SOURCE: "The Permanent Significance of Thomas Aquinas" in The Recovery of Virtue: The Relevance of Aquinas for Christian Ethics, Westminster/John Knox Press, 1990, pp. 172-79.

[In the following excerpt, Porter extols Aquinas for his unsurpassed handling of problems in his own time, as well as for providing a strong foundation on which to build in the future.]

The history of Aquinas' influence in the ecumenical church is filled with ironies. In 1879, Aquinas' intellectual authority was held up by Leo XIII, in his famous encyclical Aeterni Patris, as "a singular safeguard and glory of the Catholic Church," because "with his own hand he vanquished all errors of ancient times; and still he supplies an armory of weapons which brings us certain victory in the conflict with falsehoods ever springing up in the course of years."¹ The effect of this encyclical was mixed, by any standards. It helped to foster the brilliant flowering of Thomistic studies earlier in this century, and yet it also fostered a kind of rigid scholasticism which discredited Aquinas in the minds of many intellectuals, both in and out of the Catholic church. But the ironies do not end there. Today, Aquinas' influence among Protestant theologians may be as great as or greater than it is among Catholic theologians, in spite of the historic resistance to Thomism within the Protestant churches. Certainly, no one at the turn of the century would have foreseen that the most prominent common denominator among Catholic thinkers and major strands of Protestant thought, as represented in the work of Outka, Gustafson, and Hauerwas, would be a shared indebtedness to some aspect of Aquinas' moral thought.

In the situation of the church today, shaped as it has been by ironies such as these, a claim that Aquinas' thought has permanent significance for the ecumenical church must be spelled out with some care. It would be easy to read this claim as a reassertion of Aeterni Patris, which at least implies that Aquinas is the Christian theologian, whose work can never be superseded. That is not at all what I want to claim. To the contrary, I will suggest that Aquinas' permanent significance lies precisely in the fact that his thought contains the seeds of its own transcendence.

As I understand it, the permanent significance of Aquinas' thought must be understood and defended within the context of our interpretation of the history of the Christian tradition and our best judgments about the challenges that that tradition must meet today, if it is to continue as a living tradition. That is, Aquinas' thought is of permanent significance for the Christian tradition for two reasons. On the one hand, his thought can be shown to address the tensions and problematics of that tradition, as it had developed up to his own time, more successfully than other attempts to do so. On the other hand, it can be shown to be capable of addressing the tensions and problematics of the Christian tradition in our own time in a satisfactory way, albeit through expansion and development that will take us beyond the limits of Aquinas' own system (as he himself transcended both Aristotle and Augustine).²

Those readers who are familiar with MacIntyre's book Whose Justice? Which Rationality? will recognize that my defense of the permanent significance of Aquinas' work is dependent upon MacIntyre's account of the rationality of traditions.³ Moreover, Maclntyre himself argues "quite incidentally" that Aquinas' synthesis was superior within the context of the history of the tradition within which Aquinas stood; moreover, this superiority extended throughout that tradition as it developed beyond him, up to the emergence of liberalism as a tradition. As a result of his own account of the history of that tradition, Maclntyre concludes that he, MacIntyre, has exhibited

an Aristotelian tradition with resources for its own enlargement, correction, and defense, resources which suggest that prima facie at least a case has been made for concluding first that those who have thought their way through the topics of justice and practical rationality, from the standpoint constructed by and in the direction pointed out first by Aristotle and then by Aquinas, have every reason at least so far to hold that the rationality of their tradition has been confirmed in its encounters with other traditions and, second, that the task of characterizing and accounting for the achievements and successes, as well as the frustrations and failures, of the Thomistic tradition in the terms afforded by rival traditions of enquiry, may, even from the point of view of the adherents of those traditions, be a more demanding task than has sometimes been supposed.⁴

In this book, I have attempted to develop another, far more modest part of a general case for the permanent significance of Aquinas' thought, understood in terms of its role in the development of an ongoing tradition. I have attempted to show that Aquinas' moral thought brings together concepts that, in the thought of our contemporaries in the field of Christian ethics, provide the basis for rival and incompatible theories of morality. If the interpretation developed in this book is convincing, then Aquinas' theory of morality is of more than historical interest to us today, because it can point to strategies for overcoming the fragmentation of contemporary Christian ethics.

As I indicated in the first chapter, I do not intend to argue that Aquinas' theory of morality could be accepted as it stands today. However, I do believe that some version of that theory, reformulated in the light of contemporary problematics, would offer the best prospect for recovering a cogent accountof human goodness and human virtue from the chaos of contemporary moral discourse. In order to defend this claim, it would be necessary to show how a Thomistic theory of morality could meet the challenges which our contemporaries direct against Aquinas' thought, and that is a task for another book. But even at this point, it should be possible to offer at least some general indications of the way in which some of these challenges might be addressed in a Thomistic theory of morality, and that is what I will now attempt to do. In addition to bolstering the case that Aquinas' thought deserves serious consideration as a starting point for contemporary Christian ethics, these reflections, sketchy as they will necessarily be, may serve nonetheless to indicate the lines along which a contemporary Thomistic theory of morality might be developed.

Science, Rationality, and the Doctrine of God

Of all the contemporary ethicists we have examined in this book, James Gustafson insists most strongly that if Christianity is to continue as a living tradition, it must take account of the challenges of contemporary science. In my view, he is quite right. Furthermore, as he himself notes, his view is far more in accordance with the Thomistic spirit than would be a cavalier refusal to consider the deliverances of modern science to be relevant to Christian thought.⁵ At the same time, if these challenges are to be met, it is necessary to determine just where they lie. I would argue, contrary to Gus-tafson, that the particular deliverances of modern science to which he refers do not present significant new challenges to Christian thought. I do not deny in principle that some particular discovery might present a new challenge to Christian thought, as the theory of evolution in fact did. However, it does not seem to me that the specific discoveries that Gustafson mentions raise serious new challenges, as he thinks they do.

On the other hand, the philosophical theories of rationality that have developed under the impetus of modern science do raise serious challenges for Christian thought. In particular, the growing consensus around what was described in chapter 2 as the incommensurability thesis poses a very serious challenge to Christian claims for the universal truth of the central Christian beliefs. In that chapter, I indicated briefly how a Thomistic theory of the natural law might be developed in such a way as to take the incommensurability thesis into account. The reader will recall that I argued there that the incommensurability thesis does not necessarily raise internal difficulties for the philosophy of nature on which a Tho-mistic natural law theory must be based. However, it does imply that the universal validity of the natural law, so understood, could be established only in conversation with rival traditions, and indeed there can be no guarantee that its universal validity could be established even then. The aspiration—explicit in Catholic moral theology, and implicit in the work of those thinkers analyzed by Outka, and perhaps in the work of Gustafson as well—to establish an account of morality that would be rationally compelling to anyone whatever must therefore be abandoned. However, it does not follow, as Hauerwas argues, that there can be no rational grounds on which to promote and defend a Christian theory of the natural law over against rival theories of morality. As MacIntyre has shown, it is possible rationally to assess the rival claims of incommensurable traditions, and so it would be possible to defend a Christian theory of the natural law so long as it is understood and defended as part of a wider tradition of thought.

Ultimately, as Gustafson realizes, an adequate Christian response to the challenges of modern science must be grounded in the doctrine of God. Aquinas' thought offers an especially promising basis onwhich to develop a doctrine of God that answers the challenges of our times, not only because of the considerable merits of his own doctrine of God, but even more because his general theory of goodness presupposes the possibility and legitimacy of developing a natural theology as one component of a Christian theory of morality. Indeed, although we have not examined it in this book, I would argue that Aquinas' theological doctrine of God implies that Christians have reasons, implicit in their own tradition, to take the project of natural theology seriously. This conclusion would be especially significant because a sort of natural theology is emerging today among scientists themselves. While the details of this natural theology may not be compatible with a Christian doctrine of God, nonetheless, it would be foolish to deny that Christians can and should attempt to learn from it and to incorporate its genuine insights into Christian theology.⁶

The Social Dimension of the Human Person

A second challenge that a contemporary Thomistic theory of morality would have to meet lies in the area of philosophical anthropology. This challenge might be expressed in rough terms by asking whether Aquinas has fully grasped the social dimensions of human existence. True, he is well aware that the human person is a social creature, and he gives great weight to our obligations to family and society. Nonetheless, it might be said that he still assumes that the human person is finally a self-contained individual, capable of knowledge and free choice apart from the conditioning influences of society. But in fact, this model of the human person has been seriously undermined by philosophical work which seems to show that the human person is a creature of the social matrix within which she moves, and is radically conditioned by the structures of her society. In this country, this challenge is presented most forcefully by American pragmatism, which has had a profound influence on Protestant ethical thought that is especially apparent today in Gustafson's writings.⁷

I would suggest that the tradition of American pragmatism offers the same sort of challenge, and opportunity, to Christian theologians of our own time and place as Aristotelianism offered to Aquinas and his contemporaries. No modern school of thought offers a more radical challenge to Christian thought, and yet, -for that very reason, there may be no modern school of thought that is potentially more fruitful for Christian theology. In order to address this challenge, it will be necessary to deal with it as Aquinas dealt with Aristotle, by incorporating it as far as possible into Christian thought without compromising what is essential to the Christian tradition. To be more specific: I would argue that Christianity cannot surrender the claim that human persons are capable in principle of knowledge and actions that are not radically determined by their social matrices. But it can, and indeed must, show that this possibility is compatible with the reality of a pervasive social conditioning, which initially determines the activities of all persons, and may well continue to determine the activities of some persons throughout their lives. And arguably, Aquinas offers at least a starting point for such an analysis of human freedom, in his acknowledgment of the degree to which moral discernment is conditioned by the limitations of our knowledge of the human good, on the one hand, and by the particular circumstances within which we must act, on the other.

Levels of Goodness: Individual, Communal, and Universal Good

It will be apparent that until the Thomistic tradition has developed further along the lines just indicated, it will not be able to offer a complete answer to one of the most important questions incontemporary Christian ethics, namely, "What is the proper relationship between individual and community?" And yet, the conclusions of chapter 5 suggest the direction that such an answer would take.

As we saw in our examination of Aquinas' account of justice, Aquinas does not address the tension between the claims of the individual and those of the community by collapsing one set of claims into those of the other—that is, by identifying the good of the individual without remainder with the good of the community, or vice versa. Rather, his account of the naturally good life for the human person enables him to offer a persuasive account of the way in which the well-being of individual and community are mutually interdependent. He recognizes that no individual is able to live, much less to lead a humanly good life, apart from the sustaining structures of the community. Moreover, he at least implies recognition of the existence of the goods of traditions, which transcend the good of any individual contribution to those traditions, however exalted. Hence, he can cogently insist that the common good is greater and naturally more lovable to the individual than his own individual good, and therefore it is rational for the individual to sacrifice some measure of his material goods and abilities, and even, in extreme circumstances, his life itself, for the sake of the community. But at the same time, the common good itself cannot exist without justice, and justice demands that the community respect and foster the well-being of all its members equally in certain fundamental ways, as indicated by a correct understanding of the good life for human beings. For this reason, while the community can legitimately ask a great deal of its members, it cannot arbitrarily sacrifice them to the common good (even though it can ask them to make sacrifices themselves). A community that attempts to do so, or allows some of its members to sacrifice the well-being of others to their private interests with impunity, forfeits its claim on the allegiance of its members.

In the last section, it was suggested that once the Thomistic tradition has incorporated the insights of American pragmatism and related philosophical movements, it will be able to deal more adequately with the paradox (but not contradiction) involved in the recognition that the human person is fundamentally shaped by the communal matrix out of which her life emerges, and yet is free before God, because freed by God. As a result, it will be able to address and incorporate the insights of liberation theologians that sin is not just a private affair. There is such a thing as collective sin, which corrupts individuals without their prior consent, and from which they must be freed before they can live in the grace of God.⁸ Correlatively, the church will appear in a new light, as capable of profound corruption by society, or as capable of bringing a new hope to society, depending on its faithfulness to its own call.⁹

It is also possible to see in Aquinas' work some indications of the way in which the Thomistic tradition might be expanded to address a question which has taken on a new urgency in this century. That is, what is the proper relationship between humanity, individually and collectively, and the natural world on which we depend? There can be no doubt that so long as this question is answered within the framework of the Thomistic tradition, that answer must begin with a reassertion of the legitimacy of humanity's use of the subhuman creation for its own well-being. But it does not follow, within the parameters of this tradition, that we may treat the rest of the material creation with impunity in whatever way we like.

Apart from the requirements of a far-seeing prudence, the Thomistic tradition would suggest twoparameters within which the human use of the material creation must fall. The first is that any such use must truly be directed toward the good of all persons concerned, since the material creation is seen within this tradition as intended for the well-being of humanity as a whole. Given the realities of global interdependence, it follows that our use of the resources of nature must be directed to the good of the whole human race, and not exclusively to the good of one nation or economic collectivity.

The second parameter is set by Aquinas' general theory of goodness, according to which all creatures, and not just rational creatures, possess an intrinsic goodness apart from their potential usefulness to anything else. The specific character of each creature bestows on it an intrinsic orientation toward higher goods, and that is why we may legitimately make use of nonrational creatures for our own ends. But that orientation does not annul the goodness that each creature possesses in and of itself. On the basis of that goodness, which after all is another participation in the goodness of God, all creatures deserve some form of respect, albeit not the sort of respect that we owe to one another. At the very least, this respect would ground a distinction between, on the one hand, legitimate use, and, on the other hand, waste, destruction, or (in the case of animals) wanton cruelty, which would rightly be condemned. Even in the thirteenth century, Aquinas recognized that while the lower orders of creation are directed to serve the higher, still, God also ordains that the lower should be preserved through the activities of the higher (1.64.4). Surely we in the twentieth century can say no less.

Ultimately, Aquinas' theory of morality is significant today because it is successful on Aquinas' own terms. That is, he offers an account of the moral life which integrates the central concepts of his metaphysics into a unified account of human goodness and the virtues. Although we can no longer accept that account as it stands, it remains an impressive achievement in its own right. And I know of no better starting point from which to develop a unified theory of morality that is both contemporary and Christian.

Notes

¹ "The Encyclical Letter of Pope Leo XIII on the Restoration of Christian Philosophy According to the Mind of St. Thomas Aquinas, the Angelic Doctor" (Aeterni Patris), published in English in the 1947 edition of the Summa Theologiae, vii-xvi, at xiii.

² Alasdair Maclntyre, Whose Justice? Which Rationality? (Notre Dame, Ind.: University of Notre Dame Press, 1988), 164-82.

³ Ibid., 349-403.

⁴ Ibid., 402-3.

⁵ James M. Gustafson, "A Response to Critics," Journal of Religious Ethics 13/2 (Fall 1985), 189.

⁶ For example, see Paul Davies, God and the New Physics (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1983); A. R. Peacocke, Creation and the World of Science (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1979); and Robert Wright, Three Scientists and Their Gods: Looking for Meaning in an Age of Information (New York: Harper & Row, 1988).

⁷ The literature on pragmatism is extensive. For a good critical history of pragmatism, including a theological critique from the standpoint of African-American liberation theology, see Comel West, The American Evasion of Philosophy: A Genealogy of Pragmatism (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1989). Those who are especially interested in the influence of pragmatism on Gustafson should compare his work with the writings of H. Richard Niebuhr, who drew extensively on the work of the pragmatists, especially Mead. See H. Richard Niebuhr, The Responsible Self: An Essay in Christian Moral Philosophy (New York: Harper & Row, 1963); George Herbert Mead, Mind, Self and Society from the Standpoint of a Social Behaviorist, ed. Charles W. Morris, (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1934).

⁸ For example, see Juan Luis Segundo, Grace and the Human Condition (Maryknoll, N.Y.: Orbis Books, 1973), 37-39.

⁹ See Jose Comblin, The Church and the National Security State (Maryknoll, N.Y.: Orbis Books, 1979), for an ecclesiology that develops along these lines.