SOURCE: Ames, Roger T. “Shih (Strategic Advantage/Political Purchase).” In The “Art of Rulership”: A Study of Ancient Chinese Political Thought, pp. 65-107. Albany: State University of New York Press, 1994.

[In the following excerpt, Ames analyzes the concept of strategic advantage as described in The Art of War and traces how the concept changes in later works.]

The next concept to be analyzed in this exploration of the political philosophy of The Art of Rulership [Book Nine of the Huai Nan Tzu] is shih, “strategic advantage.” This concept has long been associated with the rise of the Legalist school as one of its three cardinal precepts: fa (“penal law”), shih (“strategic advantage/political purchase”), and shu (“art/techniques of rulership”). In spite of its central importance, the historical development of shih prior to its adoption by the early Legalist thinkers has not, to my knowledge, been examined in any depth; as a consequence, the full range of this concept has yet to be clearly delineated. Because it gradually accrued a wide though not unrelated range of meanings, it has often suffered the common fate of being interpreted in early texts with all its later connotations. If the meaning of shih as used in the earliest sources can be determined with some accuracy, this definition can be used as a starting point to trace its later development as it gradually took on additional dimensions of meaning.

It would appear that at a relatively early period—at least by the time of Sun Wu in the sixth century b.c.—thinkers who were later to be classified as “Militarists” had already appropriated the character shih to represent a specific military situation. Having acquired military connotations, this same character at yet another stage in its development was taken over by Legalist theorists and given a political dimension in many ways analogous to its earlier military application. Finally, in response to the Legalist use of shih as a special political term, Confucian-oriented texts such as the Hsün Tzu appropriated this concept and shaped it to fit their own political philosophies. As we shall discover, shih as used in The Art of Rulership is much closer to the Confucian variation than to the original Legalist stock.

DEVELOPMENT OF SHIH AS A SPECIAL MILITARY TERM

Hsü Fu-kuan suggests that the expression shih was originally a term employed by the Militarist school in discussing contention for advantageous terrain.¹ This assertion is borne out first by references to the Militarists in early texts and again by the contents of extant works representative of the Militarist school, especially those attributed to Sun Wu² and Sun Pin.³

First, there are references in the early literature which establish a definite association between the Militarist thinkers and this notion of shih. The “Debating Military Affairs” (Yi-ping) chapter of the Hsün Tzu (53/15/5), for example, opens with a debate on military affairs between the lord of Lin-wu⁴ and Hsün Tzu before King Hsiao-ch'eng of Chao.⁵ In this debate the term shih is associated with the Militarists Sun Wu and Wu Ch'i:

The lord of Lin-wu said: “This is not so. What is valued in military affairs is strategic advantage and benefit; what is put into action is versatility and deception. One adept at deploying the military moves with suddenness and secrecy, and none know from whence he comes. Sun Wu and Wu Ch'i using this philosophy were without equal in the world. How could it be necessary to first win over the people?”⁶

And in the Lü-shih ch'un-ch'iu 17/18b it states: “Sun Pin valued strategic advantage.” The Historical Records (Shih-chi) biography of Sun Pin, pp. 2163-2164, credits him with having said:

Now, one wanting to unravel a jumbled tangle of silk threads does not tug at it and strike it; one wanting to resolve a conflict does not throw himself punching and jabbing into the fray. If we avoid the enemy's strong points and attack him where he is most vulnerable, and if we change the overall circumstances and control the strategic advantage, the situation will resolve itself. …

The skillful commander who takes his strategic advantage into account can use it to his benefit.

Given the limited number of references to the Militarists in these early texts,⁷ it is fair to speculate on the basis of these passages alone that this concept of shih was considered to be of central importance to Militarist doctrine. Such speculation is confirmed by examination of the extant Militarist texts.⁸

In the Sun Tzu, and particularly in the “Strategic Advantage” chapter, one notes various shades of meaning for this term shih. First, as in 10/7a and 10/8a below, there are several instances where, given the general nature of its usage, the term can perhaps be rendered as “conditions” or “circumstances”:

In the case of being at a distance from the enemy and where conditions are equally matched, it is difficult to instigate the engagement, and were one to engage the enemy, it is not to his advantage.

Conditions being equally matched, to attack an enemy with one-tenth of his numbers is called “troops in rout.”

A second, more complex use of shih is that of “disposition,” “configuration,” “deployment,” or “shape.” As D. C. Lau has indicated,⁹ in the following two passages from the Sun Tzu (4/16b and 5/23b) the characters hsing (“shape”) and shih are used as near-synonyms:

That a victorious general committing his men to battle can be likened to the surging of pent-up waters thundering through a gorge is a matter of his army's advantageous deployment (hsing).

Hence that the strategic advantage of the skillful commander can be likened to the avalanching of round boulders down a precipitous mountainside is a matter of his advantageous deployment (shih).

The sometimes synonymous relationship between these two characters is again apparent in the following passage (6/31b):

Now the disposition of troops resembles water: the flow of water avoids high ground and hastens to low areas; the disposition of troops avoids the strong points and strikes at the weak. Water follows the ground in determining its flow; troops follow the enemy in determining their victory. Thus troops have no constant deployment (shih) and water has no constant disposition (hsing).

That hsing and shih can be used in this synonymous manner is due to the fact that they overlap somewhat in meaning. The term shih seems to have a strong connotation of physical position—not in the sense of specific location, but rather of a fluid configuration ever responsive to its context. Just as the flow of water is determined by the contour of the terrain, so the physical disposition of shih is determined by changing circumstances. “Shape” in the sense of physical terrain is again one of the most significant elements in the acquisition of strategic advantage.¹⁰ Basically, shih seems to mean occupation of high ground and the “purchase” or strategic advantage it confers.¹¹ In 5/8a the Sun Tzu employs the metaphors of water, trees, and boulders hurtling down from high ground to express this aspect of shih: “That the swiftness of dammed-up waters can even send boulders bobbing about is due to its shih.” And likewise in 5/23a: “The commitment of troops to battle for one who relies on shih is like the avalanching of trees and boulders.” Sun Tzu 5/10a likens the shih implicit in advantageous position to a drawn crossbow: “His shih is like a drawn crossbow; his striking distance is like the squeezing of the trigger.”¹²When taken in a military context, this term shih refers to deployment of one side in relation to the other. These deployments fall into two categories: “irregular deployments” (ch'i shih) and “regular deployments” (cheng shih) described in Sun Tzu 5/7b as follows: “With battle deployments, there are no more than the regular and irregular, and yet the possibilities of change from one to the other are inexhaustible.”¹³ Presumably the essential difference between these two kinds of deployment is the enemy's anticipation or lack of it. If a maneuver for advantage is expected by the enemy, it is “regular”; if it catches the enemy unawares, it is “irregular.” The critical importance of wresting deployment advantage from the enemy is stated very clearly in Sun Tzu 5/20b: “Hence it is in shih rather than in man that the skillful commander seeks his victory.” This military use of shih is perhaps best summarized in the definition which the Sun Tzu 1/17b gives for the term: “Shih is making the most of beneficial circumstances and tilting the scales in your favor.”

In the Sun Tzu, then, the term shih has at least three dimensions of meaning: (1) “circumstances” or “conditions”; (2) “physical disposition” in connection with the deployment of troops; and (3) occupation of a superior position and access to the potential advantages it confers. In this respect the word can refer either collectively or individually to the superior position, the advantage inherent in the position, and the manipulation of this advantage.

In a work as short as the Sun Tzu, the frequency of shih and the emphasis placed upon it make it without question one of the central concepts of the text. That this concept continued to be an important aspect of Militarist thought is evidenced by its role in the Sun Pin Art of Warfare (Sun Pin ping-fa) and the military chapters of The Book of Lord Shang (Shang-chün shu) and Kuan Tzu.

Although there are instances in the Sun Pin Art of Warfare where shih is used with its more general meaning of “conditions” or “circumstances,” the tendency to employ it as a specific military term is even more marked than in the Sun Tzu. Where there are only two instances in which it may possibly be rendered “circumstances” or “conditions,”¹⁴ and again one more in which it would seem to mean “physical disposition,”¹⁵ the remaining passages insist on the specifically military interpretation of the advantage inherent in a superior position. In several passages it means simply “strategic advantage” or “purchase” (nos. 83, 213-214, and 258):

Sun Pin said, “A military victory lies in the selection of appropriate personnel; courage lies in enforcing strict discipline; skill lies in turning strategic advantage to full account. …”

Use fire to throw the enemy into disorder and shower him with arrows. Use the din of the attack drums to spur the troops on, and avail yourself of every strategic advantage to assist them.

The defender can await the enemy after having occupied the best terrain and having made the most of strategic advantages.

Again, as in the Sun Tzu 5/7b, the term occurs as a compound expression chan shih to mean “battle deployment” (no. 362-363): “Thus, in battle deployment, reinforce those troops on the verge of victory, replace those in the throes of defeat, allow those who are fatigued to rest, and feed those who are hungry.”¹⁶ Most significant, however, are the two passages in which it is singled out as one of the terms used to signify factors affecting the outcome of battle (nos. 38 and 111-122):

T'ien-chi then asked, “Are authority, strategic advantage tactics, and deceit the most crucial factors in military operations?” Sun Pin replied, “Not at all. Authority is a means of assembling troops. Strategic advantage is a means of guaranteeing they will fight. Tactics are a means of harassing the enemy. While they can facilitate victory, they are not the most crucial factors.” T'ien-chi flushed and said with irritation, “These six factors are utilized by all experts in military operations, and yet you, sir, claim that they are not the most crucial considerations. …”

Huang Ti created the sword and then derived the military formation from its characteristics; Yi created the bow and crossbow and then derived the notion of strategic advantage from their characteristics; Yü created the boat and chariot and derived the notion of variability from their characteristics; T'ang and Wu created the lance and derived the notion of wielding authority from its characteristics. These four principles are all based on the application of military weapons. … How do we know that the notion of strategic advantage is derived from the bow and crossbow? An archer shoots from between shoulder and chest and kills a person over a hundred paces away who does not even know where the bolt came from. Hence it can be said: the bow and crossbow exemplify strategic advantage. … Generally speaking, there are four principles of military operations: military formation, strategic advantage, variability, and authority. A thorough consideration of these four principles is the way to crush a formidable enemy and capture a fierce commander.

Having considered these examples of usage in the Sun Pin Art of Warfare, we can conclude with some confidence that the term shih played a central role in articulating pre-Ch'in Militarist thought. This conclusion is reinforced by an analysis of the use of this term in the military chapters of The Book of Lord Shang and Kuan Tzu.

While shih does occur once in The Book of Lord Shang to mean “conditions,”¹⁷ and occurs also in compound expressions like “physical disposition” (hsing shih) in the Kuan Tzu,¹⁸ the most frequent usage nevertheless refers to the acquisition of a strategically superior position and its inherent advantage. Consider, for example, this passage in The Book of Lord Shang 5/3b (p. 76): “If there is nothing which is beneath one, he will have the advantage of the use of arms. If one can hold this advantage over a long time, his position (shih) will become supreme.” And again in the Kuan Tzu 1:25-10: “Therefore, to understand conditions and calculations clearly is a strategic advantage in the use of troops. A critical factor is timing; of less importance is the calculation of numerical strength.”¹⁹

The final stage in this investigation of shih as a key Militarist concept is an examination of its usage in Book Fifteen, Summary of Military Strategies (Ping-lüeh), of the Huai Nan Tzu. As a compendium of pre-Ch'in thought with considerable borrowings from earlier texts, the Huai Nan Tzu reflects an early Han interpretation of the essential elements of many of the early schools. While including a considerable quantity of material which can be identified in sources still extant, it also contains a wealth of early Chinese thought which has been preserved within its pages alone.

Many similar passages make it immediately apparent that the Summary of Military Strategies has been considerably influenced by other texts cataloged as belonging to the Militarist school. The importance of shih can be inferred from the fact that in the brief description of this treatise in the Summary of Essentials (Yao-lüeh) postface to the Huai Nan Tzu, the term shih occurs twice (21/3b):

The Summary of Military Strategies treatise is to explain the conditions which must obtain for victory in battle and successful attack, the strategic advantage provided by terrain and deployment, and variability possible through deceit and treachery. … If one really understands its meaning, in whatever operations he undertakes he will be free from the danger of attack. Taking strategic advantage as his basic stuff and tranquillity and clarity as his ordinary frame of mind, he can avoid his enemy's strong points and attack him where he is vulnerable as if he were driving a flock of sheep.

As in the Sun Tzu, there are instances where shih might mean simply “circumstances” or “conditions”²⁰ and places where it might also carry the connotation of “physical disposition” or “deployment.”²¹ Significantly, however, it continues to favor the special military usage: a strategically advantageous position, the purchase available to the occupant, and the manipulation of this purchase. In this treatise is found what must be the most lucid explanation of shih as a military term available to us in any of the early texts (Huai Nan Tzu 15/8a-b):

In military preparations there are three kinds of strategic advantage and two kinds of authority. There is the advantage of morale, the advantage of terrain, and the advantage of opportunity:

1. When the general is full of courage and regards the enemy with contempt, when his troops are steeled in their resolve and are pleased at the prospect of battle, when the determination of his army, countless in number, outstrips the skies, when their morale is like a tempest and their battle cries ring like thunder, when utterly committed they fall upon the enemy with all of their might—this is called a morale advantage (ch'i shih).
2. Precipitous passes, narrows, high mountains, known strategic locations, spiraling approaches, basins, snaking roadways, bottlenecks, places where one man can hold a thousand enemy at bay—this is called a terrain advantage (ti shih).
3. Taking advantage of the enemy's fatigue, their ill-preparedness and disorder, their hunger and thirst, their exposure to the elements, pressing in upon them where they are unsure of themselves and giving them no ground where they are most vulnerable—this is called an opportunity advantage (yin shih).

This passage clarifies the important point made in Sun Tzu 10/a cited above that shih is distinct from the numerical strength of the contending armies. It is not strength of numbers but elements such as “morale,” “terrain,” and “opportunity” which are indicated by the military usage of shih.

By far the majority of instances of shih in the Summary of Military Strategies can best be rendered “strategic advantage.”²² The crucial importance of shih in determining the outcome of battle is clearly stated in 15/11a: “That which determines the victor is the weighing up²³ of strategic advantages.” According to this treatise, a truly superior general assesses every factor which might have a bearing on his success or failure: the auspiciousness of the day, the fall of the land, the various human elements. Consequently, he is never routed and never suffers defeat. With the assistance of shih, however, even a mediocre general stands a good chance of victory (Huai Nan Tzu 15/11a): “Even though there is no certainty of complete success, his chances of victory are indeed good.” The preponderant importance of shih over all other factors in battle is stressed in the following passage in which it is made analogous to leverage in chopping wood and the crossbow in dispatching the arrow (15/11a):

Now, in chopping firewood with a broadaxe, one need not wait for an opportune moment or auspicious day to cut it down. But if in addressing the axe to the firewood he is without a handle for it, regardless of the extent to which he is in accordance with chao yao²⁴ or how auspicious the day,²⁵ he will be unable to cut it down. This is because he does not have a leverage advantage. If water is dammed up, it will come cascading down; if an arrow is drawn to the hilt, it will fly a long way. Now, were an arrow to be made from the finest bamboo and decorated with silver and tin, it still would not be able to penetrate the mail of even the thinnest silk or a shield of rotten lotus leaves without some kind of assistance. If, on the other hand, some muscle and the purchase of a crossbow were put behind it, it would pierce rhinoceros hide armor and pass right through a leather shield.

It is this Militarist use of shih to connote strategic advantage which at some later date seems to have been taken up by the Legalist thinkers and fashioned into one of the mainstays of their philosophical system. The next step, then, is to trace this concept through the main works of the Legalist tradition and attempt to discover how the notion of shih was extended from a principle of effective warfare to a principle of political control. In addition to the Legalist writings Shen Tao, Shang-chün shu, Kuan Tzu, and Han Fei Tzu, we will also examine the Lü-shih ch'un-ch'iu and the Hsün Tzu—two texts contemporaneous with the rise of Legalist thought that reflect a different perspective on the development of this term.

DEVELOPMENT OF SHIH AS A SPECIAL LEGALIST TERM

As a special Legalist term, shih can be rendered “political purchase.” The choice of the word “purchase” as an occasional equivalent for shih may be clarified with a simple analogy. Whereas the ruler as individual is limited in his capacity to regulate the conduct of others, from the strategically advantageous position of the throne he can use his political status as ruler to amplify his influence over others. It is this political status and its application as a fulcrum for increasing the ruler's capacity to influence others that constitute his shih. (It is significant that the Militarists cite fulcrum-like devices such as the axe handle and crossbow as metaphors for this purchase.) The concept of shih thus expressed in its political application indicates the relationship between the position of ruler and other elements of the state, a relationship which can be described in terms of political differentials or “purchase.”

SHEN TAO

Modern research into the origin and development of Legalist thought indicates that there were originally three divergent schools which were eventually brought together in the Han Fei Tzu. The school of Shen Tao (born about 360 b.c.) is reputed to have stressed “strategic political advantage” or “political purchase” (shih), the school of Shen Pu-hai (d. 337 b.c.?) stressed “techniques of rulership” (shu), and the school of Shang Yang (390-338 b.c.) stressed “penal law” (fa).²⁶ The notion that Shen Tao imbued the term shih with special Legalist connotations is due largely to the debate set out in the “Critique on the Concept of Political Purchase” (Nan-shih) chapter of the Han Fei Tzu, the assumption being that if this term had not been popularized by Shen Tao, Han Fei would not have centered his discussion on Shen Tao's comments about it. There are two occurrences of shih in the extant writings attributed to Shen Tao.²⁷ Before examining these two sources, we should consider pertinent references to Shen Tao in other texts which might shed light on his influence on the development of shih.

Although the account of Shen Tao's thought in “The World” chapter of the Chuang Tzu is predictably Taoist in emphasis, it is significant that in this short description his rejection of “sagacity” is mentioned three times.²⁸ This is at least consistent with the notion of rule by shih rather than sagacity and rule by law rather than moral persuasion. In the “Dispelling Prejudices” (Chieh-pi) chapter of the Hsün Tzu (79/21/21) we find: “Shen Tzu, being preoccupied with law, was not cognizant of superior character.” And again in the “Against the Twelve Philosophers” (Fei shih-erh Tzu) chapter (15/6/6): “They [Shen Tao and T'ien P'ien] would say they esteem the rule of law, but in fact they had no law; they did not follow the old precepts but in fact preferred to create their own.”

It is rule by law that is the distinguishing feature of Shen Tao's thought. In the Lü-shih ch'un-ch'iu 17/17a-b (notably the “Attention to Political Purchase” (Shen-shih) chapter), the following passage is attributed to Shen Tao in the context of emphasizing the importance of retaining a firm hold on one's position:

Shen Tzu said: “Now if a single rabbit hops by, everyone will chase it. This is not because one rabbit is enough for a hundred people to share, but because the question of ownership has not yet been settled. Before this has been settled even a Yao would try his hardest to catch it—how much more so an ordinary person. If someone piles up a bunch of rabbits in the marketplace, passersby will not even give them a glance. It is not that they do not want rabbits, but that the ownership of these rabbits has already been settled. Once the question of ownership has been settled, even the basest people will not wrangle over them. Thus the proper ordering of the empire and the state lies in nothing other than settling the question of what belongs to whom.”²⁹

On the basis of these references to the thought of Shen Tao in the early literature, we conclude that certain elements in his philosophy are congruent with Legalist doctrine: he wholly rejects the idea of government by morality, he advocates rule by law, and he propounds the principle that the establishment and maintenance of clearly defined political and social roles is a necessary condition for proper government. Although this third feature of Shen Tao's thought does cover the concept of shih in a very general sense, it is necessary to turn to the argument as set out in the “Critique on the Concept of Political Purchase” (Nan-shih) chapter of the Han Fei Tzu for a more precise exposition.

The quotation that is attributed to Shen Tao in this Han Fei Tzu debate is very close both in wording and in substance to the Shen Tzu 4a-b passage; indeed, it could conceivably be an expansion and elaboration on it. Assuming that Shen Tao was in fact responsible for introducing or at least popularizing the use of shih in a political sense, the Han Fei Tzu passage represents a starting point in our attempt to gather the full implications of this important Legalist term. For this reason, it is necessary to examine it carefully:

Shen Tzu said: “The flying dragon mounts the clouds and the t'eng snake wanders in the mists. But when the clouds dissipate and the mists clear, the dragon and the snake become the same as the earthworm and the large-winged black ant because they have lost that on which they ride. Where men of superior character are subjugated by inferior men, it is because their authority is lacking and their position is low. Where the inferior are subjugated by the superior, it is because the authority of the latter is considerable and their position is high. Yao the peasant could not govern three men whereas Chieh the emperor could bring chaos on the whole world. From this we know that strategic political position and its purchase are reliable whereas superior character and intelligence are not worth coveting. Indeed, where the crossbow is weak and yet the arrow soars high, it is because it has been lofted up by the wind; where a man is of inferior character and yet his orders are carried out, it is because he is being assisted by the people. When Yao was teaching from an inferior position, the people did not listen to him. But when he assumed the throne and became emperor over the world, his orders were carried out and his prohibitions were observed. Viewing it from this perspective, we can see that while superior character and intelligence are not sufficient to subjugate the people, strategic political position and its purchase can even bring men of superior character to heel.”

Shen Tao, presumably addressing himself to the ruler, makes certain assertions. First, since men of superior quality can be subjugated by inferior men and vice versa, it is not the degree of “superiority,” moral or intellectual, which affords the individual the capacity to govern others. Second, just as clouds are a necessary condition for the flying dragon to realize itself as a flying dragon, so authority and position are necessary conditions for a man to realize rulership. That is to say, even if a flying dragon has all the other attributes and qualifications of a flying dragon, it is only when he can mount the clouds that he becomes a flying dragon. In the same way, even if a man has all the ability and wisdom of a capable ruler, it is only when he has access to the authority and position of the ruler—that is, when he has shih,—that he actually has the opportunity to be a ruler. On the other hand, it is possible for a far less gifted man given the authority and position of the ruler to govern with some degree of success. Finally, whereas superior character may have some bearing on the success of government, it is the authority and position of the ruler which give him political purchase and hence political control.³⁰

“THE BOOK OF LORD SHANG (SHANG-CHüN SHU)”

Scholarly consensus suggests that The Book of Lord Shang is a composite text compiled over a period of at least a hundred years, dating primarily from the third century b.c.³¹ It is possible if not probable that the present text does in fact contain fragments from the hand of the historical person Shang Yang (390-338 b.c.).³²

Considering the theoretical sympathy which exists between Legalist doctrine and principles of military operations, it is not really surprising that a term like shih (“strategic advantage”), having strong military associations, was picked up and elaborated upon by the authors of the early Legalist texts. This bond between the Legalists and early Militarist thought is perhaps nowhere more apparent than in the three military sections of The Book of Lord Shang, in the existing references to Shang Yang's military writings,³³ and in the military treatises contained in the Kuan Tzu.³⁴

The character shih occurs with some frequency in The Book of Lord Shang, and hence provides a basis for analysis of its various usages. First, shih occurs three times in direct association with the military: 3/6a-b and 5/3b (twice in the first passage).³⁵ Second, shih occurs most frequently in this text as “prevailing circumstances” or “prevailing conditions.” This usage ranges in scope from simply “present circumstances” in 5/11a—“Under these circumstances, corrupt officials are given just the means to accomplish their wicked and perilous deeds”—to “changing circumstances.” These changing circumstances make it necessary for the sage-ruler to examine his principles of government constantly and alter them to accommodate the times (2/10a):

The sage neither imitates antiquity nor follows the status quo. To imitate antiquity is to be behind the times; to follow the status quo is to be handicapped in the face of changing circumstances. The Chou did not imitate the Shang and the Hsia did not imitate the ways of Yü. These three ages were characterized by different circumstances and yet they were all able to rule the world. While there is a set way of becoming king, to hold onto this position is a matter of different principles.

With the reins of government in hand, the sage must continue to give full consideration to changing conditions in exercising his rule (4/11b): “The sage understands the principles underlying the inevitable and recognizes the proper time and circumstances for those things that must be done.” These changing circumstances are of such overwhelming influence that if they are inimical to proper government, even the sage-king is powerless to establish orderly rule. On the other hand, the ruler can, by dealing with the political situation at its root, create circumstances conducive to proper order (5/15b-16a):

To have duties and responsibilities clearly defined is the way to create circumstances which conduce to proper order; to leave them undefined is the way to create circumstances conducive to disorder. Where circumstances conduce to proper order it cannot be otherwise; where they conduce to disorder it cannot be otherwise. If one tries to bring order against the force of circumstances he will simply increase the disorder, but if he seeks to establish proper order assisted by the force of circumstances there will be order. Thus the sage-king sought to order the orderly and did not attempt to bring proper order to the disorderly.³⁶

The influence of these prevailing circumstances is not limited to the ruler alone, of course, but pervades the entire society, transforming thieves into honest men and honest men into thieves (4/10a): “Where circumstances make it impossible to do evil, even a Robber Chih can be trusted; but where circumstances are conducive to evil, even a Po Yi will be suspect.”³⁷

The third important meaning of shih in The Book of Lord Shang is an extension of its usage as a special military term. As we have seen, in military parlance shih refers to the strategic advantage available to an army by virtue of its superior position (morale and opportunity as well as terrain) and the manipulation of this purchase to achieve its end—namely, military victory. In The Book of Lord Shang, the concept shih is extended to connote the purchase available to things at large as a consequence of their specific attributes and character.

Shih in a political context establishes the connection between political status and political purchase. Just as the wind is available to the seed-tuft, so political purchase is available to the ruler (5/9a):

To understand the Way is to understand political purchase and strategies. For this reason, the Former Kings relied on their purchase rather than their might and on strategies rather than good faith. … A seed-tuft carried aloft in a whirlwind will travel hundreds of miles because it avails itself of the advantage afforded by the wind. … Thus when one relies on this advantage he will reach his destination however far.³⁸

Just as a distinction is drawn between shih and military force due to numerical strength, so in a political context a distinction is drawn between might and shih, here meaning political purchase.

Although most of the discussion of shih in The Book of Lord Shang centers on the position of the ruler, this orientation is probably due to the perspective of the Legalist theorists rather than to any regal monopoly on shih. In fact, since shih is a natural condition of all political or social status, the shih inherent in the political position of minister must be under constant surveillance and check by his ruler (5/9b): “For one conversant with political strategy this is not the case. He divides up and separates the purchase of his ministers and puts restraints on their activities.” Although the ruler has no monopoly on shih, in the political sphere his purchase is at least theoretically without equal. Jealously prizing his exclusive access to the political advantage of the throne, he must constantly take steps to avert the consolidation of any subordinate's shih that might ultimately challenge his position and authority.

The relevant information concerning the concept shih which can be drawn from The Book of Lord Shang is limited by the brevity of the text. For amplification, it is necessary to turn to another important work in the Legalist tradition: the Kuan Tzu.

“KUAN TZU”

The Kuan Tzu, like The Book of Lord Shang, is generally considered to be a composite text dating primarily from the third century b.c. The fact that, even in its corrupt and incomplete condition, it still ranks as a lengthy text when compared to The Book of Lord Shang (about 130,000 characters as opposed to approximately 20,000) promises a more varied usage of shih. An analysis of the text shows that the term occurs only four times with a specific military association (1:22-6 [twice], 1:25-10, 3:93-9); it occurs several times as “prevailing conditions” or “circumstances.”³⁹ There is, moreover, a usage of this term with specific reference to physical terrain.⁴⁰ The most significant use of shih in the Kuan Tzu, however, signifies the purchase available to a thing in consequence of its attributes and status. This use applies to social positions (1:75-1): “If the purchase lies with the son for the duration of a year, even though he proves to be unfilial, the father will be unable to make him obedient.” More frequently and more importantly, though, it applies to political status and the advantage associated with it.

Inseparable from this use of shih is the connotation of “majesty” or “authority” often expressed as wei shih. Since Legalist writings generally, and the Kuan Tzu essays in particular, tend to address themselves to the throne, it is not surprising that the status of ruler and the shih which is attendant on this position are the main subjects of discussion. This is not to say that other political stations are without their shih. The office of minister, for example, has its shih (2:36-12): “Thus, in appointing ministers, examine their accomplishments and weigh them against virtue; investigate their industry and scrutinize it in light of the law. Where they measure up to the ts'an wu,⁴¹ promote them everywhere. Give them positions with purchase and show clear trust in them.” (See Kuan Tzu chi-chiao, p. 501.) This shih of the minister is again referred to in 3:87-4: “A ruler who loses the ‘two [yin and yang]’ and the ‘five [standards: colors, sounds, flavors, and the like]’ will lose his state; a minister who loses his ‘two’ and ‘five’ will lose his political purchase; a commoner who loses his ‘two’ and ‘five’ will lose his family.”

These isolated passages aside, the preoccupation with the ruler's political purchase demonstrates that political control in this text is generally viewed from the perspective of the ruler and with his interests in mind. The shih afforded by the throne is the ruler's exclusive property, and essentially it is this shih which makes him ruler. Remaining aloof from his ministers and subordinates, the ruler must make every effort to preserve his shih intact (1:74-13):

Thus if the ruler loses his purchase, his ministers will control him. If the purchase lies with those below, the ruler will be controlled by his ministers. If the purchase remains with him above, then the ministers will be controlled by the ruler. Thus when ruler and minister have exchanged positions, it is a matter of the political purchase lying with those below. If it lies with the minister for the duration of a year, even though he proves to be disloyal the ruler will be unable to take it away.

This too is the thrust of 3:30-7:

The tiger and leopard are the fiercest of beasts, and when they roam the deep forests and broad marshes, people fearing their nobility show them respect. The ruler has the most purchase in the world, and while he dwells in seclusion, people will fear his purchase. If the tiger and the leopard abandon their remoteness and begin to approach man, however, he will trap them and make light of their nobility. If the ruler abandons his residence and forces himself on the people, they will think nothing of him and look with contempt on his purchase.

Where the ruler fails to retain his shih and allows it to be shared among his ministers, his fall is inevitable. When his subordinates cease to obey his edicts, this is an indication that he has lost his grip on his shih as ruler (3:54-7):

That with which the ruler controls his ministers is his authority and his purchase. Thus if the authority and purchase come to lie with those below, the ruler will be controlled by his ministers. If the authority and purchase are retained by him above, the ministers will be controlled by their ruler. Now, obstructing the ruler is not a matter of shutting up his gate and guarding his door. When his commands are not carried out, his prohibitions are not observed, and his desires are not respected, he has lost his authority and purchase. Thus if authority and purchase lie exclusively with the ruler, the various ministers will be fearful and respectful. If the laws and policies are dispensed by the ministers, the people will cease to obey. Thus in the proper governing of the world by a perspicacious ruler, with his authority and purchase resting exclusively with him, he does not share it with his ministers; with the laws and policies being regulated exclusively by him, they are not dispensed by his ministers. Thus the Enlightened Laws (Ming-fa) states: “Authority does not have two homes; policies do not have two sources.”

Once the ruler's grip on his shih as ruler has slipped beyond a certain point, there is no possibility of regaining his hold. His country and his people are lost to him (3:52-9):

Now, when a ruler cannot disseminate his edicts, when his laws are not obeyed and his ministers do as they please, when his authority has waned and his purchase has already been usurped, when his edicts are not carried out, his ministers are not consulted, and his people are not employed, and when the people within his borders are not under his control, then the country is not his country and the people are not his people.

If, on the other hand, the ruler is successful in retaining his shih, it is this shih rather than any personal affection or devotion that will function as the most effective instrument of government. It will ensure his control over his ministers and the unveering loyalty of his subordinates (3:51-9):

That the various ministers do not dare to deceive their ruler is not because of any love that they bear him, but because they fear his authority and purchase. That the common people fight among themselves to serve him is not because of any love they bear him, but because they fear his laws and commands. Thus the perspicacious ruler manipulates infallible strategies to govern people who have no alternative but to serve him; he occupies political purchase which must be revered to control ministers who have no alternative but to obey him. As a result, his commands are implemented and his prohibitions are observed, the ruler is revered and the ministers are humble. Thus the Enlightened Laws (Ming-fa) states: “That the ruler is revered and the ministers are humble is not a measurement of the affections they bear him, but rather because his purchase is overwhelming.”

Thus the emotion which the ruler seeks to inspire in his subjects is wei—“awe” or “fear”—rather than love.⁴²

The most important instrument available to the ruler in maintaining his shih is his exclusive control over life and death (3:52-5 and 3:60-1)

The reason why ministers are afraid of their ruler and will serve him with diligence is because they want to stay alive and hate the prospect of death. If people did not desire life and hate death, they could not be effectively controlled. Now, there has never been a case in which power over life and death has been exclusively in the hands of the chief ministers where the ruler has not been in grave danger. Where good government or disorder is decided by important ministers rather than being determined by law, where the power over life and death lies with subordinates rather than being controlled by the ruler alone—this, then, is a “dependent” ruler. Hence when the ruler turns his authority and his purchase over to others, the disaster of assassination is imminent; when he turns his legal controls over to others, the calamities of disorder and destruction are imminent. Policies such as these are the way of the doomed ruler. Hence the Enlightened Laws (Ming-fa) states: “If the ruler gives away his exclusive powers, he will forfeit them.”

Controlling the various ministers and holding sole power over life and death is the lot of the ruler; publishing edicts and looking up to control from above is the lot of the minister. Authority, political purchase, respect, and stateliness are the lot of the ruler; humility, modesty, fear, and deference are the lot of the minister.

To check the usurpation of shih by persons close to the throne, the ruler must enforce without favoritism a system of constant and unchanging laws for any breach of proper conduct (2:28-5 and 2:33-14):

If a state is without constant laws, the great ministers will venture to encroach upon the ruler's political purchase.

When a perspicacious ruler is on the throne, it is clear that the reason why favorites cannot erode his purposes is because punishments are applicable even to those close to the throne, and the reason why high ministers are not able to encroach upon his purchase is because cliques and factions are punished.

If the faults of those below go unchastened, the shih of the ruler will be adversely affected and his authority will wane (2:95-11):

Even so, when the people are dissipated, self-seeking, and do not obey injunctions, when they put on a show of erudition, put their faith in deception, and contend forcibly with one another, then the fault lies with them below. If the fault lies below and yet the ruler fails to deal with it, then men of violence will not be overcome and depravity and disorder will not be checked. If men of violence are not overcome and depravity and disorder are not checked, the purchase of the ruler will suffer and his authority will daily decline.

In these passages we see a clear relationship between the position of ruler and the function of his shih, and it is in this clarification of the term that the Kuan Tzu (especially chap. 67) is most revealing and informative. While shih tends to retain many of its basic Militarist connotations, the area of its application has definitely been extended from the military to the political battleground.

“Lü-SHIH CH'UN-CH'IU”

Although the term shih occurs in various parts of the Lü-shih ch'un-ch'iu, it is the “Attention to Political Purchase” (Shen-shih) chapter which really provides insights into its development. The chapter opens with the assertion that the ruler must retain his shih in order to maintain his position as ruler (17/15a): “If the ruler loses ground in strategies and yet seeks to make it up in the sincerity of his subjects, this will give rise to uncertainty; if he loses ground in his political purchase and yet seeks to make it up in sovereignty, he will be in peril. Even a fish large enough to swallow a boat, if thrown up on land, will succumb to the insects.”⁴³

If the ruler loses his shih, he will be at the mercy of his subordinates. The chapter not only stresses the critical importance of shih to the retention of sovereignty but goes so far as to define sovereignty in terms of shih (17/17a): “‘King’ is political purchase. To be king is to be without equal in purchase. If there is an equal in purchase, the notion of king ceases to apply.” Failure of the ruler to retain his shih blurs the distinction between ruler and those around him and results ultimately in a challenge to his authority (17/17a):

Where their political authority is equally balanced, neither [ruler nor minister] can command the other; where their political purchase is on a par, neither can envelop the other; where their degree of orderliness is on the same level, neither can set the other right. Thus the relative size, importance, quantity, and degree of order obtaining between ruler and minister must be carefully considered. This is the gateway through which calamity and good fortune enter.⁴⁴

Thus the first concern of the ruler in his ongoing struggle to retain his position is to maintain a shih differential between himself and those over whom he exercises control (17/16b-17a): “The various nobles do not want to be the ministers of someone else but have no choice in the matter. If the ruler cannot exercise his political purchase with facility, how can he make them his ministers with any ease!”

Having emphasized the importance of shih to the ruler, the chapter then turns to a demonstration of how the empire has actually been structured on principles that facilitate the ruler's application of his shih. The principle that “large commands the small” is repeatedly asserted (17/16a-b and 17/16b):

Therefore, for the large to keep the small is auspicious, but the reverse is disastrous; for the important to command the unimportant results in obedience, but the reverse is a bad sign indeed.

Thus it is easy for a state of ten thousand chariots to command a state of one thousand chariots, it is easy for a state of one thousand chariots to command one family, it is easy for one family to command one person. If, however, one were to attempt to work in the opposite direction,⁴⁵ even a Yao or Shun would be unsuccessful.

This principle of “large commands the small” was, according to the text, applied historically in constructing a system of government that would reinforce the shih of the ruler. Certainly the division of the empire into vassal states was carried out as a means of achieving more effective control in the administration of government. It is advantageous for the ruler to preside over many small states (17/15b):

The territory of the empire being divided into three-hundred-square-mile states was a way of making the administration supremely effective. It is not that they could not be made larger, but that their being small is better than being large and their being few in population is better than being numerous. That many vassals were enfeoffed was not for the benefit of those enfeoffed, but was rather a means of facilitating the ruler's political purchase and preserving his authority. …

That this principle for maintaining political control is effective is borne out by historical example (17/15b): “Thus, looking back on previous generations, the prosperity of those whose enfeoffments were many was long-enduring and their names are glorious. Shen Nung ruled the world for seventeen generations because he shared it with the people of the world.”

These numerous smaller states existing under the large, controlling hand of the supreme ruler are not to be randomly allocated. Rather, enfeoffment must follow a definite pattern fashioned to facilitate imperial control. First the ruler takes his place at the hub of both the political and the geographical worlds: “Now, the civilized states in contact with each other by boat and carriage who do not require translators make up an area of a thousand square miles. The kings of antiquity, choosing the center of the world, established their states; choosing the center of their capital, built their palaces; and choosing the center of their palaces, erected their ancestral halls.” Radiating out from the imperial center, the empire is structured so that the closer the fief is to the center, the larger and more important it is, culminating of course in the size and importance of the ruler's personal domain (17/15b-16a): “As for the enfeoffments made by these kings, the closer they were, the larger; the more distant, the smaller. In the remote coastal regions, there were nobles with territories of only three square miles. These kings preserved their imperial houses intact by having the large command the small, the important command the unimportant, and the many command the few.”

Having first emphasized the importance of shih to the ruler in his efforts to remain “large,” and then having interpreted the structure of the state in terms of the principle that “the large commands the small,” the text next considers the relative importance of having shih as opposed to having superior qualities. The attitude toward shih expressed here is consistent with what has gone before—the greater one's shih, the easier it is to achieve one's ends. Whereas superior virtue is certainly desirable, it is made perfectly clear that it is shih rather than moral character which is the essential ingredient for success (17/16a):

The larger that which is used, the easier it will be to acquire that which is desired. If T'ang had been without his state of Yi and Wu had been without his district of Ch'i, even with perfect qualities of character they nevertheless would not have been able to succeed. Even with the superior qualities of T'ang and Wu, they nevertheless had to rely on their political purchase: how much more so those who are not a T'ang or Wu.

The text makes it clear, moreover, that in order for the ruler to retain the shih necessary to continue as head of state, he must be fully aware of political differentials and exert himself in maintaining them (17/17a): “If the king is aware that the small is better than the large and the few are superior to the many, then his intelligence will be without equal. And if his intelligence is without equal, the path of presumers and usurpers will be far removed.” While the king retains the largest and most important portion of the empire as his personal domain, this royal domain is small relative to the united whole. It is by using his shih as a fulcrum to maintain division in the empire that he is able to keep the large “small” while making his small “large.”

Just as the empire is structured on a pattern facilitating the shih of the ruler, the social and political status of those in the empire has been established with the same end in mind. The ruler must be vigilant in his attention to the graduated scheme of social and political positions and their attendant rights and duties in order to preserve the existing structure (17/17a):

As for the laws of the former kings, in investing an emperor they saw to it that the various nobles would not pretend to his position; in investing the various nobles they saw to it that the ministers would not pretend to their positions; in investing the legitimate sons they saw to it that the sons of concubines would not pretend to their positions. Pretending to the position of another gives rise to contention, and contention gives rise to disorder. Hence if the various nobles lose their positions, the world will be thrown into disorder; if the ministers are without rank, the court will be thrown into disorder; if the wives and concubines are not differentiated, the household will be thrown into disorder; if the legitimate sons and sons of concubines are without distinction, the clans will be thrown into disorder.⁴⁶

Before turning to investigate the term shih in the Han Fei Tzu, it will be useful to examine the specifically Confucian reaction to the growth and popularization of this rival doctrine in the text of Han Fei Tzu's teacher, Hsün Tzu.

“HSüN TZU”

In the Hsün Tzu's attitude toward shih we enter a new phase in the development of the term. In the lively intellectual exchange of late pre-Ch'in thought, the central ideas of Legalist political theory did not go unchallenged. In the Hsün Tzu, perhaps one of the most critical and cogently argued texts of the pre-Ch'in corpus, we have a Confucian rebuttal to the Legalist assertion that it is shih rather than moral and intellectual excellence which must be considered the first condition for effective political control.

The usage of shih in the Hsün Tzu covers the full range of meanings found in the Militarist and Legalist texts. Again shih is most frequently used as the special term developed by the Legalist thinkers to connote political status and its attendant advantage. While the Hsün Tzu does make use of shih with its special Militarist and Legalist implications, this is not to say that it accepts the concept as it is propounded in these traditions. On the contrary, the Hsün Tzu employs shih to contest their assertions.

The “Debating Military Affairs” (Yi-ping) chapter opens with a rejection of the Militarist school's amoral attitude toward the use of arms. Confucian moral precepts are as applicable to the administration of military undertakings as they are to the administration of the state. The terminology used by Hsün Tzu's foil, the Lord of Lin Wu, in advancing his arguments echoes that of the Sun Tzu and the Sun Pin Art of Warfare. Expressions such as “authority” (ch’üan), “plan or strategy” (mou), “variability or maneuverability” (pien), “deception” (cha), and the concept “strategic advantage” (shih) all occur frequently in the writings of the Militarists and were undoubtedly meant to have just such an association for the reader. Again, the principles of war advanced by the Lord of Lin Wu and summarily rejected by Sun Ch'ing Tzu (that is, Hsün Tzu) are dressed to give the impression that they are a statement of basic Militarist theory.⁴⁷ In this chapter the Hsün Tzu dismisses the Militarist emphasis on the primacy of shih in military engagements and subordinates it to considerations such as popular support and united strength, suggesting that shih itself is a by-product of moral government. The ultimate outcome of war is not determined by temporary military advantages such as deployment of troops and favorable terrain. Rather, it is determined by the will of the people. Thus, from the Hsün Tzu's perspective, shih is the popular support enjoyed by the ruler as a result of his first concern: moral government.

In addition to setting aside the Militarist emphasis on the primacy of shih in the use of arms, the Hsün Tzu also argues against the primacy given shih in the Legalist conception of effective government. Legalist political philosophy, as we have seen, rejects the Confucian reliance upon moral suasion and loyalty in favor of the manipulation of shih and rule by intimidation—thereby repudiating the fundamental Confucian precept exalting persons of superior qualities and employing the able (tsun hsien shih neng). Where the Confucians placed their faith in the transforming influence of the ruler as a consummate person, the Legalists stressed the objective conditions of his position.

Given the general thrust of the Hsün Tzu toward a reworking and crystallization of Confucian doctrine, and given Hsün Tzu's historical position as the standard-bearer of Confucian ideas at a time when Legalist thought was approaching its apogee, it is not entirely unexpected that he took it upon himself to defend evolving Confucian doctrine against this Legalist conception of shih. To a certain extent Hsün Tzu does accept the Legalist insistence on the importance of shih in maintaining political control. In fact, he even credits the enlightened sages of antiquity with the innovation of political purchase, accepting its contribution to the fabric of order in society (88/23/40):

Because the sages of antiquity regarded human nature to be evil, considering it prejudiced, unruly, perverse, and erratic, they set up the political purchase of the ruler to control it, they elucidated the notions of social norms and rightness to transform it, they propounded laws and standards to bring order to it, and they stressed punishments and penalties to place curbs on it. The people of the world, as a consequence, all conducted themselves with decorum and in conformity with what is good.

While maintaining certain reservations, Hsün Tzu does acknowledge the effectiveness of Ch'in's program for political domination of the empire—a program based on Legalist principles which include the ruler's manipulation of his political purchase.⁴⁸ At the same time, true to his Confucian commitment, Hsün Tzu asserts that in the attainment and preservation of political control, moral and intellectual superiority in the administration of government must take precedence over the manipulation of political advantage (59/16/23):

If one were to exercise the political purchase of an eminent person and carry out his Way, no one would object. T'ang and Wu stand as examples. If one were to exercise the political purchase of an eminent person and yet not employ his Way, even though he may have as much purchase as an emperor, in the end he would not even get away with being a commoner. Chieh and Chou stand as examples. Such being the case, the differences between one who acquires the purchase of an eminent person and one who acquires his Way is great indeed.

To illustrate this point, Hsün Tzu suggests that a person who has only limited political purchase can, by virtue of his exemplary character and its authentication in the government of his territory, win over the entire empire.⁴⁹ By contrast, he cites the historical examples of the miscreant rulers, Chieh and Chou, who had the birthright of emperor with all the concomitant purchase and yet lost everything because of moral deficiency and the ultimate turning away of their people.⁵⁰ Thus although the ruler is the person with access to the most political purchase in the empire, if he strays from the Confucian Way (tao) of the True King he would have been better off without any position of authority at all (37/11/1):

The state is the most efficacious instrument in the world and the ruler is the person with the most political purchase in the world. If he manages this instrument within the perimeters of the Way, he will enjoy great security and honor and will be the source of an increasing number of good deeds. But if he exercises it without reference to the Way, he will suffer great peril and ill-repute and would have been far better off with no country at all.

Hsün Tzu condemns the Legalist injunction that the ruler control his minister by exercising the purchase available to him as ruler as a decidedly inferior method of exacting obedience from subordinates (59/16/11): “Not being able to hold subordinates except by intimidating them with political purchase and terrorizing them with punishments and executions is what is called ‘awe inspired by harsh scrutiny.’”

Hsün Tzu's primary objection to the Legalist conception of shih is that where the Legalists regard the shih itself to be a sufficient condition for political control, Hsün Tzu is convinced that shih without popular support is a sinking ship and ultimately untenable. The acquisition and retention of shih are a consequence of winning over the people (40/11/70): “The discerning and perspicacious ruler is adept at winning the admiration of the people. Where the people are won over, political purchase follows upon it; where the people are not won over, purchase dissipates. Thus being a king rests in winning over the people.” And the people can only be won over by the actions of a morally superior ruler who is devoted to the public good—in short, the archetypal Confucian sage-ruler. While the enlightened ruler devotes himself to his people with the knowledge that popular support also guarantees his own security, the unenlightened ruler concerns himself with shih (44/12/5):

The perspicacious ruler considers winning over his people his most urgent task while the unenlightened ruler busies himself with the acquisition of political purchase. Where a ruler exerts himself in winning over his people, the state will be properly ordered while he personally leads a life of ease, his accomplishments will be great, and he will be held in high regard. If he is of high quality he can become a True King, but even if he is of lower quality he can still become a hegemon. But if a ruler does not exert himself in the acquisition of men but rather busies himself in the acquisition of political purchase, the state will be in disorder in spite of his having exhausted himself, his accomplishments will be negligible, and he will be of poor repute. His state will certainly be in grave peril.

Significantly, Hsün Tzu's “unenlightened ruler” bears a striking resemblance to the Legalist portrayal of an effective head of state.

“HAN FEI TZU”

The Han Fei Tzu, compiled in the middle of the third century b.c., has been described as a confluence of the various streams of pre-Ch'in Legalist doctrine. In many respects it represents an aggregation, systematization, and clarification of certain ideas current in the mid-third century b.c. These ideas were such that it required an acutely critical if not cynical mind to bring them together and integrate them into an internally consistent system of political philosophy. One of the central ideas was shih.

The Han Fei Tzu uses the term shih with all the special connotations found in earlier Legalist texts. In fact, shih as a special Legalist term finds its most lucid expression in the essays of this work. Since the Han Fei Tzu uses the concept shih more extensively than any other early text, a close scrutiny of its passages will lead us to a sharper understanding of this term and its importance to Legalist political theory. Indeed, by the time that Han Fei lent his incisive argumentation to the expression of key Legalist concepts, shih had come to occupy such an important position in the Legalist program of government that discussion of political control was impossible without it. That the Han Fei Tzu devotes an entire chapter to the significance of this term bears testimony to its importance.

There are three main points to be made concerning the usage of shih in the text as a whole. First, shih occurs in only four passages with any reference to military operations,⁵¹ but these are altogether too general to shed any light on shih and its usage as a special military term. Second, shih occurs with some frequency as “prevailing conditions or circumstances.”⁵² Third, and perhaps predictably, the most frequent occurrence of shih in the Han Fei Tzu is as the special Legalist term referring to the purchase available to a thing in consequence of its status. There is a definite relationship between one's fen—social and political status—and the purchase which exists as a condition of this status. The expression fen shih pu erh (“where purchase matches status …”) occurs twice.⁵³ There are numerous examples of this usage: the social status of commoner is without shih,⁵⁴ whereas exalted persons,⁵⁵ men of principle,⁵⁶ the crown prince,⁵⁷ court favorites,⁵⁸ the consort and concubines,⁵⁹ as well as ministers⁶⁰ and anyone else in the service of the ruler⁶¹ all have shih as a condition of their status. The degree of shih is of course graduated and culminates in the position of the ruler himself.

The Han Fei Tzu, a ruler's manual for political control, quite naturally concerns itself with the relation between the position of ruler and the function of shih. This relation is described in the Han Fei Tzu much along the lines found in the earlier Legalist texts, especially the Legalist portions of the Kuan Tzu examined above.

In the Legalist tradition, a formal notion of fen denoting the rights and duties of a given political position was articulated early on as a theoretical means of dividing up and containing the powers of individual ministers.⁶² In the Han Fei Tzu, the central principle for bureaucratic control, “accountability” (hsing ming), is based on first defining the rights and duties of an office and then insisting on absolute compliance with this definition in actual performance. When a minister or an official comes forward with advice for the throne, he is called upon to give a full statement of how his policy will benefit the state. If his policy is adopted, he is judged by the accuracy of his forecast. Where there is correspondence between the duties and the actual performance of ministers, and where there is correspondence between the claims and the actual results of policies, generous rewards are appropriate. Where correspondence is lacking, punishments—immediate, public, and severe—are in order.

This principle of accountability, seen from the perspective of the ruler, has the twofold purpose of first placing the responsibility for certain duties or the success of certain policies squarely on the shoulders of a specific minister and, second, protecting the privileges and the purchase of the throne by isolating the purchase available to individual ministers.

The position of the ruler is defined by the retention of the shih available to his office (363:2): “The reason why a ruler of a ten-thousand-chariot state and the lord of a thousand-chariot state are in control of the empire and can punish the various nobles is because of their dignity and purchase. Dignity and purchase are the muscle and strength of the ruler.” To safeguard his own control, the capable ruler permits no fluctuation in the privileges and duties available to an official (180:16): “A situation in which there is confusion and latitude in rights and duties is a source of disorder. Thus the perspicacious ruler is cautious with respect to it.” If the ruler, abandoning his personal control over his purchase and the privileges attendant on his station, instead seeks to meddle in the administrative affairs of his ministers, he will find himself ineffectual in both areas (212:13): “If the ruler does not personally attend to his purchase and to the handles of power, but rather insists on attending to affairs appropriate to his ministers, is it any surprise that he falls asleep over them!”

The ruler, beyond his status as ruler, also has the attributes of an individual person. If, however, he attempts to exercise control on the basis of these personal attributes rather than with the purchase available to his position, he pits his own strength of character against that of every other person in the state (234:8):

The state is the chariot of the ruler and his purchase is his steed. Not to use political purchase to contain ministers who would usurp the love of the people, to insist on being magnanimous to compete on equal terms with your subordinates for the allegiance of the people—this is to choose to abandon the chariot altogether and to run rather than take advantage of it and the facility of the horses.

To rely exclusively upon his own faculties for maintaining control is not nearly so effective as tapping the collective powers of the empire which are made available to him as a function of his status as ruler (71:8):

When the ruler relies upon his eyes to be perspicacious rather than trusting to numbers, what he actually sees will be little indeed. This is not the means to avoid being deceived. When he relies upon his ears for keenness of hearing rather than taking advantage of his political purchase, what he actually hears will be little indeed. This is not the way to avoid being duped. The perspicacious ruler gives the world no alternative but to see and hear for him. Thus although he dwells deep within his palace, his perspicacity makes lucid all within his realm.

Clearly it is the political purchase of the ruler rather than his own excellent qualities which is essential for proper government (155:5): “If one has the ability but not the purchase, even though he is a good man he will not be able to keep those who are not good under control.” By exercising the political leverage of the ruler, even a man of very average parts can rule effectively (266:2): “Moreover, to transform the people by personally enduring hardships even Yao and Shun found difficult, whereas to rectify one's subjects by exercising purchase even a mediocre ruler would find easy.” Conversely, without the purchase of a ruler even an ideal political leader would be ineffective in presiding over the empire (74:13): “Without the purchase afforded by the dignity and respect of the position and without the laws governing rewards and punishments, even a Yao or Shun would be unable to establish proper order.”

The function of the ruler's shih is to maintain control over his subordinates (337:15): “The people, because they are under their superior's control, fear him; the superior, with his purchase, dominates those beneath him.” In his relationship with his bureaucracy, the ruler must trust to his political advantage rather than personal loyalty if he is to retain his position (216:8): “The ruler must rely on purchase rather than faith in his ministers.”⁶³ The people work for the sovereign not in response to any love he may show for them but because they find this course of action to their own advantage (254:4): “That the people work for me does not mean they are working for me because of my love but because of my purchase.” Where it is exercised adeptly, political purchase is not only effective in foiling dissolute ministers. It can also be used to arrest conspiratorial malignancy before it can grow to challenge one's position (234:2): “Thus Tzu Hsia said: ‘One adept at handling political purchase nips evil in the bud.’”

The shih of the ruler is maintained through his exclusive power over life and death (330:14): “The ruler exercises his purchase by maintaining his grip on the handles. As a result, his commands are carried out and his prohibitions are observed. The handles are his control over life and death; political purchase is the means to overwhelm the many.” But this same shih, if not retained by the ruler as his exclusive property, can be used by others to undermine him (85:5): “If he loans out his authority and purchase, the superior and the subordinate will change places.” The ruler is warned repeatedly that he must not relegate his purchase to his ministers (251:13): “How then could the ruler possibly attain success by sharing his purchase with his ministers!” If he allows a minister the smallest concession or special privilege, this relaxation of principle can cost him advantages a hundred times the intended value (179:5): “Authority and purchase cannot be lent to others. If the ruler gives a little the minister will take a lot.”

Once the shih of the ruler has been wrested from him, there is no turning back. In all likelihood the ruler himself will be expunged and his state will be consumed in turmoil (116:15): “Political purchase and weightiness are the pool of the ruler.⁶⁴ If the ruler loses his purchase and his weightiness to the ministers, he cannot retrieve them. When Duke Chien lost them to T'ien Ch'eng and the Duke of Chin lost them to the six ministers, their states perished and they forfeited their own lives.”

While the functions of shih described in the Han Fei Tzu might seem to be substantially the same as that outlined in my analysis of the Kuan Tzu, there are at least three areas in which the Han Fei Tzu departs from the earlier Legalist texts. First, the Han Fei Tzu emphasizes the surveillance and repression of ministers and others close to the throne—an emphasis simply not present in the earlier Legalist literature. From a historical point of view, this might be interpreted as a reaction to an era of intense political struggle in which intrigue, conspiracy, and ministerial usurpation had become crowded concourses of political mobility. The Han Fei Tzu interprets political life as an ongoing conflict of individual self-interests. Only the ruler with enough astuteness and resolve to employ every advantage at his disposal can continue in power. All the nobler sentiments—love, trust, honor, mercy—are repudiated as footholds for conspiring ministers and would-be usurpers and are replaced by cold reason and the dexterous manipulation of power. The complete distrust advocated by the Han Fei Tzu respects no social institution or relationship. In fact, the closer the individual stands to the hub of power, the greater his threat to the ruler. Thus the ruler must be vigilant if he is to parry the challenges to his position which may be thrust at him from such close quarters.

Second, since the Han Fei Tzu represents the consolidation and systematization of Legalist doctrine, it is not surprising that in this text the concept of shih is woven into the fabric of a mature political philosophy. It is represented not as an independent principle but in tandem with central Legalist concepts such as “techniques of rulership” (shu), “penal law” (fa), “the handles of reward and punishment” (erh ping), and “accountability” (hsing ming).

Finally, and perhaps most significantly, the concept of shih in the Han Fei Tzu is not propounded as pure political theory. Rather it is put forward as a central principle in a practical system of political control represented as a superior alternative to the doctrines of its two greatest rivals, the Confucian and Mohist schools. Whereas shih is discussed and recommended in The Book of Lord Shang and the Kuan Tzu on its own merits, in the Han Fei Tzu it is repeatedly compared with the notion of rule by virtue. For example (342:11): “Whereas the people will certainly submit to purchase, few can be won over by rightness.” This same passage continues by pointing out that Confucius with his benevolence and rightness was only able to win over seventy men to his service. Duke Ai of Lu—a man with little to recommend him—made subjects of everyone within his borders, including Confucius. When the influence of Confucius, the epitome of moral excellence, is weighed against the political purchase of even a mediocre ruler, the scales tip decisively in the ruler's favor. Whereas the moral and intellectual qualities of Confucius failed to make any impression on his ruler at all, Confucius had no choice but to submit to the weight of Duke Ai's political control.

Having demonstrated the effectiveness of purchase as an instrument of government, Han Fei Tzu then proceeds to castigate the scholars of his day—the Confucians and Mohists—for advocating devotion to the principles of benevolence and rightness rather than counseling their rulers to take advantage of their infallible purchase. Such a policy, he admonishes, supposes the ruler to be a man of Confucius' stature and the common people to be on a par with his disciples; it is doomed to certain failure.

In yet another passage,⁶⁵ the Han Fei Tzu criticizes Confucius for advising the governor of She that “proper government lies in making those close at hand content and attracting those from distant quarters.” This is, according to the text, tantamount to “abandoning what his purchase is able to contain in favor of competing with his subordinates for the support of his people by being more magnanimous than them.” Such a course is again doomed to certain failure.

While an element of the confrontation between Legalist and Confucian-Mohist doctrine is clear in these passages, in “A Critique on the Concept of Political Purchase” (Nan-shih) it becomes the predominant theme. The critique is, for the most part, a Legalist refutation of the common arguments for government by virtue and an apology for its own concept of government by political purchase. The debate consists of three sections.

The first section comprises a statement of the efficacy of political purchase (shih) as an instrument of political control ostensibly cited from the writings of Shen Tao. The present Shen Tzu 4a-b⁶⁶ contains a similarly worded but much abbreviated passage which may have been inflated to serve the author's purposes. This statement argues that whereas the moral and intellectual superiority of the ruler may have an incidental bearing on the success of government, it cannot by any means be considered a sufficient condition for effective political control. This point is demonstrable historically: exemplary figures such as Yao without purchase, position, and authority were politically impotent. Far from being a sufficient condition, superior character is not even a necessary condition for political order. This too is demonstrable historically: rulers altogether devoid of moral merit such as Chieh have held sway over persons of considerably more worth than themselves by virtue of their purchase. Shen Tao concludes that it is political purchase and the position which it presupposes that are necessary and sufficient conditions for political control.

The second section presents a rebuttal to Shen Tao's statement from a Confucian perspective, advocating the alternative of government by moral suasion. While it might be conceded that political purchase is a necessary condition for political order, it is by no means a sufficient condition. This is demonstrable analogically and historically. Analogically (using Shen Tao's own analogy, in fact), flying dragons need rising mist and cloud (analogous to shih) to raise them aloft, but unwinged insects, even if they encounter these mists, cannot fly. Thus the rising mist and cloud, while being a necessary condition for flight, is not a sufficient condition. Historically (using Shen Tao's historical examples), rulers of exemplary character have been able to use their political purchase to effect order, but there have also been depraved rulers who, in spite of their purchase, have been unable to bring order to the empire. In fact, their purchase magnifies the degree of their injury and the extent of their disruptive influence in the same manner that it promotes the preservation of order under the moral ruler. Thus for a political theorist to advocate the principle of political purchase as a sufficient condition for political order without considering the moral caliber of the ruler is in many cases to facilitate conduct detrimental to the proper ordering of the state.

The third section defends the principle of political purchase by introducing a refinement of Shen Tao's thesis and a refutation of the Confucian arguments. This section presents Han Fei Tzu's own position. To clarify Shen Tao's thesis, he distinguishes two kinds of shih: “inevitable natural circumstances” and “political purchase initiated by humans.” “Inevitable natural circumstances” refers to a situation not only beyond human control but even beyond human influence. To exemplify this kind of shih, the text cites the historical examples of Yao and Shun (archetypal exemplary rulers) and Chieh and Chou (archetypal tyrants). The contention is that, as stated in The Book of Lord Shang (5/16a), “where circumstances conduce to proper order it cannot be otherwise; where they conduce to disorder it cannot be otherwise.” Since these circumstances cannot be significantly influenced by human agency, it is pointless to consider them in the articulation of a doctrine of political control. Thus the author makes this distinction (299:12): “What I mean by shih is simply that which is initiated by man. Superior character has nothing to do with shih as I have defined it.”

The author then seeks to demonstrate that the concepts of government by moral suasion and government by political purchase are mutually incompatible:

Using superior character as the Way of government precludes the ruler from instituting controls, but using political purchase as the Way of government requires that the ruler control everything. For the ruler of superior character who cannot institute controls to exercise political purchase which controls everything, is a contradictory position. That the positions of government by superior character and government by political purchase are mutually incompatible is clear.

The point is this: since these two methods of effecting political order are incompatible, it is necessary to choose one of them. What recommends political purchase over moral suasion is the fact that while the former can be employed by the average ruler under all but the most extreme circumstances, the latter is available only to the rare sage-ruler. Cases as rare as Yao and Shun, or as extreme as Chieh and Chou, are due to circumstances beyond human control and are too infrequent to have a real bearing on the problem of political order. The choice is between, on the one hand, exercising political purchase and achieving almost perpetual order or, on the other hand, striving for moral transformation and succumbing to almost perpetual turmoil with the rare respite of sage-inspired order. This notion of a system of government devised for the average ruler (or worse) is central to the Han Fei Tzu and underscores the pragmatic quality of its political philosophy. Where the Confucians would unrealistically press their rulers to staggering heights of moral excellence and encourage them to reach for ideals far beyond their grasp, the Han Fei Tzu is content to propose a program in keeping with the actual quality of these rulers. Government should be recognized as a craft, and political purchase should be accorded the status of an indispensable tool of the trade.

SHIH IN THE ART OF RULERSHIP

The use of shih in The Art of Rulership has a strong link with its use in historically earlier Legalist texts. This observation is borne out by a striking similarity in wording and metaphor which is immediately apparent when one compares passages with those in the earlier Legalist works—especially the Han Fei Tzu. This similarity in content and wording also tends to accentuate their dissimilarities. While The Art of Rulership shares something of a common terminological and doctrinal foundation with these texts, it also incorporates ideas which can only be described as differing radically from traditional Legalist thought. These divergent ideas are both fundamental and consistent.

The passages which make reference to shih in The Art of Rulership are at times simple expositions of Legalist precepts and at other times complex fusions of Legalist doctrine and borrowings from rival traditions. In order to assay their contents and orientation, it is necessary to look at these passages individually, abstract the Legalist elements, and isolate the contributions from other sources.

POLITICAL PURCHASE (SHIH) AS AN EFFECTIVE DEVICE FOR POLITICAL CONTROL.

In The Art of Rulership there are three passages which use the chariot metaphor as an analog for the structure of the state: 9/7a, 9/9b, and 9/13b-14a. The second of these passages seems to be wholly Legalist in its orientation (9/9b):

Political authority and purchase are the carriage of the ruler; rank and emoluments are the harness and bit of the ministers. Therefore, because the ruler dwells at the focal point of political power and holds firmly to the handles of rank and emoluments, judges nicely the degree of control, and is appropriate in when and how much to give and take away, all the people exhaust themselves in his service without feeling fatigued. Now it is not as if the relationship between ruler and minister has the substance of the bond between father and son or the depth of feeling between flesh and blood relatives, and yet the minister will work untiringly and risk his life for the sake of the ruler. Why is this? It is because political purchase makes him do so.

There are several Legalist elements in this passage. Certainly the ruler/minister relationship is represented wholly from the ruler's perspective and with his interests in mind. Note also the use of the chariot metaphor (see Han Fei Tzu 234:9, 259:5, 299:1) and the interpretation of shih as a device which provides the ruler with a chariotlike advantage—the ruler does not compete with his subjects on their level, but rather rides aloft enjoying his exclusive access to the political advantage of ruler. Also indicative of Legalist influence is the use of appropriate rewards and punishments as a device for controlling and directing the ministers. Yet another Legalist element is the emphasis on the limitations of the bond of loyalty which can exist between ruler and subject and a rejection of this bond as an effective means of ensuring diligent and faithful service from a subordinate (see Han Fei Tzu 70:13, 73:13, 267:5). Finally, one notes the reliance upon the manipulation of the ruler's singularly high position and its attendant purchase for exacting the utmost service from subordinates.

SYMBIOTIC RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN RULER AND MINISTER.

The orientation of the 9/13b-14a passage in its use of the chariot metaphor is somewhat more complex:

The government of a sagacious ruler is like the charioting of Tsao Fu. He controls the carriage from the reins and the bit, and he regulates the tightness of his grip on the reins from his sensitivity to the response of the horses' lips. He sets the correct measure in his own breast and holds the regulating whip in the palms of his own hands. What he has secured within his own mind is externally in accord with the inclinations of his horses. He is able to move forward and withdraw as straight as a plumb line, turn a corner as roundly as a compass, and even after covering a great distance, he still has strength to spare because he truly understands the art.

Now, political authority and purchase are the carriage of the ruler and the great ministers are his team of horses. There has never been a case past or present of a driver escaping danger who leaves the safety of his carriage and loses the responsiveness of his horses to his hands. Therefore, if the carriage and the horses are not in accord, even a Wang Liang would be unable to take to the road. If the ruler and his ministers are not in harmony, even a Yao or Shun would be unable to govern properly. If with a firm grasp of the art he drives the chariot of state, then a Kuan Chung or a Yen Tzu would serve him to the full extent of his intelligence; if he clarifies the distinction between the people of different status, then the wickedness of a Robber Chih or a Chuang Ch'iao can be averted.

This passage reveals obvious Legalist associations. Again notice the use of the chariot metaphor (see Han Fei Tzu 234:9, 259:5, 299:1) and the legendary charioteers, Wang Liang and Tsao Fu. Note also the emphasis on “art or techniques” (shu). Another Legalist element is the notion that if the ruler abandons his chariot and competes with his subordinates on their own level, he places himself in danger (Han Fei Tzu 234:8). Moreover, the passage mentions two Legalist heroes: Kuan Chung and Yen Tzu. Finally, one notes the use of “status” (fen) and the importance of retaining the sharp distinction between roles, rights, and duties (see Han Fei Tzu 180:16).

This second passage is unmistakably Legalist in its basic orientation. Nevertheless, in the emphasis upon a symbiotic relationship between ruler and minister—that is, a mutually cooperative and beneficial relationship as opposed to one dominated by the ruler's absolute control—one detects a definite Confucian influence.⁶⁷ This influence stands in stark contrast to the Legalist attitude of perpetual confrontation (Han Fei Tzu 34:10): “The superior and subordinate fight a hundred battles in the course of a day.” This Confucian interpretation of the reciprocal relationship between ruler and minister is developed as the central theme in the following passage (9/10a-b):

When there are strong winds, the waves rise; where there is thick foliage, the birds gather. This is because the ch'i of the one thing gives rise to the other. When the minister does not get what he wants from the ruler, the ruler will also be unable to get what he seeks from the minister. Ruler and minister benefit each other only on a basis of reciprocity. Thus the minister barters with his ruler by offering total commitment to the point of laying down his life whereas the ruler trades with his ministers by offering the dispensation of noble ranks. Just as the ruler cannot reward a minister who has rendered no service, a minister cannot die for a ruler to whom he owes no gratitude. When the favors of the ruler do not flow down to the people, for him to expect service out of them is like whipping an unruly horse. It is like hoping for a ripe harvest without rain. It is a demonstrable impossibility.⁶⁸

An interesting comparison can be made between this passage in The Art of Rulership and a similar passage in Han Fei Tzu (267:4):

The Way of the perspicacious ruler is not like this. Establishing what the people want in order to seek their good service, he thus confers noble ranks and emoluments to encourage them. Establishing what the people dislike in order to prohibit their evil, he thus metes out punishments and penalties to strike fear into them. Since his rewards can be relied upon and his punishments are certain, the ruler promotes good service from his ministers and evil is not used against him. Even if there was a Shu Tiao, what could he do to the ruler! Furthermore, the minister bargains with his ruler by offering total commitment while the ruler trades with his ministers by offering the dispensation of noble ranks and emoluments.⁶⁹ The intercourse between ruler and minister is not based on the natural love between father and son, but rather is the result of calculation. Where the ruler has the Way of government, a minister will give his best without being tempted by evil, but where the ruler is without it, a minister will obstruct the ruler's vision above and be successful in his own interests below.

On the surface the two passages appear related both in wording and content. A closer examination, however, reveals that while the Han Fei Tzu passage is a straightforward explanation of the theoretical basis for the policy of rewards and punishments, The Art of Rulership takes as its main theme the reciprocal nature of the ruler/minister relationship.

The Art of Rulership passage follows upon two historical examples—Yü Jang and King Wu—which both illustrate and lay emphasis upon the vital role played by the ruler's magnanimity. A direct connection is established between the generosity of the ruler and his ability to implement his commands. While in the Han Fei Tzu rewards and honors are conferred upon subordinates as a mercenary technique for exacting service, in The Art of Rulership rewards, honors, and favors generally are construed as a moral obligation of the ruler to his subordinates. Where the ruler exerts himself in the fulfillment of this obligation to his people, his concern is requited with loyalty, devotion, and good service. Conversely, where the ruler demonstrates utter disregard for the comfort and well-being of his people, he is in fact undermining the security of his own position. This notion of moral obligation which has been injected into The Art of Rulership's interpretation of the ruler/minister relationship clearly distinguishes it from its Legalist counterpart.

Moreover, one of the most pronounced features of Legalist literature is that political theory is constructed wholly from the point of view of the ruler's interest. In this passage from The Art of Rulership, however, the relationship between ruler and subordinate is described in terms of mutual obligations and responsibilities—if anything, the perspective tends to favor the minister and the people. Not only does it enjoin the ruler to refrain from rewarding unaccomplished ministers but it makes it amply clear that the people will not work for a ruler who fails to fulfill his obligations to them. The tempering of this concept of shih with a marked emphasis on ruler/subject reciprocity represents a clear concession to Confucian influence.

USURPATION OF THE RULER'S PURCHASE BEING SYMPTOMATIC OF DECLINE.

While there are many passages in The Art of Rulership in which Legalist political theory has been significantly altered by ideas borrowed from rival traditions, it should not be forgotten that there is still much in this treatise which is predominantly Legalist in outlook. The following 9/9b passage, for example, is wholly Legalist in its orientation:

In a disorderly state it is a different matter. Those praised by the multitude are rewarded even though they have no accomplishments, whereas those who are faithful in their duties are punished even though they are innocent. The ruler is foolish and shortsighted, and the various ministers form factions and are disloyal. The sophists travel about debating and those who cultivate lofty conduct vie with each other for public office. With their cliques they criticize the edict promulgated by the ruler; with their deviousness they contravene the prohibitions of law. Those who cultivate wisdom devote themselves to cunning and deceit; those who cultivate valor devote themselves to contention and strife. The high ministers usurp authority, the low officials seize political purchase, and together, forming cliques and factions, they manipulate the ruler. Even though this state appears to be intact, the ancients would have considered it moribund.⁷⁰

Having previously described an orderly state as one which embodies Legalist principles of political control, this passage then describes the state which, having abandoned these principles, has gone to ruin. And one sure indication of imminent ruin is ministerial usurpation of the ruler's purchase.⁷¹

RELIANCE UPON POLITICAL PURCHASE RATHER THAN PERSONAL QUALITIES.

Another familiar principle of Legalist doctrine in The Art of Rulership is the notion that in the exercise of political control, the ruler should depend upon his purchase as a ruler rather than upon his attributes and qualities as an individual person (9/14b-15a):

If a fish large enough to swallow a ship swims off course and goes aground, it will be at the mercy of the insects. This is because it has left its habitat. If a monkey leaves the trees, he will be seized upon by foxes and badgers. This is because it is in an environment not its own.

If the ruler abandons what is proper to him and attempts to vie with his ministers, the officials will seek to hold onto their positions through inactivity and those in office will seek to avoid being discharged by toadying to the ruler. As a result, the ministers will hide their intelligence and not put it to use, passing the burden onto the ruler instead.

Now, the reason why the noble and wealthy are willing to work hard, the astute are willing to look into matters, and the proud and arrogant are willing to show respect is because their political purchase is not equal to that of the ruler.

If a ruler does not entrust things to the able but is instead given to doing things personally, his intelligence will become increasingly taxed and he will take upon himself the burden of responsibility. If he is hard put to cope with his subordinates, he will not be able to facilitate what is right. If his conduct is found wanting by the country, he will no longer be able to exercise exclusive control. Since his intelligence is not sufficient to effect proper government and his awesomeness is not sufficient to enforce punishments, the ruler will not have the means to deal with his subjects.

In this passage certain Legalist elements can be readily identified. The ruler, for example, must not abandon conduct appropriate to his position and contend on a level with his ministers (see Han Fei Tzu 85:5). Moreover, the ruler maintains sway over his subordinates by means of his political purchase (see Han Fei Tzu 330:14, 337:15). One notes too that the differentiation of roles is stressed (see Han Fei Tzu 212:13). And, finally, the ruler's personal attributes are not a sufficient condition for maintaining political control (see Han Fei Tzu 234:8).

That the ruler should depend upon his purchase as ruler rather than his personal attributes is reiterated in the following passage, which asserts that even persons of inferior quality can rule by virtue of their access to shih (9/16a):

If one holds firmly to the control handles of authority and purchase, it will be easy for him to transform the people. That Tzu Lu served the ruler of Wei was because the ruler's authority was great; that Kuan Chung and Yen Tzu served the Dukes Huan and Ching of Ch'i as ministers was because the ruler's position was exalted. That the timid can subjugate the brave and the ignorant can control the intelligent is because the purchase in which they lodge themselves is superior.

It is said: “The branch must not be bigger than the trunk and the tip must not be stronger than the root. Why? Because the important and the large should have the means to control the unimportant and the small. This can be likened to the five fingers which being joined to the arm enable one to strike, pull, clutch, and pinch as he so desires.”

In other words, the small is adjunct to the large. Holding the advantage in purchase means that although what is held is extremely small, what is dependent upon it is large indeed; although what one keeps to is compact, what is under its control is extensive indeed.

That a pillar of ten girths is able to support a twenty-ton roof or that a five-inch bolt can control the opening and closing of a gate—surely it has nothing to do with their size! It is because the position they occupy is pivotal.

The assertion that the purchase of a thing is due to its strategic location in the overall structure—“it is because the position they occupy is pivotal”—is a notion reminiscent of the Lü-shih ch'un-ch'iu‘s “Attention to Political Purchase” chapter and is not inconsistent with the general Legalist conception of political purchase.⁷² What is unusual in this passage is the appearance of the basically Confucian principle of “transforming the people” (hua min).

TRANSFORMING THE PEOPLE.

This notion of “transformation” is an ingredient associated with both the Taoist and the Confucian traditions. Conventional Legalist doctrine, however, asserts that the ruler is obeyed because of the political purchase—not because of his moral influence (Kuan Tzu 1:76-2): “In his moral actions and awesomeness, the ruler is not unique in being superior to others, but because he is called ‘ruler’ people go on to exalt him and do not venture to discuss the quality of his moral actions.”⁷³ To ensure proper order in the state, the Legalist ruler manipulates his subordinates with rewards and punishments and opts for rule by law over moral edification (Han Fei Tzu 321:4): “Hence to take law as one's method is to suffer at first but benefit in the long run; to take benevolence as one's method is to snatch momentary pleasure but be ultimately frustrated. The sages weighed the merits of these two alternatives and opted for the greater benefit.”

Confucian thought, by contrast, takes the moral elevation of the people through dynamic example as the primary task of those in power. For example, the “Greater Preface” to The Book of Odes (Shih-ching) states: “With poetry the Former Kings regulated the relationship between husband and wife, developed filial piety and respect, improved upon human relations, enriched edifying instruction and advanced conventions and customs.”

Then there is the well-known Analects 24/12/19 passage: “Chi K'ang Tzu asked Confucius about government. … If you want to be good, the people will be good. The character of the superior is like the wind; the character of the subordinate is like grass. Let the wind blow over the grass and the grass will necessarily bend.” In this passage, government is interpreted as the ability to influence, educate, and improve. In the Hsün Tzu, the emphasis on study and the commitment to improve and enrich the lives of the people through education have an obvious link with this concept of transforming the people. The task of moral edification is given a high priority in the allocation of responsibilities (30/9/94):

To discuss social norms and music, to make conduct proper, to spread instruction and transformation, to enrich conventions and customs, and, nurturing things universally, to bring them to a concordant whole—these are the tasks of the senior ministers. To perserve morality intact, to promote loftiness and nobility, to extend refinement to its utmost, to unify the world, to scrutinize the smallest details, and to make all the people in the world submissive and obedient—these are the tasks of the ruler.

Perhaps the most extensive discussion of this transformation in early Chinese literature is to be found in Book Twenty, of the Huai Nan Tzu: The Great Family (T'ai-tsu). In this treatise, “transforming the people” is presented from a decidedly Confucian perspective. It is held up as the desired result of government by moral suasion which, throughout the treatise, is contrasted with the much inferior policy of government by impositional law. The following passage provides a glimpse of this recurring contrast between morality and law (20/8b):

In the proper government of the individual, the first priority goes not to the cultivation of the physical form but to the cultivation of the spirit. In the proper government of the nation, the first priority goes not to the rectification of the laws but to the cultivation of the people's transformation. … To have the people yielding to each other and contending to occupy as low a position as they can, to have them repudiating personal advantage and contending to receive as little as they can, to have them working hard and contending to give of themselves as much as they can, to have them day by day being transformed and reformed by the ruler without knowing how this comes about—this then is the basis⁷⁴ of proper government. To have the people striving to do worthy deeds for the sake of rewards, to have them refrain from doing wrong for fear of punishments, to have the common people obeying the laws below because the laws have been set right above—these are the inconsequential aspects of proper government.

It should be borne in mind that given the organismic metaphysics underlying Confucian political philosophy, the role of the people in the process of transformation is far from passive. In fact, while moral edification as the essence of education requires the teacher's commitment, the actual momentum of learning is the consequence of the student's assiduous effort. The function of humane government is to maintain an environment conducive to the people's self-realization and, without imposing constraints on natural development, to facilitate the process of self-growth.

Taoist political thought is similar in this respect. Organizational, noncoercive government simply provides the ambience in which the people can express their own spontaneous growth (Lao Tzu 57):

The Sage states:
I remain nonactive
And the people are transformed of their own accord;
I cherish tranquillity
And the people are set right of their own accord;
I do not intervene
And the people are prosperous of their own accord;
I am without desires
And the people return to their natural genuineness of their own accord.

The function of the Taoist ruler in relation to the people is analogous to the constant tao in its relation to all existence (Lao Tzu 37):

The tao is constantly nonactive,
And yet there is nothing which it does not do.
If the nobles and kings would only preserve it,
The myriad things would be transformed of their own accord.

The notion of “transforming the people” (hua min) or “the people transforming” (min hua) under the sway of the ideal ruler occupies an important place in Confucian and Taoist theory. By contrast, given the Legalist determination to channel the energies of the people to serve the ruler's ends, “transforming the people” is in principle inconsistent with mature Legalist doctrine. And yet “transforming the people” does recur in The Art of Rulership, neatly knit into a substantially Legalist fabric (9/8b-9a):

The key to success or failure in government lies in the ruler. If the inking line is properly set above, the wood will be straightened beneath it. It is not that the inking line does anything in particular to the wood, but rather that the disciplining of the wood in following the inking line makes it so. Thus if the ruler is truly upright, honest officials will be commissioned and villainous persons will hide themselves; but if the ruler is not upright, the wicked will get on in the world and loyal subjects will withdraw into retirement.

Why is it that no one tries to split jade with their hands yet they will try to break melons and gourds in this way? They do not take on the jade or stone because there is nothing to be gained from it. If the ruler holds firmly to integrity and justice as if adhering to a plumb line in measuring the vertical, then those ministers who approach with evil in their hearts will be just like eggs thrown against a rock or fire plunged into water.

Because King Ling of Ch'u was partial to slim waists, there were people who starved themselves by cutting back on their food. Because King Kou Chien of Yüeh was fond of valor, his people would all defy danger in vyeing with one another to sacrifice their lives. If we view it from this perspective, it is clear that for the person with the handles of authority and purchase can alter the prevailing attitudes.

When Yao was a common man, he could not even transform the people of one village through his example of benevolence; yet when Chieh was on the throne, his commands were implemented and his prohibitions were effective. Viewing it from this perspective, it is clear that while moral excellence is not enough to govern the world, political purchase can alter custom.

In the second half of this passage, The Art of Rulership takes King Ling of Ch'u and King Kou Chieh of Yüeh as historical examples of the overwhelming influence of the ruler. Here the predominant theme is that an upright ruler can act as an edifying force on those under his jurisdiction. King Ling and King Kou Chien as historical examples are not original to The Art of Rulership; they occur in both the Kuan Tzu and Han Fei Tzu as well as in several other early texts.⁷⁵ In all these works, as in this passage, these two kings represent the far-reaching influence of the throne. On this much the various texts are in agreement. Their difference, however, lies in the proposed objectives of this influence. By comparing the manner in which these same historical figures are used to illustrate widely divergent ideas one can discover the extent to which The Art of Rulership can be regarded as having been colored by Confucian thought.

In the Kuan Tzu, King Ling and King Kou Chien appear in a passage which stresses the vital importance of agriculture as the fundamental occupation of the state (3:2-10):

Now, the stability or inner turmoil of an individual depends on the heart; the continuity or destruction of a state depends on the ruler. What is good or bad for the empire may be the consequence of one man's actions. Where the ruler favors the basic industry [agriculture], the people will be fond of clearing uncultivated areas. Where the ruler is fond of money, the people will go in for trading. Where the ruler is fond of buildings and halls, craftsmen and artisans will be skillful. Where the ruler is fond of design and color, the women's work will be elaborate. Because the King of Ch'u was fond of slender waists, beautiful women cut down on their food; because the King of Wu was fond of the sword, the military men of the country embraced death lightly. Since death and starvation are two things universally disliked, why did these people face them of their own volition? Because they were pursuing what the ruler desired.

The ruler's position and influence are such that his desires constitute the directing force of his subordinates. This passage from the Kuan Tzu asserts that there is a connection between the ruler's influence and the activities of his people—here agricultural production will mean a strong and stable state. If, however, the ruler distracts the people from the cultivation of the fields, food will be insufficient for the needs of the country and political instability will ensue. Consistent with Legalist doctrine, agriculture is singled out as the most important occupation of the people and as the objective toward which the ruler must exercise his influence.

The Han Fei Tzu 28:15 passage provides us with an even more vivid contrast between the Legalist-oriented objective of control and The Art of Rulership's objective of educating and transforming the people:

The ruler has two pitfalls. If he employs those of superior character, his ministers will take advantage of this to maintain a hold over him. If he promotes people indiscriminately, state undertakings will end in failure. Hence if the ruler is fond of superior character, the various ministers will dress up their conduct in order to meet his approval and will not offer their true abilities in their service to him. If the ministers do not offer their true abilities in the service of the ruler, he then has no way of evaluating them. Because the King of Yüeh was fond of courage, many of his people embraced death lightly; because King Ling of Ch'u was fond of slender waists, many people in his state starved themselves; because Duke Huan of Ch'i was a jealous man and was fond of his harem, Shu-tiao had himself castrated in order to supervise the harem; because Duke Huan was fond of exotic tastes, Yi Ya boiled his firstborn and served it to him; because Tzu K'uai of Yen was fond of men of superior character, Tzu Chih made it clear that he was not interested in taking over the state.

The gist of this passage is clear: the ruler must not reveal his likes or dislikes to his subordinates. If he does, they will be able to use this knowledge to their own advantage. This problem becomes particularly apparent in the process of official promotions. If the ruler makes it known that he promotes those of superior moral and intellectual character, his ministers will vie with one another to give him the impression that they are men of just such superior character. From the Han Fei Tzu's point of view, this does not mean that these ministers will be encouraged to emulate the ruler's ideal; rather, they will mask their conduct to deceive the ruler in his assessment of their true worth. The policy to be adopted by the Han Fei Tzu ruler stands diametrically opposed to that advocated in the quotation from The Art of Rulership (9/8b-9a) cited above. In the Han Fei Tzu, the ruler is counseled to conceal the objectives of his influence and to refrain from providing his ministers with a model which can be simulated and thus used to delude him. In The Art of Rulership, on the other hand, the ruler uses his political purchase to provide his subordinates with a model of proper conduct and to propel them toward his ideal of moral excellence. In the Han Fei Tzu, knowledge and imitation of the model are a means of deception; in The Art of Rulership they are the basis of education and transformation.

It is clear that the King Ling and King Kou Chien examples in The Art of Rulership illustrate an attitude of political control very much at odds with the seemingly similar passages in the Legalist texts. The following excerpt taken from the Hsün Tzu 45/12/30 has basically the same thrust as The Art of Rulership version:

The ruler is the gnomon and the people are the shadow. Where the gnomon is upright, the shadow will be upright. The ruler is a basin and the people are water. Where the basin is round, the water will be round.⁷⁶ If the ruler is an archer, his ministers are his archer's glove. Because King Chuang of Ch'u was fond of slender waists, there were half-starved people in his court.

From this comparison of the Kuan Tzu, Han Fei Tzu, Hsün Tzu, and The Art of Rulership, we can see that they all acknowledge the efficacy of political purchase as a force which can be exerted to influence the activities of the people. Of the two Legalist texts, it is suggested in the one that this influence be used to encourage agriculture and in the other that the ruler conceal his likes and dislikes in order to avoid deception by his ministers. These are clearly two important principles of Legalist doctrine. In the Hsün Tzu and The Art of Rulership, however, the point is made that political purchase can also be used to educate and elevate the people. Given a dynamic model of moral excellence, the people will strive to emulate it. The ruler, by availing himself of his purchase as ruler, can go a long way to determining the character of his subjects. This is a commingling of Legalist and Confucian doctrine.

The principle of transforming the people is fundamentally contrary to the spirit of Legalist thought, but it is a major component of both Taoist and Confucian doctrine. In the Taoist and Confucian traditions, although the working definitions of the ruler's transforming virtue are very different, common ground is shared in that the ruler does not actively transform the people in the sense of imposing on them something that is inconsistent with their natural development. Rather, he functions as a dynamic stimulus for the realization of the people's natural potential. The Art of Rulership, having accepted the efficacy of shih as a means of implementing political theory, advocates an active approach to the problem of improving the people. Consistent with the Taoist and Confucian traditions, it insists that the ruler use the purchase attendant upon his position to channel the people's energies in a direction beneficial to their own natural development in the belief that personal, social, and political realization are correlative.

GOVERNMENT BY PURCHASE VERSUS GOVERNMENT BY MORAL SUASION.

In analyzing the Hsün Tzu's interpretation of shih, we noted that Hsün Tzu does succumb to Legalist influence to the extent of acknowledging the effectiveness of political purchase for implementing a program of government—but, at the same time, he objects to the Legalist insistence that political purchase is itself a sufficient condition for political control. In the Hsün Tzu's political theory, purchase is ultimately dependent upon popular support, and popular support is the direct result of rule which embodies Confucian ethical principles. In making this assertion, the Hsün Tzu attempts to defend Confucian political philosophy from the Legalist assault.

One of the main features distinguishing the Han Fei Tzu, from its precursors in the Legalist tradition is its treatment of government by shih not as an isolated theory but as a superior alternative to the rival Confucian principle of rule by moral suasion. The Art of Rulership's interpretation of shih, by contrast, represents a Confucian and Legalist synthesis which can perhaps best be viewed as a continuation of Hsün Tzu in attempting finally to resolve this conflict between the Legalist principle of government by shih and the Confucian principle of government by morality. On the one hand, the importance and the effectiveness of shih are readily acknowledged. On the other, it suggests that this basically Legalist tool of government control be employed to carry out the Confucian task of educating the people and refining their ethical awareness. In other words, the ultimate effectiveness of shih is regarded as conditional on the ruler's accord with the Confucian code of moral conduct.

THE PEOPLE AS THE BASIS OF POLITICAL PURCHASE.

All three passages in the Han Fei Tzu which cite the chariot metaphor make the state analogous to the chariot and the political purchase of the ruler analogous to the horses. Of the three instances of this metaphor in The Art of Rulership, the one perhaps most in keeping with traditional Legalist precepts relates the proposition of “utilizing the people” (yung chung) to the notion of political purchase (9/17a):

Now, even if Wu Huo or Chieh Fan were to attempt to lead an ox from behind by the tail, they would pull the tail off without budging the ox because they are acting contrary to the way of things. But if one were to pierce the ox's nose with a sprig of mulberry, even a half-grown boy could lead it around the country because he is following the way of things.

Because we harness the water for our use, with a seven-foot oar we can maneuver a boat. Because he takes the people as his purchase, the emperor has only to issue commands to have them implemented and observed.

In this passage the ruler is encouraged to take full advantage of the political purchase available to him as ruler not only because it is the most efficacious means of political control but also because it is “following the way of things.” He should not rely on his abilities as an individual to influence others; rather he should manipulate his subjects from the vantage point of his throne. By relying on political purchase rather than personal abilities to enlist the popular support of the people, he is able to tap the concerted strength of all those below him. This gives him power and vision far exceeding that of any individual or group of individuals who may set themselves in opposition to him and challenge his right to rule. While this principle of “utilizing the people” (yung chung) can certainly be traced back to an occasional reference in the Kuan Tzu and Han Fei Tzu,⁷⁷ in The Art of Rulership it is developed as a central theme. As such, we shall examine it in more detail below. At this juncture it is enough to draw the obvious connection between the concept of political purchase and the popular strength that becomes available to one who can stand above the people and orchestrate their energies.

In conclusion, then, the concept shih is used consistently in The Art of Rulership as a Legalist term to articulate seemingly Legalist doctrine. Its reiteration of basic Legalist precepts contributes to our understanding of pre-Ch'in political thought. Its contribution, however, does not end there. True to the spirit of eclecticism prevailing in the early Han, there is a sustained effort to select and to synthesize. With respect to shih, the two most obvious attempts to blunt radical Legalist theory with Confucian humanism are, first, the reinterpretation of the ideal ruler/minister relationship as being symbiotic, each position responsive to and dependent upon the other, and, second, the acknowledgment of the effectiveness of shih as an instrument of political influence to effect the Confucian objective of transforming and elevating the people. This revised interpretation of shih stands in sharp contrast to its function in the Legalist system as a tool of political repression.

There is a consistency in The Art of Rulership which suggests a complete and integrated system of political theory. While certain elements in this political theory are significant, it is the relative emphasis placed on the various components that determines the ultimate disposition of the system. Further, it is not only what The Art of Rulership has taken from the Legalist tradition but how it chooses to deal with what it takes, and again what it chooses to reject, that must be considered in determining its orientation. In the Han Fei Tzu, for example, shih is frequently discussed in conjunction with the ruthless repression of conniving ministers. There is an almost paranoiac preoccupation with the protection of the ruler's political prerogatives. The purport of The Art of Rulership, on the other hand, is one of harmony rather than control, cooperation rather than contention. Having acknowledged the soundness of the concept of shih, The Art of Rulership then fits it into an eclectic political philosophy which attempts to combine the effectiveness and practicability of the Legalist doctrine with the more humane considerations of its rival traditions.

Notes

1. See Hsü Fu-kuan, vol. 2, p. 143.

2. Kuo Hua-jo, p. 2, concludes that the Sun Tzu by Sun Wu was a summary of the salient features of warfare current during the Spring and Autumn period. It was a distillation of experience gained when Wu attacked Ch'u and a product of Sun Wu's study of military affairs with King Ho-lü of Wu, Wu Tzu-hsü, and others. Having undergone more than a century of oral transmission, the Sun Tzu was edited and added to by Sun Pin, a descendant of Sun Wu, to form the present thirteen chapters (p'ien). Although this has represented scholarly consensus, with the recent unearthing of the Sun Tzu Art of Warfare (Sun Tzu ping-fa) fragments and the Sun Pin Art of Warfare (Sun Pin ping-fa) (a text previously unknown), this opinion is being reassessed. On the basis of this Yin-ch'üeh-shan find in 1972, the Sun Tzu Art of Warfare is being reattributed to Sun Wu alone and is being restored to its Spring and Autumn position. See Cultural Relics (Wen-wu) 12 (1975):20-24. This relatively early dating of at least some portions of the Sun Tzu Art of Warfare is attested by the similar summary passages found in The Book of Lord Shang military chapters (see Duyvendak, The Book of Lord Shang, pp. 244-252).

3. Ch'ien Mu dates Sun Pin as 380-320 b.c. The 1972 discovery of portions of some thirty chapters of the Sun Pin Art of Warfare (Sun Pin ping-fa) in the Han tomb of Yin-ch'üeh-shan has provided us with perhaps some of the eighty-nine chapters attributed to Sun Pin in the History of the Han (Han-shu) “Record of Literary Works” (Yi-wen chih). The unearthing of this text along with fragments of the Sun Tzu Art of Warfare enables us to make a distinction between these two representatives of the Militarist school and their two treatises. The text of the Sun Pin Art of Warfare chapters has been transcribed in Cultural Relics (Wen-wu) (1975).

4. This lord of Lin-wu is identified by commentators as a Ch'u general.

5. King Hsiao-ch'eng of Chao (r. 265-245 b.c.).

6. Cf. Sun Tzu 7/14b-15a.

7. See also Han Fei Tzu 347:3 and Huai Nan Tzu 15/3a.

8. Kuo Mo-jo, vol. 5, p. 205, on the basis of the contents of the Wu Tzu, argues that it is the product of the late Warring States period or early Han. Chang Ping-lin, p. 802, notes that the military weapons mentioned in the Wu Tzu are anachronistic and dates it as late as the Six Dynasties. Since the Wu Tzu is a compilation of dubious authenticity, and shih occurs in it only twice, I shall pass over it in favor of the more reliable Sun Tzu and Sun Pin Art of Warfare.

9. See Lau, “Some Notes on the Sun Tzu,” pp. 332-333.

10. For the use of the expression hsing-shih as a compound term, see the titles of chaps. 2 and 64 in the Kuan Tzu, as well as Kuan Tzu 1:58-4, where it seems to mean “the shape of things” or “prevailing conditions.” It also occurs in the Kuan Tzu 1:22-6, where it seems to refer to the physical arrangements for defense such as walls, moats, and fortifications, which must be constructed in strategically advantageous locations. The expression hsing-shih occurs also in the Huai Nan Tzu 15/3a: “Things generally give omens. Only the Tao is without them. The reason that it is without omens is because it is without a constant shape or disposition (hsing-shih).”

11. The word “purchase” is used in the sense of a grip that enables one to apply influence or pressure in order to accomplish something. It can refer to the actual contrivance used for increasing this influence or to the advantage gained by applying this device. I have purposely avoided using “power” or “force” as equivalents for shih because I believe that shih usually refers to something quite different from the actual strength required to accomplish something. It is a kind of power, but “power” is too vague here.

12. See also the Sun Pin Art of Warfare (Sun Pin ping-fa), no. 111-122, and Huai Nan Tzu 15/11a and 15/14a.

13. For a discussion of the meaning of this passage, see Lau, “Some Notes on the Sun Tzu,” p. 331. Supporting my interpretation of shih as a special military term is a passage in the Sun Tzu Art of Warfare fragments where ch'i shih is used as a compound expression (no. 145-6). See Cultural Relics (Wen-wu) 12(1974):11 and, for a discussion, p. 18. This passage is too corrupt to venture a translation.

14. Although passage no. 243 in the Sun Pin Art of Warfare (Sun Pin ping-fa) is too corrupt to offer a definite interpretation, shih seems to mean “conditions” or “circumstances.” There is also no. 257-60:

    The aggressor, on the other hand, arrives only after having braved narrow defiles [and] if he tries to retreat they will venture to strike off his head. And even if he does advance, why will he not dare to engage the enemy? Because he is strategically disadvantaged and occupies unfavorable terrain. Where you have strategic advantages (shih) and favorable terrain, the rank and file will advance of their own accord [and] will themselves retreat. Those who can be said to be adept at warfare are those who can gain strategic advantages (shih) and occupy favorable terrain.

15. See the Sun Pin Art of Warfare (Sun Pin ping-fa) no. 349: “And that some things have a surplus while others are deficient is an example of things being of various dispositions (shih).”

16. See also the Sun Pin Art of Warfare (Sun Pin ping-fa) no. 359: “Thus, in battle deployment (chan shih), a large formation … broken, and a small formation … dispersed.” In no. 32 a similar expression, “military deployment” (ping shih), is used: “King Wei [of Ch'i] then exclaimed, ‘Excellent! You speak on military deployments with inexhaustible insight.’”

17. See The Book of Lord Shang 3/6a: “In carrying out these three things there are two conditions.”

18. See note 10 above.

19. The first reference is SPTK; the second is Chu Shih-ch'e's Shang-chün shu chieh-ku ting-pen, which is excellent for textual problems.

20. See Huai Nan Tzu 15/5a: “Therefore virtue and rightness are sufficient to win over the people of the world; human industry is sufficient to deal with the pressing needs of the world; selection and promotion are sufficient to secure the goodwill of superior men; planning and considering are sufficient to know conditions of strength and weakness. This is the root of certain victory.”

21. See Huai Nan Tzu 15/3a: “Things generally give omens. Only the tao is without them. The reason that it is without omens is because it is without a constant shape or disposition.”

22. See, for example, Huai Nan Tzu 15/9b and 15/10b: “None will venture to resist your military advantage (shih). … Strategic advantage (shih) has the edge over manpower.”

23. This character ch'ien occurs in books annotated by Hsü Shen as a substitute for the taboo, ch'üan.

24. Chao yao is the name of the seventh star of the Big Dipper, which forms the last portion of the handle. Book 5 of the Huai Nan Tzu is a system of social-ceremonial directives based on the point indicated by the chao yao star. When chao yao points in one direction, it indicates that it is the first month of spring. When it points in another direction, it indicates that it is the second month and so on. See Huai Nan Tzu, bk. 5 passim, and Needham, vol. 3, p. 250.

25. The expression hsing te refers to the twelve “ch'en” or branches and the ten “rih” or stems.

26. See Fung Yu-lan, A History of Chinese Philosophy vol. 1, p. 318. That Shen Pu-hai and Shang Yang stressed “techniques of rulership” (shu) and “penal law” (fa) respectively is stated clearly in the “Fixing Laws” (Ting-fa) chapter of the Han Fei Tzu, but no such early evidence exists for the association of Shen Tao with the concept shih.

27. See Thompson, fragments 13 (p. 236) and 71 (p. 274). Fragment 13 is similar to Han Fei Tzu 297:8 and Huai Nan Tzu 9/9a.

28. See Chuang Tzu 92/33/46: “.. and ridiculed the world's esteeming those of superior character.” And 92/33/47: “.. and criticized the great sages of the world.” And 92/33/50: “.. and had no use for the sages and those of superior character.”

29. Similar passages attributed to Shen Tao are contained in Yi-lin 2/15a and TPYL 907 (p. 4022). Again, similar passages not attributed to Shen Tao can be found in The Book of Lord Shang 5/15a and in Yin Wen Tzu 5b.

30. It is perhaps worth noting that since Legalist thought is generally meant for the ears of the ruler himself (to the extent that many of the “techniques of rulership” (shu) are to remain his exclusive property), the rather obvious question of how to acquire the position (wei) and authority (ch'üan) of a ruler does not really arise. It is how to maximize your political purchase that is of central concern.

31. Lo Ken-tse, p. 510, dates The Book of Lord Shang between 260 and 233 b.c.; Ch'en Ch'i-t'ien, Chung-kuo fa-chia kai-lun, p. 234, attributes eleven sections to Shang Yang or “possibly Shang Yang” and twelve to a later period extending into the Western Han. Duyvendak in The Book of Lord Shang, pp. 141 ff., dates it primarily as third century b.c. with some possibly original fragments. Kao Heng, in his introduction to Shang-chün shu chu-i, takes a position similar to that of Duyvendak.

32. See Duyvendak, The Book of Lord Shang, p. 131, and Kao Heng, Shang-chün shu chu-i, pp. 10-11.

33. The History of the Han (Han Shu) “Record of Literary Works” (Yi-wen chih) lists Kung Sun Yang under the “Militarist School,” and the “Treatise on Penal Law” (Hsing-fa chih) says: “The state of Wu had its Sun Wu, Ch'i had its Sun Pin, Ch'in had its Shang Yang. They all captured opposing commanders and secured victory, and handed down their written works.”

34. See, for example, chaps. 17, 26, and 28.

35. See the discussion above on the development of shih as a special military term.

36. I follow Chu Shih-ch'e, who reads the two characters shih (“age”) in this passage as shih (“circumstances”) on the basis of the Ch'ün-shu chih-yao 36/7b, which quotes this passage. See also Han Fei Tzu 299:11, which cites part of this passage.

37. Cf. The Book of Lord Shang 5/9b.

38. There is considerable textual variation on this passage. I follow the Yen Wan-li version in Chu Shih-ch'e, p. 86.

39. In this text, as in The Book of Lord Shang, the range of this usage is considerable. At one extreme one finds simply “present circumstances” in 3:95-6:

    Kuan Tzu replied: “If we accord with what is appropriate and take advantage of prevailing circumstances (shih), we will be able to get the most out of things; if we make plans and do what is expedient, our attainments will be considerable. A True King takes advantage of prevailing circumstances (shih); a sage takes advantage of changing conditions. And both are always appropriate to the things around them.”

    [Following Yü Sheng-wu in reading yen as ho; following Kuo Mo-jo in reading yu as yi; see Wen I-to, pp. 1200-1201.]

    At the other extreme one finds “unalterable prevailing circumstances.” The 3:51-9 passage following is similar to 5/15b-16a cited above in suggesting that prevailing circumstances can demand proper order: “When the perspicacious ruler is on the throne and enjoys circumstances which guarantee proper order, the various ministers will not dare to do wrong.” The assertion that prevailing circumstances are of such overwhelming influence that they can make honest men of thieves—found in The Book of Lord Shang 4/10a (and 5/9b) and also cited above—can again be found in the Kuan Tzu 1:58-4: “Therefore, when circumstances do not allow wrongdoing, even dissolute persons will be on their best behavior.”

40. Chapter 76 of the Kuan Tzu discusses five types of “regional conditions” (kuo shih) (3:82-8): “Duke Huan asked Kuan Tzu: ‘Could you please tell me about regional conditions?’ Kuan Tzu replied: ‘There are mountainous regions, regions of low-lying lands, regions of mixed mountainous and flat terrain, regions of floodlands, and regions of swampland. These are the five types of regional conditions.’”

    The expression “natural circumstances” (t'ien shih) also occurs in 3:38-7: “During the reign of Kung Kung, seventy percent of the land was covered with water while only thirty percent was dry. Taking advantage of the natural circumstances, he seized and ruled the empire.” For these two passages, see Wen I-to, pp. 1139 and 1159.

41. There is a clear definition of this term, ts'an wu, in Huai Nan Tzu 20/4b-5a. (See the accompanying translation of The Art of Rulership, note 129.) In accord with the nature of heaven above and earth below, the Former Kings established the ts'an: the family, the nation, and the officialdom. To give structure to these institutions, they laid down the proper relationships between ruler and minister, father and child, husband and wife, senior and junior, and between friends. These relationships are called the wu.

42. See, for example, 3:51-9 and 3:54-7.

43. Compare Han Fei Tzu 289:10, in which a similar passage is attributed to Shen Pu-hai: “Shen Tzu [Shen Pu-hai] said, ‘If the ruler loses ground in strategies and seeks to make it up in the sincerity of his subjects, this will give rise to uncertainty.’”

44. Compare Hsün Tzu 26/9/15:

    Where everyone's status is of equal standing, there will be no subordination; where their political purchase (shih) is the same, there will be no unified direction; where everyone is on a par, no one will command anyone else. As soon as you had the heavens and the earth, there was a distinction made between “above” and “below,” and as soon as you had a perspicacious king on the throne, his state included regulations governing status. That two persons of equal nobility cannot serve each other and that two persons of the same lowly station cannot command each other is a natural principle.

    Thompson, fragment 98 (p. 287), cites a fragment attributed to Shen Tao from the Yi-lin 2/15a: “Two persons of equal nobility do not serve each other and two persons of the same lowly station do not command each other.”

45. Following Pi Yüan's commentary in reading ch'ang shih chi tz'u as ch'ang shih fan tz'u.

46. I follow T'ao Hung-ch'ing, p. 125, in interpreting the character yi as ni: “to be similar to, to approximate, to pretend.”

47. See Chiang Shang-hsien, p. 344. Again Wei Chang-t'ung, pp. 118-119, gives examples of how the Sun Tzu is in fact misrepresented in this debate.

48. See 54/15/32.

49. See 40/11/65.

50. See 60/16/35.

51. See 12:14, 50:8, 171:6, and 163:2.

52. As in the earlier Legalist texts we have examined, the meaning of this term can range widely. At one extreme we have simply “present circumstances” (136:13): “If,” said Hui Tzu, “you put a monkey in a cage, it will be no different from a pig. Thus where circumstances (shih) are not conducive to a thing, it does not give it room to express its ability.” (Compare Huai Nan Tzu 2/13b.) At the other extreme we have the shape of circumstances in which two things participate. While this may sound like a convoluted way of saying “relationship,” it is important to remember that just as shih in its original military usage describes the situation of two armies—that is, the two armies and their relationship to one another—so the meaning of shih here indicates the two states and the relationship in which they stand (41:13 and 308:7): “Now, Yü's having Kuo is like a carriage having a running board. The running board depends on the carriage, but the carriage also depends on the running board. The relationship (shih) obtaining between Yü and Kuo is exactly this.”

53. See 284:10 and 332:11.

54. See 346:8.

55. See 156:4.

56. See 235:15.

57. See 80:2.

58. See 68:14.

59. See 84:2.

60. See 238:5 and 242:10.

61. See 325:4.

62. For example, The Book of Lord Shang has a chapter entitled “Fixing Privileges and Duties” (Ting-fen). Fen is also an important expression in the “Commentary on Enlightened Laws” (Ming-fa-chieh) chapter of the Kuan Tzu.

63. Cf. The Book of Lord Shang 5/9a.

64. See 116:8: “The control of the government being invested in the ruler himself is called ‘weightiness’ (chung).” This is a commentary on Lao Tzu 26.

65. See 284:15. I follow the Ku Kuang-ts'e commentary in reading pu as hsia.

66. See Thompson, p. 234.

67. Hsü Fu-kuan, pp. 143-144, also detects a Confucian influence here.

68. The term “favors” (te) is used in this passage in a manner reminiscent of the “Handles of Reward and Punishment” (Erh-ping) chapter of the Han Fei Tzu, where it stands in contrast to “punishments” (25:15): “The two control handles are punishments and favors. What is meant by punishments and favors? Execution and disgrace are called punishments; honors and rewards are called favors.”

69. I emend this passage on the basis of the Huai Nan Tzu 9/10a-b.

70. Cf. Kuan Tzu 3:56-2.

71. A similar wholly Legalist warning against allowing ministers to encroach upon the political purchase of the ruler appears in Book Thirteen: Perennial Discussions (Fan-lun) (13/6b):

    Old Duke Chien of Ch'i abandoned the control handles of the state and gave exclusive authority to his great ministers. The high ministers arrogated his prestige and usurped his purchase, private families formed factions and impartiality no longer prevailed. As a result, he made it possible for Ch'en Ch'eng and Ch'ih Yi Tzu P'i to succeed in their conspiracy. That the posterity of the Lü clan was cut off and the Ch'en clan succeeded to the state was the result of weakness and timidity.

    Here the author castigates Duke Chien of Ch'i for allowing his ministers to gain control of the government. Consistent with Legalist predictions for such a course of action, the purchase of the ruler was gradually eroded and the ruler himself was ultimately expunged.

72. See also Huai Nan Tzu 9/9b-10a: “Hence, because the ruler dwells at the focal point of political power. …”

73. The notion of transformation does occur in the Kuan Tzu: 2:35-5, 2:27-10. That these passages are included in the Kuan Tzu does not automatically mean, however, that they represent orthodox Legalist theory. For example (2:27-10): “Where the ruler constitutes a moral example, the people are transformed; where his moral qualities are what they should be, the bureaucracy is properly ordered. The essential task of ordering the bureaucracy properly and transforming the people lies with the ruler.” This notion of transforming the people was not only repudiated by later Legalist thinkers but was even challenged within the pages of the Kuan Tzu itself by the radical principle that the ruler's moral attributes are of no concern to his subordinates.

74. I follow Wang Nien-sun in reading sheng as pen.

75. See the notes to the accompanying translation for a list of these references.

76. I follow Liang Ch'i-hsiung, Hsün Tzu chien-shih, p. 165, in his reading of this passage.

77. See Kuan Tzu 1:73-8; 3:36-6; 3:42-1; Han Fei Tzu 305:16; 331:9; 288:4.

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