SOURCE: "Thucydides," in Progress in the Greece of Thucydides, North Holland Publishing, 1977, pp. 21-38.

[In the excerpt that follows, den Boer enters the debate over Thucydides' views on progress as a necessary part of history—that is, whether events in time necessarily "progress" toward some higher condition. He concludes, through an examination of the opening chapters of the History and contemporary Greek thought in general, that such a notion of history did not exist for Thucydides.]

One author who was not impressed by the accomplishments of man was Thucydides. Nevertheless, in the eyes of many scholars he is one of the champions of progress. "More important is the idea of progress to which the Archaeology gives expression"—[J. H. Finley] pronounces. Let us now try to determine what Thucydides really said. We are entitled to do so because scholars of repute oppose the views of Mme [Jacqueline] de Romilly and J. H. Finley. I mention Hans-Peter Stahl's book, Thukydides, Die Stellung des Menschen im geschichtlichen Prozess, which was published in 1966, as an example of such opposition. [Stahl writes,] "it seems that Thucydides himself sees the importance of what was the development of human knowledge not in change (Fortschritt) but in the determinant factor of might, which remains the same".

To discover who is right it is necessary to deal carefully with chapters 1-19 of Book I. I hope that my paraphrases of passages from this famous introduction will give a preliminary answer.

Chapter I. Thucydides writes about a unique event— a great war—the greatest disturbance in the history of the Greeks. His studies led him to the conclusion that the history of the preceding period, compared to his own, indicated no greatness, either in warfare or in anything else.

Chapter II. In ancient times, the country which is now called Hellas had no settled population. There was a series of migrations of various tribes who were constantly under the pressure of invaders stronger than they were: there was no commerce, no safe communication routes, either by land or by sea, and because of these factors the tribes were always prepared to abandon their territory.

From these two chapters alone it already becomes clear that we have to enlarge upon the statements of Stahl. The historian is anxious to prove that the Peloponnesian war holds more importance than any other event before it. Such digressions are familiar and are called αὐξήσεις, additions to show how important the subject is. For this purpose the writer has τεχμήϱια, which he will emphasise in the following chapters. These 'signs' will demand our attention: in chapter 2 some such signs are already evident, viz. invasions, no settled population, no commerce, no safe communication. It is important therefore, for us to be sceptical from the first of the idea set out by Romilly in her important article. She tries to persuade us that the problem of whether 'progress' occurs in I. 1-21, is a simple one. As is to be expected, her answer is in the affirmative, although she has to admit that the exposition deals with the importance of wars and states, the extension of political groups and the size of their means with which to determine the scale of warfare. But, so it is alleged, this is only the framework. The historian's tenet or doctrine is of a clear affirmation, coherent and outspoken, of progress. In my opinion this statement is misconceived and stems from prejudice.

However, Thucydides does give 'signs' for his own view that before the Peloponnesian war there had been no great military achievement in Hellas. The underlying causes for this were:

1. No settled population.
2. Inhabitants always prepared to abandon their own territory.
3. No commerce.
4. No safe communication by land or sea.
5. No surplus left over for capital.
6. Production only of necessities.
7. No regular system of agriculture.
8. This all culminated in lack of protection by fortifications.
9. Invasions at any moment.
10. No reluctance of the population in moving from their homes.

Point 10 brings us back to point 1.

And all these statements are combined by two other signs which on the surface appear to oppose each other, but which in fact do corroborate the passage as a whole:

1. The most frequent changes of population occurred where the soil was most fertile (e.g. Thessaly, Boeotia and most of the Peloponnese).
2. Attica was remarkably free from political disunity because of the poverty of her soil.

In the conclusions of chapters I and II the 'sign' of Attica is an important and excellent example of the historian's theory "that it was because of migration that there was an uneven development elsewhere; for when people were driven out of other areas of Greece by war or other disturbances, the most powerful of them first took refuge in Athens which was a stable society, finally becoming citizens of Athens. The influx of people created such an increase in the population that it resulted in Attica becoming too small for its inhabitants and so colonies of people were sent out to Ionia".

It should be emphasized again, that in general the author's aim was only to explain how this great war could have occurred. This point is sometimes forgotten by modern commentators. During the course of time there was a development of circumstances which brought about the possibility of war. The purpose of Thucydides in the Archaeology was to elucidate the conditions which led to 'the greatest war', and there is no passage, not even a sentence, which does not serve this purpose. There is no need for detail, and the author does not dwell on it; he merely gives the main outline of the theme by the use of brief 'signs' rather than by the use of particulars.

Chapter III. The lack of unity among the inhabitants of early Greece can be confirmed by yet another observation, from Homeric poetry. The words 'Hellas' and 'Hellenes' as a common name for land and population are late in appearing. There is no record of action in any form being taken by Hellas as a whole before the event of the Trojan War. Even the poet Homer, who lived many years after this war, refers only to the population of a very restricted area—the inhabitants of Phthiotis—when using the name Hellenes. It was the followers of Achilles who came from Phthiotis. Neither does Homer use the word 'barbarians', which proves that the people who were later known as 'Hellenes' did not see themselves as a united whole, as distinguishable from foreign outsiders. "In any case these various Hellenic states, weak in themselves and lacking in communications with one another, took no kind of collective action before the time of the Trojan War. And they could not have united even for the Trojan expedition unless they had previously acquired a greater knowledge of seafaring".

Chapter IV. The end of the previous chapter opens the way for the next 'sign': the first Thalassocracy of Minos, Lord of the Cyclades islands, in which he founded most of the colonies. One of the results of his power was security for seafaring people. "It is reasonable to suppose that he did his best to put down piracy in order to secure his own revenues".

Chapter V. This chapter takes the reader back to the remote past, piracy and the social position of the pirate. Piracy was practised by all the inhabitants of the coastal areas, and success in it was a reason for pride. A similar form of robbery was also prevalent on land.

Chapter VI. (Even now there are still people who live by these means). Personal security demanded the carrying of weapons and people were hesitant to discontinue this practice. In spite of their way of life being filled with menace and danger the Athenians were among the first to lay aside their arms and to adopt a more relaxed and luxurious form of living. A case in point here concerns clothing, and there are two stages to be discerned. In the first stage it was customary for the older members to wear costly clothes, and this was also the fashion among their kinsmen in Ionia. Later came a less pretentious way of dressing—more after the present-day fashion—which was first adopted by the Lacedaemonians. The custom of nakedness when playing games also comes from the Lacedaemonians. Formerly, Greek athletes wore loin cloths, even at the Olympic Games, and this is still the custom among some of the barbarians. "And one could show that the early Hellenes had many other similar customs to those of the presentday barbarians".

An additional observation may not be out of place here. "Human (=Greek) Progress" is not emphasized in this chapter. Its main content concerns the disappearance of violence,—the wearing of arms in ordinary life being no longer necessary, the change in people's manners, and an easier mode of life, illustrated by the trend towards a more simple form of clothing.

Chapter VII. After discussing the conditions of living in the previous chapter Thucydides returns to the question of navigation and its consequences. The art of navigation had been developed at a relatively late stage. A 'sign' of that part of the reconstruction of the past is that older settlements were founded inland, whereas the cities founded in recent times, when navigation had become safer, were built in coastal areas. The geographic position of these settlements protected the newly built harbours.

Chapter VIII. It was because of this protection that attacks from the sea became less profitable and regular commerce began to flourish: it also became possible for Minos to organize a navy and to improve the sea communication routes.

The introduction of this passage in particular confirms the widespread piracy (which was checked by Minos). According to tradition the islands of the Aegean were originally inhabited by the Carians. When Delos was purified by the Athenians all the graves on the island were opened up, and it was discovered that over half the bodies were those of Carians. This could be recognised by the types of weapons buried with the bodies, as well as by the method of burial. It is important to remember that this, and other archaeological remarks have no direct relation to the central theme—the accumulation of power; he does not say that the Carians exerted their military power over an extensive area. In this connection we should bear in mind von Fritz' observation that the opening of the graves bore out the traditional tales. We are therefore confronted here with one of the first attempts, if not the first, to combine … the 'signs', with archaeological evidence. The successful organisation of Minos drove out the pirates and brought prosperity to the coastal regions. The results of this prosperity brought with them differences of wealth and power. Minos' measures brought about possibilities for power so that a situation arose in which the coastal areas were able to acquire wealth and their population to lead a more settled way of life. Some areas were more prosperous than others. Differences occurred. Through the acquisition of capital resources the more powerful cities were able to subject the people of the weaker cities. Hellas had already developed along these lines to a certain degree at the time of the expedition to Troy.

Chapters IX-XI. The Trojan War will occupy us only briefly. The appreciation of Thucydides' argument, and in particular the question of history contra legend, can be omitted. According to Thucydides the war was the result of one of the concentrations of power, the development of which he had traced in the preceding chapter. In modern literature the evaluation of these chapters, which are filled with names from myths and legends, is not always favourable towards Thucydides. However, this is of no concern to us at the moment. The sensible middle course favoured by K. von Fritz seems to me highly preferable to the hyper-criticisms of Ed. Schwartz and the apologetics of Gomme. If nevertheless I had to make a choice between the interpretations of Schwartz and Gomme, I would side with the latter because of his awareness of the tremendous difficulties in treating this subject from a remote past. To have seen the history in mythology as a central problem, is of great merit. Thucydides perceived this, as he did also in the case of the early history of Attica (II 15-17). In my opinion there is no value in discussing the problem of whether or not we should blame him for mentioning Agamemnon and Pelops. The most important point is that the idea of progress is not mentioned in his account. His impressive treatment of the difficult problems in the early history of Greece has been the reason why scholars have repeatedly made the mistake of comparing him with his predecessors in this respect and seeing progress within the evaluation of the past. This, though, is not the progress of human society as such. Here is the point at which scholars part company. It does, of course, depend upon the lens through which we are compelled to look. I, for one, do not think that the following quotations have any bearing on progress.

1-1: "all the evidence leads me to conclude that these periods (sc. the remote past) were not great periods either in warfare or in anything else".

3-1: "the weakness of the early inhabitants" (before the Trojan War).

3-4: "these various Hellenic states … took no kind of collective action before the time of the Trojan War".

10-5: "not a large number went on the expedition" (against Troy).

11-1: "the cause (of this small number) was lack of money and want of supplies".

11-3: "as it was, just as lack of money was the reason why previous expeditions were not really considerable, so in the course of this one (the Trojan War), we shall find … that it was inferior to its fame".

In all these quotations Thucydides attempts to put forward his own subject as being greater than the events of the more distant past. He does not speak about human misery ('misère') but about military 'weakness'. Before the time of the Trojan War the things lacking were the necessary equipment, and the shortage of materials, but not the needs of the population.

When we look at Thuc. I 1-11 as a whole we can see that, from a modern point of view, the most vulnerable parts of the exposition are those which draw attention to the most important historical problems.

1. How did the Greeks become conscious of their unity, opposed to the Barbarians? His answer is that Hellen, the son of Deucalion, when he became strong, was invited to the aid of other cities. I see this act as military aid, and cannot endorse von Fritz who draws the conclusion that the fact that Hellen and his sons were invited to other cities shows an awareness of cultural unity, not a unity of language or of race. Neither the first nor the two others are even remotely connected with the passage as I see it. The other states invite them as allies in a military enterprise. So Thucydides proclaims military reasons for the unity of the Greeks.
2. Commerce and economic growth are only possible when the sea is free from piracy. That means also that one state has to possess the maritime power to impose its peace on the others.
3. The origin of power in the Greek world. It started with Mycenae, which nobody nowadays will deny.
4. The Trojan War. The historicity was never doubted in ancient times. Thucydides scrutinizes the circumstances under which such an enterprise could take place.

We must agree with von Fritz that to put these four problems clearly before his audience is 'eine grossartige Leistung'. Might is proclaimed without any moral commentary. H.-P. Stahl's statements seem to be the most satisfactory.

There are still eight more chapters to be treated and these deal with the more recent past. Here especially, there is the temptation to glorify one's own time. This temptation is sometimes irresistible to the human mind. Did Thucydides have the intellectual power to resist this popular view? The question is worth our consideration.

Chapter XII deals with the period after the Trojan War. The summary is very brief and it is not possible for any ancient or modern historian to do more until rather more progress has been made with recent archaeological research. We might safely say that in this chapter Thucydides sketched the decline of power only "very superficially". But, we can ask, who has done it better over the centuries? And in any case his purpose was to produce no more than a superficial sketch. A superficial sketch of this type left the way clear for him to deal with the new concentrations of power and with the question of how such concentrations of power could arise. He alludes briefly to the period of colonization, because this was yet another means of gaining power. Even making allowance for brevity, the words "Ionia and most of the islands were colonized by the Athenians, the Peloponnesians founded most of the colonies in Italy and Sicily", are very unsatisfactory. They should be understood as meaning only that colonization was one of the great causes of enhancement of power which led to the war, and be taken as a hint as to what would occur much later.

Chapters XIII-XIV. It is often said that this passage lacks coherence, but I am not convinced of this. Thucydides makes himself perfectly clear. He demonstrates the differences between monarchy and tyranny from the position the economy holds in both forms of government. The patriarchal kings get their 'share', their "gifts of honour"—I insist on giving the original meaning to #special char# mentioned in this chapter. However with the introduction of new forms of wealth the old aristocracy—which inherited its power from the kings— was no longer master of the situation. As Hellas grew more powerful and continued to acquire still more wealth than before, tyrannies began to be established in most of the cities, along with the increase of their revenue, whereas before that there had been hereditary kingships based on fixed prerogatives.

A shift of power follows, and a city organised along this pattern of tyranny and based upon the higher and lower levels of its citizens, requires centres of power. One such centre of power was the navy.

When Thucydides' account is reconstructed in this way much of what appears strange and 'unfinished' becomes clear. He does not speak about the oligarchies which proceed tyranny, because they were not essential to his purpose—the development of the state and the powers of the state. He does not touch upon all possible centres of power, but only upon maritime power, for he knows that it is precisely this which will explain the military conflict. Corinth and Athens rise from the shadows of time. It comes as no surprise that Thucydides places maritime history at the centre of the stage, so to speak, for he had already done so in chapter X, when discussing the partners of Mycenae in the Trojan War. He does the same again in chapter XIII, first with Corinth, when he mentions shipbuilding, the types of ships, and the construction of harbours and docks.

Here also I am disinclined to follow those scholars who accuse Thucydides of a passing and superficial treatment of his subject matter. In my opinion his report is remarkably to the point. Once again H.-P. Stahl's characterization of the 'Archaeology' of Thucydides proves to be the right one. All Thucydides' observations are centered around the development of power, which means that he needs no more than a minimum of material for his sketch. This is where the master reveals himself. He reveals himself as being not only master but also as an unbiased judge of persons and events. It does not seem accidental that this passage ends with the end of the naval history of Greece, at it were, through the achievements of Themistocles. Thucydides praises Themistocles elsewhere in what is, for him, unusual eulogy.

The particular mention given to the enormous achievements of the Phocaeans could be based on the oral tradition, or it might be due to the influence of other authors, among whom Hecataeus is likely to have been the first. I believe Thucydides was right to mention the founders of Massilia who, before they built their settlements there, had defeated the Carthaginians. After all, he could hardly have found a better illustration of such successful Greek initiative at sea.

Chapters XV and XVI are the counterparts of the two previous chapters. They are not so brilliantly worked to a climax, but nevertheless they serve the author's purpose well in his efforts to elucidate the development of power on land. The author himself explains the reasons for the impression of their being less satisfactory and lacking the depth of chapters XIII and XIV, when he states: "There was no warfare on land that resulted in any considerable accession of power". One might reproach him for viewing the wars on land only as important skirmishes between neighbours, for omitting the expansion of Argos and the power of its king Pheidon. But I repeat my earlier statement that Thucydides' intention was not to give a brief survey of history—he chose historical landmarks only for his main thesis, which was the development of concentrated power. I think that perhaps he was right in not considering the Messenian war as a part of the development of concentrated power. After all, in spite of the success of the wars, Sparta was, in the early stages, isolated from the mainstream of Greek development of power. So far as Thucydides was concerned, Greek development of power was connected with ephemeral alliances between states more than with the formation of leagues, and so far as archaic Sparta was concerned such alliances were not so evident.

The nearest approach to collective action was the ancient war between Chalcis and Eretria (the Lelantine war). During this war the rest of the Hellenic world sided with one or the other of the two combatants (end of Ch. XV). The counterpart to this conclusion is the fact that the different states which were isolated from the others suffered all sorts of obstacles to their continuous growth. The Ionian cities suffered greatly from their lack of alliances with each other. The Persian Empire stands as the great example of unity, subduing Lydia and the Greek cities in Asia and, "strong in the possession of the Phoenician navy", conquering the islands as well.

Chapter XVII. In the same perspective it is necessary to try to understand the failure of the tyrannies—even those which succeeded in maintaining themselves over shorter period: "since they had regard for their own interests only". The exceptions amongst these were the tyrants in Sicily who (as we have to interpret their being mentioned by the author) went beyond their immediate local interests. Indeed, the menace of Carthage and of the Siculi sometimes forced the Greek settlements to unite their forces.

From this we must conclude that in almost every case a concentration of power was lacking. This was the reason for so many states falling victims to the great powers, the Persians and the Lacedaemonians. Thucydides does not explain why these two forces were the exceptions. However much one would have liked to have the opinion of Thucydides about the Persian Empire, it did not concern him. His aim was the situation in his own time and an explanation of the predominant position of Sparta, which is given in the next chapter. Here, though, he does have to make some remarks on the glorious war against Persia.

Chapter XVIII and XIX. The conclusion of the former chapters is summarized in the last passage of chapter XVIII: "So for a long time the state of affairs everywhere in Hellas was such that nothing very remarkable could be done by any combination of powers and that even the individual cities were lacking in enterprise".

Now chapter XVIII brings forward another factor in the remarkable report of Thucydides: the stability of Sparta was based on the stability of its constitution. This idea was also present in the preceding chapter, if we bear in mind that the possibility for tyranny was made easier because of the lack of unity amongst the victims. Tyranny is always a product of political instability. Sparta had never been under tyranny and so continued as a politically stable society. This development was all the more remarkable since Thucydides knew that "from the time when the Dorians first settled in Sparta there had been a particularly long period of political disunity".

By taking Sparta as an example it can be seen that it is possible for a land state with no strong economic basis for power to be powerful as the result of a good and stable constitution. Such power, however, has its limits, and there are dangers which threaten its existence. Although there are great risks involved when there are numerous concentrations of rather weaker power: these are sometimes more dangerous than confrontations between two strong centres of power, because these provoke pockets of resistance. This phenomenon can be seen from chapters I-XVII, and is further confirmed in chapters XVIII-XIX; sometimes explicit statements on it are made, and sometimes it can be deduced by implication.

The Persian Wars demonstrate the creation of two different concentrations of power on mainland Greece—Athens and Sparta. This is shown in Chapter XVIII by the facts of Marathon, the naval preparation, and Sparta's command ten years later. Rivalry arose in spite of the common effort, and the war-time alliance was short-lived.

Chapter XIX underlines the significance of the two concentrations of power. Sparta and her allies, who did not have to pay tribute, Athens and her allies (whose fleets had been taken over in the course of time by Athens, with the exception of the fleets of Chios and Lesbos) who did have to pay contributions of money.

This then was the situation within the concentrations of power, and the purpose of Thucydides was to illustrate it in the chapters mentioned.

At the end of Thucydides' survey two things became clear. He works by the method of tekmèria—'signs'—. These 'signs' prove the importance of concentrations of power. Moreover, the economic factors are given more importance than was ever given by a Greek historian. Throughout the whole course of Greek historiography economic factors were never accorded much importance. As with so many great innovators, there were no successors to Thucydides, nor even imitators. When attention was given to economic factors during the new developments of historical research in modern times, Thucydides was not represented as a forerunner. The inspiration of these researchers was derived from (modern) social and economic sciences and not from antiquity. In antiquity all that was written about the influence of social and economic data was mostly too theoretical to be of any importance to the practical work of the historian, or it was limited to one or two observations about a restricted problem in a restricted period. Aristotle is a case in point here, and some data from Xenophon can illustrate it.

On the basis of the foregoing treatment of Thucydides' Archaeology, it is my intention to emphasize that a similar development can be traced concerning 'progress'. Thucydides does indeed give some examples of the improvement in the relationship between the human race and its environment, but these remarks are merely used as background for his main purpose, which was the exposition of the development of 'power'. It is therefore understandable that Lovejoy and Boas should have paid little attention to his work in general. One of the texts in G. H. Hildebrand's revised edition of F. J. Teggart, The Idea of Progress (1949), is taken from the Archaeology, but the great champions of Thucydides as a proponent of the idea of progress are Mme de Romilly and E. R. Dodds. A single quotation from Dodds is probably sufficient to illustrate their point of view: "Thucydides saw the past history of Greece as pursuing a gradual upward course". Others must judge between these words and my treatment. I must confess that I cannot find in Thucydides what Dodds states here in general terms.