[In the following essay, Conley explores Sallust's account of ambitio and avarita to show that the author does not contradict himself in Bellum Catilinae 10-11, as some scholars have claimed.]

It has long been noticed that in chapters 10-11 of the Bellum Catilinae Sallust appears to contradict himself. Chapter 10. 3 states that “primo pecuniae, deinde imperi cupido crevit,” and from the next two sentences, which develop these two concepts respectively, it is clear that Sallust identifies “pecuniae cupido” with avaritia and “imperi cupido” with ambitio. But only two sentences later, in 11. 1, we are told that “primo magis ambitio quam avaritia animos hominum exercebat.” In his recent commentary on the Catiline, P. McGushin expresses his dissatisfaction with existing attempts to explain this apparent contradiction.¹ K. Büchner's conclusion that in 10. 3 Sallust names the two vices in their order of importance, then later in 11. 1 in their temporal sequence,² seems to force the interpretation of primo … deinde in 10. 3, which taken at face value indicates a merely chronological order. D. C. Earl's proposal that the verb, exercebat, meaning “tormented,” is emphasized in 11. 1, hence that the sense of the whole is “although avaritia arose first, it was ambitio which first tormented men's minds,”³ is equally unsatisfactory in McGushin's view, for it “would have us believe that avaritia lay dormant even though it was a far more widespread vice than ambitio.”⁴ McGushin's own suggestion is that “we should not shrink from an obvious explanation: S. is guilty of careless writing.”⁵ But the problem is that if the apparent discrepancy between 10. 3 and 11. 1 is a true contradiction, Sallust is guilty not only of careless writing but of careless thinking, and one wonders whether he could have been quite so muddled as such a contradiction would imply on a point involving concepts which, by common agreement,⁶ are central in his thought. The hypothesis of L. A. MacKay, that the “mild incoherence” in this passage is a sign of a “double recension,”⁷ merits consideration: Sallust might well have changed his mind in the process of composing. The indictment then becomes merely careless writing, but it still requires us to believe that Sallust was so careless in presenting concepts of considerable importance in his work that having changed his mind on a certain point, he failed to excise or modify his earlier statement on this point, but rather inserted a contradictory statement only four sentences distant from it. This explanation is not entirely satisfactory, but might be accepted faute de mieux.

Without denying that Sallust is to some extent a careless writer—for if he were not, presumably the passage would not be so obscure as to have engendered the present controversy—it may be suggested that the passage at hand requires neither the conclusion that he was so careless a writer as MacKay implies, nor so careless a thinker as McGushin implies. Rather, although it must be granted that Sallust's second statement qualifies his first, it may be possible to interpret plausibly the received text in such a way that there is no contradiction between the two statements.⁸

The interpretations cited above (except for that of Büchner, who denies that primo … deinde indicates a chronological sequence) all assume that Sallust intends his statement in 10. 3 as a full account of the origins of avaritia and ambitio. If this assumption is discarded, however, fresh possibilities of interpretation arise. In particular, if in the earlier stage of Rome's degeneration some ambitio existed other than that of which Sallust speaks in 10. 3, then it might be possible that “primo magis ambitio quam avaritia animos hominum exercebat” even though the growth of some ambitio was preceded by that of avaritia. Since this interpretation would solve the problem posed above, let us investigate whether the text warrants such a reading.

If we examine the passage closely, we shall find support for the hypothesis that Sallust believes in multiple motives for ambitio, only one of which gave rise to the ambitio mentioned in 10. 3. Sallust's basic definition of ambitio I take to be imperi cupido.⁹ Now power may be pursued either for its own sake, or for the sake of some other goal. It is plausible that in 10. 3 Sallust is thinking not of wealth and power as independent goals but rather of the pursuit of political power (and/or positions of military command) as a means to the end of acquiring wealth.¹⁰ In other words, when Sallust says “igitur primo pecuniae, deinde imperi cupido crevit,” we should read “therefore first the desire for money, then [sc. as a consequence of this] the desire for power grew.” Apart from the intelligibility which this reading bestows upon the passage as a whole (see below), two independent considerations may be urged in support of it. (1) While primo … deinde strictly denotes only a temporal sequence, the context here seems to demand the inference that the sequence is causal as well. The entire clause “primo pecuniae, deinde imperi cupido crevit” is governed by igitur; thus the growth of both pecuniae cupido and imperi cupido somehow results from otium and divitiae (10. 2). Presumably the growth of pecuniae cupido results from otium and divitiae because the taste for the latter, once acquired, becomes addictive and so engenders a need for pecuniae. But how can the growth of imperi cupido result from otium and divitiae unless power is desired as a means to the acquisition of wealth, which in turn is desired as a means to the enjoyment of otium and divitiae? (2) The causal link between avaritia and ambitio is conspicuously illustrated in the narrative to follow by the case of the Catilinarian conspirators, whom Sallust represents as desiring power primarily as a means to the end of acquiring wealth.¹¹ Thus it is reasonable to suppose that this link is prominent in the author's thinking as he embarks upon his monograph. From this reading of 10. 3 it does not follow, however, that avaritia is the only possible motive for the pursuit of power. Rather, that there are others is suggested by Sallust's language in 11. 1: “Nam gloriam, honorem, imperium bonus et ignavus aeque sibi exoptant.” Here Sallust seems to be speaking of power pursued for its own sake and/or for the sake of gloria and honos.¹²

If this hypothesis of multiple motives for ambitio is accepted, then it becomes possible to read Sallust's second statement on avaritia and ambitio as a qualification, rather than a contradiction, of his first. In 10. 3 Sallust says, in effect, that ambitio grew following the growth of avaritia (the time interval is unspecified) and as a consequence of it. Now, if ambitio had sprung only from avaritia during the period of Rome's degeneration, then ambitio, since it was merely a means to fulfilling avaritia, would have been a less important motive than avaritia throughout the entire period. Sallust does not say in chapter 10 that such was the case, but he leaves this impression by not saying otherwise. To this misleading impression the adversative force of sed in 11. 1 is addressed. During the earlier part of the period, we are now told, ambitio was actually more important as a driving force in men's minds than avaritia: “Sed primo magis ambitio quam avaritia animos hominum exercebat.” This is possible only on the supposition that a different motive or motives for ambitio existed and were predominant at this earlier stage.¹³ Sallust does not make this plain, but his association (11. 2) of the desire for imperium with the desires for gloria and honos confirms that he is thinking along these lines. Chapter 11. 1-2 thus amounts to a qualification of chapter 10 on two related issues: the origins of ambitio (it grew partly from avaritia, but that was not its only source) and the relative importance of ambitio and avaritia during the period of degeneration.

The above interpretation would resolve the alleged contradiction between 10. 3 and 11. 1. But will it also account for the composition of the passage as a whole? In particular, one might raise the following objection: if the qualification in 11. 1 is an important one (as it appears to be, since Sallust evidently uses it as the basis for his subdivision of the period of degeneration into two stages),¹⁴ then why did Sallust wait until chapter 11 to introduce it, instead of explaining it at the outset of chapter 10 when he first takes up the subject of Rome's decline? Or if it is not important, then why did he mention it at all? The answer is that the qualification is important, but not so important that it cannot wait until he has expounded the avaritia-ambitio syndrome.¹⁵ Without assuming any particular carelessness of composition on Sallust's part, there are a number of reasons why he might have delayed introducing the qualification. The avaritia-ambitio syndrome is, first of all, the latter part of a causal series into which the author's mind is naturally led by the transition from the fall of Carthage and the beginning of Rome's supremacy (supremacy led to leisure and wealth, which resulted in greed and then, as a result of greed, ambition). Being thus naturally impelled into an exposition of the syndrome in chapter 10, there are two good reasons for him not to resist the impulse. First, it was this syndrome which most characterized the period of degeneration as a whole (it was present to some extent even during the first subperiod), so in explaining it first, before moving to the qualification, he is following his normal method of composition, which is to issue first a generalization and then explain or elaborate upon particular points in his earlier pronouncement.¹⁶ Second, the topic of the avaritia-ambitio syndrome is superior in importance to that of the subdivision into periods, for it is the former which assists the reader's understanding of the narrative to come. It is therefore appropriate to devote a chapter to the former before proceeding to the latter. On the other hand, it is worthwhile for Sallust to identify and at least mention in this digression the first subperiod in his historical scheme, even though he does not develop the subject at length here. By so doing he puts the degeneration of his own era into clearer perspective, for, as he explains, ambitio in itself is considerably less vicious than avaritia (11. 1-3),¹⁷ so that the subperiod in which ambitio was a more important motive represents a relatively more noble age than the more recent subperiod. The entire period after the fall of Carthage was depraved, but there are degrees of depravity, and matters have gone from bad to worse. This idea, introduced in 11. 1-3, forms the basis for the author's tirade against the utter dissolution of his own times, which occupies him from 11. 4 to the end of the long digression of which the passage under discussion forms a part.

Thus, the solution advanced above appears sufficient to account for both the text of Sallust's statements in 10. 3 and 11. 1 and the composition of the passage as a whole. Some might fault Sallust for not choosing more explicit language, or not including some further explanation of his meaning, or possibly for not presenting his ideas in some other order. But there is no demonstrable contradiction in the passage; on the contrary, the language of the passage points toward a consistent, though incompletely articulated, underlying conception of the role of ambitio and avaritia in Rome's decline.

Notes

1. C. Sallustius Crispus, “Bellum Catilinae”: A Commentary (Leyden, 1977), pp. 90-91. See also the recent discussion by K. Vretska in his extensive commentary: C. Sallustius Crispus, “De Catilinae coniuratione,” vol. 1 (Heidelberg, 1976), p. 213. Vretska, unlike McGushin, finds an earlier explanation of the passage acceptable, namely, that of D. C. Earl (see n. 3).

2. Sallust (Heidelberg, 1960), p. 320.

3. The Political Thought of Sallust (Cambridge, 1961), p. 14.

4. Commentary, p. 90.

5. Ibid., p. 91.

6. See, e.g., Earl, Political Thought of Sallust, pp. 5-17 and passim; E. Tiffou, Essai sur la pensée morale de Salluste (Paris, 1975), pp. 353-413; E. Koestermann, “Das Problem der römischen Dekadenz bei Sallust und Tacitus,” Aufstieg und Niedergang der römischen Welt (1973), 1.3:790.

7. “Sallust's Catiline: Date and Purpose,” Phoenix 16 (1962): 191.

8. Alternately, the difficulty in the passage could be removed by emending the text (cf. K. L. Nipperdey, Opuscula [Berlin, 1877], p. 542). The interpretation of the received text below is presented in the belief that it is sufficiently plausible to render emendation unnecessary.

9. This is indicated, as we have seen, in 10. 3-5. This basic definition is qualified in 11. 2 by the implied stipulation that before the desire for power could be considered true ambitio, it would have to be pursued in the absence of bonae artes, by improper means such as dolis atque fallaciis. See Earl, Political Thought of Sallust, p. 14.

10. In Sallust's time the acquisition of personal wealth from the tenure of public office was of course a normal part of the political system, an occasional charge of pecuniae repetundae notwithstanding. Sallust, with his fortune acquired in North Africa, would be as conscious of this as anyone.

11. Cf., e.g., 16. 4: “Eis amicis sociisque confisus Catilina, simul quod aes alienum per omnis terras ingens erat et quod plerique Sullani milites largius suo usi rapinarum et victoriae veteris memores civile bellum exoptabant, opprimundae rei publicae consilium cepit.”

12. The reader has been told in the prologue (1. 3-4) that gloria is one of the ultimate goals that men may pursue in life. On the importance of this ideal for Sallust, see Tiffou, Essai, pp. 75–117.

13. This stage probably corresponds to the time described in 10. 6, when avaritia and the concomitant type of ambitio were still growing gradually and thus had not yet become widespread.

14. See 11. 4, where the dictatorship of Sulla seems to be specified as the time at which avaritia surpassed ambitio in importance. For a different interpretation of 11. 4, but one in which the distinction in 11. 1 is still recognized as the primary basis for Sallust's subdivision of the period of decline into stages, see Earl, Political Thought of Sallust, pp. 14-15, 112.

15. By this term I mean the process in which avaritia generates ambitio and the consequent association of the two.

16. McGushin, Commentary, p. 34.

17. It is possible that there is also a personal motive involved in Sallust's explanation here. In his prologue (3. 4), Sallust had admitted that he himself, in his youth, had succumbed to ambitio. It may therefore be important, for the sake of the author's own reputation, for him to stress the difference in degree of turpitude between ambitio and avaritia and to remind the reader (with the phrase “gloriam, honorem, imperium … exoptant,”) that ambitio does not always arise from avaritia.