SOURCE: Ahleid, F. “Oratorical Strategy in Sallust's ‘Letter of Mithridates’ Reconsidered.” Mnemosyne 41, no. 1-2 (1988): 67-92.

[In the following essay, Ahleid discusses the “Letter of Mithridates” from the Historiae as a work of deliberative oratory.]

In his recent monograph on Mithridates VI Eupator, McGing describes the propaganda with which the king of Pontus tried to obtain support in his wars against Rome¹. Among the texts discussed by McGing, Sallust Hist. [Historiae] 4,69 Maurenbrecher figures as “potentially one of the most important sources for Mithridates' propaganda, as it purports to be a personal letter of the king himself” (154,178). On the other hand, it is probably not based on an authentic document and encompasses several ideas of a “general rhetorical nature”, which Sallust easily could have thought out without any knowledge of Greek and Mithridatic anti-Roman propaganda, by just putting himself in Mithridates' situation. (McGing 154-160). We think it probable that the form in which the arguments of Mithridates are presented is also Sallustian invention of the same general rhetorical nature. Apart from the opening formula (Rex Mithridates regi Arsaci salutem), the text is an elaborate specimen of deliberative oratory. As such, it has been analysed with the help of Aristotle's Rhetorica and handbooks written by contemporaries of Sallust by E. Bikerman in an article written in 1941 and published in REL [Revue de Etudes Latines] 24 (1947): La Lettre de Mithridate dans les “Histoires” de Salluste. The purpose of this paper is to modify and supplement this still indispensable article—if only because of its great number of references to rhetorical theory—, on the principle that the method of analysing forensic oratory demonstrated by C. Neumeister, Grundsätze der forensischen Rhetorik gezeigt an Gerichtsreden Ciceros (München 1964) offers a sound starting point for the interpretation of deliberative oratory as well. Like the specimens of Ciceronian forensic oratory discussed by Neumeister, this letter will be analysed as a process of persuasion during which the orator proceeds step by step to his final aim, the decision to be taken by Arsaces to join the war against Rome. This process is not only determined by its aim but also by the situation in which the letter is placed by Sallust. Little is left of his account of the events preceding Mithridates' letter to Arsaces (i.e. Phraates III, king of Parthia since 70-69, Ziegler 24). But it is possible to get an idea of Sallust's version of this part of the third Mithridatic war by combining the short fragments and the letter itself with the facts mentioned by authors who rely more or less on the Historiae: Plutarch, Dio Cassius and, possibly, Appian². In the spring of 73 (McGing 139 and 145), hostilities between Rome and Mithridates break out again. After initial successes, reverses and disasters on land and sea follow one another. A Roman army under Lucullus invades Pontus and forces Mithridates to flee to Armenia. By 70 Pontus is occupied by the Romans (Hist. 4,4-19 Maurenbrecher; Plutarch Lucullus 15-19). The Armenian king, Tigranes, gave refuge to his father-in-law, but refused to get involved in the war to help him regain his kingdom. Lucullus, in order to solve the Mithridatic problem once and for all, demanded his surrender in such a way that Tigranes could not comply, and invaded Armenia (Hist. 4,56-57; Plutarch Lucullus 21). Tigranes tried to stop the Roman invasion by venturing a formal battle near Tigranocerta and suffered a crushing defeat. In the winter 69-68 he levied a new army, the command of which was entrusted to Mithridates, and it is in this period that Sallust makes Mithridates write his letter to the Parthian king to persuade him to join forces against the Romans (Hist. 4,58-69; Plutarch Lucullus 24-29: Dio Cassius 36,1; Appian Mithr. 87). At the same time Lucullus tried to compel Arsaces to abandon the neutrality carefully kept by his predecessors in the conflict between Rome and Pontus, and to range himself to the Roman side (Dio Cassius 36,3; Appian 87). However, neither Lucullus nor Mithridates and Tigranes were successful in their attempts to win Parthian support. Arsaces kept strictly to a policy of non-intervention, assuming that an evenly balanced struggle between the opponents would ensure him the greatest safety (Dio Cassius 36,3)³.

Sections 1-4 are a prologue and are discussed as such by Bikerman 133-137. 1-2 encompass the issue and the points to be considered in the main body of the letter. Section 1 presents them in a general way and resembles Thucydides 1,32. Section 2 refers to Arsaces, who has to choose between continuation of peace or war against Rome, taking the same points into account. These points are found among the loci argumentationis listed for deliberative oratory in the handbooks from Aristotle onwards. According to some authorities, the first point … liceatne tum pacem agere … ought to precede the others as a preliminary consideration⁴. Sections 3-4 are meant to overcome the prejudices of Arsaces against the proposed alliance caused by Armenian expansion at the expense of the Parths and by Mithridates' misfortunes in his wars against Rome. In fact, the hostilities between Parthia and Armenia had started with the death of Mithridates II of Parthia not long after 87, when Tigranes felt free to occupy parts of Parthia (Debevoise 50-51; Ziegler 24). Mithridates argues that this makes the alliance profitable for Arsaces, because it is he who is in a position to dictate the conditions, and—this is undoubtedly hinted at—in this way he will recover the lost territory, as is confirmed by Plutarch, Lucullus 21,4-5 and 30,1; Dio Cassius 36,1 and 6; Memnon FgrHist 434,38,8. Mithridates' reverses are turned into advantages both for Arsaces and himself. They make him into an adviser who relies on his own experience, and into a cautionary example, a valuable asset for a mighty king like Arsaces⁵. The experience lends auctoritas to Mithridates, a prime condition for persuasiveness, especially in deliberative oratory. In this way, Mithridates tries to gain the goodwill of Arsaces (Bikerman 136).

The following points may be added to Bikerman's discussion. According to Cicero Part. 83 a question like liceatne tum pacem agere is not only a preliminary point but it also plays a pre-emptive part in a deliberation, … si quid effici non possit deliberatio tollitur quamvis sit utile. This has consequences for the tasks of the orator, which are mentioned in 85. When the orator advises a course of action, he has to prove that it is practicable, and then that it is utile. Advising against a course of action, he can follow two ways. He either proves that it is not practicable and therefore should not be undertaken, or that it is not utile and should be avoided. This passage explains the binary construction of both section 1 … tum … deinde …, and 2 … si … nisi …⁶ Trying to win Arsaces over to the proposed alliance, Mithridates will argue both as a dissuasor pacis and as a suasor belli. In his first capacity he will prove that it is not possible for Arsaces to maintain peace with Rome; and that will be enough. In his second capacity he will demonstrate that the alternative course of action, to join the war of Mithridates and Tigranes against Rome, is both honestum and utile (cf. note 4). Strictly speaking, as a suasor belli Mithridates should also have mentioned here the feasibility of a successful war against Rome, but this seems to be implied in tutum and opportuni. In any case, this locus will be part of Mithridates' further considerations.

The arguments to be used by Mithridates are indicated in 1 as general questions. They appear again in the protasis of 2, a cautiously formulated conditional sentence. Tibi si perpetua pace fieri licet and … egregia fama si Romanos oppresseris … correspond with respectively … liceatne tum pacem agere … and gloriosum as possible answers to these questions. The remaining points, opportuni and scelestissumi, correspond crosswise with tutum and pium, not as answers, but as arguments in nuce, entailing affirmative answers to these questions. In sections 1-2, not only the outline of the argumentation is indicated—one of the usual functions of a prologue—, but the argumentation has already started in this surreptitious way. The same also applies more or less to 3-4, where Mithridates refers to his misfortunes, called mala mea in 2, by means of the understatements meae res parum prosperae and ego non validissimus. He could have elaborated on his misfortunes in order to rouse the pity of Arsaces here. However, this way of gaining goodwill is not suited very well to deliberative oratory, as may be concluded from Cicero Part. 97, principia autem in sententiis dicendis brevia esse debent; non enim supplex ut ad iudicem venit orator sed hortator atque auctor. Especially in this case, it would be counterproductive for Mithridates to emphasize his pitiful circumstances. It would impair the image of auctoritas he is building up here. Besides—and this is even more serious—it would give Arsaces the idea that the war he is demanded to join, is a lost cause. In fact, one of the arguments of Mithridates will be that a successful continuation of the war is certainly possible⁷. By avoiding a too unfavourable representation of his position he smooths the way for this point. Whereas Bikerman has demonstrated that 1-4 fulfils the customary function of a prologue by creating the conditions under which Mithridates will be able to win Arsaces over to his side (docilem and benevolum facere), our further observations show that at the same time he goes beyond the line between pro-logos and tractatio.

After the prologue, Arsaces and the choice he has to make are not mentioned for a considerable time. It is only after approximately fifty lines in the Teubner edition by Kurfess that Mithridates returns in 16 to Arsaces and the present. Sections 5-9 cover the years 200-74 and tell how the kings of Macedon, Syria, Pergamum and Bithynia fell victim to Roman deceit. Sections 10-15 are about Mithridates and Rome in the period 88-69. Here, Rome is represented as the party responsible for the war, and Roman successes are explained by the hostility of nature and the shortcomings of others, not Mithridates. Both in 5-9 and in 10-15, the facts are presented in chronological order.

Bikerman 137-141 regards 5-15 as the first part of the argumentatio. It encompasses a number of historical exempla entailing two conclusions. After the conquest of Pontus and Armenia, Rome will turn against the kingdom of Arsaces. And, it will be possible to bring the war which Arsaces is exhorted to join to a successful end. Both points will serve as arguments in 16 ff. In order to give greater cogency to this way of reasoning, based as it is on induction from the incidental to the incidental, Sallust makes Mithridates start the argumentatio with a general proposition, claiming that the behaviour of the Romans towards Mithridates and the other kings mentioned originates from a long-standing greed for power and riches.

16-19 is, according to Bikerman 140 and 143 note 6, the second part of the argumentatio. Here, Mithridates counters three objections Arsaces is supposed to raise against his way of arguing in 5-15: he will have a better chance to resist the Romans if they attack Parthia after conquering Pontus and Armenia; Rome will not continue the war to subject his kingdom as well; the war envisaged by Mithridates does not promise any success.

Finally, 20-23 is an epilogue which fulfils the two functions distinguished by Cicero Part. 52-53 and contemporary rhetoricians for the forensic peroration in particular, amplificatio and enumeratio (Bikerman 144-145).

Apart from the fact that 5-15 envisages the past, and 16-19 (and also the remainder of the letter) concerns the present and the immediate future, Mithridates' tone changes considerably at 16. The questions directed at Arsaces and a forceful representation of Roman cupido imperii et divitiarum make 16-19 more emotional and obtrusive than the previous sections, as Bikerman 143-144 observes. Whereas 16-19 resembles 1-4 by showing characteristics of a conative text, 5-15 on the other hand, is a referential one. In this respect 5-15 is to be compared with Jug. [Bellum Jugurthinum] 81,1, where Jugurtha tries to rouse the fighting spirit of his newly won ally by arguing that Bocchus will otherwise be the next victim of Rome's avaritia and lubido imperitandi, like Jugurtha himself and others before him: tum sese, paulo ante Carthaginienses, item regem Persen, post uti quisque opulentissimus videatur, ita Romanis hostem fore, The speech of Jugurtha, however, is summarized in oratio obliqua, and the exempla are indicated as briefly as possible, cf. Quintilian 5,11,6 … quaedam (sc. exempla) significare satis erit. Sections 5-15 show the other way of presenting exempla distinguished by Quintilian 5,11,15 … quaedam autem ex iis quae gesta sunt tota narrabimus. Here, each example is made into a miniature story. Together they are almost a tale in its own right of Roman unreliability and bellicosity in the Hellenistic world. Ancient authorities agree that deliberative oratory, concerned as it is with a decision about the future, does not require a narratio as often as forensic oratory, cf. Aristotle Rhet. 1417 b12-16; Cicero Part. 13 and Quintilian 3,8.10-11. But in the same passage, Aristotle remarks on the possibility for the deliberative orator to influence the decision by a favourable or critical account of events from the past. And this is what Mithridates tries to do. Sections 5-15 are a narratio about events in the Hellenistic world and contribute as such to the final aim of the letter, Arsaces' decision to range himself on the side of Mithridates and Tigranes. This part of the letter is not to be regarded as the first part of the argumentatio, as Bikerman does. It serves the same purpose as the narratio of the facts of the case in forensic oratory, which is stated by Quintilian 5 pr.4 as follows; … neque prohoemii neque narrationis est alius usus quam ut huic (sc. probationi) iudicem praeparent. 5-15 is the second step in the process of persuasion, and prepares for the argumentatio, which begins at 16. An objective presentation of the facts is no more to be expected here than in a narratio in a forensic speech, which likewise aims at persuasiveness in the first place, cf. Quintilian 4,2,21 … neque enim narratio in hoc reperta est ut tantum cognoscat iudex sed aliquanto magis ut consentiat⁸. And it is probable that for this part of the letter Sallust used pro-Mithridatic sources as mentioned by McGing 160. The general proposition which precedes the actual account of events from 200 until 69, provides a framework to the following stories. It speaks about Roman aggression not only against kings but against the whole world⁹. Viewed against this background 5-15 becomes more than a collection of miniature stories. The events told in 5-15 are represented as parts of one great Roman design caused by desire for power and wealth, and in this way attain a greater persuasive force. This is a first explanation of 5 referring to the Romans as communes omnium hostes, to use a phrase from Jug. 81. Later, when we discuss the role played by the loci of 1-2, we shall suggest a second reason. It stands to reason that only kings are mentioned in the narratio (with the exception of the Cretans in 10) and that the behaviour of Rome is summarized as morem suom omnia regna subvortundi in 15. As a king Arsaces will be sensitive to these exempla in the first place (Bikerman 138 with Aristotle Rhet. 1382 b 16). As a last point we would like to add that as examples Ptolemaeus (10 and 12) and Tigranes (13) have a special relevance. Like Arsaces, they were exhorted by Mithridates to join his war against Rome. They did not heed his warnings and experience now the fatal results of their refusal.

A comparable progressive movement which makes the letter as a whole a dynamic process of persuasion, is also to be observed in the third part. Four steps are to be distinguished in the argumentatio, leading from 16 to the end of 22. The disjunctive question at the beginning of 16 presupposes two objections raised by Arsaces, which prove that he does not consider Rome a great enough danger to make him join forces with Mithridates and Tigranes. The phrase … an finem belli futurum putes implies that Arsaces could assume that Rome would be content with the conquest of Pontus and Armenia and would not continue her war to conquer his kingdom as well. The precise objection implied in nobis oppressis utrum firmiorem te ad resistundum … putes is not certain. It may be that Mithridates assumes that Arsaces reckons with a better chance to defend Parthia, because his present strength already surpasses the resources of Mithridates and the other kings mentioned in 5-15. But it is also possible to take nobis oppressis as a causal adjunct of firmiorem te ad resistundum, as Bikerman 141 does. In this case, Arsaces is supposed to consider a policy of non-intervention as profitable in the present situation. It would enable him to recover the territory occupied by Tigranes (to which 3-4 alludes), enlarging at the same time his resources against a Roman invasion of Pontus in the near future. We know that Arsaces tried to compensate the lost territory by expansion at the cost of Armenia in the years 66-65 (Plutarch Pompeius 36,2; Dio Cassius 36,51; 37,5,3 and 6,4; Appian Mithr. 106; cf. Debevoise 72-75). And this might be a point in favour of Bikerman's interpretation of the first part of the disjunctive question as a covert warning against the role of tertius gaudens which Arsaces already could have considered at the time that Mithridates wrote his letter. Since it does not make a great difference for the argumentation as a whole for which of the two possibilities we decide, we would rather try to ascertain how the objections are countered by Mithridates. Bikerman 140-141 regards the second sentence of 16, scio equidem … ad praedam peteris as the refutation of Arsaces' first objection, based on the ancient conception that a policy of non-intervention is only feasible for him who is strong enough not to have to reckon with the victorious party turning against him afterwards. The second point, an finem belli futurum putes, is argued against in 17-19. Indeed, the second sentence of 16 represents the resources of Arsaces as very extensive, but not as means with which he could ward off a Roman attack. It is these resources which stir the Roman greed for riches exposed in 5-15: ad praedam peteris. In the light of the narratio, these words provide the negative answer to the second part of the disjunctive question: Rome will not end her war in the East but the wealth of Parthia makes Arsaces her next victim. In this way, Mithridates broaches the first point of consideration mentioned in the prologue, the impossibility for Arsaces to maintain peace with Rome. The first part of the question, if Arsaces will be strong enough to resist the inevitable attack, is left unanswered. About the use of the present tense in peteris, we would like to remark that this is not only Sallustian brevitas (ad societatem … ad praedam peteris), but also a way of convincing Arsaces of the gravity of the situation. The Roman danger is very near, and, according to Aristotle Rhet. 1382 a 21 people are afraid not of things in the distant future, but of an immediate evil that causes destruction or pain.

We consider the remainder of 16 as the second step in the argumentatio. The main problem is the meaning of … quando¹⁰neque vincere neque vinci possumus in relation to the main clause ceterum consilium … bellum conficere. This has been interpreted by Bikerman 140-141 (and the commentators Opitz 1897, Jacobs-Wirtz-Kurfess 1922, Paladini, Klinz 1976 (see n. 20), 98) in the light of the ancient idea of the dangers of a policy of non-intervention mentioned above. Whoever wins the war, neutrality will be dangerous for Arsaces in any case; either the Romans or Mithridates and Tigranes will punish him. However, Büchner 413 note 156 remarks that it does not suit Mithridates in his position to put pressure on Arsaces by stating neque vincere … sine tuo periculo possumus. In fact. Lucullus was soliciting Parthian support as well, and a warning which could be easily understood as a more or less covered threat would just tip the balance for Arsaces in favour of the Romans. Moreover, it is difficult to see how this is related to the main clause. The approach by Pasoli 145 seems to us a better one. He takes neque vincere … sine tuo periculo possumus as an admission of the fact that Mithridates and Tigranes realize that they are not able to bring the war to a satisfactory end, unless Arsaces lends his support and shares part of the dangers of the war. As such this phrase indicates the reason why (quando) in the main clause the war, continued with the support of Arsaces, is presented both as the war which will end Roman aggression in the East before it reaches Parthia (bellum … conficere corresponds with finem belli futurum) and as a safe risk for Arsaces. Tigranes and Mithridates still have the means to continue the war (Tigranis regno integro, meis militibus ‹belli prudentibus›). As far as Arsaces is concerned, the war will be dangerous neither for his kingdom (procul ab domo) nor for himself (per nostra corpora), and it will not demand a great effort¹¹. Mithridates and Tigranes will take the brunt of the war and will spare their ally as much as possible, not out of generosity of course, but because of necessity. Mithridates realizes that he exhorts Arsaces to undertake the dangers of a war with Rome, and tries in this way to make it acceptable to him. For the same reason Mithridates points out what the consequences will be if Arsaces withholds his support. Neque … vinci sine tuo periculo possumus implies that a Roman victory over Pontus and Armenia will inevitably (Pasoli 145) mean danger to Parthia, as has been already argued in the first part of 16. Mithridates leaves it to Arsaces to realize that in this case the war with Rome will be far more dangerous. It would mean an invasion of Parthia and personal danger for Arsaces himself, while Mithridates and Tigranes would not be there to carry the burden of the war. The second step of the argumentatio compares the two courses of action between which Arsaces has to decide. Both options result in a war with Rome, but in respect of periculum and labor an immediate war at the side of Mithridates and Tigranes is preferable to a war in the future, when Arsaces' neutrality has caused the subjection of his fellow-kings and he will have to face a much greater danger. It is obvious that in this part of the argumentatio the main point of view is tutum mentioned in 1-2. Indeed it is covered by the definition of this locus in Rhet. Her. 3,3 … quae conficit instantis aut consequentis oriculi vitationem. The argument parvo labore plays a minor role compared with tutum. According to Cicero Inv. 2,169; Part 84 and 93; Top. 93, it goes together with quid fieri possit, the preliminary question to be considered when a course of action is advised. This point, not mentioned explicitly in the prologue, is considered here in this unobtrusive fashion. It is obvious that Mithridates argues here on the assumption that the Romans are not invincible. And this is one of the conclusions Arsaces is supposed to draw from the events told in 10-15. We notice again how the narratio prepares for the argumentatio. In view of this, it is possible that per nostra corpora not only means that there will be no personal danger for Arsaces, but also that treacherous behaviour like that of Archelaus referred to in 12 will not imperil the victory, Mithridates and Tigranes acting themselves as commanders-in-chief.

In Bikerman's interpretation of the second half of 16, the main clause contains the plan of campaign for the war of the three kings against Rome. At the same time it counters an implied objection against the possibility of a victory over Rome. It is followed by a warning against the dangers from two sides, if Arsaces maintains a policy of non-intervention. Reading apparently quo instead of quando, Bikerman does not consider the coherence in the sentence as a whole. In our opinion, the main clause and subordinate clause are interrelated, the subordinate clause providing the key for the meaning of the sentence as a whole. And what is more, regarded as an elaboration of the loci tutum and facile (quid fieri possit), this second step of the argumentatio is a natural sequel to the first one. Given the fact that after Pontus and Armenia Rome will try to conquer the kingdom of Arsaces (step one, taken up by neque vinci sine tuo periculo possumus), it is safer and easier for him to wage war with Rome now, at the side of Mithridates and Tigranes, than to wait until the subjection of Armenia and Pontus, even if he should be strong enough to resist the Romans on his own.

The last phrase of 16 neque vinci sine tuo periculo possumus leads to the third step of the argumentatio, sections 17 ff. Mithridates argues again that the conquest of Pontus and Armenia will not cause the Romans to leave Arsaces in peace. Here, Mithridates does not confine himself to referring to Arsaces' wealth as the motivation for a Roman attack on Parthia, as in 16. He elaborates on Roman imperialism and its causes in general, as stated in the first sentence of 5-15. Its general character, length and pathos (Bikerman 144) make this discussion the point of gravity of the letter. It is divided into two parts, both beginning with a rhetorical question. In 17-18 the imperial ambitions of Rome, in 19-21 the material motivation of Roman greed for conquest are in the foreground. Divided in this way, 17-21 reflects the double cause of Roman bellicosity as stated in 5.

17-18 begins with this idea of Rome's world-wide aggression expressed in a different way. In postquam ad occidentem pergentibus finem Oceanus fecit arma huc convenisse one recognizes the ancient formulation of domination over the entire world (Bikerman 142). And phrases like peste conditos orbis terrarum and socios amicos procul iuxta sitos inopes potentisque come to the same. There is no limit set to Rome's greed for power; she will not rest before she rules the whole world, including the kingdom of Arsaces. However, 17-18 is more than an elaborate repetition of the general idea in 5. A new argument is added, contributing to Mithridates' point that for Arsaces peace with Rome is an impossibility. Behind neque quisquam a principio nisi raptum habere … and convenas olim sine patria parentibus peste conditos orbis terrarum Bikerman 143 has discovered the ancient conception of the character of a nation being determined once and for all by its origin. The above quotations imply that Roman aggression did not start with the war against Philip of Macedon, as the narratio might suggest. Inherent in the nature of the Roman people, it existed from the time of Rome's foundation, and what is more, it will never cease. Conclusion: Arsaces should not expect that Rome will give up her imperial ambitions all of a sudden. Looking back to the beginning of 5-15, we may say that the words vetus and profunda attain a wider meaning now that the process of persuasion has proceeded to the present stage. The cause of Roman bellicosity is not only long-established, but also something which goes on and on, like a chronic disease. Rome's greed is no longer just immense. By now it is to be regarded as insatiable, never allowing the Roman people to end warfare until the entire world is subjected to Rome.

At the same time, Roman hostility to kings, another traditional theme of regal anti-Roman propaganda (McGing 104) and also found in Jug. 81,1, is explained. Referred to as a characteristic feature of the Roman people in 15 (morem suom omnia regna subvortundi), it is shown here as a consequence of Rome's innate imperialism. Forced as it were by nature to a continuous pursuit of power, the Romans cannot but fear kings. They regard kings as rivals, since most nations prefer royal mastery, based as it is on justice, to what Rome pretends to offer as libertas. And also as champions of the nations which have been forced to accept the grave servitium, mentioned in 11, disguised as libertas¹². These two causes, which direct Roman aggression towards kings in particular, are distinguished as reasons for fear by Aristotle Rhet. 1382b 12-13 (rivalry) and 10-11 (the conscience of injuries inflicted upon others). In this way Mithridates' decisive argument is connected with Rome's habitual cupido imperii.

The rhetorical question 19 repeats the point made in 16, that the wealth of Parthia will cause Rome to start a war against Arsaces as well. The effects of Roman greed, dolum in praesens et postea bellum, call to mind in particular Mithridates' first example mentioned in 5-15. Comparable circumstances (dum a Carthaginiensibus premebantur 6) compelled the Romans to feign friendship, later Philip was crushed by war. As a cautionary tale 6-7 is very appropriate. Trying to win Arsaces' support, Lucullus may pose as a friend; later, when Arsaces' help is no longer needed, he will show his true Roman nature. The next sentence brings the argumentation back to the general level, as in 17-18: Romani arma in omnes habent … And the methods with which Rome has made her empire as extensive as it is, are also referred to as her customary behaviour, as her second nature: per hunc morem, like the cupido imperii et divitiarum. which induces her to act as she does. With the consequences of this innate expansionism the culmination of this part of the argumentatio is reached. It will lead to the destruction of the entire world or to the downfall of Rome.

In 17-21, the question of the possibility of a policy of non-intervention is discussed for the second time, and not for the first time, as Bikerman 142-143 assumes. In 16, in such a succinct way that it only got some weight by the support of the narratio. It is only here that the far more extensive discussion from a general point of view demonstrates Mithridates' point that it is not possible for Arsaces to maintain peace with Rome in a really convincing manner. The way in which Mithridates returns to an idea discussed before, elaborating on it and adding more arguments, is typical of oratorical argumentation. In this respect step one and three of the argumentatio demonstrate the technique of hammering home an idea, discussed as commoratio and regarded as essential to oratory in Rhet. Her. 4,58¹³.

Quod haud difficile est (it is not difficult to realize the possibility implied in occident, viz. to defeat¹⁴ the army of Lucullus and to bring Rome's war in the East to an end) introduces the fourth and final step in the argumentatio, which brings us from general considerations to the situation of the moment. As in the second step, the advantages of an alliance with Mithridates and Tigranes and an immediate war with Rome are demonstrated, but from a different point of view. The argument in 16 concentrated on what both kings were able to contribute to the war in order to make it safe and easy (but the latter played a secondary role) for Arsaces. Here, it is the precarious position of Lucullus' army which will make the war easy. As a concomitant of an fieri possit, the locus “facile” encompasses the arguments mentioned by Cicero Part. 95 under de ratione efficiendi. And indeed, just as in 16, the possibility of a successful war against Rome is taken into consideration under cover of facile. Its arguments quo loco and contra quos are recognized in respectively si tu Mesopotamia nos Armenia circumgredimur and exercitum sine frumento sine auxilio. Fortuna aut nostris vitiis adhuc incolumem refers to the storms mentioned in 14 and the shortcomings of Tigranes mentioned in 15, which prevented the destruction of the Roman army, and support Mithridates' argument. Safety is not considered here, pace Bikerman 145.

The change in point of view also possibly explains a second difference between 21 and 16. Where considerations of safety prevail, no personal involvement in the war is requested from Arsaces. But after the long exposition of Rome's criminal nature, Mithridates ventures to modify 16, indicating that the three kings have to march against Lucullus, … si tu Mesopotamia nos Armenia circumgredimur. And it is this personal involvement of Arsaces which enables Mithridates to turn to the fourth point mentioned in 1-2. Glory will be bestowed on him, because his personal assistance (auxilio profectum) will prove to be the decisive step towards the annihilation of Roman oppression. After the above, it is not possible to regard 20-22 as part of a peroratio, as Bikerman does. Not only because of the fact that gloria is considered here for the first time, but also because the other points discussed in these sections are not mere repetitions, but additions to and modifications of points argued before.

The letter is not rounded off with a peroration proper, but by a short concluding passage, not uncommon in deliberative oratory¹⁵. 23 contains the expected exhortation to join forces at this favourable moment in order to destroy once and for all the latrones gentium (Bikerman 145). However, more obtrusive is the final warning against a narrow-minded policy of non-intervention, which would cause the subjection of Pontus and Armenia. Here, Mithridates repeats and at the same time sharpens the issue stated in 1-2. The issue is indicated as a choice between the two courses of action between which Arsaces has to decide, annihilation or victory. And this implies at last an answer to the first objection Arsaces was supposed to have raised in 16. Even the king of wealthy Parthia will not be strong enough to counter a Roman attack on his kingdom, when non-intervention has caused the ruin of Mithridates and Tigranes.

Following the process of persuasion throughout Mithridates letter we come to the conclusion that he acts indeed in the two capacities implied in 1-2. Advising against a policy of non-intervention, he demonstrates in steps one and three of the argumentatio that it is impossible for Arsaces to maintain peace with Rome. Arguing in favour of an alliance against the Romans, in step two, he points out that an immediate war at the side of Mithridates and Tigranes will be safer and easier for Arsaces than the war which will be the inevitable result of a Roman victory over Mithridates and Tigranes. Step four, in the same vein, demonstrates that the army of Lucullus is in such a situation that it can easily be defeated. Also in favour of a common war is the statement in 22 about Arsaces' renown as a saviour of the world from Rome and her crimes. The stories in the narratio about the criminal behaviour of the Romans against the Hellenistic kings prepare for the discussion of the possibility of non-intervention in the argumentatio. And the tales where Mithridates blames other people and nature for the successes of the Roman armies, are immediately related to the considerations of tutum and facile in the argumentatio. Besides, the prologue already suggested that he did not suffer a total defeat.

The most important part in the argumentatio is played by the question whether non-intervention is feasible. And accordingly, in the narratio most attention is paid to the events which lead to the conclusion that after Mithridates and Tigranes, Arsaces will be the next victim of Rome. And this idea is also implied in the final sentence of the letter. Bikerman 145 has reached comparable conclusions. The question of the possibility of maintaining peace with Rome plays the leading part throughout the letter; tutum (and facile) come second; of only minor importance are gloriosum and the remaining point in 1, pium. Because of the correspondence scelestissumi-pium in 1-2¹⁶, Bikerman takes it that Mithridates argues from this point of view in the passages where the criminal behaviour of the Romans is exposed, viz. 5-15, 17-18 and 22. We might ask, however, if the war which Arsaces will fight with his allies, is referred to as pius only because it will liberate the nations from their common foe. Coming to the assistance of Mithridates and Tigranes, Arsaces prevents at the same time a Roman attack on Parthia, cf. 16 procul ab domo … bellum conficere. Bikerman 143 has observed that the war Arsaces is exhorted to undertake is a pre-emptive war. But he has not considered whether the war can be qualified as pius in this respect as well. This would alter the status of pius among the loci referred to in 1-2, and at the same time add to our understanding of Mithridates' oratorical strategy. We have not paid attention to pius and the arguments it entails before, in order not to interrupt the description of Mithridates' argumentation in its successive stages.

The article bellum in the Thesaurus Linguae Latinae 2, 1847-1848, and the material on pius collected in the offices of the Thesaurus in Munich, include several passages where pius by itself or in combination with iustus qualifies a war. Several passages are about what scholars usually refer to as “bellum iustum”, i.e. a war only to be undertaken for certain specific reasons and after the observance of certain formalities¹⁷). Mostly it is an act of unprovoked aggression performed by the enemy-to-be, which makes a state feel entitled to undertake a war. But in two passages a war is justified not by actual aggression, but because of the attitude of the enemy-to-be making a war probable or unavoidable.

Our first case is part of the story told by Livy in book 8 about the Latini trying to break away from Roman supremacy. Although allies for a long time, occulte Romanum coquebant bellum (3,2). Called to account by the Roman senate, their spokesman Annius, in stead of offering satisfaction, demands total equality of status between Latini and Roman citizens. He puts pressure on the senators by stating that it is only consanguinity which keeps them from enforcing their demands by war. Livy comments … tamquam victor Capitolium cepisset non legatus iure gentium tutus loqueretur (5,2). When the consul Manlius Torquatus calls Iuppiter to witness this example of perfidy and arrogance, Annius adds insult to injury by slighting the divine power of Iuppiter (6,2). Leaving the senate, Annius is dangerously injured by a fall, which makes Torquatus exclaim: bene habet, di pium movere bellum (6,5), and convince the Roman people that the accident is a sign of divine approval for a war against the Latini. The war, which is started immediately, resembles the war Arsaces is advised to begin, because it is not undertaken to ward off but to prevent an act of aggression. The Latini preparing a war secretly and Annius threatening Rome with a war, justify this reaction, qualified as pius.

Our second case is Livy 9,1,10. Again arrogance characterizes the behaviour of the enemy-to-be¹⁸). Competing with Rome about the supremacy over Italy (8,23,9), the Samnites seize every opportunity to renew the war in spite of treaties and promises solemnly made (8,37,2). At last, they realize that they are defeated again and again, because the gods punish perfidy (8,39,10). They decide to regain the favour of the gods by asking the Romans for peace and by offering to pay damages and to hand over those leaders responsible for the war. When Rome only accepts the first offer and does not grant peace, Pontius reassures the Samnites that the gods, offended by this violation of the ius gentium, will be on their side (9,1,3-4). Incriminating Roman behaviour with the same pathos as Mithridates and with arguments probably borrowed from comparable anti-Roman sources (Burck 1175), Pontius argues that this example of Roman superbia (1,4 and 8) is a symptom of the determination of the Romans to destroy the Samnites in order to attain the supremacy over Italy (1,9-10). To prevent this, the Samnites have the moral right to reopen the war. Varying his customary formulation iustum piumque, Livy stresses its pre-emptive character and makes Pontius impress the war upon the Samnites both as inevitable and as a last resort: Iustum est bellum, Samnites, quibus est necessarium¹⁹et pia arma quibus nulla nisi in armis relinquitur spes (9,1,10). In the same way Mithridates argues that Arsaces has the moral right to join his war against Rome in order to prevent the Romans from conquering Parthia.

The above does not alter the fact that Arsaces' war can be considered pius too because it will save the world from Roman aggression. As such it is similar to the wars which the Romans claim to have undertaken to protect allies, or communities which after appealing for help were accepted as allies. That a war started for this reason was regarded as pius is proved by Livy 30,31,4-5, where Scipio holds the Carthaginians responsible for both the first and the second Punic war: et tunc Mamertinorum sociorum periculum et nunc Sagunti excidium (the Saguntini were allies according to 21,6,3 and 10,6) nobis pia ac iusta induerunt arma. However, to undertake a war for this reason, is not a question of a moral right, but a question of fides, a moral obligation like the one in private life between cliens and patronus to reciprocal assistance. The obligation which Arsaces will fulfil by joining a war against latrones gentium is also a moral one, but it concerns all nations on earth, not only the allies of Arsaces. Mithridates uses one of the arguments with which Adherbal appeals to the senate for help against Jugurtha. In Jug. 14 Adherbal argues that Jugurtha's aggression ought to be stopped, not only because of Rome's obligations to a socius atque amicus populi Romani (2), but also because of the moral duty inherent in Rome's world-wide sovereignty to guarantee justice in the world: … erat maiestatis populi Romani prohibere iniuriam neque pati quoiusquam regnum per scelus (7); … quibus pro magnitudine imperi ius et iniurias omnis curae esse decet (16). According to Mithridates, it is the maiestas of Arsaces as a king which obliges him likewise to a patrocinium orbis terrarum, as it is called by Cicero Off. 2,27. It is the moral duty of Arsaces as such to see that the Romans are punished for their crimes—18 in tempore vindices adfuturi—and to put an end to Rome's world-wide aggression²⁰. Although the war the Romans are exhorted to in Jug. 14, is not explicitly referred to as pius, the resemblance between this war and a war undertaken in defence of socii, which is actually called pius ac iustus by Livy, is great enough to regard Jug. 14 as a proof for Bikerman's view that pius in 1 is related to the passages in Mithridates' letter, where the war is represented as the answer to Rome's crimes against the entire world. Moreover, Jug. 14 also serves as an illustration of the difference between the two lines of arguments to which pius leads in Mithridates' further considerations. As a preemptive war, Arsaces' war is a question of a moral right; as a war which will save the world from the Romans once and for all, it is an obligation of a higher moral order.

In this vein Mithridates begins his considerations in 5. The incrimination of Rome as the common foe of all nations is not only the general framework for the exempla in 5 ff., as we have pointed out before, it also presents right at the beginning the envisaged war in the favourable light of a highly respectable moral obligation. From the exempla of Roman unreliability and violence against kings, Arsaces is supposed to infer that his kingdom is in danger as well. As such, they contribute both to Mithridates' point that a policy of non-intervention is impossible for Arsaces, and that Arsaces has the right to prevent a Roman invasion of Parthia by joining Mithridates and Tigranes. In 10-12, the first Mithridatic war is spoken of in terms of a “bellum iustum”. Whereas Mithridates was no danger for the Roman empire (quem diiunctum undique regnis et tetrarchiis ab imperio eorum), the mere reputation of his wealth and spirit of independence (fama erat divitem neque serviturum esse; this recalls 5 cupido imperi et divitiarum) made Rome provoke a war through her ally Nicomedes of Bithynia. Therefore, the expulsion of Nicomedes from his kingdom is explained as a retribution for wrongs done to Mithridates. However, when the further stages of this war are mentioned, the occupation of Asia is represented as vengeance for Roman crimes committed against Antiochus (spolium regis Antiochi) approximately a hundred years earlier, and the invasion of Greece is explained as an attempt to release the Greeks from Roman oppression²¹. Especially the latter proves that Mithridates wants his first war to be regarded not only as a question of self-defence, but also as the fulfilment of the moral duty of kings to other nations referred to in 18. As regards Mithridates' view on the present war, it is difficult to accept the conclusion of McGing. based on 13: “It seems, then, that he made no attempt to deny his responsibility for starting the war” (14). Mithridates did start the war indeed, but—and this is understandable in the light of Roman perfidy mentioned in 5-9—realizing that the peace of Dardanus did not mean peace, only a short reprieve from Roman aggression. He took the initiative before the Romans having recovered from civil war could continue their conquests with their former strength. In a way, this war could be called pre-emptive too, and therefore Mithridates is not responsible. No more than the Samnites were. when they restarted the war with Rome, encouraged by Pontius' speech in Livy 9,1. In both cases, Rome is responsible. Representing in this way the present war as pius, Mithridates tries, even before discussing the actual situation, to remove Arsaces' doubts about the justification of the war he is encouraged to take part in.

Turning to the situation of 69-68, Mithridates argues in 16 that Arsaces' wealth will make Parthia the next target of Rome. This point serves not only as an argument for the impossibility of maintaining peace with Rome, but also as one for the right of Arsaces to join in a war which will prevent the Romans from invading his kingdom. This is repeated in 17-21, serving again the same purposes. But also by arguing that the predicted Roman attack is nothing but the next step towards fulfilment of an innate, never-ending ambition to dominate all nations on earth, Mithridates tries to convince Arsaces that this pre-emptive war means at the same time that he will act in accordance with his responsibility as a king for justice in the entire world.

Finally, both pius arguments are implied in the concluding passage. The exhortation referring to latrones gentium oppressisse reminds Arsaces for the last time of his duty towards the world in general. The warning against non-intervention, which recalls the impossibility of peace with Rome, implies the right of Arsaces to join Mithridates' war in order to prevent the otherwise inevitable conquest of Parthia.

Since the argumentatio not only considers pius where the Romans are described as latrones gentium, as Bikerman assumed, but also where Mithridates argues that Arsaces will not be able to maintain peaceful relations with Rome because of the attraction of the wealth of Parthia for Roman cupido imperi et divitiarum, our conclusion must be that a major part of the argumentatio is concerned with the second point of view, mentioned in 1. In the narratio and in the concluding section 23 pius plays a role of comparable importance. Therefore, as regards the status of pius, from 5 onwards the justification of the alliance with Mithridates and Tigranes against Rome is just as important as the question of the feasibility of a policy of non-intervention. We notice also that the argument of Arsaces' kingdom being the next prey for Rome's innate imperial ambition and rapacity is used by Mithridates in two ways, as suasor societatis belli in order to justify the alliance, and as dissuasor pacis in order to demonstrate the impossibility of the alternative course of action. In this respect, the argumentatio does not reflect the neat division in accordance with rhetorical prescript indicated in 1-2. Comparing this procedure with the arguments suggested by Cicero Part. 95 to prove the possibility of a course of action, we observe that Mithridates mainly argues by means of contra quos. Another argument mentioned by Cicero, quibus facultatibus armorum pecuniae sociorum earumve rerum quae ad quamque rem efficiendam pertinent, is not entirely neglected, as Bikerman 145-146 assumes. The facultates armorum pecuniae at Arsaces' disposal are used to prove that the Roman habitual aggression is bound to be directed towards Parthia as well. The other way in which Mithridates could use the facultates-argument would be to state that the resources of Parthia would not be sufficient for Arsaces to withstand a Roman attack when Mithridates and Tigranes have been defeated. This is suggested in 16, but not further developed in the argumentatio, and returns suddenly in 23 as an unquestionable fact.

According to Bikerman 147, it is the course history took after 69-68 which explains why the arguments entailed by liceatne tum pacem agere and pium overlap. At the time when Sallust made Mithridates write his letter, the argument that Parthia would be the next victim of Rome's imperial ambitions had been invalidated by further developments in the East. Arsaces and his successors kept to the Parthian policy of non-intervention without the disastrous consequences predicted by Mithridates. And Parthia stayed independent far longer than Pontus and Armenia. However, it is difficult to understand why Sallust should have reckoned with what he and his readers knew, but what was unknown to anybody else in 69-68. It is in the nature of this and the speeches in ancient historiography in general, that Mithridates does not base his considerations on a foreknowledge of facts which are unknown to him and are partly outside the scope of the Historiae. It is probable oratorical strategy which makes Mithridates prove the impossibility of non-intervention in this way. On the one hand, the argument that Arsaces would be no match for the Romans, notwithstanding his enormous resources, would be a strong point. On the other hand. Mithridates might have feared that he would hurt Arsaces' pride by emphasizing this point too much. Therefore, it does not play the part in the argumentatio one expects reading the beginning of 16. Other arguments mentioned by Cicero, like tempus and locus, are used in 16 and 21, but in order to demonstrate the advantages of the alliance with Mithridates and Tigranes. By proving the impossibility mainly via contra quos and putting great stress on the moral aspects of the question, Mithridates makes it all sound rather flattering. Especially the passages where the war with Mithridates and Tigranes against Rome is not only justified as a right but also as a duty on an even higher level of morality, are supposed to have a great appeal to the pride of such a mighty king as Arsaces. It is not without reason that at the end of the argumentatio this aspect of pius goes together with gloria²²).

A second reason for the importance of the moral point of view is found not in this text as an example of deliberative oratory, but in the intention with which it was composed. As has been observed by Bikerman 133 and other scholars²³), Sallust wrote this text in order to portray one of the main characters in the period of Roman history dealt with in the Historiae. By making Mithridates argue as he does and expose the foreign policy of Rome as a policy based on violence and fraud, Sallust is able to demonstrate the hatred against anything Roman in this formidable opponent and to explain his inflexible resistance against Rome.

It is tempting to conclude from this letter that Sallust's scepticism about the justification of Roman imperialism had grown during the years devoted to historiography, just as the picture of the internal development of the Roman res publica in the prologue of the Historiae (1.11-12 Maurenbrecher) is far less favourable than in Cat. 6-13 and Jug. 41-42. Scholars believe that Mithridates' criticism reflects the author's attitude towards Rome as an imperial power²⁴). However, the judicious discussion of this point by La Penna, 249-254 should warn us against rash conclusions from a text, the supposed intention of which cannot be ascertained by its context, and which differs in this respect from comparable incriminations of Rome in Livy (e.g. 31,29; 37,25,5-7; 42,25,8-9; 42,52,6-16; 44,24,2-6, cf. Burck 1157-1163 and 1169-1176). Unfortunately, the fact that the letter of Mithridates is transmitted without its context makes it impossible to decide if the supposed critical attitude of Sallust towards Roman imperialism offers a third explanation for the way in which Mithridates demonstrates that Arsaces can no longer refuse to join in his war against the Romans.

Notes

1. B. C. McGing, The Foreign Policy of Mithridates VI Eupator King of Pontus (Leiden 1986).—Other references: K. Büchner, Sallust (Heidelberg 1960); E. Burck, Die römische Expansion im Urteil des Livius, ANRW [Austlieg und Niedergang der Romischen Welt] 2,30,2 (1982), 1148-1189; G. Calboli, Cornifici Rhetorica ad C. Herennium (Bologna 1969); N. C. Debevoise, A Political History of Parthia (Chicago 1938, repr. New York 1968); A. La Penna, Le Historiae di Sallustio e l'interpretazione della crisi repubblicana, Athenaeum NS 41 (1963), 201-274; V. Paladini, C. Sallusti Crispi Orationes et epistulae de historiarum libris excerptae (Bari 1956); E. Pasoli, Le historiae e le opere minori di Sallustio (Bologna 1967²); K.-H. Ziegler, Die Beziehungen zwischen Rom und dem Partherreich (Wiesbaden 1964).

2. For the debt of these authors to Sallust Hist. cf. B. Maurenbrecher, Prolegomena (Leipzig 1891, repr. Stuttgart 1967), 47 ff.; J. van Ooteghem, Lucullus (Brussel 1959), 215 ff.; McGing 176 ff.

3. B. Maurenbrecher, Fragmenta (Leipzig 1893, repr. Stuttgart 1967), 158-159, 177-178; Bikerman 132-133; and 146; Debevoise 71; McGing 145-153, 162; Ziegler 25.

4. Pium and gloriosum are regarded as subdivisions of honestum by Cicero Inv. 2.161 and 166; Rhet. Her. 3,4 and 7. Tutum falls under utile according to Cicero Inv. 2.168-169 and Rhet. Her. 3,3. Aristotle Rhet. 1359 a 11-15 and 1392 a 8-b 14 discusses possibility and impossibility in relation to each of the three kinds of oratory, Cicero Inv. 2,169; de Orat. 2,336; Part. 83-85 as a specific locus of deliberative oratory.

5. In quod florentibus … tua componas Sallust combines two ideas of a proverbial character: man is blinded by good fortune (e.g. Cato pro Rhod. 163 Malcovati ORF⁴ with G. Calboli, Catonis Oratio Pro Rhodiensibus (Bologna 1978), 273 ff., and Livy 30,30,16) and: man learns from the experience of others (e.g. Rhet. Her. 4,13 with Calboli 291).

6. Cicero Part. 83-85 also proves that Büchner 230 and note 154 is wrong discovering in 1 a Roman predilection for peace above war. Dein does not imply a difference in moral evaluation. It refers to the preliminary character of the first question in relation to the following questions pium, tutum, gloriosum, cf. Aristotle Rhet. 1359 a 31-34; Cicero Inv. 2,169; de Orat. 2,336; Quintilian 3,8,16 and 25.

7. Indeed, in the following years Mithridates was able to continue the war not unsuccessfully, although in a way different from §21. Only Pompey's invasion of Pontus in 66 made things definitely change for the worse (McGing 162-164).

8. Cf. the definitions Narratio est rei factae aut ut factae utilis ad persuadendum expositio, Quintilian 4,2,31, and, exemplum id est rei gestae aut ut gestae utilis ad persuadendum id quod intenderis commemoratio, 5,11,6. To the same effect Rhet. Her. 1,12 … cum exponimus rem gestam et unumquidque trahimus ad utilitatem nostram vincendi causa For detailed discussions of the differences between Mithridates' version of Roman policy in the Hellenistic world and neutral or pro-Roman versions we refer to Paladini a.l. and L. Raditsa, Mithridates' View of the Peace of Dardanus in Sallust's Letter of Mithridates, Helikon 9-10 (1969-1970), 632-635, and, The Historical Context of Mithridates' Description of the Status of Asia in Sallust's Letter of Mithridates, ibid. 689-694. We have not been able to consult Raditsa's dissertation Columbia 1969, A Historical Commentary to Sallust's Letter of Mithridates. See also H. E. Stier, De Mithridatesbrief aus Sallusts Historien als Geschichtsquelle, in Beiträge zur alten Geschichte und deren Nachleben, Festschrift Altheim (Berlin 1969), 441-451.

9. For the expression nationibus populis regibus referring to the οἰχουμἐνη cf. V. Paladini, C. Sallusti Crispi Epistulae ad Caesarem (Bologna 1967) 120 and Rhet. Her. 4, 13 with Calboli 291.

10. According to Paladini a.l., the first word of the subordinate clause in the Vaticanus is quando not quom, which editors used to print as quo[m] or replace by quoniam.

11. The unimportant role played by parvo labore (the reading of the Vaticanus) and the fact that it is not found in the secondary sources are no reasons to exclude these words from our text, cf. Paladini a.l. and Bikerman 141 note 6.

12. The sarcasm in libertas 18 is proved by comparing this letter with texts where the Roman wars with the Hellenistic kings are justified by the restoration of the libertas of the Greek cities: Livy 33,33,5 (with Burck 1166); 37,54,17 and other passages discussed by H. Drexler, Iustum Bellum, RhM [Rhenisches Museum] 122 (1959), 115 ff. Cf. H. Volkmann, Antike Romkritik, Gymnasium Beih. 4 (1964), 16.

13. Rhet. Her. 4,58 Commoratio est, cum in loco firmissimo a quo tota causa continetur the innate cupido imperi et divitiarum of the Romans), manetur diutius et eodem diutius revertitur Its effect: non enim datur auditori potestas animum de re firmissima demovendi, and Pliny Epist. 1,20,3 … plerisque longiore tractatu vis quaedam et pondus accedit, atque corpori ferrum, sic oratio animo non ictu magis quam mora imprimitur, cf. Calboli 408-409.

14. If quod haud difficile est is regarded as an example of brevitas, which leaves it to the reader to supply difficile with occīdere taken from occident, it is not necessary to assume a lacuna in the Vaticanus between occident and quod, cf. Paladini a.l.

15. Cf. the speech of Philippus, Hist. 1,77 Maurenbrecher. For other examples see R. Volkmann, Die Rhetorik der Griechen und Römer, (Leipzig 1885²), 298.

16. Pia bella as an answer to scelera also in Ovid Ars 1,199 pia bella … sceleratas sagittas Fast. 5,569 pia … arma and 575 scelerato sanguine; Curtius 6,3,18 pia bella suscipere et Bessi sceleri … irasci.

17. Modern practice using bellum iustum in this sense seems caused by passages like Cicero Rep. 3,55 and Off. 1,35. In fact, terminology varies considerably. Varro fr. Non. 850 (Lindsay) uses pius, whereas in L. 5,86 iustus. Livy uses pius or combines iustus and pius, cf. S. Clavadetscher, Πόλεμοs δίχαιοs und bellum iustum. Versuch einer Ideengeschichte (Zürich 1985), 175-176 and 180-184. “Bellum iustum”, which plays a minor role in Sallust Cat. 51,5-6 and Jug. 102,12-13, and its relation to ancient international law and the ius fetiale in particular have been often discussed; for summaries and bibliographical references cf. W. Dahlheim, Struktur und Entwicklung des römischen Völkerrechts im dritten und zweiten Jahrhundert v. Chr. (München 1968), 171-180; W. V. Harris, War and Imperialism in Republican Rome (Oxford 1979), 166-175; R. M. Ogilvie, A Commentary on Livy Books 1-5 (Oxford 1965), 127-134. H. Hausmaninger, “Bellum iustum” und “iusta causa belli” im älteren römischen Recht, Oesterreichische Zeitschrift für öffentliches Recht 9 NF (1961), 340 demonstrates the combination of ritual and archaic litigation in the formalities prescribed by the ius fetiale, possibly a typical Roman feature, Clavadetscher 186-187. Comparable procedures in Homeric society are discussed by F. Hampl. “Stoische Staatsethik” und frühes Rom, Historische Zeitschrift 184 (1957), 263 ff. The psychological background is discussed by Clavadetscher 75, Dahlheim 172, Drexler 109-111 and 118-119, Harris 171. About the legalistic attitude of the ancient Romans towards the justification of a war see H. Le Bonniec, Aspects Religieux de la guerre à Rome, in J-P. Brisson (ed.) Problèmes de la guerre à Rome (Paris-den Haag 1979), 103; Hampl 256 and 270; Hausmaninger 345. Scholars disagree about the question whether the scrupulous observance of the formalities was enough for the ancient Romans to feel entitled to start a war (Dahlheim 173; Harris 167; J Heurgon, La guerre romaine aux 4^e–3^e siècles et la fides romana, in Brisson, 28) or that material grounds were also required (Hampl 259). Varro fr. Non. 850 (Lindsay) and the setting of Livy 1,32 probably point at the latter, cf. Clavadetscher 135,144,177 and 186; Hausmaninger 341-342. Historiography, epos and philosophical treatises demonstrate that with the extension of Roman international relations outside the surrounding Latin and Italian communities the original ritual changed into a simplified and secularized procedure. At the same time, the Romans seem to grow more concerned about the material justification, trying to make their wars of conquest acceptable, cf. Harris 171-175 and Burck 1174. Finally, it is not clear whether a pre-emptive war is envisaged in Cicero's considerations on the officia bellica in Off. 1,34-40, cf. Clavadetscher 136-138.

18. About the role of superbia in comparable stories in Livy books 1-5 cf. N. Erb, Kriegsursachen und Kriegsschuld in der ersten Pentade des T. Livius (Zürich 1963), 27-42.

19. The second preliminary question in deliberative oratory, and discussed together with quid aut possit fieri aut non possit in Cicero Part. 8 and de Orat. 2,336; cf. Aristotle Rhet. 1359 a 34; Cicero Inv. 2,171; Quintilian 3,8,22 and 25.

20. About fides encompassing obligations towards Rome's allies cf. E. Badian, Foreign Clientelae (Oxford 1958), 1, 9-11, 35, 41-42, 63, 74 and D. Timpe, Herrschiftsidee und Klientelstaatenpolitik in Sallusts Bellum Jugurthinum, Hermes 90 (1962), 341 and 349-351. About the maiestas of Rome entailing the duty to guarantee justice in the world cf. Büchner 183, 185 and 188, and A. Klinz, Sallust Bellum Jugurthinum und Historien in Auswahl (Münster 1976), 27-28.

21. For the representation of Mithridates as liberator of the Greeks on coins and sculpture cf. McGing 99-100.

22. The prevalence of the moral point of view seems to be reflected by the structure of 1 satisne pium tutum gloriosum an indecorum sit. Pium and gloriosum, considerations of honestum, encapsulate as it were tutum, belonging to utile (cf. note 4) and the three are balanced by indecorum. However, it is also possible to take gloriosum and indecorum together, although this produces an even more striking example of inconcinnitas cf. A. D. Leeman, Orationis Ratio, (Amsterdam 1963, repr. 1986), 246.

23. Büchner 229 and 234; La Penna 252; Pasoli 137; Stier 448 and 550.

24. Bikerman 147-151; Büchner 235; O. Leggewie, Gaius Sallustius Crispus Historiae Zeitgeschichte (Stuttgart 1975), 58-59; Pasoli 135-136.