SOURCE: "Works of St. Thomas and Their Literary Forms" in Toward Understanding Saint Thomas, translated by A. M. Landry and D. Hughes, Henry Regnery Company, 1964, pp. 79-99.

[In the following excerpt from a work originally published in French in 1950, Chenu asserts that Aquinas's works must be studied in relation to their genre. She then proceeds to outline the history of the reading, the question, the disputation, and the article.]

I. Thought and Literary Form

After a presentation in general outline of the broad cultural contexts of the life-work of Saint Thomas, it may seem that it is taking things from too far afield to begin a study of his works from an examination of their literary forms. In the very measure that they are works of the mind and the expression of a philosophy and of a wisdom, do they not lie beyond the reaches of any craft? Are they not free in their means of expression? Are they not like something detached and standing at a lofty distance away from stylistic artifice and convention?

In point of fact, however, such thinking is illusory and fundamentally a psychological error about the way even the most pure type of thinking is bound up with the modest tool of language and its processes. Embodied in language, a system of thought may only thus be grasped, that is, within the very formulae it has adopted and within the structures with which it has fitted itself out. The forms and structures of language are not neutral or interchangeable garments that must, as quickly as possible, be put aside. They are the permanent support of thought, so that by examining the forms in which a mind is dressed, one has a good chance of discovering its very inner workings. As a matter of fact, even in its general features, literary form is bound up with the way a mind goes about its thinking. Plato wrote dialogues, and with him, the myth-form was a tool of expression intimately bound up with his most profound intuitions. It was a tool, so to speak, substantially one with his genius. Augustine wrote "confessions," while Dionysius employed symbols, not as a mere literary whim, but rather to translate his own vision of the world. Saint Thomas wrote no dialogues, he wrote commentaries. He wrote no confessions, he gave us a summa. Due to his upbringing in the scholastic "craft," he tended to expunge symbols, except for those which classroom use had conventionalized and thereby rendered neutral. All his writings were the direct or indirect outcome of his professional work as a teacher. This fact cannot be immaterial.

Within the bounds of his craft as a Schoolman, however, the writings of Saint Thomas are nevertheless diversified. It is important to recognize that they vary in technique in accordance with teaching methods themselves. One cannot read one of his commentaries on Aristotle in the same manner that one would read one of his commentaries on Scripture. His Disputed Questions contain resources far different, both in power and in quality, from those found in the exactly corresponding sections of the Summa theologiae. As a literary construction, any one of his Quodlibeta is disconcerting for the modern mind.

Let us then first examine the general procedures of exposition that were applied in the university teaching of the XIIIth century. With this as a starting point, we shall then take up the several types of works that Saint Thomas composed.

II. The Procedures of Exposition

The "style" of the Scholastics in its development as well as in its modes of expression can be reduced, as if to its simple elements, to three procedures. These followed progressively one upon the other and typify, moreover, both their historical genesis and their progress in technique. First camne the lectio [reading]; from the reading was developed the quaestio [question]; from the question, the disputatio [disputation]; and in summas, the "article," somewhat as the residue of the disputed question, became the literary component.

1. The lectio

The entire medieval pedagogy was based on the reading of texts, and in the universities, scholasticism gave this type of work institutional form and enlarged upon it.

"One who aspires to wisdom should therefore apply himself to reading, learning, and meditation," wrote John of Salisbury¹, while. Hugh of Saint Victor observed: "There are two things in particular by which one is instructed for knowledge: namely, reading and meditation"². Whereas meditatio meant that by an assimilative process that was strictly personal one tended toward a grasp of the deeper nature of things not yet well known, lectio and doctrina were concerned with the handing over of a body of knowledge already discovered. Whereas doctrina stood for the complex of the means of instruction, by lectio was meant the process of acquiring science by means of the reading of texts. "Reading is the process of becoming informed in rules and precepts, from a study of written texts"³. There was the lectio of the master, or the magistral reading (lego librum illi); the lectio of the pupil, or the discipular reading (lego librum ab illo); and the lectio that was done in private, or the personal reading (lego librum)⁴. To teach meant to read, that is: to read in the technical sense. The professor "read" his text. The course that he gave was called a lectio; and he himself was referred to expressly as lector [reader].

When the teaching of Aristotle was put under a ban, the wording of the decree of prohibition forbade that his works be "read," that is, taught either publicly or in private, leaving open the question of their being studied by the individual on his own⁵. The old monastic term lectio, as found in the 48th chapter of the Rule of Saint Benedict, thus came to new life in a cultural and academic meaning.

If the word reading cane to have this renovation in meaning, and if there was such a broadening out of the thing it stood for—a broadening far beyond the learning potential derived from ordinary book reading—the reason lies in the recovery of the works of Antiquity and the prodigious success that they enjoyed. Men were anxious to explore these treasures, with the result that the latter became objects of study, that is, texts used in the teaching program of the day. Previously, in theology, the object of study was found in Scripture, the bearer of Revelation. The normal and in principle the necessary procedure for learning was to study the text itself of the Scriptures. Now, however, without any rule of religious belief compelling adhesion to their contents, other texts became the official matter in all the various fields of instruction. These the university enrolled, little by little, in the academic programs of study and required the book-dealers to place available copies of them at the student's disposal for a fixed sum^a.

In grammar, the auctores were Donatus whose Ars Minor and Ars Major presented in a single manual grammatical knowledge in two stages, and Priscian, whose Institutiones furnished the student with a basic text that was at once clear, solid, and abundant. In rhetoric, it was Cicero with his De Inventione, and the pseudo-Ciceronian Rhetorica ad Herennium, along with Quintilian and his Institutio Oratoria. In medicine, the texts were those of Galen and Constantine the African; in law, the various books of the Corpus Juris; and in philosophy, those of Porphyry and Boethius.

Gradually, texts began multiplying. After 1215, it soon became the general practice in theology to read the Sentences of Peter Lombard before the Scriptures. The future master in theology was required to have done a public reading of the Sentences, as in the case of Saint Thomas arriving at Paris, and having to exercise the office of "Bachelor of the Sentences" for a two-year period (1254-1256). In grammar, new texts set to verse supplanted those of Priscian: the Doctrinale of Alexander of Villedieu (1199), and the Graecismus of Evrard of Bdthune (1212). Similarly in science, medicine, and other fields, recently discovered and translated books, like the Canon of Avicenna and the De Animalibus of Aristotle invaded the areas. In philosophy, it was all of Aristotle, and one can discern the various stages in the spread of his thought by the successive enrollment of his books on the program of studies. The entrance of his De Anima on the curriculum of the faculty of arts in 1252 marked the official breaking of the barrier that, with not too much efficacy however, had been set up against him for some forty years. We have the tax lists that were drawn up for the stationarii or book-dealers at Paris in 1275 (?) and 1303⁶ and at Bologna in 1289⁷. These lists give the names of the required textbooks for the various courses, along with the publications of professors then actually teaching. Thus, even down to the material details of the institution the regime which we have described took on concrete form. In it, thinking developed around an auctoritas, that is to say, around some text held to be the authoritative expression on the subject that it dealt with. This was scholasticism, the end-product of the discovery and re-birth of ancient learning.

As a consequence, we can practically measure the upsurge of work at the universities of the XIIIth century by noting the progress in both quantity and quality of the texts of the auctores. Yet, at the same time, one can foresee that these same texts, playing the important part that they did, were quickly to become a source of stagnation from the moment that the school people limited themselves to their pages as if they contained the ultimate in science. Instead of being the means to open the mind to a knowledge of objects, of realities, the tendency was to consider them themselves as the "objects" of learning. Thus, science in medicine meant to know, not the human body but the Canon of Avicenna. Knowledge in grammar was to know, not the actual living speech of men but Priscian. Philosophical knowledge meant to learn Aristotle, instead of trying to discover the laws that govern the phenomena of nature, and the causes that explain all being. Away with reality, if it is not found in our books! The commentator allowed himself to be taken in by his own game. Having lost little by little his power of discovery, he condemned in principle anyone so imprudent as to find anything in contradiction to his book. We know what degree of obtusion the medical doctors reached when confronted with the anatomical discoveries of the XVth century and how the philosophers at Padua, fanatical followers of the Stagirite, rose up in condemnation of the theories of the new physics. Scholasticism died under the annihilating load of its texts. These texts, riddled throughout with artificial exegesis, overburdened, tortured to meaninglessness, were drained of every drop of live-giving sap. In fact, the very first plank in the platform of the XVth century Renaissance was: "Back to sources," that is to say, back to the reading of the originals over and beyond the commentaries: Could there be any greater derision against the School, born of these same sources? Descartes, for instance, protested that he wanted to write "meditations," and no longer "questions"'⁸.

Before the decay set in, however, the lectio, in itself and later in the "questions" in which authentic scholasticism reached its triumph, had run a magnificent course. In the language of Varro who had handed down the practice of the ancient grammatici [grammarians] as interpreters of texts, the term lectio stood for nothing more than a modest exercise in reading. It prepared for the emendatio, the enarratio, and the judicium, all elements of an analytical commentary touching upon both form and content and issuing in an aesthetic judgment⁹. In the Middle Ages, the lectio covered, both in surface and in depth, this whole field of study. As the academic techniques became better established, the lectio became more and more diversified—ranging from the simple verbal annotation that was inserted as a "gloss" between the lines (glossa interlinearis) or in the margins (glossa marginalis) of manuscripts, all the way up to the ample expositio [exposition] which was a uniform and continuous commentary. As early as the year 1215, the statutes of the University of Paris distinguished between two ways of reading Aristotle's texts: one read ordinarie [in the ordinary way], wherein a full exposition was given, or one read cursorie [in the cursory way], that is, in rapid style and not pushing beyond an understanding of the letter of the text¹⁰.

Completely fitted out, the lectio unfolded in three layers of textual consideration: the littera, which was a simple explanation of the words and phrases of the text, according to the tenor of their immediate interconnection; second, the sensus, in which the meanings of the various elements in the passage were analyzed and reformulated in clear language; and third, the sententia, in which there was an endeavor to infer, beyond everything that exegesis had brought out, the depth of thought contained in the text and its true meaning. "What else," asked Robert of Melun, "is sought after in the reading of a text, if not its inner meaning which is called sententia?".¹¹ At each layer, the quality of the exegetical work depended on the precision and the insight of the commentator. Under its apparent limitations, the lectio, as we shall see (in chapter IV), exhibited an astonishing degree of plasticity. Taken as a whole, however, the method of reading tended to remain completely analytic. The text was mastered by a successive grasp of its elements rather than in its entirety, that is as a total organism. It is something of an embarrassment for us to see how Saint Thomas, following the fashion of his day, breaks down, divides, and subdivides an epistle of Saint Paul. Yet, over and beyond this parcelling of the text, he, more than the others, disengaged its general idea.

2. The birth of the quaestio

It is quite natural that, in any reading of a text, one should pause here and there before some obscure word, or some more difficult thought, which suddenly raises questions. Where the reading has been organized as a schoolroom exercise as was the medieval situation, these problems, which confer contrasts in a text as it unfolds, become the occasion for active research and more extensive elaboration. It is in this way that the medieval literary form of quaestiones came to emerge from the lectio. Early in the days of the Church, and apart from the running commentaries that were made on the Bible, there had already grown up a literature of quaestiones et responsiones [questions and answers] in which particular problems bordering upon or even overreaching the text were discussed and doctrinal research went beyond exegesis¹². The medieval lectio, in like manner, was to give rise to quaestiones that went beyond the mere explaining of the texts, the latter, however, still furnishing the substance with which they dealt. In these quaestiones, together with the resources of the ancientdialectic and later of demonstrative logic, came into play the great complex of problems instigated during the XIIIth century by the entrance of Aristotle and the new surge of inquisitiveness in theological matters. With the "questions," scholasticism reached the peak of its development. In them, it found the literary medium best answering its creative inspiration in philosophy as in theology.

At the level of the text, there were several sources out of which questions could develop. One could be the vagueness of some expression calling for more precision; another, the clashing of two interpretations; and still another, the opposition between two "authorities" giving contrary solutions on the same problem. The lastnamed situation extended beyond the immediate exegesis of the text. With a view to personally enlarging on a doctrine, two contradictory texts, or even two authors, were summoned into the discussion: "… some [various sayings of the Fathers], apparently at loggerheads with one another, giving rise to a question," as Abelard had expressed it¹³. Yet, much ground was covered after the latter's Sic et Non had expressedly introduced dialectic to obtain this purpose. Due partly to the progressive demands of the mind and partly to the added refinement that was given to the tools of speculation, the stage of textual exegesis was decidedly left behind. In its place, the various doctrines proposed by the text were treated in themselves, and soon after, other new problems as they gradually emerged.

Following upon this first shift in the center-line of work, a generalization of the already developed technique came to be added. It became no longer a simple question of submitting to research those problems already under discussion or still open to debate. Even the points accepted by everybody and set forth in the most certain of terms were brought under scrutiny and subjected, by deliberate artifice, to the now usual processes of research. In brief, they were, literally speaking, "called into question," no longer because there was any real doubt about their truth, but because a deeper understanding of them was sought after. Theologians as well as philosophers asked the question: Does God exist? Is the soul spiritual? Should a person honor his parents? etc. Yet, of the question, only the form remained¹⁴, with the typical word Utrum [Whether] everywhere, and over and over again employed.

Therein was a progress in technique of capital importance, out of which scholasticism, both in its deep mental outlook and in its writing procedures, came to be built up. An illustration of it may be seen in the case of the young man who can be said to have begun leading a life of the mind when, at the time of his intellectual puberty, he starts "calling into question" (in the sense already mentioned) anything that heretofore he had accepted in a purely passive manner. Western reason, even in theology, had reached the state of adulthood. From this point on, a professor was no longer an exegete alone, he was a master who, to employ the word then in use, "determined" the questions. He did this no longer by bringing authorities into play—a process that would only leave the mind empty despite its acceptance in obedience and certitude—but rather by appeal to reasons that would display to the mind the roots of things. In these very terms Saint Thomas, in his famous fourth Quodlibet (a. 18), defined the working status of the theologian, as of one whose task it is, once he has taken possession of the datum of revelation, to build up into a "science" the intelligibility of his faith¹⁵.

Of a generalized calling-into-question of this nature, such was the gravity, such equally the grandeur. Yet, such was also to be the risk, for, standing next to the technique would be the danger of dialectical formalism, due to come into play as soon as the question procedure would become an end in itself without a further thought given to real objects in and throughout the texts. If one should entertain anydoubts about the extent of an operation of this sort, one need only review—from the invectives of Roger Bacon to the troubled entreaties of Pope Gregory IX¹⁶—the resistance—at times angry or stubborn, at times intelligent or obtuse, according to the writer's temperament—that it provoked in the field of theology, the field par excellence of authority.

3. The evolution of the question: the disputatio

It was in the nature of things that the question should detach itself, little by little, from the text from which it had originated, and that it should come to be set up in a form of its own, independent of the lectio. It is not our object here to follow the course of this evolution, the successive stages of which have been shown to be, in theology: Robert of Melun's Quaestiones de divina pagina (around 1145), Odo of Soisson's Quaestiones (around 1164), and Simon of Tournai's Disputationes (around 1201)¹⁷. Suffice it to note that this achieving of literary independence was the outward sign that autonomy had also been reached in matters of doctrinal research and of scientific curiosity. Problems and their solution were no longer bound up with a text.

Another feature of this evolution needs to be expressly indicated. Two or more masters, regardless of whether they might be in agreement or disagreement, took a hand in the positing and resolving of questions. Here again, it was normal that, in the face of a problem, divergent views should be held. Yet, in the present case, this divergence was to be given an institutional form in a university exercise. Things so developed that apart from the lectio, which by the same token resumed its more simple exegetic character, special exercises were held during which one of the masters submitted, in the presence of the school body, some question of current interest to be discussed with his fellow-masters. Objections were raised, points discussed, retorts flung back, with the debate finally coming to an end with the master in charge giving his own conclusion or "determination" on the question. Picture the renewal in liveliness in sessions of this sort and what they did for competition in research! They produced the "disputed question"¹⁸. One recalls here the famous incident in the career of Saint Thomas at the moment when the intellectual crisis, centered around the condemnation of Aristotelianism, had reached a peak of acuteness at the University of Paris. Brother John Peckham, master regent of the Friars Minor, rose up against Brother Thomas Aquinas, master regent of the Friar Preachers, and in the presence of all the masters and bachelors, sharply criticized "in pompous and inflated terms" the account he had just given of the Aristotelian theory of the unity of forms¹⁹.

It is difficult to say at what exact date this sort of exercise first appeared and how often it was held. One thing, however, is certain; in the middle of the XIIIth century, a master's responsibility at the faculty of theology included a threefold duty: legere, disputare, praedicare [to read, "to dispute," to preach]. In fact, when Saint Thomas assumed the duties of the masterate, the two types of teaching (leaving out the question of preaching) were expressly marked off from each other and set up in institutional form. It is doubtful, however, that the number of "disputations" was fixed, although the master was required to give his lectio every day.

Father Mandonnet describes the sort of event that the disputation had come to be at the faculty of theology.

When a master disputed, all the morning lectures of the other masters and bachelors on thefaculty were dispensed with. Only the master who was to conduct the dispute gave a short lecture, in order to allow time for the audience to arrive. Then the dispute began: and it took up a more or less considerable part of the morning. All the bachelors of the faculty as well as the students of the master who was disputing had to be present at the exercise. The other masters and students, it would appear, were left free to do so; but there is small doubt that they too showed up, in numbers that depended on the reputation of the master and on the topic that was being discussed. The clergy of Paris, the prelates and other Church dignitaries who happened to be at the capital at the time, were quite willing to attend these academic jousts that passionately absorbed the contemporary mind. A dispute was a tournament for the clergy.

The question to come under debate was fixed in advance by the master who was in charge of the disputation. Both the disputation and the day on which it was to be held were announced in the other schools of the faculty. The matters argued by one and the same master might vary widely, because, under ordinary circumstances, a professor held only a small number of annual disputations.…

The disputation was controlled by the master, but, strictly speaking, he was not the one who did the actual disputing. Rather, his bachelor assumed the task of replying, thus starting his apprenticeship in exercises of this sort. The objections usually represented different currents of thought, and were first formulated by the masters present, then by the bachelors, and finally, if the situation warranted it, by the students. The bachelor gave response to the arguments proposed, and, if need be, got help from the master. Such, in a summary way, were the main features of an ordinary dispute. They made up, however, only the first part of the exercise—' though the principal and most lively part.

The objections, put forth and solved in the course of the disputation without any pre-arranged order, presented in the end a doctrinal matter that stood in quite a state of disorder, resembling, however, much less debris scattered over a battlefield, than half-worked materials laid out across a construction job. That is why, in addition to this first session of doctrinal elaboration, a second one was held. It was called the "magisterial determination."

On the first "reading" day, to use the language of the time, that is, on the first day when the master who had conducted the disputation was able to lecture (a Sunday, a feast day, or some other obstacle could prevent him from doing so on the day that followed his disputation), he went over, in his own school, the material over which the disputation had been held the day or a few days before. First, he co-ordinated, as far as the matter would allow, in logical order or sequence, the objections which had been opposed to his thesis, and cast them in definite form. These were followed by a few arguments in favor of the doctrinal position which he was going to propose. He then passed on to a more or less extended expose of his own doctrine on the question under debate. This exposition furnished the core and essence of his determination. He wound up by replying to each objection that had been stated against the doctrine of his thesis.

This second act, following on the disputation²⁰, was known as the determinatio [determination], because the master determined, that is, gave an authoritative formulation of the doctrine that had to be held. To determine or define a doctrine was the right or privilege of those who held the title of master. A bachelor did not have the authority to perform such an act.

The acts of determination, set down in writing by the master or an auditor, make up the writings that we call the Disputed Questions, and the latter represent the final part of a disputation. A disputed question, then, is not a sort of recording or a stenographic account of the disputation itself, but rather, of the determination of the master. Through the disputed question [as we have it], however, we are able to recognize the objections being raised against the doctrine of the master, the bachelor, and, when necessary, the master himself, arguing for it in reply—and again, in some instances, certain particularities that showed up in some disputations and which have been preserved in the edited determination²¹.

4. The quaestio de quolibet

A very original type of disputed question sprang forth and developed in the same style from within that literary genre, and we moderns have been even more troubled trying to get the right idea about it. Even if it is only in a very sketchy way, an examination of the physionomy of the disputation de quolibet, or quodlibetal disputation, as it is called, will have its advantages, first because Saint Thomas was one of those who pioneered in its use, and again because, through this type of disputation, it becomes possible to complete the picture of the intense vitality animating the medieval university milieu, especially that of Paris, where it was brilliantly successful²².

Twice a year, near Christmas and Easter, in the faculties of arts, law, medicine, but especially in the faculty of theology, the masters were free to hold a disputation in which the choosing of the subjects to be debated was left to the initiative of the members of the audience, who could raise any problem they liked. In the phrase of Humbert of Romans, it was a disputation "on anything at anyone's will"²³. The Medievals spoke of it as a "general" disputation. In it were raised the most diverse and ill-assorted questions, ranging from the highest speculations in metaphysics all the way down to the small problems of public or private everyday life. All this was left to the initiative of anyone in the audience. The multiplying of questions lacking all unity in subject and altogether unforeseeable, coming as they did from the audience, was enough to give rather a strange air to the session itself, and no less to its results which have been preserved in the master's "determination." This kind of session was a hard one to conduct, and many a master refused to risk himself at it, or felt satisfied when he had done so once in his career. This explains why we have so few large collections of quodlibeta.

The session began around the hour of Terce perhaps, or of Sext; in any case, quite early in the morning, since there was the risk that it would go on for a long time. In fact, what characterized it was the capricious and off-hand manner in which it unfolded, along with an ever-present uncertainty hovering over the proceedings. It was no doubt devoted to disputing and argumenting like so many others, but with this special feature that the master had lost the initiative in bringing up the matter for discussion which now rested with the members of the audience. In ordinary disputes, the master had announced beforehand the subjects everyone would be occupied with; he had had time to mull them over, and to prepare them. In the quodlibetal dispute, it was everyone's privilege to raise any kind of problem at all. Herein lay the great danger for the master who was host to the affair. The questions or objections could come from every direction, and it mattered not at all if they sprang from hostility, simple inquisitiveness, or cunning. One could question the master in all good faith, simply to know his opinion, but one could also try to have him contradict himself, or oblige him to give his own views on burning subjects he would prefer never to touch upon. At one time, it would be someinquisitive stranger or some apprehensive worrier; at another, it was a jealous rival or a curious master attempting to put him in bad straits. In some instances, the problems were clearcut and interesting; in others, the questions were ambiguous and the master had great trouble in seeing their full import and understanding their real meaning. Some questioners would candidly confine themselves to a strictly intellectual level, while others nurtured some secret thought of diplomacy or of disparagement.… Anyone, therefore, willing to hold a general disputation must have a presence of mind quite out of the common, and a competency almost universal in its scope²⁴.

The interesting thing about these disputes was less the fullness of doctrinal exposition they gave occasion to than the incidental and current character of the questions and answers. Positions were adopted from one session to another—right at the heart of conflicts between doctrines and persons, right in the midst of the liveliness caused by the competing of different ideologies. A study of the cross-indications supplied by these conflicts and competition (the chronology of which is so precious for the historian) permits one to establish methodically the successive stages in the evolution of the problems and to grasp the immediate and precise reactions of authors. In Saint Thomas's day, these exercises were in the best state of balance they were ever to know, for soon, at least in their written form, they were to fall into lengthiness, yielding to amplification and subtleness, and no longer giving a true idea of the living reality which had formerly given rise to them.

5. The construction of an "article"

Within this perspective of the question and disputation we have to understand, in its construction and dynamic qualities, that unit which in scholastic works is still today called an articulus [article]. Through this unit, the Schoolmen drafted and developed their doctrines in their works comprehensive of a whole subject, such as, for example, their collections of disputed questions, or their summas²⁵. The Summa theologiae of Saint Thomas, for instance, is not made up of chapters, but of articles.

What is an "article"?²⁶ It is an account reducing to simple elements and expressing in schematic form for the benefit of the students all the work that was required to raise, discuss, and solve a question under dispute (a). First of all and properly speaking, it is a question. Circa primum quaeritur … [Concerning the first it is asked … ]: such were the words that served to introduce an article, and here the word quaeritur [it is asked] must be taken in its technical sense. It is charged with the same impelling pressure towards research as was the [problem] in Aristotle (Metaph., B, I, 995a24-b4), confirmation of which we find in the strong formulation of Boethius: "A question is a proposition carrying doubt"²⁷. Hence the vigorous sense of the scholastic Utrum with which, invariably and to the point of monotony, the Schoolmen opened each one of their articles²⁸.

From this starting point, the pro and con are brought into play, not with the intention of finding an immediate answer, but in order that, under the action of dubitatio [doubt], research be pushed to its limit. A satisfactory explanation will be given only on the condition that one continue the search to the discovery of what caused the doubt. Therein is the [disputare]. It should be well understood that in stating the pro and con the arguments are not, at least where the technique is employed to perfection, simply lined up and juxtaposed one after another. On the contrary, they are interlocked with the purpose of leading the mind on to the knottiest part of the problem. Sic proceditur [In this manner does one proceed] means, we are going to reason, to discuss. In the language of the times,arguere [to argue], argumentari [to offer arguments], objicere [to set forth] are words all synonomous with the term disputare, so that objicere and objectio [setting forth] do not, in themselves and always, have the meaning that the word "objection" today denotes. Objicere is to inducere rationes [bring in reasons] in favor of the one or the other part; it is not to oppose a fact or an argument against a previously established thesis. If the latter were the case, things would be reversed insofar as the dynamics of the dialectical process are concerned. Such a reversal, harmless in appearance, would destroy the cogency for inquiry which is pressing continuously from one end to the other the pro and contra proposed in the quaestio, and which leads the mind on to its highest working pitch. An objection, in the modern sense of the word, would be, in XIIIth century style, an instantia, an obviatio, words indicating resistance. The medieval "objection," on the contrary, was in reference to the open quest of a problem's intelligibility, in-ducere rationes. We insist on this very exact attitude which has been obliterated—annoyingly—by formalism in the case of some modern interpretations²⁹. If we understand things in this way, we shall avoid misinterpreting the Sed contra [On the contrary]—as we see almost always done. The Sed contra, in itself, is the expression neither of the author's thesis nor of an argument borrowed from some authority as the foundation of his own position. In itself, the sed contra is the presentation of the alternate position, an expression of rationes quae sunt ad oppositum [the reasons which stand for the other position].

The arguments in the second sequence are not proposed against those of the first series; they are given in favor of the second part of the alternative, and it is only indirectly that they are in opposition with those expressed in favor of the first part. The part in the article which is directly in opposition with the arguments rejected from the viewpoint of the thesis which the determination established, is the one which contains the answers that follow the body of the article, the responsiones ad objecta, that is, the answers to the arguments (in the sense already established) which diverge from the thesis, no matter if they be from the first or from the second series³⁰.

And the stage is set for the master to "answer." Respondeo dicendum [I answer that it must be said]: the answer will contain whatever must be stated in order that the doubt raised by the question be dispelled. Herein is the body of the article in which are expounded at least the principles from which the author would solve the problem if not always the organically structured doctrine he holds. The author's solution is called his determinatio of the question. Always the perspective is that of a disputation; and ever present in the background also, is the Aristotelian technique of [determining] and [determination], working in depth.

The master's answer to those of the proposed arguments that, in one part (sometimes in both parts) of the alternative, do not agree with the position he has just stated are usually given in the form of a distinction, since rarely is the opposing position simply rejected. Rather the master marks off upon what share of truth this position is founded. He distinguishes in it that aspect or that viewpoint which has been successfully grasped: Haec ratio procedit de … [This reason proceeds from … ]. In a way, there is an effort to embody the truth that the opposing position contains within a wider framework which, far from casting it aside, underwrites its truthfulness. This valuable piece of observation will again turn up when we set out to define through what processes of construction Saint Thomas built up his works.

Such, then, is the inner meaning of those formulas whose fate it was to become stereotyped. In historical fact, they were actually brimming with life as they were used in a disputing of questions. This same life—the very life of a mind at work—they kept in the articles drawn up in the silence of a cell. For an article is a quaestio, not a thesis, the word that was to be used in the manuals of modern scholasticism. The change in terms is in itself a denunciation of the heinous reversal to which have been subjected the exalted pedagogical methods set up in the XIIth century universities: "active" methods, mindful to keep open, even under the dead-weight of school work, the curiosity of both the student and the master.

Let us make no mistake about it. Concerning the medieval school, which was so impulsive and tumultuous in its reactions, we have come to draw up a most miserable picture, closely-copied from the modern manuals of XVIIth century scholasticism. Therein barrenness, far from existing to the benefit of an exacting technique, was simply the end-product of a rationalizing that was short-sighted in its views, lacking in intuition and power for synthesis, and stiffly collared by clerical or lay protectiveness, with the result that freedom in quest and ardor for progress paid the price for official favors. A distressingly equivocal state of affairs.… To read Abelard, Hugh of Saint Victor, Albert the Great, Saint Bonaventure, and Saint Thomas in a Wolfian atmosphere, is to misconstrue their thought to the point of no return. However deserving they may be, the Disputationes metaphysicae of Francis Suarez, from the standpoint of intellectual formation, have no more than their name in common with the quaestiones disputatae of the XIIIth century³¹.

III. Classification of the Works of Saint Thomas

The foregoing describes the dress and inspiration of the literary forms—we can now say, doctrinal forms—within which the works of Saint Thomas were composed, and within which they are to be classified. The forms employed in medieval teaching did not, in effect, develop all at the same time and along a single front. Rather their development took place according to the objects studied and as the texts, which served as the basic tool in teaching, were progressively exploited. In those cases in which the text selected for teaching purposes was a revealed one, it was normal that the understanding of it should take place on the level of exegesis, of the lectio. Only little by little did questions come to be knit out of it, and, through gradual amplification, to go beyond, and finally to gobble up textual reading. When the books of Aristotle were first circulated, they were the object of a simple commentary—at a time when, after fifty years of official reading, the text of Peter Lombard was already overloaded with questions. In like manner, in the production of Saint Thomas, we find works ranging, as the case goes, from the simple commentary all the way to the independent question.

Among the works that are no more than simple commentaries making up an expositio, we have, on the one hand, those dealing with Aristotle and Dionysius, and on the other, those related to Scripture. In the first case, the books of Aristotle were, in the time of Saint Thomas, still the object of a textual lectio, whereas in the second case, the evolution [from the lectio to the quaestio] had run its course. Consequently, with the quaestio having become a completely independent exercise at the faculty of theology, teaching of the Bible was divided between a course on the text of the Bible, the latter remaining the basic textbook, and the disputation of questions. Let us immediately observe, moreover, that these expositiones vary greatly in form, running the gamut between literal commenting and paraphrasing, between impersonal glossing and original elaborating.

On Peter Lombard's Sentences, the text of his teaching as a bachelor, and on the Boethian De Trinitate, Saint Thomas, like all his contemporaries, no longer limited himself to a simple expositio. He did go along with the text, of which he gave an analysis (divisio textus) and a summary literal explanation (expositio textus;) but the latter are only remnants of the form they originally had. In reality his whole effort is directed to the study of questions whose great number and variety are wholly outside the text from which he started.

Then, we have both the ordinary and the quodlibetal questions that Saint Thomas disputed in his capacity of master.

The two summas, both the Summa contra Gentiles and the Summa theologiae, especially the latter, are linked with the literary forms we have spoken about, but they were composed and built up free of Saint Thomas's official teaching and in reference to some external circumstances or to certain scientific needs that the author himself will tell us about later.

Likewise, in the case of his works written for occasions, there is reference to historical or doctrinal contingencies. These works show great variety in content and form and were subsequently to be grouped together under the neutral title of Opuscula.

Finally, as we have already had the occasion to state, it was a master's duty, at the faculty of theology, to preach to his students, as well as to teach them. Saint Thomas has left us a number of sets of collationes [collations].

The foregoing grouping of his works according to the technique of their composition enables us to bring into focus the picture of the organic character, as well as of the historical conditions, of the Master's scientific activity. It is against these general contexts that we shall have to look into each one of his works. Yet before doing so, let us examine the working conditions and the resources all his works have in common: the language, the processes of documentation, the procedures of construction.…

Notes

¹ "Qui ergo ad philosophiam aspirat, apprehendat lectionem, doctrinam, et meditationem." Metalogicon, lib. I, c. 24; Webb ed., 53; P.L., 199, 853D; McGarry ed., 65.

² "Due praecipue res sunt quibus quisque ad scientiam instruitur, videlicet lectio et meditatio." Didascalicon, praef.; Buttimer ed., 2; P.L., 176, 741A; Taylor ed., 44.

³ "Lectio est cum ex his quae scripta sunt, regulis et praeceptis informamur." Ibid., lib. III, c. 7; Buttimer ed., 57; P.L., 176, 771C; Taylor ed., 91.

⁴Ibid.: "There are three kinds of lectio: that of the teacher, that of the learner, and that of the one who reads by himself. Thus we say: 'I am reading the book to him'; or 'I am reading the book from him'; or simply 'I am reading the book."'—Abelard designated the pupils of Alberic of Reims as "those who read from him." Theologia christiana; P.L., 178, 1258D. In Saint Anselm we find; "I have heard thatyou are reading from Master Arnulf." Epistolae, lib. I, epist. 55; P.L., 158, 1125; Schmitt ed., t. III, epist. 64, 180.

John of Salisbury proposed calling the reading done by the master praelectio, and the personal reading lectio. [The word "reading" is equivocal. It may refer either to the activity of teaching and being taught, or to the occupation of studying written things by oneself. Consequently, the former, the intercommunication between teacher and learner, may be termed (to use Quintilian's word) the pre-reading (prae-lectio); the latter, or the scrutiny by the student, the "reading" (lectio) simply so-called.] Metalogicon, lib. I, c. 24; Webb ed., 53; P.L., 199, 853D; McGarry ed., 67-68.

⁵ See ChUP, I, 70 n. 11: "Neither Aristotle's books on natural philosophy nor any commentaries thereon are to be read publicly or secretly at Paris; and this we enjoin under penalty of excommunication."

^a On the medieval bookdealer, at Paris for instance, see H. Rashdall, The Universities of the Middle Ages, ed. F. M. Powicke and A. B. Emden, Oxford, 1936, I, 421-424. On everything concerning books in the Middle Ages, see especially J. W. Thompson, The Medieval Library, in UCSLS, 1939, and in particular Part IV: Making and Care of Books in the Middle Ages; ch. XVIII—The Scriptorium, 594-612; ch. XIX—Library Administration and the Care of Books, 613-629; ch. XX—Paper, the Book Trade, and Book Prices, 630-646; ch. XXI—The Wanderings of Manuscripts, 647-661.

⁶ See ChUP, I, 644, n. 530; II, 107, n. 642.

⁷ See I libri della bottega di Solimano stazionario dello studio bolognese (July 30, 1289), list published in ASI, XLV (1910), 388-390.

⁸Résponses aux secondes objections, in Oeuvres de Descartes, ed. C. Adam and P. Tannery, t. VII, Paris, 1904, 157: "What prompted me to write meditations rather than disputations or questions, as the philosophers do; or again, theorems or problems, in the manner of the geometricians … so as to bear witness in this way that I have written only for those willing to take pains to meditate seriously with me and to consider things with attention." [See GBWW, trans. G. S. Haldane and G. R. T. Ross, XXXI (1952), 129. Also published under the title: The Philosophical Works of Descartes, 2 vols., in Dover, T71 and T72 (1955).]

⁹ On this program of the ancient commentators, see H. I. Marrou, Saint Augustin et la fin de la culture antique, 2d ed. in BEFAR, CXLV (1949), 20-25. ["Since Varro, it had become classical to distinguish four phases in this study: the lectio, the emendatio, the enarratio, the judicium. The lectio was an expressive reading aloud, carrying within itself the practical teaching of diction, that element bound to be so useful to the future orator.… The enarratio was a commentary, what we mean nowadays when, in our 'explanations of texts,' we speak of both the literal commentary and the literary commentary. The emendatio … has no exact counterpart in our modern teaching; it comprised two exercises which we distinguish one from the other: textual criticism … and criticism of style.… The judicium was the crowning point of any study; it was a brief general review of everything that previous analysis had brought out, and it gave a final aesthetic judgment on the work that had beenstudied" (20-21).]—On the manner in which the work was carried out in the ancient commentaries, an already stylicised affair at Alexandria in the VIth century, see E. Bréhier, in RDP, 1942-43, 93-94.

¹⁰ "[The masters of arts] will read in the schools Aristotle's books on dialectics, both the old and the new, not in the cursory, but in the ordinary reading." ChUP, I, 78, n. 20. In the regulation for the English nation at the faculty of arts, in 1252, the ordinary and cursory readings were likewise distinguished: "[The future bachelor will have attended] two ordinary readings and at least one cursory reading of Aristotle's Topics and Fallacies; and if not the cursory reading, then at least three ordinary readings." Ibid., 228, n. 201.

¹¹ "Quid enim aliud in lectura quaeritur quam textus intelligentia, quae sententia nominatur." Sententie, praef., Martin ed., in SSL, XXI (1947), 11.—See Hugh of Saint Victor, Didascalicon, lib. III, c. 8; Buttimer ed., 58; P.L., 176, 771D; Taylor ed., 92: "The exposition contains three things: the littera [letter], the sensus [obvious sense], and the sententia [deeper meaning]. The littera is the congruent ordering of the words, which is also called construction. The sensus is a certain easily-recognized and apparent meaning which the littera offers at first sight. The sententia is a deeper understanding which is not arrived at except by means of exposition or interpretation. With the preceding, this is the order of inquiry that should be followed: first, the littera, then the sensus, then the sententia. When this has been done, the exposition has reached the stage of completion."—See also John of Salisbury, Metalogicon, lib. I, c. 24; Webb ed., 56; P.L., 199, 855; McGarry ed., 67.—At the end of his commentary on the VIIth book of the Ethics, Saint Thomas concludes: "And thus the sententia of the seventh book is brought to a close."

¹² See G. Bardy, La litterature patristique des Quaestiones et responsiones sur l'Ecriture sainte, in RB, XLI (1932), 210-236, 341-369, 515-537; XLII (1933), 14-30, 211-229, 328-352. In this study, research is pursued as far as the IXth century.

¹³ "… aliqua [diversa patrum dicta] ex dissonantia quam habere videntur, quaestionem contrahentia." Abelard, Sic et Non, prol.; P.L., 178, 1349A.

¹⁴ This evolution in technique was quite exactly recognized as such by the contemporary Clarenbald of Arras, a member of the school of Chartres and the author of a commentary on the De Trinitate of Boethius, written after 1153. Here is his diagnosis: "It seems necessary to recall just what a question is.… When [Aristotle] wrote these words: utrosque idem utrisque opinari, he wanted it understood that this kind of question referred to propositions that were certain, as for example: Whether the pearl is a stone or not. Hence, in the same treatise on the Topics, though in a different place (I, 3), he reminds us that a problem can be made up out of every proposition. But these questions that are made up from propositions that are certain, have nothing of a question but its form." Der Kommentar des Clarenbaldus von Arras zu Boethius De Trinitate … hrsg. von W. Jensen, in BSHT, VIII (1926), 34.

Judging by what his disciple, John of Salisbury, says about the matter, Alberic was the first master, in the field of dialectic, to make use of this generalized calling into question: "The first of these [Alberic], who was punctilious in everything, found everywhere occasion for questioning, to the point that not even a polished surface would be without a flaw, and, according to the saying, 'for him, the bulrush would not be free of nodes,' for even there he pointed out what had to be unknotted."Metalogicon, lib. II, c.10; Webb ed., 79; P.L., 199, 876C; McGarry ed., 96.

¹⁵ Saint Thomas, Quodl. IV, a. 18: Whether theological determinations should be made by authority or by reason. "… Then there is the magisterial type of disputation in the schools, whose goal is not the removal of error, but rather the instruction of the listeners so that they may be led to understand the truth that the master intends to bring out. In this latter case, recourse should be had to reasons that search to the root of the truth and show how the thing which is said to be true is actually so. Otherwise, if the master determines the question by appeal to bare authorities, the listener will have a certainty that the thing is so, but he will have acquired no science or understanding and will go away with an empty mind."

¹⁶ Among other texts in which Roger Bacon bewails the current taste for questions to the abandonment of the literal commentary on the texts, here is one from his Compendium studii theologiae: "Although the main business of the study of the theologians should be concerned with the sacred text, it should be known, as has been ample times proved in the prior part of this work, that nevertheless theologians for the past 50 years have been mainly preoccupied with questions, evidence of which any one can see in the number of treatises and summas, and burdens enough for horses, which many have produced, and not with the most sacred text of God. Wherefore, the theologians show more inclination to receive a treatise on questions rather than on the text.…" H. Rashdall ed., in BSFS, III (1911), 34. See also, ibid., 25. Bacon speaks of fifty years before. This brings us back to the years 1225-1230, at the time when Gregory IX addressed two solemn bulls to the masters of Paris (one dated July 7, 1228, and the other April 13, 1231), in which he recalls the principles that must regulate the use of reason in theology. See ChUP, I, 114-115 n. 59; 136-138 n. 79. See also M.-D. Chenu, La théologie comme science au XIIIe siècle, 3d rev. ed., in BibTh, XXXIII (1957), 26-32.

¹⁷ See Robert of Melun, Quaestiones de divina pagina, Martin ed. in SSL, XIII (1932); Odo of Soissons, Quaestiones, Pitra ed. in ANSS, II (1888); Simon of Tournai, Disputationes, J. Warichez ed., in SSL, XII (1932).—On the evolution of this literary genre, see R. M. Martin, op. cit., introd., xxxiv-xlvi.

¹⁸ To be sure, all during the early Middle Ages, there had been "disputes" between masters who were the protagonists of diverging opinions. Lanfranc, for example, in the XIth century, as the chronicler tells us, emerged victorious in his dispute with Berengar. See Guitmundi De corporis et sanguinis Christi veritate in Eucharistia libri tres, lib. I; P.L., 149, 1428B [See R. W. Southern, Lanfranc of Bec and Berengar of Tours, in SMH, 1948, 27-28]. It is a known fact that Abelard excelled in disputations and that he was one of the creators of the technique. In their time, however, disputes were not yet a part of an academic order of things set up in an organized university and with a definite apparatus and regularity. [A number of XIIth century works carry the word disputatio in their title. See R. W. Hunt, The Disputation of Peter of Cornwall against Symon the Jew, in SMH, 1948, 143-156.]

¹⁹ "The aforesaid witness said he heard from several Friar Preachers worthy of credence that once Brother Thomas was conducting a disputation in Paris, which was attended by Brother John of Pizano of the Order of Friars Minor, who later became Archbishop of Canterbury, and that however much the said Brother John, in his pompous and inflated terms [verbis ampullosis et tumidis], showed himself aggravating to the same Brother Thomas, not once did the latter himself cease to use the language of humility, but was always pleasant and humane in his answers." ASS, March 7, Processus inquisitionis, c. 9, n. 77, 712; Foster ed., 107-108. Compare this account with Peckham's own, and with the latter's variant interpretation of the episode, Registrum Epistolarum fratris Johannis Peckham, Vol. III, in RBMAS, LXXVII (1885), 866. [On Peckham's subsequent condemnation of Thomistic doctrines, see D. L. Douie, Archbishop Pecham, Oxford, 1952, 272-301, and D. A. Callus, The Condemnation of St. Thomas at Oxford, in AqP, V (1955), 17-35. See bibliographies therein.]

²⁰ The double session was not, moreover, confined to quodlibetal disputations alone, but was also, it would seem, in operation in the case of ordinary disputed questions. See A. Teetaert, La littérature quodlibétique, in ETL, XIV (1937), 75-105.

²¹ P. Mandonnet, Chronologie des questions disputées de saint Thomas d'Aquin, in RT, XXIII (1928), 267-269.

²² Complete information about the structure, evolution and characteristics of interest concerning this literary genre will be found in P. Glorieux, La littérature quodlibétique de 1260 à 1320, in BibTh, V (1925), introd., and even more in a second volume of his: La littérature quodlibétique, ibid., XXI (1935), introd. See also his Le Quodlibet et ses procédés rédactionnels, in DTP, XLII (1939), 61-93, and Où en est la question du Quodlibet?, in RMAL, II (1946), 405-414.

²³ "…de quolibet ad voluntatem cujuslibet.…"Humbert of Romans, Instructiones de officiis Ordinis, c. 12, in BHROVR, II (1889), 260.

²⁴ P. Glorieux, La littérature quodlibétique, in BibTh, XXI (1935), 10-11. Here is a significant text: "In the quodlibetal disputations, ten questions were proposed by my associates, because of the two which I had proposed myself. Out of the ten, five were concerned with the matters under dispute, and the other five on matters related in some way with them.… Likewise, the unrelated questions, which were brought up in the quodlibetal disputation by associates.…" London ms., British Museum, King's Library, 10 C. VI, fol. 152.

²⁵ See Z. Alszeghy, Einteilung des Textes in mittelalterlichen Summen, in Greg, XVII (1946), 46-58. The word articulus always indicated what was considered to be the elemental unit in every field and in every discipline ("What is intended in the article is found in a fourfold discipline.…" Alexander Halensis, Summa, III, q. 69, n. I, a. I, obj. ult., Venice ed., 295; Quaracchi ed., t. IV, vol. 2, n. 698, 1113, 5). It ranged from the simple announcing of a point to be debated during the course of a commentary on a text to the "article of faith" in theology.

²⁶ See the scrupulous and scrupulously documented study of F. A. Blanche, Le vocabulaire de l'argumentation et la structure de l'article dans les ouvrages de saint Thomas, in RSPT, XIV (1925), 167-187.

a) See ch. IX, note 2.

²⁷"Quaestio est dubitabilis propositio." Boethius, In Topica Ciceronis, lib. I; P.L., 64, 1048D.

²⁸ See Aristotle, Metaph., X, 5, 1055b-1056a3, and Saint Thomas, In X Metaph., lect. 7; Marietti ed., 488, n. 2060.

²⁹ See A. Blanche, op. cit., 177-179.

³⁰Ibid., 180.

³¹ G. Paré, A. Brunet, P. Tremblay, La renaissance du XIIe siècle. Les écoles et l'enseignement, in PIEM, III (1933), 132.…

Abbreviations

AqP: The Aquinas Papers. The Aquinas Society of London, London, 1946.

ASI: Archivio storico Italiano, Florence, 1842.

ASS: Acta sanctorum … Digessit, notis illustravit J. Bollandus. Ed. novissima contulit G. Henschenius. Paris, 1863-1867.

BEFAR: Bibliothèque des Écoles françaises d'Athènes et de Rome. Pub. sous les auspices du Ministere de l'éducation nationale. Paris, 1877.

BHROVR: Beati Humberti de Romanis Opera de vita regulari. Ed. J. J. Berthier. II vols. Rome, 1888-1889.

BibTh: Bibliothèque thomiste. Directeur: P. Mandonnet, vols. I-XXIV; M.-D. Chenu, vol. XXV… (Le Saulchoir)Paris, 1921.

BSHT: Breslauer Studien zur historischen Theologie. Breslau, 1922.

Buttimer ed. Hugonis de Sancto Victore Didascalicon: De Studio Legendi. A Critical Text by C. H. Buttimer. CUA-SMRL, X (1939).

ChUP: Chartularium Universitatis Parisiensis. Sub auspiciis consilii generalis facultatum Parisiensium ex diversis bibliothecis tabulariisque collegit et cum authenticis chartis contulit H. Denifle … auxiliante A. Chatelain. Vols. I-IV. Paris, 1889-1897.

DTP: Divus Thomas Commentarium de philosophia et theologia. Piacenza, 1880.

ETL: Ephemerides theologicae Lovanienses. Theologia dogmatica—Theologia moralis—Jus canonicum. Universitas catholica lovaniensis. Louvain-Bruges, 1924.

GBWW: Great Books of the Western World. R. M. Hutchins, editor in chief. Chicago-London-Toronto, (copyright 1952).

Greg Gregorianumr. Rivista trimestrale di studi teologici etfilosofici. Rome, 1920.

Marietti (or Marietti ed.) Divi Thomae Aquinatis Doctoris Angelici (Various Works … by Various Editors). Pub. by the Casa Marietti. Turin-Rome.

McGarry ed. The Metalogicon of John of Salisbury. A Twelfth-Century Defense of the Verbal and Logical Arts of the Trivium. Trans. with an Introd. and Notes by D. McGarry. Berkeley and Los Angeles, 1955.

PIEM: Publications de l'Institut d'études médiévales. Vols. I-X, Paris-Ottawa, 1932-1941; vols. XI …, Paris-Montreal, 1950.

P.L. Patrologiae cursus completus. Series prima in qua prodeunt Patres, Doctores Scriptoresque Ecclesiae Latinae. Vols. I-CCXXI. Paris, Migne, 1844-1864. Ed. altera, 1866 ff. Supplementum, 1958 ff.

RBMAS: Rerum Britannicarum medii aevi scriptores, or Chronicles and Memorials of Great Britain and Ireland during the Middle Ages. Pub. by the authority of Her Majesty's treasury, under the direction of the Master of the Rolls. London-Oxford-Cambridge, 1857.

RDP: Revue de philosophie. Paraissant tous les deux mois. Paris, 1900.

RAAL: Revue du moyen âge latin. Etudes-textes-chronique-bibliographie. Lyon, 1945.

RSPT: Revue des sciences philosophiques et théologiques. Paris, 1907.

RT: Revue thomiste. Paris, 1893.

Schmitt ed. S. Anselmi Cantuariensis Archiepscopi Opera omnia. Ad fidem codicum recensuit F. S. Schmitt. VI vols. Edinburgh, 1946-1951.

SMH: Studies in Medieval History Presented to F. M Powicke. Ed. R. W. Hunt, W. A. Pantin, R. W. Southern. Oxford, 1948.

SSL: Spicilegium sacrum Lovaniense. Etudes et documents. Université catholique et Collèges O.P. et S. J. de Louvain. Louvain-Paris, 1922.

Taylor ed. The Didascalicon of Hugh of St. Victor. A Medieval Guide to the Arts. Trans. from the Latin with an Introd. and Notes by J. Taylor. RCSS, LXIV (1961).

Webb ed. Joannis Saresberiensis Episcopi Camotensis Metalogicon libri III. Recognivit et prolegomenis, apparatu critico, commentario, indicibus instruxit C. C. I. Webb. Oxford, 1929.