SOURCE: "'Scientia' and the Summa theologiae" in Knowledge and Faith in Thomas Aquinas, Cambridge University Press, 1997, pp. 78-98.

[In the following excerpt, Jenkins discusses the structure and nature of the Summa Theologiae and argues that its intended audience was advanced students in theology.]

The Summa theologiae is the chefd'oeuvre of St. Thomas Aquinas. Although all of Aquinas's works are powerful and important, and several are masterpieces, the Summa theologiae is his most comprehensive and is thought by most to be his greatest. The sheer organization of such a large amount of disparate material in the four volumes of this work is a remarkable feat. And on any given issue, the Summa generally contains the most mature, clear and definitive statement of Aquinas's position. Thus, when there is a dispute about Aquinas's views on some question, debate nearly always turns primarily on one or more passages from this work.

The centrality of the Summa theologiae is apparent also from biographical evidence. Most of Aquinas's major theological and philosophical works arose from responsibilities as a student or teacher, or from various controversies of the day, and these situations determined the form of the work in question. The Sentences commentary was required of Aquinas as a theology student; the commentaries on Scripture, and perhaps those on the books of Aristotle,¹ arose from his duties as a teacher; the disputed and quodlibetal questions are records of the academic disputations, conducted in a more or less standard form, required or at least expected of Aquinas as a Master at Paris; his polemical works, such as the De unitate intellectus and De aeternitate mundi, were simply his responses to pressing controversies of the day. Only in the two summae, the Summa contra gentiles and the Summa theologiae, was Aquinas able to break with conventional forms, to cast his thought in a new mold and to compose a systematic work according to what he thought the subject demanded. The Summa contra gentiles was a significantly earlier work, written in the early 1260s. The Summa theologiae expresses his most fully developed thought and was clearly his most ambitious work, one in which he explicitly claims to have departed from older forms to present the subject in the way it demanded.² He labored long over it, beginning the Summa theologiae in 1266 and working on it until his death in 1274, when it was left unfinished. And it was the culmination of his efforts to present systematically Christian theology, the subject which his position as a theological Master (magister in sacra pagina) at the University of Paris, and his vocation as a Dominican priest, called him to teach.³ Thus we find in the Summa theologiae Aquinas's most mature, most original and most comprehensive treatment of the subject which was his life's work.

In spite of the primacy of this work in the Thomistic corpus, it has, I will argue in this chapter, been widely misunderstood. Scholars have failed to understand the work's fundamental epistemic notion, scientia, and so have not clearly grasped Aquinas's intention in writing it. I have tried to elucidate this concept in the previous two chapters, and now I will attempt to discover what light it can shed on the Summa theologiae and its presentation of the scientia of sacred doctrine.

The Summa theologiae, I will argue, is a work of second-level pedagogy, as I explained this notion in chapter one. To the extent that commentators have recognized that the Summa is a pedagogical work, they have seen it as a work of first-level pedagogy, and I will begin by arguing against this interpretation. I will then consider the intended audience of the Summa, and argue that the work was for very advanced students in theology, who were well suited for second-level pedagogy. Finally, I will argue that we can make better sense of the nature and structure of the Summa theologiae on the hypothesis that it is a work of second-level pedagogy, and will conclude by raising some problems for my interpretation which will be addressed in subsequent chapters.

3.1 The Summa Theologiae: An Introduction for Beginners?

In the prologue to the Prima pars of the Summa theologiae Aquinas announces his intention in the work as a whole:

Because the teacher of Catholic truth not only must instruct those who are advanced [provecti], but also must educate beginners [incipientes] (as St. Paul writes in I Corinthians 3 [1-2], "Even as unto babes in Christ I have fed you with milk and not meat"), our purpose in this work is to pass on the things which pertain to Christian religion in such a way as is fitting for the education of beginners.⁴

Perspicacious scholars have recognized the importance of Thomas's pedagogical intent in the Summa. Chenu writes:

The praise directed toward the Summa theologiae throughout the centuries, the technical difficulties encountered in it, the power of the synthesis it contains should not mask the original purpose for which it was written … By the author's own avowal, it was dedicated to the instruction of beginners in theology.⁵

James A. Weisheipl writes that in the Summa "Thomas wanted to present a comprehensive vision of 'sacred doctrine' for beginners, a handbook suitable for novices."⁶ And Leonard E. Boyle suggests that Aquinas began the Summa because he felt "practical theology was too much with the Dominican Order and that the 'Fratres communes' and the students in particular … were not being allowed more than a partial view of theology."⁷

What sort of instruction is Aquinas attempting to impart in the Summa theologiae? In chapter one (pp. 46-49) we distinguished between first and second-level inquiry, and to these correspond first and second-level pedagogy. In first-level pedagogy the student acquires familiarity with the fundamental concepts and principles in the field. The existence of the subject will be proven to him, if this is necessary. And, at this first stage, an instructor would employ demonstrations quia which move from truths better known to the student to principles which are better known simpliciter. Having acquired a familiarity with the fundamental concepts and grasped the principles, the student in second-levelpedagogy would follow the order of scientific demonstrations as defined in the PA, moving from causes to effects. The concern at this second stage would be to present material so as to instill the intellectual habits by which the student would readily and correctly consider effects in the field by virtue of their causes. With what sort of pedagogy is the Summa concerned?

Since Chenu does not mention any special character to the Summa's pedagogy, it is natural to suppose he means what we, who do not share Aquinas's notion of scientia, mean by "instruction for beginners," namely that the work is an initial introduction to the key concepts and basic truths of a field for one unfamiliar with them. Weisheipl suggests this view even more strongly when he calls the Summa a "beginner's handbook."⁸ And Boyle argues at length that Aquinas "probably had young and run-of-the-mill Dominicans in mind and not a more sophisticated, perhaps university audience when in chiselled prose and in easy, logical steps he put his Summa theologiae together."⁹ Thus in these writers we find at least the suggestion, and at most the explicit claim, that the Summa was intended as a piece of first-level pedagogy—an initial introduction for neophytes to the truths in a field of knowledge. This is, I believe, the standard reading of the pedagogical character of the Summa theologiae.

When this understanding is pressed, however, serious problems emerge. For if that is what Aquinas intended, the work seems a spectacular failure. Chenu goes some way toward acknowledging this when he writes that Aquinas perhaps suffered from "some of that illusion which is common to professors as regards the capacities of their students."¹⁰ And Weisheipl writes that though the first part "succeeded admirably," the second and third parts "are far from being a simple introduction."¹¹ But these admissions, I want to argue, greatly understate the difficulties.

Consider first of all the content of the work. If it is an introduction for neophytes in the field we would expect it to present the key concepts and major issues of Christian theology, but not in all their complexity. What distinguishes an initial introduction is that, though it presents essential concepts, claims and methods within a field, the accounts of especially difficult claims and concepts are simplified, certain qualifications and fine distinctions are neglected, and some objections and disagreements among practitioners in the field are ignored. In place of these we would expect to find concrete examples and analogies drawn from experiences familiar to the student. However, this is not the sort of content we find in the Summa theologiae.

Consider, for example, question 85, article one of the argues Prima pars, where Aquinas asks "Whether our intellect understands corporeal and material things by abstraction from phantasmata." In this article he distinguishes and briefly describes the sensitive, angelic and human intellects; he presents his view on how humans apprehend intelligible forms by abstracting them from phantasmata, or sense images; he distinguishes individualizing and intelligible matter; and he briefly explains what he sees as Plato's error on this question. In the response to the first objection he rejects a crude realism according to which composition in the world must always be mirrored in composition in our intellect for true understanding. In his response to the second objection, he elaborates the distinction between common and sensible matter. In the third response he distinguishes between phantasmata, which affect sense organs, and species intellegibiles which are impressed on the receptive intellect. In the fifth and sixth responses he discusses the agent intellect, and its role with respect to phantasmata and sense perception. The writing is condensed and abstract, and though three examples are mentioned (viz. thecolor of an apple and the sensations of hot and cold, hard and soft), they are hardly the sort of illustrations which would be of much help to a beginner. And this is only one of 2,669 articles in the Summa. Moreover, it is from the first part which Weisheipi says "succeeds admirably" as a simple introduction, rather than from the more difficult second and third parts.

Furthermore, when we compare the Summa theologiae with other works of Aquinas, it does not seem related as an initial introduction is to more advanced works. In Quaestiones disputatae de veritate Aquinas goes over the same material he treats in Summa theologiae 1.85.1, although the questions posed are slightly different. What we have as disputed questions are, of course, the written record of Aquinas's actual disputations at the University of Paris. In such disputations Aquinas, as the disputing Master, would pose the question to be addressed, and it seems that on the first day of the debate the members of the audience, both faculty and students, would pose objections and a bachelor of theology would respond. On the next day, after considering the arguments on both sides, the Master would give his determinatio or resolution of the question and his own response to each of the objections. This was then written up and edited by the Master.¹² Thus the quaestiones disputatae were the most philosophically and theologically sophisticated presentations to the most sophisticated audience of Aquinas's day.

When we compare Quaestiones disputatae de veritate 10.5 & 6 with Summa theologiae 1.85.1, we do find that the latter is simplified, but not in the way we would expect for an initial introduction. Because the Summa article does not record an actual disputed question, it has fewer objections. (There are six objections in De veritate 10.5 and nine in 10.6, while there are only five in Summa theologiae 1.85.1.) Many of the objections in the disputed questions are redundant, and in reducing the number Aquinas is no doubt trying to avoid the "frequent repetition [which] generated boredom and confusion in the minds of the members of the audience."¹³ Moreover, in De veritate 10.6 Aquinas develops his position dialectically by considering and arguing against the "complex variations of ancient opinion."¹⁴ In the Summa he presents and argues for his own opinions directly, briefly discussing only Plato as a contrary opinion. He was perhaps trying to avoid the "useless multiplication of questions, articles and arguments."¹⁵ In these ways, then, the Summa discussion is simpler. Nevertheless, there is no substantive philosophical or theological point which is part of the exposition of Aquinas's views in the De veritate but is not made in the Summa. The differences between the works are with respect to the clarity and conciseness of expression, and not to the content of Aquinas's claims and arguments.

When we look at the Summa contra gentiles 11.77, which treats similar issues, we find its discussion is shaped by Aquinas's dispute with an Avicennian reading of Aristotle. In that article, however, we find no higher level of philosophical and theological content than in the Summa. If anything, Aquinas's presentation of his position is less elaborate there.

The content of the Summa theologiae is not that of a work gauged for neophytes in a field. The discussion we have considered is not a simplified account for beginners in which important but difficult details have been glossed over; it is, rather, Aquinas's clearest, most precise and most philosophically subtle treatment of these matters. Aquinas does show a concern with clarity, conciseness and elegance of presentation, but his attention does not seem to be directed to beginners.

The structure of the work, moreover, violates Aquinas's own principles for the order of initial discovery and learning. In the Summa Aquinas states a pedagogical principle which we saw foreshadowed in the Posterior Analytics commentary: "when any effect is more apparent to us than its cause, we proceed through the effect to an apprehension of the cause."¹⁶ This principle is expressed more fully in the commentary on Aristotle's Physics:

With respect to the discovery of first principles, [Aristotle] adduces the claim that being better known to us and [being better known] by nature are not the same; rather, those things which are better known by nature are less well known to us. And because this is the natural manner or order of learning—that one moves from things known to us to things unknown to us—thus it is that we must move from what is better known to us to what is better known by nature.¹⁷

Aquinas begins the Summa, however, not with effects which are most apparent to us, but with God, the first cause of all things which is least known to us in this life,¹⁸ but best known by nature.¹⁹ He moves from there to angels, which are also beings better known by nature but less well known to us. Only then does he turn to mundane creatures, with which we are most familiar. This procedure is precisely the opposite of what Aquinas's pedagogical principles regarding initial instruction in a field recommend.²⁰

Chenu discusses the structure of the Summa at length. Having made the point that Aquinas's purpose was "instruction for beginners," Chenu says that Aquinas sought the proper "ordo disciplinae", the order of learning. Until the thirteenth century, theological treatises took a historical order, the order of salvation history. However, Chenu writes, "at the very moment when, by means of the magnificent Aristotelian inheritance, the notion of science was taking on such vigor in method and meaningfulness, the masters of the first half of the thirteenth century were faced with the problem of applying this notion of science in their theological efforts."²¹ Aquinas, Chenu argues, employed the Neoplatonic structure of emanation and return to provide "an order for science, injecting intelligibility into the heart of the revealed datum."²²

In his discussion, Chenu clearly drifts without explanation from the question of pedagogical structure to that of scientific structure, and he ends up conflating the two. Views may differ on the proper structure of a science, and they may differ on the proper order for initial instruction of beginners, but certainly these two questions are to be distinguished. Euclid's Elements may have achieved the proper structure for geometry, for its deductive structure lucidly displays the logical structure of the science. However, it is far from clear that he thereby hit on the proper way to introduce beginners to geometry. Although we may agree with the scientific structure of the Elements, it is far from clear that we should begin a course in elementary geometry with a lecture reciting the definitions, postulates and common notions of Book 1. Chenu, however, assuming that Aquinas was interested in some form of initial instruction, and finding the structure of a science in the Summa theologiae, is led to confuse the two issues.

Chenu, Weisheipl and Boyle all fail to appreciate fully Aquinas's concept of scientia, and how it differs from our cognitive notions. Consequently, they fail to distinguish clearly between first and second-level pedagogy. Realizing that the Summa is pedagogical, they naturally suppose that it is pedagogy as we normally understand it, one appropriate to our concept of knowledge. They assumethat it primarily involves the discovery of new truths in a field, and do not recognize the need for the intellectual habituation of second-level pedagogy. But when it is understood in that way, the Summa is at best odd and at worst incomprehensible. I want to argue that the work is one of second-level pedagogy. Before turning directly to this, though, I shall consider who the incipientes and novitii were for whom, as the prologue states, the work was written.

3.2 The Intended Audience of the Summa Theologiae

In a recent and influential monograph, Boyle has argued that the Summa was written not for the students at the University of Paris, as has generally been thought, but for the studia and priories in the Dominican provinces.²³ The University of Paris in the thirteenth century, arguably the greatest center of Christian theology which has ever existed, attracted the best minds of Europe for a rigorous and lengthy program of studies. Aquinas lived and taught at the Dominican studium generale there, which was the site of study for the most intellectually able Dominican students from all of Europe.²⁴ Dominicans sent to these general studia were destined to go on to become lectores or teachers in Dominican priories or in provincial studia, or even masters at the universities, and thus were distinguished from those preparing for pastoral ministry.²⁵

Boyle argues that the Summa was not, as has been thought, written for the intellectual elites at the universities, but for the fratres communes, the ordinary Dominican brethren, engaged in the pastoral work of preaching and hearing confessions and for students preparing for such work. The Dominicans, the Order of Preachers, in 1221 received from Pope Honorius the further commission of "hearing confessions and enjoining penances." For this work, study in moral theology was needed, and early Dominicans wrote a number of manuals devoted to practical moral theology. When Aquinas came upon the scene, however, he "may have felt that practical theology was too much with the Dominican Order," and that the brethren "were not being allowed more than a partial view of theology."²⁶ Aquinas wrote his Summa for Dominicans, Boyle suggests, to place their practical moral instruction in a more theoretical, theological context. "By prefacing the Secunda or 'moral' part with a Prima pars on God, Trinity and Creation," Boyle writes, "and then rounding it off with a Tertia pars on the Son of God, Incarnation and the Sacraments, Thomas put practical theology, the study of Christian man, his virtues and vices, in a full theological context."²⁷

Boyle's evidence for his conclusions is circumstantial: (1) Aquinas probably began the Summa after four years at Orvieto where he first "took his place in the normal stream of the Dominican educational system,"²⁸ and as a lector his task was to instruct Dominicans engaged in pastoral work; (2) Dominican education in the provinces (as opposed to the universities) was focused on an anecdotal moral theology, and Aquinas would probably have felt dissatisfied with its limited scope; (3) the writing of the Summa was begun at the studium at Santa Sabina in Rome, where, Boyle believes, Aquinas seems to have been given free rein to shape the theological training of students in the Roman province of Dominicans; and (4) the Summa, and particularly the second part, seems to parallel the confessional manuals of the time, and so may have been meant to replace them. Boyle himself seems to recognize that evidence of this sort is not wholly compelling, and so only suggests" a conclusion,²⁹ and says it is "probably" true³⁰ or "likely,"³¹ or that it is an "assumption [which] is hardly out of the question."³²

Although Boyle's work is original and suggestive, I think one of its key tenets must be rejected. This is the contention that in the Summa Aquinas had "run-of-the-mill Dominicans primarily in mind and not a more sophisticated, perhaps university audience."³³ There are several reasons to doubt this claim. First, the considerations of content and structure mentioned above suggest otherwise. Although the articles of the Summa are condensed, they are as sophisticated and demanding as anything Aquinas wrote, they address all the most difficult and controversial issues of his day, and the structure of the work is not appropriate for initial instruction. This does not seem to be the sort of work one would write if one's primary audience were those preparing to engage only in the pastoral duties of preaching to, and hearing confessions of, ordinary lay people. Secondly,³⁴ Boyle correctly portrays Aquinas as very influential in setting the educational policy of his own Roman province. The 1265 provincial chapter put him in charge of establishing and running the studium at Santa Sabina in Rome, and the 1272 chapter declared: "We entrust entirely to Friar Thomas d'Aquino the general studium of theology as to place, persons, and number of students."³⁵ If, as Boyle argues, Aquinas spent several of his most mature years writing the Summa for the fratres communes in his province, he could, and most likely would, have brought it about that the priories and provincial studia began to use the work. Since he spent the years from 1272 until his death in 1274 in the province, he was well positioned to bring it about that the first and second parts of the Summa, which were then finished, be disseminated and used in the province's schools. However, there is no evidence that the work was widely used in the province during or immediately after Aquinas's lifetime.³⁶

We can make much better sense of the Summa, I contend, if we see it as a work intended for a student pursuing a degree in theology, for one aspiring to be a Magister in sacra pagina, or for someone at a comparable level. The universities of Paris and Oxford alone were able to confer degrees in theology in the thirteenth century, and Paris was clearly dominant in theology. Moreover, since Aquinas studied and taught at Paris, it would have influenced him. An eyewitness account tells us that Aquinas began the Summa after beginning a revision of his commentary of the Sentences of Peter Lombard."³⁷ If this is so, then it is likely that he began the Summa after becoming dissatisfied with the limitations a commentary on the Sentences imposed. This hypothesis is further supported by the prologue of the Summa, which states that the work is intended to break with commentaries, in which "the things which it is necessary for such students to know are not taught according to the order of the discipline, but according to what is required for the exposition of the text."³⁸ It is most likely, then, that he intended the Summa to play the role in the educational system that was comparable to that which the Sentences were then playing, albeit unsatisfactorily.

The university student who studied the Sentences in Paris would have been well prepared for the Summa. He would, first of all, have had extensive philosophical training, and particularly in the works of Aristotle. Before one could commence theological studies, he had to have received the degree of Master of Arts. Traditionally, study in the liberal arts meant the classical liberal arts of the trivium and quadrivium. The influx of translations of classical works between the middle of the twelfth and the middle of the thirteenth centuries, however, brought about a gradual evolution in the arts course. By 1255 it is clear that the texts lectured on in the Arts Faculty at Paris were those of the Aristotelian corpus, a few writings falsely attributed to Aristotle, and a handful of other works.³⁹ In Aquinas's mature years, then, study in the arts was primarily the study of Aristotle. A common understanding of Aquinas's Aristotelian commentaries is that they were written for students and faculty in the arts, to guide the reading and teaching of Aristotle's works.⁴⁰ If this is so, then thesedetailed and philosophically challenging commentaries tell us what Aquinas thought a student in the arts should have been taught and should have learned.

The course in the Faculty of Arts was lengthy and rigorous. At Paris, it was five or six years.⁴¹ The first two years were spent listening to lectures and attending disputations, and the next two participating in disputations under the supervision of a master. A minority of students went on to "determine," which consisted in determining or resolving questions being disputed. At this stage, students would also lecture cursorily on assigned texts.⁴² Finally, the student could be presented for a license to incept as a master. Although this was not universally enforced, upon graduating as a Master of Arts he was required to lecture for two years on the faculty.⁴³

Dominican candidates for theological study were exempt from the requirement of being Masters of Arts,⁴⁴ but only because they had completed equivalent studies in their own Dominican studia. In 1259 Aquinas, Albert the Great and several other prominent Dominicans were members of a commission which mandated that Dominican studia for the arts be set up where they had not hitherto existed, that the curriculum of such schools be brought into agreement with that of the university, and that the method of teaching be through lectures and disputations.⁴⁵

After completing the arts course, a smaller number of highly qualified students would go on to study theology. To become a "Master of the Sacred Page," as one completing the theology degree was called, eight years in addition to the arts course were required.⁴⁶ Of this, the first six years were spent hearing lectures; four years were spent on the Bible and two on the Sentences of Peter Lombard.⁴⁷ After this, if he were 25 or older, the student could petition to be made a bachelor. As a bachelor he gave cursory lectures on the Bible for two years. He then became a bachelor of the Sentences—a Sententarius, as such a student was called—and he delivered lectures on the Sentences.

Here too Dominicans received exemptions due to previous work in their studia. Before coming to the university a Dominican would have studied theology for two or three years in a provincial house of studies and for one in a studium generale, whether at Paris or elsewhere. Thus when he came to Paris to lecture as a bachelor of the Bible or the Sentences, he could begin immediately.⁴⁸

I am arguing, then, that the Summa was written for these extremely well prepared and highly capable students who studied, and eventually commented upon, the Sentences of Peter Lombard at the University of Paris. These students could have been expected to handle the dense, difficult and copious material presented in that work. Moreover, since our best evidence is. that the Summa theologiae was written to play a role similar to that which the Sentences of Peter Lombard played, it is most likely that it was written for the students who were at the level at which the Lombard's work was to be studied. That is, it was meant to serve as a final, comprehensive course for theology students.⁴⁹

Someone will certainly object, however, that Aquinas would not have referred to such advanced and accomplished students as beginners (incipientes) and novices (novitii), as he does refer to the intended audience of the Summa theologiae in the prologue to the prima pars. There Aquinas tells us that the work was written for those just commencing the study of theology, and so the interpretation I have argued for cannot be right.

It is not the case, though, that those called beginners are always rank beginners. Words such as beginner and novice (and incipientes and novitii in Latin) presuppose a contrast with the more advanced and accomplished, and just what contrast is in question depends upon the context in which these words are used. For example, an aspiring concert pianist about to make his debut with a major orchestra may be called a novice or beginner, though he has been playing the instrument at an extremely high level for years. Such a description is nonetheless apt, for the young pianist is a beginner in comparison with established concert pianists. The designation beginner makes sense because the presupposed contrast is between beginning and established concert pianists, not between this pianist and piano players generally. Similarly, it is possible that when Aquinas says that he is writing the Summa theologiae for beginners rather than for the advanced, the presupposed contrast is not between advanced students and rank beginners; it is between students, albeit very advanced students, on the one hand, and Aquinas's fellow theological Masters at Paris, on the other. The former group would have been very accomplished, would have been studying for a long time and would not have been far from their inception as Masters. However, in contrast to St. Thomas Aquinas, St. Bonaventure, Stephen Tempier, John Pecham and others, they were beginners. When Aquinas presents arguments in his disputed questions or in his polemical works, he is engaging in debate with other Masters. So when Aquinas writes in the prologue to the Summa theologiae that he is writing for beginners and not for the advanced, it is possible that this means that he is not trying to address disputes with his fellow Masters, but is attempting to write a work for students who were nearing the end of their theological studies. And, I would argue, the nature and structure of the Summa theologiae is such that we must conclude that in fact the "beginners" mentioned are advanced students, not those just entering upon theological study.

I conclude, then, that Aquinas wrote the Summa theologiae as a work suitable for the pedagogical needs of those very advanced students, and it was intended as the culmination of their studies before they took up positions as theological Masters at Paris and elsewhere. But though I claim that Aquinas wrote the Summa theologiae for students at Paris, I do not want to claim that it was written only for theology students at Paris or Oxford. Although these two universities alone could confer theological degrees in the thirteenth century, they were not the only schools of theology. However, these theological universities, particularly Paris, became the model for theological study elsewhere.⁵⁰ The 1259 commission on Dominican education, as we have seen, brought the Dominican arts curriculum into line with that of Paris, and established the university system of lectures and disputations as the proper method of instruction. Although the educational policy of the Roman province was in flux in Aquinas's lifetime, and evidence about its nature is scant, it does seem that the effort was to bring study in the provincial studia in line with and up to the standards of Paris. Thus, although it may be that Aquinas also had schools in the Dominican provinces in mind when he wrote the Summa, he hoped that the curriculum there would be comparable to that in Paris. If that were the case, the Summa theologiae could have been used by them as well.

3.3 The Nature and Structure of the Summa Theologiae

My contention, then, is that the Summa theologiae was intended to play a role in theological education similar to that which the Sentences played at Paris, whether the educational institution was in fact the University of Paris, or Oxford, or one of the Dominican studia, or any similar institution of theological education. If this is so, then a student would have had extensive preparation beforeencountering the Summa. As Aquinas envisioned it, it is likely that the student would have been through the Aristotelian corpus using Aquinas's commentaries, or at least would have heard lectures in the manner of Aquinas's commentaries. Thus he would, through both hearing and delivering lectures, have had a thorough acquaintance with Aristotelian philosophy, of the ways in which it did and did not accord with Christian orthodoxy, and of the way in which many of its concepts and principles are open to dialectical development in light of Christian doctrine and subsequent philosophical and theological developments.⁵¹ He would, again through hearing and delivering lectures, have had a thorough acquaintance with Christian Scripture. And since lectures on the Bible involved addressing questions and problems of Christian theology, he would have had a sophisticated knowledge of Christian doctrine and theology. Given this wide exposure to philosophy and theology, what more would a student need? What he would need, according to Aquinas, is to grasp the truths of Christian theology, of sacred doctrine, in the right kind of way. What he would need is to have the material presented so that he would grasp effects in virtue of causes, and thus acquire the noetic structure proper to that scientia. What he would need is second-level pedagogy, and this, I submit, is what the Summa theologiae attempts to provide.

First-level pedagogy, which is in many ways the most prolonged and arduous, would have occurred in the student's course in the arts and in the first four years of theology. In the arts course he would have mastered logic and grammar through the study of Aristotle's Categories, De interpretatione, Topics, De sophisticis enlencis, the Prior and Posterior Analytics, as well as works by Boethius and Priscian. In the physical scientiae, he would, through careful study of Aristotle's Physics, have learned about, inter alia, material substances and their accidents, the four causes and the nature of physical change. Through the study of Aristotle's De anima, De sensu et sensato, De memoria et reminiscentia and De animalibus he would come to know about the souls of humans and animals, about human action and human cognition. Through the study of De caelo et mundo, Meteorologia and De generatione et corruptione he would have been taught about inanimate nature and about the celestial bodies and their role in the order of the sub-lunar world. In the practical scientiae, through the study of the Nicomachean Ethics and the Politics, he would have considered human good, action, virtue, happiness (beatitude) and political philosophy. And in metaphysics, through the study of Aristotle's Metaphysics, he would have learned about being qua being and the immaterial substances, which are God and the intelligences or (as Moses Maimonides and Aquinas identified them) angels. In all these fields he would not only have encountered the teachings in each of these disciplines, but would also have acquired sufficient mastery to conduct disputations on controversial issues in these fields, and perhaps even have done some lecturing on key texts.

After first-level pedagogy in the philosophical scientiae in the arts course, the student would then learn the doctrines of Christian theology by attending lectures on the Bible for four years. These lectures, though based on the Biblical texts, would have been substantive theological lectures on Christian doctrine. Through them the student would have become familiar with these doctrines, and would have heard lectures on God, the Trinity, creation, the Incarnation, sin, salvation, grace and so on. In his first four years as a theology student, then, he would have become familiar with the concepts and doctrines of Christian theology.

When he was ready to study the Sentences of Peter Lombard, then, he would already have become familiar with the key theological and philosophical concepts, arguments and claims of Christiantheology. In the ideal case, at least, there would have been little for him to learn that was new. When Aquinas wrote the Summa theologiae to play the role that the Lombard's Sentences had been playing in the theology curriculum, his primary concern was not to pass on new claims and arguments, but to take the student through the final stage in the acquisition of the scientia of sacred doctrine. For full scientia the student, having grasped the fundamental concepts, learned the key claims and acquired the skills of reasoning and disputation, would need to engage in reasoning from the fundamental causes in this field to conclusions. This was second-level pedagogy, and its purpose was to instill in the student a habit of thought, so that his reasoning in the field would move easily, by second nature, from the fundamental causes to their effects. With this sort of training, when he considered (for example) human beings, he would readily think of them not simply as humans, but as beings which have their beginning and end in God, and as creatures which are finite reflections of the divine goodness. Only when he not only knew that humans were in fact creatures, but had also acquired the ready habit of thought to consider and contemplate them as such, did the student have scientia of sacred doctrine. The Summa theologiae, I am claiming, is a work of second-level pedagogy which is intended to instill just this habit of thought.

When we view the Summa as a work of second-level pedagogy, I contend, it makes much more sense. First, the content of the work is more appropriate for a thirteenth-century theology student who had completed his Master of Arts and four years of Biblical study. The level of sophistication and range of philosophical and theological issues addressed in this work is well beyond what a rank beginner could absorb. However, if the student had gone through the heavily philosophical, Aristotelian curriculum in the liberal arts of the mid-thirteenth century, and had studied, lectured upon and attended substantive theological lectures on the Bible for four years, he would be adequately prepared to take on what we find in the Summa theologiae.

Secondly, as we have seen, the structure of the Summa theologiae is precisely the opposite of what, in Aquinas's view, first-level pedagogy requires. It seems to accord, however, with what second-level pedagogy demands. This is especially clear in the prima pars, in which the discussion moves from God, to creation in general, to a discussion of the kinds of creatures which exist, moving from higher to lower creatures; and it concludes by considering God's conservation and governance of the whole.

Thirdly, to the extent that treatments of questions in the Summa theologiae do differ from treatments of the same or similar questions in other works, such as the Quaestiones disputatae or the Summa contra gentiles, they seem particularly suited to a work of second-level pedagogy. As we saw above in our discussion of Summa theologiae 1.85.1 (pp. 81-83), the Summa theologiae does not leave out anything essential to the resolution of the question of that article that was found in corresponding passages of the previously composed Quaestiones disputatae de veritate. Thus the Summa, as was argued above, does not seem geared to an untrained, unsophisticated audience, as a work of first-level pedagogy would be. But in the Summa Aquinas does eliminate objections which are either redundant or do not lead to any distinctively illuminating point, and he also leaves out a discussion of numerous and various opinions of ancient thinkers, something which is not essential to his response to the question of that article. The Summa theologiae, then, presents Aquinas's resolution of the question at hand in all its sophistication and subtlety, but free from extraneous material and repetition. The concern seems to be to set forth what is essential to the Scientia in as concise and lucid a manner as possible. And this interest in clarity and economy of presentation seems particularly appropriate tosecond-level pedagogy, for there one seeks to give a clear and uncluttered view of the whole sweep of the scientia, and particularly of the way its essential claims flow from its fundamental principles. In the initial discovery of difficult truths, tangential discussions and a meticulous consideration of objections are necessary to aid understanding, eliminate confusion and remove doubts. In second-level pedagogy, however, what one needs is a perspicuous presentation of the reasoning which leads from principles to conclusion, so that he will begin to think of the subject in this way. Extraneous or redundant material must be eliminated so that the structure of reasoning in the scientia can be better seen. The changes we find in the Summa theologiae in comparison with the Quaestiones disputatae seem to be directed to this end.

In the prologue to the Summa, Aquinas makes clear that concern for structure and economy of presentation are what had made him break with older forms. His dissatisfaction with the currently available works is (1) that they contain a multiplicity of useless questions, articles and arguments; (2) they fail to treat what is necessary for scientia according to the ordo disciplinae; and (3) the repetition of material in them produces boredom and confusion in the students. That is, he does not complain that existing works contain significant errors, or teach falsehoods, or ignore important material; his complaints all have to do with the fact that they do not present the material in the right kind of way. In second-level pedagogy it is precisely the way material is taught, the order of presentation, which is crucial. For only when the order of teaching clearly mirrors the order of causality can one begin to acquire the noetic structure proper to scientia.

Furthermore, we can, on this hypothesis, understand the significance of Aquinas's persistent—even obsessive—concern with the architectonic in the Summa. At the beginning of each question Aquinas tells us how that question fits into the larger scheme of the Summa and how the individual articles are structured. This may seem an unimportant, idiosyncratically scholastic preoccupation with order, and some writers have felt free to pluck questions and articles out of the context and try to understand them in isolation. But this can only lead to distortions, for, if I am right, then the structure of the work is, in one sense at least, its primary point. Since the concern is with second-level pedagogy, it is precisely the structure which Aquinas wants to communicate to the student, for he hopes thereby to shape the student's understanding.

My claim, then, is that in the Summa theologiae Aquinas's primary concern is with second- and not first-level pedagogy. This shift in perspective, I believe, enables us to make better sense of the work. It also gives rise to some important objections, which I will present in the next section. In the remaining chapters of this work I will try to respond to these objections, and we can thereby perhaps acquire a better understanding of the Summa theologiae and the scientia of sacred doctrine.

3.4 Some Objections

The first objection asks whether Aquinas would have considered a PA scientia generally, and not just the scientia of sacred doctrine, a practical possibility which might have served as a goal for inquiry. For the stringency of the requirements for a PA scientia may lead one to wonder whether we could ever have the apprehension of principles which it demands. According to the interpretation presented in chapter one, for a person to have scientia in a field, he must have grasped all the principles of that field; he must also, because they are indemonstrable principles, have apprehended themnon-inferentially; and, finally, he must know them better than any conclusions drawn from them in the scientia. But for several reasons, the first objection argues, in the merely human scientiae this seems such a remote and even unrealizable ideal that it renders this view of scientia irrelevant to actual scientific inquiry and training.

For, first of all, given the course of gradual discovery in many disciplines, particularly in empirical sciences, a given individual at a given time in the course of this gradual discovery should not expect to grasp all the principles of a scientia adequately. The principles of a scientia are immediate propositions, which are propositions in which the definition, or part of the definition, or another immediate attribute is predicated of a subject. It is perhaps plausible that for a mathematical scientia, such as geometry, we can identify the relevant immediate propositions and deduce from them all the conclusions of the scientia. (Thus it has often been said that Euclid's Elements seems to be quite close to the ideal the Posterior Analytics offers us, and perhaps served as a model for Aristotle's speculations.) However, Aquinas clearly wants to apply the PA account to natural scientiae, such as biology or physics.⁵² But the history of science has shown that it is very difficult to arrive at an adequate account of the essences studied in these scientiae. Secondly, it seems principles could not be known non-inferentially. In empirical disciplines, an objector may argue, essential definitions and the principles to which they give rise should be viewed as inferences from observational claims about the thing. For example, we infer the essence of water, or cow, or man from a large set of observations about how water, cows and men behave. Therefore, it seems, the essences of these things and the corresponding principles should be viewed as inferences from the observational claims, and thus the principles are known inferentially. Third and finally, some of the observational claims from which, as the objector claims, principles are inferred are conclusions of the scientia of which the principle in question is a principle. But, then, the principle could not be better known than the conclusions of the scientia, as the doxastic causality condition requires, for it is inferred from some of them. For these reasons, the first objector argues, Aquinas could not have thought that the PA notion of scientia as we have understood it could serve as an ideal for actual scientific inquiry.

A second objection focuses on the scientia of sacred doctrine and its principles, which are the articles of faith. It argues that the previous objection applies a fortiori to faith and the principles of sacred doctrine. A common view of Aquinas's account of the epistemic grounds for the assent of faith is that it is based on two sorts of arguments from philosophical theology. First, one constructs or encounters arguments from natural theology which justify the belief that God exists. Secondly, one constructs or encounters arguments that God brought about miracles and signs in Biblical times and in the history of the Church, and that these arguments ultimately justify the claim that what the Church claims as a divine revelation is in fact such.⁵³ But if this is Aquinas's account, then a Christian's belief that God exists or that God is Triune must be based at least partially on his belief in the propositions which are the premises of these natural theological arguments. However, some of these propositions (e.g. The world exists, or A miracle occurred) would be conclusions of sacred doctrine, and thus must be derived from its principles, which, according to the PA, must be better known than the conclusions. But, it seems, this requirement could never be fulfilled, for the principles are inferred from these putative conclusions.

A third objection argues that Aquinas makes clear that we cannot have scientia of the principles of sacred doctrine, and so, it would seem, neither can we have it of the conclusions which flow fromthese.⁵⁴ We can have a full apprehension of the mysteries of faith only when we, separated from our earthly bodies, behold the divine essence in heaven.⁵⁵ Thus it seems that, by Aquinas's own principles, he cannot instill the scientia of sacred doctrine in his students in this life, as I am claiming he is trying to do in the Summa theologiae.

Fourthly and finally, I have claimed that the structure of the Summa theologiae moves from causes to effects in a way which accords with second-level pedagogy, and that this is especially clear in the prima pars. But, a fourth objector asks, how does the second part, and particularly the secunda-secundae fit into this structure? Moreover, there seem to be parts of even the prima pars which do not fit into second-level pedagogy. For instance, after the introductory first question, Aquinas considers whether God, the subject of this scientia, exists. But according to the PA, at the second level of inquiry one must know that the subject exists.⁵⁶ Thus, upon a closer, more detailed examination, it is not clear that the structure of the Summa theologiae does accord with second-level pedagogy.

3.5 Conclusion

I have in this chapter argued against the standard interpretation which takes the Summa theologiae as a work of first-level pedagogy. Rather, it was written for very advanced students in theology, to serve as a final, comprehensive treatment of sacred doctrine. That is, it was intended as a work of second-level pedagogy which would present material moving from causes to effects, so that the habits of thought required for scientia would be instilled in students.

We have seen, though, that there are objections to the interpretation so far developed. We will give careful attention to these objections in the remaining chapters of this work, and our discussion of them will, I hope, further elucidate Aquinas's understanding of scientia and his project in the Summa theologiae. In chapter four we will consider the first objection, and look carefully at Aquinas's account of our apprehension of the principles of merely human scientiae, and particularly the more problematic physical scientiae. We will not be able to discuss these scientiae in all the detail they deserve, but I will provide some response to this objection, and this will also provide important background for our discussion of faith. After treating grace and the theological virtues in chapter five, we will in chapter six take up the second objection, and consider Aquinas's account of the assent of faith. Having dealt with these issues, we will be able to return to a consideration of the Summa theologiae, and I will attempt to respond to the third and fourth objections raised above.

Notes

¹ The purpose of the Aristotelian commentaries is somewhat controversial. See note 40 below.

²ST 1, prologus.

³ For a helpful discussion of the centrality of Aquinas's role as a teacher of Christian theology, see Etienne Gilson, The Christian Philosophy of St. Thomas Aquinas, 3-25; and for an excellent discussion of his vocation as a member of the Dominicans, the Order of Preachers, see Josef Pieper, Guide to Thomas Aquinas, trans. by Richard & Clara Winston (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1962), chs. 2 & 3.

⁴ST 1, prologus.

⁵ Marie-Dominique Chenu, OP, Towards Understanding Saint Thomas, trans. by A. M. Lanidry & D. Hughes (Chicago: Regnery, 1964), 297-98.

⁶ James A. Weisheipl, OP, Friar Thomas D'Aquino: His Life, Thought, and Work (New York: Doubleday, 1974), 222.

⁷ Leonard E. Boyle, OP, The Setting of the Summa theologiae of Saint Thomas, The Etienne Gilson Series 5 (Toronto: Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies, 1982), 7.

⁸ Weisheipl, 223.

⁹ Boyle, 17.

¹⁰ Chenu, 298.

¹¹ Weisheipl, 222-3.

¹² Some details of the procedures for disputation at Paris are unclear. I have here followed Weisheipl's description, 124ff..

¹³ST 1.prologus.

¹⁴De ver. 10.6.

¹⁵ST 1.iprologus.

¹⁶ST 1.2.2.

¹⁷In Physica, 1.i.7. Since this principle is repeated in Aquinas's own works, we can suppose that Aquinas embraced what he here attributes to Aristotle.

¹⁸ "Sed quia de Deo scire non possumus quid sit, sed quid non sit, non possumus considerare de Deo quomodo sit, sed potius quomodo non sit" (ST 1.3.prologus.)

¹⁹ "Deus … maxime cognoscibilis est" (ST 1.12.1).

²⁰ We find a different procedure in Aquinas's De ente et essentia. There Aquinas first treats (in chapter two) essence as found in composite, material substances-which are better known to us but less well known by nature. He only then considers (in chapter four) simple substances—which are better known by nature but less well known to us. This order of treatment follows more closely Aquinas's pedagogical principle for initial instruction in a field, and is not the one we find in the Summatheologiae.

²¹ Chenu, 303.

²² Ibid., 306.

²³ Boyle, The Setting of the Summa theologiae of Saint Thomas.

²⁴ Since before 1228, each Dominican province had been permitted to send three friars for study to Paris, which was then the only studium generale. After the foundation in 1248 of studia generalia at the Universities of Cologne, Oxford, Montpellier and Bologna, each Dominican province was also entitled to send two students to each of these general studia.

²⁵ William Hinnebusch writes (The History of the Dominican Order, vol. 2 [New York: Alba, 1973]) that a consequence of the opening of further studia generalia in 1248 was that "by gathering advanced students preparing for the professorship into selected houses of studies, the Order distinguished between advanced theological work and theological preparation for the ministry" (39).

²⁶ Boyle, 7.

²⁷ Ibid., 16.

²⁸ Ibid., 1.

²⁹ Ibid., 14.

³⁰ Ibid., 17.

³¹ Ibid., 19.

³² Ibid., 17.

³³ Ibid., 17. My emphasis.

³⁴ I owe the following point to conversations with my colleague Joseph Wawrykow. But, of course, the claims I make are not necessarily to be attributed to him.

³⁵Acta capitulorum provincialium provinciae Romae, ed T. Kaeppeli, OP, Monumenta Ordinis Fratrum Praedictorum Historica, xx (Rome: Institutum Historicum Fratrum Praedictorum, 1941), 39. See also Weisheipl, 294-6.

³⁶ There would have been reason to continue to teach the Sentences to those students destined for university study, for this was still the standard university text. However, for the fratres communes in the priories, who were not destined for the universities, there would have been no reason not to substitute the Summa as the standard theological text—if, in fact, it was intended for this group.

³⁷ Tolomeo of Lucca, Historia ecclesiastica, lib. 23, c. 15, in L. A. Muratori, Rerum italicarum scriptores, xi, (Milan: 1724), 1172-73.

³⁸ST 1.prologus.

³⁹Chartularium universitatis Parisiensis, ed. Henricus Denifle, OP (Paris: 1889) 1, 277-79. For the best discussion of the course of studies in the arts at Paris and Oxford see Gordon Leff s Paris and Oxford Universities in the Thirteenth and Fourteenth Centuries (New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1968), esp. 137-60; and his "The Trivium and the Three Philosophies" in Universities in the Middle Ages, ed. Hilde de Ridder-Symoens (Cambridge University Press, 1992), vol. 1, of A History of the University in Europe, ed. Walter Rtlegg, 307-336.

⁴⁰ See James A. Weisheipl, OP, Friar Thomas D Aquino: His Life, Thought, and Work (Garden City: Doubleday, 1974), 272-85. Weisheipl believes that Aquinas was combating the rise of the heterodox Aristotelianism of the Averroists, and that he undertook the Aristotelian commentaries as "an academic apostolate demanding his best efforts" (284), an apostolate which was to provide "an exegetical guide [to young masters] in order to understand and teach the Aristotelian books accurately without being led into heresy "(284-5).

This view has been challenged, however, by Rend-A. Gauthier, OP in Preface to the Sentencia libri De anima in the Leonine edition of Thomas's Opera omnia (Rome: 1882-), 45: 283^*-294^*. According to Gauthier, Aquinas was not combating Averroists in the Aristotelian commentaries, but had a positive theological and philosophical project. He was trying to extract (degagér) from Aristotle's texts a philosophical account of the soul which was valid not just for the ancient Greeks, but for all times, and which could give the Christian a better understanding of the human being as revealed by the Word of God (293^*).

⁴¹ At Oxford, it seems to have been seven or eight years. See Leff, Paris and Oxford 157-8; "The Trivium" 328.

⁴² A cursory lecture was one which sought simply to instill familiarity with a text by reviewing its content and structure with students, but it did not attempt to deal with any philosophical or theological problems arising from the text. These problems were treated in the Master's lecture.

⁴³ See Paris statutes of 1215 in Chartularium universitatis Parisiensis, 1, 78-9.

⁴⁴ At Paris, members of the mendicant orders were permitted to begin theology studies without a university arts degree. At Oxford a 1253 decree made the status of Master of Arts a prerequisite for becoming a Master of Theology. Until 1303, however, dispensations from this requirement were liberally granted. See Hinnebusch OP, The History of the Dominican Order, vol. 2, 78.

⁴⁵Chartularium universitatis Parisiensis 1, 385-86. See also Hinnebusch, 7-8, 27.

⁴⁶ Leff, Paris and Oxford, 165.

⁴⁷ Ibid., 166.

⁴⁸ Hinnebusch, 59.

⁴⁹ The Sentences of Peter Lombard were glosses on the sayings of Church Fathers, which theology students first studied and then lectured and commented upon. I do not want to claim that Aquinas expected the Summa theologiae to replace the Sentences entirely, nor that students were to comment on the Summa as they had on the Sentences. My claim is only that Aquinas intended the Summa to serve as the basis for a final, comprehensive course for theology students, as the Lombard's Sentences had been doing. He may have nevertheless envisioned that study of and commenting on the Sentences would still be done to some extent and in some manner.

⁵⁰ Monika Asztalos, "The Faculty of Theology," in de Ridder-Symoens ed., Universities in the Middle Ages, 417.

⁵¹ See my "Exposition of the Text: Aquinas's Aristotelian Commentaries," 39-62.

⁵² Of course, it is not twentieth-century biology and physics one should have in mind here, but the inquiries of the sort we find in Aristotle's works, such as De partibus animalium and De generatione et corruptione, which served as the basis for speculations about nature in thirteenth-century Europe.

⁵³ This account of Aquinas's view of the epistemic justification of the assent of faith is what I call the "naturalistic interpretation," and it is discussed in chapter six below.

⁵⁴ST 11-11.2.1.

⁵⁵ST 1.12.11.

⁵⁶In Post. anal. 1.ii.15.

Abbreviations

ST:

Summa theologiae

SCG:

Summa contra gentiles

SSS:

In quattuor libros Sententiarum

De potentia:

Quaestiones disputatae de potentia

De ver.:

Quaestiones disputatae de veritate

In De anima:

Sententia libri De anima

In Ethica:

Sententia libri Ethicorum

In Meta.:

Expositio in libros Metaphysicorum

In Periherm.:

Expositio in libros Perihermenias

In Physica:

Expositio in libros Physicorum

In Post. anal.:

Expositio libri posteriorum

In De Trin.:

Super Boethium de Trinitate