SOURCE: Skidmore, Clive. “Valerius's Moral Purpose.” In Practical Ethics for Roman Gentlemen: The Work of Valerius Maximus, pp. 53-82. Exeter, England: University of Exeter Press, 1996.

[In the following essay, Skidmore emphasizes the moral-didactic orientation of Valerius's Memorable Doings and Sayings, viewing its central purpose as the depiction of “traditional standards of morality” from a bygone era.]

[T]he true purpose of Valerius's work has been obscured by the gratuitous assumption that it was merely a handbook for rhetoricians and declaimers. That can be seen very clearly in Bloomer's monograph. The author is well aware that Valerius's examples from the past ‘serve as models of conduct’, that they are ‘types of morality or immorality’, that his chapters ‘are taken as the various departments of human life’, and that he does ‘advance a certain program of what is valuable and paradigmatic from the past’. In his conclusion, Bloomer refers to Valerius's ‘pursuit of praise and blame from a traditional set of characters’, and draws a persuasive parallel with the statues of the great men of the past in Augustus's forum (1992, pp. 11, 17, 55, 150, 257, 258). And yet he continues:

Valerius' seamless history is similarly manipulative, though his rhetoric calls attention to its rhetorician in ways so insistent as to be transparent. The density and transparency of technique and effect have little to do with the conveyance of points of information or the persuasion of a point of view.

(1992, p. 258 (my italics))

So strong is the unexamined assumption about Valerius's purpose that his aim of ethical persuasion is, despite all the evidence, explicitly denied.

The preface to the Memorable Words and Deeds clearly states the moral purpose of the work and the means by which it is to be accomplished:

The Memorable Words and Deeds of the men of Rome and foreign nations are scattered among various authors and cannot easily be sought out, so I have decided to make a compilation from famous authors to spare those requiring proofs the labour of long research … I invoke your favour upon this enterprise, Caesar, to whom men and gods alike have entrusted the rule of the land and sea; by your divine wisdom are the virtues of which I speak encouraged and the vices punished with the utmost severity.

It contrasts the idea of virtus (good moral conduct), and vitia (bad moral conduct), and the theme introduced here of the duality of these concepts is expanded and re-emphasized throughout the course of the work.¹ So we come across this comment upon an example in Omens (I. 5.2):

merito autem de laude inter se victoria et pia precatio amplissimi viri certaverint; aeque enim virtutis est et bona patriae auxisse et mala in se transferri voluisse.

Truly the triumph and the pious prayer of this most noble of men rival each other, for it is equally laudable to have contributed to one's country's success and to have called down its misfortunes upon oneself.

Here virtus, moral excellence, is linked to laus, public approval, the just reward of good moral conduct.² The moralistic scheme is expanded still further in the preface to Moderation (IV. 1):

Transgrediar ad saluberrimam partem animi, moderationem, quae mentes nostras inpotentiae et temeritatis incursu transversas ferri non patitur. quo evenit ut reprehensionis morsu sit vacua et laudis quaestu sit opulentissima.

Let me now move on to the most generous quality of the human soul, moderation, which defends our minds from the assaults of fury and rashness. Therefore it is free from carping criticism and rather blessed by a wealth of praise.

The virtue of moderation is contrasted with the vices of rashness and fury, qualities which are approved and condemned respectively (laus and reprehensio) by public opinion.³ Similarly, later in the same chapter (IV. 1.8):

libenter tunc opinionem suam populus Romanus a Graccho deceptam cognovit moderationemque eius debita laude prosecutus est.

Then the Roman people recognized that Gracchus had defied their expectation and honoured his moderation with well-earned praise.

So Gracchus's virtus, moderation, is rewarded by the public recognition which it deserves.

Valerius's basic division of qualities into either vices or virtues is qualified in the preface to Freedom of Speech and Action (VI. 2):

Libertatem autem vehementis spiritus dictis pariter et factis testatam ut non invitaverim, ita ultro venientem non excluserim. quae inter virtutem vitiumque posita, si salubri modo se temperavit, laudem, si quo non debuit profudit, reprehensionem meretur.

Though I have not welcomed into my work the headstrong spirit of frankness which is attested by many words and deeds, yet I have not excluded its spontaneous appearance, once I encountered it. For it occupies a place midway between a virtue and a vice—if it is exercised with moderation it earns praise, but if it is vented inappropriately it merits only disapproval.

This passage again emphasizes the ideas of virtus and vitia and praise (laus) and reproach (reprehensio), and their dependence upon the concept of just reward. Also it introduces a category of words and deeds somewhere in between virtues and vices, and thus the moral scheme is expanded.

As well as appearing in chapters devoted to virtues and to ambiguous moral qualities, the scheme is reiterated at the beginning of the section on vices (IX. 1):

iungatur illi libido, quoniam ex isdem vitiorum principiis oritur, neque aut a reprehensione aut ab emendatione separentur, gemino mentis errore conexae.

Let lust follow on from luxury, since it arises from the same gross elements, and both qualities should share rebuke and correction, being akin in their misguided inclinations.

By continual references to this theme in the prefaces to the individual chapters (e.g. III. 1; III. 2; IV. 1; V. 1; V. 2; V. 3; V. 4; VII. 4; VIII. 7; IX. 1; IX. 6), Valerius is able to precondition his audience's attitude to the examples which follow.

The most significant treatment of this theme, however, is in the pair of chapters Gratitude and Ingratitude. Here is the preface to Gratitude (V. 2):

Gratas vero animi significationes et ingrata facta libuit oculis subicere, ut vitio ac virtuti iusta merces aestimationis ipsa comparatione accederet. sed quoniam contrario proposito sese distinxerunt, nostro quoque stilo separentur, prioremque locum obtineant quae laudem quam quae reprehensionem merentur.

I was inclined next to look at expressions of gratitude and ungrateful actions, so that by that very comparison the just reward due to virtue and vice might become clear. But since these qualities have separated themselves by their conflicting themes, let them be separate in our work too, and let those examples deserving praise achieve precedence over those deserving censure.

While it is common for Valerius to refer to aspects of the moral scheme, it is rare that he outlines the ideas as a whole as he does here. Notable in this preface is the emphasis on the idea of just deserts, for the central theme of these two chapters is that the failure to reward moral excellence and punish vice threatens the whole structure of society. For instance (V. 3.2e):

Quis ignorat tantum laudis Scipionem Nasicam toga quantum armis utrumque Africanum meruisse? … sed is quoque propter iniquissimam virtutum suarum apud cives aestimationem …

Who denies that Scipio Nasica deserved as much public recognition for his actions in peacetime as did either of the Africani for their successes in war? … But this man because of a most unfair appraisal of his virtues by his fellow citizens …

The third foreign anecdote sees the culmination of this theme in an example unlike any other in the whole work, in that it forms a carefully orchestrated piece of Silver Latin oratory. First the charges are brought against Athens: the fates of Theseus, Solon, Miltiades, Phocion, Themistocles and Aristides. This leads into a rhetorical diatribe unparalleled anywhere in the work, even in the tirade against Sejanus (IX. 11. ext. 4).⁴ The whole point of employing rhetorical technique is to persuade the reader, so the more effort Valerius puts into his style the more important must be the point he wishes to put across. The message here is of fundamental importance to Valerius's all-pervasive theme of virtues and vices and public approval or censure, for this concept is entirely dependent on the idea that moral conduct receives the reward that it deserves. If this does not happen then the whole system of human morality, as Valerius sees it, is thrown into confusion (V. 3, ext. 3):⁵

Quid abest igitur, quin publica dementia sit existimanda summo consensu maximas virtutes quasi gravissima delicta punire beneficiaque iniuriis rependere? … in qua urbe adversus ingratos actio constituta est, et recte, quia dandi et accipiendi beneficii commercium, sine quo vix vita hominum †experet tollit quisquis bene merito parem referre gratiam neglegit.

What choice is there, then, but to think it general insanity with total unanimity to punish outstanding virtues as if they were abominable crimes and to reward services with insults? … in the very city in which a legal process was set up against ungrateful people, and rightly, for indeed whoever fails to render adequate thanks to one who well deserves them, damages the fellowship of giving and receiving services, without which human existence could scarcely occur.

The diatribe is introduced by the important themes of virtus and reprehensio and the idea of the just reward of virtue is encapsulated in beneficia. These ideas dominate the passage and culminate in an elaborate piece of prosopopoeia (V. 3. ext. 3):

lege itaque legem, quae te iure iurando obstrictam tenet, et quia bene meritis debita reddere praemia noluisti, laesis iusta piacula exsolve … inmemores beneficiorum Athenae, reprehensionis lingua sermone licenti soluta non tacet.

Read that law then that holds you bound under oath, and because you were unwilling to grant the rewards due to men who had well deserved them, offer just atonement to those you have wronged … Athens, forgetful of services rendered, the voice of censure with unrestrained words refuses to be silent.

This theme occurs throughout the work, most frequently in the prefaces to chapters, where it serves to provide moral guidance by preconditioning the reader's attitude to the examples that follow. However, those prefaces to chapters which do not refer to this theme often also perform the task of preconditioning the reader. Valerius usually introduces each chapter with a programmatic preface, the purpose of which is to make the point which will be proven by the subsequent examples. Many of these chapters reveal their purpose by the contrast of virtues and vices, but many that do not do so serve equally well to predispose the reader's view of the examples that follow (for example VII. 1; VII. 5; VIII. 9; IX. 4). For example, the preface to Marital Love (IV. 6):

… quasi quasdam imagines non sine maxima veneratione contemplandas lectoris oculis subiciam, valenter inter coniuges stabilitae fidei opera percurrens, ardua imitatu, ceterum cognosci utilia.

I am inclined to place before the eyes of my reader some representations of traditional love which should be looked upon with great respect, and to review acts of ardent and deep-seated loyalty between spouses. Though these examples are difficult to emulate, yet they are useful to know.

Many of these prefaces are devoted to elaborate praise of virtues or to condemnation of vices, and seek to convince the reader of the point made by the chapter's examples (for example Virtues: IV. 1-7; Vices: IX. 1-3, IX. 6, IX. 9). Occasionally, where his message seems obvious, it may be omitted as unnecessary (for example VI. 7; VIII. 5), elsewhere it is important to condition the reader's attitude before he reads the examples lest he draw the wrong conclusion from them. For example, the chapter Military Discipline contains tales of very harsh discipline, such as deserters being trampled by elephants or suffering amputation of their hands, yet the preface is careful to justify the usefulness of such measures as one of the supports of Empire.⁶ The prefaces form an important part of Valerius's composition in that they take the place of argument in a theoretical treatise, by stating the morals to be illustrated by the subsequent examples.

Although almost every chapter in the Memorable Words and Deeds has its own programmatic preface, only one of the nine books of the work has a preface. This is the second book, which is devoted to the subject of ancient and generally obsolete social customs and which sees the author making explicit contrasts between the high standards of morality in the early Republic and the moral decline of his own age. Such a contrast must always be at least implicit in a work which seeks to impose the conduct of the men of the past on those of the present.

Dives et praepotens naturae regnum scrutatus iniciam stilum qua nostrae urbis qua exterarum gentium priscis ac memorabilibus institutis: opus est enim cognosci huiusce vitae, quam sub optimo principe felicem agimus, quaenam fuerint elementa, ut eorum quoque respectus aliquid praesentibus moribus prosit.

Having investigated the abundant and omnipotent realm of Nature, I shall write of the ancient and memorable customs of our city as well as those of foreign nations. For it is important to understand the origins of the prosperous age we live in beneath the sway of an excellent emperor, so that awareness of the past may benefit the morality of our own age.

In this preface the contrast between past and present is quite explicit, as Valerius justifies the inclusion of antiquarian material by its role in providing moral guidance for his audience. The subordination of antiquarianism to moralizing suggests that among the Ancient Customs Valerius will only include examples of institutions which he believes necessary to rectify modern morality. However, the pleasure criterion is one to which Valerius admits elsewhere, and certain anecdotes in the book are not explicitly paralleled with modern decadence. Yet this does not mean that these examples are not intended to make a moral point, for it would be neither practical for the author nor enjoyable for the audience if Valerius were to point an explicit moral to every single anecdote.

Even when the anecdotes of Book II appear not to fulfil a moral purpose, they still form part of Valerius's overall scheme. The whole efficacy of Valerius's examples depends upon the audience's respect for the institutions and standards of the past, and in this antiquarian section Valerius wants to paint a picture of life lived according to the traditional standards of morality that he is trying to promote. By portraying the consensus of the community as founded upon virtue he is attempting to instil into the reader a sense of tradition and respect for the men and customs of the past. Also relevant here is a technique which Valerius employs extensively in Ancient Customs of including examples not so much of ancient institutions as of moral qualities which will be treated later in the work, especially the virtues of self control (continentia) (II. 2.8; II. 5.5; II. 5.6), propriety (verecundia) (II. 1.5; II. 1.7; II. 3.1), and severity (severitas) (II. 1.2; II. 7.8; II. 9.1; II. 9.2). This technique enables him to put across the same message in a separate chapter without seeming to do so, and to suggest that the idealized society of the Early Republic was founded upon these virtues (for other virtues, see II. 2.5; II. 7.8; II. 7.14).

The first chapter of the book is particularly notable for its comparisons between past and present morality in relation to marital discipline (II. 1.2):

quod genus severitatis aetas nostra diligentius in Capitolio quam in suis domibus conservat.

Our era has preserved this form of discipline more carefully on the Capitoline than in our own homes.

Several of the examples in this chapter foreshadow the author's attitude towards marital relations in the chapter Severity. His criticism of the first divorce signifies his disapproval of the prevalence of the practice in modern Rome (II. 1.4):⁷

Sp. Carvilius … reprehensione … non caruit, quia ne cupiditatem quidem liberorum coniugali fidei praeponi debuisse arbitrabantur.

Sp. Carvilius did not escape censure because the men of old thought that not even the desire for children should have been placed before conjugal devotion.

In these examples Valerius's antiquarianism is patently a vehicle of his moral purpose, and other anecdotes show an implicit criticism of modern morality and the need to gain the reader's approval of the moral values embodied in the ancient customs.

However, one of the most interesting examples in this chapter contains no criticism of modern morality yet is of great relevance to Valerius's moral purpose (II. 1.10):

Maiores natu in conviviis ad tibias egregia superiorum opera carmine conprehensa † pangebant, quo ad ea imitanda iuventutem alacriorem redderent. quid hoc splendidius, quid etiam utilius certamine? pubertas canis suum decus reddebat, defuncta [viri] cursu aetas ingredientes actuosam vitam fervoris nutrimentis prosequebatur. quas Athenas, quam scholam, quae alienigena studia huic domesticae disciplinae praetulerim?

The elders used to declaim at banquets the recorded achievements of their ancestors in song to the sound of the flute, to make young men more eager to imitate them. What could be more fine or more useful than this competition? Youth bestowed due honour on the greybeards, the generation whose strength was spent by age gave the support of their goodwill to those entering the prime of their active lives. What Greek learning, what philosophical school, what foreign courses of study could I prefer to this Roman method of instruction?

Valerius gives here the whole concept of historical examples and of his own work; he emphasizes the value of imitation of the old by the young, just as in his own work the men of the present are to imitate those of the past. No doubt he sees his own work as a modern descendant of the banquet songs, especially as he concludes this passage by attributing the success of the great men of the past to this form of education.

The contrast between past and present is maintained in the next chapter in a lengthy section devoted to the condemnation of the use of the Greek language in Roman public life. Again Valerius mirrors Tiberius's disapproval of modern practice, a disapproval to which Suetonius devotes a whole chapter of his biography (Tiberius 71). However, the author also introduces in these chapters the virtues of restraint and propriety, treated in their own right later in the work. These examples, like those of severity, are not so much of actual customs, but of the moral excellence of the men of old. This technique is related to an idea which pervades the work, and indeed exercised a strong influence upon the whole of Greek and Latin historical interpretation, namely that the stability of any state is dependent upon the morality of its individual citizens (Aristotle, Politics VII. 13.15 (1334a.6); Livy I. 1.11; Plato, Alcibiades I. 134; Laws III. 698b; Protagoras 322c; Republic IV. 435d-e; Sallust, Catiline 2; 10). Valerius is keen to emphasize that the men of the past were able to found the Roman Empire only because of their high moral standards of qualities such as self-control, propriety and severity. This view of historical cause and effect is particularly conspicuous in Sallust, who attributes Roman decline to the vices of extravagance and avarice (Catiline 5; Earl, 1961, pp. 13-16, 86). It is significant that it is the opposing virtue of restraint which Valerius seeks to emphasize in these anecdotes (II. 2.8):

… quorum [tribunorum] quemadmodum maiestas amplificabatur, ita abstinentia artissime constringebatur … continentiaeque tantum tribuebatur, ut multorum aes alienum, quia provincias sincere administraverant, a senatu persolutum sit.

… just as the honour of the tribunes was enhanced, so it was scrupulously kept in check by their restraint … and such was the self-control attributed to our commanders that the debts of many men were paid by the Senate because they had governed their provinces honestly.

The purpose of many of these apparently antiquarian anecdotes is to introduce and praise the virtues which the author regards as essential to the moral rectitude of the individual and to the stability of the state.

The fourth chapter of Book II, which is devoted to the Roman theatre, is of particular interest:

Proximus a militaribus institutis ad urbana castra, id est theatra, gradus faciendus est, quoniam haec quoque saepe numero animosas acies instruxerunt excogitataque cultus deorum et hominum delectationis causa non sine aliquo pacis rubore voluptatem et religionem civili sanguine scaenicorum portentorum gratia macularunt.

It is only a short step to make from military customs to the armed encampments of the city—in other words the theatre—since this too has often caused vigorous battlelines to be drawn up. Although it was invented for the worship of the gods and for the entertainment of men, the theatre, to our shame in this time of peace, has marred both entertainment and religion by the shedding of Roman blood for the sake of the freaks of the stage.

Valerius contrasts the original performances of the theatre, which took place in an atmosphere of piety, with modern scenes of violence and disorder between factions supporting rival actors. Several were killed in a riot in ad 15, and as a result exile became the penalty for breach of the peace among the audience; in ad 22 or 23 the leaders of the factions and even the actors were exiled (Suetonius, Tiberius, 37, 2; Tacitus, Annals I. 77).⁸ Valerius's comparison between present and past is all the more apt because of its topical nature; the issue must have been controversial at the time, and Valerius as elsewhere provides guidance on a morally ambiguous question (II. 7; III. 6; VI. 2; VII. 3 and 4; VIII. 8; IX. 10).⁹ Because he echoes the official attitude, Valerius can quite safely make an explicit comparison between the theatre in its early days and what it has become, thus illustrating the moral degeneracy of the age.

The contrast between past and present is similarly explicit in the next chapter where he includes this example (II. 5.5):

Fuit etiam illa simplicitas antiquorum in cibo capiendo humanitatis simul et continentiae certissima index: nam maximis viris prandere et cenare in propatulo verecundiae non erat. nec sane ullas epulas habebant, quas populi oculis subicere erubescerent. erant adeo continentiae adtenti.

There was also in the culinary tastes of the ancients that austerity which is the most sure indication of both civilized conduct and self-control. It was not deemed shameful for the elite of society to take breakfast and dinner in public. Nor indeed did they have feasts of a kind that they would be ashamed of in the sight of the public. To such a degree were they mindful of their self-control.

Again self-control appears as one of the most important Roman virtues, and again Valerius emphasizes that the ancient customs were the embodiment of the virtues on which the state depended.

The moral point is also topical, since according to Tacitus culinary extravagance reached its peak in the mid-first century ad (Tacitus, Annals III, 52f.; Balsdon, 1969, pp. 36f.; Friedländer, 1909, vol. II, pp. 146f.). In the next anecdote, although he is supposed to be discussing the temples to Febris, he cannot resist more moralizing on the same subject.

The motive of criticism of modern morality is also responsible for the inclusion of a chapter The Judgement of the Censors (II. 9):

nam ut opes populi Romani in tantum amplitudinis imperatorum virtutibus excesserunt, ita probitas et continentia, censorio supercilio examinata … nisi foro et curiae officium ac verecundia sua constiterit, partarum rerum caelo cumulus aequatus sedem stabilem non habebit.

For as by the martial prowess of its generals the wealth of the Roman people achieved such vast quantities, so their honesty and self-control was carefully measured by the censors … unless duty and propriety are observed in the senate-house and forum, the piled-up spoils of war, though they reach to the skies, will not have a firm foundation.

This preface makes the point that the purpose of the custom is to exemplify the virtues of severity and self-control. The comments on immorality at home and conquests abroad should be seen as criticism of contemporary Rome, especially since the censorship was now effectively obsolete (Loewenstein, 1973, pp. 66-9, 257, 344, 367). His comments on the punishment of bachelors (II. 9.1), and of a man who divorced his wife (II. 9.2), recall chapter one and show that he is again providing guidance on matters of contemporary concern and controversy. The contrast between ancient and modern Rome is still more explicit in the tale of Cornelius Rufinus (II. 9.4):

ipsae medius fidius mihi litterae saeculi nostri obstupescere videntur, cum ad tantam severitatem referendam ministerium adcommodare coguntur, ac vereri ne non nostrae urbis acta commemorare existimentur; vix enim credibile est intra idem pomerium X pondo argenti et invidiosum fuisse censum et inopiam haberi contemptissimam.

As god is my witness, the very syllables of our own age seem to me to be struck with amazement when they are expected to perform the office of describing such severity, and to fear lest they be thought to record the annals of some other city. For it is scarcely credible that within the same city limits ten pounds of silver was once considered an enviable fortune and is now regarded as a despicable pittance.

The concept of severity and the dependence of the Empire upon morality are notable again here. This chapter on the censorship is unique in Book II since it is devoted to a single antiquarian institution used as the concrete manifestation of severity, and in this way it illustrates the author's moralizing purpose as expressed in the Preface to Book II.

Book II is unified in that it is devoted to antiquarianism as a vehicle for Valerius's moral message. Similarly, Book I is entirely devoted to the subject of religion, again in pursuance of Valerius's moral principles. The principle of religious belief is of utmost importance for the efficacy of Valerius's moral message, and for this reason it is introduced right at the beginning of the work and pursued with unparalleled single-mindedness throughout the first book.

The idea that the gods watch over human affairs and cause men to prosper or fail is the ultimate incentive to upright moral conduct. The twin qualities of religious veneration and moral excellence were generally regarded as the foundations of Roman political success (Livy I. 9.4; Sallust, Jugurtha 14.19; Lind, 1972, pp. 236-52; Walsh, 1961, p. 66). The close relationship of the two ideas means that by juxtaposing the subject of religion in Book I with ancient customs in Book II, Valerius appeals to the audience's respect for the traditions and customs of the past.

Valerius begins his treatment of the subject of religion with little hint of moralistic intent, the first examples of Reverence for the Gods exemplifying the piety of the men of old, tales for example of those who laid down their office because of some minor religious scruple. However, halfway through the chapter a change of emphasis becomes apparent (I. 1.7-8):

Maximae vero virginis Aemiliae discipulam extincto igne tutam ab omni reprehensione Vestae numen praestitit. qua adorante, cum carbasum, quem optimum habebat, foculo imposuisset, subito ignis emicuit. Non mirum igitur, si pro eo imperio augendo custodiendoque pertinax deorum indulgentia semper excubuit, quo tam scrupulosa cura parvula quoque momenta religionis examinari videntur, quia numquam remotos ab exactissimo cultu caerimoniarum oculos habuisse nostra civitas existimanda est.

Following the extinction of the sacred flame the divine power of the goddess Vesta protected the pupil of the chief vestal Aemilia from any blame. For whilst worshipping Aemilia placed upon the shrine the finest robe that she owned and suddenly the flame was rekindled. So it is no wonder if to increase and preserve that Empire persistent attentiveness towards the gods has always been exercised, so that minor matters of religious scruple are regarded with particular care, because our state should never be thought to have averted its gaze from the most scrupulous observance of religious matters.

The story of Aemilia and the novice Vestal is introduced to render explicit an idea hitherto implicit, that the success and security of the Empire is dependent upon the goodwill of the gods. Valerius encourages religious respect by the strongest of human instincts, self-interest.

The story of Aemilia marks a distinct change in the presentation of material in this chapter. Except for the first section, which contains a brief paragraph of introduction, all the previous anecdotes are brief and lacking in comment by the author (I. 1.1-6). But from this point, at which the whole purpose of the chapter becomes apparent, the stories become longer and the author makes his point in every single case (I. 1.7-15). Valerius introduces his theme implicitly, then makes it explicit and reinforces it by commenting on all the following examples. See for instance I. 1.9:

Omnia namque post religionem ponenda semper nostra civitas duxit, etiam in quibus summae maiestatis conspici decus voluit. quapropter non dubitaverunt sacris imperia servire, ita se humanarum rerum futura regimen existimantia, si divinae potentiae bene atque constanter fuissent famulata.

For our state always held that everything took second place to religious observance, even where the honour of the highest rank demanded attention. Therefore commanders did not hesitate to be subject to the sacred rites, believing that if they had served the divine will loyally and well they would become the masters of human affairs.

Here the contractual link between piety and political success is explicit, and the idea of the stability of the Empire being dependent upon the morality of the individual is introduced in the first chapter of the first book. The individual is linked to the destiny of the Empire by the necessity for rapport with the gods, not just on the part of the great men of the state but of each citizen. The point is made by two stories of the piety of ordinary citizens which immediately follow (I. 1.10).

Traditional piety is also exemplified in the tale of the Greek philosophical books dug up with the body of Numa and promptly burnt (I. 1.12):

noluerunt enim prisci viri quidquam in hac adservari civitate, quo animi hominum a deorum cultu avocarentur.

For the men of old did not wish anything to be preserved in this state by which men's minds might be distracted from the worship of the gods.

The contrast between past and present attitudes towards religion and philosophy is clear. The relationship between men and the gods is clarified by Valerius's treatment of the tale of Regulus (I. 1.14):

potuerunt profecto dii inmortales efferatam mitigare saevitiam. ceterum, quo clarior esset Atilii gloria, Karthaginienses moribus suis uti passi sunt, tertio Punico bello religiosissimi spiritus tam crudeliter vexati urbis eorum interitu iusta exacturi piacula.

Without a doubt the immortal gods could have checked this brutal savagery. But, so that Atilius's renown should be all the more famous, they allowed the Carthaginians to behave according to their nature, being ready in the third Punic war to exact due punishment for the most heinous torture of a devout soul by the destruction of their city.

The implication is that the gods gave the Carthaginians a choice in their treatment of Regulus, and because they chose to behave inhumanely, it was granted to the Romans to exact just vengeance upon them. The point is reinforced by the opening of the next anecdote (I. 1.15):

quanto nostrae civitatis senatus venerabilior in deos!

How much more reverent towards the gods was our senate!

This reinforces the idea that respect for the gods consists in part of right conduct. This anecdote tells how after the disaster at Cannae the Roman women were forbidden to mourn lest the rites of Ceres be interrupted:

qua quidem constantia optinendae religionis magnus caelestibus iniectus est rubor ulterius adversus eam saeviendi gentem, quae ne iniuriarum quidem acerbitate ab eorum cultu absterreri potuerit.

By this steadfastness in maintaining religious devotion the gods were ashamed to rage further against that nation which even by the harshness of its sufferings could not be deterred from their worship.

Here the emphasis is somewhat different since the gods are dissuaded from further punishment of the Romans by their steadfast devotion. This story and the previous one of Regulus are really examples of Loyalty to the State (VI. 6) and Staunchness in Adversity (III. 8) respectively; the purpose of these anecdotes is to show how the exercise of these virtues is rewarded by the gods. Good moral conduct and piety are thus linked as part of the overall moral scheme, and the religious content of Book I is unified with the moralistic content of Books II-IX. The introduction of the idea of the gods rewarding good moral conduct at the beginning of the work signifies its importance. This idea is relevant to the preface of a later chapter Anger and Hatred (IX. 3):

Ira quoque et odium in pectoribus humanis magnos fluctus excitant … sed proprietatis eorum certissimae sunt imagines, quas di ipsi in claris personis aut dicto aliquo aut facto vehementiore conspici voluerunt.

Anger and hatred stir up great tides of emotion in human hearts … there are most reliable examples of their particular nature, which the gods themselves have wanted to be conspicuous in men of note either by some word or some more violent action.

This preface is quite remarkable in its suggestion that the gods themselves have determined that some men should act as exemplars of good or bad conduct to the rest of humanity. By bringing prosperity to the virtuous and disasters to the wicked the gods provide examples according to which men can determine their conduct; this complements the theme of divine intervention so emphatically proposed throughout Book I. Valerius endows his work with divine approval, and in effect represents himself as a direct agent of divine will. Thus he links the religious content of Book I with the moralistic material of Books II-IX, and the ideas of religion and good moral conduct are united into a coherent moral scheme.

The first part of the chapter Reverence for the Gods (I. 1), which exemplifies the divine reward of human piety, is balanced with tales of the disaster which impends upon the sacrilegious. Here, as elsewhere, the treatment of vices is briefer than that of virtues,¹⁰ but necessary to enable Valerius to put his message across in a negative as well as a positive way (I. 1. ext. 4):

In quam ne incideret Timasitheus Liparitanorum princeps † consilio sibi aliter atque universae patriae utili providit exemplo.

Timasitheus, leader of the Liparitani, offers a salutary example by his wisdom for himself rather than his whole nation of how to avoid this.

Valerius makes clear that it is the cautionary nature of the examples that makes them useful to the reader. Indeed the rest of the surviving part of this book—Omens, Dreams, Prodigies, and most of Wonders—is entirely devoted to inculcating into his readers a belief in the gods and in a system of morality which acts in rapport with the gods.¹¹ These anecdotes, like those in the chapter Reverence for the Gods, are balanced between those which show how obedience to the will of the gods as revealed by signs, portents, and dreams, which are in themselves a proof of trust in the gods, ensures success, whereas disobedience precipitates disaster. The theme permeates these chapters, perhaps being most explicitly stated in the case of Marcus Crassus (I. 6.11):

sic deorum spreti monitus excandescunt, sic humana consilia castigantur, ubi se caelestibus praeferunt.

Thus the warnings of the gods wax wrathful when scorned; thus human intentions are punished, when they reckon themselves above the gods.

The whole of Book I is devoted to teaching this single lesson, which is vital to Valerius's purpose of encouraging good moral conduct and deterring bad. The direct intervention of the gods in human affairs is stimulated by good or bad moral conduct, and they themselves make men into examples to be imitated or avoided by rewarding virtue or punishing vice. In this way the stability of the state is linked to the individual by his morality and respect for the gods. This identification of the good of the state with the morality of the individual is fundamental to Valerius's moral scheme and combines patriotic traditionalism with self-interest. The role of the gods in dealing out to men the just rewards of their moral conduct serves to unify the religious content of Book I with the moralistic content of Books II-IX.

So far, in exploring the evidence of Valerius's moral purpose we have considered only those instances in which it is not so much moral guidance as moral exhortation that is needed, since the rights and wrongs of the issues are evident. But not all of Valerius's work is devoted to outright condemnation or approval; a significant proportion of it is concerned with less clear-cut matters on which a reader might well require moral guidance. One of these was noted above—the theatre, a matter of evident moral ambiguity which must have been much discussed at the time (II. 4). We have also seen in the introduction to the chapter Freedom of Speech and Action (VI. 2), the recognition of subjects of moral ambiguity described as ‘located between virtue and vice’. Here Valerius reveals the intention to guide his audience in matters of moral ambiguity. He concludes the preface to the chapter thus:

sed quia humanae vitae partes persequi propositum est, nostra fide propria aestimatione referatur.

But because it is my intention to go through the various aspects of human existence, according to my word let it be related with the appropriate verdict.

Valerius therefore feels obliged to deal with every subject upon which a reader might require moral guidance.¹² For this reason we note the inclusion of the chapter Famous Men who indulged in more Freedom of Dress or Appearance than was Traditionally Acceptable (III. 6). Valerius feels obliged to include anecdotes on the subject, which was, like the theatre, both topical and controversial. His treatment, however, is brief and without comment, in contrast with his attitude in previous and subsequent chapters. This ambiguity is confirmed by his concluding words (III. 7):

sed haec atque his similia virtutis aliquid sibi in consuetudine novanda licentiae sumentis indicia sunt.

But these examples, and examples similar to them, are cases of virtue acquiring an element of presumption in innovations of fashion.

The antithesis here between virtue and vice reflects that in the preface to Freedom of Speech and Action and confirms that the author is unsure of his moral position; nevertheless he still feels it necessary to include a chapter on the subject.¹³

However, distinct from those chapters in which the author confesses the ambiguity of the subject are those in which he attempts to solve the reader's moral dilemma by defining the moral nature of the subject. Thus in the prefaces to the chapters Ingenuity in Speech and Action and Stratagems he is careful to precondition and guide the reader's attitude towards the anecdotes by resolving the element of moral ambiguity (VII. 3, VII. 4):

Est aliud factorum dictorumque genus a sapientia proximo deflexu ad vafritiae nomen progressum, quod, nisi fallacia vires adsumpsit, finem propositi non invenit laudemque occulto magis tramite quam aperta via petit.

There is another category of deeds and words which proceeds from wisdom by a convenient detour to the name of cunning; and which does not achieve fulfilment of its intention unless it gained advantage by deceit. It seeks glory via concealed paths rather than by the nearest detour.

Illa vero pars calliditatis egregia et ab omni reprehensione procul remota.

Indeed, that aspect of cunning is honourable and far removed from all criticism.

By reference to the overall moral scheme of vices and virtues Valerius resolves the moral dilemma and provides guidance. Although the quality here, as in the chapter Freedom of Speech and Action (VI. 2), is more intellectual than moral, for Valerius's purpose it is necessary to define it in accordance with his moral scheme. In the same way in the chapter Revenge (IX. 10) he defines the moral position of revenge in the preface to the examples:

Ultionis autem quem ad modum acres, ita iusti aculei sunt.

The barbs of revenge, though they may be sharp, yet they are just.

Here too he defines the moral nature of the quality but does not lavish upon it the elaborate praise in the treatment of other virtues. This signifies perhaps a residual element of moral doubt, and also the lesser importance of these chapters.

Similarly we may compare the preface to Leisure (VIII. 8):

Otium, quod [praecipue] industriae et studio maxime contrarium videtur, praecipue subnecti debet, non quo evanescit virtus, sed quo recreatur.

Leisure, which seems to be a quality thoroughly opposed to study and diligence, should be particularly associated with them; not the kind that causes virtue to diminish, but that by which it is renewed.

Valerius is careful to define leisure in relation to the contrast between virtues and vices, and because of the nature of his work he feels obliged to include a few examples, no matter how brief.

By recognizing the ambiguous nature of certain moral qualities, Valerius acknowledges the difficulties which may be involved in the practical exercise of virtue. For this reason he includes a chapter on Desperate Situations (VII. 6). This chapter is of particular interest since it does not concern a virtue, a vice, or even an ambiguous moral quality, but rather is concerned with examining a human situation and how men act in it. Valerius's message is that the application of a moral code may not be clear-cut in time of crisis; this is a point he makes near the beginning of the chapter (VII. 6.1):

quae, si per se aspiciantur, aliquid ruboris habeant, si autem admotis necessitatis viribus ponderentur, saevitiae temporis convenientia praesidia videantur.

These measures, if considered in isolation, may seem shocking; yet if considered within the pressing constraints of dire need, they may seem to be appropriate safeguards at a desperate time.

Nevertheless, morality must still operate, and Valerius's purpose is to demonstrate to the audience how one should act in such a situation. Thus his comment on the steadfastness of the besieged Casilinates who ate all the leather in the city shows his approval (VII. 6.2):

quid illis, si acerbitatem casus intueare, miserius, si constantiam respicias, fidelius?

If you consider the bitterness of their plight, what could be more pitiful? If you consider their resilience, what could be more faithful?

This contrasts with his opinion of the Numantines who turned to cannibalism (VII. 6. ext. 2):

Nulla est in his necessitatis excusatio: nam quibus mori licuit, sic vivere necesse non fuit.

In this case desperation was no justification; for men who had it in their power to die need not have prolonged life by these means.

So by positive and negative examples Valerius shows the reader how to act in such a crisis, in the same way as in the chapters Freedom of Speech and Action (VI. 2) and Revenge (IX. 10).

Similarly, he tells the tale of the besieged Praenestines, one of whom sold his rations for a high price (VI. 6.3):

Sed credo, deorum providentia [effectum] et venditori et emptori quem uterque merebatur exitum adtribuit: avaro enim [et] fame consumpto manubiis sordium suarum frui non licuit, aequi animi vir ad salutarem inpensam faciendam care quidem, verum necessarie, conparato cibo vixit.

But I believe that the providence of the gods bestowed on the seller and buyer alike the fate that each deserved; for the miser perished from hunger, and therefore was not allowed to enjoy the spoils of his base action, the man with common sense survived by incurring healthy expenditure on food, obtained at a high price, but in dire need.

Here moral judgement is expressed by the idea which dominated Book I and recurs throughout the work (for example II. 7.7; VII. 6.3; IX. 3. preface), that the gods reward or punish men's behaviour as it deserves.

Perhaps it is significant then that this chapter should be followed by a number of chapters on legal subjects, which also concern the practical exercise of moral values. Indeed three successive chapters are devoted to the subject of wills, which for most Romans must have been one of the main opportunities to apply moral criteria in practice. This phrase (VII. 7) suggests his intention to provide guidance of every aspect of human existence:

Vacemus nunc negotio, quod actorum hominis et praecipuae curae et ultimi est temporis.

Now let us apply our attention to the business which men perform at the very end of life with considerable concern.

Valerius refers in these three chapters to the deified personification of the virtue Aequitas, and his clear approval of the anecdotes of the first chapter (VII. 7) and disapproval of those of the second and third chapters (VII. 8a-b) show that he is providing examples of this quality.¹⁴ Besides advising those making wills, he may also have in mind those faced with the duty of adjudicating on them.

The legal theme is pursued in the next chapter Why Notorious Defendants were acquitted or condemned (VIII. 1), which deals with those whose trials were influenced for better or worse by factors extra quaestionem. Here again moral guidance is provided by reference to aequitas (VIII. 1. abs. 2):

misericordia ergo illam quaestionem, non aequitas, rexit, quoniam quae innocentiae tribui nequierat absolutio, respectui puerorum data est.

So it was pity, not fairness, that guided that enquiry, since acquittal could not be granted to innocence, but was given out of consideration for the boys.

That the purpose of this chapter is to provide examples of miscarriages of justice is confirmed by the preface of the next chapter (VIII. 2):

Publicis iudiciis adiciam privata, quorum magis aequitas quaestionum delectare quam immoderata turba offendere lectorem poterit.

I shall follow judgements in public cases by those in private ones; in the latter the reader will be pleased by the fairness of the proceedings rather than be shocked by the unrestrained mob.

The use of the term aequitas, fairness, in the preface is programmatic. The use of the term delectare relates to Valerius's comments elsewhere (e.g. VIII. 15 preface), that examples of moral conduct and its reward may please the reader. Instruction and entertainment are by no means incompatible for Valerius, and he makes a moral judgement upon each of the examples in the chapter (VIII. 2.4):

quid aliud hoc loci quam verecundiam illius saeculi laudemus, in quo tam minuti a pudore excessus puniebantur?

What should we praise here other than the propriety of that age in which such minor offences against good manners were punished?

As in Book II, Valerius compares the morality of past and present. The remaining chapters on the legal theme are short of examples and cursory in their treatment. The preface to Examinations by Torture explains their inclusion (VIII. 4):

Atque ut omnes iudiciorum numeros exequamur, quaestiones, quibus aut creditum non est aut temere habita fides est, referamus.

And in order to pursue all the types of judicial enquiry, let us discuss examinations by torture, to which either no credence was given, or to which belief was given too readily.

Valerius's audience are intended to find examples of this kind useful and their purpose is instructive. Examinations by Torture may be intended to exemplify Staunchness in Adversity (III. 8) in everyday life; the fact that the exemplars are slaves would show the use of a fortiori argument.¹⁵ These legal chapters are clearly included for the instruction of the audience, and could be applied in a number of ways; they would be relevant to those adjudicating on cases as well as those engaging in litigation.

The idea of providing practical guidance in everyday life also explains the inclusion of several chapters devoted to the subject of consolation. The subject of grief is, like that of Desperate Situations (VII. 6) and Old Age (VIII. 13), an unavoidable part of the human condition, and therefore one upon which Valerius feels obliged to provide moral guidance. This obligation is made incumbent on him by his claim to cover all aspects of human existence and therefore all moral dilemmas, a commitment which accounts for the variety of consolatory themes he includes. Consolatory motives are apparent in several chapters, for example Electoral Defeats (VII. 5):

Campi quoque repraesentata condicio ambitiosam ingredientis viam ad fortius sustinendos parum prosperos comitiorum eventus utiliter instruxerit, quia propositis ante oculos clarissimorum virorum repulsis ut non minore cum spe honores, ita prudentiore cum animi iudicio petent meminerintque nefas non esse aliquid ab omnibus uni negari.

A description of the nature of the hustings should also usefully teach those setting out upon the path of ambition resolutely to endure the less successful results of the elections. For, when the electoral defeats of eminent men have been vividly depicted before them, they will then aspire with no less hope to achieve office, but with a more realistic attitude of mind, and they may recall that it is no crime for the community to refuse something to the individual.

Valerius here professes the usefulness of his examples and his clear instructive purpose of encouragement and consolation. Though the anecdotes date to the Republican period, they are relevant to any political system as examples of constantia, staunchness, in a given situation. This chapter, like others, is concerned with practical exercise of virtue in a certain field. Valerius wishes to make the unusual circumstances of his examples relevant to the everyday life of his audience. The chapter Prestige (II. 10) shows some relationship to the motivation of Electoral Defeats in putting moral greatness above electoral success.

Valerius also regards moral greatness as more important than material wealth, and includes a chapter Poverty, the theme of which is manifest in the preface (IV. 4):

omnia nimirum habet qui nihil concupiscit, eo quidem certius † quam cuncta possidet, quia dominium rerum conlabi solet, bonae mentis usurpatio nullum tristioris fortunae recipit incursum.

Undoubtedly the man who desires nothing is the man who has everything; and much more so than he who possesses everything, since it is common for mastery of material wealth to be lost. The possession of a heart at ease is proof against the onset of more impoverished circumstances.

However, the consolatory motives of the chapter are not made explicit until its concluding homily, which stresses the superiority of moral rectitude to financial prosperity (IV. 4.11):

Haec igitur exempla respicere, his adquiescere solaciis debemus, qui parvulos census nostros numquam querellis vacuos esse sinimus … iuro nullas divitias talium virorum paupertati posse praeferri.

We, who never allow our meagre means to be free of complaints, should therefore look back to these examples, and be satisfied with their consolation … I swear that no riches could be preferred to the poverty of men such as these.

Valerius connects the consolatory and moralistic motives in this chapter by the contrast between past and present morality (IV. 4.7):

Anguste se habitare nunc putat cuius domus tantum patet, quantum Cincinnati rura patuerunt.

These days a man thinks he resides in cramped quarters if his house extends only as far as did the estates of Cincinnatus.

This chapter also refers to the idea that the stability of the state is dependent on morality, a notion equally prominent in the previous chapter, Restraint and Self-Control, which strikes a contrast between ancient and modern morality and emphasizes that moral excellence is more important than wealth (IV. 3.7, 13):

nunc quo ventum est? a servis impetrari vix potest ne eam supellectilem fastidiant, qua tunc consul uti non erubuit.

Now what have things come to? You can hardly get slaves not to despise the utensils which once a consul was not ashamed to use.

nec quantum auri et argenti sed quantum amplitudinis pondus secum ferret aestimabatur.

It was not the measure of a man's gold and silver but the weight of his integrity which used to be calculated.

The emphasis on this idea means that Restraint and Self-Control (IV. 3) fulfils an important role in introducing the themes found in Poverty (IV. 4) and linking the two moral purposes of guidance and consolation. Poverty is concerned with showing how one ought to act in such circumstances, and gives examples of the practice of Restraint and Self-Control in the everyday world. Study and Diligence (VIII. 7) and Old Age (VIII. 13) are similarly related to each other, since Old Age is concerned with the exercise of Study and Diligence in a certain situation, and provides both consolation and guidance as to how one should deal with this inevitable aspect of the human condition (VIII. 13).¹⁶

One of the most popular consolatory topics of the age was that of Fortune, which Valerius includes in the chapter Changes of Character and Fortune (VI. 9):

Multum animis hominum et fiduciae adicere et sollicitudinis detrahere potest morum ac fortunae in claris viris recognita mutatio, sive nostros status sive proximorum [ingenia] contemplemur: nam cum aliorum fortunas spectando ex condicione abiecta atque contempta emersisse claritatem videamus, quid aberit quin et ipsi meliora de nobis semper cogitemus.

Changes of character and fortune in famous men are, when examined, able to endow men's minds with much confidence, and remove much anxiety, whether we consider our own situation or that of our nearest and dearest. For when we, in looking at the destinies of others, see that renown has emerged from ignoble and lowly circumstances, is it inappropriate that we should always think on better prospects for ourselves?

The recommendation of the solace to be gained from the contemplation of others' misery is the main purpose of this programmatic preface. However, Valerius's consolatory purpose extends beyond the hackneyed theme of the instability of Fortune. He also consoles by examples of character changes; the reference in the preface to proximorum ingenia and the fact that all the examples of character changes (VI. 9.1-6; ext. 1-3) concern dissolute young men who later became great men of the state, shows that these stories are intended to console parents dismayed by their wayward offspring. Here again the moral and consolatory purposes are interlinked, since in every case the conversion is from bad to good moral conduct.

Similarly, the preface to Valerius's next chapter, Good Fortune, is relevant to his moral purpose (VII. 1):

Volubilis fortunae conplura exempla retulimus, constanter propitiae admodum pauca narrari possunt. quo patet eam adversas res cupido animo infligere, secundas parco tribuere. eadem, ubi malignitatis oblivisci sibi imperavit, non solum plurima ac maxima, sed etiam perpetua bona congerit.

I have described a number of examples of the fickleness of Fortune, but only a few examples of consistently favourable Fortune can be described. From this it is evident that Fortune eagerly inflicts adversity, but grants success sparingly. When she has forced herself to forget her malicious nature, she heaps up rewards which are not only considerable and bountiful but also eternal.

The concept of the capriciousness of Fortune is counterbalanced in this chapter by casting Fortune in the role of an agency whose rewards are sometimes consistent and even overwhelming. The second anecdote in this brief chapter enables Valerius, through the character of Apollo, to make the point, familiar in Valerius's consolatory chapters, that material wealth is no guarantee of happiness. Valerius dilutes the idea of the randomness of Fortune which conflicts with his view of divine intervention in human affairs, and religious, consolatory and moralistic ideas become interlinked.

The other theme on which Valerius provides consolatory examples is that of death. This subject Valerius deals with by means of several different types of anecdote. The usual ideas in this kind of consolation are the need for moderation in grief, the inconsistency of Fortune, others who have borne death bravely, and the idea that sometimes death is to be preferred to life.¹⁷

Valerius includes a brief chapter Parents who Steadfastly endured the Death of Children (V. 10), and the emphasis here is on the practice of Staunchness in Adversity (III. 8), in particular everyday circumstances; the consolatory purpose is obvious. It is worth remembering in relation to the usefulness of this chapter how much more frequently this kind of consolation would have been needed in the ancient world (Balsdon, 1969, pp. 88f.; Brunt, 1971, pp. 131f.; Hopkins, 1983, pp. 218-26).

The other chapter explicitly devoted to the theme of death is Unusual Deaths (IX. 12), which begins with a lengthy homily on the futility of hoping for a long life or of living without achievement. Despite references to this standard theme of consolatory literature throughout the chapter, the treatment lacks the moralizing one might expect, and the rather bizarre tales at first sight fail to be relevant to the points made in the preface. It is, however, in the preface to the next chapter, The Greed for Life (IX, 13), that Valerius clarifies his reasons for including Unusual Deaths:

Verum quia excessus e vita et fortuitos et viriles, quosdam etiam temerarios oratione attigimus, subiciamus nunc aestimationi enerves et effeminatos, ut ipsa conparatione pateat quanto non solum fortior sed etiam sapientior mortis interdum quam vitae sit cupiditas.

But since in our discourse we have touched upon departures from life both accidental and brave, and some even reckless, let us now make a judgement on those which were cowardly and unmanly, so that it may be clear from the comparison how the desire for death may be not only more courageous but sometimes even more sensible than that for life.

The two chapters are intended to illustrate how an early death may be a blessing and a prolonged life a curse. This theme was of great importance in consolation; any death, no matter how bizarre, is better than the miserable life of the exemplars of The Greed for Life. These chapters are included not only for consolation, but also for moral instruction, and the concept of just deserts reappears (IX. 13.2):

Ipsa verba tale flagitium narrantis secum luctantur, nec silentio amica, quia occultari non meretur.

The very words of one who describes such a scandal struggle with themselves; nor is silence favourable, for it does not deserve to be concealed.

The purpose of moral guidance and consolation is also a feature of the sixth chapter of Ancient Customs (II. 6), which is entirely composed of foreign examples on the themes of grief and facing death bravely. By mixing examples of suicide with those of the funeral customs of foreign nations the consolatory and moral purposes are both fulfilled. In all of these anecdotes Valerius approves those who feel neither fear nor grief. This is his comment on the Massilians, who have no funeral rites (II. 6.7):

etenim quid adtinet aut humano dolori indulgeri aut divino numini invidiam fieri, quod inmortalitatem suam nobiscum partiri noluerit?

So what is the point of giving oneself up to mortal grief or becoming jealous of the divine power of the gods, because it has refused to share immortality with us?

Similarly, he praises the attitude of the Cimbri and Celtiberians who refuse to survive a fallen leader and prefer to die in battle rather than by disease, and of the Thracians, who celebrate deaths and mourn births (II. 6.12). In both of these anecdotes, Valerius praises courage in the face of death and describes them as worthy of laus, the reward of virtus. The latter anecdote also refers to the idea in the Greed for Life that life may be more miserable than death.

Valerius considers the Lycian custom of men wearing women's clothes to distract their minds from grief (II. 6.13), and the Indian women who mount their husband's funeral pyre as an act of devotion (II. 6.14). Thus the dual purposes of consolation and moral guidance on the ethics of suicide are fulfilled. As in Ancient Customs (II. 1-6) Valerius employs antiquarianism in order to make moralistic points, and shows the embodiment in ancient customs of virtues which he discusses in their own right elsewhere (II. 6.11 is an example of Friendship, II. 6.12 of Wise Deeds and Remarks, and II. 6.14 and 15 of Marital Love). The theme is not comparative customs connected with death, but how a man should face death; the author's moral purpose is manifested in the dual aims of consolation and moral guidance.

Most of Valerius's chapters are devoted to virtues, others to their practical exercise and to matters of moral ambiguity, but there are also those devoted to vices. It is equally significant for Valerius's moral purpose that he includes such chapters at all, and that they form a comparatively small part of the work.¹⁸

He is, nevertheless, wary of including chapters of this kind lest their influence should adversely affect his audience's morality. This caution is apparent in two instances where chapters devoted to opposing qualities are juxtaposed—in the conclusions to Ingratitude (V. 3) and Men who failed to live up to the Achievements of their Famous Parents (III. 5):

Sed omittamus ingratos et potius de piis loquamur: aliquanto enim satius est favorabili quam invisae rei vacare.

But let us pass over the ungrateful and speak rather of the conscientious; for it is more profitable to apply one's time to useful rather than negative material.

Animadverto in quam periculosum iter processerim. itaque me ipse revocabo, ne, si reliqua eiusdem generis naufragia consectari perseveravero, aliqua inutili relatione inplicer.

I perceive how perilous is the road along which I have embarked, and accordingly restrain myself of my own volition, lest if I should continue to follow up the remaining human debris of this kind I might become involved in some unproductive narrative.

These statements suggest that examples of vice are not as useful for the moral guidance of the reader and that they may have a detrimental effect, hence their cursory treatment in the work as a whole. Nevertheless, Valerius is keen to insist that the chapters devoted to vices are necessary and explains to his readers why this is so, again in two places where chapters on opposing qualities are juxtaposed, in the preface to Greed for Life (IX. 13), quoted above at p. 77, and in the preface to Gratitude (V. 2):

Gratas vero animi significationes et ingrata facta libuit oculis subicere, ut vitio ac virtuti iusta merces aestimationis ipsa conparatione accederet … prioremque locum obtineant quae laudem quam quae reprehensionem merentur.

I was inclined next to look at expressions of gratitude and ungrateful actions, so that by comparison the just reward due to virtue and vice might become clear … let those examples deserving praise achieve precedence over those deserving censure.

Comparison is the motive for the inclusion of vices; Valerius realizes that the best way of making a point is by contrast. In both cases he deliberately deals with the virtue before the corresponding vice, and in the preface to Gratitude he makes this technique explicit;¹⁹ this is reflected on the larger scale since most of the chapters devoted to vices occur in the last book. The inclusion of vices is also relevant to the preface of Anger and Hatred, where Valerius states that the gods themselves make men exemplifications of good or bad moral conduct (see p. 66-7). By including exemplars of vices Valerius is able to put across his message in both a positive and negative way, thus doubling the impact of his message by using the opposite angle. This technique with examples is recommended by orators and employed by other moralists (Wardman, 1974, p. 26; Plutarch, Demetrius I. 4-5; Pseudo-Aristotle, Rhetorica ad Alexandrum VIII. 1429a; Seneca the Elder, Controversiae IX. 2.27; Seneca, Anger III. 22.1, ‘et haec cogitanda sunt exempla, quae vites, et illa ex contrario, quae sequaris …’).

In those chapters that deal with virtues Valerius is keen to condemn the opposite vices; this is not sufficient to point an effective contrast, but does precondition the reader's attitude to the chapters in Book IX.²⁰ The ‘just reward’ of the preface to Ingratitude is a theme in Book IX, where it is related to the idea that the stability of any city or state is dependent on morality, so that we find examples of states which have fallen because of vice (IX. 1. ext. 2; 3; 6; IV. 3 preface for the same idea).

The idea of comparison is significant of the author's didactic intent. The preface to the first chapter of Book IX, Luxury and Lusts, reveals another reason for the inclusion of examples of vices, and a previously unsuspected aspect of Valerius's moral purpose (IX. 1):

Blandum etiam malum luxuria, quam accusare aliquanto facilius est quam vitare, operi nostro inseratur, non quidem ut ullum honorem recipiat, sed ut se ipsa recognoscens ad paenitentiam inpelli possit.

Luxury, an alluring vice which is somewhat easier to reproach than to avoid, should also be included in my work, not so that it should receive any praise, but so that by recognition of its own nature it may be induced to reform its ways.

Valerius shows his earlier caution by emphasizing, right at the beginning of the book, that the subsequent examples are not to be imitated. However, this preface also presents a new aspect of Valerius's moral purpose, that by writing he hopes to encourage men who are now more devoted to vice to change their ways and pursue virtue instead. The fact that he makes this suggestion at the beginning of the most extensive treatment of vices in the work shows its importance and illustrates his moralistic aims.

In opposition to vices, Valerius also includes chapters devoted to the public recognition and just reward of moral conduct as part of his moral scheme. The idea of just reward is present throughout the work (see p. 54f. above), but concentrated in two particular chapters. The first is Prestige (II. 10), which concerns great men towards whom unusual respect was shown because of their moral conduct, and the importance of this idea is signified by the copious praise and apostrophe which characterizes this chapter, most notably in the example of Cato (II. 10.8):

quibus opibus, quibus imperiis, quibus triumphis hoc datum est? exiguum viri patrimonium, astricti continentia mores, modicae clientelae, domus ambitioni clausa, paterni generis una [inl.] imago, minime blanda frons, sed omnibus numeris perfecta virtus.

To what wealth, commands, or triumphs was this honour ever given? The man possessed only a poor inheritance, a character bound by self-control, modest patronage, a house closed to ambition, only one ancestral image in his father's family, a manner not at all charming—but a moral excellence perfect on every criterion.

Prestige rather than public office is presented here as the reward of moral rectitude. This chapter is entirely devoted to persuading the reader to pursue virtue by holding out as inducement the justified respect of his fellow citizens.

The same themes are apparent and more explicit in the preface to The Rewards of Virtue (VIII. 15):

Candidis autem animis voluptatem praebuerint in conspicuo posita quae cuique magnifica merito contigerint, quia aeque praemiorum virtutis atque operum contemplatio iucunda est, ipsa natura nobis alacritatem sumministrante, cum honorem industrie appeti et exsolvi grate videmus.

Generous souls may take pleasure in the open display of splendid prizes that have been earned, because it is equally enjoyable to look upon the rewards of virtue and upon her works. Nature herself provides us with incentive, when we behold high office being diligently sought and gladly performed.

In its emphasis upon the rewards of virtue this preface is reminiscent of both Prestige and Gratitude, and underlines the same important moral message. Contemplation of the rewards of virtue should be enjoyable for the reader, and the entire purpose of these chapters is to illustrate the rewards of virtue and thus incite the reader to attain them through outstanding moral conduct.

Notes

1. The important role played by the contrast of virtues and vices has been noted by, for example, Bliss (1951), p. 7; Guerrini (1980), p. 90, n. 33; Paladini (1957), p. 232. Bliss does not consider this contrast incompatible with the role of rhetorical handbook, and states that the arrangement of the work according to this contrast is in the interests of originality and readability rather than in pursuance of a lofty moral purpose.

2. Other references to the concept of just reward occur at, for example, I. 1.13; I. 1.14; I. 5.2; III. 2.22; IV. 1. ext. 2; IV. 3.9; IV. 7.5; V. 2. ext. 4; VIII. 15; IX. 2. ext. 9.

3. Rashness and Fury have their own chapters in Book IX.

4. For confirmation of Sejanus’s identity see Briscoe (1993), pp. 401-2.

5. Cf. V. 2 ext. 4: ‘… by these and similar examples the goodness of the human race is enhanced and perpetrated. These are the fires, theses are the spurs, which cause mankind to burn with desire to give aid and to win merit.’

6. Valerius’s attitude is coincident with that of Tiberius; Suetonius, Tiberius 19; Tacitus, Annals III.21.

7. For Tiberius’s wish to revive earlier attitudes towards women, see Suetonius Tiberius 35 and Tacitus, Annals II. 85. On divorce at Rome see Carcopino (1946), pp. 95f.; Balsdon (1962), pp. 216f.; Corbett (1930), chapters 5 and 9.

8. In a.d. 24 Oscan farce and certain forms of dancing were forbidden on moral grounds: Tacitus, Annals IV. 14.

9. See also p. 68f, [in Practical Ethics for Roman Gentlemen: The Work of Valerius Maximus, University of Exeter Press, 1996.]. Compare III. 9.2, the criticism of bachelors with Suetonius, Augustus 34.

10. In the work as a whole there are less vices than either virtues or ambiguous qualities. See note 18 below.

11. Cf. I. 5.1. where the author’s belief in omens is evident. Also, I. 6.3: ‘… the gods showed the way to an unexpected victory by a remarkable prodigy …’ Other examples in the chapter warn how the rashness and boldness of ignoring divine signs led to disaster, e.g.: I 7.1: ‘… what else should we think but that it was brought about by divine intervention that the life already destined for immortality should not suffer undeserved violence.’ I. 7.6: ‘the doom overhanging C. Gracchus was clearly and plainly indicated in his sleep.’ On Wonders and Valerius’s criteria of belief see Chapter 9.

12. Valerius also makes this point elsewhere: IX. 3. ext. 1: ‘… but when faithfulness to my purpose reminds me that everything should be included …’ IX. 11: ‘Now since I am reviewing the good and evil aspects of human existence with illustrations by examples …’

13. Valerius’s ambiguity may reflect Tiberius’s inconsistency; compare Suetonius Tiberius 13 with Tacitus, Annals II. 67 and II. 31.

14. For example, VI. 1; VI. 6. ext. 1, for other deifications of virtue. On the vividness of personified virtues see Fears (1981), p. 845.

15. Cf. Seneca on illness, p. 26 [in Practical Ethics for Roman Gentlemen: The Work of Valerius Maximus, University of Exeter Press, 1996.].

16. The idea of industria, diligence, is evident in the preface to the chapter. See Chapter 9.

17. These four ideas dominate, for example, Plutarch’s Ad Apollonium: Examples of moderation in grief; 4, 8, 9, 19, 21, 22, 28, 29. Examples of inconsistency of Fortune; 5, 6, 30-1. Examples of those who have borne death bravely; 33. Examples of how death is not an evil 10-16, 27.

    Compare also Seneca’s Consolatio ad Marciam: Examples of moderation in grief; 2-5. Examples of those who have borne death bravely; 12.6-16; 4. Examples proving death is not an evil; 19.4-21. Examples of the inconstancy of Fortune; 16.5, 22.1-3.

18. Vices are covered in chapters III. 5; V. 3; VII. 8a; IX. 1-9, 11, 13, 15. The total number of chapters is ninety-one. See Wardman (1974), p. 26, on Plutarch, ‘His (Plutarch’s) purpose will be adequately fulfilled if he provides one or two examples (of vice).’

19. Cf. III. 3. ext. 7, which acts as an introduction to the juxtaposed chapters Men of Humble Origins who achieved Honour (III. 4) and Men who failed to live up to the Achievements of their Famous Parents (III. 5) where Valerius again states that he will deal with the virtue before the vice.

20. For example lust and greed are mentioned in the preface to Restraint and Self-Control (IV. 3).

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