[In the following essay, McGrath evaluates Anselm's thought on salvation as it appears in his Cur Deus Homo, maintaining that Anselm's conception of justice is based on theological rather than legal foundations.]

Anselm of Canterbury has attracted increasing scholarly attention during the past century as a major thinker standing at the dawn of the Middle Ages. His greatest intellectual achievement is generally considered to be the monograph Cur Deus Homo, which is of decisive importance in the history of doctrine. Its unrivalled combination of sustained argument, moral force and originality make it a landmark in the history of literature as well as of doctrine. The Reformers, as well as several of the earlier scholastics, were to take up and develop aspects of his theology, and the doctrines of justification associated with the Reformers, particularly those of Melanchthon and Calvin, are set within a theological framework which is recognizably Anselmian.¹ Anselm's interpreters, however, transferred his soteriological concepts from their original context to one considerably more juridical in outlook, with the result that his theology has generally been approached with certain preconceptions quite alien to Anselm's own time. Thus Anselm has frequently been accused of legalizing the gospel, being typical of the Latin ‘impulse to carry religion into the legal sphere’.² His most outspoken English critic, Hastings Rashdall, dismissed his soteriology as feudal: ‘Anselm appeals to justice: … but his notions of justice are the barbaric ideas of an ancient Lombard king, or the technicalities of a Lombard lawyer’.³ It is a sad reflection upon the current state of English theological awareness that this misrepresentation of Anselm's soteriology is still generally accepted. Rashdall's offended liberalism, however, prevents him from grasping the theological framework of the Cur Deus Homo. Whilst Rashdall appreciated that Anselm ‘made a serious attempt to vindicate the whole scheme (of salvation) from the point of view of justice’, he failed to answer the central question posed by the Anselmian soteriology: What concept of justice is appropriate to God's dealings with men? Anselm does not employ ‘ordinary ideas of justice’, and his soteriology can only be understood when the concept of iustitia which underlies God's dealings with man is established. The present study is concerned with establishing Anselm's concept of justice. Anselm's soteriology can only be described as ‘legalist’ or ‘juridical’ if it can be demonstrated that a ‘legalist’ or ‘juridical’ concept of justice lies behind it. It is the contention of the present study that this is not the case.

God is wholly and supremely just.⁴ How, then, can he, being just, spare the sinner? This is the central question with which Anselm is concerned in the Cur Deus Homo. How can there be justice in giving eternal life to one who deserves death?⁵ In the discussion of the relation between justice and mercy in the Proslogion, Anselm initially locates the source of God's mercy in his bonitas,⁶ which may be contrasted with his iustitia.⁷ He then, however, moves on to argue that, despite the apparent contradiction between misericordia and iustitia, God's mercy must somehow be grounded in his justice. Anselm resolves this dilemma in the following manner: God is just, not because he rewards us as we deserve, but because he does what is appropriate to him, the highest good.⁸ It appears that Anselm is wrestling with various concepts of justice, before finally adopting that which is most suitable for his purpose. A similar pattern emerges in the Cur Deus Homo, where Anselm notes various interpretations of justice: iustitia hominis, which obtains under law,⁹ strict justice, iustitia districta, beyond which ‘nothing more strict nor just can be imagined’,¹⁰ and supreme justice, summa iustitia.¹¹ But the final concept of justice which emerges appears to be that arrived at in the Proslogion—namely, justice as action directed towards the highest good. This understanding of justice has its roots in the works of St Augustine, for whom Anselm frequently professed a high regard,¹² and it is therefore to be expected that he would follow his master in this important matter.

Augustine's understanding of iustitia within the civitas Dei is based on the concept of God as iustissimus ordinator,¹³ who orders the universe in accord with his will. Thus iustitia can take on a wide meaning, approaching that of a physical ordering of all things, but particularly referring to the ordering of the affairs of men, and their relation to their environment.¹⁴ For Augustine, iustitia is practically synonymous with the right ordering of human affairs, and that right ordering of human affairs is part of man's pilgrimage to the heavenly city.¹⁵ Augustine's quasi-physical understanding of justice reflects his hierarchical structuring of the order of being: justice is essentially the ordering of the world according to the order of being, which is itself a reflection of the divine will.

By a.d. 396 Augustine had abandoned his previous hopes of saving or perfecting mankind through human society. This is reflected in his abandoning the concept of lex temporalis,¹⁶ a human law which is derived from the eternal divine law. Augustine, becoming increasingly aware of the radical dichotomy between human ius and divine ius, rejected the former as a basis of salvation. Instead, he developed a concept of iustitia by which the natural order is preserved by the eternal law.¹⁷ As God created the natural order of things, so iustitia is reflected in the correct order of nature. This may be illustrated by considering man's relationship with God. God created man as he ought to be—i.e., he created man in iustitia, the correct order of nature. But by choosing to ignore God's own ordering of his creation man stepped outside this state of iustitia. Man cannot save himself, as to do so involves the restoration of the correct order of things—i.e., the rectitude of the relationship between God and man. Justification is therefore a ‘making right’, a restoration of this relationship between God and man; it is not conceived in juridical or legalist terms. Iustitia reflects the ordering of the world, including the relationship of God to man, and man to his fellows, and is not a legal concept in itself.

The correct relationship between men, which is being established in the process of justification, is reflected in Augustine's understanding of social or political justice. Augustine modifies Cicero's classical definition of the res publica¹⁸ by making iustitia an essential element of the iuris consensus. Where there is no true iustitia, there is no true ius.¹⁹ For Cicero, iustitia is based on ius—i.e., justice is based on law; for Augustine, ius is based on iustitia—i.e., law is based on justice, the correct ordering of the universe, itself a manifestation of the divine will. The laws which govern the affairs of men are themselves but one aspect of the correct ordering of the entire universe—and that right ordering of things is itself justice.

In his discussion of the background to the Incarnation, Anselm appeals to the order established by God at creation; however, he reserves the term rectitudo to describe this basic God-given order of creation, using the term iustitia in a number of derivative senses, each of which can be traced back to the basic concept of rectitude. The close connection between veritas and iustitia in Anselm's thought is due to their both being aspects of the basic concept of rectitudo. Thus, in general, truth is a form of rectitude, a following of the right rules.²⁰ In the treatise De Veritate, truth is defined as ‘rectitude perceptible only to the mind’.²¹ Elsewhere, truth can be equated with rectitude, indicating the closest of relationships between the two concepts.²² In general, truth is regarded as rectitudo—anything which is as it ought to be is true, and anything which is true is as it ought to be. Thus the relationship between rectitude, justice and truth could be expressed as follows:

rectitudo [conditions] veritas (i.e., metaphysical rectitude) [and] iustitia (i.e., moral rectitude).

Justice is a ‘rectitude of will served for its own sake’, rectitudo voluntatis propter se servata.²³ Anselm clearly assumes the interrelationship of the three concepts: et quoniam de rectitudine mente sola perceptibili loquimur, invicem sese definiunt veritas et rectitudo et iustitia.²⁴

The basic meaning of rectitudo is the divine ordering of the universe, which has its origin in the divine will, and which is itself a reflection of the divine will. Anselm's metaphysical theory of truth considers that the truth of a cognition derives from its rectitudo—i.e., it is as it should be. Everything has its own particular rectitudo; everything is true in so far as it is what it should be according to its idea in God. Truth is the conformity of what is to the rule which fixes what it should be. As this rule is itself part of the divine nature, Anselm concludes that there is only one supreme truth, God.²⁵ Thus truth is basically metaphysical rectitude, conformity to the intended pattern. Of course, Anselm concedes that the notion can bear various derivative meanings—for example, the veritas of a proposition such as Dies est is evidently secundum hanc veram eam iudicat usus communis locutionis,²⁶ a non-technical notion recognised by common sense.²⁷ The truth of the proposition Dies est clearly depends upon the circumstances, and can this be said to be an extrinsic truth. But the fundamental sense of veritas relates to intrinsic truth, metaphysical rectitude in the sense of conformity to the divine will. Thus for Anselm, the answer to the question Quid est veritas?²⁸ requires reference to rectitude.

The concept of justice also requires reference to the fundamental notion of rectitude. Justice has, as its basic sense, the moral rectitude of the universe, the moral order established by God at creation, itself an expression of the divine will and nature. The Augustinian character of this understanding of justice will be evident. The moral ordering of the universe encompasses the relationship between God and man, between man and his fellow men, and between the various existential strata within man (on the neo-Platonic anthropological model favoured by Augustine). Just as Anselm recognized various derivative senses of the term veritas, so he also notes them with iustitia. Thus human justice is an aspect of iustitia in that it reflects the divine ordering of the universe. The regulation of the affairs of men by human justice is an aspect of iustitia, but is not identical with it. Ius must be based on iustitia. The justice which regulates the affairs of men is not equivalent to the justice which God imposed upon himself and his own dealings with man. There is a clear distinction between supreme justice (i.e., God's) and strict justice (i.e., that of man).²⁹ God's moral ordering of the created universe involves both the regulation of the affairs of men, and the self-regulation by God of his dealings with men—but it is not possible to argue that the laws governing each are the same. In its fundamental sense iustitia merely refers to moral rectitude—i.e., that God has imposed a moral order upon the universe. It remains to be seen what form this moral ordering takes with respect to the various aspects of creation. This point had already been made by Augustine during the course of the Pelagian controversy. Augustine is prepared to concede the validity of the Ciceronian definition of human justice as ‘giving every man his due’.³⁰ Yet when Julian of Eclanum gave the same definition for divine justice—i.e., of giving every man what is due to him—Augustine confronted him with the parable of the labourers in the vineyard, illustrating the impropriety of applying this definition of civil justice to God's dealings with men.³¹ Strict justice cannot accommodate the concept of grace; supreme justice can.

Man was created in a state of iustitia originalis,³² which was forfeited at the Fall. Man's present state is that of iniustitia. It must be stressed, however, that the concept of iustitia originalis merely provides a convenient summary of the moral rectitude of God's created order, and does not refer to any legal status of man. Anselm states that the basic requirement of iustitia is that every inclination of the rational creature be subject to God³³—and this simply amounts to a statement of the place of man in the moral ordering of creation, established by God himself, and reflecting his character as summa iustitia. The moral ordering of the universe allots a specific place to man in creation, with a moral obligation to submit his rational nature to God, his Creator. This moral rectitude of the universe was violated by man, and not by God, at the Fall. Iniustitia is the privation of iustitia,³⁴ and the essence of original sin is the inherited lack of moral rectitude in the will of every fallen man. Before the Fall, Adam was able to submit his rational nature to the divine will; now his successors are incapable of this fundamental obligation laid upon man by God. This represents a significant departure from the Augustinian doctrine of original sin, since the stress on concupiscence is omitted. Indeed, as the essential nature of injustice is that of privation, it cannot be described as a positive entity in itself, but merely the absence of a desirable quality.³⁵

Man's violation of the moral order of creation means that he is no longer capable of submitting his rational nature to God, and therefore that he is incapable of redeeming himself. If man is to be redeemed, a divine act of redemption is required. But man's violation of the moral ordering of the universe at the Fall does not permit God to violate it still further in order to redeem fallen man. God, having established the created moral order, conforms to it himself. This important point is made by Anselm at several points, particularly at that point in the Cur Deus Homo where the question why God cannot forgive sins by mercy alone is considered.³⁶Si Deus hoc vult, iustum est.³⁷ Anselm's discussion of this proposition reveals his grave reservations concerning the concept of justice involved. God's freedom in will and in action is limited by his own nature. God is not free to do anything that violates his own nature, since that involves a contradiction. Thus what is just cannot become unjust merely because God wills it, as such an alteration would involve a radical change in the divine nature. God's character as the summa iustitia is expressed in the rectitude of the moral order of creation, and the free forgiveness of sins through mercy violates this moral ordering, and is therefore a contradiction of the divine nature. God's attributes are essential to his being, and are not merely accidents which he can change at will. God wills right because it is right. Anselm's important theological insight concerning the divine attributes is that they must co-exist within the limiting conditions that they impose on each other. Thus the rectitude of the established moral order requires that God redeem man in such a way that is acceptable within the limitations of the moral order established by God himself as an expression of his own nature. This is no legalism, but merely a proper insistence upon the moral character of God as summa iustitia.

In a very brief review of the accounts traditionally given of the Atonement, Anselm makes it clear that he is unsatisfied with their failure to understand why God should have willed to save man: they are merely descriptions of what happened when God did deliver mankind, and offer no explanations of why God should save man in the first place, nor of why he chose to save him in the particular way that he did. None of the traditional accounts can be said to be a systematic account of the nature or the necessity of the Atonement. Anselm thus presents an account of the matter based on the concept of iustitia, which demonstrates that:

(1) the redemption of mankind is necessary as a matter of justice;

(2) this redemption is accomplished in a manner which does not violate the moral order of the universe, established by God himself.

We shall consider these two points separately.

If justice be understood as a lex talionis, or in the Ciceronian sense of ‘giving each his due’, it is clearly impossible to consider God's redeeming of mankind as an act of justice. This, however, is not the concept of justice employed by Anselm. For Anselm, the moral rectitude of the created order was violated by man's fall. It is therefore necessary that the moral rectitude of the created order be restored, as its present state is unjust. Because whatever is unjust contradicts God's nature, it is impossible for God to permit this state of affairs to continue. Therefore God's justice necessitates the redemption of mankind. God, as summa iustitia, is bound by his own nature to restore the moral rectitude of the created order, and therefore to redeem mankind. Both Augustine and Anselm's predecessor at Bec, Lanfranc, interpreted the Pauline term iustitia Dei as the righteousness by which God justifies believers;³⁸ Anselm adopts a similar interpretation, but for a different reason.

Anselm prefaces his discussion of the method by which God redeemed mankind by considering the rival theory of the ‘Devil's rights’. It has often been assumed that the reason for Anselm's devoting considerable space to the refutation of this theory is its importance in the previous treatments of the question. This, however, overlooks the point that the theory made a claim to be based on justice. Anselm, whose theory depends upon a different concept of justice, must first refute the older theory. According to the ‘Ransom’ theory, the devil had rights over man, which God was bound to respect on account of his just nature. But this is not consonant with Anselm's concept of justice: justice relates to the moral ordering of the universe, which the devil clearly violated in his seduction of man. As the devil is part of the created order, he is subject to the same iustitia as that order. Himself a rational being, the devil was under the same moral obligation to submit his will to God. Only if he were outside of God's creation, and could stand aloof from its moral ordering, could this theory of the ‘Devil's rights’ have any credibility. By his violation of the moral order of the universe, the devil had lost any claim to iustitia which God was bound to respect. Anselm therefore dismisses the theory which had been current for so long: non video quam vim habeat.³⁹

Anselm's own theory can be stated as a series of propositions, if the numerous diversions are ignored. When this is done, the centrality of the concept of justice becomes evident.

1. Man was created in a state of original justice for eternal blessedness;

2. This blessedness requires the perfect and voluntary submission of man's will to God (i.e., justice);

3. Man's present state is that of iniustitia;

4. Either this will result in man's being deprived of eternal blessedness, or else the situation must be rectified by an appropriate satisfaction;

5. This satisfaction must exceed the act of disobedience;

6. Man cannot offer anything to God other than the demands of iustitia, and on account of his present iniustitia he cannot even do this;

7. Therefore God's purpose in creating man has been frustrated;

8. But this is unjust, and involves a contradiction;

9. Therefore a means of redeeming the situation must exist, for justice demands it;

10. Man cannot redeem himself;

11. God could make the necessary satisfaction;

12. Since only God can, and only man ought to, make the required satisfaction, it must be made by a God-man;

13. Therefore the Incarnation is required on the grounds of justice.

The importance of justice at this stage in the argument is often overlooked. The ‘syllogism’ which demonstrates the necessity of the Incarnation may be stated thus:

A. Only man ought to make the offering for sin—yet he cannot;

B. Only God can make the offering for sin—yet he ought not to.

It is clear that this ‘syllogism’ can lead to two conclusions:

Either: Only a God-man both can and ought to make the offering for sin; or Only a God-man both cannot, and ought not to, make the offering for sin.

From a purely dialectical standpoint, the monograph could equally well be entitled Cur Deus non homo. God's justice, however, demands that the moral rectitude of the created order be restored, so that the second conclusion is to be rejected. Justice demands redemption, so a means of redemption must exist.

The weak point in Anselm's soteriology is generally considered to be his discussion of satisfaction.⁴⁰ It is not proposed to defend this in the present study. It is clear, however, that Anselm considers the payment of a satisfaction by the God-man to provide a means of satisfying the demands of moral rectitude without in any way violating the established moral order of the universe. It is quite probable that Anselm regarded the satisfaction-merit model provided by penance, and established within the church of his time, as a paradigm for divine remission of human sin which would readily be accepted by his readers as just.

The central problems faced by Anselm in formulating his soteriology were:

1. To demonstrate why God should wish to redeem mankind in the first place;

2. To demonstrate why God should have redeemed man in the particular manner he chose.

Anselm's answers to both these questions, and also to several subsidiary questions raised in the course of his discussion, depend upon the understanding of justice as moral rectitude. To describe Anselm's soteriology as ‘legalist’, ‘feudal’ or ‘juridical’ is to miss the point. It is inevitable that Anselm's concepts should be influenced by the period in which he lived; it is clear, however, that he does not use contemporary concepts of justice in his discussion of the Atonement. His concept of justice is not that of a barbaric Lombard king, but that of a theologian convinced that God created the world in rectitude, and was now acting in accordance with that rectitude to redeem it. Far from representing an unwarranted intrusion on the part of law into religion, Anselm's soteriology represents the application of the conviction that God is just to the basic article of the Christian faith—the redemption of fallen mankind through Christ.

Notes

1. For a discussion of the development of the doctrine of justification within the Western theological tradition, see my Iustitia Dei: a History of the Doctrine of Justification, 3 vols (to be published by James Clarke & Co, Cambridge).

2. A von Harnack, History of Dogma, 7 vols (London, 1894-99) vol. III, p. 310. See also G. Aulén, Christus Victor (London, 1934), pp. 100-09.

3. H. Rashdall, The Idea of Atonement in Christian Theology (London, 1920), p. 355.

4. Proslogion, 9; S Anselmi Cantuarensis Archiepiscopi Opera Omnia, edited F. S. Schmitt (Stuttgart-Bad Cannstatt, 1966) vol. I, p. 106. 18.

5. Vol. I, p. 106. 19-107. 3.

6. Vol. I, p. 107. 16-18.

7. Vol. I, p. 107. 23-6.

8. Proslogion, 10; vol. I, p. 109. 4-5 ita iustus et non quia nobis reddas debitum, sed quia facis quod decet te summe bonum.

9. Cur Deus Homo, I, 12; vol. II, p. 69. 22.

10. Vol. I, 23; vol. II, p. 91. 10; vol. II, p. 91. 15.

11. Vol. I, 23; vol. II, p. 91. 27-28.

12. E.g., see Monologion, praefatio; vol. I, p. 8. 9; De Incarnatione Verbi, 6; vol. II, p. 20. 14-15.

13. De Civitate Dei, XII, 17.

14. See E. Gilson, History of Christian Philosophy in the Middle Ages (London, 1978), pp. 77-81.

15. R. A. Markus, Saeculum: History and Society in the Theology of St Augustine (Cambridge, 1970), p. 88.

16. For its original statement, see De Lib. Arb., I, vi, 15; I, v, 11.

17. See Contra Faustum xii, 27.

18. Cicero, De Rep. I, 39 coetus multitudinis iuris consensu et utilitatis communione societatis. See M. Testard, Saint Augustine et Cicéron (Paris, 1958), vol. II, pp. 39-43.

19. De Civitate Dei, XIX, 21.

20. D. P. Henry, The Logic of St Anselm (Oxford, 1967), p. 230.

21. De Veritate, 13; vol. I, p. 199. 19.

22. De Veritate, 2; vol. I, p. 178. 25; ibid., 4; vol. I, p. 181. 3-9; ibid., 10; vol. I, p. 189. 31.

23. De Veritate, 12; vol. I, p. 194. 26; De Casu Diaboli, 9; vol. I, p. 246. 26-30.

24. De Veritate, 12; vol. I, p. 192. 7-8.

25. See E. Gilson, op. cit., pp. 136-9.

26. De Veritate, 2; vol. I, p. 179. 14-28.

27. Henry, op. cit., pp. 230-1.

28. John 18, 38.

29. Anselm may have Cod. Just. I, 55, 6 in mind.

30. E.g., De Lib Arb I, xviii, 27. cf. Cicero, Rhetoricii Libri duo qui vocantur de Inventione Rhetorica II, 53 … iustitia est habitus animi, communi utilitate conservata, suam cuique tribuens dignitatem.

31. Contra Iulianum, vol. I, p. 35.

32. E.g., De Conceptu Virginali, 2; vol. II, p. 141. 8-11.

33. Cur Deus Homo, I, 11; vol. II, p. 68. 12-16.

34. De Casu Diaboli, 9; vol. I, p. 246. 26.

35. The influence of Anselm's doctrine of original sin appears to have been minimal until Albertus Magnus defined the formal element of original sin to be privation of justice.

36. Cur Deus Homo, I, 12; vol. II, p. 70. 11-30.

37. Loc. cit.

38. This is the general interpretation of the phrase in the patristic and scholastic eras—see my Iustitia Dei, vol, I for details.

39. Vol. II, p. 56. 2-3.

40. See J. McIntyre, Anselm and His Critics (London and Edinburgh, 1954), and especially F. Hammer, Genugtung und Heil. Absicht, Sinn und Grenzen der Erlösungslehre Anselms von Canterbury (Wien, 1966).