[In the following essay, Sawyer and Sawyer provide historical background to Chinese warfare and the evolution of weapons.]

Military thought, the complex product of both violent war and intellectual analysis, suffered from disparagement and disrepute during almost all the past two millennia in Imperial China. Ignoring the original teachings of Confucius, self-styled Confucians eschewed—whether sincerely or hypocritically—the profession of arms and all aspects of military involvement from the Han dynasty on, growing more vociferous in their condemnation with the passing of centuries.¹ However, regardless of these people's civilized and cultured self-perception, the nation could not be without armies or generals, particularly in the face of constant “barbarian” threats and ongoing conflicts with volatile nomadic peoples. Accordingly, a number of early military treatises continued to be valued and studied and thereby managed to survive, while the turmoil of frequent crises inevitably fostered generations of professional military figures and additional strategic studies. Yet compared to the Confucian classics and various other orthodox writings, the military corpus remained minuscule, numbering at most a few hundred works.

Individual chapters of several writings by influential philosophers of the Warring States period (403-221 b.c.),² such as Lord Shang, also focused upon military matters, often with radical impact.³ Many famous thinkers, including Hsün-tzu and Han Fei-tzu,⁴ pondered the major questions of government administration and military organization; motivation and training; the nature of courage; and the establishment of policies to stimulate the state's material prosperity. The Tso chuan and other historical writings similarly record the thoughts of many key administrators and preserve the outlines of famous strategies, although their presentation of battlefield tactics is minimal.

A number of the ancient strategic monographs became relatively famous, and scholars in the Sung period (circa a.d. 1078) collected, edited, and assembled the six important survivors, augmenting them with a T'ang dynasty book; the final product was the Seven Military Classics. Thus codified, the seven works thereafter furnished the official textual foundation for government examinations in military affairs and concurrently provided a common ground for tactical and strategic conceptualization.

Despite incessant barbarian incursions and major military threats throughout its history, Imperial China was little inclined to pursue military solutions to aggression—except during the ill-fated expansionistic policies of the Former Han dynasty, or under dynamic young rulers, such as T'ang T'ai-tsung, during the founding years of a dynasty. Rulers and ministers preferred to believe in the myth of cultural attraction whereby their vastly superior Chinese civilization, founded upon Virtue⁵ and reinforced by opulent material achievements, would simply overwhelm the hostile tendencies of the uncultured. Frequent gifts of the embellishments of civilized life, coupled with music and women, it was felt, would distract and enervate even the most warlike peoples. If they could not be either overawed into submission or bribed into compliance, other mounted nomadic tribes could be employed against the troublemakers, following the time-honored tradition of “using barbarian against barbarian.”⁶

According to Confucian thought, which became the orthodox philosophy and prescribed state view in the Former Han, the ruler need only cultivate his Virtue, accord with the seasons, and implement benevolent policies in order to be successful in attracting universal support and fostering stability. Naturally, there were dissenting views, and even Mencius (371-289 b.c.), the second great Confucian, advocated punitive military expeditions to chastise evil rulers and relieve the people's suffering. However, except under rulers such as Sui Yang-ti (reigned a.d. 605-617), who sought to impose Chinese suzerainty on external regions—and thereby impoverished the nation—military affairs were pressed unwillingly; most of the bureaucracy tended to disdain anything associated with the military and the profession of arms.

EVOLUTION OF CONFLICT AND WEAPONS IN CHINA

“THE SHANG”

Over the centuries Chinese military thought mirrored the evolution in weapons, economic conditions, and political power while creating the framework for strategic conceptualization and stimulating the development of battlefield methods. Tactics appropriate to the dawn of the historical Shang period changed in response to increased manpower, greater speed and mobility, and the invention of more-powerful shock and missile weapons. However, a critical kernel of thought that focused on basic questions, including organization, discipline, evaluation, objectives, and fundamental principles, retained its validity and continued to be applied until the Ch'in eventually conquered and unified the empire, thereby signifying the end of the Warring States period.

The Shang dynasty was a theocratic state whose power arose initially from, and continued to depend upon, the military skills of the nobility, in conjunction with its religious beliefs and institutions.⁷ The populace was effectively divided into four classes: ruling families; royal clan members, many of whom were enfeoffed or served as officials, and other members of the nobility; common people, who were essentially serfs; and slaves.⁸ The king exercised great power over a central area and enjoyed the allegiance of various lords in the peripheral territory. The nobility, which was educated and cultured, lived in well-organized cities marked by massive complex buildings, such as palaces and temples.⁹ The common people, who dwelled in semiearthen huts, farmed or practiced various specialized crafts during most of the year, although they were also required to provide conscript labor and even to mobilize to assist military campaigns.

Bronze technology advanced rapidly from the official inception of the Shang (traditionally dated as 1766 b.c., when T'ang I mounted his victorious campaign over the Hsia) until its collapse at the hands of the Chou, about 1045 b.c.¹⁰ Intricately detailed ritual vessels, essential to the ancestor worship that underlay the king's power, provide dramatic evidence of the technological achievements and the government's effective management and monopoly of productive resources.¹¹ Although the weapons for the nobility were fashioned primarily from bronze, the raw materials for agricultural implements and the arms carried by the commoners were largely confined to stone, wood, and animal bones.¹² Millet and, later, wheat, were the staple crops, and they were stored in centralized granaries after harvesting. Rice was known, but it remained an expensive luxury even for the ruler because it was cultivated mainly in the south.¹³ The level of material culture had progressed sufficiently to sustain cities with large populations based upon organized farming and systematic exploitation of the hunt. Some animals—such as sheep, oxen, pigs, and dogs—had been domesticated,¹⁴ and both silk and hemp were produced. Vessels for ordinary use were made of pottery, which was marked by intricate designs.

Prior to the Shang dynasty, armed conflict essentially consisted of raids by and engagements between neolithic villages, although certain clan chiefs apparently developed local power bases and some regional strongmen emerged, such as those who founded the Hsia dynasty. However, with the rise of the Shang and the imposition of significant central authority (although not administration), a royal standing army of about a thousand was maintained. The number could be expanded as needed: The subservient lineage chiefs and state rulers would be ordered to furnish supporting armies. Although the king normally commanded in person, a rudimentary military bureaucracy with specialized officials already existed.¹⁵ A royal campaign against border enemies might require three to five thousand men, and a campaign directed toward an insolent state as many as thirteen thousand.¹⁶ Military actions required from a few days to perhaps three months; the actual battles generally were settled in a single confrontation, although engagements lasting several days have also been recorded.¹⁷ The army was divided into three sections—left, right, and middle¹⁸—formed from two types of units: loosely organized infantry, conscripted from the privileged populace,¹⁹ which acted in a supporting role; and chariots, manned by the nobles fulfilling their martial responsibilities as warriors and sustainers of the state.

Shang warfare objectives included the imposition or reinforcement of royal suzerainty, the mass capture of prisoners, and the seizure of riches.²⁰ Control over areas outside the central core continued to be imposed through a vassal-like network, rather than through integration under a centrally administered bureaucracy. Plunder increased the wealth of the royal house and also furnished the means to reward loyal service. Some prisoners were enslaved and forced to work in either agricultural or domestic tasks, but large numbers were sacrificed as part of Shang religious ceremonies.²¹

During the several hundred years of Shang rule, bronze weapons formed an integral part of every Shang warrior's arsenal.²² The preferred weapon was the ko (halberd, or dagger-ax),²³ supplemented by spears²⁴ and the compound bow.²⁵ Bronze-tipped arrows, propelled by reflex bows whose pull may have reached 160 pounds, provided effective action at a distance. Daggers and hatchets were available for close fighting; leather armor and large shields—the latter used in coordinated fighting tactics—offered considerable protection against shock weapons and projectiles.²⁶ Bronze helmets were fabricated to deflect missiles and glancing blows, and thin bronze plates were affixed as outer protection on both armor and shields. According to Warring States theory, weapons were usually of mixed type, providing the means for both aggressive and defensive action at close and long ranges. However, the sword evolved slowly, apparently from daggers or perhaps the dagger-ax, and true swords did not become common until the middle of the Warring States period.²⁷

The chariot functioned as the basic fighting unit during the late Shang, Western Chou, and Spring and Autumn (722-481 b.c.) periods; it remained important until well into the Warring States (403-221), when it was gradually supplanted by large infantry masses and eventually, during the third century b.c., began to be supplemented by the cavalry. Chinese tradition portrays the Shang as having employed seventy chariots during the campaign of rectification to oust the evil Hsia dynasty.²⁸ However, twentieth-century archaeological discoveries, supplemented by textual research, indicate that the chariot, rather than being an indigenous development, did not reach China from Central Asia until the middle of the Shang dynasty—approximately 1300 to 1200 b.c.²⁹ Initially, the use of chariot was probably confined to ceremonies and transportation and only gradually was expanded to the hunt and eventually to warfare. Epigraphic materials provide evidence that the Shang relied upon infantry units of nobility to confront their enemies even after the integration of the chariot into their military organization. In fact, throughout the Shang, the chariot may have remained a prestige symbol; its function during military engagements was restricted to providing transport mobility and serving as a command platform rather than constituting a significant military weapon.

The chariots of the late Shang and subsequent Chou periods normally carried three men: the driver in the center, the archer on the left, and a warrior with a dagger-ax on the right. Five chariots constituted a squad, the basic functional unit, and five squads composed a brigade. Each chariot had a complement of 10 to 25 close-supporting infantry, with an additional vanguard of perhaps 125 men in later times.³⁰ A Shang team consisted of two horses, and the rectangular chariot rode on two sturdy, multispoked wheels. Training for warfare included large-scale royal hunts that utilized chariots, although given the difficulty of developing driving skills and the fighting expertise appropriate to a racing chariot, far more practice must have been necessary.³¹ It was an expensive weapon that required craftsmen to build and maintain; thus its use was confined to the nobility, minimally supported by conscripted commoners. Battles accordingly resolved into a number of individual clashes, with personal combat supposedly governed by appropriate ceremonial constraints (probably a later romanticization). A few scholars have seen references to hunting on horseback in certain sentences, but these claims are generally discounted: The horse was employed only in conjunction with the chariot. However, lacking stirrups and a saddle and hampered by his long robes, the mounted rider could not become an effective military element until the third century b.c.

THE CHOU

The Chou came to power by overthrowing the Shang in a decisive battle at Mu-yeh after many years of stealthy preparation and the gradual expansion of their power base through carefully wrought alliances, the submission of some smaller states, and the subjugation of other clans and peoples. Possibly descendants of the Hsia,³² the Chou originally dwelled to the north but had been forced south into the Wei River valley by more-aggressive peoples.³³ As the Chou were situated on the periphery of Shang culture, they were able to assimilate many of the material and cultural achievements of Shang civilization in relative freedom while successfully developing a strong agricultural base, indigenous technology, and their own cultural identity. External barbarian pressures stimulated their military skills, organizational abilities, and tactical thought simultaneously, and the Shang even entrusted them with the task of subjugating rebellious peoples in the west, which allowed the Chou to increase their military prowess.³⁴ When they mounted their final campaign against the debauched, enervated Shang, the Chou's weapons and implements were similar to the Shang's. Perhaps the only Chou innovation was the extensive employment of chariots, facilitating more-rapid movement and the conveying of greater quantities of weapons and supplies.³⁵ The Chou's victory probably stemmed in large part not only from the Shang's disorganization but also from the exhaustion suffered by the Shang in fighting off hostile nomadic peoples to the north and east and from their large-scale commitment to a southern military expedition at the moment of attack.³⁶ The Chou's overall campaign and tactics (particularly if the Book of Documents and the Six Secret Teachings preserve any reliable material) approached the conflict from a new perspective—abandoning ritualistic, formal combat for effective revolutionary activity.³⁷

The Chou kings were confronted with the immediate problem of ruling an empire of disparate peoples and far-flung territories with only a small Chou population. Although the Chou had apparently enjoyed the allegiance of roughly eight hundred states in the final campaign against the Shang, many had also opposed them. These enemy peoples, the tens of thousands of Shang nobility, and even the populace of their own allies all had to be effectively controlled, and smoldering rebellions quenched. Immediately after the famous battle at Mu-yeh, King Wu had the T'ai Kung secure the Chou hold over the surrounding area. Next, when returning to the capital, the Chou vanquished a number of recalcitrant states lying along the corridor of their march.³⁸ Finally, the Western Chou consolidated their rule through several political and military measures, the most important of which was the enfeoffment of powerful clan members among both allied and dissident states. Each person so enfeoffed would establish a collateral family line and would emigrate with his family members, retainers, and military forces. They would constitute a Chou enclave among the local people and would immediately construct a walled town, which would function as the Chou military, political, economic, administrative, and cultural center.³⁹

The Chou also forced thousands of Shang noble families to emigrate to the eastern capital region, where they could be adequately supervised and controlled, although they were allowed to retain most of their own officials, customs, and laws.⁴⁰ Thereafter, the early Chou kings imposed their rule and consolidated their power through close connections with all the vassals thus established. The obedience of these feudal lords was ensured by their participation in clan activities and power, was reinforced by their military and political inferiority, and was emphasized by their relative isolation—all of which necessitated mutual cooperation under the king's directives. The Shang's theocratic character was displaced by a more worldly approach, although the Chou king preserved and emphasized his right to sacrifice to the ancestors, whose intimate involvement in state affairs remained necessary, and to Heaven, which had sanctified Chou's revolutionary activity.

In addition to maintaining six royal armies and posting garrison units throughout the realm,⁴¹ the Chou also incorporated eight armies from the vanquished Shang and could summon the forces of their own vassals as necessary. These units were still composed essentially of nobility, although they were assisted by commoners, personal retainers, and servants in a secondary role. No doubt the shih—minor descendants of the ruling house, younger sons of earls and dukes, and other members of the lesser nobility—also furnished many of the combatants and foot support. Throughout the Western Chou period, the actual fighting was conducted by men of rank and was marked increasingly by mutual deference and respect, with the chariot dominating as the focus of power and mobility.

THE WESTERN CHOU

Following the final conquest of the peripheral areas and their integration under central authority through the imposition of a feudal system, the first few hundred years of the Western Chou period witnessed no dramatic changes in military technology or strategy. Armor more suited to the increasingly active role played by infantrymen appeared and evolved, thanks to improvements in tanning and leather-working capabilities. Coincident with the consistent advances in metallurgical skills, the shape of weapons continued to evolve slowly, becoming longer, stronger, and more complex, eventually resulting in the development of the true sword, which appeared in limited quantities by the end of the Western Chou in 771 b.c. However, long weapons persisted—for fighting either from chariots or dismounted—with the halberd (dagger-ax) predominating.

After only four generations, the central power of the Western Chou began to erode, dissipated partly by fatal expansionist campaigns into the south. Early on, the Western Chou became preoccupied with barbarian threats from the north and west, and they were impoverished as the kings continued to grant fiefs and rewards to the loyal vassals who sustained the government. Consequently, the feudal lords gradually rose in power, and although still reluctantly obedient to the king's demands, they became increasingly self-conscious about their regional identities, particularly as they interacted with local peoples and cultures. The ruling house was also plagued by weak and incompetent rulers, some of whom had obviously forgotten that King Chou's debauchery was among the justifications cited when King Wu presumptuously claimed the sanction of the Mandate of Heaven. Eventually, in 771 b.c., a Chou king, restored to the throne through the efforts of vassal states, was compelled to move the capital ignominiously to the east to avoid barbarian pressures and prolong the myth of dynasty. Ironically, one of his defensive actions was to enfeoff the ancestors of the state of Ch'in as a reward for their horsebreeding efforts, in the expectation that they (who were semibarbarians themselves) would form a bulwark against the nomadic tide.

THE SPRING AND AUTUMN

The Spring and Autumn period (722-481 b.c.), named after the famous Confucian classic chronicling the era, witnessed the rise of state power, development of internecine strife, and destruction of numerous political entities. At its inception, descendants of the various Chou feudal lords still ruled in most states, generally in conjunction with other members of their immediate families and the local nobility. Although they appeared to exercise supreme power, their positions depended largely upon the kinship system and the state as extensions of the greater clan. With the Chou's continued decline, the states were effectively freed of their subservient status and therefore were able to exercise increasing independence in their activities. Their new assertiveness reflected not only the shift in the balance of power from a central authority to peripheral actors but also the distinct weakening of the original ties of kinship upon which enfeoffment had been based. The passing of generations, combined with the inherent difficulties of traveling to the capital to participate actively in the Chou court, had contributed to this estrangement. Although the feudal lords continued to seek Chou sanctification and strongmen later appeared to wield power as hegemons in the dynasty's name, their acquiescence in major political and military affairs had to be sought—rather than being mandated—by the king. Freed of old constraints, the feudal lords focused on internal strife and interstate conflict instead of devoting themselves to performing the duties of vassals.

The locus of state power also tended to shift from the enfeoffed ruling house to the contending parties. From the beginning to the middle of the era, the ministerial families—mostly collateral descendants of the first feudal lord—grew more powerful. In many states they even wrested control of the government from the legitimate line, only to exterminate each other in the next century. By the end of the period the surviving states all had effective despots—either members of the founding family who had managed to reseize power or survivors from one of the great families that had usurped the throne. Because more than a hundred states were annexed or extinguished during the Spring and Autumn period—with their ruling clans and great families reduced to commoners, enslaved, or killed—much of the original feudal nobility ceased to exist.

As a result of the predatory campaigns of the stronger states, the scope of warfare in the Spring and Autumn period increased dramatically. It necessarily involved greater numbers of peasants as integral elements because it could not depend solely upon the nobility. Sustained combat, at least on open terrain, apparently remained centered on the chariot supported by infantry forces, which grew more and more numerous. Concepts of chivalry initially prevailed, and the ethics of battle dictated adherence to the li (forms of propriety), although conscripted infantry were little bound by them. Within a century, however, only the foolish and soon-to-be-defeated were burdened by the old code of ethics, and the ancient style of individual combat—despite personal challenges still offered to instigate battles—was outmoded.⁴³

Early in the period, campaign armies consisted of roughly several hundred to a thousand chariots, accompanied by perhaps ten thousand men. However, by the end of the Spring and Autumn period in 481 b.c., the strong states of Ch'in and Ch'i fielded approximately four thousand chariots each, supported by forty thousand infantrymen. Cavalry remained unknown, and in 541 b.c. the Chin commander even compelled his reluctant chariot forces to dismount and—as infantrymen—engage barbarian foot soldiers.⁴⁴

Combat weapons throughout the period were similar to those of the Western Chou, with the infantrymen depending more upon spears and short swords than the dagger-ax (halberd), which was the weapon par excellence of charioteers.⁴⁵ Metalworking skills continued to advance, resulting in stronger, sharper, larger, and more-deadly combat tools. Yet bronze technology remained the norm, with the newly discovered processes of iron and steel technology (in the late Spring and Autumn period) confined largely to the production of agricultural implements.⁴⁶

Wars occurred frequently, and even the most powerful state, should it fail to prepare its defenses and train its soldiers, could be vanquished. Consequently, the recognition and retention of individuals proficient in the military arts became essential, and rewards—including position, honors, and rank—for valor, strength, and military achievements were initiated. Basic physical qualifications for members of the standing army and for those selected to more elite units were maintained.⁴⁷

As talent grew in importance, resulting in social mobility, bureaucracies staffed by capable individuals began to expand, supplementing and then displacing government by members of the ruler's clan and the entrenched nobility. More-direct forms of administration, through the establishment of districts rather than through enfeoffment, apparently emerged, permitting the central government to wield greater power over the entire state. Peasants slowly began to gain land tenancy instead of being serfs; they prospered economically as property gradually became a transferable commodity rather than the sole possession of the king.

THE WARRING STATES PERIOD

At the beginning of the Warring States period in 403 b.c., the pace of events accelerated. The conflicts of the Spring and Autumn period had segmented China into seven powerful survivor-states,⁴⁸ each contending for control of the realm, and fifteen weaker states for them to prey upon. The feudal lords had by then evolved into despotic monarchs who were compelled to nurture the development of extensive economic and political bureaucracies just to survive. In order to suppress external threats effectively, virtually every ruler had to expand his state's agricultural base. The immigration of disaffected people from other states was encouraged by policies providing them with land, and tenancy and landownership continued their swift development. After 500 b.c. iron implements came into general use, and drainage and irrigation projects vastly increased the food reserves—and therefore strength—of some areas. Trade and commerce flourished, and as a result, a class of influential merchants arose, although they continued to be officially despised.

During the Warring States period, the scale of conflict surged phenomenally, sustained by the increasing agricultural productivity and expanding material prosperity. In the Shang a few thousand men once had constituted an army, whereas now the weaker states easily fielded 100,000 and the strongest, in the third century b.c., reportedly maintaining a standing army of nearly a million, is said to have even mobilized 600,000 for a single campaign. In the battle between Ch'in and Ch'u the total number of combatants apparently exceeded a million, an astounding figure even after discounting for inaccuracy and exaggeration. Numerical strength had become critical, for in the previous campaign Ch'in, with 200,000 soldiers, had suffered a severe defeat. Naturally, casualties also escalated rapidly, with 100,000 from Wei dying at the battle of Ma-ling in 341 b.c.; 240,000 in the combined forces of Wei and Han perishing at I-ch'üeh in 295 b.c.; and 450,000 men of Ch'u being slaughtered at Ch'ang-p'ing in 260 b.c. Campaigns of such magnitude required lengthy periods for logistical preparation, mobilization, and engagement. Instead of a few days or weeks on the march, with perhaps a couple of days in battle, as in the Shang, months and even years were necessary, with the battles raging for tens of days, or stalemates persisting for a year or more.

Managing the employment of such vast resources and manpower demanded great expertise, and the profession of arms quickly developed. Whereas the newly free masses were generally registered and subjected to military training on a seasonal basis and were conscripted for combat when needed, the army's core had to be composed of practiced, disciplined officers and soldiers. Drill manuals and deployment methods, as well as the tactics they would be designed to execute, suddenly became indispensable. An extensive body of military theory appeared, stimulated not only by battlefield and training requirements but also by new political theories and individual philosophies. Numerous military books—remnants of which survive—were no doubt composed during the early part of the Warring States, and their theories found rigorous employment thereafter.

The commander's qualifications and responsibilities also changed during the period, with strategy becoming so complex that the replacement of a general could, and frequently did, result in an army's defeat and the endangerment of an entire nation. Although rulers continued to meddle in army matters—with catastrophic results—often at the instigation of jealous ministers or corrupt officials acting on behalf of foreign powers, in general, professional officers who specialized solely in military affairs appeared. Early in the Warring States period the ideal commander was normally an effective, even exemplary, civilian administrator, such as Wu Ch'i, but toward the end, the civilian realm became increasingly estranged from the realities of warfare.⁴⁹

During the Shang and early Chou periods, battles were fought on agricultural and otherwise open, undefended terrain, with mobilized armies encountering only scattered cities during their advances. Some fortifications seem to have always existed—such as the famous thick neolithic and Shang dynasty stamped-earth walls that are still being discovered—but forces could essentially roam through the countryside unhampered until encountering them. In the Warring States period the feudal lords undertook the expanded defense of borders, constructing “great walls,” ramparts, forts, and guard towers throughout the countryside to defend the entire territory against incursion. ⁵⁰States protected their land more than their people, and the objective of warfare changed as each state sought not to capture prisoners and plunder for riches but to vanquish its enemies by seizing their lands, exterminating their armies, gaining political control of their populace, and administratively annexing their territory.

Fortified cities, previously military and administrative centers, grew enormously in significance as industry, trade, and population all flourished, and they became focal points in the road network. Accordingly, whereas in the Western Chou and Spring and Autumn periods it was advisable to circumvent these isolated cities rather than to waste men and resources besieging and assaulting them, their capture or destruction now assumed critical importance. Techniques for assault and defense advanced simultaneously, with siege engines, mobile shields, battering rams, catapults, mobile towers, and similar mobile devices appearing in substantial numbers. Specialists in the technologies of assault and defense were needed: The Mohists, who created and mastered defensive techniques and measures, became famous for their dedication to assisting the targets of aggression. Therefore, Sun-tzu's condemnation of besieging and assaulting cities had become outdated by the time of Sun Pin's analysis of vulnerable and impregnable targets in his Military Methods.⁵¹

The growth of mass infantry armies was also accompanied by the perfection and widespread use of the crossbow during the fourth century b.c.;⁵² by further developments in articulation, deployment, and maneuvering capabilities; and by the reluctant adoption of barbarian practices to create the cavalry.⁵³ Under constant pressure from mounted steppe horsemen, various perceptive commanders and rulers realized the need to develop their own cavalry. Although the history of the horse in China is still emerging, it appears that in 307 b.c. King Wu-ling of North Chao, over vehement objections, deliberately—to facilitate adoption of the cavalry—forced on his troops the “barbarian style of dress” (short jacket and trousers) instead of the indigenous and much-revered long coat of the Chinese. Since the fifth century mounted horsemen had apparently been challenging the Chinese states. The skill of riding probably evolved from Iran and the steppe region, and foreign horses had long been famous in China for their speed and endurance. Wu-ling created the first known cavalry, immediately providing the state with a vastly increased offensive potential.

The saddle, when there was one, was extremely primitive—only a rolled blanket, and stirrups did not appear until the end of the Han. Consequently, the rider was burdened with the task of simultaneously controlling his horse and either shooting his bow or striking with his shock weapon. The effectiveness of the horsemen, acting from such an unstable platform, was inevitably limited and stemmed more from their great speed and mobility than inherent fighting power. However, the development of the cavalry—mentioned only briefly in the military books prior to T'ang T'ai-tsung—freed armies from being confined to open, chariot-accessible terrain and allowed their diffuse deployment in ravines, valleys, forests, hilly fields, and mountains, fully exploiting the terrain.⁵⁴ Supported by vast hordes of armored infantrymen wielding spears, crossbows, and swords (possibly of iron),⁵⁵ warfare on an unprecedented scale suddenly became both possible and inevitable. In the final century of conflict, the third century b.c., which witnessed the growth and decisive triumph of Ch'in, massive campaigns requiring hundreds of thousands of men executing both “explosive” and “persisting” strategies decimated the populace and the countryside. In those days the strategies and methods of the famous tacticians were repeatedly tested and applied and were proven to have a timeless validity.

THE STATE OF WEI

The history of Wei, an important participant in the politics of the era, reflects the evolution of military affairs during the Warring States period. Wu Ch'i⁵⁶ became a famous general and military administrator in Wei, whereas both Mencius, the early Confucian standard-bearer, and Wei Liao-tzu, reputed progenitor of the military classic bearing his name, squandered their persuasive skills on King Hui. One of the seven powers in the Warring States period, Wei had become an independent political entity in 434 b.c. when three powerful families carved the large, formerly mighty state of Chin into Wei, Chao, and Han. In 403 b.c. the Chou king recognized the de facto rulers as feudal lords, and in 376 b.c. they completely exterminated the remnants of the Chin ruling house. Situated in the central part of China between the contending powers of Ch'in to the west and Ch'i to the east, Wei was the strongest of the so-called three Chin. Initially, the capital was at An-i, but the fertile plains area in which it was located lacked such natural defenses as mountains and ravines, and the government suffered from constant pressure from hostile neighbors in all directions. When the government was strong and prosperous, it could retain control over the West Ho region and thus fend off any threat from the belligerent Ch'in; when weak—through the ruler's ineptitude or some disaster—it suffered repeated defeats in the incessant warfare. Furthermore, whereas Ch'in had been successfully stymied by the strength of the great Chin, once the latter was segmented, the successor states—indifferent to mutual cooperation—lacked the power necessary for independent survival.

King Wen, who reigned from the inception of Wei until 387 b.c., realized the need for talented advisers and welcomed worthy men irrespective of their regional origin. Li K'o, one of the outsiders who responded to this policy, was appointed to high office and had great impact. He rewrote the laws, promulgated measures to increase agricultural production, established private property, and fostered a stable commodity-price policy. Hsi-men Pao focused his efforts upon irrigation, thereby greatly increasing the nation's wealth. Wu Ch'i, appointed commanding general, conducted numerous successful campaigns against the Ch'in and secured the defense of the West Ho region. King Wen's son King Wu continued Wu Ch'i's basic policy, thereby compelling the other Chin states of Han and Chao to respect Wei's might and prosperity, although Wu Ch'i was ignominiously forced by court intrigues to flee for his life.

Unfortunately, King Hui—who assumed power in 370 b.c.—was more successful in antagonizing people than in employing them, and he forfeited the services of many talented individuals, such as Lord Shang (who subsequently was instrumental in strengthening Ch'in). Instead of nurturing harmonious relations with his neighbors, he appears to have constantly annoyed them, greatly exacerbating the pressures and conflicts on all sides. Furthermore, he eventually lost the West Ho region, thereby opening the state to incursions by Ch'in, and was forced to move the capital to Ta-liang, thereafter calling the state Liang.

Two famous battles illustrate the nature of warfare in this period. The first, at Kui-ling, stemmed from King Hui's desire to recoup losses suffered at the hands of Ch'in in the west. Wei's army, under the command of P'ang Chüan, attacked Chao in the north. Finding itself hard-pressed, Chao requested aid from Ch'i, in the east, on the premise that as Chao presented a natural barrier and defense against Wei, it would be strategically advantageous for Ch'i to support Chao's efforts. Although the Ch'i ruler assented, Sun Pin—the famous strategist whose book has recently been rediscovered—advised waiting for the two antagonists to exhaust themselves, thereby ensuring maximum gain with minimum risk and effort. In 352 b.c., under the command of T'ien Chi, Ch'i mobilized an army to effect an indirect strike at the Wei homeland, the critical city of Ta-liang, in accord with the principles of “first seize what they love,” “attack vacuity,” and “strike where undefended.” P'ang Chüan, flushed with his victories in Chao, reacted as predicted, racing back to mount a counterattack. Ch'i then feigned concern and withdrew to its chosen battlefield to await the Wei army, thereby following a number of basic tactical principles from Sun-tzu and Sun Pin, such as “with ease await the tired.” From its fortified positions and high terrain Ch'i was able to quickly defeat the exhausted Wei army, inflicting severe casualties at minimal cost.

Some years later, Wei found itself being increasingly squeezed by a newly vigorous Han, to the south, Ch'in, to the west, Ch'i, to the east, and Chao, to the north. King Hui embarked on a campaign against Han, which had become formidable through the administrative efforts of the famous theorist Shen Pu-hai and by forming an alliance with and returning to Chao the cities previously lost. P'ang Chüan, again entrusted with command, struck directly at the Han capital. Han, as Chao had before, sought aid from Ch'i, citing the benefits of mutual defense. Again Sun Pin advised waiting for the forces to decimate each other, further weakening Wei. Han mounted a total defensive effort but lost five major battles in succession and was forced to submit to Ch'in in a desperate effort to survive. Ch'i then sallied forth, following the previous strategy, with Sun Pin as strategist and T'ien Chi in command. P'ang Chüan immediately abandoned his campaign in Han, turning back toward his home state. Meanwhile, King Hui mobilized all his resources, placing his son in command of the home-defense troops, with the sole aim of seeking a decisive confrontation with Ch'i.

Under Sun Pin's direction the Ch'i armies, which were advancing into Wei, followed the dictum “be deceptive.” P'ang Chüan arrogantly believed the men of Ch'i to be cowards who would flee rather than engage mighty Wei in battle. Therefore, Sun Pin daily reduced the number of cooking fires in the encampment to create a facade of ever-increasing desertion. He also effected a tactical withdrawal to further entice P'ang Chüan into the favorable terrain at Ma-ling where the Ch'i commander concealed ten thousand crossbowmen among the hills. P'ang Chüan, apparently afraid that he would miss an opportunity to inflict a severe blow on the retreating Ch'i army, abandoned his heavy forces and supply train and rushed forth with only light units. Arriving at night, the combined Wei forces were ambushed as soon as they penetrated the killing zone. In addition to being decisively defeated by Ch'i's withering crossbow fire, 100,000 Wei soldiers needlessly perished because of their commander's character flaws and hasty judgment.⁵⁷

Thereafter, Wei not only never regained its former power but also suffered numerous incursions by the now-unchecked mighty Ch'in, which would eventually subjugate all China. In 340 b.c. Wei was forced to cede 700 li to Ch'in after sustained defeats, and felt compelled to move its capital to Ta-liang to avoid the incessant danger. Although a strong figure occasionally emerged to effect a temporary resurgence in Wei's strength, its territory continued to shrink until the state, together with the royal house, was finally extinguished in 225 b.c.

THE MILITARY WRITINGS

In order to appreciate the great value and inherent importance of the Chinese military classics, one should note several brief historical and political points. First, military works were not normally permitted in private hands, and their possession could be construed as evidence of a conspiracy. (Possession of the T'ai Kung's Six Secret Teachings—a book advocating and instructing revolution—would be particularly fatal.) Second, almost all these teachings were at first transmitted down through the generations, often orally and always secretly. Eventually they were recorded—committed to written form on bamboo slips—and sometimes became public knowledge. Government scribes and designated officials gathered the slips for state use, depositing them in imperial libraries, where they were so highly valued that they were exempted from the infamous book burnings of the Ch'in dynasty. Once stored away, they were accessible to a few professors of the classics, a restricted number of high officials, and the emperor himself. Even these privileged individuals might still be denied access to the critical writings, especially if they were related to the imperial family.

Even after the teachings were recorded in manuscript form on bamboo, silk, or eventually paper (after the Han dynasty), patriots sometimes felt compelled to remove them from public domain. General Chang Liang, who played a fundamental role in the overthrow of the tyrannical Ch'in dynasty and in the establishment of the Han, for example, supposedly had the sole copy of the Three Strategies of Huang Shih-kung, from which he had personally profited, buried with him in his casket. According to one tradition, however, the text resurfaced when his tomb was vandalized in the fourth century a.d. Another example is the well-known (although perhaps apocryphal) refusal of Li Wei-kung, a famous strategist and effective general, to provide the T'ang emperor with more than defensive knowledge and tactics. In the view of Li Wei-kung, strategies for aggressive action should not be disseminated because, with the empire already at peace, they could only aid and interest those who wanted to precipitate war and incite revolution.

The seven military books, as they have been traditionally arranged in the Seven Military Classics since the Sung dynasty, are

Sun-tzu's Art of War

Wu-tzu

The Methods of the Ssu-ma (Ssu-ma Fa)

Questions and Replies Between T'ang T'ai-tsung and Li Wei-kung

Wei Liao-tzu

Three Strategies of Huang Shih-kung

T'ai Kung's Six Secret Teachings

Although uncertainly abounds regarding the authorship and dates of several of the classics, as well as to what extent they are composite books drawing upon common ground and lost writings, the traditional order unquestionably is not chronological. Sun-tzu's Art of War has generally been considered the oldest and greatest extant Chinese military work, even though the purported author of the Six Secret Teachings—the T'ai Kung—was active hundreds of years earlier than the (possibly) historical Sun-tzu. Materials preserved in the Ssu-ma Fa reputedly extend back into the early Chou; the Wu-tzu may have been recorded by Wu Ch'i's disciples, although suffering from later accretions; and the Three Strategies probably follows the Wei Liao-tzu, yet traditionalists still associate it with the T'ai Kung. Accordingly, one possible order (with many caveats and unstated qualifications) might well be

Biographies of the purported authors, along with summary discussions of the evidence for ascribing dates of composition to particular periods, are found in the introductions to the individual translations. Much of the evidence is tenuous and often circular, and the systematic study of the evolution of strategic thought and military concepts remains to be undertaken. However, the preceding sequence—although possibly infuriating Sun-tzu advocates—seems sustainable in the light of both traditional textual scholarship and recent tomb discoveries. The relative order of books in the third period (which probably coincides with the latter half of the third century b.c.) remains to be defined.⁵⁸ Although we recognize these chronological issues, for purposes of continuity in introducing essential historical material and developments, our order of presentation places the Six Secret Teachings first, discussing the T'ai Kung as an active participant in the great Chou drama that would affect and color Chinese history for three millennia. The Ssu-ma Fa, which makes frequent references to Chou practices, follows, and then the Art of War. The Wu-tzu, which might have been composed close to the time of the Art of War, completes the early Warring States works. Thereafter, the sequence continues in likely chronological order, with the Wei Liao-tzu, the Three Strategies, and finally the medieval Questions and Replies.

Notes

1. The Confucius (551-479 b.c.) of the Analects demands courage and resoluteness in the practice of righteousness and requires that his disciples always do what is appropriate. He cultivated the six arts, which included chariot driving and archery, and in other texts refers to the terrible visage of the righteous man when he dons his armor. He also indicated that thechün-tzu, or perfected man, does not compete, which was taken by later Confucians as evidence that conflict and warfare are inappropriate for civilized men. Other early Confucians, such as Mencius (371-289 b.c.) and Hsün-tzu (a Confucian of the late Warring States period who wrote extensively on military affairs), were cognizant of the inescapable necessity of wars and armies. Only after several centuries, as the Confucians became further removed from the pristine spirit of their founder and the realities of the early context, did the tendency toward pacificism, or (perhaps more correctly) the civil,emerge and gain ascendancy. This is a complex topic that requires an extensive separate analytic work.

2. The dates assigned to the Spring and Autumn and the Warring States periods vary somewhat depending on the writer's predelictions. The Ch'un ch'iu, or Spring and Autumn Annals, which chronicles events from 722 to 481 b.c., was traditionsally held to have been edited didactically by Confucius and was one of the essential Five Classics. (Confucius no doubt used the work for educational purposes and may have emended it to some extent, but he cannot be considered the compiler or editor in any real sense.) The Tso chuan, purportedly a commentary to the Spring and Autumn Annals but in actuality a self-existent work that protrays the period in considerable detail, covers the years 722 to 486 b.c. (or 464 b.c.; opinion seems to vary) The Intrigues of the Warring States contains some material from the early fifth century b.c., but it basically records the people and events of the period 403-221 b.c., when the Ch'in officially assumed the mantle of imperial rule. Thus the Spring and Autumn period should refer to 722 to 481 b.c.and the Warring States era 403-221 b.c., traditionally dates that are adopted herein. However, there is also considerable logic to dating the Spring b.c. and extending the Warring States period to cover the interval between the end of the Tso chuan material and 403 b.c.. This gives dates such as those Herrlee G. Creel (The Origins of Statecraft in China, University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1970, p. 47) adopts: 770-464 and 463-222b.c.

3. Lord Shand (died 338 b.c.), although much reviled by Confucian tradition, had great impact in reforming the laws and institutions of the state of Ch'in. Among his important contributions were imposing stringent laws; advocating and implementing a severe but certain system of rewards and punishments; restricting the conferring of rank to military achievements; organizing the entire populace as well as the military into groups of five and ten, thereby creating a dual-purpose, mutual guarantee system that facilitated immediate conscriptions; and eliminating the boundary paths between fields, making land a salable commodity. (Some of these reforms may have had antecedents, including those involving the military. For example, see Fu Shao-chieh, Wutzu chin-chu chin-i, Shang-wu yin-shu-kuan, Taipei, 1976, p. 17.) The remnants of Lord Shang's book have been translated by J. J. L. Duyvendak as The Book of Lord Shang (Arthur Probsthain, London, 1928; reprint, University of Chicago Press, 1963).

4. Han Fei-tzu (died 233 b.c.), a famous Legalist and former disciple of Hsün-tzu (298-238 b.c.), left an extensive treatise, which has been translated in full by W.K. Liao (The Complete Works of Han Fei-tzu, 2 vols., A. Probsthain, London, 1959 [reprint of 1939 edition]), and as selections by Burton Watson (Han Fei-tzu: Basic Writings, Columbia University Press, New York, 1964.)

5. “Virture,” although encompassing the basic meaning of moral virtue, was the object of much complex thought in ancient China and came to have numerous naunces and technical meanings, including “power” and “potency.” Some of these are discussed briefly in the footnotes to the translations. In general, “Virture” (capitalized) is used to translate the term te whenever the transcendent dimensions are critical—when the cultivation of te (virture) leads to Virture, which is synonymous with moral achievement and the inner power that accompanies it. Within the context of Taoist texts and to a certain extent military writings influenced by them, the term te indicates inner potency or power—generally as contrasted with and distinguished from the moral and ethical realm because the artifical constraints of rites, morals, and ethics were anathema to most Taoist-oriented thinkers (neo-Taoism and eclectic works excepted). A specialized body of literature has developed in recent years, due partly to the discovery of previously unknown manuscripts; these writings offer various conceptualizations and systematizations under the rubric of “Huang-Lao” thought, although there is by no means universal accord that these trends constitute a school or an affiliation. Specialists are no doubt aware of them, but the general reader may find Arthur Waley's classic comments on the term te in his introduction to The Way and Its Power (Grove Press, New York, 1958), or D.C. Lau's thoughts in his translation of the Tao Te Ching (The Chinese University Press, Hong Kong, 1982) of interest. (Also see the notes to the number 24, for further discussion and sources, and Aat Vervoorn's article “Taoism, Legalism, and the Quest for Order in Warring States China,” JCP, Vol. 8, No. 3 [September 1981], pp. 303–324).

   Throughout we translate te as “virture” when it refers to morals and ethics and as “Virtue” when it connotes the attainment of special status—with inherent power—through the cultivation of virtue, which is not unlike the original meaning of virtus. The questions of its transcendent dimensions, relationship to potency, and metaphysical realization in warfare command must be left to another book and the studies of experts.

6. Every “civilized” dynasty, including the Shang, appears to have exploited “barbarian”—defined by reference to the dynasty's own self-perceived level of civilization—peoples against other, similar peoples. In many cases they were even settled in the frontier regions, just within state borders, and shouldered the burdern of dynastic defense. However, this first appeared as an articulated policy in the Han era and was symptomatic of the steppe-sedentary conflict. Discussions may be found in Owen Lattimore, Inner Asian Frontiers of China (Beacon Press, Boston, 1962); Yü Yingshih, Trade and Expanson in Han China (University of California Press, Berkeley, 1967); and Sechin Jagchid and Van Jay Symons, Peace, War, and Trade Along the Great Wall (Indiana University Press, Bloomington, 1989).

7. This discussion of the Shang is based on standard Western texts and monographs, such as Kwang-chih Chang's Shang Civilization (Yale University Press, New Haven, 1980) and Cheng Te-k'un's Shang China (Heffer, Cambridge, 1960), supplemented by the normal range of articles from specialist journals, such as Early China and Wen wu. They are listed in the bibliography under the sections for historical materials.

8. A major point of contention is whether slaves were used solely for domestic work and perhaps occasional agricultural activties or whether the entire Shang edifice was based on the systematic use and exploitation of a slave class of agricultural workers. Depending on whether a Marxist or another synthetic framework is employed, the evidence is defined and interpreted differently. However, it appears that enslaved prisoners and their descendants were found largely in domestic work rather than agriculture.

9. In the Shang and Chou dynasties, the presence of the lineage's ancestral temple virtually constituted the defining feature of a capital city. Naturally, various deities, spirits, and animistic forces were also worshipped, depending on the period, state, and beliefs of the time. The ruler's ancestral temple always played a critical role in prewar discussions and in prebattle ceremonies, as is evident the Seven Military Classics.

10. In the past decade a number of lengthy, minutely detailed articles based on historical records, recently recovered bronze inscriptions, calendrical reconstructions, and celestial phenomena have discussed the probable date for Chou's conquest of the Shang. The traditionally held date of 1122 b.c.proposed by the Han dynasty scholar Liu Hisin has been invalidated emphatically by David Pankenier's proof that the rare five-planet conjunction recorded in the Bamboó Annals actually occurred on May 28, 1059 b.c. (See David W. Pankenier, “Astronomical Dates in Shang and Western Zhou,” EC7 [1981-1982], p. 2-5.) Various other dates previously proposed—such as 1111, 1075 (T'ang Lan), 1027, 1025, and 1023 (Bernhard Karlgren)—have also been discarded. Current arguments, based on essentially the same evidence—including the critical five-planet conjunction—variously supplemented or interpreted, produce three theories: Pankenier's January 20, 1046 b.c. (Pankenier, “Astronomical Dates,” p. 2-37, in particular p. 16); David S. Nivison's January 15, 1045 b.c. (originally proposed in his article “The Dates of Western Chou,” HJAS, Vol. 43, No. 2 [December 1983], pp. 481-580), and 1040 (according to his notes revising the JAS article published almost simultaneously in Early China [EC8 (1982-1983), pp.76-78]); and Edward Shaughnessy, who supports Nivision's first date of January 15, 1045 (see “‘New’ Evidence on the Zhou Conquest,” EC 6 [1980-1981], pp.57-79, and “The ‘Current’ Bamboo Annals and the Date of the Zhou Conquest of Shang,” EC 11-12 [1985-1987], pp. 33–60, especially p. 45). Chou Fa-kao also supports the 1045 date in a Chinese review article (“Wu Wang k'e Shang te nien-tai wen-t'i,” in Li-shih Yü-yen Yen-chiu-so chi-k'an [BIHP], Vol. 56, No. 1 [1985], Taipei, pp. 5-41). Because 1045 b.c. appears well-founded, it is adopted herein. However, for further discussion, see Chang, Shang Civilization, pp. 15-19; Creel, The Origins of Statecraft in China, pp. 487-491, who suggest accepting the traditional date of 1122 b.c. even though acknowledgeing it may be inaccurate; Tung Tso-pin, “Hsi-Chou nien-li–p'u,” BIHP23 (1951), pp. 681-760; Ch'ü Wan-li, “Hsi-Chou shih-shih kai-shu.” BIHP 42 (1971), pp. 775-802; Jung Men-yϋan, “Shih-t'an Hsi-Chou chi-nien,” Chung-hua wen-shih lun-ts'ung 1 (1980), pp. 16-20; Ho Yu-ch'i “Chou Wu-wang fa-Chou te nien-tai wen-t'i Chung-shan Ta-shϋeh hsϋeh-pao 1 (1981), pp. 64-70; and Edward L. Shaughnessy, “On the Authenticity of the Bamboo Annals,” HJAS, Vol. 46, No. 1 (June 1986), pp. 149-180.

11. The casting of massive ritual cauldrons, some weighing several hundred pounds, and the production of bronze weapons required hundreds of skilled artisans engaged in coordinated activity.

12. It is well-known that in the plains area of central China—the locus of the Shang dynasty—the soft yellowish earth can easily be dug with a sharpened wooden stick or other nonmetallic object. Naturally, agricultural effciency improves with metal plows and hoes, but they were not essential and were rarely, if ever, used in the Shang era. (See Chang, Shang Civilization, p. 223; Hsu and Linduff, Western Chou Civilization, pp. 75 and 353; and T. R. Treger, A Geography of China, Aldine, Chicago, 1965, pp. 50-51.) A contrary view is taken by the traditionalist Ch'en Liang-tso in a lengthy, detailed reveiw of the archaeological evidence. He concludes that the Shang already had bronze agricultural implements, which were used concurrently with those made of inexpensive materials such as stone and bone. Moreover, in his view, these implements were employed extensively throughout the Chou period until they were finally displaced by iron in the Warring States era. (See Ch'en Liang-tso, “Wo-kuo-tai te ch' ing-t'ung nung-chü,” Han-hsüeh yen-chiu, Vol. 2, No. [June 1984], pp.135-166, and Vol. 2 [December 1984], pp. 363-402.)

13. Rice, which requires wet cultivation, originated in the south and was little grown in Shang central areas. (For general discussions of agriculture in China, see Science and Civilisation in China, Vol. 6, Part 2, Agriculture [by Francesca Bray], Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1984; Kwang-chih Chang, eds., Food in Chinese Culture, Yale University Press, New Haven, 1977; and E. N. Anderson,The Food of China, Yale University Press, New Haven, 1988.)

14. The enormous numbers of animals used in the almost continuous sacrifices, which went to feed the priestly caste and the nobility, is cited as evidence that cattle and other animals must have raised. Cf. Chang, Shang Civilization, pp. 142-145, 230.

15. See ibid., pp. 195-196. The king's wives are also recorded as having commanded troops and as having personal forces.

16. Cf. Cheng Te-k'un, Shang China, pp. 208-212; Chang, Shang Civilization, p. 249. The total number in the army during wartime is sometimes estimated at thirty thousand (Cheng, Shang China, p. 210), which would be many measures smaller than the number of troops reported as having engaged in the battle of Mu-yeh. This suggests that the more limited figures apply only to the early to middle Shang era—perhaps with significant expansion later—as well as overstatement

17. See Fan Yuzhou, “Military Campaign Inscriptions from YH 127,” BSOAS, Vol. 52, No. 3 (1989) pp. 533-548; and David N. Keightley, who cites the extensive nature of the king's travels in “The Late Shang State,” in the The Origins of Chinese Civilization, University of California Press, Berkeley, 1983, pp. 552-555.

18. A later term, the Three Armies (san chün), was used constantly to refer to a campaign army. Whether it originates with these three divisions (san shi) or was simply an organizational creation (such as for upper, middle, and lower) is not clear. (Cf. Chin Hsiang-heng, “Ts' ung chia-ku pu-ts u yen-chiu Yin Shang chün-lü-chung chih wang-tsu san-hsing san-shih,” Chung-kuo wen-tzu52 [1974], pp. 1-26; and the material on military organization in Appendix E.)

19. A basic distinction in the Shang and Early Chou was made between the people who dwelled within the kuo, the “state,” and those who lived outside it. At this time a state was essentially a city fortified by surrounding walls, with the privileged class residing within its protective confines. The city dwellers furnished the warriors, whereareas those outside the walls were not required to serve or where merely conscripted as menial support (if they were not alien peoples under the control of the kuo). This distinction declined as the scope of warfare eventually expanded in the Spring and Autumn period. (See, for example, Hsϋ Hsi-ch'en, “Chou-tai ping-chih ch'u-lun,” Chung-kuo shih yen-chiu, 4 [1985], pp. 4-5.)

20. On warfare objectives, see Yang Hung, Chung-kuo ku-ping-ch'i lun-ts'ung, Ming-wen shu-chü, Taipei, 1983, p. 8. Although agriculturally based and accordingly prosperous, the Shang ruling house required vast riches to distribute to the nobility, whether directly or indirectly (through allowing them to retain the plunders of war). Because the Shang domain was extensive and the nobility counted in the ten of thounsands of families, it was rather voracious. For example, in one battle the Shang reportedly took thirty thousand prisioners (see Chang, Shang Civilization, p. 194).

21. Among the peoples particularly chosen for sacrifice were the Ch'iang, from whose Chiang clan many of the principal wives of the Chou royalty came. The T'ai Kung, adviser to Kings Wen and Wu of the Chou, was also of Ch'iang origin. It seems possible that the Shang's enmity toward the Ch'iang drove them to an alliance with the Chou, although this is not known. See E. G. Pulleyblank, “The Chinese and Their Neighbors in Prehistoric and Early Historic Times,” in The Origins of Chinese Civilization, pp. 420-421; Chang, Shang Civilization, p. 249.

22. In the Shang and probably the Early Chou, weapons were generally stored in government armories and were distributed only when required for military campaigns. (See Yen I-p'ing, “Yin Shang ping-chih,” Chung-kuo wen-tzu, NS 7 [1983], p. 36.) This reflected the considerable cost of weapons and diffused any threat of an armed political revolt against the ruling family. Furthermore, because of the cost factor, some researchers believe conscripted infantrymen were generally not furnished with serious weapons until the infantry grew in signifance and less expensive iron tsu, Chung-kuo chϋn-shih-shih, Vol. 4: Ping-fa, Chieh-fang-chϋn ch'u-pan-she, Peking, 1988, p. 2.)

23. The dagger-ax dervies its name form the dagger-like blade horizontally affixed near the top of a long wooden shaft, but it is primarily a hooking weapon. Wounds are inflicted by swining down and pulling forward, with the curved knife-like blade cutting in and hooking the enemny (rather than delivering a crushing, chopping blow directly into the soldier as an ax blade would. The ancients also had axes, but their role seems to have been limited and perhaps largely ceremonial.) See Chou Wei, Chūng-kūo ping-ch'i shih-kao,Ming-wen shu-chϋ, Taipei, 1980, pp. 64-88; Hayashi Minao, Chugoku In-shu jidai no buki, Kyoto Daigaku Jimbun Kagaku Kenkyūsho, Kyoto, 1972, pp. 3-96; Lao Kan, “Chan-kuo shih-tai e chan-cheng fang-fa,” BIHP 37 (1967), pp, 53-57; and Shih Chang-ju, “Hsiao-t'un Yin-tai te ch'eng-t'ao ping-ch'i,” BIHP 22 (1950), pp. 59-65. A number of specialized articles have discussed this indigenous weapon, including Ma Heng, “Ko chi chih yen-chiu,” Yenching hsüeh-pao, No. 5 (1929), pp. 745-753; Kuo Pao-chün, “Ko Pao-chün, Ko chi yü-lun,” BIHP, Vol. 5, No. 3 (1935), pp. 313-326; and Li Chi, “Yü-pei ch'u-t'u ch'ing-t'ung kou-ping fen-lei t'u-chieh,” BIHP 22 (1950), pp. 1-31.

24. The spear was already extant in Shang times and no doubt dates back to the neolithic period. Shang spears boasted bronze spearheads (as well as those made of other materials, such as stone and bone, but with the development of iron technology, iron tips appeared by Warring States period. In addition, the longers spears suited to use the chariot (and thus also employed by infantry) in the Shang and Early Chou tended to be too unwieldy for infantrymen and consequently were shortened somewhat in the Warring States period. Conversely, the blades tended to become longer and sharper in the early Spring and Autumn period and continued to undergo similar modifications thereafter. For detailed discussions, in addition to references listed in the bibliography, see Chou Wei, Chung-kuo ping-ch'i shih-kao,pp. 98-102; and Hiyashi Minao, Chūgoku In-Shū jidai no buki,pp. 97-130.

25. The bow was already a major part of the Shang warrior's arsenal and was generally carried by the chariot commander. Composite bows appeared early, increasing in complexity, size, and strength over the centuries with improvements in bonding and crafting technology. Various materials, including bamboo, were employed and were matched for greatest composite strength under tension. In the Shang era wooden shafted arrows generally mounted bronze points, although bone, stone, and other materials were also employed. However, bronze continued to prevail even after iron had generally appeared in the Warring States (refer to note 55 below). For an overview and detailed discussions, see Hiyashi Minao, Chūgoku In-Shū jidai no buki, pp. 243-299 (on bows) and 321-374 (on arrows); Yoshida Mitsukuni (who also discusses crossbows), “Yummi to óyumi,” Tóyóshi kenkyū, Vol. 12, No. 3 (1953), pp. 82-92; and the classic report and analysis of Shih Chang-ju, “Hsiao-t' un Yin-tai te ch'eng-t'ao ping-ch'i,” pp. 25-44 (on the bow) and 44-54 (on arrows).

26. See Appendix C for an annotated discussions of the development and history of armor in ancient China.

27. In recent years there have been a number of claims for widespread use of bronze swords in the Early Chou, such as Hsu and Linduff, Western Chou Civilization, p. 81. However, although the innovative horizon for many weapons and technological achievements continues to be pushed earlier and earlier with each new discovery, it would seem these would best be termed daggers rather than swords, both in length and function. See Appendix D for an annotated discussion of the sword's history and some of the issues surrronding it.

28. “Chien-hsüan,” Lü-shih ch'un-ch'iu, CCCY edition, Shang-wu yin-shu-kuan, Taipei, 1985, p. 204. Although claims that the Hsia had chariots are generally discounted, such assertions continue to be made including the recent PRC publication Chung-kuo chϋn-shih-shih, Vol. 3Ping-fa, p. 5.

29. See Appendix A for an annotated discussion of the introduction and history of the chariot in China.

30. See the discussion of military organization in Appendix E for further information and references.

31. The Ssu-ma Fa discusses the practice and objectives of holding such hunts, and they are mentioned in a number of the other Seven Military Classics as well as in the Tso chuan and the “Ta Ssu-ma” section of the Chou li. (See the translator's introduction and notes to the Ssu-ma Fa translation for further information.) Also see Ping-fa pp. 32-33; Yen I-p'ing, “Yin Shang ping-chih,” p. 40; and Hsϋ Hsi-ch'en, “Chou-tai ping-chih ch'u-lun,” p. 10.

    The difficulty in attaining the required chariot skills and their expense are cited by some historians as the critical factors that made the rise of infantry units inevitable. Conscripts, whatever their class orgin, simply could not be trained in the time available. For example, see Yang K'uan, "Ch'un-ch'iu Chan-kuo-chien feng-chien te chϋnshih tsu-chih ho chan-cheng te pien-hua,” Li-shih chiao-hsϋeh4 (1954), p. 12.

32. One tradition asserts that the Chou were descendants of the Hsia, whereas modern scholars such as K. C. Chang postulate that the peoples of the “Three Dynasties” were culturally and racially alike but politically distinct. (See K. C. Chang, “Sandai Archaeology and the Formation of States in Ancient China: Processual Aspects of the Origins of Chinese Civilization,” in The Origins of Chinese Civilization [ed. David N. Keightley], pp. 495–521; and Chang, Shang Civilization,pp. 348-355.)

33. The Chou's “barbarian” origin was generally recognized in antiquity, and the Shih chi explicitly records Tan Fu—the Chou progenitor—as deliberately abandoning nomadic ways after his people resettled with him in the south to avoid conflict with other barbarbians. (See the “Chou Annals.” Further discussion is found in the translator's introductoin to the translation of the Six Secret Teachings.)

34. King Chou of the Shang was persuaded by opulent bribes not only to release the future King Wen from detainment but also to name him “Lord of the West.” Under this title he was entrusted with responsiblity for defending Shang's flank and thereby afforded an excellent pretext for developing and exercising his own military powers. (See the translator's introduction to the Six Secret Teachings for additional information.)

35. It is generally thought that speed, mobility, and surprise marked the Chou campaign, with the chariot playing a key role. However, there are dissenting views, such as Hsu and Linduff (Western Chou Civilization, p. 88), who consider other factors more important (such as the effective deployment of infantry, longer swords, and superior armor [see Hsu and Linduff, p. 8]). For further discussion, see the translator's introduction to the Six Secret Teachings and Appendix A.

36. According to the Shih chi,, the Shang had a one-hundred-thousand-man campaign army in the south, which could have amounted to a third or more of their total available forces and perhaps included some of their best units. King Chou of the Shang compounded his difficulties by ignoring repeated warnings about the potential danger posed by Chou and notice of their actual advance. (Numbers from this period are extremely unreliable and should only be understood as indicative or comparative size.)

37. Because the antiquity of the Six Secret Teachings is almost universally denied, it seems possible that this revolutionary impulse may have been directed toward the imperial Ch'in by writers very late in the Warring States period. Their hatred of the brutal Ch'in would account for the ferocity of the policies, with such fervor being envisioned in the heroes of the ancient Chou as they gambled everything to overturn the vile despot. Wheter the combatants observed and civilizing rites (such as in the early Spring and Autumn period) in the centuries prior to the battle at Mu-yeh is doubtful, but the traditional view assumes that they did. (This is discussed further in the translators's introduction to the translation of the Six Secret Teachings.)

38. See Edward L. Shaughnessy, “‘New’ Evidence on the Zhou Conquest,” pp. 66-67.

39. Herrlee G. Creel's classic work, The Origins of Statecraft in China, still contains the most extensive reconstruction and discussion of these measures as well as of the Chou military. However, also see Hsu and Linduff, Western Chou Civilization.

40. See Hsu and Linduff, Western Chou Civilization,pp. 113-119; and Tu Cheng-sheng, “Lüeh-luh Yin i-min te tsao-yü yü ti-wei,” BIHP, Vol. 53, No. 4 (December 1982), pp. 661-709.

41. See Cho-yün Hsu's extensive analysis, Ancient China in Transition,Standford University Press, Stanford, 1965.

42. See the translator's introduction and notes to the Ssu-ma Fa translation. The emphasis on discipline and concerted action evident throughout the Seven Military Classics reflects this shift from the noble days of chariot warfare. (For additional discussion of the code of chivalry and its inevitable decline, see Frank A. Kierman, Jr., “Phases and Modes of Combat in Early China,” in Chinese Ways in Warfare [ed. Franz A. Kierman, Jr., and John K. Fairbank], Harvard University Press, Cambridge, 1974, pp. 27-66.)

43. This incident, as recorded in the Tso chuan for the first year of Duke Chao, has historical importance because it shows the “barbarian” enemy fighting soley as infantryment rather than mounted on horses or from chariots. In additions, the Chou's realization of the limitations of chariot warfare is clearly shown by the necessity they felt to abandon their own chariots and engage the enemy in confined valley terrain. The reluctance of at least one high official to relinquish his honored position as charioteer and descend to the state of a foot soldier (for which he was summarily executed) also illustrates the prevailing attitude even this late in the Spring and Autumn period. (See Legge's translation of the incident, The Chinese Classics: Volume V, The Ch'un Ts'ew with the Tso Chuen, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1872 [reprinted Chinhsüeh shu-chü, Taipei, 1968], p 579.) Wei Shu initiated the conversion and formulated a plan whose effectiveness was augmented by its deceptiveness. To confuse the enemy he deployed the combined chariot and accompanying infantry forces in an unusual, unbalanced formation, provoking the enemy's laughter and ridicule–until the Chin forces sprang into action and routed them. “Be deceptive” was a dictum clearly in the minds of commanders in this era, a century or two before Sun-tzu's Art of War. (For further discussion and analysis, see Ping-fa, p. 36, and the Wu-pei-chih 53, pp. 22B-24B.) As the infantry expanded, officers from the nobility were assigned to commonad then, and rank ws granted to everyone—regardless of status—for military achievement. Consequently, the status of the foot soldier improved dramatically, and although the old attitudes (which disdained foot assignment against the prestige of being assigned to the chariot) were never completely erased, their amelioration marked a significant change (see Ping-fa,p. 58).

    It should be noted that chariots were not employed at this time in such peripheral southeastern states as Wu and Yüeh. Initially, this might have been because of ignorance and unsuitable terrain, but even after they were taught the skills of chariot driving the tactics of warfare deployment, these and several other states fielded only infantry units. (For further discussion, see Appendix A and also Tu Cheng-sheng, “Chou-tai feng-chien chieh-t'i-hou te chϋn-cheng hsin-chih-hsü,” BIHP, Vol. 55, No. 1 [1984], pp. 74-75, 82-89; Ping-fa, p. 58; Yang K'uan, “Ch'un-ch'iu Chan-kuo-chien,” p. 11; and Yang Hung, Chung-kuo ku-ping-ch'i, p. 126.)

44. Another weapon, the chi probably began to appear in some numbers around this time. The chi, or “spear-tipped dagger-ax,” differed from the dagger-ax in one formidable aspect: It had a metal point at the top of the shaft to allow thrusting and stabbing. With the addition of this spear tip, the weapon could be used for an initial stabbing thrust, but if the target were missed, it could be pulled back or swung to catch the enemy with the knife-like horizontial blade. In the arly stages it was probably made from two separate bronze parts, which were secured to a pole; this has prompted some archaeologist to argue the chi has a longer history than is generally acknowledge. (After the wooden shaft had completely disintegrated, the two parts, which would be found separtely, would be misinterpreted as having come from two weapons—a dagger-ax and a spear—rather than being parts of an integrated, composite one.) However, it appears that the chi was primarily a foot soldier's weapon, perhaps developed to better equip them to attack chariots; thus it grew in popularity as infantry forces were augmented. In Shang tombs only ko (halberds, dagger-axes) are found, whereas Han excavations yield only chi, or spear-tipped dagger-axes. In the thousand years between the demise of the Shang and the flourishing of the Han, chi, were probably created in the early Chou or Spring and Autumn periods, gradually becoming more popular until proliferating the Warring States era. For detailed discussions, see Kuo Pao-chün, “Ko chi yü-lun,” pp. 313-326; Kuo Mo-jo, Chou ch'ing-t'ung-ch'iming-wen yen-chiu, Jenmin ch'u-pan-she, Shanghai, 1954, pp. 172-186; Ma Heng, “Ko chi chih yen-chiu,” pp. 745-753; Chou Wei, Chung-kuo ping-ch'i shih-kao, pp. 88-98; and Hayashi Minao, Chūgoku In-Shū jidai no buki, pp. 10-13 and 78-96.

    In an article examining a multiple-blade chi excavated from a Warring States tomb, Sun chi concludes that this sort of weapon was probably wielded by charioteers against foot soldiers and thus represented a response to the growth of infantry forces and their mounting threat to the chariot. (The attachment of knife blades to the wheel hubs served a similar functions, as his article discusses on p. 83.) This implies further questions about the evolution of contending with other chariots or infantrymen–to which answers are unavailable. See Sun Chi, “Yu-jen ch'e-wei yϋ to-ko-chi,” WW 1980, No. 12, 83-85.

45. See Appendix D for details and also note 55 below.

46. Some of these qualifications are recorded in Hsün-tzu and itemized in the Six Secret Teachings; further discussion is found in the footnotes to the translations.

47. The Seven Strong States of the Warring States period, identified by Liu Hsiang's classic list, were Ch'i, Yen, the Three Chin (Han, Chao, Wei), and the newly powerful, originally peripheral states of Ch'u and Ch'in. Wu and Yϋeh, two other so-called barbarin states, also emerged as significant forces.

48. The Ssu-ma Fa discusses the distinctions that mark the form and spirit of the civilian an militiary realms and advises against their becoming confused or intermixed. Most of the Seven Military Classic discusses the qualifications necessary for generalship, refelecting the rising concern with professionalism and a turning away from the preoccupation with moral qualifications found in the Tso chuan. Ironically, in earlier times the Shang and Chou kings as well as the local vassal lords not only governed their respective realms but also commanded the army exercised supreme military power. Over time they became divorced from the complexities of battle.

49. Strategic points, such as passes and major road intersections, were increasingly guarded and fortitfied. The norhtern states, such as Yen and Chao, sought to diminish the moblility of mounted nomadic forces by creating static defense systems (“walls”) along their lenghty, exposed borders. See Yang K'uan, “Ch'un-ch'iu Chan-kuo-chien feng-chien te chϋn-shih tsu-chih ho chan-sheng te pien-hua,” p. 12. Also note Arthur Waldron's work on “walls”; “The Problem of the Great Wall of China,” HJAS, vol. 43, No. 2 (1983), pp. 643-663; and The Great Wall of China: From History to Myth, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1990.

50. See Yang Hung, Cung-kuo ku-ping-ch'i, pp. 78-89. The Mohist were famous for their doctrine of not making distinctions in one's love for his fellow man. Under the direction of Mo-tzu (fl. 479-438 b.c.)—their founder and leader—they actively practiced their doctrine of opposing warfare, rusing to aid the defense of the besieged. See Robin D. S. Yates, “Siege Engines and Late Zhou Military Technolog,” in Explorations in the History of Science and Technology in China (ed. Li. Guohao et al.), Shanghai Chinese Classics Publishing House, Shanghai, 1982, pp. 409-451, for a discussion of the technology that appeared in this period. For the medieval period, which includeds the T'ang (the era of the Questions and Replies), see Herbert Franker, “Siege and Defense of Towns in Medieval China,” in Chinese Ways in Warfare, pp. 151-194.

51. Although early Chinese compound bows were extermely powerful, crossbows provided dramatically more formiddable firepower, their strength and effective killing range generally increased over ther centuries as their mechanisms were perfected. The earliest type was probably hand-cocked, using only arm strength. More powerful versions required leg strength, and the strongest used a rope attached to the waist to pull the sling back. (See Hsü Chung-shu, “I-she yü nu,” pp. 435-438.) By the end of Warring States period, crossbows had come into extensive use, although their strategic value was probably not exploited fully until the Han dynasty. Hand-held crossbows, which fired two bolts simultaneously, and repeating models (as well as repeating double-bolt models) dating from the Warring States period have now been excavated, reflecting the crossbow's technological sophistication and importance. (See Ch'en Yüeh-chϋn, “Chiang-ling Ch'u-mu ch'u-t'u shuang-shih ping-she lien-fa-nu yen-chiu,” WW 1990, No. 5, pp. 89-96.) Larger, winch-powered models mounted on chariots or carriages, also capable of shooting multiple bolts, are described in Six Secret Teachings and are discussed in the translation. (Also see Robin D.S. Yates, “Siege Engines and Late Zhou Military Technology,” pp. 432-443.)

    Tradition holds that the Yellow Emperor invented the crossbow, and Hsü Chung-shu, “I she yü nu chih su-yüan chi kuan-yü tz'u-lei ming-wu chih k'ao-shij,” pp. 417-418 and 438.) However, Hsü's classic view not withstanding, based on textual references and other linguistic evidence it appears the crossbow probably orginated outside the central states area of China, perhaps in Ch'u or the southwest. (See Jerry Norman and Tsu-lin Mei, “The Austroasiatics in Ancient South China: Some Lexical Evidence,” MS 32 [1976], pp. 293-294; Yang Hang, Ku-ping-ch'i, pp. 143-144; and Ch'en Yϋeh-chϋn, “Lien-fa-nu,” p. 96.) Remnants of crossbows with bronze trigger mechanisms have been found in tombs fom the middle Warring States period, prompting scholars such as Kao Chih-hsi to argue for a much earlier (indigenous) invention–probably in the Spring and Autumn period–using wooden components. (See Kao Chih-hsi, “Chi Ch'ang-sha, Ch'ang-te ch'u-t'u nu-ch te Chan-kuo-mu-chien-t'an yu-kuan nu-chi, kung-shih te chi-ke wen-t'i,” p. 96. Note that as of this writing, no pre-Warring States crossbows have been discovered. See Hayashi's Minao's extensive, although dated, summary, Chūgoku In-Shū jidai no buki, pp. 301-330.) The first recorded tactical use appears to have been at the battle of Ma-ling in 34 b.c., as depicted in the Shih-chi and the text of the Sun Pin's Ping-fa. The Spring and Autumn Annals of Wu and Yϋeh also contain numerous references to crossbows, but truly extensive employment probably began with the Han, who exploited their superior firepower and range.

52. See Appendix B for an annotated discussion of the cavalry in Chinese history.

53. The speed and mobility of the cavarly in all but the most impenetrable forest and marshes allowed the development of unorthodox tactics (ch'i) versus orthodox (cheng) methods. Although infantry forces can also be employed in unorthodox ways, an essential aspect of the unorthodox is its unexpectedness, its exploitation of surprise, for which the cavalry is ideally suited. Sun-tzu is generally credited with advancing the idea of the unorthodox, and it is extensively discussed and expanded in the Questions and Replies (based on actual employment by T'ang T'ai-tsung and General Li in decisive battles when they were struggling to establish the T'ang). The Six Secrets Teachings also analyzes the relatives methods for employing infantry, chariot, and cavalry forces.

54. Iron was used extensively for the agricultural implements—generally manufactured and distributed under government monopoly—during the Warring States period. The Japanese scholar Sekino Takeshi has advanced the idea that cheap, readily available, mass-produced iron swords provided Ch'in's conscripted infantry forces their great killing power. (Cf. Sekino Takeshi, “Chūgoku shoki bunka no ikkósatu—dótestsu katoki no kaimei ni yosete,”Shigaku zasshi vol.60, No. 10 [October 1951], pp. 867-907.) However, others strongly dispute his contention for a variety of reasons. First, the sword had always been a weapon of the nobility and was generally carried by officers rather than ordinary infantryment. (Cf. Noel Barnard, “Did the Swords Exist,” EC [1978-1979], pp.62-63.) They would naturally have perferred the familiar elegance of the bronze weapon overr the cruder iron sword. Second, bronze swords and complex metal-working technology (such as layering with different alloys) produced very sharp, fine weapons. Third, few iron swords have been unearthed—even from the famous tombs of Ch'in Shih-Huang-ti, where most of the warriors are armed with bronze rather than iron weapons. (Cf. Noel Barnard, “Did the Swords Exist,” p. 63; David N. Keightley, “Where Have All the Swords Gone?' EC 2 [1976], pp. 31-34.) Thus several scholars have concluded that the Han era marks the true ascension of iron weapons, with the bronze sword becoming an anachronism thereafter. (For a dissenting view, see Li Xueqin, Eastern Zhou and Qin Civilization,Yale Univeristy Press, New Haven, 1985, chapter entitled “Iron Objects,” pp. 315-329, who notes that China had cast iron, wrought iron, and steel by the Warring States era, which suggest a long prehistory in the Spring and Autumn period).

55. See Wu Ch'i's biography in the translator's introduction to the Wu-tzu translation.

56. The battle of Ma-ling is apparently the first recorded conflict in which crossbows were employed. (There are also different versions regarding who exercised ultimate command–P'ang Chϋan, who may have been killed at the earlier battle, or the imperial prince, who sallies forth with the home defense forces. General P'ang's character flaws and rashness were frequently cited by Chinese military analysts as evidence of the need for a constellation of virtues in any supreme commander.)

57. The complex process of analyzing language, concepts, and historical events to create a systematic textual chronology has been both complicated and simplified by the writings discovered in various tombs in recent decades. The detailed textual studies of Ch'ing dynasty scholars, although valuable for understanding the text themselves, have led to conclusions that must now be reexamined and revised. Discussions of the provenance of the individual Seven Military Classics are found in each translator's introduction. For general discussion, see Robin D. S. Yates, “New Light on Ancient Chinese Military Texts,” TP74 (1988), pp.211–248.

Abbreviations Used in the Notes

AA: Acta Asiatica

AM: Asia Major

BIHP: Bulletin of the Institue of History and Philology

BMFEA: Bulletin of the Museum of Far Eastern Antiquities

BSOAS: Bulletin of the School of Oriental and African Studies

CC: Chinese Culture

CCCY: Chin-chu chin-i editions

EC: Early China

GSR: Grammata Serica Recensa (Bernhard Karlgren, BMFEA 29 [1957])

HJAS: Harvard Journal of Asiatic Studies

JAOS: Journal of the American Oriental Society

JAS: Journal of Asian Studies

JCP: Journal of Chinese Philosophy

JNCBRAS: Journal of the North Central Brance, Royal Asiatic Society

KK: K'ao-ku hsϋeh-pao

MS: Monumenta Serica

PEW: Philosophy East and West

T'oung Pao

Wen-wu