SOURCE: Nollendorfs, Cora Lee. “The Role of the ‘Aesthetic Subject’ in the Theoretical Writings of Friedrich Schiller and Wilhelm von Humboldt: The Aesthetics of Reception in the Eighteenth Century.” In Eighteenth-Century German Authors and Their Aesthetic Theories: Literature and the Other Arts, edited by Richard Critchfield and Wulf Koepke, pp. 203-19. Columbia: Camden House, 1988.

[In the following essay, Nollendorfs outlines Humboldt and Schiller's ideas regarding the role of the reader or viewer of a work of art, noting Humboldt's success at outlining a receptivity theory that has continued to remain relevant through the years.]

In Rezeptionsgeschichte: Grundlegung einer Theorie, published in 1977, Gunter Grimm calls for a reevaluation of eighteenth-century aesthetic theories along lines which would provide a theoretical basis for the aesthetics of reception.¹ Although eighteenth-century philosophers of aesthetics were concerned with other aspects of aesthetic theory—aesthetic taste, aesthetic judgment, and questions concerning the relationship between the aesthetic object and the subjective perception—there was at the same time a growing concern with questions of the effect of art on the audience. From this viewpoint it is only a short step to the question of the process involved in the reception of a work of art and the role which the audience plays in aesthetic communication. Like Grimm, I feel certain that a major investigation of eighteenth-century aesthetic theories from this point of view would provide a wealth of information.

In this essay I have set myself much more modest goals. I shall outline in brief the ideas of Friedrich Schiller and Wilhelm von Humboldt concerning the “aesthetic subject,” a term which I use here to mean the audience, reader, or viewer of a work of art. I shall demonstrate that while they both were concerned with questions of art's effect on the audience, only Humboldt succeeds in developing a kind of reception theory in the sense of the term as it is used today.

To be sure, concern with the effect and the effectiveness of art and literature goes back much further than the eighteenth century. In Book II of Plato's Republic, music and literature are recommended for the education of the young as a means to develop character; this is definitely a kind of precursor of notions of an aesthetic education. Furthermore, the entire tradition of rhetorics and its study of techniques of persuading and impressing an audience can be seen as early attempts to come to grips with problems of the effect of art on the audience. But the focus is different in the eighteenth century. Schiller's discussion of the effect of art in terms of an aesthetic condition (ästhetischer Zustand) in man which makes possible both moral and political action is only a very refined descendant of Plato's notion of the use of music and literature for character development. And the work of eighteenth-century aesthetics with its study of the effect of art is only peripherally related to the tradition of rhetorics with its techniques of persuasion.²

It seems to me appropriate to consider the work of Schiller and Humboldt together as representatives of the aesthetic theories at the end of the eighteenth century, not only because of their close relationship during the years when they were working on aesthetics, but also because their different points of view complement each other and provide insight into our subject from differing perspectives. While Schiller writes as a poet, at times even describing his own techniques and giving theoretical bases for the practicing poet, Humboldt's approach goes directly to the problem of understanding the work of art in its relationship to its audience. Furthermore, there is an interdependence of their ideas in that Humboldt's major work on aesthetic theory, which was written several years after Schiller had permanently laid aside aesthetic philosophy to return to his work as a dramatist, seems to be conceived in parts almost as a direct answer to Schiller: Humboldt emphasizes particular points which he had found in Schiller's work and with which he disagrees.

It must be stated at the outset that Schiller at no point differentiates between ideas of effect and reception in the modern sense. Although he is concerned throughout his theoretical writings with the effect (Wirkung) of art, he never comes to grips with the notion of the reception or concretization of the work of art. However, Schiller's work with effect leads him to an understanding of some of the problems inherent in this approach to art, and this in turn becomes a point of departure for Humboldt's work, which does come closer to a kind of reception theory.

Beginning with the early lecture, “Was kann eine gute stehende Schaubühne eigentlich wirken?” (1784), Schiller addresses the question of the possible effect of a theater. He argues in favor of a national theater on the grounds that a national theater can contribute to the development of morality and national character: “… [the stage has an effect] which is deeper and more lasting than morals and laws.”³ He continues: “I simply cannot ignore at this point the great influence which a good established theater would have on the spirit of the nation.”⁴ He further points out the political possibilities of the theater: “To no less extent could the opinions of the nation concerning government and rulers be put right from the stage, if the leaders and guardians of the state knew how.”⁵ The young Schiller is thus an unmistakable proponent of littérature engagée. Though often dismissed as unimportant because of its sharp contrast with Schiller's later notions,⁶ which oppose the idea of such direct influence, this lecture is closely connected with his other theoretical writings in at least one point: preoccupation with the notion of Wirkung.

A chief difficulty with littérature engagée is the fact that it may not stand the test of time; when such literature addresses an issue which is no longer current, it may be misunderstood, not understood, or judged uninteresting. This point does not escape Schiller's attention, and it leads him to a serious attempt to deal with a possible problem inherent in Wirkungsästhetik, namely, the problem of possible different effects of a given work of art on different generations of audiences. Unable to accept the historical development of effect, Wirkungsgeschichte in modern terminology, Schiller proceeds to address the question of how to avoid it. In “Über die tragische Kunst” (1792), Schiller argues that certain characterizations from Roman literature cannot be appreciated by modern audiences because we as moderns do not share their sentiments: “For the Roman the sentence of the first Brutus, the suicide of Cato have subjective truth. … In order to share these feelings with them, one must have a Roman way of thinking. …”⁷ Although Schiller in this instance is speaking neither of the effect of art nor of littérature engagée, the connection is not in any way obscure. Without an understanding of the sentiments which motivate the characters in a work of art, the work cannot have the proper effect, or perhaps any effect at all, on its audience. Speaking in this essay only of tragedy, Schiller argues that there must be similarity between the sufferer and the spectator to the extent that the spectator can imagine himself in the position of the character on stage: “The possibility of pity depends namely on the perception or presumption of a similarity between us and the suffering subject.”⁸ This discussion of tragedy, basically the heritage of Aristotle's Poetics and Lessing's theory of drama, is not of importance to my argument. More essential is the fact that Schiller attempts to find a solution to the problem of possible lack of similarity between characters in the work of art and the spectator; and this I find to be an outgrowth of his concern with the notion that art should have an effect on its audience. Schiller urges the poet to choose items of a general and necessary nature for all people of all times: “… but the unconditionally true, that which is solely human in human conditions, will always be its most fertile subject matter [= the most fertile subject matter of tragedy]. …”⁹ Similarly he praises the artist who can distinguish between the accidental and the necessary, omitting the former in favor of the latter: “For this reason the wise sculptor throws away the clothing and shows us merely naked figures, even though he knows very well that this was not the case in real life. Clothes are for him something accidental, to which the necessary may never be subordinated. …”¹⁰

This notion of removing the accidental qualities of an object and bringing out the inner necessity of its essence is an important part of Schiller's aesthetic theory. What critics have failed to understand is the fact that this line of thinking, which began with Schiller's concern for the effect of art on the audience and led him from there to a rejection of accidental qualities in an art object, became the basis for his theory of the Idealität of art. Indeed, Schiller's definition of idealization uses precisely the same language as the statement quoted above: “To idealize something means for me only to strip it of all its accidental attributes and to bestow upon it the character of inner necessity.”¹¹ Rather than paying attention to Schiller's notion of idealization as a derivative of his concern with problems of audience effect, critics have merely pointed to its source in the aesthetic theory of Kant.¹²

Schiller repeatedly emphasizes the need to reject the accidental and present instead the necessary; the artist must serve Schein and ideality rather than reality. Schiller's concern for the ideality of art makes him hesitant toward individuality or even unable to appreciate individuality.¹³ He exhorts the poet to purify or idealize his individuality. In his review “Bürgers Gedichte” (1791) he states it as follows: “All that the poet can give to us is his individuality. Therefore this must be worthy of being exhibited before the world and its heirs. His first and most important business is to ennoble his individuality as much as possible, to refine it to the purest, most magnificent humanity. …”¹⁴

The same idea is stated once more in the review “Matthissons Gedichte” (1794): “Every individual human being is to that degree less a human being that he is individual; every way of perceiving is to that degree less necessary and purely human that it is peculiar to a particular subject. Great style lies only in getting rid of the accidental and in the pure expression of the necessary.”¹⁵ For Schiller individuality in art interferes with its lasting effect.

Thus Schiller insists throughout that the effect of art on the audience is of primary importance. He understands from studying examples from Roman literature that works of art may evoke what we would call different reception from different generations of audiences, and he sees this as a problem which the artist must strive to avoid. Schiller would sympathize with the notion of Wirkung as important to aesthetic theory but rebel at the notion of Wirkungsgeschichte. To combat such a possible changing effect, Schiller proposes ideality, as opposed to individuality, in art.

Schiller's scrutiny of the problems inherent in an aesthetic theory which insists upon the effect on the audience as a primary concern takes him even further. He is aware that there are differences not only among different generations of audiences, but also within an audience of contemporaries. This is for Schiller an additional factor which makes it difficult for the artist to control the effect of his art on the public. Schiller divides the public, his audience, into the categories of those who cannot understand tragedy—“the common masses” “the great masses”¹⁶—and those who can. The reason for this is the fact that different individuals have different degrees of moral sense: “Moral sense, to be sure is found in all human beings, but not in all to that degree of strength and freedom which is the necessary presupposition for the critical examination of these cases.”¹⁷ Only those with a highly developed moral sense can enjoy tragedy and tragic objects: “Therefore the pleasure whereby the communication of painful emotions delights us springs forth out of our moral nature. …”¹⁸ To iron out differences in effect on his public and to promote a correct and unified understanding of a work of art, Schiller suggests the development of morality: “For this reason the high value of a philosophy of life which by means of constant reference to universal laws weakens the feeling for our individuality and teaches us to lose our little self in the context of the great totality. … Even the most painful loss does not lead it beyond a calm melancholy, with which a considerable degree of pleasure can still be coupled.”¹⁹

Paradoxically, Schiller is suggesting art to develop morality to promote the understanding of art. For as he had stated earlier, art is a means toward morality: “Art does not only have a moral effect because it delights through moral agents, but also because the pleasure itself which art provides becomes a means toward morality.”²⁰

The effect of a work of art on its public can thus be controlled by means of moral education of the public in a kind of reverse aesthetic education. Art and morality, art and reason, are thus permanently and inextricably intertwined. But Schiller has other answers to the question of how to control the effect of a work of art on its audience. For example, he experiments with the manipulation of the public through elements within the work of art itself, such as in his use of the chorus in Die Braut von Messina. In his novel Der Geisterseher, Schiller in several instances heightens the impact of his narration by stressing the reactions of built-in spectators to events, rather than the events themselves; Wirkung or effect here becomes the main event in a way which seems to foreshadow modern approaches to the use of the audience.²¹ Schiller's notion of precisely what effect art should have changed through the years—from morality or even definite political goals in his early lecture “Was kann eine gute stehende Schaubühne eigentlich wirken?” to freedom in a balance between man's sensuous and spiritual parts in the Briefe über die ästhetische Erziehung des Menschen (NA 20, 375, 377-378). But he never left the spectator out of the picture. The work of art he always thought of in its relationship to the audience, the aesthetic subject, the Rezipient; and the success of a work of art was in his view to be measured at least in part by its ability to have a specific effect on its public.

Recent scholarship which has dealt with Schiller's ideas on aesthetic effect has concentrated on his Briefe über die ästhetische Erziehung des Menschen and has limited itself to a discussion of art's effect in terms of an aesthetic condition (ästhetischer Zustand) in man which makes possible both moral and political action.²² Because this work has already been the object of research, I choose here to emphasize Schiller's other writings and other parts of his concern with the effect of art on the audience. At the same time, this very important part of Schiller's contribution to my topic should not be overlooked entirely. As a matter of fact, it is precisely with the idea of aesthetic education that the aesthetic philosophy of Schiller and that of Wilhelm von Humboldt overlap most directly, and, as I have demonstrated elsewhere,²³ one can make a strong case for the notion that Humboldt influenced Schiller's thinking in this area in direct and important ways. In two early essays, “Über Religion” (1789) and “Ideen zu einem Versuch, die Gränzen der Wirksamkeit des Staats zu bestimmen” (1792), Humboldt describes the aesthetic feeling (ästhetisches Gefühl) as responsible not only for man's ability to perceive beauty but also for man's ability to achieve moral perfection: “On this soil [= aesthetic feeling], if not solely, at least primarily, the beautiful and even more the sublime … blossoms forth, which brings man, so to speak, closer to divinity.”²⁴ A high degree of morality, argues Humboldt, is possible only when actions spring from the nobility of the aesthetic feeling, as only this morality is the result of spontaneous human virtue and yet is prompted neither by fear nor by the promise of reward: “… the idea of the sublime alone [makes it] possible to obey unconditionally ruling law, to be sure, through the medium of feeling, in a human way, and still, because of the complete lack of consideration for happiness or unhappiness, in a divinely unselfish way.”²⁵ There is unmistakable similarity between Humboldt's theory of the aesthetic feeling and Schiller's theory of the aesthetic sense (ästhetischer Sinn), as Schiller develops it in the “Kallias Briefe” (1793) and Über Anmut und Würde (1793). Further, Schiller's distinction between an action of moral dignity and an action of moral grace (in “Über Anmut und Würde”) is parallel to a distinction Humboldt makes between actions of moral strength and moral goodness (in “Über Religion”). Later, Humboldt's influence may well have been at the root of an inconsistency which critics have noticed in Schiller's Briefe über die ästhetische Erziehung des Menschen, namely, the unexplained shift from his notion of the aesthetic state as a mere step on the way to the state of reason as the goal for man, to his final position within the same work which seems to regard the aesthetic state itself as the goal. The main point of interest for our question here concerning the role of the aesthetic subject in the work of Schiller and Humboldt is the fact that they both came to view aesthetics as something more than the study of the beautiful as the basis of the beaux arts; aesthetics for them is instead the study of man as an aesthetic being, and art for them is the means to the perfection of man in the highest possible degree. It is in this sense that they both understand the concept of the effect of art.

The years 1794-1797 were a time of close friendship and intellectual association between Schiller and Humboldt. Living both in Jena, they were in constant contact for about twenty months during this period; the rest of the time, while Humboldt was in Berlin, they kept up a lively correspondence which attests to their common interests and to the importance of each for the work of the other.²⁶ Humboldt's major work on aesthetic theory was written in Paris, where he took up residence with his family in November of 1797. Long and ponderous though it is, it was the work of just a few months, as Schiller had read it by the end of June of the following year.²⁷ This opus was published in 1799 with the title Ästhetische Versuche I. Über Göthes Hermann und Dorothea. Despite the title, no further parts ensued. However, an essay in French, written for Madame de Staël, appeared in the same year.²⁸ These two works provide the basis for my discussion of Humboldt's aesthetic theory.

Central to a study of the role of the aesthetic subject is Humboldt's question: “… how are aesthetic effects through the artist at all possible?”²⁹ With this question Humboldt is attempting a far more basic understanding of the relationship between the artist and his public than Schiller ever reached. As a matter of fact, communication theory itself begins at the point where such fundamental questions are raised concerning the possibility of contact between speaker and listener, artist and public. Of importance for our topic is the fact that Humboldt, like Schiller, postulates aesthetic effect as a basic notion in the study of aesthetics. But unlike Schiller, who asks what the effect of art should be (“Was kann eine gute stehende Schaubühne eigentlich wirken?”) and then what the artist should do to achieve the effect, Humboldt asks how art has an effect. The question here is not what is taking place when a work of art is created, but rather, given the work of art, what is happening through it as the artist interacts with his audience, the aesthetic subject.

Humboldt's answer, a carefully formulated theory of aesthetic communication, reflects his thorough knowledge of the aesthetic theories of his time, particularly the work of J. J. Engel and Karl Philipp Moritz, who are to an extent his forerunners in that they also deal with the nature of aesthetic understanding and the way the reader perceives the work of art.³⁰ Humboldt, however, is the first to make the aesthetic communication process itself and the role of the aesthetic subject the central element in an aesthetic theory. Whereas his predecessors had asked what art is, or the relationship between beauty and morality, or how aesthetic judgments are possible (Kant), Humboldt concentrates on the process involved in aesthetic Wirkungen.

Humboldt argues that the aesthetic communication process has three basic components: the artist, the work of art, and the public. The work of art is created twice, first by the poet, and again in an act of recreation by the reader, who therefore has an active, not passive, role in the communication. Humboldt states that the artist must force the reader to become creative: “Let [the artist] merely collect our own being into one point and command it, as he always must do as an artist, to place itself in an object outside itself … and immediately … a world stands before us. For our whole being is then both in us and in all points active and is creative. …”³¹ In another place he argues that the artist must force the phantasy of his reader to produce the art object described purely out of itself: “The secret of the artist is to ignite the imagination by means of the imagination. For in order to necessitate our imagination to produce the object which he describes purely out of itself, the object must go forth freely from his imagination.”³² Or in another place: “Whoever … views a painting with the eyes of a person with true understanding, must recreate it in his phantasy himself; and whoever reads a poet must, to a certain extent, himself be a poet.”³³ This seems to be nothing less than a direct anticipation of the idea of the concretization of a text (Ingarden) or of reception theory's notions of the potential text, created by the poet, and the real text, created by the reader in the act of reading.

In Humboldt's view, the artist, although he creates a work of art, does not communicate the work of art at all. A detailed description of his object might bypass the imagination of the reader and fail as an aesthetic communication. Humboldt states: “In vain the poet describes the beauty of his beloved in every detail. Never will her image impress itself upon our imagination if he is not successful in filling his readers with the same enthusiasm that consumes him himself.”³⁴ Such a communication would remain within the realm of reality and merely define and limit: “… the difference is simply this, that reality speaks to the senses, art to the phantasy, that the former provides hard and cutting contours, the latter to be sure always definite ones, but also always infinite ones.”³⁵ The artist's realm, however, is not reality but rather the imagination. The artist communicates not the work of art, but instead “a mood … a receptivity” or “an excitability.”³⁶ He may not change the aesthetic object, but rather must direct his attention to the “aesthetic subject”—which is, by the way, a term of Humboldt's: “[The artist may] change only little … on his object … therefore there remains nothing for him to do but to turn to the subject, whom he intends to affect.”³⁷ In this process the work of art itself is merely an objective medium through which an “electric spark” from the phantasy of the artist can be transmitted to the phantasy of his reader: “… the artist [begins] initially from nothing other … than transforming something real into an image … this … [is] only possible in this way … that he, so to speak, lets an electric spark pass from his phantasy into the phantasy of others, and this namely not directly, but rather in this way: that he breathes it into an object outside of himself.”³⁸ What is transmitted, he repeats elsewhere, is the spark which will awaken and guide the imagination of the reader: “[The poet] gives … our imagination the electric shock which wakens it to life and forces it … to follow him … through the entirety of his artistic production.”³⁹

Schiller argues that art achieves its purpose when the spiritual powers, reason and imagination, are active: “The means whereby art accomplishes its purpose are as numerous as are sources of free pleasure. But I call that pleasure free, where the spiritual powers, reason and imagination, are active, and where the feeling is produced by a mental image. …”⁴⁰ Humboldt would not agree with Schiller on this point, and for this reason he does not share Schiller's concern that the work of art may not have an enduring and an unchanging effect on its audience. Humboldt defines the imagination alone to be the realm of the poet: “The domain which the poet works as his property is the territory of the imagination; he deserves to be called a poet only if he occupies the imagination and only in so far as he does this intensely and exclusively.”⁴¹ Humboldt even warns the artist of the danger of getting into the realm of philosophy and interesting the mind and the heart, rather than exclusively affecting the imagination: “Since [poetic art] operates through language, thus through a means, which, originally made only for the understanding, needs first a reworking in order to gain admittance with the phantasy—therefore it easily strays over into the territory of philosophy and interests the mind and heart directly, rather than operating only on the imagination. … On these false paths now poetic art falls away from its actual and higher nature. …”⁴²

This is an important point. Schiller develops his theory of the ideality of art to ensure that the work of art will not be something that later generations would fail to appreciate; but Humboldt argues that this art is not art in its highest form at all, as it appeals to the understanding rather than exclusively to the imagination. Humboldt, too, speaks of the ideality of art. But whereas for Schiller ideality is opposed to individuality and idealization involves the removal of accidental, individual qualities, for Humboldt ideality is opposed to reality and idealization means transformation from reality into a picture which addresses only the imagination. According to Humboldt, the artist “must wipe out every memory of reality in our soul and keep only the phantasy alone active and lively.”⁴³

Kurt Müller-Vollmer has discussed Humboldt's aesthetic theory as a theory far ahead of its time.⁴⁴ Insisting as he does that art has nothing at all to do with reality but only with the imagination, Humboldt has advanced a concept of art which can embrace modern directions in art far more than those of his predecessors and contemporaries. He speaks of the “phantasy-unity” or the “unity and … formality”⁴⁵ of the work of art. Of importance for our topic is the fact that Humboldt's entire aesthetic theory is built around the question of the nature of the communication which takes place when the artist creates a work of art which is then read, viewed, or heard by an audience. Differing with Schiller, for whom art is connected with morality, the imagination with the reason, Humboldt insists only that art remove its audience from the realm of reality and force it to become creative.

The communication between the artist and his public can fail, according to Humboldt, only because of shortcomings on the part of the artist: “Furthermore, the fulfillment in the most exact sense is only the work of the true artistic nature.”⁴⁶ If the artist has succeeded in subordinating all our spiritual powers to the imagination, he must of necessity succeed in communicating with the public. He states: “The mind therefore, which the artist has thus affected, is always inclined … to complete the whole … circle and—to embrace a world of phenomena at once.”⁴⁷ Humboldt does not share Schiller's fear that a work of art may not have a constant and enduring effect; and thus he seems in this sense even further than Schiller from modern reception theory's idea that the “real” text perceived by the reader is determined not only by the poet's product but also by the historical, sociological, and psychological background of the reader. Humboldt states: “The work of a genius will always speak to us and ignite our phantasy.”⁴⁸ What is communicated is the magical spark which sets in motion the imagination of the reader, and this is neither impaired nor changed by time and circumstance.

Yet Humboldt does in the final analysis reach the conclusion that the effect of a work of art is an individual effect, enabling the recipient to develop his own individual character. Speaking of the illustrious individuals who can serve as examples for humanity—“those distinguished people who serve here as an example for us”⁴⁹—including artists, philosophers, and natural scientists, Humboldt states: “[What makes those people great people] does not make those upon whom it has an effect exactly like the individuality which it has … in and of itself; not only does it not give them a definite form, but rather it induces them to find that form which is the most characteristic for them. For it awakens their inner spiritual vitality, and this of course forms within them that character which is the only one appropriate for them.”⁵⁰

In other words, each act of reception is an individual event with an individual result, to which not only the artist but also the individuality of the receiver is a contributing factor. These remarks are to be found in a separate work, a short sketch entitled “Über den Geist der Menschheit,” which Humboldt's editor Albert Leitzmann dates from December, 1797.⁵¹

Two further points must be noted in this sketch: (1) Quite contrary to Schiller, who insists that the poet must get rid of his individuality as far as possible by means of idealization, Humboldt stresses the individuality of the poet: “Those distinguished people … always … have a definite and original individuality.—One should only develop oneself completely into a human being, and one will certainly also appear as a unique human being.”⁵² (2) Humboldt here becomes more specific about the effect of art on its audience, that is, the reason why art can be beneficial for the development of character. As for Schiller, art is for Humboldt important for the development of man as a moral being. He states: “… [the genuine] poet … [opens to] us a deep insight into ourselves and the world … [what is found in these so distinguished people], will fit into every picture of perfected humanity and will nourish and strengthen perfected humanity in its effect on others.”⁵³ Art is for Humboldt exemplary, opening our eyes to the perfection possible for man.

Modern theorists make a distinction between the notions of reception (Rezeption) and effect (Wirkung), understanding the former to designate a purposeful action of coming to grips with a work of art, such as the reading of a text, and the latter to mean the involuntary consequential condition of the reader, viewer, or other audience after his act of reception.⁵⁴ Let us in conclusion consider the extent to which the work of Schiller and Humboldt touches upon these ideas. Schiller does not consider the act of reception per se at all or the type of process which takes place when the audience is presented with a work of art. He uses the term Wirkung and insists that art does and should have effect, but although he places the effect of art within the moral and political realm, he remains rather vague in these notions. Schiller does confront the issue of a changing history of the effect of a particular work of art, but he rejects this, insisting that a work of art, through idealization, must be of a general and universal nature, and suggesting that the effect on the audience will thus be constant.

Humboldt, on the other hand, addresses himself to both what we call reception and what we call effect. First he asks how art has an effect, questioning in essence the communication process itself. Then he confronts the issue of what the effect of art is. Unlike Schiller's theory, which rejects the notion of individuality which is important to modern historical thinking, Humboldt's theory admits the possibility of individual and differing acts of reception for a given work of art.

The work of Schiller and Humboldt on the effect of art, the aesthetic communication process, and the role of the aesthetic subject remained without direct influence on the development of aesthetic theory; for it was not until the twentieth century that stress was laid again on these issues. However, both Schiller and Humboldt must be viewed as precursors. There is a basis for the aesthetics of reception here, as Gunter Grimm suspected, and even though there is no direct connection between modern reception theory and its eighteenth-century forerunners, their work in this area is not only valid as interesting history but also can contribute a point of view to the current debate.

Notes

1. Gunter Grimm, Rezeptionsgeschichte: Grundlegung einer Theorie mit Analysen und Bibliographie (Munich: Wilhelm Fink Verlag, 1977), 69.

2. For the connection between Schiller and the tradition of rhetorics see Gert Ueding, Schillers Rhetorik: Idealistische Wirkungsästhetik und rhetorische Tradition (Tübingen: Niemeyer Verlag, 1971).

3. “… die Schaubühne wirkt tiefer und daurender als Moral und Geseze.” Schillers Werke, Nationalausgabe (Weimar: Hermann Böhlaus Nachfolger, 1943-), 20, 93. Henceforth the above edition is referred to as NA.

4. “Unmöglich kann ich hier den großen Einfluß übergehen, den eine gute stehende Bühne auf den Geist der Nation haben würde.” Ibid., 99.

5. “Nicht weniger ließen sich—verstünden es die Oberhäupter und Vormünder des Staats—von der Schaubühne aus, die Meinungen der Nation über Regierung und Regenten zurechtweisen.” Ibid., 98.

6. One exception to this trend is Hans Mayer, “Das Ideal und das Leben,” in Schiller: Reden im Gedenkjahr 1955, ed. Bernhard Zeller (Stuttgart: Ernst Klett Verlag, 1955), 162-191. See especially 174-176.

7. “Für den Römer hat der Richterspruch des ersten Brutus, der Selbstmord des Cato subjektive Wahrheit. … Um diese Gefühle mit ihnen zu theilen, muß man eine römische Gesinnung besitzen. …” Schillers Werke, NA 20, 161.

8. “Die Möglichkeit des Mitleids beruht nehmlich auf der Wahrnehmung oder Voraussetzung einer Aehnlichkeit zwischen uns und dem leidenden Subjekt.” Ibid., 160.

9. “… doch wird das unbedingt Wahre, das bloß Menschliche in menschlichen Verhältnissen stets ihr ergiebigster Stoff [= der ergiebigste Stoff der tragischen Kunst] seyn …” Ibid., 162.

10. “Deßwegen wirft der weise Bildhauer die Bekleidung weg, und zeigt uns bloß nackende Figuren; ob er gleich sehr gut weiß, daß dieß im wirklichen Leben nicht der Fall war. Kleider sind ihm etwas zufälliges, dem das nothwendige niemals nachgesetzt werden darf …” Ibid., 197-198.

11. “Etwas Idealisieren heißt mir nur, es aller seiner zufälligen Bestimmungen entkleiden und ihm den Charakter innerer Notwendigkeit beilegen.” Schillers Sämtliche Werke, Säkular-Ausgabe (Stuttgart and Berlin: J. G. Cotta'sche Buchhandlung Nachfolger, 1904-1905), 16, 392. This statement is from Schiller's comments to Körner concerning Körner's essay “Über Charakterdarstellung in der Musik,” which appeared in the fifth issue of the Horen for 1795.

12. See Eugen Kühnemann, Kants und Schillers Begründung der Ästhetik (Munich: C. H. Beck'sche Verlagsbuchhandlung, 1895); also Karl Vorländer, Kant, Schiller, Goethe: Gesammelte Aufsätze, 2nd ed. (Leipzig: Felix Meiner Verlag, 1923).

13. See also Friedrich Meinecke, Schiller und der Individualitätsgedanke (Leipzig: Felix Meiner Verlag, 1937).

14. “Alles, was der Dichter uns geben kann, ist seine Individualität. Diese muß es also wert sein, vor Welt und Nachwelt ausgestellt zu werden. Diese seine Individualität so sehr als möglich zu veredeln, zur reinsten herrlichsten Menschheit hinaufzuläutern, ist sein erstes und wichtigstes Geschäft …” Schillers Werke, NA 22, 246.

15. “Jeder individuelle Mensch ist gerade um soviel weniger Mensch, als er individuell ist; jede Empfindungsweise ist gerade um soviel weniger notwending und rein menschlich, als sie einem bestimmten Subjekt eigentümlich ist. Nur in Wegwerfung des Zufälligen und in dem reinen Ausdruck des Notwendigen liegt der große Stil.” Ibid., 269.

16. “der gemeine Haufe”; “der große Haufe.”, (Ibid., 144-145).

17. “Der moralische Sinn liegt zwar in allen Menschen, aber nicht bey allen in derjenigen Stärke und Freiheit, wie er bey Beurtheilung dieser Fälle vorausgesetzt werden muß.” Ibid., 144.

18. “Aus unserer moralischen Natur also quillt die Lust hervor, wodurch uns schmerzhafte Affekte in der Mittheilung entzücken …” Ibid., 151-152.

19. “Daher der hohe Werth einer Lebensphilosophie, welche durch stete Hinweisung auf allgemeine Gesetze das Gefühl für unsre Individualität entkräftet, im Zusammenhange des großen Ganzen unser kleines Selbst uns verlieren lehrt … Auch der schmerzhafteste Verlust führt sie nicht über eine ruhige Wehmuth hinaus, mit der sich noch immer ein merklicher Grad des Vergnügens gatten kann.” Ibid., 151.

20. “Die Kunst wirkt also nicht deswegen allein sittlich, weil sie durch sittliche Mittel ergötzt, sondern auch deswegen, weil das Vergnügen selbst, das die Kunst gewährt, ein Mittel zur Sittlichkeit wird.” Ibid., 135.

21. In an unpublished lecture “Theatrical Scenes in the First Book of Friedrich Schiller's Novel Der Geisterseher,” presented at the MLA Convention in New York, December, 1981.

22. Horst Turk, “Wirkungsästhetik: Aristoteles, Lessing, Schiller, Brecht. Theorie und Praxis einer politischen Hermeneutik,” Jahrbuch der deutschen Schillergesellschaft, 17 (1973), 519-531; Olav Münzberg, Rezeptivität und Spontaneität: Die Frage nach dem ästhetischen Subjekt. Studienreihe Humanitas. (Frankfurt a.M.: Akademische Verlagsgesellschaft, 1974), 35-43.

23. Cora Lee Price, “Wilhelm von Humboldt und Schillers ‘Briefe über die ästhetische Erziehung des Menschen,’” Jahrbuch der deutschen Schillergesellschaft, 11 (1967), 358-373.

24. “Auf diesem Boden [= im ästhetischen Gefühl], wenn nicht allein, doch vorzüglich, blüht … das Schöne, und noch weit mehr das Erhabene auf, das den Menschen der Gottheit gleichsam noch näher bringt.” Wilhelm von Humboldts Gesammelte Schriften, Preußische Akademieausgabe (Berlin: B. Behr's Verlag, 1903-1936), 1, 170.

25. “… die Idee des Erhabenen [macht es] allein möglich, dem unbedingt gebietenden Geseze zwar allerdings, durch das Medium des Gefühls auf eine menschliche, und doch, durch den völligen Mangel der Rüksicht auf Glükseligkeit oder Unglük, auf eine göttlich uneigennüzige Weise zu gehorchen.” Ibid., 172.

26. See Der Briefwechsel zwischen Friedrich Schiller und Wilhelm von Humboldt, ed. Siegfried Seidel, 2 vols. (Berlin: Aufbau-Verlag, 1962).

27. See Schiller to Humboldt, June 27, 1798.

28. This essay appeared in the Paris magazine Magasin encyclopédique in the fall of 1799. Republished in a bilingual French and German edition in: Kurt Müller-Vollmer, Poesie und Einbildungskraft: Zur Dichtungstheorie Wilhelm von Humboldts. Mit der zweisprachigen Ausgabe eines Aufsatzes Humboldts für Frau von Staël (Stuttgart: J. B. Metzlersche Verlagsbuchhandlung, 1967).

29. “… wie sind überhaupt ästhetische Wirkungen durch den Künstler möglich?” Wilhelm von Humboldts Gesammelte Schriften 2, 318.

30. Johann Jakob Engel, Über Handlung, Gespräch und Erzählung (Leipzig, 1774; rpt. Stuttgart: J. B. Metzlersche Verlagsbuchhandlung, 1964): Karl Philipp Moritz, Über die bildende Nachahmung des Schönen (Braunschweig, 1788; rpt. Heilbronn: Verlag von Gebr. Henninger, 1888).

31. “[Der Künstler] sammle nur unser eignes Wesen in Einen Punkt und bestimme es, wie er als Künstler immer thun muss, sich in einem Gegenstand ausser sich selbst hinzustellen … und es steht unmittelbar … eine Welt vor uns da. Denn unser granzes Wesen ist dann in uns zugleich und in allen seinen Punkten rege und ist schöpferisch. …” Wilhelm von Humboldts Gesammelte Schriften 2, 136.

32. “Die Einbildungskraft durch die Einbildungskraft zu entzünden, ist das Geheimnis des Künstlers. Denn um die unsrige zu nöthigen, den Gegenstand, den er ihr schildert, rein aus sich selbst zu erzeugen, muss derselbe frei aus der seinigen hervorgehn.” Ibid., 127-128. See also Müller-Vollmer, Poesie und Einbildungskraft. 129.

33. “Wer … ein Gemälde mit den Augen des wahren Kenners betrachtet, muß es in seiner Phantasie selbst aufs neue erschaffen; und wer einen Dichter liest, muß, bis zu einem gewissen Grade, selbst Dichter sein.” Ibid., 125.

34. “Vergebens beschreibt der Dichter die Schönheit seiner Geliebten bis in alle Einzelheiten, niemals wird sich ihr Bildnis unserer Phantasie einprägen, wenn es ihm nicht gelingt, seine Leser mit der gleichen Begeisterung zu erfüllen, die ihn selber verzehrt.” Ibid., 123.

35. “… der Unterschied ist allein der, dass die Wirklichkeit zu den Sinnen, die Kunst zu der Phantasie spricht, dass jene harte und schneidende Umrisse, diese zwar immer bestimnnte, aber immer auch unendliche giebt.” Wilhelm von Humboldts Gesammelte Schriften 2, 131.

36. “eine Stimmung … eine Empfänglichkeit … eine Erregbarkeit” Ibid., 136, 138.

37. “[Der Künstler darf] an seinem Objecte … nur wenig ändern … es bleibt ihm also nichts übrig, als sich an das Subject zu wenden, auf das er wirken will.” Ibid., 126.

38. “… der Künstler [geht] zuerst von nichts anderm aus … als nur etwas Wirkliches in ein Bild zu verwandeln … diess … [ist] nur dadurch möglich … dass er gleichsam einen elektrischen Funken aus seiner Phantasie in die Phantasie andrer überströmen lässt, und diess zwar nicht unmittelbar, sondern so, dass er ihn einem Object ausser sich einhaucht.” Ibid., 132.

39. “[Der Dichter] versetzt … unserer Einbildungskraft den elektrischen Schock, der sie zum Leben erweckt und sie zwingt … ihm durch das Ganze seiner künstlerischen Produktion … zu folgen.”

    Müller-Vollmer, Poesie und Einbildungskraft, 123-125.

40. “Die Mittel, wodurch die Kunst ihren Zweck erreicht, sind so vielfach, als es überhaupt Quellen eines freien Vergnügens gibt. Frei aber nenne ich dasjenige Vergnügen, wobei die geistigen Kräfte, Vernunft und Einbildungskraft, tätig sind, und wo die Empfindung durch eine Vorstellung erzeugt wird.” Schillers Sämtliche Werke, Säkular-Ausgabe, 11, 141.

41. “Das Feld, das der Dichter als sein Eigenthum bearbeitet, ist das Gebiet der Einbildungskraft; nur dadurch, dass er diese beschäftigt, und nur in so fern, als er diess stark und ausschliessend thut, verdient er Dichter zu heissen.” Wilhelm von Humboldts Gesammelte Schriften 2, 126.

42. “Da [die Dichtkunst] durch die Sprache, also durch ein Mittel wirkt, das, ursprünglich nur für den Verstand gebildet, erst einer Umarbeitung bedarf, um auch bei der Phantasie Eingang zu finden; so schweift sie leicht in das Gebiet der Philosophie hinüber und interessirt unmittelbar den Geist und das Herz, statt bloss auf die Einbildungskraft einzuwirken. … Auf diesen Abwegen nun artet die Dichtkunst von ihrer eigentlichen und höheren Natur aus. …” Ibid., 143-144.

43. “[Der Künstler] muss in unsrer Seele jede Erinnerung an die Wirklichkeit vertilgen und nur die Phantasie allein rege und lebendig erhalten.” Ibid., 126.

44. Müller-Vollmer, Poesie und Einbildungskraft, 47-48.

45. “Phantasie-Einheit … Einheit und … Formalität” Wilhelm von Humboldts Gesammelte Schriften 2, 133, 130.

46. “Auch ist die Erfüllung [der Forderung eines Künstlers] im genauesten Verstande nur das Werk der ächten Künstlematur.” Ibid., 137.

47. “Das Gemüth also, auf das der Künstler so eingewirkt hat, ist immer geneigt … den ganzen … Kreis zu vollenden und … eine Welt von Erscheinungen auf einmal zusammenzufassen.” Ibid.

48. “Das Werk des wahren Genies wird immer zu uns sprechen und unsere Phantasie entzünden.” Müller-Vollmer, Poesie und Einbildungskraft, 129.

49. “… jene ausgezeichneten Menschen, die uns hier zum Vorbilde dienen” Wilhelm von Humboldts Gesammelte Schriften 2, 329.

50. “[Was jene Menschen zu grossen Menschen macht,] macht diejenigen, auf die es einwirkt, nicht gerade der Individualität gleich, die es … selbst an sich trägt; es giebt ihnen ferner nicht allein gar keine bestimmte Form, sondern bestimmt sie, diejenige, die ihnen die eigenthümlichste ist, aufzufinden. Denn es weckt ihre innere geistige Lebenskraft und diese bildet natürlich denjenigen Charakter in ihnen, der allein ihnen gemäss ist.” Ibid., 330.

51. See Ibid., 405.

52. “Jene ausgezeichneten Menschen … haben … immer eine entschiedene und originelle Individualität.—Man bilde sich nur vollkommen zum Menschen aus, und man erscheint sicherlich auch als ein eigener Mensch …” Ibid., 329.

53. “… [der ächte] Dichter … [eröfnet] uns einen tiefen Blick in uns selbst und die Welt … [Was sich in diesen so ausgezeichneten Menschen findet] wird … in jedes Bild vollendeter Menschheit hineinpassen, und in der Wirkung auf andre diese immer nähren und stärken.” Ibid., 328-329.

54. Gunter Grimm, Rezeptionsgeschichte: Grundlegung einer Theorie mit Analysen und Bibliographie, 26.