SOURCE: "Professor Alexander's Proofs of the Spatio-Temporal Nature of Mind," in The Philosophical Review, Vol. XLIX, No. 3, May, 1940, pp. 309-24.

[In the following essay, Bateman examines Alexander's proofs of the spatial and temporal nature of mind: his argument from introspection and his argument from the spatio-temporal properties of the neural processes.]

According to Alexander, Space-Time is the simplest form of reality, out of which all finite existents—including minds—are made. Growth and creative process flow from the intrinsic nature of this primordial stuff; and the ensuing spatio-temporal configurations, with their differences of complexity and pattern, give rise to new levels of existents having new qualities, such as materiality, life and consciousness. While an emergent quality is grounded in the 'lower' level of existence from which it emerges, it is a new order of existent, unpredictable from the nature of its components and possessing its own special laws of behavior. For example:

Mind is a new quality distinct from life, with its own peculiar methods of behaviour, for the reason already made clear, that the complex collocation which has mind, though itself vital, is determined by the order of its vital complexity, and is therefore not merely vital but also mental.¹

It is important to note that while the empirical qualities of lower levels are carried up into the 'body' of a higher level, they are not carried up into the new quality.

Contrariwise the categorial characters are carried up into the emergent existent. For everything is a complex of space-time and possesses the fundamental properties of any space-time, which are the categories. Hence, though life is not colored it is extended and in time, and this we have seen to be true of mind as well.²

If, then, mind is to accord with the fundamentals of his metaphysical system, Alexander must show that it is both spatial and temporal; more specifically, since consciousness is the distinctive feature of mind,⁵ he recognizes the necessity of showing that space and time are "carried up" into the emergent quality mind or consciousness, and consequently, that mental acts are spatial and temporal. Now mental acts cannot be contemplated, they are enjoyed; consequently, the data relevant for demonstrating that mind or consciousness is spatial and temporal can only be disclosed in enjoyment. Although this condition of proof is required by the novel, unique, and autonomous nature ascribed to emergent qualities, and is prescribed definitely in many passages,⁴ it tends to drift into an argument based on the spatio-temporal properties of the neural processes, which, being dependent on contemplation, would appear to be an ignoratio elenchi.

In outlining and examining these two arguments for the spatial and temporal nature of mind, attention will be primarily centered on the more difficult demonstration that mind is spatial. Furthermore, I shall not discuss the contentions that mental space and time is a piece of the space and time in which physical events occur, and that the time of mental events is spatial and their space temporal precisely as with physical space and time. These issues are obviously subsidiary to the problem of the general nature of mental space and time.

I

Proof of the Spatio-temporal Nature of Mind from Introspection. If enjoyment is thus the nervus probandi of the introspective proof of the spatio-temporal character of mind, it seems advisable—even at the risk of laboring with what is now a commonplace in philosophical terminology—to recall its scope and nature.

The relation of mind and its objects is one of "compresence". Compresence is not peculiar to the conscious level, but on the contrary, "It is the simplest and most universal of all relations",⁵ and pertains between all finites irrespective of their level of existence. If one of the partners in the compresent relation be a mind, the act of mind "contemplates" its object and "enjoys" itself. The act of mind qua experiencing is enjoyed, the object upon which the act is directed is experienced and contemplated. Consequently, enjoyment and contemplation are strictly correlative. Alexander thus extends the customary connotation of enjoyment, which restricts it to pleasurable experiencing. "It includes suffering or any state or process insofar as the mind lives through it."⁶

It is of the first importance for the subsequent discussion to note that Alexander will not allow that mind or its acts can be contemplated.⁷ The possibility of introspection might seem to falsify this statement, but that is because introspection is being confused with extrospection. Introspection proper is the enjoyment of the acts of perceiving, remembering, thinking, etc. Extrospection is the contemplation of sensa or images in perceiving, imagining, and remembering.

But the landscape I imagine or Lorenzo's villa on the way down from Fiesole that I remember with the enchanting view of Florence from the loggia, are no more discovered to me by introspection than the rowan tree which I perceive in front of my window as I write. These objects are presented to me by imagination or memory or perception, not by introspection, and are the objects not of introspection, but of extrospection, if such a word may be used, all alike.⁸

Again,

The mind can never be an object to itself in the same sense as physical things are objects to it. It experiences itself differently from them. It is itself and refers to them. .. . I do not in introspection turn my mind upon itself and convert a part of myself into an object, I do but report more distinctly my condition of enjoyment.⁹

These typical passages elucidating and prescribing the nature of enjoyment, appear to render it a very elusive source of evidence. No reflective act may detect its message, for it immediately attaches itself to the act of reflection. It is so parasitical to contemplation and in se so precluded from objective reference of any sort, that it will not be surprising to discover that enjoyment cannot disclose either its own form, relationships or spatio-temporal attributes, and that Alexander's proof of the spatiotemporal character of mind from enjoyment appears to march only through the kindly offices of contemplation.

The proof that mind or consciousness is spatial begins by an appeal to introspection.

My mind is for me, that is for itself, spread out or voluminous in its enjoyment. Within this vague extension or volume the separate and salient mental acts or processes stand out as having position, and 'direction'. My mind is streaked with these more pungent processes, as when a shoot of painful Consciousness is felt or a sudden thought produces a new distribution in this extended mass. These streaks and shoots of consciousness have the vaguest position, but they have it; and such position and direction are most clearly marked in the higher acts of mind, imagination or desire or thinking, and especially when there is a change in what we call the direction of our thinking.¹⁰

It is to be particularly noted that the extensity and protensity of sensa, images, or any alleged mental content are not relevant for proving the spatio-temporal nature of mind. "By mental space and time, I do not mean the space and time which belong to our images and thoughts: these, according to our assumption, are nothing but physical space and time as they are represented in images and thoughts."¹¹ It is the '-ing' aspect of the mental act, the movement of consciousness enjoyed as 'direction' which is the clue to a correct understanding and appraisal of mental or enjoyed space and time. Direction of mental process is exemplified by Humpty Dumpty's poem in Through the Looking Glass: "I'd go and wake them if . . ." "We cannot do it, Sir, because . . ." where the forward and defeated movement of the mind is made the centre of attention.

Another illustration of mental direction is afforded by the memory and expectation of ourselves. I may remember how I felt when I heard my friend was dead, and this enjoyment has a different direction from the enjoyed expectation of myself going to Europe next year. It is important to note that these differences of direction are directly apprehended.

It might be thought that when I remember myself, my enjoyment is a present one and is somehow referred to the past. But this again is a misreading. My enjoyment of myself in the past is enjoyed as past; and my expectation of myself in the future is enjoyed as future. They have the character of past and future written in their faces.¹²

Whether in the study of past and future objects or in that of past and future states of ourselves, we have thus seen that our consciousness of past and future is direct, and is not the alleged artificial process of first having an experience of the present and then referring it by some method to the past or future.¹³

Direct apprehension of past and future is thus asserted to be an essential condition of enjoying direction and mental time.

The notion of enjoyed or mental space is more liable to misunderstanding. No student ofSpace Time and Deity will of course suppose that mental space is subjective. A more excusable misunderstanding is to confuse mental space with the spatial imagery of our memories and expectations. But the spatial imagery of my memory of a great pageant or even the spatiality of a purely imaginative construction is not mental or enjoyed space, but contemplated space. Mental space is the space in which the mind experiences itself as living—its direction qua functioning.

Particular emphasis on enjoyed space occurs in its alleged exemplification in the appreciation of passages quoted from Tennyson, Keats and Wordsworth—although the primary purpose of the quotations is to show that mental space and physical space belong to the same space.

"Let anyone who at all possesses sensory imagination think of the lines:—

The same that ofttimes hath
Charmed magic casements, opening on the foam
Of perilous seas, in fairy lands forlorn,

and ask himself whether he is not conscious of the object described as somewhere in Space along with himself, that is, does not enjoy himself in an enjoyed space, along with an object somewhere in contemplated Space."¹⁴

I understand the intent of such passages to be that our thoughts proceed outwards from a focal point, which initially is simply felt as an absolute 'here' or centre. Without deliberation or even attention upon ourselves, objects and their spatial relationships are regarded as 'outwards' from an immediately felt 'me locus of reference'. Other illustrations of enjoyed space enlarge its span—a shoot of painful consciousness, and the vague premonitory shoots of consciousness which anticipate at times the winding up of a watch at night as contrasted with some other habit like turning off the electric light before going to bed.¹⁵ Although no precision or accuracy of spatial descrimination is claimed for such habits and attitudes, a direction is enjoyed in the momentum felt as accompanying their functioning and in the tension of their frustration.

Just as with mental time, so mental or enjoyed space is direct. Spatial discrimination by immediate relationships could not occur without contemplative operations; and we are warned that if we try to find a direction of mental process which can be contemplated, we will find none, and the problem is queered from the outset.¹⁶

It may be mentioned that Alexander suggests that his doctrine of mental or enjoyed space offers a solution of how we localise pains and aches in our bodies and correlate mental and neural processes.¹⁷

II

If this outline correctly presents Alexander's introspective argument for his doctrine of mental space and time, its verity requires discussion of two points of fundamental importance:—(1) Does enjoyment disclose 'direction' of mental process and establish the fact of mental space-time?

(2) How far does enjoyed space and time assume importance in establishing the ontological status of mind?

(1) Does enjoyment disclose 'direction' of mental process?—I think the issue here is fundamentally the same as that raised by Broad in his review ofSpace Time and Deity:

"Is enjoyment by a mind a mode of knowledge or only a mode of being?"¹⁸ Alexander replied, "it is undoubtedly a mode of being, but not only a mode of being, for it is a kind of being which is knowing, and is at once a knowing of objects (in virtue of which relation it is called contemplation) and of itself. . . . Directly you speak of knowing by enjoyment, you have to add the proviso that this is not knowing of the enjoyment. Otherwise you would have the mind looking on at itself, which if the notion of enjoyment is valid, it cannot do, or at any rate does not do".¹⁹ Again, "There are no two separate mental acts, one of enjoyment and one of contemplation. The mind, in enjoying itself,²¹ has before it, and therefore contemplates, the object. Contemplation is a name for the same act as enjoyment, only in reference to the object. The enjoyment is at once a state of being of the mind itself, and that to which the object is revealed, and so is an act of knowing, Reciprocally, in knowing the object I know myself, not in the sense that I contemplate myself, for I do not do so, but in the sense that I live through this experience of myself."²⁰

These quotations confirm the contention that no mediate operations of relating one state of mind and another can enter into enjoyment. Enjoyment must be taken at a gulp; and at first sight, its claim to be a mode of knowledge might seem to be simply another futile exhibit of an apprehensio simplex. I believe, however, that Alexander would argue that while he is committed to view enjoyment as a form of direct apprehension, it is not purely immediate; and that his doctrine of mental perspectives allows him to combine mediacy with directness of enjoyment. Broad's excellent summary of this doctrine is sufficient for our purposes.

'My mind at 10 o'clock today' does not consist simply of enjoyments whose date is 10 o'clock today. It consists of a certain selected group of enjoyments of various dates . . . past enjoyments which are remembered by me at 10 o'clock today and those future enjoyments that are anticipated by me at 10 o'clock today are to be included in the selection which constitutes 'my mind at 10 o'clock today'. . . .

If you now ask Alexander how he reconciles the presentness of my memory of yesterday's thought with the pastness of the thought and with the denial that the one contemplates the other, his answer will be, I take it: "The remembered thought is past for its date is yesterday; but there is a present memory of it, because this past enjoyment is included in that set of enjoyments of various dates which constitutes 'your mind at 10 o'clock today'."²¹

This ingenious suggestion is undoubtedly attractive. In the first place, it may appear to escape the difficulties attending the usual versions of immediate apprehension; for it would allow that a memory qua enjoyed—while not mediated by being the object of any contemplated activity—has a telescoped mediacy through its spatio-temporal connections with other mental acts. As Alexander puts it, "On the side of the enjoyment, too, we never have the single act appropriate to the object, but an act linked up with other acts."²² In the second place, by providing a direct apprehension of the past, it avoids the well-known difficulties attending accounts of memory which make it derivative.²³ And, lastly, in the implied spatio-temporal continuity between mental acts, it can claim to make the basis of a unitary consciousness and continuous self concrete and intelligible.

The theory is not, however, free from difficulties. I shall not discuss the perplexities connected with the notion of a "mass of enjoyments at a moment"²⁴ or even a 'remembered enjoyment', except to mention that if 'enjoyment' in these contexts connotes the '-ing' aspect of a mental act, it appears to imply the attending to an act which itself involves attention—a feat which I regard as impossible. The crucial issue is, if memory and expectation are directly enjoyed as alleged, would they evidence direction? The unequivocal repudiation of any reference to a present in memory and expectation²⁵ eliminates a co-ordinate from which direction can be apprehended. Direction is essentially relational and can only be apprehended in a situation which transcends the self-sufficient pulse of enjoyment. This contention would also seem to apply to the apprehension of present, past, and future.

Wholly from within any enjoyed present, that present has no external temporal boundaries. It has no laws in time. It is dateless and tenseless. . . . To view the present as occupying a temporal position is already to have transcended the present. The view requires a perspective wider than any which is accessible within the boundaries of presented and present.²⁶

What is said here of the present applies equally to the past and future. The very characteristics of continuity, successiveness, and irreversibility attributed to Time by Alexander, involve the awareness of a time order which transcends the inarticulate directness of enjoyment. In short, temporal direction is contemplated not enjoyed.

The notion of enjoyed direction in mental space appears to me equally fictitious. Alexander anticipates a natural rejoinder to his notion of mental or enjoyed space.

All this will seem to some to be founded on an elementary blunder of confusion between the locality of consciousness and the sensation derived from the scalp or the movements of the eyes. All our mental life is accompanied by these experiences, and when we talk of enjoyed space we are thinking of and misinterpreting what we learn about our head.²⁷

Nevertheless, the view repudiated is not without distinguished adherents. Professor Stout writes:

The self is an embodied self. Both embodied self, as engaged in the process of seeing and thing seen as 'external object' enter our total experience in essential correlation and contrast with each other. The thing seen is an external object for me, just because it is apprehended as spatially external to my body, and because my body and especially my eyes as implicated in the process of perceiving enter essentially into the constitution of my percipient self.²⁸

Alexander allows that my body is a co-ordinate of reference when I ask 'where I am in the whole of space'. "I feel myself somewhere in my body or more particularly in my head. I am now contemplating the whole of space and localizing my enjoyed space in the same place as a contemplated object my body. . . ."²⁹ Nevertheless, he would maintain that the identification of mental and neural space consequent upon knowledge about my central nervous system, itself depends upon the primacy and integrity of an enjoyed space. Now, undoubtedly, external reference in ordinary everyday experience appears to dispense with deliberate contemplation of its focal origin; but this is surely because a biologically useful and firmly engrained habit has rendered the bodily reference implicit. A speck of dust in the eye or a sore palate renders explicit the focal role of the seeing eye and tasting palate. But the really fundamental objection to Alexander's notion of enjoyed space and direction is that urged in the case of enjoyed time. The very nature of space—with its characteristics of coexistence and continuity—and direction—which is essentially a relation between spaces—cannot be apprehended without contemplative operations. As Professor Kemp Smith argues, categories—in the Kantian sense—are involved in the apprehension of Time and Space.

The objects of intuition, time and space, are indeed apprehended as continuous; but, as we find upon analysis, such continuity already involves the employment of the category as a condition of its apprehension. For only as we employ the concept of whole and part can we apprehend specific times and specific spaces as being continuous, i.e., as always being wholes, relatively to their constituent parts and yet at the same time as always being themselves parts of a time and space which transcend them.³⁰ . . .

It may be said that these difficulties are superseded by the doctrine of intuition. Alexander maintains that the spatial and temporal characteristics of objects are not apprehended by the senses but by intuition. The sense organs acquaint us with the secondary qualities of objects: intuition reveals their spatio-temporal properties. Since, however, our experience of external things is 'provoked' in us through sensation, we cannot intuit their spatio-temporal characteristics without sensing some of their secondary qualities.

When I see a blue patch I see its blue quality, but I have intuition of its extent. I do not see a blue which possesses an extent, but I intuit an extent of space which I see blue. I do not apprehend an extended colour but a coloured extent.³¹ Hence, Every sensory act contains in itself and consequently conceals or masks a simpler act of intuition.³²

We are warned that this statement must not be interpreted so as to give rise to phantom difficulties with respect to the coordination of the acts of intuiting and sensing.

There are not two acts of mind, but only one act of mind which in its sensory character apprehends the colour and in its intuitive character apprehends the place of it. We are conscious of a place coloured or of colour in a place.³³

Nonetheless, in evolutionary development, Alexander would seem to hold that intuition is temporally prior to other modes of apprehension. "Intuition pure and simple is more elementary than sensation".³⁴ "Intuition is different from reason, but reason and sense alike are outgrowths from it, empirical determination of it."³⁵Conscious intuition, however, is inextricably dependent upon sensation. "Intuition" is not to be had as consciousness in the absence of sensation (or else of course ideation).³⁶

This brief outline of the doctrine of intuition is sufficient to show its important bearing on the topic of mental space-time. In the first place, if spatio-temporal relations are neither properties of sensa nor apprehended by sensation, it would give the quietus to the objection that mental space is really being confused with the contemplated space of sensations derived from the scalp or sensory organs. Secondly, it allows that directness of spatial apprehension which necessarily attaches to enjoyed space. But while the doctrine of intuition—with certain modifications—appears to me suggestive for contemplative operations, I find its application to enjoyed space and time another matter. In this regard, it must be remembered that since enjoyment is conscious, intuition will be "inextricably dependent upon sensations". The question arises, what is the contemplative act to which intuitive enjoyment of mental space is correlative? The answer appears to be, the intuiting of the space of the object. "The mind enjoys its own space through intuition of its object's space."³⁷

.. . A space which enjoys itself consciously or mentally as space (e.g., a neural tract AB) contemplates the space of the object (e.g., a line of colour ab), or rather has for its object an external, non-mental, contemplated space, contemplated that is in its form and position in total space.³⁸

I cannot see that these passages are a correct description of the enjoyed correlative. It is not at all evident that contemplation by a conscious neural tract of the space of a line of color justifies us in saying that the neural tract thereby enjoys itself spatially, or still less that it thereby enjoys its own space. The enjoyed correlative in such an experience would be the enjoyment of contemplating the space of the line of color.³⁹ The mind's enjoyment of its own space—if it occurred—would seem to require a different correlative contemplative act. Of course, the facile transition between the contemplated space of the object apprehended and the mental space of the act is supposed to be "a direct consequent of the continuity of spacetime, in virtue of which any point-instant is connected sooner or later directly or indirectly with every other".⁴⁰ But even if this be so, it is irrelevant for the discussion of conscious enjoyment. The enjoyment of continuity by point-instants is but a mythical analogy, and so far as conscious apprehension is concerned the intuition of the conscious neural tract is directed upon the spatio-temporal properties of the object presented in sensation. Apprehension of its own space and direction requires additional acts, and as I have argued contemplative acts.

The doctrine of intuition raises precisely the same issues already discussed in connection with 'direction', and I agree with Kemp Smith's contention that even intuition "involves the apprehension of meanings, and as factors indispensable to the possibility of such meanings, categorial relations".⁴¹

My conclusion then is that enjoyment does not disclose 'direction' of mental process nor is it capable of apprehending space in any shape or form. In both cases judgmental activity and contemplative operations of comparison are involved which transcend the directness essentially attaching to enjoyment.

(2) Alexander assigns to his conclusions about mental space and time the weighty ontological significance of establishing the spatio-temporal nature of mind. The basis of this conclusion appears to be two-fold (i) that the mind is as it enjoys, and, hence, the enjoyment of space and time constitutes the mind spatio-temporal, (ii) that the enjoyment is as the object contemplated.

The mind enjoys itself as substance through intuition of an external substance.⁴²

When the mind is aware of number, it also enjoys itself as number.⁴³

The mind enjoys itself categorially in contemplating the corresponding categorial feature of the object which it contemplates.⁴⁴

It might be supposed that the principle becomes a reductio ad absurdum in view of Alexander's account of illusion. If the mind is as it enjoys, then the mind is itself sweet, blue, infinite, and illusory in its enjoyment of sweet, blue, infinity, and illusion. But if enjoying illusion constitutes our mind illusory, illusion would be impossible, for "illusory appearances have their source in the mind itself".⁴⁵ As an ad hominem argument the contention misses fire, for illusory appearances are not regarded by Alexander as nonentities, but as real things seen awry or squintingly.

While we may agree with Alexander that the mind is its acts, not an entity apart from its act, and that "each of our acts in the appearance of the whole self as contained within its proper spatio-temporal enjoyed contour"; nonetheless, Berkeley's admonition that "those qualities (viz, extension and figure) are in the mind not by way of mode or attribute but only by way of idea",⁴⁶ seems applicable to the contention that the mind in enjoyment is as the object contemplated. I can only reiterate my belief that enjoyment is in such cases misdescribed, and that in contemplating the qualities and properties of an object, we do not enjoy ourselves under the same denominations, and do not acquire the qualities and properties of the objects apprehended.

Thus the introspective proof of the spatio-temporal nature of mind seems inconclusive for two reasons. Firstly, because enjoyment—despite the theory of perspectives—is intrinsically incapable of apprehending 'direction' which discloses the spatio-temporal nature of mind. Secondly, because, though it might be plausibly maintained that the mind is as it enjoys, it cannot be allowed that the mind in enjoying itself is as the objects contemplated.

III

Proof of the spatial nature of mind from the spatio-temporal properties of the neural processes. This argument appears inconclusive for several reasons. In the first place, the spatio-temporal properties of the neural processes are physical and contemplated. They are, therefore, irrelevant as evidence for proving the existence of mental space and time, which is enjoyed. In the second place, the identification of the neural and mental processes, on which the proof depends, is a virtual repudiation of the theory of emergence so vital to Alexander's cosmology, and commits him to the behaviorism which he explicitly repudiates.

I propose to keep in line with the previous discussion by concentrating on 'direction'. "The direction of a mental process is that of its specific anatomical or physiological path."⁴⁷ "Direction of the mental process means the actual movement within the neural space which is enjoyed in the identical mental space."⁴⁸

Now, if by mental space is meant "the space in which the mind experiences itself as living or which it enjoys", how can the space and direction of neural processes which qua neural processes are neither enjoyed nor contemplated by their owner, be relevant to the discussion? The neural processes are not themselves apprehended nor are they apprehended as constituent facts in the contemplation of objects. As Alexander himself points out: "It is a commonplace that in seeing a tree I know nothing of the occipital movement, and when I think of the occipital movement I am not seeing the tree."⁴⁹

It might, however, be contended that this interpretation is mistaken, since it concentrates attention exclusively on the neural processes; and that a more accurate analysis would show the direction and position of the neural process to be a relational affair determined by its corn-presence with the appropriate object—"the form or pattern of the process is determined by its relation to its object".⁵⁰ Such would seem to be the presupposition of such statements as

Thus not only does mind enjoy its own space through intuition of its object's space, but the enjoyed and the contemplated spaces both belong to the same space.⁵¹

.. . A space which enjoys itself consciously or mentally as space (e.g., a neural tract AB) contemplates the space of the object (e.g., a line of colour ab) or rather has for its object an external non-mental, contemplated space, contemplated that is, in its form and position in total Space.⁵²

Now as it has already been pointed out, it is not at all evident that contemplation by a neural tract of the space of a line of color justifies us in saying that the neural tract thereby enjoys itself spatially, or still less that it thereby enjoys its own space. The enjoyment in such an experience would be the enjoyment of contemplating the space of the line of color.⁵³ I fail to see that a transition from contemplation to enjoyment is provided, which would render the proof from the neural processes relevant for demonstrating the spatio-temporal nature of mind.

This proof is vitiated in a similar way by Alexander's repudiation of behaviorism and by the status of mind implied in his theory of emergence. Holt's behavioristic view of consciousness is rejected, because it fails to account for self-consciousness or self-experience as exhibited in enjoyment.⁵⁴ Epiphenomenalism is rejected, because there is no evidence that a neural process possessing the mental character would possess its specific neural character if it were not also mental. "A neural process does not cease to be mental and remain in all respects the same neural process as before."⁵⁵ The perplexities of Alexander's insistence that an emergent is "at once new and expressible without residue in terms of the processes proper to the level from which they emerge",⁵⁶ recurs in his identification of neural and mental processes and his like insistence on the unique, autonomous nature of mind. True, there is a distinction hinted at between merely neural processes and neuro-mental processes; but, even if we restrict our attention to the latter, emergence taken seriously recognizes that a new quality arises "constituting its possessor a new order of existent with its special laws of behavior".⁵⁷ One cannot affirm strict continuity between the various levels of existents and also maintain their emergent quality. To say "Each new type of existence when it emerges is expressible completely or without residue in terms of the lower stage and therefore indirectly in terms of all lower stages",⁵⁸ is surely a departure from the theory of emergence, and I might add, a fallacy of genetic explanation.

If emergent qualities are genuinely new they cannot be regarded as simply spatio-temporal complexes in disguise.

The proof of the spatio-temporal nature of mind from the spatio-temporal properties of the neural processes fails both in cogency of demonstration and is incompatible with Alexander's view of mind implied in his rejection of behaviorism and his doctrine of emergence.

¹ II 45, 46. All references, unless otherwise stated, are to Space-Time and Deity. S. Alexander, 2 vols., Macmillan.

² II 71 (Italics mine). This distinctive character of Alexander's version of Emergent Evolution is necessary to make it conform to his ontological monism and theory of categories, but I regard the attempted synthesis riddled with questionable logic. His difficulties are rooted in the fact that his ontology and categorial theory requires continuity between the different levels of existence, whereas continuity saps all the vitality from emergence.

³ I am not concerned with the validity of this assertion. That it represents correctly Alexander's view may be seen from the definition of mind in II 4: 81, the oft recurring expression "mind or consciousness" and the index heading "Mentality—Consciousness".

⁴ I 93; II 89, 90. Preface to New Impression, xv.

⁵ II 81, 82, 102.

⁶ I 12.

⁷ I 19. I am not concerned to discuss the validity of this contention, but to indicate that it prescribes a necessary condition for the proof of the spatio-temporal character of mind.

⁸ I 18.

⁹ II 89.

¹⁰ I 97-8.

¹¹ P. 9. Abstract of Gifford Lectures, prepared by the author for his audience.

¹² Abstract p. 10: I ch. IV.

¹³ I 133.

¹⁴ I 99.

¹⁵ I 212.

¹⁶ Preface to New Impression xv.

¹⁷ I 102.

¹⁸Mind XXX, 118, p. 129.

¹⁹Mind XXX, 120, pp. 420-21.

²⁰ Preface of New Impression xiv.

²¹Mind XXX, 118, p. 134.

²² II 100.

²³Cf. the masterly discussion by C. D. Broad in Mind and its Place in Nature, Ch. V.

²⁴ I 134.

²⁵ I 116, 133.

²⁶ G. P. Adams in University of California Publications in Philosophy, vol. 18, p. 211.

²⁷ I 101.

²⁸ G. F. Stout, Mind and Matter, 155; cf. Bk iv. Chap. 1 2.

²⁹ I 101.

³⁰ N. Kemp Smith, Prolegomena to an Idealist Theory of Knowledge, 134-35.

³¹ II 164.

³² II 148.

³³ II 148.

³⁴ II 201.

³⁵ II 147. In passing I might mention that from Alexander's epitomized version of Dr. Head's neurological studies, I find no support for regarding intuition as phylogenetically prior to sense. Cf., e.g., "Pain, heat, and cold impulses cross in the spinal cord first, touch impulses later" . . . II 179, and the evidence that spatial apprehension is intimately connected with the cortex.

³⁶ II 147, 201.

³⁷ II 155.

³⁸ II 145.

³⁹Cf. II 153. "In contemplating the action of the wind blowing down a chimney, we enjoy first the act of contemplating the blowing wind, and the standing chimney . . ." (Italics mine).

⁴⁰ II 144.

⁴¹ N. Kemp Smith, op. cit. 132.

⁴² II 155 (Italics mine).

⁴³ I 319. Cf. II 151 where the assertion is softened to "our enjoyment has number".

⁴⁴ II 144.

⁴⁵ II 211.

⁴⁶ Berkeley, Principles 49.

⁴⁷ I 110.

⁴⁸ II 128.

⁴⁹ I 109.

⁵⁰ II 117.

⁵¹ II 155.

⁵² II 145.

⁵³ It was gratifying to find this assertion supported by Mr. Hallet's comments on Alexander's use of enjoyment. "Thus the deliverance of immediate experience is that we enjoy the contemplation of the objects. It is only an outside observer (or the mind itself in thought) who says that what we enjoy is the neural process." Aeternitas 261. Again, "I understand Mr. Alexander to assert: when two things A and B are cognitively compresent, one of them (say A) is of the order of complexity to which the quality of consciousness or mind belongs. A then has (or is) a neural system which is innervated in response to stimulus from B which is mediated by ordinary physical or organic processes. This innervation is enjoyed by A, but not as a neural innervation; it is enjoyed as the contemplation of B" (Ibid. 262).

⁵⁴ II 111.

⁵⁵ II 8-46, 62-69.

⁵⁶ II 45.

⁵⁷ II 46.

⁵⁸ II 67 (Italics mine).