which Aristotle did not admit, and, in a general way at least, accepts those principles which Aristotle accepts. It should be pointed out that he seems to depart from Aristotle on occasion, as we shall indicate in due course. Our attention will be directed only toward Ockham's consideration of real being, not possible or mental being.

The analysis of being in the mediaeval tradition was generally an attempt to describe the intrinsic structure of really existing things. The product of this sort of inquiry was the identification of those principles which determine a thing in its existence, or nature, or its similarity to or difference from others, or its changeability. The principles so discovered were naturally supposed to exist in the real world in some way. Now Ockham has very definite notions about what could exist outside of the mind. For him, the term "being" (ens), when applied to real being, signifies the concrete singular entities outside the mind.¹⁴ Everything outside the intellect is an entity, and this applies to real beings and the principles of real beings. In Ockham, there are no principles outside of the mind save entities. The consequence of this is that all such principles are really separable. In this, Ockham certainly differs from many of his predecessors. Neither essence and existence in St. Thomas Aquinas, nor the common nature and "haecceitas" in John Duns Scotus are conceived of as entities, although they are thought to be really present in and in some way distinct in the real world. They are presented as the principles of entities, in that they are supposed to constitute somehow the ontological structure of things, but they are not entities themselves. They are therefore by no means separable in the real world; that would be absurd. Ockham's view, as we have seen, is otherwise. He denies therefore that we are able to verify any extra-mental distinction that is not real (implying the separability of the things so distinct). The Scotistic formal distinction, whereby two principles may be non-identical but not be entities, is ruled out of court.¹⁵ His reason for insisting that the only distinction in extra-mental reality is one allowing the separability of the things distinguished is found in his criterion of distinction. To his mind, there is no adequate test of determining if two things are distinguished except our ability to assert contradictories of them. So, we can say that a man is rational and a jackass is not rational and thus distinguish them. If we admit the Scotistic formal distinction, however, we would have no real defense against someone who might say that a man and a jackass only differ formally and not really.¹⁶ It is better therefore to retain only the real distinction. Consequently, when Ockham takes up the problem of the principles of real being, among the questions he will ask is whether any of the candidates proposed can be taken as entities; and the test he will use is separability. In this way he will be able to admit the principles of Aristotle, such as form and matter (which, rightly or wrongly, he interprets as entities), and reject such principles as essence and existence, (which cannot be so interpreted). Let us now see how he does this.

The text I wish to use is from the Summa Logicae, III-II, c. 27.¹⁷ The question at issue is the relation of existence ("esse existere") to the thing ("res"). Is the existence of the thing a distinct entity from the essence ("essentia ") of the thing outside of the soul? His answer is that "existence" has the same signification as "thing" and that it does not differ at all from essence.

And it seems me that there are not two such things, nor does "existence" signify something distinct from the thing.¹⁸

It is evident that Ockham considers that "essence," "existence," and "thing" have exactly the same referent, the extramental entity. They are not distinguished as entities and therefore are not distinct principles. He gives several reasons, of which we will list two. The first reason illustrates our position concerning the essential Aristotelian character of his analysis.

Because if it is distinct, it is either substance or accident. Not accident because then the existence of a man would be quantity or quality, which is manifestly false… Nor can it be said that it is substance because every substance is either matter or form or the composite or the absolute substance; but none of these can be said to be existence, if existence is something other than the entity of the thing.¹⁹

Ockham assumes that the Aristotelian categories subsume all of reality, and what cannot find a place within these categories, or within their principles (that is, matter and form, which are the principles of substance) is either nothing, or at least indistinguishable from them.

The second reason we are taking up is an application of the theory of distinctions.

Further, if they are two things, there would be no contradiction if God were to conserve the entity of the thing in the nature of things without the existence, or conversely, the existence without the entity, both of which are impossible.²⁰

This argument, based on the power of God, holds that God can maintain anything in existence independent of anything else. If essence and existence therefore are real things, it should be possible for God to conserve the existence of a thing without its essence and vice versa. This naturally reduces the distinction between essence and existence to nonsense, and Ockham therefore has no qualms about dismissing it. I think we need not pursue this matter any farther.

As we have already noted, the only principles Ockham admits are those found in Aristotle, namely, substance and accident, and form and matter. These are necessary for the explanation of change. This means that Ockham's analysis of being is really an analysis of changing being. As for the remaining Aristotelian principles, namely, act and potency, we shall see later that, while accepting them, he reduces them to form and matter.

To illustrate these points, it is sufficient to quote a few texts. With regard to substance and accident, it is clear that he conceives them to be separable.

… "accident" signifies a thing distinct from the substance in which it inheres, and without which, that substance is able to exist, at least by Divine Power.²¹

An accident will, through Divine Power, be able to exist and be conserved "without its subject."²²

These texts are as explicit as they can be on this point. The necessity of positing these principles is found in the need to account for the alteration we find in certain subjects, which are at one time hot and at another time cold, or at one time white and at another time black.²³ In short, it is in the analysis of change that these principles are revealed.

Form and matter are likewise allowed to be real principles and, at the same time, to be entities. The texts again are quite clear.

I show that matter and form are positive things and that they are distinct…²⁴

… matter is something actually existing in the nature of things which is in potency to all substantial forms…²⁵

To the second principal argument, I say that united in a thing there are many things which are really distinct, and yet making one thing; such are matter and form, subject and accident, and things of this sort.²⁶

As in Aristotle, these principles are necessary in accounting for substantial change.²⁷

As for the remaining Aristotelian principles of act and potency, it appears that Ockham, while accepting them, considers them to be identical with form and matter, at least in their strict signification.

Act is taken… in one way… strictly for an act informing another and coming to it anew.²⁸

In this same text, he also notes that "act" may signify any real being as opposed to merely possible being. In this sense, matter may be called act. Matter, however, insofar as it can receive form, is also called potency.

Potency is the substance of matter, that is, potency is the substance which is matter…²⁹

It should be clear from the above texts that these principles are mainly concerned with change.

I think it is evident from what we have said that the only intrinsic principles of being that the Venerable Inceptor accepts are those of Aristotle; and, like Aristotle, they are revealed in the analysis of change and are intended to make sense of change. With this in mind we can now turn to the doctrine of efficient causality in Ockham.

IV

Since Ockham accepts only Aristotle's principles of being, it is natural to expect therefore that Aristotle's doctrine of causality will receive a favorable hearing from the Venerable Inceptor. This is especially so as Ockham defined causality in terms of being. In Aristotle, being is analyzed primarily in terms of form.³⁰ For him, therefore, efficient causality is basically concerned with the communication or production of form.³¹ Aristotle had no notion of creation, and so he only had to account for why things become the kinds of things that they are; he did not have to explain their very existence. Now we shall see that, although Ockham, as a Christian, believed in the fact of creation, he did not believe that that fact could be discerned by human reason, unaided by Revelation. This implies that, for the mind, causality is basically a principle of change, not of being.

Ockham holds that the only causes are the four enumerated by Aristotle.³² We are concerned here solely with efficient causality, since that is the instrument which he uses to prove the existence of God. For Ockham, a cause is that from which the being of another follows.³³ When efficient causality is in question, therefore, we must ask what is meant when he says that the being of another follows. It is clear from the following rather lengthy text that he means being as following from change. Each of the examples given is a species of change.

"Efficient cause" is taken in three ways—strictly, broadly, and very broadly. Strictly taken, a cause is efficient when it causes a newly existing thing, so that nothing of that thing preceded; for example, fire generates fire or the sun heats, for in these cases a substantial or accidental form newly exists. Broadly taken, a cause is efficient which makes something to be such a kind which it was not before, whether in making a new thing, or in conjoining a pre-existing part, or taking away parts, or changing something in a similar manner. So it is said that a builder is the cause of the house because he composes the parts among themselves, and yet nothing in itself totally new is acquired… Very broadly taken, a cause is efficient if it effects change, whether by making one thing from many things, or causes something to have a figure different from what it formerly had (either by altering or taking away its parts), or only moving it locally. So we say that an intelligence is the efficient cause of the motion of heaven, that is, it moves heaven, but causes no new thing in heaven.³⁴

This division of causality is not of mutually exclusive elements, but rather each member of the division is of greater generality than, and at the same time encompasses, the member which immediately precedes. Thus the broad sense includes the strict sense, and the very broad sense includes both the broad and the strict senses. Now how are we to understand this division? These kinds of causes are found in nature by our ordinary experience; namely, they are the kinds of causes known to Aristotle. (It is largely Aristotle's physics, or what Ockham took to be such, that is being summarized in the work quoted.³⁵) All of the types of causality mentioned in this passage are causes of change, as is obvious from the examples. Efficient causes, in the first sense, are those that bring about generation, corruption, and alteration. The second sense includes augmentation, diminution, and, in general, the production of anything achieved through the addition, subtraction, or arrangement of already existing parts. The third sense adds local motion. This is therefore a summary of the different sorts of causes of change; there is no reference to creation here, or the production of being per se.

Now it may be objected at this point that the passage quoted is from a work on the philosophy of nature and so there was no need to discuss creation. We have not proven therefore that Ockham holds that the human mind, without revelation, only understands efficient causality in terms of change. We must concede that the point is well taken. If we are to show that the fact of creation is not evident to human reason according to the Venerable Inceptor, we will have to rely on more than this text. We intend to do this. Our purpose in citing the above passage was to illustrate how Ockham was able, while defining causality in terms of being, to understand it solely as a principle of change. It is doubtless true that Ockham, as a Christian theologian trying to understand the faith, would require a notion of causality that would include creation; so he defines causality in terms of being. Our task now is to show that creation³⁶ is unknown to reason without the light of faith.

It is obvious that the human mind cannot show that anything is created, according to Ockham. The reason is that all effects given in our experience seem to be quite explicable in terms of generation and corruption, namely, in terms of change. It is unnecessary therefore to bring in creation as a mode of causality. Further, there are some objects, such as separated substances and the heavenly bodies, that seem to be uncaused; therefore creation is not needed to account for them.

… it cannot be sufficiently proven that there are any effectibles besides generables and corruptibles, the sufficient causes of which are the lower natural bodies and the celestial bodies. The reason is that it cannot be sufficiently proven that a separated substance or any heavenly body are caused by anything efficiently.³⁷

The importance of this text for the understanding of Ockham's natural theology can hardly be doubted, and we will return to it later. The point to note now is that change is able to account for those things in our experience which are caused; consequently, causality is a principle of change.

It is plain therefore that any proof for the existence of God in Ockham which is based on efficient causality can only reach a first cause of change, not of being. Further, anything that cannot be shown to be a product of change cannot be shown to be caused. Such is the case with matter.³⁸ Ockham cannot therefore show that God is the cause of all things. Matter, separated substances, and the heavens cannot be shown to be caused. Let us now turn to his proof for the existence of God.

V

Our discussion of Ockham's proof for the existence of God will concern itself with the kind of being in which it terminates, and especially with the question of whether Ockham really transcends the limits of nature when he arrives at a first cause. We do not therefore intend to give a thorough-going analysis of its structure.

The proof, which develops out of a discussion of the famous argument for the existence of God presented by Duns Scotus is fairly straightforward. We may summarize it as follows: whatever is produced is conserved as long as it exists; since this thing is produced, it is conserved so long as it exists; with respect to its conserving cause, we may ask whether it is produced or no; if not, we have reached a first conserving cause, and thus a first efficient cause, since all conserving causes are efficient causes; if it is produced, then it is also conserved by another, and of this other we may make the same inquiry. Now we must either go on to infinity in the series of conserving causes or we must stop somewhere with a first cause; but the former is impossible, since it would entail the actual and simultaneous existence of an infinite multitude, which all acknowledge to be impossible. Thus, there must exist a first conserving, and so, a first efficient cause.³⁹

The general lines of the argument are clear enough. It is similar to many proofs from efficient causality found in the Middle Ages, such as the Second Way in St. Thomas. What does set it apart is the principle upon which it is based—"whatever is produced, is conserved, as long as it exists." Ockham is the first, as far as I know, to use conserving causality in his argument. He never discusses the principle, and how he would ground it is a matter of conjecture.⁴⁰ He does regard it as manifest, however.

Why does the Venerable Inceptor feel compelled to use this principle? In order to answer this question it is necessary for us to make clear just how a proof for the existence of God from efficient causality was expected to arrive at its goal. This goal was a first cause. To arrive at a first cause it had to be shown that an infinite series of causes was insufficient to account for any given effect. This could be done in two ways: first by showing that there could only be a finite series of causes, the first member of which being the first cause, by definition; or, second, granting the existence of an infinite series, by showing that such a series would not suffice, unless some first cause outside of the series were posited. We are only concerned with the attempt to rule out infinite series altogether, as that was the path followed by Ockham.

The Venerable Inceptor attempted to do this by showing that all of the causes exist simultaneously. If there were an infinite number of them, this would mean that there exists in act an infinite multitude. Ockham, along with the mediaevals in general, held this to be impossible. He does not discuss it but merely refers to the "philosophers" (perhaps having Aristotle's Metaphysics, II, 2, in mind). Scotus tried to show the simultaneity of causes with his notion of essentially ordered causes. This, however, is a matter into which I do not wish to go, since it is very complex and would take us too far away from our topic. Besides, I intend to deal with this problem in Scotus and Ockham at another time. Let us therefore simply summarize Ockham's position, along with the core of his criticism of Scotus.⁴¹

The principal objection that Ockham makes to Scotus's discussion is that the latter uses productive causality. Ockham holds it is impossible to show that any series of productive causes is not infinite. A productive cause gives existence, either in the substantial or accidental order. Once the effect is posited, however, the cause is no longer needed. It could cease to exist, without making any difference to the effect. It would be impossible to show, therefore, that the members of a series of productive cause exist simultaneously. They could exist successively. In this instance, there could be an infinite number, without an actually existing infinite multitude. This would be quite possible, in Ockham's view. If one interprets the causal series as conserving, however, it clear that all of its members must exist simultaneously. A cause can only effect if it exists. A conserving cause, therefore, exists simultaneously with its effect, namely, what it conserves. If it ceased to exist, it would no longer be a conserving cause because it would no longer be a cause. The same is true for all members of a series of conserving causes. They must all exist simultaneously, and, since an actually existing infinite multitude is excluded, there can only be a finite number of them. The first member of such a series would naturally be the first conserving cause. Thus does Ockham prove the existence of the first cause.

How far can Ockham go toward identifying this cause? He has arrived at a first conserving cause; and, from what has been said previously, we can say that it is a first conserving cause of change, or, more exactly, a first conserving cause of the products of change. It is therefore clear that the function of the first cause in Ockham's philosophical universe is similar to that in Aristotle's. Can we say, however, that Ockham has transcended nature? It seems not. All that we require is a being, or beings, which, while exercising a general causality, do not themselves seem to require a cause. As noted above,⁴² the heavenly bodies seem to fulfill the requirements. Everything caused in our experience could very well be the product of generation and corruption, of which the sufficient causes could be terrestrial and celestial bodies. Concerning the latter, it cannot be shown that they have any cause.⁴³ They need not even have a cause of their local motion outside of themselves, since Ockham does not accept the principle: whatever is moved is moved by another.⁴⁴ Thus Ockham could well say that, while we do arrive at a first cause, that cause could be a heavenly body.

I say that we do stop at a first efficient cause and there is no regress to infinity. It is sufficient that a heavenly body be posited because we do experience concerning such that they are the causes of others.⁴⁵

In Ockham, it cannot be shown therefore that the human mind can transcend nature. We noted above that Ockham does not even use the term "Deus" in the proof for the existence of a first cause in the Quaestiones super octos libros Physicorum.⁴⁶ The philosophical universe in Ockham is, as in Aristotle, a realm of change, of forms succeeding forms in matter.⁴⁷ All that has to be explained is why these changes take place. The creating God of Christianity is not manifest here; the notion of the old Franciscan school that the universe is the image of God finds little scope in Ockham. One could perhaps argue in Ockham's defense that he did manage to reveal something of God, in that the God of Christianity is, among other things, the first conserving cause. Since the God of Christianity is in fact outside of nature, Ockham did indeed transcend nature in arriving at a first conserving cause. In reply to this, however, it may be said that we require the faith to assure us that we have transcended nature; otherwise, the human mind cannot know it.

In conclusion, we might suggest, assuming what we. have said in this article has any merit, that Ockham anticipates something of the modern attitude toward nature. It would seem that modern science could only arise when nature began to be studied for its own sake, and not for what it reflected of something else, namely, God; in Ockham, nature reveals very little of God. Further, with the inability of the human mind to transcend nature, the latter, for man, becomes a self-sustaining system both in its existence and processes. This also is, I take it, an anticipation of the moderns.

Notes

¹ New York: Scribners, 1937, pp. 61-91.

²Friedrich Überwegs Grundriss der Geschichte der Philosophie, Zweiter Teil: Die patristische und scholastische Philosophie. Ed. by B. Geyer (Berlin, 1928), p. 571.

³The Logic of William of Ockham (New York: Russell and Russell, 1965), Chapter One, passim.

⁴ "The Spirit of Franciscan Philosophy," in Franciscan Studies, N.S. II (1942), p. 220.

⁵ loannis Duns Scoti, Ordinatio, Prol., p. 1, q. 1, in Opera Omnia, studio et cura Commissionis Scotisticae (The Vatican: Typis Polyglottis, 1950), Vol. I, p. 9: "Nota, nullum supernaturale potest ratione naturali ostendi inesse viatori, nec necessario requiri ad perfectionem eius… Igitur impossibile est hic contra Aristotelem uti ratione naturali."

⁶ By calling Ockham "sceptical," I mean that his philosophical principles, especially when he turns to the consideration of God, do not carry him as far as the principles of many of his predecessors. He is not a sceptic in the sense that he denies that the human mind can know any truth.

⁷ For example, David Knowles, The Evolution of Medieval Thought (New York: Vintage, 1962), pp. 322-323.

⁸ P. Boehner, "Zu Ockhams Beweis der Existenz Gottes," Franziskanische Studien, XXXII (1950), 50-69.

⁹ Guillelmi de Ockham, Scriptum in Librum Primum Sententiarum, Ordinatio, Dist. II-Ill, ed. S. Brown, O.F.M., adlaborante G. Gál, O.F.M. (St. Bonaventure, N. Y.: Franciscan Institute, 1970), pp. 337-357.

¹⁰ Ed. by P. Boehner in Ockham: Philosophical Writings (Edinburgh: Nelson, 1962), pp. 122-125.

¹¹ Strasbourg, 1491.

¹²Tractatus de Praedestinatione et de Praescientia Die et de Futuris Contingentibus, q. 1, Ed. by P. Boehner (St. Bonaventure, N. Y.: Franciscan Institute, 1945), p. 17: "Causa… accipitur… pro re aliqua habente aliam rem tamquam suum effectum, et dicitur causa ad cuius esse sequitur aliud, quia ipsa posita ponitur effectus et non posita non potest poni."

¹³ For a good account of Ockham's metaphysics, see P. Boehner, "The Metaphysics of William Ockham," in The Review of Metaphysics, I (1947-48), 59-86. Reprinted in Collected Articles on Ockham, Ed. by E. Buytaert (St. Bonaventure, N. Y.: Franciscan Institute, 1958), pp. 373-399; it is to this reprint that I will refer, when mentioning this article. Also see P. Lucey, Metaphysics and the Philosophy of William of Ockham (Rome: Pontificia Universitas Gregoriana, 1954).

¹⁴Quod. V, 21; also Ord., d. 2, q. 6, p. 196.

¹⁵Ord., d. 2, q. 1, pp. 14-17. When the faith demands some distinction stronger than the logical, and weaker than the real, as in the doctrine of the Trinity, Ockham does admit the formal distinction. In the Trinity, the Divine Persons cannot be really distinct (that would be tritheism), nor can they be logically distinct (that would be modalism); hence, some distinction, such as the formal distinction, is necessary (Quod. I, 3). This is known, however, on faith only.

¹⁶Ord., d. 2, q. 1, p. 16.

¹⁷ Ed. by P. Boehner in "Meta. of Wm. Ockham," in Col. Art., pp. 389-90.

¹⁸Ibid., p. 389: "Et mihi videtur quod non sunt talia duo, nec esse existere significat aliquid distinctum a re.

¹⁹Ibid., p. 390: "Quia si sic, aut esset substantia aut accidens. Non accidens, quia tunc esse existere hominis esset quantitas vel qualitas, quod est manifeste falsum… Nec potest dici quod sit substantia, quia omnis substantia vel est materia vel forma vel compositum vel substantia absoluta; sed nullum istorum potest dici esse, si esse sit alia res ab entitate rei."

²⁰Ibid.: "Item, si essent duae res, non esset contradictio, quin Deus conservaret entitatem rei in rerum natura sine existentia, vel e converso existentiam sine entitate, quorum utrumque est impossibile."

²¹De Sacramento Altaris (Strasbourg, 1491), c. 32: "… accidens significat rem distinctam a substantia inherentem illi rei, scilicet substantiae, et sine qua potest illa substantia saltem per potentiam divinam existere."

²²Ibid., c. 12: "Poterit accidens per divinam potentiam sine subjecto existere et conservari."

²³Quod. VII, 7.

²⁴Summulae Physicorum (Venice, 1637), I, 8, p. 10: "Ostendo quod materia et forma sunt res positivae, et quod sunt distinctae…" C. K. Brampton has challenged the generally accepted assumption that the Summulae Physicorum is an authentic work of Ockham, in his article, "Ockham and his Authorship of the Summulae Physicorum," in Isis, LV (1964), pp. 418-426. An able reply, however, was provided by J. Miethke in his "Ockhams Summulae Physicorum, eine nicht authentische Schrift?", in the Archivum Franciscanum Historicum, LX (1967), pp. 57-68. In general, I agree with Miethke, and so I see no reason to abandon the common view on this matter. I have not hesitated therefore to make use of the Summulae. For the sake of those who find Brampton more convincing than I do, however, I have provided additional documentation in a couple of important instances (see notes 26 and 29 below).

²⁵Ibid., I, 15, p. 18: "… materia est quaeda m re s actualiter existens in rerum natura quae est in potentia ad omnes formas substantiales.…"

²⁶Ord., d. 2, q. 3, pp. 89-90: "Ad secundum principale dico adunata in re sunt aliqua multa distincta realiter, facientia tamen unum in re, sicut se habent materia et forma, subjectum et accidens, et huiusmodi." This is one of those points on which Ockham certainly departs from Aristotle. The latter clearly does not regard matter, for example, as an entity. See De Generatione et Corruptione, I, 5, 320al3-16, where Aristotle says that matter is separable only in discourse or definition (logos). Indeed, it is doubtful that Aristotle regarded any of the principles discussed as entities (excepting separated forms).

²⁷Sum. Phys., I, 8, p. 10.

²⁸Ibid., I, 16, p. 19: "Actus capitur… uno modo… stricte pro actu informante aliud et advenient sibi de novo."

²⁹Ibid., p. 20: "Potentia est substantia materiae, id est, potentia est substantia quae est materia …" The identification of act and potency with form and matter is also made in the Summa Logicae, III-II, c. 27 (ed. by Boehner, see note 17 supra), p. 390: "Item si essent [essence and existence] duae res, aut facerent per se unum, aut non. Si sic, oporteret, quod unum esset actus et reliquum potentia, et per consequens unum esset materia et aluid forma…"

³⁰Metaphysica, VII, cc. 4-6.

³¹Ibid., cc. 7-8.

³²Ord. (Lyons, 1494-1496), d. 35, q. 5, N.

³³ Cf. supra, n. 12.

³⁴Sum. Phys., II, 3, p. 35: "Est autem advertendum, quod causa efficiens tripliciter accipitur: stricte; large; et largissime. Stricte dicitur causa efficiens, quando causat rem noviter existentem, ita quod nihil illius rei praecessit, sicut ignis generat ignem, et Sol calefacit, ibi enim forma substantialis et accidentalis noviter est. Large dicitur, causa efficiens illa, quae facit aliquid esse aliquale, quale prius non fuit, sive rem novam faciendo, sive partem praeexistentem coniugendo, sive partes auferendo, vel aliis modis consimilibus transmutando, et sic dicitur quod artifex est causa domus, quia solum componit partes domus ad invicem, et tamen nulla res secundum se totam nova est acquisita… Largissime dicitur causa efficiens pro omne movente, sive illud movens faciat unum ex multis, sive transmutando partes, sive auferendo, faciat alterius figurae, quam prius, sive etiam solum transmutat illud localiter. Et sic dicimus quod intelligentia est causa efficiens motus Caeli, id est movet Caelum, et tamen nullam rem novam causat in Caelo."

³⁵Ibid., Proem., p. 1. Ockham remarks that he accepts all here which is not repugnant to the Christian Faith.

³⁶ "Creation" is taken, among other things, to designate a causal act needing no previously existing matter. Change requires such matter. See Quod., II, 9.

³⁷Quod., II, 1: "… non potest probari sufficienter quod sint aliqua effectibilia praeter generabilia et corruptibilia, quorum causae sufficientes sunt corpora naturalia inferiora et caelestia corpora, quia non potest probari sufficienter quod substantia separata quaecumque, nec aliquod corpus caeleste causatur a quocumque efficiente."

³⁸Sum. Phys., I, 15, p. 18: "Sed materia est … de se ingenerabilis et incorruptibilis.…"

³⁹Ord., d. 2, q. 10, pp. 355-356: "Et ideo potest argumentum sic formari: quidquid realiter producitur ab aliquo, realiter ab aliquo conservatur quamdiu manet in esse reali; sed iste effectus—certum est—producitur; igitur ab aliquo conservatur quamdiu manet. De illo conservante quaero: aut producitur ab alio, aut non. Si non, est efficiens primum sicut est conservans primum, quia omne conservans est efficiens. … Si autem illud sic conservans producitur ab alio, igitur conservatur ab alio, et de illo alio quaero sicut prius, et ita vel oportet ponere processum in infinitum vel oportet stare ad aliquid quod est conservans et nullo modo conservatum, et tale erit primum efficiens. Sed non est ponere pro-cessum in infinitum in conservantibus, quia tunc aliqua infinita essent in actu, quod est impossible. … Sic igitur videtur per istam rationem quod oportet dare primum conservans et per consequens primum efficiens." The proof is repeated in the Quaest. Phys., q. 136, ed. by Boehner, Ockham: Phil. Writ., pp. 122-125.

⁴⁰ See the plausible suggestion of J. R. Burke, The Nature and Kinds of Causal Relations according to William Ockham, unpublished Ph.D. dissertation (Fordham Univ., 1968), pp. 42-43, 110. Building on Fr. Burke, we might conjecture that, since Ockham regards form and matter as entities, and since matter is in potentiality to all forms (Sum. Phys., I, 15, p. 18), there is no reason why it should be conjoined to this form rather than another, unless through the influence of an external cause. Ockham seems to suggest this in Sum. Phys., I, 7, p. 8: "Omne compositum componitur ex partibus, sine quibus esse non potest, et dependet ex causis, sine quibus una pars compositi alteri non unitur…"

⁴¹" The discussion of Scotus is found in his Ordinatio, d. 2, p. 1, qq. 1-2, Opera Omnia, Vol. II, pp. 154-161. In Ockham, the discussion is in the Ordinatio, d. 2, q. 10, pp. 347-350 and in the Quaest. Phys., qq. 132-134, ed. by Boehner in Ockham: Phil. Writ., pp. 115-118.

⁴² P. 82 supra.

⁴³Ibid.

⁴⁴ See the Reportatio, II, q. 26, M. Ockham does not regard the acquisition of a new place as demanding an efficient cause in the strict sense, but only in a very broad sense. See the Sum Phys., II, 3, p. 35, cited supra, pp. 80-81.

⁴⁵Quod., II, 1: "Dico quod standum est ad primum efficiens et non est processus in infinitum. Et illud efficiens potest poni corpus caeleste, quia de illo nos experimur quod est causa aliorum."

⁴⁶Supra, p. 73 and note 10.

⁴⁷ Ockham again differs from Aristotle in that the latter seems to transcend nature, whereas it appears that the Venerable Inceptor cannot.