The argument of this essay is that G. E. Moore's 'The Refutation of Idealism' provided E. M. Forster with a philosophical argument about the perception of reality that he used to connect the central concerns of The Longest Journey. This use involved converting the refutation of epistemological Idealism into an ethical conclusion about accepting the objective reality of other people, of other loves, of other societies, of nature, and finally of time. From Moore's interest in arguments against the existence of objective reality Forster develops his own novelistic interest in the objective and subjective assumptions that his characters act upon in their lives. In his own fictional terms Forster 'refutes' their idealisms—both epistemological and altruistic—by showing their consequences especially in love. (pp. 52-3)

Forster's use of Moore will undoubtedly strike some philosophers and even some critics as hopelessly naïve. The Longest Journey will never rank as a great philosophical novel…. Forster may not have understood the philosophical significance of Moore's refutation, but The Longest Journey suggests that he recognised a revolution in thought when he saw one…. There are many things wrong with The Longest Journey: the sudden deaths that his plot needed, the sentimental characterisation of Stephen, the authorial essays and purple patches, the ambivalence about Rickie's inadequacy and priggishness, the uncertain conflict between homoerotic and heterosexual love. Forster has admitted his painful awareness of some of these difficulties. But there are more things right about the novel than is often recognised. The Longest Journey is a far richer, subtler, and finally more serious book than many readers realise. One of the reasons why the novel has been so dispraised appears to be an unawareness of its philosophical basis. (p. 53)