SOURCE: "The Problems of Reason," in A Re-Appraisal of Kierkegaard, University Press of America, 1995, pp. 27-38.

[In the following essay, Slaatté argues that contrary to what some rationalists have charged, Kierkegaard did not "scorn" reason. Rather, Slaatté maintains, Kierkegaard's writings suggest that reason does make up one part of human existence, but it does not reflect the entirety of one's selfhood.]

1: Reason and the Reasoner

Existentialist thinkers have been influenced by Kierkegaard, directly or indirectly, upon recognizing that "existence precedes essence." This implies that it is erroneous to speak of man as a rationally objectified concept or an abstraction called human nature or mankind. We begin and end our theorizing with the self, who can say "me."

In Western philosophy it was Parmenides and Plato who reversed this perspective placing essence before existence. The rational conceptualization of man was an objectification of a subjective existence. Aristotle accepted this precedent in his realism. However, these Greek philosophers overlooked the fact that a man exists concretely before he theorizes abstractly; he is subject before he is object. "I am" has priority to "man is." Thus an existence-related reason must take precedence over a theoretical reason. Similarly Kant's Verstand is prior to Vernunft; a practical reason or understanding is more basic than a pure reason.

One's genuine existence involves a self-transcendence upon seeking his true selfhood. Choice or acts of commitment are made before reason presents its idealistic blueprints. Kierkegaard saw this shrewdly in relation to what he called the three "stages of life," the aesthetic, the ethical and the religious.¹ The aesthetic stage is one of neutrality or non-commitment; the ethical involves decisions relative to personal life; the religious moves to a kind of moral idealism but is mature only through "the Moment," referred to above, in "the leap of faith" yielding an encounter with the Eternal in the present moment of existence. This is what enabled S. K. to say, "I am Transcended." Only a self-transcending subject-self could experience this encounter in which infinitude becomes meaningful to a despairing finitude. No self-sufficient reason could realize this or arrange for it.

In his way Kierkegaard could see that reason cannot account for itself. In this respect, between the lines he concurred with Kant's practical reason based on a priori categories of reason mixed with sense perceptions, and with Pascal's underlying intuitions basic to logic and mathematics. Relating this to concrete existence, Pascal said, "We know truth not only by reason but also by the heart, and it is by this last way that we know first principles." Pascal had in mind the awareness of number, motion, space and time and added, "And reason must trust these intuitions of the heart."² He said, "The heart has its reasons which reason does not know."³

Kant's a priori categories of reason⁴ were not unlike Pascal's intuitions, but, unlike Pascal and Kierkegaard he separated the theoretical or pure reason from the practical. In doing this he bi-furcated the self. This violated or destroyed the holistic existentiality of man and his reason. In doing so he invited Hegel to run wild with pure reason as he projected it into a cosmic, monistic inflation thereof, a hypostasized cosmic Being of Reason lacking individuality while synthesizing all opposites dialectically. Thus the individual mind basic to Kierkegaard's philosophy was reduced by Hegel to a mere speck of a universal Reason.⁵ It was this losing sight of the individual in favor of the universal that was revolting to S. K. Existence was lost track of in a cosmic essence. Kierkegaard saw that weakness also in Hans Martensen's rationalized theology linked with Hegelian metaphysics.⁶ Kierkegaard saw that concrete existence cannot escape the clash of opposites and be reduced to a neat synthesis of reason. Reason has no grounds for erecting a remote pedestal removed from life's tensions. Reason itself cannot adequately account for its own implicit tensions between logic and its underlying intuitions. Nor can reason resolve the tension between the concrete knowing self with its involvements in nature and society while simultaneously transcending them. Reason must cope with paradox and not by-pass it.

Impatient critics have labeled Kierkegaard as "pathological," but perhaps these observations put the matter in a truer light. Kierkegaard neither bi-furcated man as did Kant nor projected him ontologically into a cosmic process with Hegel, let alone de-man him with the materialist, behaviorist and positivist. This is because S. K. contended that man was an individual or concrete subject-self, who must be viewed as a whole self or none at all. This even suggests a latent or presupposed existential element in Descartes' cogito ergo sum, when not pressed rationally. Thus reason's own paradox is apparent. One can affirm, doubt or even negate the self with David Hume, only as he presupposes the self existentially. This, in fact, was Descartes' basic weakness upon doubting himself and, thereby, rationally "proving" himself. Such thinking neglects the primacy of the thinker in favor of his objectified thought. Yet Descartes was sensitive to the prejudices and finitude within one's reasoning, another pre-existential factor in his favor.⁷

The German philosopher Richard Kroner speaks to the main issue here when he says, "It is not important to conclude from the fact that I think, as Descartes did, that I exist; but it is important to conclude that I exist in distinction from whatever is the content of my thought."⁸ The matter is especially important when the self is seen to be characterized by a freedom to assert itself and to choose—even to choose to reason away the very capacity to choose! While many of the contradictory elements in human experience, including S. K.'s either/or ethical tensions, are due to moral freedom under the constraints of natural and social necessities, together with the moral imperative to choose, reason cannot legitimately project itself away from the concrete reasoning self. The existing thinker precedes what he thinks. Thus Kierkegaard was correct in stressing the primacy of the thinking subject over all objectifications whether rationalistic or scientific. The subject can know the object, but the object cannot know the subject. Subject and object (even objective concepts) are interrelated, but precisely because the existing knower has priority over what he knows. Here we see how the either/or is related to the both/and. The paradox of moral choice is really within the paradox of reason per se, though Berdyaev surpassed Kierkegaard in clarifying this.

2. Reason and Human Existence

Rationalists are inclined to attack Kierkegaard for scorning reason.⁹ This is misleading. Kierkegaard acknowledges that reason is an implicit aspect of concrete human existence but by no means the whole of the self nor able to do full justice to the holistic individual in his concrete existence. Kierkegaard did not scorn reason but detested rationalism's idolatry of reason. To attack rationalism as having the last word on reality is not to dismiss the role of reason but to keep it in its rightful place. It is a tool, not a tribunal. Human existence is also irrational and transrational in various ways. In such contexts reason must be kept instrumental, not authoritative with finality. It is akin to Kant's practical reason with skepticism about pure reason. It cannot know das Ding an sich or the essence of things. As Nicholas Berdyaev put it in his Slavery and Freedom, "A thinker engaged in epistemology seldom arrives at ontology."

Kierkegaard did not deny the objectivity of the object. He approached a phenomenalism akin to Kant's skepticism that implies that we only know the appearance of the object; it is an interpretation wherein consciousness interrelates sense perceptions with intuitive mental insights. To be significant the object has to be relevant in this way to the knowing subject, which is conscious. The primacy of this conscious subject brings existentialism close to Husserl's phenomenology.

Reason has no self-contained answer to the meaning of a holistic, concrete existence, for reason must always function from within existence. It is enmeshed with the very existence it seeks to understand. This undergrids Kierkegaard's emphasis upon inwardness. Reason's objective theories are refracted by existence, and its ontological objectifications are idolatrous. This reflects the paradox of reason per se. It also suggests the priority of the existential perspective, for, as already stated, existence precedes or is more basic than a theoretical essence. A man thinks in a variety of ways before he speculates rationally.

The self-transcending and thing-transcending self is fundamental. It alone can ask "Why?" after all the empirical explanations and rationalistic speculations are posed. In fact, each person sees the world in his way or from his perspective not always amenable to objective theories. He sees things through his particular glasses, as it were, and he has no assurance that such a perspective is rendered with fairness by a rational objectification or scientific explanation. There is no guarantee that each self sees the world the same as another, let alone as it is, realistically "out there." My color-blind friend does not know what he is missing, and my dog and cat suggest that I don't either! This inconstancy of our sense perceptions is accentuated all the more when we put drab-looking stones under an ultraviolet ray lamp. The accommodation of light rays to our limited eye sight all the more reveals how limited our daily knowledge really is when we behold the breath-taking beauty of the stones. Similarly, there is no assurance that the Begrifflichkeit or thought forms, precepts and concepts of any two persons are the same. Much the same epistemological relativism applies to the human will, which Kierkegaard regarded as more basic to existence than reason. His emphasis upon either/or accentuates the decisiveness of existence. Decisions or choices are fundamental to daily life, S. K. stressed. To find yourself you "must choose." The will is basic. As Karl Heim put it in behalf of S. K., "My will is a particular form of the existence of my ego."¹⁰ Yet the will cannot be localized directly with the body, brain or heart. Paradoxically, reason cannot objectify the will but must presuppose it in the holistic, concrete "I" who even wills to reason. The cognitive and volitional self are interrelated, if not the same. Yet the rationalists among the Greeks, notably Socrates and Plato, failed to see this.

A molten imagination often takes over where a solidifying reason leaves off. Upon seeing the need of something less direct and at the same time more penetrating than a cold reason by which to communicate with other selves, Kierkegaard astutely turned to what is called "indirect communication," a more poetic to mythical type of expression.¹¹ Instead of one's being constrained by logic to see a point, he is persuaded from within to see it pictorially. It helps one to see himself. Often S. K. used a provocative incident, parable, metaphor or simile that speaks to the whole self when reason cannot. Where reason is coldly and remotely direct, this method of communication is warmly and winsomely indirect. It is the difference between being told something and discovering it for oneself. It is a method that proves most provocative to the self when a rational theory or empirical account proves limited if not repulsive. But, then, once recognized, even reason is influenced by such thought. Thus, human understanding involves an impertinent paradox that proves pertinent to reason itself, existentially.

It was in this context that S. K. found the meaning of existence for him, which it must be. He found it where most rationalists and empiricists are too reluctant or proud to look, viz from within the darkness of a closeto-home despairing finitude. It was in that Moment when the Eternal absolute flashed like a lightning bolt into his anxiety-laden, but faith-conditioned, consciousness, giving his finite existence a new dimension of a qualitative meaning. Kierkegaard in this respect proved to be the first thinker to see the qualitative difference between the finite and the infinite. He saw this contrast as the Abyss, which is healed only by the either/or decision within the "leap of faith" associated with "the Moment." Whereas the opposite poles remain pronounced for Kierkegaard and are interrelated only through a faith-subsumed reason, Hegel mediated them too readily in his rational monism.¹² Thus S. K. was truer to the existing self.

As partially an existentialist, Friedrich Nietzsche failed to find a meaning in existence.¹³ Though he joined Kierkegaard in the rejection of rationalistic ontologies, he failed to find the Absolute and found no answer to the question of life's meaning. However, critically it can be said that Kierkegaard did not clarify sufficiently the relation of reason to faith so as to show the difference between a responsible and irresponsible decision.¹⁴ But this criticism is a rationalistic one which fails to understand the transrational nature of faith as an important aspect of a holistic existence. Many things, including ethical issues come alive with relevance to the subject self on a faith-conditioned basis, not the least of which is the meaning and role of an expendable agape love. No rational theory can do it justice nor account for it. The moral idealisms of rationalists are too abstract and "unparticular" to be truly relevant to the "me" of existence, but a Christly love is not.

3. Reason and Philosophical Issues

A criticism sometimes hurled at the existentialist is that he reduces man to nothing or to something meaningless. This is an attempt to make the existentialist appear to be a nihilist. While Nietzsche's pessimism, Sartre's ethical relativism and Heidegger's doctrine of "nothingness" seem to invite the accusation, actually it cannot fully apply even to these thinkers. Each takes man very seriously, keeping him responsible for his existence and refuting every intellectual attempt to reduce a man to a mere concept, brute or thing.

Though every existentialist accentuates man as a problem to himself, he sees that the individual is not yet what he really is, can become or ought to be. As S. K. suggested, a man is seen yearning to be what he is not, while he senses that what he is not is really what he is! This profound paradox is fundamental to the existence of the self. It implies, as Karl Jaspers recognizes, that a person's real self is, so to speak, ahead or above himself, though not removed from his concrete self-in-existence.¹⁵ Until this is recognized in some way a person fails to live wholesomely, i.e. he is uncommitted to what he yearns for or sees to be his real self. To exist, as Heidegger suggests, is to be able to "stand apart" from oneself (ex-sistere) in an inward manner so as to appraise oneself.¹⁶ This is not a projected re moval from the concrete self but a kind of psychological introspection or intrinsic capacity of the self to turn upon itself from within in the interest of seeking, finding and fulfilling true selfhood. In this light, Socrates' "Know thyself and Kierkegaard's: "Choose thyself," become exceedingly important admonitions. Only selves can choose themselves, or even care who they are.

We must assert that a thinker like Friedrich Nietzsche sometimes sounds like a nihilist in his repudiation of moral and spiritual values or meanings in favor of new ones based on the natural search for power. But his kind of nihilism is really more of a warning than a recommendation. Nietzsche is sensitive to the hypocracies in European culture and, therefore, thinks the Christian ethic is defeated internally by the "mendaciousness of all Christian interpretations of the world and of history."¹⁷ Moral skepticism, he believes, is a product of idealistic moral interpretations no longer acceptable. But the lack of sanction, we reply, is not the falsity of that to which it gives reference. Though Kierkegaard would not deny the common mendacities of social life, he would not concede that they are necessary. Men are free to live on a higher level. There may be an Unconditioned source of moral truth, which men do not sanction but which sanctions them. This Kierkegaard saw so clearly in his encounter with the Absolute that transcended him as well as all rationalistic universals. It is unfortunate that Nietzsche and Sartre did not come to understand this. Kierkegaard received his clue from the Bible. Not making him a nihilist, it pointed him to values and ideals identified with the divine Absolute revealed especially through Christ. It is this which offsets for him the relativism of existence giving him a new outlook, meaning and hope as well as love ethic.¹⁸

Man is not simply involved in his problems; he is a problem, even to himself. To assert this is not to be a nihilist, however, and certainly not an escapist, but quite the contrary. Man is a self, and a self-in-the-making at that. If a man is said to amount to "nothing" it is only in the sense that, unless his concrete self acts, wills, chooses or takes sides, he is nothing. To be a self is to assert oneself, and this includes the matter of relating oneself to himself and others. Thus, to a great extent a person is not just what he thinks and does but what he decides, chooses, acts upon and commits himself to. Hence, he is no bigger than that to which he is committed. To discover this is the prelude to self-discovery, self-fulfillment and authentic existence. S. K. found that in facing up to despair the Absolute breaks through to his consciousness giving him a re-orientation of life, which yields his true self.

But does a person exist even if he does not act or choose? This question is legitimate, we believe, but apt to be a "leading question" of a kind that is misleading. It is apt to be "loaded" rationally so that its presuppositions constrain the answer. We must realize that man is not an ontological substance, even if he yearns to know his being or what it means. To exist is to be a particular conscious being, who is aware of his being. Yet, right here existentialists may differ greatly. Nicolas Berdyaev, for instance, has seen shrewdly that not only is freedom, creativity and act fundamental to man's personal existence but intrinsic to the pneuma or spirit that he is.¹⁹ We cannot rationally ontologize this, however, for it falls outside the pall of reason. To do so with the Scholastics, modern idealists and others is to be much in error. Not a rational concept, only the spirit-self can exist and be a free or responsible self, hence, a possibly fallen or enslaved self, too. Ontos and nous are immune to both freedom and pneuma. Though pneuma can embrace the functions of soma and psyche, it moves beyond them, incorporating man as a total spirit-subject-self, as Berdyaev stressed it. Only such a self can question or yearn for himself, his true identity, vocation and destiny. Whereas the atheistic-to-agnostic existential thinker sees the self's identity and vocation strictly within his own grasp, if at all, the theistic existential thinker sees the need of the Kierkegaardian "leap of faith," since one's true identity and vocation transcend him as he now is in his concrete actuality. Not irrational, this rather respects the prerational or transrational dimension of the rational, even as it concedes the limitations of the rational.

Kierkegaard provocatively suggests that there are three moral alternatives on the sea of personal existence; either to sink, swim or be saved; a hopeless despair with no self-contained guidance available; a meaningless foundering with no shore in sight; or a meaningful hope from beyond oneself. The latter is linked with the faith-conditioned encounter with the eternal Absolute, the Unconditioned beyond all that is conditioned, relative or finite. Looking beyond reason's limitations it may be more imperative and more tenable, too, than atheistic existentialists like Jean Paul Sartre dare to admit. For a person to be caught in an oceanic whirlpool of meaningless existence is to toy with a psychosis, not to mention a hell-on-earth. It is not to find but to lose one's real self; it is to be trapped in a state of artificial existence, which makes no headway. To settle for just that is to surrender either by frustration, inertia or suicide to nothingness.²⁰ Dunked in existence men may need a firmer footing provided from beyond a fallen, finite selfhood, if they are to know their real meaning. Dare men admit it today? Kierkegaard did when he saw himself transcended in the Absolute, the meaning-giving locus of one's true Existenz. Sartre has failed to see it, perhaps because he has not looked beyond himself, from within himself. Likewise Nietzsche. They settled only for what their finitude could supply. S. K. looked to the infinite or the Absolute.

While one cannot live without assertion and resolve, it takes more than sheer self-assertion or Stoical resolve to exist authentically in this world. It demands the self-seizure of oneself, a facing up to one's existence as-it-is. Thus, the man who comes to despair of his quasi-private life can begin to exist genuinely. He sees that he has questions, which he cannot answer of himself. In the face of this paradox of selfhood, he must assert himself from within himself to realize himself. But how? Only when his angst, the inner despair at failing to be himself, becomes a form of self-transcendence does he cross the threshold of self-disclosure. But this occurs, Kierkegaard maintains, only as one's self-transcending consciousness comes to the point of being able to concede: "I am Transcended." This is based on a faith commitment and opens up a faith-subsumed reason that can grasp existentially the issues that make theology possible, relevant and meaningful. Whereas Nietzsche viewed self-transcendence mainly in the search for power, an idea which influenced Adler's psychoanalysis, Kierkegaard viewed it through the Credo quia absurdum of the faith referred to above, which is "the highest immediacy" and makes for nonconformity to social precedents and pressures. Since both thinkers reacted against the Greek rationalistic ontologies and believed in the primacy of the self, ethical decision was to them basic to existence and self-realization. Every person must think for himself. As S. K. said, universals and systems fail to do the self justice. Nietzsche agreed. Both thinkers rebelled against all hypocracy and a state which coddled the Church with a soft idealism. Both rejected the view of the idealists that what you must think by reason must be.²¹

For Kierkegaard the self is a paradox in which the finite and infinite meet. Self-transcendence in the form of faith yields a final truth to give oneself to—in "the Moment" which transcends temporal existence. S. K. thus can say, "With God's help, I shall be myself."²² Faith accepts the paradox of Christianity and finds 'the new focal point that supercedes a despairing finitude as rationalism cannot. Reason counts the paradox of Christ as "absurd." For a long while Heidegger seemed to be of this persuasion by not addressing the question of God, but eventually he came to respect "the Holy." This was his later-found respect for the awesomeness of Being in the Being of his existence.²³ As Richard Kroner has pointed out, Heidegger wanted to retain the biblical truth but only by stripping it of its transcendent and mythical elements.²⁴ In a sense Jean-Paul Sartre followed Kierkegaard to the precipice of despair but left a person "to make himself" or find his self-made meaning.²⁵ What both Nietzsche and Sartre have failed to understand is that God transcends all the rational speculations which can be rejected by the same kind of reasoning. Kierkegaard saw this and viewed God as the Unconditioned Absolute that supercedes all finite speculative projections. Commitment to this makes for the true self-transcendence. No institutionalized religion can be a substitute for such a "total-self commitment," he said,—not that all religious institutions must be abrogated, for they are responsible for a witness to God. Nietzsche, in contrast, rejected both religious substance and form. He denounced all the values of life based on faith as though faith had no room for reason in existence. This he did upon stressing his cynical version of "the transvaluation of all values" in favor of whatever makes for power over others and a super-race based thereupon.²⁶

Karl Jaspers said with some justification that both Nietzsche and Kierkegaard have doctrines of transcendence, which few can follow. Admittedly, each sees the struggling man of existence, but the one version is of an idolator; the other a worshipper; the one settles for a new nihilism, the other for a faithconditioned meaningfulness. Jaspers is much closer to Kierkegaard. Not only does he reject rationalistic objectifications in favor of concrete existence but sees truth linked with das Ümgreitende or the "The Encompassing" much like William James' view of "the More." This is an awareness of Transcendent Being and is essential to one's true being as the unconditioned ground of the self.²⁷ Neither reason nor science can explain it. It is akin to Tillich's pro-Kierkegaardian "Ultimate concern" and "ground of being," while the basis of a higher freedom. Jaspers sees that to be true to the self reason must function in relation to this paradoxical condition of existence, quite as S. K. does. Jaspers states provocatively, "Since all existential strivings for Transcendence are dialectical, a definitive (rational) statement of their direct contents is always prone to be false."²⁸ For him Transcendence is the real, eternal Being that is man's source of self-fulfillment, the Deity "as it appears to us in this world."²⁹ Not fully identical with S. K.'s view, Jasper's view is closer to deism than to theism, since his deity concept is not clearly identified with the biblical "I Am," being closer to one's own self-transcendent being. Jaspers contends that reason "has suffered shipwreck," and sees with S. K. that this is where one's philosophy must begin existentially, while it helps prepare one for an acquiescence to "Eternity inside Time" or to an "ascent to Transcendence."³⁰ Unlike Nietzsche, who said "God is dead," Jaspers says philosophy cannot fight off religion but must relate itself to this polarity of existence, which centers about the finite self's awareness of the infinite or Transcendent.

What Jaspers tried to assert from a psychoanalytical perspective was that the self-transcending self really finds meaning in the divinely Transcendent.³¹ In this respect he was pro-Kierkegaardian. Much the same could be said in behalf of Karl Gustave Jung after many years of stressing divine immanence in relation to man. A holistic, existential subjectivity was finally recognized as basic to "the subjective variety of an individual life." Also, Jung eventually conceded that man needs "a wisdom greater than his own," an illumination from a transcendent source.³² Karl Menniger as another psychoanalist came to see that people are persons, not just organisms.³³ Each of these psychiatrists saw that persons lack meaning without reference to the transcendent. Yet, what to Jung was long accepted as religiously immanental may be likened to the psychological aspects of existence, which allowed for what Kierkegaard viewed as subjective "apprehension" giving rise to religious "relevance," also to what the theologian Emil Brunner claimed was das Anknüpfungspunkt or "point-of-contact" between man and the divine… These psychological factors are immanental seats of religious relevance but not seats of religious authority.

Notes

¹ S. K., Stages On Life's Way, pp. 399-403 and Concluding Unscientific Postscript, pp. 309-350, 440, 498 nt, 499-502. The former book elaborates what the latter brings forth.

²Pensees, 282, p. 96.

³Ibid, 277, p. 95.

⁴ Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, Book I, Chap. I.

⁵ Hegel, The Phenomenology of Mind, p. 798. cf. my work, The Pertinence of the Paradox, pp. 121, 136.

⁶ See the second chapter of this book [A Re-Appraisal of Kierkegaard.]

⁷ "I think, therefore I am," a presumed proof beginning with doubt. Rene Descartes, "The Principles of Philosophy," Pt. I, A Discourse On Method, Everyman's Library, p. 165 ff. cf., Pt. I.I.XXXVI, LXXL, LXXIL.

⁸ Kroner, "Heidegger's Private Religion," Union Seminary Quarterly Review, Vol. XI, no. 9, May, 1956, p. 31, Cf. pp. 46-48.

⁹ Cf. L. H. DeWolf, The Religious Revolt Against Reason, Chap. III.

¹⁰ Heim, Christian Faith and Natural Science, p. 64.

¹¹ S. K. Training in Christianity, pp. 46, 132, 141.

¹² Cf. Croxall, Kierkegaard Commentary, p. 32.

¹³ Heim, op cit, p. 17.

¹⁴ Cf. Kaufmann, Existentialism from Dostoevsky to Sartre, p. 17.

¹⁵Reason and Existenz, pp. 18, 141, 25, 132.

¹⁶Existence and Being, pp. 334,346.

¹⁷The Will to Power, Book One, II, ed. Kaufmann, p. 110.

¹⁸ For the latter see S. K.'s work Purity of Heart, which, I believe, he would have expanded had he lived longer.

¹⁹Spirit And Reality, pp. 13, 15ff, 32ff.

²⁰ Upon dismissing God, Sartre also dismissed all ideals in favor of "an absurd world." As for the latter point, see Viktor Frankl's works including Man's Search For Meaning which emphasizes that the new form of neurosis in the West today is due to various types of meaninglessness. Cf. his Doctor and the Soul…

²¹ S. K. Concluding Unscientific Postscript, 1941 ed., pp. 107, 297, 176, 178, 273, 275, 278, 319, 350, 437.

²² S. K. The Journals, p. 138.

²³ Cf. Slaatte and Sendaydiego, The Philosophy of Martin Heidegger, Chapter III.

²⁴ Kroner, op cit, pp. 5, 25, 28f.

²⁵ Sartre, Existentialism, trans. B. Frechman, Philosophical Library, 1941, pp. 16-20.

²⁶ Nietzsche, Thus Spake Zarathustra, pp. 6, 104, 106 (and) "The Gay Science," Existentialism … ed. Kaufmann, p. 105f.

²⁷ Jaspers, Reason and Existenz, pp. 25, 52f, 141, 189, Cf. Jaspers, Der Philosophische Glaube, pp. 131, 134.

²⁸Der Philosophische Glaube, p. 130.

²⁹ Jaspers, "On My Philosophy," Existentialism … ed. by Kaufmann, pp. 112, 136, 138.

³⁰Ibid, pp. 139, 145, 154. Cf. pp. 152-155.

³¹ Jaspers, Reason and Existenz, pp. 131, 135.

³² Jung, The Undiscovered Self, p. 110. Cf. Chaps, iv, vi.

³³ Menninger, Theory of Psychoanalytic Technique, p. 94.