SOURCE: Sawyer, Ralph D. and Mei-Chün Lee Sawyer. Introduction to The Complete Art of War, by Sun Tzu and Sun Pin, translated by Ralph D. Sawyer and Mei-Chün Lee Sawyer, pp. 1-36. Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1996.

[In the following essay, Sawyer and Sawyer offer historical background to Sun-Tzu's era and discuss the fundamentals of his writings.]

SUN TZU AND HIS ERA

THE SPRING AND AUTUMN PERIOD

The state of Chou, which had righteously overthrown the debauched Shang to found its own dynasty in 1045 b.c. upon an avowed foundation of moral virtue and benevolence, established its authority by dispatching royal clan groups to both enemy and unsettled domains. Within a few generations, however, the Chou began experiencing nomadic pressure in the north and west; therefore, the quest for allies, resources, and political strength had to be redirected toward the south and southeast. Several early Chou kings enthusiastically undertook military campaigns to the south with mixed results, and King Chao, the fifth to reign, even perished mysteriously, leading to the oft-repeated charge that the state of Ch'u had murdered him. While members of the ruling clans originally emigrated to these areas for defensive purposes, this southern offensive essentially became cultural in nature. The peoples around initial Chou enclaves gradually became sinicized, particularly as they acquired a taste and then need for Chou products and technologies. Numerous small states proudly claimed descent from one or another Chou royal family member, and most at least nominally allied themselves with the Chou, and later with the stronger northern states that emerged when Chou power visibly declined.

The Spring and Autumn period (722-481 b.c.) was characterized by great personalities, inescapable intrigue, murder, ever-expanding warfare, and the unfolding of astounding dramas in which entire states rose and perished, often at the whims of dominant individuals. It witnessed the rise of great families and their inevitable, often brutal conflict with the older ruling Chou nobility, as well as the destructive emergence of seven great states, each reputedly capable of fielding 10,000 chariots. By the early sixth century the state of Chin had already formed six armies, visibly usurping Chou royal prerogative, and could easily mobilize 75,000 men whenever necessary. (These same six armies, under the control of rival factions, would eventually sunder the state as the six ministerial families contended for ultimate authority.) Originally founded by the royal house of Chou, awesome Chin then abrogated the role of hegemon or de facto ruler under the legitimized guise of sustaining Chou rule and coerced the other states into formally recognizing and even sanctifying its prestigious role.

Although the central states vigorously contended among themselves for relative supremacy, they retained a joint sense of identity, consciously distinguishing themselves from the uncivilized “barbarian” areas and peoples. Consequently, with both disdain and trepidation they observed the rapid development of the wild southern areas where the states of Ch'u (an important stimulant to Sun-tzu's thought), Wu (home to Sun-tzu's activities), and Yüeh (Wu's nemesis) were forming. They also feared the ever less submissive state of Ch'in in the old Chou heartland. The south was not only different but also enjoyed distinct advantages, including a warmer, more productive climate; abundant aquatic resources; and extensive rivers, lakes, mountains, and dense forests. A natural bastion that frequently rendered chariot-centered warfare useless, the terrain discouraged invasions from the north while compelling the development of naval forces. These inland navies capitalized upon the indigenous skills that had evolved to exploit the Yangtze, Han, and Huai rivers, the numerous lakes, and the expansive marshes.

The powerful state of Wu claimed an antiquity even greater than the Chou itself, supposedly having been founded by the eldest son of an early Chou ancestor. Because much of it occupied an alluvial plain formed by the Yangtze River, Wu lacked anything more than small hills, and approximately 15 percent of its area was wet, consisting of marshes, rivers, lakes, and ponds. (These natural obstacles probably stimulated Sun-tzu's development of terrain-based tactical principles.) Before Sun-tzu assumed his advisory role, the contiguous states of Wu and Ch'u had been fighting for more than fifty years. While Ch'u was initially strong, as the decades passed Wu commenced increasingly aggressive actions, forcing Ch'u to undertake massive defensive preparations, including the construction of walled cities and other fortifications, beginning around 538 b.c. Wu also benefited from Ch'u's tendency to brutally suppress minority peoples and the smaller states in the region, easily finding numerous allies and local support among them. By exploiting the sense of common identity fostered by confronting a mutual enemy, Wu was able to draw upon them for material support, local guides, and field intelligence, an important element in Sun-tzu's overall doctrine.

Being a young state, Wu was marked by a growing self-consciousness but still generally governed by dynamic leaders who largely avoided the pitfalls of extravagance and debauchery. Instead of exploiting or exhausting the people, its kings fostered policies to nurture them, increase the population, and stimulate productivity. Consequently, throughout their numerous military campaigns Wu's warriors were courageous and energetic, endured great hardship, and often turned defeat into victory. Their leadership was also more unified than in other states, perhaps accounting for the army's flexibility and ability to respond quickly. Moreover, because their forces would be outnumbered in virtually every clash with Ch'u's armies, Wu's leaders had to develop imaginative tactics and consistently avoid frontal, brute-force assaults that could decimate their troops, an approach reflected in Sun-tzu's emphasis upon maneuver warfare and avoiding direct confrontations with superior enemies. Wu's attacks stressed speed and mobility, frequently employed deceit and clever stratagems, and focused upon frustrating the enemy's plans and movements—all cardinal principles in the Art of War.

Conversely, Wu also mounted such formidable defenses that Ch'u's armies frequently could not discover any weakness to exploit. Clearly, Wu's pre-Sun-tzu efforts exemplified and perhaps furnished the historical basis for several pivotal teachings from the Art of War, including: “Subjugating the enemy's army without fighting is the true pinnacle of excellence. The strategy for employing the army is not to rely on their not coming, but to depend upon us having the means to await them. Do not rely on them not attacking, but depend upon us having an unassailable position. When someone excels at defense the enemy does not know where to attack. If I do not want to engage in combat, even though I merely draw a line upon the ground and defend it, they will not be able to engage me in battle because we thwart his movements.”

In the first year of King Ho-lü's reign, after some years of preparation, Wu moved its capital to Ku-su near modern Su-chou. The new capital, erected on the Chou model with inner and outer fortified walls, furnishes clear evidence of the effectiveness of Wu's bureaucratic administration, as well as its material resources and planning capabilities. The city was immense, with the inner wall's perimeter reportedly measuring 30 kilometers and the outer wall stretching 50 kilometers. Constructed at the edge of Lake T'ai Hu, it was sited along the first section of an eventual network of extensive canals that were to prove of great significance in Chinese history. Ostensibly developed to transport grain and nurture trade, this first canal section was primarily strategic, designed to facilitate the movement of troops northward.

Commencing with Ho-lü's third year, Wu launched a series of nearly annual attacks against Ch'u, always emerging victorious. With each attack it subjugated additional Ch'u client states, sometimes permanently absorbing them, at other times merely freeing them from the yoke of dominance. At the same time, Wu sought to ensure that any of the smaller, powerful states that might mount a surprise attack on its homeland—should it mobilize to undertake a far-reaching campaign—had its military potential negated through preemptive aggressive action. Wu also mounted its first strike in the lengthy, eventually fatal conflict with Yüeh in 510 b.c.; thereafter, astutely fearing Yüeh's great military potential, King Ho-lü had Wu's already extensive fortifications strengthened and expanded in order to encompass all the populace. In 509 b.c. Ch'u finally decided to attempt an attack against Wu, only to be repelled and suffer the loss of additional towns.

Meanwhile, Wu had deliberately adopted a strategy of temporizing and harassment in order to enervate Ch'u and dissipate its resources. Dividing its forces into three field armies, Wu dispatched each in turn to engage the enemy without becoming involved in protracted battles or decisive confrontations. Mobility was equally emphasized in effecting a long-term campaign that not only had physical objectives but also focused on disrupting Ch'u's command, sowing doubt and dissension, and frustrating its leadership until Ch'u would become simply incapable of coping with Wu's threats.

The strategy of mounting a marauding campaign was ostensibly chosen to allow Wu's forces time to rest and rebuild, as well as to undermine and weaken the enemy. However, Ch'u's overwhelming might and the largely impenetrable nature of its state also dictated the need to avoid headlong confrontations in which Wu would inevitably be decimated. Wu was therefore forced to contemplate employing confined terrain to its tactical advantage, to spread the enemy out, to choose its objectives carefully, and to suddenly concentrate its forces where unexpected—all principles found in Sun-tzu's Art of War, which itself emphasizes segmenting and combining, changing and transforming when necessary: “The army is established by deceit, moves for advantage, and changes through segmenting and reuniting. Thus its speed is like the wind, its slowness like the forest; its invasion and plundering like a fire; unmoving, it is like the mountains. It is as difficult to know as the darkness; in movement it is like thunder.”

SUN-TZU'S LIFE AND ACHIEVEMENTS

Space does not permit recounting the battles prior to Sun-tzu's appearance nor analyzing the brilliant campaign of 506 b.c. against Ch'u, although in virtually all of them Wu seized the initiative, manipulated Ch'u's armies, and employed deceit and unorthodox tactics extensively. Wu's experience turned talented generals into effective commanders and unified the soldiers behind a king who willingly shared every hardship with them. Conversely, Ch'u increasingly antagonized its allies and the subordinate states upon whom it might have drawn; debilitated its people; and oriented itself toward self-destruction.

Vestiges of Sun-tzu's dramatic life and involvement in the events of his era are preserved in two similar biographies, one embodied in the Shih Chi, famous throughout Asia as China's first true history and a great literary masterpiece, the other in the Wu Yüeh Ch'un-ch'iu. The latter recounts a more interesting version of Sun-tzu's career and experiences:

In the third year of King Ho-lü's reign, Wu's generals wanted to attack Ch'u, but no action was taken. Wu Tzu-hsü and Po P'i spoke with each other: “We nurture officers and make plans on behalf of the king. These strategies will be advantageous to the state, and for this reason the king should attack Ch'u. But he has put off issuing the orders and does not have any intention of mobilizing the army. What should we do?”

After a while the King of Wu queried Wu Tzu-hsü and Po P'i: “I want to send forth the army. What do you think?” Wu Tzu-hsü and Po P'i replied: “We would like to receive the order.” The King of Wu secretly thought that the two of them harbored great enmity for Ch'u and was deeply afraid that they would take the army out only to be exterminated. He mounted his tower, faced into the southern wind, and groaned. After a while he sighed. None of his ministers understood the king's thoughts. Wu Tzu-hsü secretly realized the king would not decide, so he recommended Sun-tzu to him.

Sun-tzu, whose name was Wu, was a native of Wu. He excelled at military strategy but dwelled in secrecy far away from civilization, so ordinary people did not know of his ability. Wu Tzu-hsü, himself enlightened, wise, and skilled in discrimination, knew Sun-tzu could penetrate and destroy the enemy. One morning when he was discussing military affairs he recommended Sun-tzu seven times. The King of Wu said: “Since you have found an excuse to advance this officer, I want to have him brought in.” He questioned Sun-tzu about military strategy, and each time that he laid out a section of his book the king couldn't praise him enough.

Greatly pleased, he inquired: “If possible, I would like a minor test of your military strategy.” Sun-tzu said: “It is possible. We can conduct a minor test with women from the inner palace.” The king said, “I agree.”

Sun-tzu said: “I would like to have two of Your Majesty's beloved concubines act as company commanders, each to direct a company.” He ordered all 300 women to wear helmets and armor, to carry swords and shields, and stand. He instructed them in military methods, that in accord with the drum they should advance, withdraw, go left or right, or turn around. He had them know the prohibitions and then ordered, “At the first beating of the drum you should all assemble, at the second drumming you should advance with your weapons, and at the third deploy into military formation.” At this the palace women all covered their mouths and laughed.

Sun-tzu then personally took up the sticks and beat the drum, giving the orders three times, and explaining them five times. They laughed as before. Sun-tzu saw that the women laughed continuously and wouldn't stop. Sun-tzu was enraged, his eyes suddenly opened wide, his sound was like a terrifying tiger, his hair stood on end under his cap, and his neck broke the tassels at the side. He said to the Master of Laws, “Get the executioner's axes.”

Sun-tzu then said: “If the instructions are not clear, if the explanations and orders are not trusted, it is the general's offense. When they have already been instructed three times, and the orders explained five times, if the troops still do not perform, it is the fault of the officers. According to the rescripts for military discipline, what is the procedure?” The Master of Laws said: “Decapitation!” Sun-tzu then ordered the beheading of the two company commanders, the king's favorite concubines.

The King of Wu ascended his platform to observe just when they were about to behead his beloved concubines. He had an official hasten down to them with orders to say: “I already know the general is able to command forces. Without these two concubines my food will not be sweet. It would be appropriate not to behead them.”

Sun-tzu said: “I have already received my commission as commanding general. According to the rules for generals, when I, as a general, am in command of the army, even though you issue orders to me, I do not have to accept them.” He then had them beheaded.

He again beat the drum, and the women went left and right, advanced and withdrew, and turned around in accord with the prescribed standards without daring to blink an eye. The two companies were silent, not daring to look around. Thereupon Sun-tzu reported to the King of Wu: “The army is already well ordered. I would like Your Majesty to observe them. However you might want to employ them, even sending them forth into fire and water, will not present any difficulty. They can be used to settle All under Heaven.”

The King of Wu was suddenly displeased. He said: “I know that you excel at employing the army. Even though I can thereby become a hegemon, there is no place to exercise them. General, please dismiss the army and return to your dwelling. I am unwilling to act further.”

Sun-tzu said: “Your Majesty only likes the words; he isn't able to realize their substance.” Wu Tzu-hsü remonstrated: “I have heard that the army is an inauspicious affair and cannot be wantonly tested. Thus if one forms an army but does not go forth to launch a punitive attack, then the military Tao will be unclear. Now if Your Majesty sincerely seeks talented officers and wants to mobilize the army to execute the brutal state of Ch'u, become hegemon of All under Heaven, and overawe the feudal lords, if you do not employ Sun-tzu as your general, who can ford the Huai, cross the Ssu, and traverse a thousand kilometers to engage in battle?”

Thereupon the King of Wu was elated. He had the drum beaten to convene the army's staff, assembled the troops, and attacked Ch'u. Sun-tzu took Shu, killing the two renegade Wu generals, Princes Kai-yu and Chu-yung.

The Shih Chi succinctly summarizes Sun-tzu's achievements: “To the West the king defeated the powerful state of Ch'u and advanced into Ying. To the north the king overawed Ch'i and Chin and manifested his name among the feudal lords. This was due to Sun-tzu imparting power to him.”

If Sun-tzu's biography is at all credible, it would seem reasonable, as claimed by traditionalist scholars, that he was entrusted with overall command of Wu's military forces for the purpose of effecting their reorganization and training. From the Art of War and other military classics it is clear that even at this early date, approximately 509 b.c., small-unit organization, segmentation, articulation, and maneuver were all primary objectives of military preparation, furnishing the basis for implementing complex battlefield tactics, while massive infantry forces were beginning to appear, supplemented by chariots for open-terrain engagements whenever feasible. In contrast, the armies found in the north were centered upon the chariot, with infantry forces supplementing them, although the latter became the central tactical element as time progressed and tactics evolved during the Spring and Autumn period. In the campaign against Ch'u that eventually reached its capital of Ying, Wu's three armies totaled 33,600 highly disciplined, well-organized combat soldiers capable of following orders and executing tactics.

Sun-tzu himself remains an enigma, not only because of the absence of historical data in the so-called authentic texts of the period but also because his life never generated the anecdotes and illustrative stories frequently found about famous figures in the works of succeeding periods. His background and early history are completely unknown, and despite recently uncovered materials it remains unclear whether he was born in the state of Wu or Ch'i and whether he had studied military strategy or served in any sort of command capacity before venturing to instruct the king of Wu. The dramatic way in which he illustrated his theories about military organization and discipline with 300 of the king's concubines, and thereby received his appointment, may well be apocryphal. Although he is never mentioned in any recorded source as having sole command of the troops, following Wu's conquest of Ying, the capital of Ch'u, his name completely disappears. Perhaps he realized the difficulty of surviving under the unstable political conditions of his time, or feared he would be executed by the new king, Fu-ch'ai, after becoming entangled in the ever-present political machinations, and set an example for later ages by retiring to obscurity, leaving his work behind. Many theories have been vociferously advanced to explain this invisibility; however, chief among them is that most of the credit that was rightly his was attributed to his mentor, Wu Tzu-hsü, because the latter was more prominent and his life, a living melodrama writ large, provided a natural focal point for tales of intrigue and portraits of achievement. Remarkably, some scholars deny Sun-tzu's very existence, advancing the theory that he and Wu Tzu-hsü were identical, one and the same individual.

SUN PIN AND HIS ERA

THE WARRING STATES PERIOD

Military tactics, being founded upon historical antecedents, formulated in terms of contemporary concepts, focused upon perceived capabilities, and directed toward achieving political objectives, are inescapably the product of specific environments. Battlefield evolution stimulates further developments, as may be clearly seen in the influence that the Warring States period had on Sun Pin's Military Methods in comparison with Sun-tzu's Art of War.

The Warring States period (403-221 b.c.) is aptly named because it witnessed almost interminable strife among the surviving feudal states as they strived to strengthen themselves through internal reforms and the forcible annexation of their neighbors. Unlike the Spring and Autumn period, in which a semblance of civility and vestiges of restraint had persisted under the nominal aegis of the impotent Chou king, by the Warring States period power alone had come to dictate policy and relations. While four mighty entities (Chin, Ch'u, Ch'i, and Yüeh) had dominated the realm late in the Spring and Autumn period, by the early Warring States period Chin's powerful clans had rent it asunder, producing the three smaller though still formidable states of Han, Wei, and Chao—also termed the “Three Chin”—plus a minor remnant briefly maintained by the old Chin royal house. Yüeh, on the eastern coast, began the period as a respected power because it had extinguished Wu, but doomed by internal discord, it was gradually subjugated by Ch'u, which completed its conquest in 306 b.c. To the north, Yen emerged as a capable but relatively weak state, while Ch'in, which eventually vanquished all the major powers and exterminated the remaining minor ones to formally proclaim the Ch'in dynasty in 221 b.c., aggressively nurtured its power base in Chou's original territory from early in the fourth century.

Four of the era's so-called “seven powerful states”—Han, Wei, Chao, and Ch'i—were crucial participants in the events around Sun Pin, while Ch'in, ever-strengthening in the west, perpetually cast an ominous shadow over the unfolding events. Despite (or because of) the incessant warfare, it was an era of remarkable intellectual ferment as the often beleaguered rulers vigorously struggled to unify their states, impose centralized control, and establish the material prosperity necessary to sustain prolonged military campaigns. Widely diverse viewpoints and policies were espoused, although they all essentially focused upon employing capable individuals, creating effective administration, improving agriculture, and expanding the military through better organization, training, and selection. Unlike in the Spring and Autumn period, when feudal rulers were still sufficiently entrenched to feel unthreatened, in the Warring States period creative thinkers (such as Confucius) could no longer be ignored or merely tolerated. In the instability of the Warring States period a single individual, such as Shang Yang, sometimes played the key role in revitalizing an otherwise moribund state, often against virtually overwhelming opposition from privileged interests. In other instances a succession of “Worthies” or a propitious conjunction of talents persuaded a ruler to forge ahead by implementing revolutionary measures.

Military organization strengthened considerably in the Warring States period as both campaign and standing armies expanded. It was not just augmented numbers, however, but rather a dramatic increase in the basic qualifications and expertise of the soldiers that had the greatest impact. Infantry development peaked and the cavalry was introduced, although the latter was not a factor—if it even existed—in the two famous battles linked with Sun Pin's name, Kuei-ling and Ma-ling. A second major difference from the Spring and Autumn period was the imposition of year-round service and fixed periods of duty, rather than just assembling semi-skilled forces to supplement the warrior nobility during appropriate seasonal mobilizations and training. The early military writings frequently contain injunctions against violating the seasons, and many historic campaigns were in fact initiated in the fall, the season of death, but when prolonged engagements began to require from six months to a year, seasonal concerns obviously became moot. Rigorous training and discipline invariably became the norm in the Warring States period, with the soldiers being taught not only weapons skills but also numerous formations such as described in the Military Methods. With their troops acquiring articulation, segmentation, and maneuver capabilities, generals could configure their deployments to the terrain and the enemy's disposition. As the Warring States period progressed and campaign armies routinely exceeded 100,000 troops, most states imposed a form of the mutual responsibility system in which rewards and punishments were severe, and defeat, the loss of a comrade, or cowardice normally punished by death. Naturally, the soldiers' responsiveness to orders still depended upon the difficulty of the task confronting them coupled with the strictness of their commander. It is unlikely, however, that discipline was lax in any army during the period, because defeat meant death at the hands of the enemy. Capturing prisoners was no longer a priority; destroying enemy forces had become paramount.

In the Warring States period the infantry became the primary force, displacing the chariot and outmoding old-style engagements between chariot-mounted nobles. However, chariot-centered units remained significant and on reasonably level terrain they could provide a formidable penetrating force, especially when deployed against unprotected infantry arrays. Designated combat platoons would provide close support for advancing chariots, protecting them from flank attacks by enemy infantrymen, but could also be detached to act as an independent ground force and supplement the regular infantry regiments. Within the limits of terrain-imposed constraints, the commander could select and employ an appropriate mix of chariot, infantry, and (eventually) cavalry forces. Mobility is historically identified with the cavalry, but a thousand chariots could rapidly deploy at least as many bowmen, as well as a thousand warriors armed with shock weapons, assuming the driver remained with the team. In both of Sun Pin's battles with Wei, P'ang Chüan's disorganized forces rushed onto the battlefield, presumably led by their chariots and accompanied by fleet infantry running on foot, to confront an established, well-entrenched enemy with prepared defenses. From Military Methods it appears that Sun Pin did not employ either the chariots or cavalry as a mobile force in the actual conflict, deploying them instead as fixed elements. Especially on the more open terrain of Kuei-ling, he may well have used the chariots as war wagons (perhaps like John Zizka) or constructed temporary fortifications from them.

SUN PIN'S LIFE AND CONFLICTS

Virtually every traditional source identifies Sun Pin as Sun-tzu's lineal descendant, although the actual relationship may well have been somewhat less direct. Several family trees have been suggested, but they are all dubious reconstructions that naturally ignore the possibility that Sun-tzu himself may not have existed. The common view identifies Sun Pin as Sun-tzu's grandson, but since more than a century separates their active years, “great grandson” or even “great great grandson” is more likely. Assuming that Sun Pin would have been at least twenty-five during the unfolding of the Kuei-ling campaign in 354 to 353 b.c. yields a projected birthdate of approximately 380 b.c., consistent with a statement in the Shih Chi placing him more than a century after Sun-tzu.

Even though he enjoys a joint biography with Sun-tzu in the Shih Chi, virtually nothing is known about Sun Pin's life and background apart from the incidents preserved in this account. Several scholarly and popular editions published in the past decade have recently supplied surprisingly embellished biographies for Sun Pin, but essentially they all derive from inferences based upon the Shih Chi and a few brief references in other writings associated with the period. Sun Pin's life and accomplishments, as reprised by Ssu-ma Ch'ien some two centuries after his death, unfold as follows:

About a hundred years after Sun-tzu died there was Sun Pin. Sun Pin was born between Ah and Chüan in Ch'i and was a direct descendant of Sun-tzu. Sun Pin had once studied military strategy together with P'ang Chüan. P'ang Chüan was already serving in the state of Wei, having obtained an appointment as one of King Hui's generals. Realizing that his abilities did not come up to Sun Pin, he secretly had an emissary summon Sun Pin. When Pin arrived, P'ang Chüan feared that he was a greater Worthy than himself, and envied him. By manipulating the laws, he managed to have him sentenced to the punishment of having his feet amputated and his face branded, wanting to thereby keep him hidden so that he would not be seen by the king.

An emissary from the state of Ch'i arrived at Liang in Wei. Sun Pin, who was banished from the court because of his punishment, secretly had an audience with him and exercised his persuasion. Ch'i's emissary found him to be remarkable and clandestinely brought him back to Ch'i in his carriage. T'ien Chi, Ch'i's commanding general, regarded him well and treated him as an honored guest.

T'ien Chi frequently gambled heavily on linked horse races with the princes. Sun Pin observed that the fleetness of his horses did not differ much from theirs. The horses had three grades—upper, middle, and lower. Thereupon Sun Pin said to T'ien Chi: “My lord should bet again for I am able to make you win.” T'ien Chi trusted him and wagered a thousand gold coins with the king and princes. When they approached the time for the contest Sun Pin then said: “Put your lowest team of horses against their best; your best team against their middle one; and your middle team against their lowest one.” When the three teams raced, T'ien Chi lost one race but won two, so that in the end he gained the king's thousand gold coins. T'ien Chi then introduced Sun Pin to King Wei. King Wei questioned him about military affairs and appointed him as a strategist.

Thereafter the state of Wei attacked Chao. Chao was sorely pressed and requested aid from Ch'i. King Wei of Ch'i wanted to appoint Sun Pin as commanding general, but Pin respectfully declined, saying: “It is not possible for a man who has been mutilated by punishment.” Thereupon the king appointed T'ien Chi as commanding general and Sun Pin as strategist. Pin traveled in a screened carriage, making plans while seated.

T'ien Chi wanted to lead the army into Chao, but Sun Pin said: “Now one who would untie confused and tangled cords does not strike at them with clenched fists. One who would disengage two combatants does not strike them with a halberd. While they stand opposed to each other you should hit their vacuities. Then as their dispositions counter each other and their strategic power is blocked, the difficulty will be resolved by itself. Now Wei and Chao are attacking each other, so Wei's light troops and elite soldiers must certainly all be deployed outside their state, with only the old and weak remaining within it. Wouldn't it be better to lead the troops on a forced march to Ta-liang, occupying their roads and striking their newly vacuous points? They will certainly release Chao in order to rescue themselves. Thus with one move we will extricate Chao from its encirclement and reap the benefits of Wei's exhaustion.” T'ien Chi followed his plan, and Wei did indeed abandon Han-tan, engaging Ch'i in battle at Kuei-ling. Ch'i extensively destroyed Wei's army.

Thirteen years later Wei and Chao attacked the state of Han. Han reported the extremity of its situation to Ch'i. Ch'i ordered T'ien Chi to take command and go forth, proceeding straight to Ta-liang. When General P'ang Chüan of Wei heard about T'ien Chi's thrust to Ta-liang, he abandoned his attack on Han and embarked on his return. Ch'i's army had already passed by and was proceeding to the west. Sun Pin said to T'ien Chi: “The soldiers of the Three Chin (Han, Wei, and Chao) are coarse, fearless and courageous, and regard Ch'i lightly. Ch'i has been termed cowardly. One who excels in warfare relies upon his strategic power and realizes advantages from leading the enemy where he wants. As the Art of War notes, ‘One who races 100 kilometers in pursuit of profit will suffer the destruction of his foremost general; one who races 50 kilometers in pursuit of profit will arrive with only half his army.’ Have our army of Ch'i, upon entering Wei's borders, light 100,000 cooking fires. Tomorrow make 50,000, and again the day after tomorrow start 30,000 cooking fires.”

P'ang Chüan, after advancing three days, greatly elated, said: “Now I truly know that Ch'i's army is terrified. They have been within our borders only three days, but more than half the officers and soldiers have deserted.” Thereupon he abandoned his infantry and covered double the normal day's distance with only light, elite units in pursuit of them. Sun Pin, estimating his speed, determined that he would arrive at Ma-ling at dusk.

The road through Ma-ling was narrow, and to the sides there were numerous gullies and ravines where troops could be set in ambush. There he chopped away the bark on a large tree until it showed white and wrote on it, “P'ang Chüan will die beneath this tree.”

Then he ordered 10,000 skilled crossbowmen to wait in ambush on both sides, instructing them: “At dusk, when you see a fire, arise and shoot together.” In the evening P'ang Chüan indeed arrived beneath the debarked tree. He saw the white trunk with the writing, struck a flint, and lit a torch. He had not finished reading the message when 10,000 crossbowmen fired en masse. Wei's army fell into chaos and mutual disorder. P'ang Chüan knew his wisdom was exhausted and his army defeated, so he cut his own throat, saying: “I have established this clod's fame!” Ch'i then took advantage of the victory to completely destroy their army and returned home with Imperial Prince Shen of Wei as prisoner. Because of this Sun Pin's name became known throughout the realm, and generations have transmitted his Military Methods.

This dramatic biography no doubt found strong echoes in Ssu-ma Ch'ien, for both had endured the humiliation of corporal punishment yet survived to achieve fame and greatness.

Neither T'ien Chi nor Sun Pin are mentioned as having any active role in Ch'i's military or government after the battle of Ma-ling, although their earlier reputations had spread even among enemy states. Because Military Methods contains references to battles subsequent to Ma-ling but not after the turn of the century, there is a slight possibility (assuming such references are not simply additions by disciples) that Sun Pin may have survived until roughly 305 or 300 b.c., when he would have been nearly eighty. However, evidence is similarly lacking as to whether he played an ongoing role as a tactical adviser or simply remained in the obscurity of retirement.

CONCEPTS AND PRINCIPLES IN THE SUN FAMILY MILITARY WRITINGS

Sun-tzu's Art of War, as transmitted through the ages, consists of thirteen chapters of varying length, each ostensibly focused upon a specific topic. While most contemporary Chinese military scholars continue to characterize the entire work as an organic whole marked by the logical progression and development of themes from start to finish, obvious relationships between supposedly connected passages are frequently difficult to determine or simply nonexistent. However, the major concepts generally receive frequent, consistent treatment throughout, supporting the attribution of the book to a single figure or well-integrated school of thought.

Because the Art of War is remarkably lucid, if compressed and sometimes enigmatic, only a minimal introduction, supplemented by an extensive index to the major concepts, principles, and tactics, need be undertaken here. In contrast, insofar as Sun Pin's Military Methods is badly fragmented and the recovered passages tend to focus on concrete issues rather than general principles, a brief overview of the main concepts and fundamental tactics, in conjunction with somewhat more extensive chapter commentaries, may prove beneficial. Although disagreement continues about whether the two halves of the Military Methods should be considered a single work, the analysis that follows treats all thirty-one original chapters as an integral work, the product of Sun Pin's school of thought, if not Sun Pin himself. Moreover, because he founded most of his concepts and many of his tactics upon Sun-tzu's Art of War, the individual commentaries provide further explications of their respective viewpoints.

FUNDAMENTALS

WARFARE AS THE GREATEST AFFAIR OF STATE

As already mentioned, by Sun-tzu's era the practice and scope of warfare had evolved sufficiently to endanger the existence of virtually every state, large and small alike. Many had already perished; innumerable ruling families had been extinguished and their peoples subjugated; and others tenuously survived only through adroit political maneuvering and servile submission. Accordingly, amid the turmoil of the late Spring and Autumn period Sun-tzu felt that mobilizing the nation for war, committing the army to battle, and risking the state's destruction could only be undertaken with the greatest gravity. The very opening words of the Art of War stress the critical importance of warfare: “Warfare is the greatest affair of state, the basis of life and death, the Way to survival or extinction. It must be thoroughly pondered and analyzed.”

Unlike historical incidents in which kings committed troops to battle over a few mulberry trees, or policies advanced by the Legalists in which military measures were viewed simply as another instrument for increasing the wealth and prosperity of the state, Sun-tzu stressed that warfare should not be undertaken unless the state is threatened. Moreover, haste, fear of being labeled a coward, and personal emotions such as anger and hatred should never be permitted to adversely influence state and command decision making. The army must not be rashly thrown into an engagement, thrust into a war, or unnecessarily mobilized. Instead, restraint should be exercised while—if threatened but incapable of mounting a victorious response—effecting measures to ensure that the army cannot be defeated.

Sun Pin similarly believed warfare to be of paramount importance, critical to a state's survival in the predatory environment of the Warring States period. Moreover, perhaps in reaction to expansionist activities and new political views that advocated mounting aggressive campaigns in a quest for profits, Military Methods equally stresses that wars should not be undertaken except when unavoidable, never pursued for pleasure or profit. After pondering the course of human history and the comparative nature of man and animals, however, Sun Pin concluded that conflict had arisen in the mists of antiquity, was inherent to the human condition, and remained unavoidable. Despite the greatest efforts, armed clashes continued to escalate because Virtue, while fundamental and essential (as propounded by the Confucians), proved inadequate for mastering evil even during the period of the legendary Sage Emperors, China's incomparable paragons.

The corollary to this existential emphasis on warfare is avoiding debilitating conflicts that vitiate the state and perhaps create easily exploitable opportunities for third parties. Much of Sun-tzu's second chapter, “Waging War,” is devoted to arguing against protracted warfare because the economic consequences rapidly become extreme. Furthermore, protracted warfare enervates the state and erodes its will to fight (as the Vietnam conflict did in America), even when the people are united with their ruler. Other writers of the Warring States era echoed Sun-tzu's theme, all mirroring his emphasis upon swiftness and decisiveness—a fundamental underpinning for all his tactics—although several, including Sun Pin, shifted his enjoinder from protracted campaigns to frequent conflicts, pointing out that numerous battles, even victories, ultimately exhaust both the army and state, inevitably culminating in disaster.

Underlying Sun-tzu's grand strategy—and that of virtually all military writers thereafter, including Sun Pin—is the assumption that the state will nurture a prosperous, contented populace whose willing allegiance to their ruler is unquestioned. This notion in fact is the sole lesson of the tomb text entitled “King of Wu's Questions,” in which Sun-tzu concludes that the factions that tax their people the least, and thus stimulate economic prosperity, will prevail in the internecine strife then brewing in the powerful state of Chin. Subsequently, Sun Pin pointedly advised King Wei that his primary policy must be to enrich the state, and thereafter to strengthen the army.

ACCURATE INTELLIGENCE, ANALYSIS, AND PLANNING

Throughout the book Sun-tzu's approach is thoroughly analytical, mandating careful planning and the formulation of an overall strategy before commencing a campaign. In consonance with his emphasis on the need for rationality and self-control, Sun-tzu stressed the necessity to avoid all engagements not based upon extensive, concrete analyses of the overall situation, including the combat options and one's own capabilities. In one of his most famous statements, Sun-tzu said: “One who knows the enemy and knows himself will not be endangered in a hundred engagements.”

Detailed calculations were apparently performed in the ancestral temple prior to mobilizing for a campaign, and presumably similar, more specific assessments would be made by the commander before engaging an enemy force in the field. Although undertaken in the ancestral temple, these procedures were not a form of divination but were probably based upon quantified estimates that systematically assigned numerical values to the strength of objectively examined aspects for both sides, such as embodied in Chapter 1, “Initial Estimations.” Some forty paired, mutually defined, interrelated categories for analyzing the enemy's strength and readiness—such as Heaven and Earth; prosperity or poverty; unity or disunity; competent rulership or weakness; social order or disorder; and other economic and military strength indicators—can be abstracted from the Art of War. Pre-battle evaluations turned upon numbers as respectively many or few; strength as powerful or weak; discipline as well trained or lax; and various marks of competence in command and control. Tactics for the battle itself might be conceived in terms of offensive and defensive capabilities; advancing and retreating; and the unorthodox and orthodox. The comparative state of readiness might be decided by analyzing such pairs as hungry or sated; exhausted or rested; ordered or disordered; fearful or confident; cold or warm; wet or dry; and lax or alert. Whenever, after having been properly adjusted for proportionate impact, the calculations indicated that an enemy held a decided advantage, the ruler was to shun warfare. Similarly, battlefield commanders were to avoid these enemy forces, instead assuming a defensive posture or conceiving tactics that would convert the enemy's superiority into weakness, such as harassing the rested until they become exhausted, or forcing the united to became separated.

Sun-tzu also believed that gathering military intelligence must be a committed, ongoing activity exploiting every possible channel to gain knowledge of the enemy. Naturally, traders, although still somewhat limited in the Spring and Autumn period, might provide valuable commercial intelligence about crops, metalworking, and other industries of potential military significance, while diplomats could provide appraisals of the overall situation. Later, in the Warring States period, peripatetic persuaders would even provide detailed knowledge of defense and other aspects. Open sources could only describe the visible, however, not the invisible—plans, military secrets, the ruler's ambition, the personality of key officials, and the character of generals. Accordingly, in “Employing Spies,” history's first chapter on spycraft, Sun-tzu strongly advocated the judicious employment of spies, categorizing them according to function and indicating the essentials of interpretation and control.

In a famous passage, Sun-tzu stated: “The means by which enlightened rulers and sagacious generals moved and conquered others, that their achievements surpassed the masses, was advance knowledge.” This sentence in fact summarizes Sun-tzu's approach to warfare and distinguishes him from many historical political and military leaders who ignorantly committed their states to battle. As he asserted in “Military Combat”: “One who does not know the plans of the feudal lords cannot prepare alliances beforehand. Someone unfamiliar with the mountains and forests, gorges and defiles, the shape of marshes and wetlands, cannot advance the army. One who does not employ local guides cannot obtain advantages of terrain.” Later military texts, including Military Methods, indicate the need to gather military and political intelligence, even to employ spies, as essential to precampaign preparations, but mainly as a statement of fact or a simple reminder rather than with the intensity of the Art of War.

STRATEGIC OBJECTIVES AND METHODS

Sun-tzu, who envisioned warfare somewhat more transcendentally than later writers, believed that the primary objective should be vanquishing the enemy without actually engaging in combat, thereby realizing the ideal of complete victory: “The highest realization of warfare is to attack the enemy's plans; next is to attack their alliances; next to attack their army; and the lowest is to attack their fortified cities. Thus one who excels at employing the military subjugates other people's armies without engaging in battle, captures other people's fortified cities without attacking them, and destroys other people's states without prolonged fighting. He must fight under Heaven with the paramount aim of preservation. Thus his weapons will not become dull, and the gains can be preserved. This is the strategy for planning offensives.”

Whenever possible victory should be achieved through diplomatic coercion, disrupting the enemy's alliances, thwarting its plans, and frustrating its strategy. Only if someone threatens military action or refuses to acquiesce without being brutalized should the government resort to armed combat. Even when exercising the military option, every campaign should strive to achieve maximum results with minimum exposure, limiting as far as possible the destruction to be inflicted and suffered.

In Sun-tzu's view, defensive measures are equally aggressive for they ensure that the army's strength will be sufficient to prevail in situations where other techniques, including deception, cannot be effectively implemented: “One who cannot be victorious assumes a defensive posture; one who can be victorious attacks. In these circumstances, by assuming a defensive posture, strength will be more than adequate, whereas in offensive actions it would be inadequate. Those who excel at defense bury themselves away below the lowest depths of Earth. Those who excel at offense move from above the greatest heights of Heaven. Thus they are able to preserve themselves and attain complete victory.” In consonance with these beliefs Sun-tzu observed: “The victorious army first realizes the conditions for victory, and then seeks to engage in battle. The vanquished army fights first, and then seeks victory.” Obviously his dictum was directed toward generals who, having assumed the mantle of command, rushed headlong into battle, who fought whenever confronted by an enemy force and thereby endangered not only their own troops but also the state.

COMMAND AND CONTROL

THE COMMANDER

Since the commander-in-chief controls the state's destiny, both Sun-tzu and Sun Pin extensively discussed his qualifications, enumerating critical abilities and characteristics and identifying assets and liabilities. These discussions, coupled with assertions in both texts regarding the necessary independence of the commander once in the field, provide clear evidence of the rise and status of professional generals, although such qualities were equally to pertain to rulers, whether simply governing the state or serving as their own field commanders.

All military and philosophical writings that propose ideal combinations of traits for commanders stress courage or wisdom. The chapter entitled “Initial Estimations” in the Art of War identifies the following as requisite characteristics for any general: wisdom, credibility, benevolence, courage, and strictness. Commentators have traditionally emphasized the placement of wisdom before courage, although Sun-tzu never justified its priority. However, making wisdom fundamental fully accords with the importance accorded calculations, knowledge, and tactical expertise throughout the book. Conversely, Sun-tzu never commented on the role of courage except to condemn generals obsessed with a commitment to dying.

Correlating the important traits and abilities with the weaknesses specifically mentioned in the Art of War yields a comprehensive portrait of a good commander. In addition to the strengths named above, the general should be knowledgeable, skilled in analysis, and unconcerned by fame and punishment. He places the army first and is tranquil, obscure (unfathomable), upright, self-disciplined, and clever and inventive. His talents are all-encompassing. In contrast, a weak general is unenlightened. He brutalizes and fears the masses, is not strict, loves the people, is committed to life, is unable to fathom the enemy, and is obsessed with achieving fame. Moreover, he is easily angered, hasty to act, and arrogant. It naturally follows that the absence of desirable qualities or the presence of their opposites constitute serious flaws that enemy commanders will deliberately seek out and exploit. Subsequent military texts thus discuss numerous character deficiencies and exploitable traits, including virtues that have become extreme and therefore unbalanced, in both commanders and rulers and suggest concrete ways to systematically probe for them and then turn them to advantage.

Finally, commanders and rulers must cultivate Virtue, righteousness, and the other aspects of rulership and command prowess and thereby attain Te, the encompassing personal power necessary to overawe the realm and their subordinates. These and other issues of righteous qualification are only briefly mentioned in the Art of War, never focused upon or developed as in many other writings, including Military Methods. By Sun Pin's era, however, because the commanding general not only controlled the military power that could ultimately decide a kingdom's fate but also had to formulate strategy and execute complex tactics during lengthy campaigns such as Kuei-ling and Ma-ling, rulers were forced to exercise even greater care in evaluating candidates for the position. No doubt loyalty became paramount because once deployed in the field, in direct command of increasingly loyal troops, a disaffected or ambitious general could easily rebel or shift his allegiance to enemy authorities. Moreover, the king would be doubly endangered to the extent that he committed his best troops to the field.

According to enumerations found in several chapters of Military Methods, the commanding general, as well as virtually any officer exercising authority over military units, should be qualified by personal characteristics, intelligence, knowledge, and command skills. He should be a man of Virtue in every sense: benevolent, courageous, righteous, incorruptible, and caring. Moreover, he must not only manifest positive characteristics but also be free from the innumerable character flaws that can doom campaigns or be easily exploited, such as arrogance, greed, frivolity, cowardice, indecisiveness, laziness, slowness, brutality, selfishness, argumentativeness, carelessness, doubt, irascibility, and dejection.

Intelligence, knowledge (gained from study and experience), and the wisdom to make appropriate evaluations were also minimal requirements. Furthermore, Sun Pin believed, a good general had to possess and exercise sufficient command and control skills that the army would be united, disciplined, submissive, and spirited. He had to be awesome to evoke respect and obedience, but not brutal; treat the men well, evincing concern, but without forfeiting their martial spirit; and elicit great effort without exhausting the army. He had to be confident, so that people would trust his orders, and decisive, rarely changing his commands or directions.

Finally, both Sun-tzu and Sun Pin repeatedly stated that the commanding general, once appointed, should not only enjoy the ruler's complete confidence but also be empowered with absolute authority to conduct military affairs solely as his judgment might dictate. The ruler should never interfere, nor should high-ranking government officials be allowed to challenge the commander's dictates. Naturally, subordinate officers would question his judgment and orders only on the pain of death.

SELECTING, TRAINING, AND CONTROLLING THE TROOPS

The era of qualifying men for military duty based upon increasingly severe standards is frequently identified with the brilliant general Wu Ch'i, who was active in Wei around the end of the fifth century, approximately midway between Sun-tzu and Sun Pin. Because Sun-tzu is virtually silent upon the issues of qualifications (apart from commanders), organization, and training, Wu Ch'i's writings probably reflect trends that had become visible in the stronger states in the intervening century. By 350 b.c., Sun Pin apparently assumed that soldiers would be at least minimally qualified for military duty, although he also emphasized employing elite units composed of selected men for the critical tasks of spearheading assaults and penetrating formations. Moreover, while he stressed the need to gain the masses because they can provide the means to victory, Sun Pin disparaged the role of large numbers alone, believing that untrained masses cannot be relied upon for success. To be effective, he said, troops have to be controlled, motivated, and molded into a unified force in which all the individual units vigorously cooperate with and sustain each other. However, the task of wresting victory generally falls to selected, spirited forces.

Throughout the Spring and Autumn and Warring States periods, rife with daily threats to life and existence, apart from the hierarchical organization imposed on the troops together with the various forms of mutual responsibility that bound (or entangled) the members of each squad inextricably together, the main method of control was the strict implementation of systems of reward and punishment. While both Sun-tzu and Sun Pin certainly ascribed to contemporary beliefs on the necessity and efficacy of such systems, only the edges of a fully formulated doctrine are apparent in the few statements preserved in the Art of War and Military Methods. Sun-tzu mentions the power and importance of rewards in motivating men on the battlefield and spies in foreign territory in but three or four brief passages. Punishments receive even more cursory treatment, but as part of a very well known passage emphasizing that they can be applied only after an emotional foundation has been nurtured: “If you impose punishments on the troops before they have become attached, they will not be submissive. If they are not submissive, they will be difficult to employ. If you do not employ punishments after the troops have become attached, they cannot be used.”

Sun Pin astounded King Wei by suggesting that rewards are not the most critical issue; however, he clearly assigned a major role to them in motivating men, causing them to forget death and willingly enter into battle. Moreover, he apparently subscribed to the idea that excessive material wealth in society would blunt the effect of rewards, although his economic vision is unclear since he also stressed enriching the state as fundamental doctrine. Punishments, in contrast, make it possible to instill order and compel men to obey odious commands simply because they fear their superiors' punitive powers. Clearly the punishments he envisioned were severe, although he does not discuss their psychology extensively. In all cases the actions required must be reasonable in order to motivate the men to perform them and thereby reap the incentives of rewards, while the implementation of both rewards and punishments must be thorough, clear, and just.

THE PSYCHOLOGY OF CH'I, OR SPIRIT

Sun-tzu frequently discussed the essential problem of command: forging a clearly defined organization in control of thoroughly disciplined, well-ordered troops. The critical element is spirit, technically known as ch'i, the pneuma or essential vital energy of life. The concept of ch'i has long been fundamental to many aspects of Chinese thought, ranging from metaphysics to medicine, science through religion. One popular view is that the character for the word originally represented the vapors rising from cooking rice and is thus symbolic of nourishment in every sense. Ch'i is the foundation and basis of courage, the vital spirit that is directed by will and intention. As Sun-tzu indicates in the Art of War, when soldiers are well-trained, rested, properly fed, clothed, and equipped, if their spirits are roused they will fight vigorously. However, if physical or material conditions have deadened their spirits; if there is any imbalance in the relationship between command and troops; or if for any reason they have lost their motivation, they will be defeated.

Conversely, the commanding general must manipulate the situation so as to avoid the enemy when their spirits are strong, such as early in the day, and exploit any opportunity presented by their diminishment, attacking when they no longer have any inclination to fight, such as when about to return to camp. Prolonged warfare can only lead to enervation; therefore, careful planning to guarantee the swift execution of campaign strategy is paramount. Certain situations—such as being thrust onto fatal terrain where a desperate battle must be fought—are inherently conducive to eliciting the army's greatest efforts, while others are debilitating, dangerous, even fatal, and must be scrupulously avoided. Rewards and punishments provide the basis for control, but every effort must be made to foster and maintain the proper attitude of desire and commitment. Accordingly, all detrimental stimuli, such as omens and rumors, must be prohibited.

Sun Pin's motivational psychology is equally founded upon a psychology of ch'i and fully consistent with Sun-tzu's analyses and findings. Although rewards were the primary method for stimulating men in the Warring States period, Sun Pin devotes an entire chapter—“Expanding Ch'i”—to explicating the motivational steps required to psychologically prepare an army for battle. While other texts discuss ch'i and a psychology of ch'i can be constructed from several of them, Sun Pin's remarkable multistage analysis remains unique.

IMPORTANT STRATEGIES AND METHODS OF WARFARE

DECEPTION AND THE FORMLESS

Sun-tzu's military thought has frequently been erroneously identified solely with “deceit and deception,” both in China and the West, because he strongly advocated their employment to attain military objectives. For this he was often scorned by the literati, but he was closely followed by later military writers, including Sun Pin. Although many of the tactics Sun-tzu proposed throughout the Art of War are premised upon executing deceptive measures, only two explicit statements appear in the book. The foremost anchors much of Chapter 1: “Warfare is the Tao of deception. Thus although you are capable, display incapability to them. When committed to employing your forces, feign inactivity. When your objective is nearby, make it appear as if distant; when far away, create the illusion of being nearby.” The second one, from “Military Combat,” asserts: “The army is established by deceit, moves for advantage, and changes through segmenting and reuniting.”

Despite his emphasis, however, deceit is not practiced as an art or end in itself, contrary to contemporary tendencies. Rather, false measures, feints, prevarications, troop deployments, brush dragging, feigning of chaos, and other such acts are all designed to further the single objective of deceiving the enemy so that they will be confused or forced to respond in a predetermined way and thereby provide the army with an exploitable advantage. Warfare thus must be viewed as a matter of deception, of constantly creating false appearances, spreading disinformation, and employing trickery and deceit. When imaginatively created and effectively implemented, the enemy will neither know where to attack nor what formations to employ and will accordingly be condemned to making fatal errors. Sun Pin's concurrence may be seen throughout Military Methods where he frequently advised implementing deceptive measures to facilitate resolving tactical problems. His focus, however, remains concrete, and no broad statement of utility ever appears.

Deception, however skillfully practiced, will invariably prove ineffective unless the army can conceal its own plans. Although the later military writings more explicitly address the need for secrecy, in “Nine Terrains” Sun-tzu stressed that the commanding general should be obscure and unfathomable, never revealing his plans or intentions even to his own troops. Furthermore, he said: “Direct the masses of the Three Armies as though commanding one man. Press affairs on them, do not explain the purpose to them.”

Deception and manipulation are actually aspects of a greater principle involving form and the formless. Whenever the army deploys onto the battlefield, its configuration, being immediately apparent, evokes a reaction in the enemy. Whether the enemy will then modify its original anticipations, vary its tactics, or view events as confirming a preconceived battle plan depends upon its evaluation of the unfolding situation. In normal circumstances, force deployments quickly betray the commander's intentions and methods. Although warfare in this period was neither as rigid nor as predictable as in the Early Chou or ancient Western world because segmentation, small-unit articulation, and independent movement had all been thoroughly developed by Sun-tzu's time, in general an attack's thrust could still be predicted from the method of deployment and disposition of forces.

Realizing that any action at all will elicit a response while remaining invisible is impossible, Sun-tzu advanced a theory of what might be summarized as the “deceptive and formless.” Though the principle is unstated in the Art of War, obviously the best way to be unfathomable—that is, to be formless—is to display false appearances to the enemy. By integrating these two principles, an astute commander can manipulate the foe and preserve vital secrecy. Many commentators over the centuries failed to realize that the formless is attained through creative deceit and therefore erroneously and artificially isolated the two.

In “Vacuity and Substance,” Sun-tzu elucidated two basic principles for effectively waging war: attack voids and concentrate substantial force at chosen points. The means to forcing the enemy to disperse his forces is again the formless: “If I determine the enemy's disposition of forces while I have no perceptible form, I can concentrate my forces while the enemy is fragmented. If we are concentrated into a single force while he is fragmented into ten, then we can attack him with ten times his strength. Thus we are many and the enemy is few. If we can attack his few with our many, those whom we engage in battle will be severely constrained.” Naturally, to thus fragment the enemy, the army must not betray its intentions and secrecy must be maintained.

CONFIGURATIONS OF TERRAIN

The recognition that topography is fundamental to military tactics, the classification of terrain types, and the correlation of basic tactical principles with particular terrains are all generally attributed to Sun-tzu. Even though a cursory examination of earlier battles indicates that effective commanders had been implementing terrain-based tactics long before Sun-tzu vaulted onto the historical stage, and certain land configurations, such as sinkholes, were commonly known to be fatal to any disposition of forces, Sun-tzu was perhaps the first to systematically study these matters and develop a coherent body of operational principles. The Art of War then influenced many later military writings, particularly Six Secret Teachings, which contains several chapters advancing appropriate tactics for a wide variety of situations.

The very first chapter of the Art of War identifies terrain (Earth) as one the five major factors in warfare. In Sun-tzu's definition, “Earth encompasses far or near, difficult or easy, expansive or confined, fatal or tenable terrain.” Therefore, he concluded that one effective criterion for evaluating the probable victor in any encounter is based on the question, “Who has gained the advantages of Earth?”

Everything depends upon terrain because “terrain gives birth to measurement,” providing the means to determine force levels appropriate to situations and the ground's configuration. Accordingly, military intelligence consists not only of knowledge of the enemy but also the topography of the invasion route and likely battlegrounds. Consequently, Sun-tzu said: “Configuration of terrain is an aid to the army. Analyzing the enemy, taking control of victory, estimating ravines and defiles, the distant and near, is the Tao of the superior general. One who knows these and employs them in combat will certainly be victorious. One who does not know these or employ them in combat will certainly be defeated.” While his assertion would seem to be common sense at its essence, many battles have been lost just in the twentieth century because commanders neglected to acquire and familiarize themselves with accurate topographical information.

“Nine Terrains” are frequently associated with Sun-tzu because that is the title of his famous chapter where these nine appear: dispersive, light, contentious, traversable, focal, heavy, entrapping, encircled, and fatal. However, careful study of the Art of War reveals more than twenty distinct configurations of terrain as well as several specific deadly land formations, such as “Heaven's Well.” They are discussed in Chapters 8, 10, and 11 and further categorized in the Tactical Index. While the terms overlap to some extent, the definitions and associated tactics are never contradictory. Furthermore, the texts remain remarkably clear and explicit even at the end of the twentieth century, precluding any need for further analysis.

Apart from named configurations, Sun-tzu also mentioned such problematic obstacles as rivers, wetlands, mountains, marshes, and salt flats. For example, in “Maneuvering the Army,” he correlated four deployments with land features that fall under his definition of “entrapping terrain”: “Where there are mountains and forests, ravines and defiles, wetlands and marshes, wherever the road is difficult to negotiate, it is entrapping terrain.” Commanders had to moderate their tactics, maneuvers, and rate of movement to compensate for such difficulties, while also seeking to exploit them to their own advantage whenever possible.

Classifying and exploiting various configurations of terrain also constitute a significant topic in Military Methods, where Sun Pin clearly subsumed most of his predecessor's categories. To all the familiar “deadly terrains”—Heaven's Well, Heaven's Jail, Heaven's Net, Heaven's Fissure, and Heaven's Pit—drawn from the Art of War, he added a number of generally recognized entrapping terrains. Examples of the latter that can retard an army's progress and convert the most aggressive force into a vulnerable target include gorges with streams, valleys, river areas, marshes, wetlands, and salt flats. Water hazards are particularly troublesome, and Sun Pin provided further injunctions about going contrary to the current's flow or being caught fording rivers.

More important, Sun Pin reiterated Sun-tzu's general principle that the commanding general must investigate the terrain, become thoroughly familiar with it, and actively exploit the topography, the aspects of Earth, to emplace his troops and defeat the enemy. When the advantages of terrain are realized, the troops will naturally be inclined to fight. The enemy should be targeted on deadly ground (and of course manipulated or forced into entering it), while easy terrain should only be exploited when the commander enjoys a decisive superiority in numbers or mobile elements. Correspondingly, constricted terrain—warned against by all the military writers—and especially ravines, should be fully utilized to control and vanquish the enemy. Not only do they provide the means for the few to attack the many, but also ground conducive to exploiting advantages of height and concealing troops in ambush. With appropriate fortifications erected across the mouth, including interconnected chariots deployed with shields to fill the voids, they become strongholds not easily assaulted.

STRATEGIC POWER

The concept of strategic power figures prominently in both ancient military and Legalist thought, perhaps originating with the former. Unfortunately, its complexities require a book-length study to resolve a number of fundamental questions, and the cryptic nature of many military writings only confuses matters. The concept is pivotal, however, in Sun-tzu's and Sun Pin's thought.

A wide variety of words have been used to translate the term for “strategic power” throughout this century, including circumstances, energy, latent energy, combined energy, shape, strength, momentum, tactical power, force, authority, influence, power, condition of power, force of circumstances, positional advantage, and purchase. While in essence the concept of strategic power entails the idea of advantage resulting from superior position, this aspect of positional advantage has perhaps been overemphasized, thereby slighting the essential role the element of mass (or the army's forces) fulfills in creating impact. According to the concepts of modern physics, the momentum that can be developed, and thus the amount of force that can be applied, when a rolling stone collides with an object in its path depends upon the original height; the final speed at the moment of impact (which will have been reduced from the theoretical maximum as it passes over objects and encounters resistance); and its weight. Clearly, a stone will transfer less energy at the moment of impact than a much larger boulder, and the total destructive potential is inherently related to the mass of the object.

The paradigm example is Sun-tzu's analogy of a log or stone perched atop a hill that, although temporarily stabilized, retains great potential energy. In motion, that energy can be explosively released and need only be directed to be effective: “One who employs strategic power commands men in battle as if he were rolling logs and stones. The nature of wood and stone is to be quiet when stable but to move when on precipitous ground. If they are square they stop, if round they tend to move. Thus the strategic power of one who excels at employing men in warfare is comparable to rolling round boulders down a thousand-fathom mountain. Such is the strategic configuration of power.”

Consequently, Sun-tzu sought to maneuver the army into a position where it enjoyed such great tactical advantage that the impact of its attack, the impulse of its strategic power, would be like the sudden onrush of water cascading from mountain peaks. Deploying the troops into a suitable configuration; creating a tactical imbalance in power; concentrating forces upon focused targets; exploiting advantages of terrain; and every other activity integral to engaging in combat would be directed toward this moment, this decisive objective. Thus two equally important factors are integrated by the concept of strategic power: first, the strategic advantage conveyed by superior position, and second, the power of the forces involved. (“Power” refers to the army's overall capability in all aspects—including endurance, spirit, discipline, equipment, command, and physical condition—rather than simply strength of numbers.) Obviously, strategic advantage also has a pronounced temporal character; therefore, it should not be confined to exploiting advantages of terrain, as frequently thought.

Sun Pin fully accepted the concept of strategic power as formulated by his illustrious ancestor but little discussed it except in a thought-provoking chapter entitled “Preparation of Strategic Power,” instead devoting his passages to the means and methods for concretely applying it on the battlefield. In short, the astute commander seeks to fully exploit whatever advantages of terrain his numbers, firepower, morale, superior provisions, and other force multipliers make possible. When these elements are attained, the soldiers will realize their army enjoys an advantage in strategic power and fervently engage the enemy; when they are not, it will prove difficult to wrest victory with a force of reluctant warriors. For Sun Pin, whose era witnessed the introduction and first widespread use of the crossbow, it was the crossbow itself that could be taken as a model. The bowman acts at a distance, unseen and unknown, just like the general, but the arrow flies forth to inflict great damage. The release of strategic power should be like this, just as Sun-tzu himself had envisioned.

THE UNORTHODOX AND ORTHODOX

The concept and application of the unorthodox and orthodox, much discussed by the later military classics, probably originated with Sun-tzu. Although clearly visible in the principles and tactics proposed throughout the Art of War, however, the concept is specifically named in just one succinct, critical passage in “Strategic Military Power.” Moreover, it is indeed ordered as the unorthodox and orthodox, rather than as prioritized in the West, orthodox and unorthodox. While the implications, if any, remain to be explored, against a background of correctness and uprightness the choice seems deliberate. In addition, in early China the military was generally regarded as unorthodox, in accord with Lao-tzu's pronouncement in the Tao Te Ching: “With the orthodox govern the state; with the unorthodox employ the army.”

While the unorthodox and orthodox clearly require a book in themselves, in essence “orthodox” tactics include employing troops in normal, conventional, “by the book,” expected ways, such as massive frontal assaults, while stressing order and deliberate movement. “Unorthodox” tactics are primarily realized through employing forces, especially flexible ones, in imaginative, unconventional, and unexpected ways. Therefore, instead of direct chariot attacks, unorthodox tactics would mount circular or flanking thrusts; instead of frontal assaults, they would follow indirect routes to stage sudden, behind-the-lines forays. Their definition of course depends upon normal expectation within a particular battlefield context, as well as the enemy's anticipations, and therefore they are mutually defining, mutually transforming, and circular in nature. The orthodox may be used in unorthodox ways, and an orthodox attack may be unorthodox when unexpected, precisely because it is orthodox; a flanking or indirect assault would thereby be considered normal and therefore orthodox. A frontal feint by a large force, designed to distract or lure an enemy, would also be unorthodox.

The concept can become extremely complex and has often been misunderstood throughout Chinese history, or even dismissed as simplistic, when it is quite the opposite. In essence it remains a descriptive tool for tactical conceptualization, for characterizing and manipulating forces within—and by exploiting—an enemy's matrix of expectations, rather than a transformational mode to be actualized in the concrete reality of men and weapons the way a military formation is deployed. There is nothing mysterious or mystical about the unorthodox and orthodox and their mutually productive relationship, yet later commentators and strategists sometimes become seriously confused. Under such circumstances, a useful tactical conceptualization became an unnecessary obstacle to clear strategic thinking.

In Military Methods things that are orthodox—whether forces, tactics, or strategies—obey the basic rules that govern general situations, whereas the unorthodox deliberately (but not simply or naively) runs contrary to normal expectation and thus entails the element of surprise. It is the latter that of course accounts for the surpassing effectiveness of unorthodox tactics. However, the ability to envision them within particular contexts requires genius, as may be seen from Sun Pin's intriguing chapter entitled “Unorthodox and Orthodox.” While opposites, such as rest and motion, may be characterized by this pair, the successful creation of overwhelming tactics is far more complex, taking the practitioner into the realm of employing the formless against the formed, exploiting strength through weakness, and subverting superiority through complementary deficiencies. Although Sun Pin only focused upon this doctrine in a single chapter, the principles may be seen in his choice of advanced tactics for defeating various formations in several earlier chapters as well, such as segmenting the troops, mounting flank and encircling attacks, and generally manipulating the enemy to render him vulnerable to unexpected measures.

TACTICAL PRINCIPLES

ESSENTIAL MEASURES

Sun-tzu's numerous principles might well be reduced to the fundamental one of manipulating the enemy, thereby creating the opportunity for an easy victory, and then applying maximum power at the appropriate moment. To this end he classified the types of terrain and their exploitation; advanced numerous tactics for probing, controlling, and weakening the enemy; advocated the employment of both orthodox and unorthodox troops to wrest the victory; and stressed speed and surprise. The enemy should be lured into untenable positions with prospects of gain; enervated by being wearied and exhausted before the attack; and penetrated by forces suddenly concentrated at vulnerable points. The army should always be active, even when assuming a defensive posture, to create and seize the temporary tactical imbalance of power that will ensure victory. Accordingly, certain situations and configurations of terrain should be avoided or turned to advantage when opportune. Thereafter, the focus can be directed toward realizing a predetermined campaign strategy and implementing appropriate operational and battlefield tactics to defeat the enemy. Avoiding strong forces is not cowardice, but wisdom, for it is self-defeating to fight when and where not advantageous. As Sun-tzu stated, “One who knows when he can fight, and when he cannot fight, will be victorious.”

The foremost tactical principle for assaults is encapsulated by the famous dictum, “Go forth where they do not expect it, attack where they are not prepared.” This principle can only be realized through maintaining secrecy in all activities; by establishing complete self-control and strict discipline within the army; and by being unfathomable. The corollary to being unfathomable is seeking out and gaining detailed knowledge of the enemy through all available means, including the rigorous employment of spies. The unvarying rule is never to rely upon the goodwill of others or upon fortuitous circumstances but to guarantee—through knowledge, persistent analysis, and defensive preparation—that the enemy can neither mount a surprise attack nor gain a victory through simple coercion. As Sun-tzu said: “One who knows the enemy and knows himself will not be endangered in a hundred engagements. One who does not know the enemy but knows himself will sometimes be victorious, sometimes meet with defeat. One who knows neither the enemy nor himself will invariably be defeated in every engagement.” Sun-tzu also emphasized the high price of partial knowledge: “If I know our troops can attack, but do not know the enemy cannot be attacked, it is only halfway to victory. If I know the enemy can be attacked, but do not realize our troops cannot attack, it is only halfway to victory. Knowing that the enemy can be attacked, and knowing that our army can effect the attack, but not knowing the terrain is not suitable for combat, is only halfway to victory. Thus one who truly knows the army will never be deluded when he moves, never be impoverished when initiating an action. Thus it is said if you know them and know yourself, your victory will not be imperiled. If you know Heaven and you know Earth, your victory can be complete.”

Sun Pin clearly absorbed many of Sun-tzu's fundamental concepts and implicitly assumed certain operational principles common to practices of his era. Among those actually incorporated into his thought from the Art of War, the most important is the fundamental principle of manipulating the enemy to create weakness, then aggressively exploiting that weakness. As many modern commentators have pointed out, Sun Pin's work is little concerned with defensive warfare, although the function and establishment of fortifications are mentioned. Prior to embarking on a military campaign, commanders must make preparations, evaluate the enemy, and formulate a comprehensive plan. Thereafter, the army's efforts should be directed toward exploiting weaknesses already present and creating opportunities where none exist. The methods, all familiar ones found in the Art of War, include being deceptive; luring enemies onto fatal terrain; enticing them into movement in order to destabilize and then attack them; and realizing advantages of terrain.

Whenever confronting a strong enemy, one's own forces should be divided into three or more operational groups. One group should then be employed to engage the enemy, the others kept in reserve or deployed in ambush to take advantage of the enemy's movements and contain any unexpected developments. (Sun Pin is thus the first strategist to advance the concept of a strategic reserve.) Similarly, the enemy should be coerced into splitting into disjointed groups, for then its soldiers can be easily engaged piecemeal by locally superior numbers. Naturally the commander must seek out and exploit every possible weakness, deliberately exacerbating those inherently marking the enemy. Among those Sun Pin identified are such character flaws in the commanding general as easily becoming angered and—as in P'ang Chüan's case, according to his biography—arrogance. Armies that are tired and weary make easy targets, just as do those on constricted terrain where their movements and potential responses are severely limited. The confused, doubtful, unprepared, and weak can all be summarily attacked and defeated. Whether the enemy appears strong or weak, tactics should always focus upon acting unpredictably, going forth where unexpected, attacking where the enemy is unprepared, striking their weak points, vacuities, and undefended areas, assaulting their flanks, and especially encircling their rear. Emotional factors should also be considered: Fear, doubt, and confusion should be induced in the enemy through every means possible, including feigned retreats and sudden, unfathomable movements. In every instance the army's actions must be timely and confident, appropriate to the overall situation, and directed toward ultimate success.

Sun Pin also provided categories for classifying enemy armies coupled with suggested methods for response. Furthermore, he described the behavior that should characterize an invading army moving onto enemy territory and concretely analyzed cities in terms of whether they could be successfully attacked as economic, political, and military centers. However, most of this material, for which he has justifiably become famous, appears in the second half of the work. In fact, the famous principle attributed to him in the various biographical accounts of the twin campaigns—manipulate the enemy by seizing what he loves—only appears there.

RELATIVE STRENGTH AND APPROPRIATE TACTICS

Throughout the Art of War Sun-tzu advised that one should fight only when victory can be perceived and should adopt a defensive posture—or simply avoid the enemy—when it cannot. By implementing proper defensive measures, the skilled general will ensconce his troops in an unconquerable position, one from which he will emerge victorious if attacked, but might also deter a formidable enemy from even attempting an assault. Sun-tzu never suggested any concrete measures for realizing this invincibility, however; nor did he mention aggressive measures that might be implemented when forced to fight in disadvantageous circumstances. Moreover, while he clearly advocated adopting a defensive posture, the spirit of the Art of War distinctly inclines toward employing a variety of measures to manipulate the enemy and gain the localized advantage that will permit launching a victorious attack. Later writers were fully cognizant of the need to adopt temporizing measures, and many generals proved successful through implementing them.

Only one passage in the Art of War suggests general principles for combat under varying conditions of relative strength: “If your strength is ten times theirs, surround them; if five, then attack them; if double, then divide your forces. If you are equal in strength to the enemy, you can engage them. If fewer you can circumvent them. If outmatched, you can avoid them. Thus a small enemy that acts inflexibly will become the captives of a large enemy.” Even here Sun-tzu does not really advocate avoiding the enemy unless clearly outmatched, no doubt preferring to concoct measures to divide the opposing forces and then launch concentrated attacks, much as Mao did in China's revolutionary war.

Sun Pin also pondered the parameters for innovating tactics under various conditions of relative strength, although much of the concrete discussion appears in the second half of Military Methods. Three possibilities exist: the few or weak against the many or strong; equal strength; and the many or strong against the few or weak. Confronting a vastly superior foe is of course every commander's nightmare, but the imbalance also presents the greatest possibilities for glory if victory can somehow be achieved. Appropriately, there are more concrete tactical suggestions for this situation than all the others combined, with the main advice being to employ temporizing rather than direct assault tactics; to attack where the enemy is unprepared, a general principle in any case to conserve strength and forces; to divide and strike with “death warriors” whose commitment might wrest a telling advantage; to avoid easy terrain and exploit the possibilities of constricted ground; to segment the enemy so that it will be ignorant of each group's actions and can therefore be struck in relatively localized strength; and to stretch the enemy out, always avoiding direct confrontations.

In situations of equal strength a commander can of course employ many of the same tactics, but the measures need not be so urgently dictated or so limited in possibility. Sun Pin particularly advised that in attacking strength with strength, one should still choose a complementary configuration or a deployment that will prove effective in the specific situation rather than engage in a direct confrontation. Naturally, dividing the enemy continues to be the single most powerful tactic, presumably a preparatory measure in most circumstances.

The third situation, one of overwhelming superiority, apparently proved problematic in ancient times because tacticians were constantly surprised when rulers inquired about it. No doubt many kings and commanders fell into the pitfall of underestimating their enemies and suffered accordingly. Sun Pin suggested that to avoid this blunder the commander should feign disorder and entice the enemy into movement, tricking him into coming forth where he could be engaged and overcome by superior numbers. Alternatively, weak troops could be employed to foster the false sense of elation that would inevitably result when the enemy achieved apparently easy gains, thereby drawing the enemy out for an expanded engagement across a more extensive front. Surprisingly, many of the manipulatory tactics used against overwhelming odds, such as feeding the enemy's arrogance and spreading them out, may also provide a key to victory. Finally, where enemy troops are contained or trapped, an outlet should be left so as to prevent a sudden determination to fight to the death, which may result on fatal ground without escape, Sun-tzu noted. Conversely, if trapped oneself, elite troops, acting as if deranged, can be employed to disrupt the enemy and create an opening.

FORMATIONS

While Sun-tzu identified several important principles governing deployments and the control of forces in the field, he never discussed the various formations employed in his era apart from a single reference to the circular formation. In contrast, perhaps reflecting the evolution of military science that necessarily emphasized first training the troops in various formations and then selectively employing them depending upon the battlefield situation, Sun Pin not only discussed the nature of formations but in the second half of his book also provided a brief analysis of ten different formations with their advantages and countermeasures. Of particular interest is Sun Pin's use of the sword and arrow as analogies for the nature of effective formations. Essentially, there has to be a substantial structure or basis coupled with a sharp, piercing edge (since swords were primarily thrusting rather than slashing instruments in China). In the chapter entitled “Eight Formations,” Sun Pin asserted that formations must be suited to the topography and that their employment should generally adhere to the principle of dividing one's forces into three operational groups, with one to execute the formation and the others to be reserve units and unorthodox forces. Unfortunately, he never elucidated the eight formations or indicated in what ways they are individually suited to various configurations of terrain. Other chapters, however, mention several specific formations: The Awl, Wild Geese, Fierce Wind, and Cloud Array appear in the first half along with some basic characteristics, such as the Cloud Array being designed for arrow warfare. Chapter 16, which begins the second half of the book, enumerates ten different deployments or formations. (The Chinese characters for these terms are the same and the meaning not clearly segregatable, but a distinction should be made between “formations” as theoretical organizational constructs and actual “deployments,” which employ formations.) The Wild Geese and Awl formations reappear among these ten, but the others are primarily a matter of shape or array, such as circular, hooked, dense, and sparse. Additional ones scattered about the book in various chapters include an “extended horizontal array,” a “basket-like” deployment, the “sharp hooking array,” and the “full” and “vacuous.” Preferred modes of employment are indicated for some of them—such as the “square” formation being the means to solidify control and the “circular” to facilitate turning movements—but generally the descriptions are terse and lack any real explanation of their shape or mode of action. Later military compilations provide some odd renditions for them, but extensive research will be required before even minimally accurate reconstructions become possible.

Based upon these distinctive formations it is obvious that organization, segmentation, and articulated deployment were all essential elements in any commander's tactics. From other writings, the basic outlines of organization, such as by squads of five and companies of a hundred, are clear and to be expected in the state of Ch'i as well. If the training techniques of Sun Pin's era were at all like those preserved in Six Secret Teachings and similar writings, the troops would have been well drilled and easily capable of responding on signal to deploy in any particular formation and subsequently change into a different one. The commander's responsibility would be to chose appropriately, providing himself with advantageous forms while denying the enemy an opportunity to attack or find an easy opening. Some, such as the diffuse formation, were clearly designed to allow the enemy to penetrate and become trapped, particularly as Sun Pin otherwise advises that the middle should be kept open or void. Moreover, based on the arrow analogy, normally the general should place his best troops at the front, so that their combat power is greatest there even though large numbers of soldiers are kept in reserve.