SOURCE: "General Works, Theory and Its History," in The American Economic Review, Vol. 25, No. 3, 1935, pp. 502-8.

[In the following essay, Parsons reviews the English-language translation of Trattato di sociologia generale.]

The final appearance, after being heralded for so many years, of the English translation of Pareto's Trattato di Sociologia Generale is surely an event of the first importance for the social sciences of the English-speaking world, though perhaps not altogether for the reasons most generally heralded. The editor, his collaborators and the publishers are to be congratulated upon the successful completion of so monumental a task.

The particular form which Pareto's venture into sociology takes happens to be of the greatest importance to all economists who are interested in the general status of their science relative to the other social sciences. Pareto's experience has a peculiar relevance to the current methodological controversies in American economics between "orthodox" and "institutionalist" schools. For he took a way out of the situation underlying the controversy which is not very widely accepted, at least in any systematic, methodologically self-conscious form, but which is in my opinion exceedingly fruitful.

In this connection Pareto's personal history is interesting. His concern with economic problems began from a practical, political point of view. He became involved as a popular writer in the protectionist controversy in Italy in the eighties on the free trade side. From here he turned to economic theory as a "pure" science, linking it up with his previous training in mathematics and the physical sciences. Finally to supplement his economic theory, in part in an attempt to understand the same concrete problems of protectionism with which he started, he turned to the immense task of formulating a treatise on general sociology.

This personal experience is formulated in the Treatise in his extremely interesting discussion of the relation of protection to the general cycles of social change with which he is there concerned. Here he carefully distinguishes three things: (a) the direct economic effects of a protectionist measure, (b) the indirect economic effects and (c) the social effects. To get an accurate picture of the concrete results all three must be considered together in close interdependence with each other.

The direct economic effect is in general a "destruction of wealth." But this may (not must) be counterbalanced by the indirect effects through the relation to other than economic elements of the social situation. This comes about above all through the fact that protection puts into the hands of government a very far-reaching control over economic opportunity. Under certain circumstances this may be used in such a way as to favor the entrance to such opportunities of a certain type of persons, the "speculators" who would otherwise be denied the opportunity to rise to positions of influence. The result of this transfer of control over enterprise may, on account of the productiveness of this group, be an augmentation of wealth in the community more than sufficient to counter-balance the direct economic effects.

But under the third heading Pareto puts the question into a still wider perspective. The relation of protection to a process of "circulation of the élite" is part of the general alternation between relative predominance of the first two classes of "residues" in the governing classes. That is, it is part of the process by which men of "faith," of strong moral character, who are willing and able to use force to defend their faith and their position, are gradually displaced by men facile in "combinations" who govern by "ruse" but who are in general unable to use force, of whom the "speculators" are one subtype. This process, proceeding far enough, eventually creates an un-stable situation in which the governing class can be easily overthrown by persons organized to employ force to attain their ends. Such a revolution will result in the end of the previous cycle, including that of increasing economic prosperity. To this result protection contributes its quota. It is itself in turn, of course, in part a function of the other elements. A certain type of governing class, in command at a certain phase of Pareto's cycle, will tend to turn to protectionist policies on account of the exigencies of its own position—it has need of the "speculators" and protection offers an immensely powerful means of winning their support.

This example may serve as an introduction to the general issue of the relations of economics and sociology in Pareto's thought. What impressed him were above all three facts: (1) That the teaching of "pure" economic theory was in general that protection would lead to a "destruction of wealth"—the exceptions were of quite minor importance; (2) that the protectionist movement had, in continental Europe, steadily gained ground in spite of this fact, and (3) that the immediate result had not been detrimental to economic prosperity but rather the reverse. The third fact, as we have seen, he explained by the indirect economic effects of protection, the second by the situation of the governing classes.

Most economists may be presumed to be familiar with Pareto's work in economic theory which attained its most comprehensive formulation in his Manuale d' Economia Politica. In spite of its mathematical formulation, its general tone is "orthodox" or "neo-classical." But from the above consideration of the question of protectionism, and similar treatments of other problems, Pareto did not conclude that the inability of economic theory alone to give a satisfactory solution of a concrete "economic" problem (e. g., to explain the effects of a given protective measure) was a reason for discarding the economic theory. He concluded rather that the economic theory was correct, but abstract, dealing with only one element of a complex situation. To get a satisfactory solution of the concrete problem it is necessary to synthesize the results of economic theory with those of other theories dealing with the other elements in the same situation. It is this, above all, which his sociology is meant to do—to provide a theory, analogous to the economic, of these other elements.

In this review it is possible to give only the barest sketch of the structure of his general theory. Its genesis from the problem of the scope of economics is evident in the fact that the point of departure is from a distinction between the "logical" and the "non-logical" elements of action and the fact that only the former is positively defined, leaving the latter as a residual category. Logical action includes the economic element but is a broader category including also the technological, political and other elements. It is defined as actions consisting of "operations logically united to their end" from the point of view both of the person performing them and of an observer having "amore extensive knowledge" of the circumstances—the former being the "subjective," the latter the "objective" aspect. This is essentially the familiar postulate of "economic rationality." Insofar as it departs from this standard for any reason whatever, action is non-logical, which Pareto explicitly states "does not necessarily mean illogical."

Since the "logical" elements of action are in his opinion fairly adequately analyzed by other sciences, especially economics, Pareto devotes his analytical attention in the treatise to the non-logical element. Here he follows a peculiar method which has not been very generally understood. There are, he says, two roughly distinguishable sets of concrete data which may be studied—"overt acts" (B) and the linguistic expressions or "theories" associated with them (C). Both may be regarded as causally connected with a non-observable "state of mind" (A) from which on the whole they result. Now the "theories" (C) may be regarded as a more accurate index of (A) than can (B), which is more influenced by the external circumstances of the situation, etc. Hence he confines his analytical attention to (C), the "theories" associated with non-logical action.

Insofar as action is logical it may be regarded as "resulting from a process of reasoning." This process of reasoning, the "theory" associated with logical action takes the form of a scientific theory, a "logico-experimental" theory as Pareto calls it. Non-logical action, on the other hand, proceeds from "a certain state of mind," "sentiment," etc. While scientific theories reflect external facts, those associated with non-logical action, which are "theories" current in society departing from the scientific standard, are, as Pareto generally puts it, "manifestations of sentiments."

To the study of these non-scientific theories, or more accurately theories insofar as they are non-scientific, Pareto then addresses himself by the inductive method. The result of his induction is the distinction of two elements in these theories, a relatively constant and a relatively variable. The former he calls "residues," the latter "derivations."

Thus the famous category of "residues" is not an "instinct" or "drive" or any other psychological element, but the constant element in non-scientific theories. The residues are not themselves the "forces" which determine non-logical action but are rather "manifestations" of them in much the same sense as a thermometer-reading manifests the thermal state of a substance. The real forces lie in the "state of mind" or more specifically die "sentiments."

The question of the kind of doctrine Pareto is advancing when he lays such great stress on the residues becomes then a matter of what is included in this category of "sentiments." It will be remembered that the concept of non-logical action was in the first place a residual category and it follows that this character is shared by that of sentiment. It is not surprising, therefore, that further analysis, beyond the point to which Pareto himself explicitly carried it, reveals more than one element. In fact as ultimate non-logical elements in action we find two main categories emerging. One is the "non-rational" psychological factor of instinct or drive, the other that of "ultimate value-attitudes" (my own, not Pareto's term).

The latter form the source of the ultimate ends of action even though the adaptation of means to end is "logical." That is, in this case even though there is a logical element, the means-end relationship, mere is also in concrete action a non-logical element, that of ultimate ends. The residues, the "major premises" of non-scientific theories, contain as one element these ultimate ends. They are not "statements of fact" but "manifestations of sentiments" because the ultimate ends of action are not determined by the exigencies of the conditions of action but form a separate element.

These value-attitudes are expressed not only in the form of ultimate ends of "logical" means-end relationships, but constitute at least the main basis of another extremely important class of actions namely "ritual" actions, both magical and religious. The discovery of the immense social importance of ritual and not its dismissal as the result of mere "ignorance" and "superstition" may be regarded as one of the most important results of Pareto's explicit study of the "non-logical" elements of action—a distinct improvement on the type of economist who tends to generalize his postulate of economic rationality to cover human action as a whole.

I have dwelt at some length upon this central logical structure of Pareto's sociological thought for two reasons—because it is one of the best examples available of the way a realization of the limitations of economic theory in the solution of concrete problems may lead directly from a consideration of the place of the economic element in human action to a consideration of the other elements in relation to it. In this respect Pareto's experience is highly instructive. It is of the greatest interest to economists as a means of placing their discipline in its wider perspective, and to sociologists since the path from the economic (more broadly "rational" in Pareto's "logical" sense) element of action into the sociological is one of the main paths by which a science of sociology has been emerging in the recent development of European social thought. In that development Pareto deserves for this reason alone an important place. The second reason for emphasizing his theoretical analysis is that it has been very generally misinterpreted in the discussion in such a way as seriously to obscure the questions here discussed.

This theory does not, however, remain hanging in the air, as it were. Pareto uses it in the latter part of the book to develop a most interesting theory of cycles of social change of which I have given a bare hint in the discussion of protection above. There is no space to go further into it here. It represents, however, one instance of a highly significant type of turning point in the interpretation of the general trend of contemporary social change. The slackening of economic "progress," the resurgence of violence, and of nationalism and other "irrational" faiths all find a place which it is difficult to find for them in the theories of orthodox liberalism. In his interpretation of some of these concrete phenomena Pareto advances views which have provided the main subject matter of the popular discussion of his work. I do not propose to enter upon that discussion here. Suffice it to say that though he is doubtless open to criticism at many points, and, like almost all writers, probably exaggerates the importance of certain aspects, nevertheless his work will well repay careful consideration along with other interpretations. But equally his concrete theories should be interpreted in the light of his general theoretical problems, which many have failed to do.

I have not discussed Pareto's views on general scientific methodology because it seemed to me that other aspects were of greater interest to economists. Pareto was himself trained in mathematics and physical science. Both in economics and in sociology he always had in mind the methodology of the physical sciences as a model. In this respect, however, his work was much more sophisticated than that of the earlier "positivists" in the social sciences. He is far less open to the charge of importing physical science concepts into fields of phenomena not adapted to their use.

On this aspect of Pareto's work Professor Henderson's little book should prove an indispensable guide to the serious student. It is written by a man who is a careful, thorough and penetrating student of Pareto's work and at the same time an eminent scholar in some of the natural sciences on the background of which Pareto would like to have his own work projected. It stands out head and shoulders above every other secondary attempt with which I am acquainted to interpret Pareto's methodological position.

For the most part I think there is to be accorded high praise and little criticism for Pareto's "natural science" methodology of sociology. His sceptical and sophisticated form of it divests it of most of the objectionable features of "positivism," reducing it to the methodological fundamentals of science in general, natural or social. It need only be said, I think, that Pareto's general preoccupation with the natural science model rather closes his mind to the importance of some methodological questions peculiar to the sciences dealing with human action, notably those pertaining to the status of the "subjective aspect" of action and the interpretation of forms of "symbolic expression." Such questions arise, however, in an acute form only at a relatively advanced stage in the analysis on the frontiers of Pareto's own theory. This disadvantage is much more than counterbalanced by the clarity and cogency of Pareto's argument on the more general level. One who has gone through his work thoroughly certainly should be forever cured of many of the most common and—alas—still prevalent errors.

In conclusion let me state—Pareto's Treatise was not written as and should not be taken as the bible of a new religion—for the worship of "science" is just as much a religion as any other. It is a scientific treatise written by a great scientist for scientists; it is unquestionably one of the few most eminent works of its kind in its time in the social sciences. Its eminence, however, does not lie so much in its final systematization of the pioneer work of others, but in itself being a pioneer work, pushing the boundaries of systematic scientific theory into regions which though by no means uncharted in human experience have been none the less highly inadequately subjected to rigorous scientific analysis. It stands by no means alone in this attempt. The approximately contemporary works of Durkheim and Max Weber furnish two other instances. But it is one of the few most important of its kind.