SOURCE: Piper, Linda J. “Sparta after Alexander.” In Spartan Twilight, pp. 5-23. New Rochelle, N.Y.: Aristide D. Caratzas, 1986.

[In the following essay, Piper details the period of Spartan military and political decline from 371 to 260 b.c.]

In 371 b.c., the Greek world heard with disbelief that a small Theban force had defeated a larger Spartan army at Leuctra. The Spartan military had seemed invincible for so many years that victory was almost a commonplace in Spartan foreign affairs. Yet if the other Greeks were shocked by the news, the men and women within Sparta took it in a typically calm and stoical fashion, firm in their belief that it was merely a temporary setback. This was not to be so, however. Discontent with Spartan hegemony had been festering in the Peloponnesus for many years, suppressed only by Spartan military supremacy. The news of the Theban victory brought this discontent to the surface, and many cities, especially those in the central Peloponnesus, seized the opportunity to break with the Peloponnesian League and form their own defensive organizations; the Arcadian League was in existence by 370 b.c. This was the beginning of the end for Sparta.

Yet worse was to come. That same year, 370, the Theban army, backed by Arcadian forces greedy for plunder, invaded Laconia and ravaged the countryside. The city of Sparta held strong, even though her walls were still merely the shields of her citizens, and Epaminondas wisely bypassed it. Before returning to Boeotia, however, he laid the foundations for a new city of Messene at Mount Ithome and surrounded it with a strong wall, thus depriving Sparta of her control over Messenia and the inhabitants, who had for so long worked the land as helots of the Spartan citizens. Sparta had lost both prestige and property; it is small wonder that most historians ring down the curtain on Spartan history at this point. This is premature, however, since the history of Sparta was far from over. To be sure, it is the story of a long twilight and one which can only be imperfectly reconstructed from scattered sources, but if much is obscure, there are also flashes of brilliance, so that the later history of Sparta helps illuminate the Hellenistic world.

At Leuctra Epaminondas shattered both the Spartan army and its myth of invincibility, and there is no minimizing the proportions of the military disaster. But the defeat in 371 b.c. served only as a prelude to further reverses later in the fourth century. The Spartans remained aloof from the Athenian-Boeotian coalition formed to thwart the ambitions of Philip II of Macedon, but after Philip triumphed over his enemies in 338, he turned against all those who had remained neutral. Although the majority of the Peloponnesian cities welcomed Philip, the Spartans refused to receive him into their city, preferring instead to suffer once again the plundering of Laconia and the further loss of territory. Through Philip's generosity, Sparta's neighbors gained the always disputed border territories of Laconia: Arcadia took the Sciritis, Messenia the Dentheliatis, and Argos the Cynuria.¹ Sparta was thus restricted to the territory between Mount Taÿgetus and the coast of the Aegean Sea with her borders extending as far north as Sellasia and south to the Laconian Gulf. This was the best part of Laconia, but the loss of almost one-half of her former possessions was a serious blow to Spartan pride and especially to her economy.

Of Spartan leaders in this period we know very little. Although the Agiad king Cleomenes II was then in the midst of an extremely long reign (369-309), he remains a shadowy figure. The most known about him is that he had two sons, Acrotatus and Cleonymus, neither of whom succeeded him. Fortunately the Eurypontid monarchs were more forceful and therefore made more of an impression on history; this is certainly the case with Archidamus III (361-338) and his son Agis III (338-331). Diodorus says that Agis' father, Archidamus III, died in Italy fighting in the service of Tarentum on the same day and even at the same hour that the Greek alliance failed at Chaeronea.² This would perhaps account for the absence of a Spartan force in Boeotia on that fateful day, but it does not explain why Archidamus would take an army to Italy at a time when Philip was an active threat to Greek independence. The king and his force were no doubt fighting as mercenaries; Tarentum was a colony of Sparta, but to attribute altruistic motives to the Spartans or anyone else in this period would be idealistic. Sparta had been in difficult economic straits since the loss of Messenia, so it is possible that Archidamus' campaign was a state-sponsored, money-making venture, much in the order of the campaigns of Agesilaus II in Egypt in 361 b.c. He may also have felt that Philip was a danger to northern Greece only and, in typical Spartan fashion, was unconcerned about affairs north of the Peloponnesus. How many men Archidamus had with him is unknown, but neither Cleomenes II nor Agis attempted to lead a Spartan force north to Chaeronea.

After Philip had established his control over Greece, he called all of the allies together at Corinth and founded a new Hellenic League. The Spartans obstinately refused to join, stating that “their customs did not permit them to follow others, but to lead.”³ Although they had not dared to face Philip's forces in the earlier invasion of Laconia, Philip, on the other hand, had decided against an attack on Sparta, which would be strenuously defended and might detain his attention too long from the rest of Greece, where his hold was still tenuous at best.⁴ Philip needed the support of the Greek allies for his projected invasion of Asia Minor. So at Corinth, Philip laid the groundwork for his eastern campaign and ignored the insult from Sparta, recognizing it as a feeble gesture of defiance from a city badly weakened and surrounded by enemies.

Assassination put an end to Philip's plans, but Alexander continued his father's policies concerning both Asia and the Greeks. When the Persian expedition finally got underway in 334 b.c., he left Antipater behind in Macedonia to keep an eye on Greek affairs. It was only to be expected, however, that once Alexander was occupied in Asia, Sparta would try to recover both her prestige and her territories. Agis, now asserting his leadership, moved to revitalize the demoralized Spartan army and to seek new allies. Counting on a Persian victory, in 333 b.c., he sent envoys to Darius III;⁵ he himself sailed to Siphnus with a single trireme to meet there with Darius' representatives, Pharnabazus and Autophradates, and ask for monetary aid in raising a Greek revolt against Macedonia. Unluckily, Agis arrived at Siphnus at the same time as the report of Alexander's victory at Issus, but although the Persian commanders were naturally shocked at the news, the Spartan king still received thirty silver talents and ten triremes from Autophradates, all of which he sent to his brother Agesilaus at Taenarum to be used immediately against the pro-Macedonian cities on the island of Crete. Agis stayed for a time in the islands before eventually joining Autophradates at Halicarnassus, perhaps in hopes of gaining more aid. When it was not forthcoming, he sailed home.

The Persian defeat at Issus did not prove catastrophic to the Spartan plan since 8,000 Greek mercenaries, previously in Darius' army, now joined Agis, who used them to conquer and garrison many cities on Crete.⁶ In this way he gained himself a military reputation, but even so it was not until Antipater was engaged in quelling a rebellion in Thrace that the Spartans were able to form an alliance of the majority of the cities in the Peloponnese.⁷ Antipater rushed back from Thrace to meet this new threat, and in 331 b.c. faced and defeated the coalition in a battle fought near Megalopolis, a city loyal to Macedonia; Agis died in the battle.⁸ This ended the Peloponnesian alliance. According to Curtius the Macedonian victory broke the spirit not only of Sparta and her allies but also of others who had perhaps contemplated rebellion.⁹ Antipater, however, was not completely the victor since Alexander's policies concerning Greece had to be considered. For this reason he occupied none of the conquered cities, including Sparta, and rather than settle the peace himself, referred the matter to the council (synedrion) of the Hellenic League. The council, in turn, passed on the decision, especially concerning Sparta, to Alexander. Antipater did take hostage fifty of the noblest Spartiates; the remaining Spartans sent envoys to Asia “hoping to be forgiven for their mistakes.”¹⁰ Alexander reaffirmed all of the previous decisions on Sparta, and from this time until the death of Alexander in 323 b.c., quiet prevailed in the Peloponnesus.

The Lamian War, which broke out in the autumn of 323, found most of the Greeks in league against Antipater, who was now regent in Macedonia. Athens sought and obtained as allies some cities in the Peloponnesus, but once again Sparta remained aloof.¹¹ There are several possible reasons for Spartan neutrality, not the least of which was the fifty hostages taken to Macedonia by Antipater only eight years before. Sparta had no doubt also suffered a severe loss in manpower in her defeat at Megalopolis in 331, and if Sparta had put all of her resources into the previous effort, war may have been economically impossible. Arcadia must have remained neutral also, since none of the sources mention any of these cities as allies of either side; Sparta could not have marched north without going through Arcadian territory. Finally, there was the consideration of what might happen to Sparta if left practically undefended against long-standing enemies in southern Arcadia and Messenia.¹² With or without Sparta, the outcome would probably have been the same. Antipater was once again victorious (321 b.c.), and since he was no longer bound by Alexander's policies, the Greek cities lost their allied status and became tax-paying subjects of Macedonia; garrisons were placed in the strongest of the cities, and tyrants, supporting and supported by the Macedonian regent, took control in others. Of all the important cities of classical Greece, Sparta was the only one to escape both garrison and tyrant. Antipater also ignored this once great city.

Spartan foreign policy was still almost nonexistent when Antipater died in 319 b.c. He had taken no notice of Sparta in the last years of his reign, and this state of affairs might have continued indefinitely if Sparta had not become involved in the power struggle between Antipater's son, Cassander, and his designated successor, Polyperchon. Although the Spartans gave active support to neither contestant, they were openly in sympathy with Polyperchon until Cassander besieged Tegea in 317 b.c. They then began to regret their choice and to prepare for an invasion of Laconia. Justin says that Sparta strengthened both her army and her fortifications, seeing in the latter clear evidence of the degeneration of fourth-century Sparta and the increasing weakness of her position.¹³ Although she could still mobilize two to three thousand men plus mercenaries,¹⁴ the Spartan peripheral protection no longer existed, and the Spartan soldier now faced the enemy on his own frontier. Since Sparta still had no wall, the fortifications Justin mentions would have been meager at best, so the Spartans must have been greatly relieved when trouble in Macedonia forced Cassander to lift the siege of Tegea and return home. He had settled affairs by 316 b.c., however, and in the next year was back in the Peloponnese.

By 315 b.c. the struggle between Cassander and Polyperchon had become international in scope with each of the eastern satraps taking sides. Most of the Peloponnesus, either willingly or unwillingly, was allied against Cassander, but although he invaded Argos, Arcadia, and Messenia, he carefully avoided Laconia,¹⁵ perhaps because the Spartans had made no overt movement against him. At about the same time, however, Aristodemus of Miletus, who had just arranged an alliance between Polyperchon and Antigonus, arrived in Laconia, where he sought and received permission from the Spartans to recruit mercenaries in their territory. He hired eight thousand men from the Peloponnesus,¹⁶ many of whom were probably Spartans. After the loss of Messenian land and subsequent decline in the Spartan economic system, the Spartiate who had been dispossessed of his property had few opportunities for employment open to him, and it is significant that the old Spartan citizen-soldier was well into the process of becoming a professional soldier for hire. At the same time, mercenary service resulted in a dangerous loss of manpower on the home front.

It is impossible to assign a date for the beginning of Spartan mercenary service. For centuries Sparta was a closed society with a training program designed to provide the best citizen army in Greece. Even the number of exiles were few, the best known in the fifth century being the former king, Demaratus, who returned to Greece with the invading Persian army in some sort of advisory capacity to King Xerxes.¹⁷ In the fourth century, however, even Spartiates in good standing with the government volunteered for mercenary service. Spartans served in the army of Cyrus in his war against his brother, King Artaxerxes II, and no doubt could have been found in the Persian armies facing Alexander.¹⁸ Mercenary service could also be government policy. King Agesilaus II took a Spartan force to fight for Egypt in 361 b.c.,¹⁹ and in 338, Archidamus III had an army in southern Italy.²⁰ Closely allied to Spartan mercenary service in the fourth century was the use of Taenarum on the southern tip of Laconia as a recruiting base.²¹ Agis III sent the money and ships gotten from Autophradates to Taenarum, which seems also to have been a point of departure for Crete, since Agis' brother sailed from there. For some unknown reason recruiting operations ceased there after the fourth century, but for about fifty years Taenarum saw a great deal of activity.

That Spartan soldiers maintained a good reputation is evident in the fact that Spartan military aid was still sought by other cities. In 317 b.c., Syracusan exiles arrived in Sparta from Acragas, charged with the responsibility of bringing back a general to lead an alliance of a few Sicilian cities against Agathocles of Syracuse.²² Acrotatus, the elder son of Cleomenes II, quickly accepted the position, eager for the fame that a foreign command could bring him and anxious to get away from Sparta where he was extremely unpopular; he had opposed the decree that lifted the shame from those who had survived at Megalopolis.²³ He left immediately with only a few ships and without obtaining permission from the ephors, probably because he doubted that they would give him their consent, but although he set sail for Acragas, high winds drove him off course to the territory of Apollonia. Once there, acting like a true condottiere who takes employment where he can find it, Acrotatus aided the citizens of Apollonia in ending an Illyrian siege of their city and even effected a peace between the two enemies. Then once again he set sail, this time for the Spartan colony of Tarentum. After persuading the Tarentines, who placed great trust in his words because of his ancestry, to vote him twenty ships,²⁴ he finally arrived at Acragas and assumed command.

Up to this point Acrotatus had been a trifle dilatory, but at least had acted honorably. In Acragas, however, he exchanged Spartan austerity for the extravagance of a tyrant and succeeded in making himself so offensive that he insulted even the normally indulgent Sicilians. When he treacherously murdered Sosistratus, a prominent Syracusan exile who was known for his integrity, the remaining exiles and the townspeople united against him and forcibly removed him from the generalship. Acrotatus fled from Sicily in fear for his life, sailing secretly in the night for Laconia.²⁵ After his return to Sparta nothing more is heard from Acrotatus, but it is certain that he was dead by 309 b.c., the date of his father's death.²⁶

Of the two possible successors of Cleomenes II the more likely choice was Cleonymus who had already proved himself an able military leader. But Cleonymus had a violent nature, and the Spartans believed, probably correctly, that he was inclined toward absolute monarchy.²⁷ Areus, the son of Acrotatus and grandson of Cleomenes, became king instead. This was a decided insult to Cleonymus since he, as Cleomenes' only surviving son, had a better claim to kingship, and worse yet, Areus was only a child. But Cleonymus, who was not deemed worthy of ruling Sparta, was offered the generalship of the armies and may even have acted as regent during Areus' minority.²⁸ In this way the Spartans managed to have their cake and eat it too; Cleonymus was kept from becoming an autocrat, but his military expertise would benefit the army.

A new threat to the stability of Greece arose in 307 b.c. when Demetrius, the son of Antigonus I, began his campaign to wrest control of Greece from Cassander. He was not able to turn his attention toward the Peloponnesus until 303 b.c., but once there he was completely successful Demetrius eventually controlled Corinth, Achaea, the Argolid, all of Arcadia except Mantinea, and even managed to persuade the citizens of Sicyon to change the site of their city; but he did not invade Laconia. The sources give no reason for this; once again Sparta seems to have been saved by her ancient military reputation. Once Demetrius had returned to the Isthmus, he called together representatives of the Greek states and resurrected Philip's Hellenic League with himself as commander in chief. Again, Sparta refused to join; this time Messenia and Thessaly also abstained from membership. After garrisoning Acrocorinthus, Demetrius marched north to continue his war against Cassander.²⁹

For the fifth time in thirty-three years, Sparta had escaped Macedonian conquest: Philip, Alexander, Antipater, Cassander, and Demetrius all seemed to have weighed the risk of fighting Spartans at Sparta and decided that victory would cost too much in time and manpower. On the other hand, except for the short period of activity under Agis III, the Spartans had made no move against the Macedonians and actually were isolated in Laconia, surrounded by a ring of age-old enemies. Aside from Agis, the only defiance shown by Sparta was her two refusals to join the Hellenic League. The age of Spartan military glory seemed gone forever.

To Spartans, however, a military reputation was still of the highest importance, and as mentioned before, other states still looked to Sparta for military aid. Shortly after Demetrius left the Peloponnesus, an embassy arrived from Tarentum seeking Spartan help in the Tarentine war with the Lucanians and Romans. Since Demetrius was no longer a threat, Cleonymus accepted the Tarentine offer, with the blessings of the ephors.³⁰ He then, with Tarentine gold, hired five thousand soldiers from the Peloponnesus, again many of them no doubt Spartans, and later in Tarentum enlisted some Italians. These men, plus the Tarentine troops, gave him an army numbering over twenty thousand;³¹ the Lucanians, in terror, asked Tarentum for peace. Cleonymus, however, was not satisfied with such an easy turn of events, since he had hoped to use the command as the first step to personal power. Thus, when the citizens of Metapontum refused to come over to him, he persuaded the now friendly Lucanians to join him in an attack on the Metapontine territory. The city eventually surrendered, and the citizens received Cleonymus as a friend. In spite of that, he demanded from them six hundred talents of silver and two hundred maidens of the best families as hostages—not as a security measure, says Diodorus, but merely to satisfy his own desire.³² Then, as seems to have been typical of commanders outside Sparta, he settled down to a life of luxury.

Cleonymus, although he had a strong army and ample supplies, used them haphazardly. After making ambitious plans to invade Sicily and overthrow Agathocles, he turned instead to Corcyra, gained the city, exacted tribute, and installed a garrison, intending to make this his base of operations against Greece. At this time envoys proposing alliances came to him from both Cassander and Demetrius, but he joined neither. Instead, learning that the Tarentines were no longer obeying his commands, he sailed back to Italy, leaving behind the garrison on Corcyra. He landed in the territory of Tarentum and took an unknown town, sold its inhabitants into slavery and plundered the countryside. The city of Triopium also fell.³³ Now, however, the natives throughout the region rallied against Cleonymus, and in a night attack upon his camp, they killed more than two hundred of his men and took about one thousand prisoners. When at the same time a storm destroyed twenty of his ships, Cleonymus cut his losses and sailed again for Corcyra, where he now established a base for piratical raids in the Adriatic. His ventures took him back to Italy as far north as the Venetian lagoons, only to suffer a severe defeat at the hands of the inhabitants of this area. In 300 b.c., Agathocles captured Corcyra and ended the pirate career of Cleonymus, who then returned to the Greek mainland.

The expeditions of both Acrotatus and Cleonymus were private, mercenary enterprises, not undertaken in behalf of the state, although the latter had gained permission from the ephors. Once that campaign was launched, however, the city had nothing to do with either provision or strategy, and the army was hired from the whole of the Peloponnese with Tarentine gold. Cleonymus' exploits gained him offers of alliance from both Cassander and Demetrius—but they sought the alliance of Cleonymus the condottiere and his mercenary band, not of Cleonymus and Sparta. And of special interest, no doubt, was Corcyra, a strategically important island in any age. This is made evident by the fact that when Cleonymus lost the island and returned to Sparta, no further attempt was made to gain his friendship. Once outside Sparta, both brothers fell victim to temptation and, in their enjoyment of a new luxurious life-style, lost sight of their original objective. Diodorus says of each man that “he did nothing worthy of Sparta”³⁴

Meanwhile, at Ipsus in Asia Minor, one of the great battles of antiquity had been fought in 301 b.c. Cassander, who wisely decided that Macedonia and Greece were enough for him to govern, left the repartitioning of the east to others and returned to Pella, where he died in 298 b.c. He was followed in death after only a few months by his eldest son and successor, Philip IV, and Macedonia was then divided between the remaining sons of Cassander, Antipater I and Alexander V. At the same time Demetrius, who had returned to Greece after the battle of Ipsus only to find himself deserted by his former allies, began his new campaign to gain the Macedonian throne.

By 294 b.c., Athens had capitulated to Demetrius, and he was free to turn toward Sparta. This time Sparta did not wait for an invasion, and this proved her undoing. The Eurypontid king Archidamus IV led out an army which was defeated and routed in a battle with Demetrius' forces near Mantinea.³⁵ Obviously, Archidamus must have been able to rally his men, since a second pitched battle was fought closer to Sparta, but once again Demetrius was victorious; this time he captured five hundred men and killed two hundred. Although the Spartans had reinforced whatever defenses had been erected previously against Cassander in 317 b.c.,³⁶ the city was about to fall when word came to Demetrius from Alexander V asking him for help against his brother Antipater. He immediately marched north, forgetting the Spartans in his desire to get on more solid ground with the Macedonians, but this time only blind luck had saved Sparta. If a more enticing opportunity had not been offered, Sparta would have been conquered by Demetrius and no doubt garrisoned. She had put up a stiff resistance, and there is no record of cowardice on the part of any Spartan, but her manpower was just not equal to the situation. In 294 b.c. the gods were on the side of Sparta—and perhaps of Demetrius too, since by the end of the year he was king of Macedonia.

Once Demetrius I was master of Macedonia, he first conquered Thessaly and then, in 293 b.c., turned against the Boeotians, who made friendly agreements with him until an army under the Spartan Cleonymus arrived at Thebes. None of the sources indicate whether or not Cleonymus was hired to bring an army, but it is doubtful that he would have led his troops north without monetary enticements. As for government policy, although sending armies to the Isthmus to keep invaders out of the Peloponnese had been an old Spartan practice, aggressively seeking out the enemy was not. This was probably another individual venture of the part of Cleonymus to gain wealth and fame for himself, although the ephors might have given him permission, as they had previously, to recruit his troops in Laconia. At his arrival Thebes revolted, but when Demetrius laid siege to the city, Cleonymus fled in fear of the siege weapons, leaving the Thebans no choice but to surrender.³⁷ Fortunately Demetrius did not pursue Cleonymus into the Peloponnese, and a twelve-year period of relative quiet followed his return to Sparta.

Spartan leadership for half a century, with the exception of Agis III, had been apathetic and almost lifeless. By 281 b.c., however, Areus was king in his own right, and the operation of foreign affairs was once again in the hands of an ambitious monarch who stood ready to make his bid for hegemony of the Peloponnesus. When another power struggle developed in Macedonia, this time between Antigonus Gonatas, the son of Demetrius, and Ptolemy Ceraunus, exiled son of Ptolemy I, Areus seized the opportunity to put his plans into operation. Encouraged by the turmoil in the north, most of the Greek cities, led by Sparta, allied against Macedonia, and by the winter of 281 b.c., Areus had re-formed the old Peloponnesian League.³⁸ In 280, he marched north at the head of a coalition army of Spartans, Eleans, and Arcadians. Although Sparta's old enemies Argos and Megalopolis had expelled their Macedonian garrisons, they refused to join an army led by Sparta, but at the news of the march, four Achaean cities, Patrae, Dyme, Tritaea, and Pharae, broke away from Macedonian control and joined the coalition.

But with all their show of force, the Greeks were still afraid to attack Macedonia directly. Instead, Areus and his army shipped from Patrae across the Corinthian Gulf to Aetolia, which was not only an ally of Gonatas but also offered an opportunity for plunder. Areus, using the excuse that Aetolia had occupied the Cirrhian plain dedicated to Delphi, laid waste the Aetolian homeland, but when the beleaguered inhabitants retaliated with guerrilla warfare, the allied army began to suffer. Finally the allies refused to go further, the coalition collapsed and Areus, checked by both enemies and friends, returned to Sparta.³⁹ The Achaean cities, including the four former allies of Areus, then reconstituted the old Achaean League, which had been broken up after Ipsus and which was to become the constant enemy of Sparta in the third century b.c.

Thus Areus had failed in his first extra-Peloponnesian venture, but the fault may not have been his entirely. Although sources are clear on the fact that he led the army, his role in the strategy of the campaign and in the negotiations with the allies is obscure. There is no doubt that Sparta initiated the reconstruction of the Peloponnesian League and that her king was accepted as the general of the coalition army. This is very typically the policy of a strong monarchical leadership as against the quiescent, stay-at-home policy typical of the ephors. Areus must have the prime mover of the league and of the campaign against the Aetolians, but he would also face opposition from the ephors. Once it became apparent that the allies were dissatisfied with Areus' leadership, with or without good reason, the ephors may have been able to step in and conduct the negotiations in such a way that the alliance would fall apart. The allies also did not seem to have the necessary courage for a difficult campaign, since they were ready to retreat as soon as they faced stiff opposition from the Aetolians. It is impossible to judge Areus' military ability from this campaign; failure did not dull his ambition, as is apparent from subsequent events.

In 280 b.c., however, it was necessary for Areus both to gain some military success that would wipe out the memory of defeat and also to refill the treasury, which must have been depleted by the expense of the Aetolian campaign. Thus Areus joined the ranks of the condottieri by answering the call from Gortyn for military aid, setting out for Crete perhaps shortly after he had returned from Aetolia.⁴⁰ At any rate, by 279 b.c., when the Gauls were approaching Thermopylae, Pausanias says that neither the Messenians nor the Arcadians joined the other Greeks in defense of the pass for fear that the Spartans would invade their territory while they were gone.⁴¹ Obviously the Spartans did not go either. This in itself would indicate that Areus either could not persuade the ephors to grant permission for this campaign or that he was no longer in Sparta. There is a firm basis for the latter supposition since Pausanias also states that “Cleonymus and the Lacedaemonians” refused to grant Messenia the necessary truce so that she might go to Thermopylae.⁴² Areus seems to have left Cleonymus behind as his agent, or—more likely perhaps—once Areus was out of the way, Cleonymus had reasserted himself.

Cleonymus took firm hold of Spartan foreign affairs, extending Spartan power in the Peloponnese and at the same time seeking powerful allies against the Macedonian king. He was unsuccessful in bringing aid to Elis, which, although occupied by the Messenians, had a strong pro-Spartan party,⁴³ but at Troezen he expelled Craterus, the half-brother of Gonatas, and replaced the Macedonian garrison with Spartans.⁴⁴ It is possible that he also entered into an alliance with Apollodorus, the tyrant of Cassandreia and friend of the Seleucid monarch, Antiochus I.⁴⁵ And finally, it was during this period that Cleonymus attempted to fortify his position in the city by marrying Chilonis, a Eurypontid princess much younger than himself, and by seeking to raise up the masses against the oligarchy and the constitution. If he felt his last action to be necessary, it would seem that the government was at least nominally loyal to the absent king. He was frustrated in both his political and marital plans, however, for he obtained few revolutionary followers, and Chilonis made no secret of her love for Acrotatus, the son of Areus. The lack of support on the part of the people probably stemmed not so much from a desire to keep the monarchy for Areus as to keep it from Cleonymus with his reputation for violence. Sometime before 274 b.c., therefore, Cleonymus was forced to leave Sparta, whether in disgust or in exile it is difficult to say. That year found him in the service of Pyrrhus, king of Epirus, who was then engaged in the acquisition of western Macedonia and Thessaly. It was Cleonymus who urged Pyrrhus to turn to Sparta.

Pyrrhus had returned to Greece from his misadventures in southern Italy and Sicily in 275 b.c. to rebuild his military reputation by the conquest of western Macedonia and Thessaly. He accomplished this by defeating the new ruler of Macedonia, Antigonus Gonatas, the son of his old mentor Demetrius I. So in 272 b.c., when Cleonymus approached Pyrrhus with his scheme to regain control of Sparta, the Epirote king eagerly accepted the opportunity to gain new conquests, perhaps without even considering the possibility of a Spartan-Macedonian retaliatory alliance, so little respect had he for the defeated Gonatas.⁴⁶ Pyrrhus entered the Peloponnesus with twenty-five thousand infantry and two thousand cavalry as well as twenty-four elephants, all of which was a good indication, as Plutarch points out, that he came “to possess the Peloponnese for himself, not Sparta for Cleonymus,”⁴⁷ but he seems to have been welcomed at Megalopolis since his primary objective was so obviously Sparta. When a Spartan embassy came to him there, he denied any intentions of invading Laconia and declared that he would send his younger sons to Sparta to be given a Spartan education, thus lulling the citizens into a false sense of security, even when he started his march south. As soon as he reached Laconia, however, he began plundering the territory and, arriving at night before Sparta, almost took the city by surprise only to lose his advantage when, against the advice of Cleonymus, he decided to wait until daylight to attack.⁴⁸

Plutarch, in his life of Pyrrhus, has given a dramatic account of the heroic defense of Sparta in this emergency, and the episode is a testimony to the survival, under less happy circumstances, of the antique Spartan character. Cleonymus and Pyrrhus had chosen the perfect time to invade, with Areus and most of the men fighting in Crete. But the two allies, who had also hoped to capitalize on the fact that Areus was supposedly none too popular with the oligarchy in Sparta, found instead that Cleonymus was disliked even more.⁴⁹ Since Eurypontid history at that time is hazy, it is not known exactly who was king, although, whoever he was, he obviously exerted no authority and did nothing. In this extremity it was the women who saved the city. A certain Archidamia led the other women in resisting a plan of the men to smuggle them out of Laconia to Crete. The women claimed that they had no desire to live if Sparta should perish. Since the city still did not have a ring wall, the men decided to run a trench, eight hundred feet long, parallel to the enemy camp. At both ends of the trench, which was six cubits wide and four cubits deep, they planned to embed wagons up to the axles in order to stop the elephants, and all of this had to be completed in the one night's respite given by Pyrrhus. The women, taking matters into their own hands, sent the few fighting men off to rest and then, working through the night, dug the last third of the trench themselves. The next morning the weary women sent out the army with words of praise and encouragement, while Chilonis stood aside with a rope around her neck so that Cleonymus would not take her alive.⁵⁰

There has been some hesitancy on the part of certain modern historians to accept this story of the courage displayed by the Spartan women during Pyrrhus' attack on the city. Aristotle had castigated them for their cowardice when Epaminondas and the Thebans had invaded Laconia in 369 b.c.⁵¹ and for their lack of discipline and greed for wealth.⁵² There is no reason, however, to doubt that both Spartan men and women rallied vigorously and resolutely in the face of such grave danger to their city. Aristotle claims that by this time the women controlled two-fifths of Spartan territory,⁵³ so it is conceivable that they acted courageously out of a desire to protect their property, but first and foremost, they had made the decision to stay in Sparta when they could have gone to Crete, and after this it was common sense to do all they could to keep the city and themselves from falling into enemy hands. It was only a small army which faced Pyrrhus the next morning, but it was determined to protect Sparta at all costs.

Although Pyrrhus himself led the attack that day, the loose dirt of the freshly dug trench made it all but impossible for his men to get a firm foothold. Ptolemy, Pyrrhus' eldest son, then took two thousand Gauls and Chaonians and tried to force his way through the wagons, but as long as they were embedded in the soil they made both the enemy offense and the Spartan defense difficult. Finally the Gauls began to pull up the wagons and drag them away. Acrotatus, however, realizing the danger to Sparta if these defenses should fail, rallied three hundred men and, taking advantage of the sloping ground, secretly circled around behind Ptolemy. This sudden attack on his rear forced Ptolemy to wheel about and recall the Gauls from the wagons, but Acrotatus and his men did not get back to safety easily, and many lives were lost in the effort. A fierce battle also raged around Pyrrhus, but night put an end to the fighting with neither side victorious.

At daybreak the battle began again. Pyrrhus' men attempted to fill up the trench with whatever material they could find, while the king himself tried to force the wagon wall. Once again the battle was fierce, but finally, after Pyrrhus' horse was killed, he called a halt to the fighting. By this time many Spartans had fallen in battle, and most of those remaining were wounded. Pyrrhus hoped that they would realize the hopelessness of their situation and make concessions, but the gods once again smiled on Sparta. Just when defeat seemed imminent, Ameinas, a Phocian general in the service of Antigonus, arrived from Corinth with mercenary troops to aid Sparta. Pyrrhus had inadvertently thrown Sparta and Macedonia together in their mutual desire to halt him. Shortly after the arrival of Ameinas, Areus returned from Crete, probably brought back by urgent messages from home. With him were two thousand soldiers.⁵⁴

It is doubtful that the Spartans had sought aid from Macedon although Gonatas' decision to send on troops from Corinth (he had only just arrived there) was a wise diplomatic move on the part of the Macedonian king. Gonatas naturally stood to gain by thwarting Pyrrhus' plans for the Peloponnesus, and if he could do this and end the old Spartan enmity at the same time, he would doubly benefit from the maneuver. Against both Macedonian and Spartan reinforcements Pyrrhus could accomplish nothing, but instead of retreating north, he took out his rage and disappointment in ravaging the countryside of Laconia, stopping only when envoys from one of the factions in dispute at Argos approached him about military aid for their party. He then started for Argos, constantly harassed on the way by Areus who, with frequent ambushes, continually cut off the Gauls and Molossians bringing up the rear of the army. This technique was so effective that Pyrrhus eventually sent Ptolemy to take charge of the rear. When Ptolemy was killed in the fighting, however, the overconfident Spartans decided they could take on the whole of Pyrrhus' army and, against orders, rushed onto a plain. Areus could do nothing to prevent a vengeful Pyrrhus and his Molossian cavalry from slaughtering the outnumbered Spartans. Plutarch says that this additional loss to Sparta when the war was already over was due to “the ambition of the commanders.”⁵⁵ The desire for vengeance was probably a stronger motive, but as a result, Areus lost part of his best troops in a needless battle. Pyrrhus died a brief time after this in Argos; nothing more is known of Cleonymus.

Once again Sparta had been saved from capture and loss of independence. This time her citizens fought bravely in her defense, but luck played a large part also, for the city surely would have fallen if the Macedonian reinforcements had not appeared on the scene just at the right moment, and the timely arrival of Areus' troops was one more bit of good fortune. It took a civil disturbance in Argos to draw Pyrrhus out of Laconia, and even then the Spartans needlessly lost a large number of lives in an undisciplined action during the pursuit. Their success in holding off the enemy, however, no doubt strongly influenced future events.

The affair of Pyrrhus, if it accomplished nothing else, greatly enhanced the prestige of Areus. The Spartan king had followed his enemy to Argos to join forces with Gonatas and his Macedonian army in defeating Pyrrhus there. It is possible (though not probable) that the Spartans and Macedonians now entered into an alliance,⁵⁶ if so, it was of brief duration. Ptolemy II of Egypt, who had been subsidizing Pyrrhus as his agent against Gonatas, was so impressed by Areus' performance that he now turned to the Spartan king as his new champion. To the Spartans Ptolemy offered the hope of a restored hegemony in the Peloponnese; to Areus he held out the opportunity for personal glory and a large amount of Egyptian gold.⁵⁷ But the most compelling reason for accepting the Egyptian alliance and not the Macedonian, was probably the fact that Ptolemy was far away in Egypt while Gonatas was all too close at hand. The new Spartan policy would scarcely come as a surprise to Gonatas, since he had done nothing to reassure the Spartans that he was concerned for the liberty of Greece and instead had fostered tyrannies in Argos and Megalopolis, the natural enemies of Sparta, while maintaining the garrison on Acrocorinthus. Sparta could hardly quarrel immediately with the man who had rescued the city from sure destruction, but the tyrannies sponsored by Gonatas were good grounds for an eventual break with Macedonia.

Ptolemy proposed to attack Gonatas with a powerful Greek alliance backed by Egyptian naval and financial support, a plan which actually had been set in motion by his late wife Arsinoë II in order to place her son, Ptolemaeus, on the throne of Macedonia. Ptolemy supported Ptolemaeus' claim to that region, probably to keep him from meddling in the succession in Egypt. Thus the Egyptian king formed a coalition with Sparta and Athens which he hoped would result in Ptolemaeus replacing Gonatus—at least that was the plan as long as Arsinoë was directing operations. When the war started in 267 b.c., Arsinoë was dead.

The war officially began when Chremonides, an Athenian, offered in the Athenian ecclesia a resolution inviting the Greeks to form a general league of liberation against their common enemy, Macedonia. His success was limited, but his name was given to the Chremonidean War, which lasted for almost six years. Athens made an alliance with the Spartans, her first since the Persian War; Sparta brought with her as allies Achaea, Elis, most of Arcadia, and part of Crete. Ptolemy's fleet, under Patroclus, was sent into the Saronic Gulf. Since Athens and Sparta were divided by Gonatas' garrisons at the Isthmus, the Egyptian fleet was extremely important as a connecting link. Gonatas had as his allies Argos and Megalopolis; Boeotia and Aetolia remained neutral but friendly to Macedon. Most important, however, was the fact that the king held the Isthmus with his garrisons on Acrocorinthus and in Megara.⁵⁸

Gonatas took the initiative in 266 b.c. by invading Attica and cutting off the Athenian supply line, but Patroclus retaliated by capturing Sunium and operating a blockade-running service to Athens, which was fairly successful. Still, the Egyptian admiral was careful, probably on orders from Ptolemy, never to engage the Macedonian fleet in combat, and perhaps for the same reason he never attempted to ferry Areus' troops across the gulf. Instead, in 265 b.c. Areus made a frontal attack upon the Macedonian fortifed position at Corinth. Why he attempted this foolhardy action is not known, but it is probable that his Spartan pride and Ptolemy's generous financial support encouraged him to make the attempt. Areus was defeated and killed in the battle.⁵⁹ After this the Spartans made no further attempt to help Athens, and the city fell in 262 b.c.; a lasting peace between Athens and Macedonia was made in 261. As a result of the Chremonidean War, the former work of Areus in the Peloponnesus was destroyed. Achaea abrogated her alliance, Mantinea joined the Arcadian League, and the Dentheliatis (which had become Spartan again at an unknown time) was restored to Messenia. Areus had made a gallant effort, but without the aid of the Egyptian fleet the campaign was doomed from the beginning.

Although the Chremonidean War was a fairly short and uncomplicated affair, there are two difficulties: Why did Patroclus refuse to transport the Spartan army to Attica? And were there one or two campaign seasons at Corinth? It is impossible to learn the answers to the first question, although with Gonatas controlling both the Isthmus and Piraeus, Patroclus seems to have been stalemated. No landing could be made in unfriendly Aetolia either, and Boeotia was neutral.⁶⁰ As for the Spartan campaigns and the date of the death of Areus, the generally accepted theory is that Areus marched to Corinth twice, in 266 and 265, and that it was during the second season that he attacked the city and was killed.⁶¹ Diodorus leaves little doubt as to the date of Areus' death since he says that the king ruled for forty-four years after succeeding his grandfather (who died in 309 b.c.).⁶² If Areus' reign ended in 265 and the war officially started with the Macedonian action in 266, then obviously there must have been two campaigns, the second one fatal to Areus.⁶³

The period of Areus' rule brought about some interesting internal changes in Sparta. According to Phylarchus, Areus introduced courtly luxury and extravagance,⁶⁴ and it is generally acknowledged that he coined the first Spartan money,⁶⁵ placing his head on it in the manner of a Hellenistic king. He was also the first, and possibly the only, Spartan king for whom an inscription of honor was erected outside Sparta. On a fragment of this inscription found at Delphi, Areus is designated as the son of King Acrotatus and Queen Chilonis⁶⁶ in a typically Hellenistic manner although his father was not a king, nor was his mother a queen. To mention his mother, furthermore, was contrary to Spartan customs, but indicative of an age in which women had begun to play an important part in public affairs. A statue honoring Areus was also erected by Ptolemy II at Olympia.⁶⁷

It is unfortunate that our sources on Areus are so brief. From what we do know about him, it is obvious that he was a strong personality in a period of weak Spartan kings. In his policy of expansion, he acted in the tradition of the old kings, but he was Hellenistic in his coalitions with Antigonus, Ptolemy, and Athens, and in his coining of money. Modern historians have generally not been kind to Areus, but this does him less than justice. In both his attempts to gain the leadership of Greece, he was betrayed by his allies, once in Aetolia and again at Corinth when Patroclus failed to provide the necessary support for the coalition. Justin said that the other Greeks feared Spartan ambitions,⁶⁸ and perhaps this was true. But it is also true that Areus, whatever his personal motives, took the lead in endeavoring to free Greece from Macedonian control, and his failure to do so was in large part due to the hesitation of his allies.

Areus was succeeded by his son Acrotatus, about whom very little is known other than his love affair with Chilonis and his defense of Sparta against Pyrrhus. Plutarch says he was defeated and killed by the tyrant Aristodemus in a battle at Megalopolis.⁶⁹ The date usually given is ca. 260 b.c., indicating that Acrotatus did not long survive his father. From the death of Acrotatus until the beginning of the reign of Agis IV, a period of almost twenty years, the sources are silent. Sparta, however, had suffered several severe military setbacks, and the loss of manpower must have been grievous at a time when the Spartan population had already decreased greatly as a result of domestic problems. Sparta retired into a period of quiet to recoup her losses. But she remained free, she paid no tribute, she had no foreign garrison within her city, and even in defeat, she had suffered no shame.

Notes

1. According to Carl Roebuck, “The Settlement of Philip II in 338 b.c.,” CPh 43 (1948):84-85, Philip“in supporting Argos, Arcadia, and Messene as a bloc against Sparta … had adopted Epaminondas' solution of the Peloponnesian problem.”

2. Diod. xvi.88.3.

3. Arr. i.l.2.

4. E. Badian, “Agis III,” Hermes 95 (1967):171-72, suggests that Philip left Sparta independent as a deterrent to his Greek allies and compares Philip's policy to that of Flamininus in 196 b.c. This is stretching the analogy, however, since Agis put up no fight against Philip and was in a vulnerable position, while Nabis, in a strongly fortified city, gave Flamininus cause to respect the military ability of Sparta. See [Piper, Linda J. “Sparta after Alexander.” In Spartan Twilight. New Rochelle, N.Y.: Aristide D. Caratzas, 1986.], pp. 106-110.

5. Arrian (iii.24.4) says these envoys were captured by Alexander after Issus and cites the names “Pausippus,” “Monimus,” “Onomas,” and “Callicratides,” but in ii.15.2 he mentions a Spartan Euthycles taken at Damascus. Curtius says the envoys (Onomastorides, Onomas, and Callicratides) became mercenaries in Darius' army and did not surrender until after the Persian king's death; iii.13.15 and vi.5.7. John C. Rolfe, in his translation of Curtius for the Loeb Classical Library (I, pp. 150-51, n. c), doubts the validity of the reference in book iii.

6. Diod. xvii.48.1. Curtius (iv.1.39-40 and vi.1.1) indicates that the cities were divided in allegiance between Sparta and Macedonia.

7. Diod. xvii.62.4-8; Curt. vi.1.1. Arrian (iii.6.3) says Alexander sent aid to those Peloponnesians not disposed toward rebellion. For an excellent analysis of participating and nonparticipating states, see E. I. McQueen, “Some Notes on the Anti-Macedonian Movement in the Peloponnese in 331 b.c.,” Hist 27 (1978):40-51.

8. Diod. xvii. 63; Curt. vi. 1; Just. xii. 1.8-11. The sources disagree on the date of the battle of Megalopolis, which could have taken place as early as September of 331 b.c. and as late as August of 330. R. A. Lock, “The Date of Agis III's War in Greece,” Antichton 6 (1972):10-27, reviews at length the information given by the ancient sources, but comes to no clear conclusion; the battle “occurred after November 331 and not later than April of the following year.” G. L. Cawkwell, “The Crowning of Demosthenes,” CQ 19 (1969):170-80, and B. Niese, Geschichte der Griechischen und Makedonischen Staaten seit der Schlacht bei Chaeronea, repr. (Darmstadt, 1963), Vol. I, pp. 497-500, both argue for a date in the middle of 330 b.c. Most scholars accept Curtius' version as the more logical, placing the battle in September 331, just shortly before Gaugamela. See E. N. Borza, “The End of Agis' Revolt,” CP 66 (1971):230-35 and McQueen, “Some Notes,” p. 55. The sources agree that the Macedonian forces numbered forty thousand while the Greeks had only twenty thousand men, but we should hesitate to accept this as fact.

9. Curt. vi.1.16.

10. Diod. xvii.73.5-6; Curt. vi.1.17-20. On the question of whether or not King Agesipolis II was one of the Spartan hostages (as suggested in Plut. Mor. 251 B) see McQueen, “Some Notes,” pp. 60-64.

11. Paus. i.25.4; Diod. xviii.11.2. Also neutral were Arcadia, most of Achaea, and Megara.

12. For an interpretive study of Sparta's foreign policy, 331-263 b.c. see P. Cloché, “La politique extérieure de Lacédémonie depuis la mort d'Agis III jusqu'à celle d'Acrotatus, fils d'Areus I,” REA 47 (1945):218-42 and 48 (1946):29-61.

13. Just. xiv.5.6-7.

14. Diod. xvii.63.3. This is supposedly the number that fought at Megalopolis in 331 b.c.

15. Diod. xix.64.1.

16. Diod. xix.57.5; 60.1.

17. Herod. vii.234-37.

18. Diod. xvii.48.1. Since eight thousand mercenaries joined Agis, it is reasonable to speculate that many of them were originally Peloponnesians and that a percentage of those came from Laconia.

19. Plut. Ages. xxxvi.1.; Xen. Ages. ii.28-31. W. K. Pritchett, The Greek State at War (Berkeley, Calif., 1974), Part II, pp. 89-90, argues convincingly that Agesilaus was acting as a condottiere in this campaign.

20. Diod. xvi.88.3.

21. G. T. Griffith, The Mercenaries of the Hellenistic World (Cambridge, England), pp. 259-60.

22. Diod. xix.70.2-3.

23. Diod. xix.70.4-6. Niese (I, p. 437, n.3) suggests his opposition was Eurypontid policy, since the war had been an Agiad venture. See also McQueen, “Some Notes,” p. 59.

24. Diod. xix.70.8.

25. Diod. xix.71.1-5. He had squandered the war funds on luxurious living and no doubt feared Sosistratus in addition to being jealous of his prominence.

26. Plut. Agis iii.4; Diod. xx.29.1.

27. Plut. Pyr. xxvi.8. There is no doubt of Cleonymus' military ability. See Polyaen. ii.29; Frontinus Strat. iii.6.7.

28. Areus was born in 312 b.c. The choice of Areus as king was not strictly in accordance with Spartan custom, since his father (Acrotatus) died before his grandfather (Cleomenes II). The successor should have been Cleonymus, but popularity, or the lack of it, seems to have played a major role in the final decision. If Cleonymus did act as regent for his nephew, this may have led Polyaenus (ii.29.1) erroneously to call him King of the Lacedaemonians in referring to a time when Areus was definitely king.

29. Plut. Dem. xxv.1-3.

30. In the year 302 b.c. Cleonymus could have been the first Spartan to fight the Romans. Livy (x.2.1-3), however, gives two versions: first that the consul Aemilius” in one battle forced the enemy to flee to his ships” and second that he finds “in some annals … that Cleonymus left Italy before it became necessary to fight against the Romans.” The latter is more likely.

31. Diod. xx.104.2.

32. Diod. xx.104.3. Also Duris of Samos, FGrHist 76 F 18. For a discussion of the factors involved at this time see C. A. Giannelli, “Gli interventi di Cleonimo e di Agatocle in Magna Grecia,” CS 11 (1974):353-67.

33. Diod. xx.104-105; Livy x.2.1-3. Livy mentions that Cleonymus took an Italian city named Thuriae (otherwise unknown), but R. Geer (vol. X, L.C.L. edition of Diodorus) claims this occurred the year after Triopium fell.

34. Diod. xx.104.4

35. Plut. Dem. 35.1; Polyaen. iv.7.9-10.

36. Pausanias (i.13.6), in discussing the fortifications raised against Pyrrhus in 272 b.c., relates: “Even before this, in the war with Demetrius, Sparta had been fortified by a strong palisade and deep moats, and also with buildings at the most assailable points.”

37. Plut. Dem. 39.2. Demetrius' siege machines, on the other hand, must have been fearsome—thus his nickname, “Poliorcetes.”

38. Just. xxiv.1.2.

39. Just. xxiv.1.7. The allies accused the Spartans of seeking“their domination, not the liberty of Greece.”

40. Plut. Pyr. xxvii.1.

41. Paus. iv.28.3 on Messenia; viii.6.3 on Arcadia. In vii.6.7, Pausanias claims that none of the Peloponnesians marched against the Gauls at Thermopylae.

42. Paus. iv.28.3.

43. Paus. iv.28.4-6.

44. Polyaen, ii.29.1.

45. Paus. iv.5.4; Polyaen, vi.7.2.

46. Paus. i.13.4. Pausanias claims Cleonymus prevented Pyrrhus from completing the conquest of Macedonia by diverting his mind from more important affairs with a promise of Sparta. For an analysis of Pyrrhus' campaign in the Peloponnese, see P. Lévêque, Pyrrhos (Paris, 1957), pp. 576-613.

47. Plut. Pyr. xxvi.9. For an interesting interpretation of Pyrrhus' plans for the Peloponnese, see C. F. Lehmann, “Der erste syrische Krieg und die Weltlage um 275-273 v. Chr.” Klio 3(1903):537-47.

48. Plut. Pyr. xxvii.1-2. Justin (xxv.4.4) claims that Pyrrhus received envoys seeking alliance from the Athenians, Achaeans, and Messenians, while Pausanias (iv.29.6) says that the Argives and Messenians came as allies to aid Sparta. Plutarch mentions no allies for either side, and this is probably correct.

49. E. Will, Histoire politique du monde hellénistique (323-30 av. J.-C.) (Nancy, 1966-67), Vol. I, p. 192. Plutarch (Pyr. xxvii.2) does indicate, however, that the friends and helots of Cleonymus spent the night in getting his house ready for his return.

50. Plut. Pyr. xxvii.2-5.

51. Arist. Pol. 1269b. Both Plutarch (Ages. xxxi.4) and Xenophon (Hell. vi.5.28) emphasize that the women were afraid because they had never seen an enemy fire before.

52. Arist. Pol. 1269b.

53. Arist. Pol. 1270a.

54. Plut. Pyr. xxix.3-6.

55. Plut. Pyr. xxx.6.

56. Justin (xxvi.1.1) is not clear on the status of Sparta.

57. W. W. Tarn, Antigonos Gonatas (Chicago, 1969), p. 293 n. 48, bases this premise on the larger number of Ptolemaic coins of the third century b.c. found in Laconia; see A. H. B. Wace, BSA XIV (1907-1908):149. Ptolemy Philadelphus dedicated a statue of Areus at Olympia: SIG³ 433.

58. Unfortunately, there are no literary sources for this war, but events can be reconstructed, in part, from a long inscription found at Athens commemorating the treaty between the city and Sparta; see SIG³ 434/35.

59. Plut. Ag. iii.4. Pausanias (iii.6.6.) says that Areus and his men were forced to make a strategic withdrawal because of a lack of supplies.

60. W.W. Tarn, Ant. Gon., pp. 299-300.

61. W.W. Tarn, “The New Dating of the Chremonidean War,” JHS 54 (1934): 26-39.

62. Diod. xx.29.1.

63. H. Heinen, Untersuchungen zur hellenistischen Geschichte des 3. Jahrhunderts v. Chr., pp. 201-202, has a theory, based mainly on previously ignored material from the Athenian archon lists, that there were three campaigns, beginning in 267 b.c. His reasoning is interesting but highly speculative.

64. Phylar, frag. 43, FHG I. 175; FGrHist 81 F 44.

65. Head, HN² p. 434; a tetradrachma of Areus. The same coin is in C. M. Kraay, Greek Coins (London, 1966), p. 520. Of special importance is the recent work of Susanne Grunauer-von Hoerschelmann, Die Münzprägung der Lakedaimonier (Berlin, 1978), pp. 1-4 and plate 1.

66. SIG³ 430.

67. SIG³ 433. Pausanias (vi.12.5) discusses this statue.

68. Just. xxiv.1.7.

69. Plut. Ag. iii.5. W. W. Tran, “The Arcadian League and Aristodemus,” CR 39(1925):104-107, explains a confused section in Pausanias, which claims that Aratus defeated and killed Agis IV at Mantinea, clearly an impossibility, by suggesting that this was the battle in which Aristodemus defeated and killed Acrotatus with the help of the Arcadian League. This would account for Pausanias without rejecting him entirely and would also clear up some of the questions concerning Megalopolis' defeat of a supposedly superior Sparta. It is an interesting theory with several points in its favor, but it does not offer enough evidence for a rejection of Plutarch, who is usually much more reliable than Pausanias.

List of Abbreviations

AC: L'Antiquité Classique

AClass: Acta Classica

AHR: American Historical Review

AIV: Atti dell'Istituto Veneto di Scienze Lettere ed Arti

AJA: American Journal of Archaeology

AJAH: American Journal of Ancient History

AJPh: American Journal of Philology

AncSoc: Ancient Society

Athen: Athenaeum

BCH: Bulletin de Correspondence Hellénique

BFC: Bolletino di Filologia Classica

BHJ: Birmingham Historical Journal

BSA: Annual of the British School of Athens

CAH: Cambridge Ancient History

CH: Cahiers d'Histoire

CPh: Classical Philology

CQ: Classical Quarterly

CR: Classical Review

CS: Critica Storica

CSCA: California Studies in Classical Antiquity

CW: Classical World (formerly Weekly)

DHA: Dialogues d'Histoire Ancienne

DOP: Dumburton Oaks Papers

FGrHist: F. Jacoby, Die Fragmente der griechischen Historiker

FHG: Müller, Fragmenta Historicum Graecorum

GIF: Giornale Italiano di Filologia

Hist: Historia

HN²: Head, Historia Numorum, ed. 2

IG: Inscriptiones Græcae

JHS: Journal of Hellenic Studies

JRS: Journal of Roman Studies

LEC: Les Études Classiques

OCD: Oxford Classical Dictionary

PP: La Parola del Passato

P-P: Past and Present

QUCC: Quaderni Urbinati di Cultura Classica

RAL: Rendiconti della Accademia dei Lincei

RD: Revue Historique de Droit Français et Étranger

RE: Realencyclopädie der classischen Altgerumswissenschaft

REA: Revue des Études Anciennes

REG: Revue de Études Grecques

RFIC: Rivista di Filologia e d'Istruzione Classica

RH: Revue Historique

RIL: Rendiconti dell'Istituto Lombardo

RPh: Revue de Philologie

RSA: Rivista Storica dell'Antichitá

RSI: Rivista Storica Italiana

RSV: Bible, Revised Standard Version

SCI: Scripta Classica Israelica

SEG: Supplementum Epigraphicum Graecum

SIG³: Dittenberger, Sylloge Inscriptionum Graecarum, ed. 3

TAPhA: Transactions and Proceedings of the American Philological Association

Bibliography

Niese, B. Geschichteder Griechischen und Makedonischen Staaten seit der Schlact bei Chaeronea. 3 vols. Reprint. Darmstadt, 1963.