SOURCE: "Ockham on Human and Divine Freedom," Franciscan Studies, Vol. 38, 1978, pp. 122-32.

[In the following excerpt, Clark explores Ockham's descriptive definition of causality.]

Toward the end of its vital life, Scholasticism seemed to lapse into a painful second childhood. The very possibility of Scholastic theology was again questioned—this time by the uncompromising philosophy of Latin Averroism. The Parisian Statutes of 1270 and 1277 tried to legislate an alliance between reason and faith but only added to the confusion.¹ Early heresies returned to trouble the old age of Scholasticism; a subtle form of Pelagianism, for example, was debated seriously in the 14th century. But above all, the political influence attached to types of scholastic discourse such as Thomism and Scotism came to have a disruptive effect. The battle for prestige between universities and teaching orders developed too often into predictable and counterproductive arguments, and finally, into harsh forms of intellectual control. After a century of commentary on the Sentences of Peter Lombard there seemed to be no consensus or clarification. Indeed, the Nominalist movement took shape in the early fourteenth century convinced of the presence of fundamental mistakes in the fabric of Scholasticism and of the need to rethink its progress.

William of Ockham (c. 1285-1349) initiated the mood and ambivalent energies of Nominalism. In general, the historiography has painted a picture of Ockham as a theological reactionary. And at first glance, he filled the description. Ockham rejected the errors of Latin Averroism explicitly; he warned frequently that Greek philosophy suffered from its ignorance of God's freedom.² And this had special importance—he revitalized the distinction between God's "absolute" and "ordained" power.³ This distinction expressed the world's contingency by contrasting absolute possibilities with the ordained facts of creation—a timely reminder for the Averroists who denied freedom in the First Cause. But in Ockham's hands this dogma seemed capable of compromising orthodoxy as readily as heresy: God's promises could be reversed as easily as Aristotle's false conclusions. Understandably, many scholars have considered the distinction of "absolute-ordained" power as the structural key to Ockham's thought and to the entire Nominalist movement. Recent studies of Ockham are sympathetic or critical of his motives and accomplishments according to the interpretation placed on this distinction. Both friends and foes have claimed that the philosophy of Nominalism was derived from, or was a function of, its theological premises.⁴

Too little is said about the philosophical correctives that Ockham attempted. Not that Ockham is primarily a philosopher: the nature of Scholasticism precludes such claims. But rather, it needs to be said that crucial philosophical tangents account for much of Ockham's importance within the intellectual climate of the 14th century and, in turn, these philosophical options have a dramatic effect upon the theology of Ockhamism. The issue of free will is a case in point. Ockham's study of personal freedom represents a departure from the Aristotelian traditions on causes and explanations so radical that it constitutes a "via moderna." Then, his theory of freedom as contingency breaks down the static boundary between God's absolute and ordained power transforming this distinction into a dialectic and giving Ockham his theological method. In the end, the Ockhamist response to the intellectual unrest of the early 14th century turns more on metaphysics than dogma.

In preface, there is a caveat. The doctrine of freedom like much of Ockham's work has an unfinished and almost uneven quality. Called to Avignon to defend his orthodoxy and then involved in the frustrating debate over Franciscan poverty, he ended his academic career prematurely. His ideas are suggestive but not fully developed. The various factions within 14th century Nominalism are plausible considering the unfinished system of its "Inceptor. "⁵And yet, the unfinished state of Ockham's system produces a number of successful by-products. Loose ends as well as clear genius cause turning points in the history of ideas.

I. Causality in General

The issue of "free will" involves the claim that some causes are unique and abnormal when compared to the regular forces of nature. In Ockham's case, there is doubt whether any causes function, let alone free ones. Some scholars claim that Ockham repudiates any rational or empirical evidence for causal efficacy, that he translates and dilutes the notion of "causing" into "temporal precedence."⁶ If causal relationships are illusory or reduced to conceptual sequence, then the question of free causes must be futile. This consequence would be ironic since Ockham intends to salvage the notion of causality from its legitimate doubts. Perhaps in no other area is the confusion so manifest between Ockham's "loose ends" and his considered judgments.

Ockham's definition of causality is simply a set of criteria by which an instance of the cause-effect relationship can be recognized. An essential order among events, so that the posterior depends upon the prior item, justifies an assertion of causality.⁷ An experimental attitude is required here. There is no a priori way of determining causation since "the simple cognition of the cause does not contain the simple notion of its effect."⁸ The concept of one individual does not entail knowledge of a second individual: the notion of "man" does not include knowledge of the distinct things producible by man. The word "cause" is a complex or "connotative" term precisely because its meaning supposes an observed dependence between two occurrences. Thus Ockham requires that an immediate, irreversible and essential order among events be experienced to justify the inference of causality.

Notice that Ockham "infers" causes. Strictly speaking, it is impossible to prove even a posteriori that this thing caused this determinate effect.⁹ The problem is not the failure of the principle of causality—Ockham expects that every novelty will be a result—but the difficutly in pointing to the correct cause. The Schoolmen commonly held that "Whatever God produces by means of secondary causes, He can produce and conserve immediately without secondary causes."¹⁰ This "famous proposition of theologians" is reason to admit the possibility of causal occasionalism. Although combustion always results from the contact of fire and cotton, their proximity may be the "occasion" in which God immediately and solely produces the ignition. The traditional maxim does not limit or delineate God's ability to make exceptions to the appearances of force and efficacy in nature. Ockham speculates that the exception might be the rule. He goes further than the inherited claim that exceptions to natural causality are the presuppositions of miracles and sacraments. Ockham claims that the flame-cotton-combustion sequence would be identical to human observers whether flame were the cause or God alone produced the combustion. Men see a prior and posterior item within the process without "seeing" causality—a third item. Ockham cannot advance systematic criteria by which men could distinguish between natural and supernatural effects within the world or within the human mind.¹¹ True, he expresses a common sense conviction that nature operates effectively; he makes a revealing distinction between natural and miraculous causes. But occasionalism remains a problem for Ockham. His theological axiom of God's primary causality raises doubts about the causal appearances of nature that Ockham cannot eliminate philosophically. Having stated that occasionalism cannot be disproved logically or experientially, Ockham simply abandons the question. The twisted theories of causality in the next generation of Schoolmen—see Thomas Bradwardine, John of Mirecourt and Nicholas of Autrecourt¹²—are in part the residue of a provocative issue treated with carelessness.

Ockham's caution in pointing to actual causes takes some interesting tangents. His philosophy fosters an inductive methodology in the physical sciences which became somewhat characteristic of the Nominalists.¹³ In theory, the analysis of concepts is inadequate for finding causes so men must observe the world carefully to discover how it works. Then, as a theologian, Ockham warns that the Almighty could usurp the causative connections that seem to hold phenomena together. In its best light, this warning establishes creation as an on-going process rather than accomplished fact. The tone is not skeptical. The lack of strict certitude about any de facto cause in the physical universe is softened by a sense of probability regarding the laws of nature. Physicists manufacture theories and not laws about the function of physical forces.¹⁴ The bottom line of Ockham's awareness of the hand of God in nature and history is a theory of causality remarkably close to the business of modern science.

But what of Ockham's skepticism about knowing real causes? There is a growing opinion that he was an "unwilling" skeptic because he could not cognitively or perceptually differentiate between mere precedents and active influences vis-à-vis an event.¹⁵ The important and overlooked tangent between Ockham's doctrine of free will and his position on knowledge of causes must be mentioned here. Human freedom represent a boundary to the Primary Cause and offers Ockham at least one assurance of non-divine agency.

Both participants and spectators have that type of evidence which Ockham calls "experientia."¹⁶ But these two forms of experience are not equally reliable. Self-knowledge is more certain than our knowledge-of-others; the degree of certitude grows when the person is directly involved in the event instead of an outside observer. Even God's omnipotence cannot jeopardize man's consciousness of being a willful agent. The Almighty could directly place some volition within the human soul—Ockham never denied this possibility.¹⁷ But when both cause and effect are internalized, men know directly and immediately their active or passive state of mind. Supernatural effects within the soul would be conspicuous and foreign since they were not chosen. Ockham's difficulty in asserting an influence between the prior and posterior items of a natural occurrence (and his struggle to defend cognition as representative of the extra-mental world) derives from the spectator's inability to distinguish perceptually between what is mere precedent and what is an active influence upon the result. But in the case of will-acts, the person participates directly as cause and receptacle of a certain choice. Consciousness of a volition can be tested by consciousness of eliciting that volition to ascertain one's agency. The experience of freely willing stands as one certainty against the dark possibility of occasionalism and complete skepticism. With subjective experience for evidence, Ockham would claim that his doctrine of free will has better foundations than, say, his theories of natural science.

Ockham advocates a descriptive definition of causality. The cause-effect paradigm remains a tool of discovery and form of explanation if a cause is defined as "an absolute thing required in real existence for the existence of another thing."¹⁸ The world is an orderly place. Even if God were the only cause, a constant pattern of action and reaction is apparent within the material universe. Without resolving the possibility that God alone produces change, the essential precedents of change can be isolated and collected as information useful in predicting and controlling the process. The logical and theological problems which Ockham admits in pointing to a real cause are side-stepped as abstract because in practice, the necessary precedents of some phenomenon are the only causal data required by men. Instead of force or influence, causality is transformed into presence. Ockham is silent about the intrinsic transfer between cause and effect; he neglects the dynamics of production; he does not consider causality as an influx passing from cause to effect. These are not oversights. Rather, it speaks to a distinctive feature of Ockhamist physics and metaphysics that exact description serves to explain the facts.

Causality is an issue that seems to transcend the literal content of a philosophical system. Causes are supposed to explain things. But perhaps more importantly, causes regulate and determine what is explainable. For the Ockhamist, things are intelligible when considered within the context of their precedents. He accounts for events by carefully describing the items whose presence governs the occurrence of those events. His accent falls upon the control of phenomena. Ockham's definition is functional rather than analytic since causality is not something different than cause and effect. Thomas Aquinas and Duns Scotus might have reduced causality to its metaphysical principles but Ockham denies any need to "explain" the causes which explain things. Instead of analysis or dissection, the Nominalist explains his world by describing it scientifically. This procedure implies a slow departure from the Aristotelian system. Although Ockham continues to use the Philosopher's principles of "matter" and "form" to explain substantial changes in nature, these intrinsic causes are substantive and real things for Ockham.¹⁹ If the specific question of the will's nature, i.e., the will as cause, is considered, the contrast between Ockham and Aristotle becomes more explicit.…

Notes

¹Chartularium Universitatis Parisiensis, ed. H. Denifle and E. Chatelain (Paris, 1889), I, 486-487, 543-588. The work of Father Mandonnet remains valuable for the doctrinal content of the Averroistic Movement in the late 13th century. Siger de Brabant et I'Averröisme Latin au XIII^meSiècle, I^re Partie, Étude Critique, Vol. VI (Les Philosophes Belges; Louvain, 1911), chap. 8-9. The confusion resulting from the Paris Condemnations is outlined well by Etienne Gilson, History of Christian Philosophy in the Middle Ages (New York, 1955), pp. 387-426.

² For example, see Quodlibeta Septem (Strasbourg, 1491), I, q. 4, wherein Ockham refers to the Paris Statutes explicitly. See Super Quattuor Libros Sententiarum, Vols. III-IV (Opera Plurima; Lyons, 1494-96), I, dist. 43, q. 1, L-M; I, dist. 42, q. 1, D and II, qes. 4-5, E, for Ockham's warning about the "Philosophers." [All references to the "Quodlibetal Questions" will come from the Strasbourg edition. Quotations from the "Sentence Commentary" will come from the Lyons edition except where it is possible to use the critical edition in progress at the Franciscan Institute].

³ Ockham explains that: "God can produce somethings by 'ordained' power and others by 'absolute' power. This distinction should not be understood so that two powers really exist in God of which one is ordained and the other absolute because there is only one power in God regarding created being which is God Himself in every way… Rather, it must be understood thus: 'to be capable of something' is sometimes considered according to the laws ordained and instituted by God. God is said to do these things by ordained power. Otherwise, 'to be capable of something' is taken as 'to be able to produce everything which does not entail a contradiction to be done,' whether or not God ordained that He would do it since He could do many things which He does not wish to accomplish." Quodl., VI, q. I (my translation). See Rev. Richard Deshamais, C.S.C., The History of the Distinction Between God's Absolute and Ordained Power and Its Influence on Martin Luther (Unpub. Ph-D dissertation, Dept. of Philosophy, Catholic University of America, 1966).

⁴ Heiko Oberman has promoted a more positive assessment of Ockham's work but he agrees with many of the critics of Nominalism about the primary importance of theology within this movement. "Nominalistic philosophy is the reflection and echo of its theology and, in particular, its concept of God's potentia absoluta." "Some Notes on the Theology of Nominalism with Attention to its Relation to the Renaissance," Harvard Theological Review, 53 (1960), 50. Oberman claims that the major contention between recent Ockham studies concerns the positive or negative interpretation placed upon the "absolute-ordained" distinction. See his Harvest of Medieval Theology, Gabriel Biel and Late Medieval Nominalism (rev. ed.; Grand Rapids, 1967), p. 30, William Courtenay is more cautious than Oberman but basically in agreement. He claims that "although not all scholars are willing to define Nominalism in terms of the dialectic of the two powers, an increasing number share with Oberman his belief that the dialectic of the two powers and, behind it, a particular understanding of covenant and contingency is an important key to the thought of Ockham and many of his followers—perhaps ultimately more significant than the approach of language…" "Nominalism and Late Medieval Thought: A Bibliographical Essay," Theological Studies, 33 (1972), 721.

The position that Oberman, Courtenay and others are attempting to revise claims a negative and destructive effect within philosophy due to the absolute-ordained dogma. Gilson, for example, speaks about Ockham's "theologism" and its corruption of philosophy. The Unity of Philosophical Experience (New York, 1937), pp. 61-91. For David Knowles, the doctrine of absolute power was "the most characteristic part" of Ockham's thought and led to "practical scepticism or to a blind fideism." "A Characteristic of the Mental Climate of the 14th Century," Mélanges offerts à Étienne Gilson (Études de Philosophie médiévale; Paris, 1959), pp. 315-320. Francis Oakley asserts that "from Ockham's fundamental insistence on the omnipotence and freedom of God follow, not only his nominalism, not only his ethical or legal voluntarism, but also his empiricism." "Medieval Theories of Natural Law: Will-iam of Ockham and the Significance of the Voluntarist Position," Natural Law Forum, 6 (1961), 82.

⁵ Prof Oberman suggests four "schools" within Nominalism; his divisions are made largely on the basis of dogmatic similarities. Harvard Theological Review, 58, pp. 53-56. Father Damasus Trapp, O.E.S.A., reports on two major groupings of Nominalists distinct in their methods. "Augustinian Theology of the Fourteenth Century," Augustiniana 6 (1956), 150. In the case of free will, for example, a Nominalist such as John Buridan (d. after 1358) had little in common with Ockham. Cf. Edward J. Monahan, "Human Liberty and Free Will According to John Buridan," Medieval Studies, 16 (1954), 72-86. This study of Ockham's notion of freedom, therefore, does not pretend to have general application to other Nominalists.

⁶ For example, Gilson, The Unity…, pp. 61-91; Harry J. Klocker, S.J., "Ockham and Efficient Causality," The Thomist, 23 (1960), 106-124; and "Empiricism and Reality," The Heythrop Journal 4 (1963), 42-55.

⁷Sent., I, d. 1, q. 3 (Franciscan Institute ed., I, pp. 416-417); "Ad primum istorum respondeo quod quamvis respectu ejusdem effectus possint esse plures causae, hoc tamen non est ponendum sine necessitate, puta: nisi per experientiam possit convinci, ita scilicet quod ipso posito, alio destructo, sequitur ille effectus, vel quod ipso non posito, quocumque alio posito, non sequitur effectus. Exemplum primi: probatur quod ignis est causa caloris, quia ipso igne posito—omnibus aliis amotis—sequitur calor in calefactibili approximato; eodem modo probatur de sole quod est causa caloris, quia igne amoto et sole approximato sequitur calefacio. Exemplum secundi: probatur quod objectum est causa intellectionis intuitivae, quia omnibus aliis positis, ipso solo amoto, non sequitur notitia intuitiva; ergo objectum est causa notitiae intuitivae. Et tenet tale argumentum per talem propositionem quod 'quaecumque res absoluta requiritur in esse reali ad esse alicuius, est causa illius in aliquo genere causae.' Primum argumentum tenet per istam propositionem 'omne illud quo posito sequitur aliud, est causa illius.' Aliter aliquid esse causam alterius potest probari sine tali experientia per rationem." Also see Ockham's Summulae in libros Physicorum (Rome, 1637), II, c. 3. The most thorough study of Ockham's texts on causality is yet unpublished. See J. R. Burke, The Nature and Kinds of Causal Relations According to William Ockham (Unpublished Ph-D dissertation, Dept. of Philosophy, Fordham University, 1968).

⁸Sent., Prologue, q. 9 (Franciscan Institute ed., I, p. 241); "Quia, sicut prius argutum est, inter causam et effectum est ordo et dependentia maxime essentialis, et tamen ibi notitia incomplexa unius rei non continet notitiam incomplexam alterius rei." Also see, Sent., I, d. 3, q. 8 (Franciscan Institute ed., II, 528).

⁹Sent., II, qes. 4-5, R; "Ex hoc sequitur quod non potest demonstrari quod aliquis effectus producitur a causa secunda, quia licet semper ad approximationem ignis ad combustible sequatur combustio, cum hoc tamen potest stare quod ignis non sit ejus causa quia Deus potuit ordinasse quod semper ad presentiam ignis passo approximato, ipse solus causaret combustionem; sicut ordinabit cum ecclesia quod ad prolationem certorum verborum, causetur gratia in anima." It should be mentioned that Aristotle, without recognizing a free Creator of the universe, still had serious problems in demonstrating an actual cause. Cf. Post. Analytics, II, c. 16 (98^b 25-48). Father Damascene Webering, O.F.M., explains the Aristotelian and Ockhamistic rules of strict demonstration to clarify the difficulties in a priori and a posteriori proof of actual causes. Theory of Demonstration according to William Ockham (Franciscan Institute Publications; St. Bonaventure, 1953), pp. 3-20; 143-165. Also see Sent., I, d. 1, q. 3 (Franciscan Institute ed., I, p. 418), where Ockham professes "to infer causality"—"inferre causalitatem"—from the consistent and immediate dependence of one item upon another. Ockham's "problem" with identifying causes is similar to David Hume's. It is not the special dispensation or the miraculous intervention of God that troubles Ockham, but rather the possibility that God might have ordained (potuit ordinasse) a universe in which He alone would be a causal agent. Man's perception of the world would not be altered if occasionalism obtained. For different reasons, Ockham would have the same trouble as David Hume in asserting that one billiard ball "moves" another. Causality is an inference; it is an interpretation that men place upon the experience of priority among events.

¹⁰ For example, Quodl., VI, q. 6 and Sent., II, qes. 4-5, Q.

¹¹ Questions about a divine influence upon the observed reaction lead to questions about a divine influence upon the process of observation itself. Ockham cannot prove that natural objects are the causes of our mental perceptions of those objects. God can make men "see" stars that do not exist. See the complimentary texts in Sent., Prologue, q. I (Franciscan Institute ed., I, 38-39); Sent., II, q. 15, E and Quodl., VI, q. 6. This possibility is somewhat exceptional considering Ockham's usual exposition of cognition as a reliable expression of realities outside the mind. In fact, he teaches that the mind is a "passive" power (i.e., knowledge is a univocal effect inacted by the knowable object) to insure a genuine and unadulterated reflection of the extra-mental world. He rejects the theories of an "agent intellect" and "intelligible species" in part to avoid intermediaries between the mind and its objects. Yet Ockham did not, and apparently could not, explain how to distinguish intrinsically between perceptions caused naturally and those produced within the human mind supernaturally. The lack of thoroughness is troubling. Ockham's theory of cognition develops without an adequate epistemology.

¹² Thomas Bradwardine (d. 1349) magnified the prerogatives of God to the extent that secondary causes seemed impotent or predetermined. See Gordon Leff, Bradwardine and the Pelagians: A Study of His "De Causa Dei" and Its Opponents (Cambridge Studies in Medieval Life and Thought; Cambridge, 1957), pp. 48-54. John of Mirecourt (fl. 1340-50) and Nicholas of Autrecourt (c. 1300-1360) also referred frequently to God's omnipotence but they seemed to have philosophical interests. They appealed to God's absolute power to undermine the intuitional evidence for such concepts as "substance" and "causality" and, in general, reduced the means of certainty to faith and logical demonstration. See the texts and analysis of F. Stegmuller, "Die zwei Apologien des Jean de Mirecourt," Recherches de Théologie Ancienne et Médiévale, 5 (1933), 40-78; 192-204; Julius R. Weinberg, Nicholaus of Autrecourt: A Study in 14th Century Thought (Princeton, 1948); and J. R. O'Donnell, "The Philosophy of Autrecourt and His Appraisal of Aristotle," Medieval Studies, 4 (1942), 97-125. It is not intended to assert that there was a direct influence by Ockham upon these later Scholastics. Textual studies have not advanced to the point of confident judgements about Ockham's sphere of influence. It is safe to say only that Ockham's regard for the doctrine of God's prime causality and his theory of strict demonstration precede the exaggerated tactics of Bradwardine, Mirecourt and Autrecourt.

¹³ See A. C. Crombie, Medieval and Early Modern Science, Vol. II, Science in the Later Middle Ages and Early Modern Times: XIII-XVII (Garden City, 1959), pp. 28-35 and Ernest A. Moody, "Empiricism and Metaphysics in Medieval Philosophy," The Philosophical Review, 67 (1958), 145-163.

¹⁴ "Because the laws of nature are metaphysically contingent, they are scientifically necessary only by a hypothetical necessity—ex suppositione naturae. Thus an irradicable element of 'hypothesis' is introduced into the science of nature, and, as its counterpart, the principle that all scientific hypotheses require empirical verification and retain an element of probability which cannot be completely eliminated." E. A. Moody, "Ockham, Buridan and Nicholas of Autrecourt: The Parisian Statutes of 1339 and 1340," Franciscan Studies, 7 (1947), 141.

¹⁵ Philotheus Boehner and Anton Pegis traded several articles while debating about Ockham's "scepticism." Marilyn Adams reviews their arguments in "Intuitive Cognition, Certainty and Skepticism in William Ockham," Traditio, 26 (1970), 389-398. The state of the question now is whether Ockham could distinguish in se between natural intuitions and supernatural ones. It is clear that Ockham did not mean to promote scepticism but, nevertheless, makes intuition the basis of informative knowledge while admitting that intuition might be non-informative (i.e., represent a non-existent object). There is no evidence more basic than intuition by which Ockham could determine the validity of intuition. Gordon Leff has written the most recent study of the "scepticism" question in William of Ockham: The Metamorphosis of Scholastic Discourse (Manchester, 1975), pp. 2-29. Unfortunately, he absolves Ockham of the charge by citing Ockham's definitions of "evident" knowledge and assent. These definitions only prove Ockham's sincere concern for the reliability of knowledge. They are, however, unworkable. The notion of "evident" cannot save Ockham's epistemology if there is no human way to determine which cognitions should be called "evident" and which should be defined as "appearance."

¹⁶Sent., III, q. 12, SS; "Aliqua talis propositio habet cognosci per experientiam acceptam respectu actus alterius hominis; alia non potest evidenter cognosci nisi per experientiam acceptam respectu proprii actus. Exemplum primi; 'Iracundus est mitigandus per pulchra verba,' quando vidi eum sic mitigatum per alium vel per se… Exemplum secundi; aliquis enim eliciendo frequenter actum continentiae et temperantiae magis disponitur ad Dei cognitionem et dilectionem et ad studendum… quae non possunt evidenter esse verae nec evidenter ab aliquo sciri sine actu proprio elicitivo generativo virtutis." Also see Sent., Prologue, q. 1 (Franciscan Institute ed., I, 40-41) where Ockham follows Augustine in teaching that experience immediately concerns "intelligentia" as well as "sensibilia." The degree of certainty which Ockham attributes to self-experience also comes to the surface in his moral doctrine. "Et ultra, dico quod illa scientia [moralis] est certior multis aliis, per quanto quilibet posset habere majorem experientiam de actibus suis quam de aliis. Ex quo patet quod illa scientia est multum subtilis, utilis et evidens." Quodl., II, q. 14 (Vat. Lat., 3075, fol. 20vb is used to correct the deficient text of the Strasbourg edition). See the remarks of Leon Baudry, Lexique Philosophique de Guillaume d'Ockham (Paris, 1957), p. 177.

¹⁷ For example, Sent., II, q. 19, M-N; Sent., III, q. 10, R and Sent., Prologue, q. 3 (Franciscan Institute ed., I, 141).

¹⁸ Supra, footnote 7. This definition, in Ockham's mind, has the authority of Aristotle, see Sent., IV, q. 1, A. Ockham uses the four causes of Aristotle in analysing data. But he improvises on the meaning of Aristotelian terms. Ockham considers a cause as a significant presence; a causal relationship as an essential order between items or events.

¹⁹Summulae in Libros Physicorum (Rome, 1637), I, c. 7; "Ad generationem naturalem, ergo, oportet ponere materiam et formam, quod sint et quod distinguantur." See A. Pujol, The Hylemorphic Teachings of William Ockham (Unpublished Ph. D dissertation, Dept. of Philosophy, St. Bonaventure University, 1962).…