SOURCE: “The Arabic Sources for the Life of Saladin,” Speculum, Vol. XXV, No. 1, January, 1950, pp. 58–72.

[In the following essay, Gibb examines the style, content, and historical accuracy and value of several contemporary Arabic sources of the life of Saladin.]

All historians who have studied the life of Saladin have given the first place to two Arabic sources: the Life of Saladin by Bahâeddîn Ibn Shaddâd (translated in Volume III of the Recueil des Historiens des Croisades: Historiens Orientaux), and the universal history, el-Kâmil, of ‘Izzeddîn Ibn el-Athîr (partially translated in Volumes I and II, 1, in the same series). As to the authority and reliability of the former, little can now be added to the testimony of Stanley Lane-Poole in his preface (p. vi) to Saladin, in the ‘Heroes of the Nations' series (London and New York, 1898). Bahâeddîn (1145-1234) writes with the most sober good sense and honesty, and I can find in his work little even of that ‘personal bias and oriental hyperbolism’ which Lane-Poole thought it necessary to excuse. He first came into direct relation with Saladin, however, only in 1184, as one of the ambassadors from Mosul, and did not finally join him as Judge of the Army until 1188. From then onwards, i.e., during the whole period of the Third Crusade, he not only presents a faithful record of events as he saw them, but also, through his position as confidant and intimate friend of Saladin, gives us an insight (as no ordinary chronicle can do) into the motives by which Saladin was actuated in many critical decisions. For the nineteen years between 1169 and 1188, on the other hand, Bahâeddîn can only report at secondhand, and is not infrequently at fault over details of fact and chronology. Bahâeddîn's fellow-citizen, Ibn el-Athîr (1160-1234), has enjoyed for so many centuries the reputation of being one of the greatest historians of Islam that it may seem almost superfluous to discuss his qualifications and authority, especially when he was a contemporary of Saladin personally connected with the administration at Mosul, and therefore in a position to know at least the external facts. Though he had no doubt seen Saladin, both at Mosul and in Syria, there is no indication that he ever came into personal contact with him. His bias against Saladin is notorious; but, with some allowances made for that fact, his narratives have generally been accepted as those of a well-informed contemporary chronicler. That this view can no longer be maintained will be the main conclusion of the present article.

Two other important contemporary sources are known to have existed and were made partially available to students of the Crusades in the extracts or abstracts from them made by Abû Shâma (1203-1267) in his work known as The Two Gardens (partially translated in R.H.C.Or., IV and V). One of these writers was a chronicler at Aleppo, Ibn Abî Taiy (ca 1160-1235, and therefore an exact contemporary of Ibn el-Athîr), who is distinguished by the fact that alone of the later chroniclers he was a Shi‘ite,¹ a fact which may have contributed to the disappearance of the original text of his works. The surviving extracts show him to have been an original writer, with a special interest in social and topographical details, but with a certain bias against Nûreddîn, who had exiled his father from Aleppo. Considerable portions of his history are found also in a later Arabic general chronicle, that of Ibn el-Furât (d. 1405), of which, however, the volume covering the years 1172 to 1190 is missing.

The second and much more important writer whose works were utilized by Abû Shâma was the ‘Secretary’ ‘Imâdeddîn of Isfahân (1125-1200); indeed, the greater part of The Two Gardens may be described as an abridgement of the two works devoted by ‘Imâdeddîn to the life of Saladin, with additional materials from other sources. The better-known of these two works, entitled el-Fath el-Qussî, opens with the preparations for the battle of Hattîn in 1187 and ends with the death of Saladin and division of his empire in 1193, thus covering much the same period as the firsthand part of Bahâeddîn's Life. Of this work several manuscripts have survived, and the text was published in 1888 by Count Carlo Landberg. Since ‘Imâdeddîn had been Saladin's personal secretary since 1175, the authority of the work is not less than that of Bahâeddîn, yet the few historians who have made direct use of the text have with one voice complained of what Lane-Poole called his ‘intolerable rhetoric.’ For ‘the Secretary’ (el-Kâtib), as he is generally called, was one of the most famous of the classical exponents of that highly ornate and rhetorical rhyming-prose style of composition which was affected in the chanceries of the mediaeval Islamic kingdoms, and rivalled in his own time only by his official superior, Saladin's secretary of state, the kâdî el-Fâdil.

The Fath displays all the characteristics of this secretarial style, with its inclusion of rhetorical set-pieces on the seasons and other subjects, its inflated introductions to the narratives of events, and frequent excerpts from the author's own letters and despatches. This floridness of language, which is generally equated by western readers with emptiness of content and fulsome panegyric, largely accounts for the comparative neglect of this work, though its stylistic qualities obviously do not in themselves determine its quality as an historical source. It is also, however, difficult to read (even for Arab readers, as Abû Shâma himself points out), and it is scarcely surprising that few have been found to echo the judgment of its editor: ‘Plus j’avançais dans mon travail, plus j’étais sous le charme de la parole du fameux Kâtib. Je n’avais rien lu de pareil, mais aussi n’avais-je rien lu de plus difficile au point de vue lexicographique. … Je suis rentré … plein d’enthousiasme pour mon auteur.’

The Fath was not, however, the principal work devoted by ‘Imâdeddîn to the history of Saladin. This was a later and exhaustive history in seven volumes entitled el-Barq el-Shâmî, ‘The Syrian Lightning,’ which covered the whole period of the author's association with Saladin, including the early years when both were still in the service of Nûreddîn. Like most of the voluminous Arabic chronicles of the Middle Ages, it soon dropped out of circulation in favor of the abridgement made by Abû Shâma. Apart from a vague indication of a manuscript or manuscripts at Leningrad, the only parts of it known to exist are two volumes in the Bodleian Library at Oxford: Vol. III, covering the years 573-575 A.H. (July 1177-May 1180), and Vol. V, covering 578 to the beginning of 580 (May 1182-July 1184). A detailed account of these volumes and their contents will be given elsewhere; here it is more important to indicate what light they throw upon the value of the Barq as an historical source and its relation to the other known sources.

The original text of the Barq makes it clear that (as might have been deduced from Abû Shâma's extracts and from the Fath) ‘Imâdeddîn's history is in no sense an ordinary narrative chronicle. It is much more in the nature of a professional diary or record of the author's secretarial activities, copiously illustrated with copies of or extracts from his own despatches, his semi-private correspondence with the kâdî el-Fâdil, diplomas of appointment to various posts composed by him, his literary and poetic occasions, and (less frequently) details of his private affairs. But since ‘Imâdeddîn accompanied Saladin almost without intermission from the summer of 1175 until his death, it is also a chronicle of events, with the remarkable feature that they are usually related in the first person plural, a practice which inevitably (but often, I think, mistakenly) gives an impression of vanity and self-importance on the writer's part. He does, however, include narratives of the few events at which he was not present, and occasionally relates events by reproducing one or more of his own or of the kâdî el-Fâdil's despatches instead of by a direct narrative.

The stylistic features of the work are not uniform, but vary considerably from section to section. In some passages the rhetorical structure is highly elaborated, in others it amounts to little more than a habit of expressing everything in rhyming-prose, which is upon occasions remarkably direct and unstilted. Saladin, for example, is represented as speaking in rhymed prose, but except in one or two short set discourses the impression is one of natural and unaffected speech. In the hands of so skilful a master of language and vocabulary, the fact that his narratives are cast throughout in this medium does not in the least detract from their clarity or their precision. The numerous excursus and introductions have a different literary function altogether and in no way interfere with the narrative passages, where the rhyming-prose style lends itself at most to the charge of redundancy or tautology.

On close examination ‘Imâdeddîn's statements are remarkably sober. Leaving aside all questions of literary style, they are not unlike the minutes or reports of a conscientious civil servant (as indeed he was). There is a certain plainness of speech, an absence of comment either for or against, and even a kind of detachment which contrasts oddly with his official identification of himself with the events by the constant use of the pronoun ‘we.’ It is almost a paradox that so solid and matter-of-fact a chronicle should be clothed in a garment of such literary and aesthetic exuberance. His reliability will be discussed later on; but a writer who tells of his own withdrawal because of cold feet from the expedition to Ramleh in 1177 and quotes the comments of his friends upon this action inspires us from the outset with some confidence in his truthfulness.

Although ‘Imâdeddîn's literary elaboration in the long run detracted from the circulation of his writings, it is common knowledge that the generation of chroniclers after him fully realized their value and drew extensively upon them. Hitherto it has been difficult to determine the extent of their borrowings. In the following pages the narratives of the most celebrated of these histories, the Kâmil of Ibn el-Athîr, are analyzed for the years covered by the extant volumes of the Barq, and an attempt will be made to show the exact relation between them.

A.H. 573. Ibn el-Athîr begins with the narrative of Saladin's defeat at Ramleh (XI, 292-293 [I, 627-628]).² That this is taken entirely from the Barq is clear from the details included in the narrative, such as the gallantry of Taqîeddîn's son (reproducing the substance of one of ‘Imâdeddîn's ‘epic’ passages: Barq, III, 13^v-14^r), and the capture and later ransom of ‘Îsâ el-Hakkârî (15^r = Abû Shâma, I, 273, ll. 22-25 [IV, 187]). This is followed by an account of the attack on Hamâh by Philip of Flanders (XI, 294 [I, 630]), ‘the reason for the attack being that one of the greatest of the Counts of the Franks had arrived in Palestine by sea, and on seeing that Saladin had returned to Egypt in defeat he seized the opportunity of the defenceless state of the country, because Shamseddawla [Tûrânshâh] was in Damascus as Saladin's lieutenant and had few troops with him, besides being absorbed in his pleasures and disinclined to action.’

Here too the dependence of Ibn el-Athîr upon the Barq seems clear from the fact that not only does the order of the statements follow precisely the order in Barq, III, 25^r, but the structure of events is practically the same (cf. Abû Shâma, I, 275 [IV, 191-2]). That this is not due to the quotation of an official despatch is clear from the description of Tûrânshâh's conduct, which would certainly have found no place in an official account. But Ibn el-Athîr does add something to his source, namely, the statement that the attack on Hamâh was occasioned by Saladin's defeat at Ramleh. This can only be ascribed either to carelessness, Ibn el-Athîr having been misled by the fact that in the Barq the attack on Hamâh follows the account of the Ramleh expedition, or else to deliberate falsehood, backed up by concealment of the dates of the two events. The Barq clearly states the date of the attack on Hamâh as 20 Jumâdâ I (14 November 1177) and that of Saladin's defeat at Ramleh as 1 Jumâdâ II (25 November), whereas Ibn el-Athîr mentions only Jumâdâ I in both entries and gives no precise date for the first.

The succeeding account of events in Aleppo (XI, 294-295 [I, 631-663]) again follows the order and the details of Barq. 23^r-25^r, even to the extent of describing the torture of Gumushtegîn at Hârim in general terms instead of the precisions of his own earlier account in the History of the Atâbegs [II, 2, 325]. It is noteworthy that he ends this paragraph with the words ‘When the Franks saw this, they left Hamâh and marched to Hârim in First Jumâdâ, as we shall relate.’ But in fact he had given this relation on the previous page of the Kâmil, whereas in the Barq it follows immediately afterwards.

The only other event relating to Syria mentioned by Ibn el-Athîr in this year is an unconnected narrative of an unsuccessful raid by an undefined body of Franks on the territories of Hims (XI, 297 [I, 632]). The passage is taken entirely from a despatch to Baghdad, extracts from which are given in Barq, 43^v ff. The episode is mentioned on fol. 44^v and is couched in similar terms. But Ibn el-Athîr, finding it in this isolated form, failed to observe that it related to the same occasion as the abortive attack on Hamâh (‘As they were passing by the frontier district of Hims,’ in the words of the despatch), and the event itself is confirmed by William of Tyre (XXI, 19; trans., II, 425).

A. H. 574. The brief narratives on events in Syria which occupy nearly the whole entry for the year (Frankish attack on Hamâh, rebellion of Ibn el-Muqaddam and siege of Baalbek, other Frankish raids) all reproduce the substance of ‘Imâdeddîn's narratives. It is arguable that they might have been derived from official circulars and other sources, however, and the very general terms which Ibn el-Athîr uses do not allow of any proof of direct dependence.

A. H. 575. The report of the battle at Merj ‘Uyûn (9 June 1179) is certainly based on ‘Imâdeddîn's account; the interpolated remark on the amount of Balian's ransom (XI, 301 [I, 636]) is taken from Barq III, 131 (Abû Shâma, II, 8 [IV, 199]), where it is one item in a longer list. The special attention given to the exploits of Farrukhshâh also reflects ‘Imâdeddîn's special paragraph on the same subject (fol. 136) and quotes the same verse of poetry. The following account of the destruction of the Templars' castle at Jacob's Ford might have been taken from an official circular, but so closely follows the Barq that it is difficult to assume any other source, notably in the detail of the amir Chauli's appeal to Saladin to allow him to try the fortune of a coup de main, which is in Barq, 141^r, though missing from Abû Shâma's abridgement (II, 11). Ibn el-Athîr's reference at the end of his narrative to the large number of poems composed on the subject is certainly inspired by the poems (four in all) quoted in the Barq, and the verses which he cites are taken from the first two of these four poems.

The immediately following narrative of the battle between Taqîeddîn and the Seljuq Sultan of Konia (XI, 303 [I, 639]) is again obviously derived from ‘Imâdeddîn. The latter begins his narrative with the remark that Taqîeddîn was absent from the operations at Jacob's Ford for this reason, a remark which Ibn el-Athir puts at the end; and a still more definite indication is found in the figures given for the Seljuq army. ‘Imâdeddîn (Barq, III, 138^r = Abû Shâma, II, 9^*) puts it at 20,000 men; the parallel narrative of Ibn Abî Taiy at ‘3,000 cavalrymen’ (Abû Shâma, loc. cit.); Ibn el-Athîr says ‘a force said to have been 20,000 men.’ In this instance the hypothesis of an official despatch can be excluded, since ‘Imâdeddîn reproduces also the text of the despatch which was sent to Mosul on this occasion (Barq, 138^v-139^r), and in this document the Seljuq army is put at 30,000 men.

In the miscellanea with which, as usual, Ibn el-Athîr ends the events of the year, he includes (304-305 [I, 640]) a statement that Saladin, on Tûrânshâh's offer to exchange Baalbak for Alexandria, in the month of Dhu’l-Qa‘da (i.e., April 1180) gave it to his nephew Farrukhshâh, who thereafter raided the lands of the Franks as far as Safed. He has here, as frequently, combined two passages in one, but the first one is a year out. Tûrânshâh left for Egypt at the end of Dhu’l-Qa‘da 574 (May 1179) (Barq, 120^v-121^r =. bû Shâma, II, 6³). Farrukhshâh's appointment to Baalbek was made in 575 and his raid on Safed in Dhu’l-Qa‘da of that year (‘Imâdeddîn dates it precisely to the 18^th = 15 April; cf. Abû Shâma, II, 15^*).

It will be seen from this summary that, in regard to the history of Syria during these three years, there is no fact mentioned in Ibn el-Athîr's chronicle which is not in ‘Imâdeddîn's work, except for the misstatement relating to the attack on Hamâh in November 1177 and for a small personal reminiscence of seeing a letter of Saladin's (related in XI, 293). The only thing, in fact, which prevents us from asserting outright that every one of these narratives was derived from the Barq is Ibn el-Athîr's invariable habit of rewriting the content of the paragraphs which he uses in his own language, which excludes the final argument of identity of linguistic expression.

A. H. 578. The extant portion of Volume v of the Barq opens with Saladin's march into Upper Mesopotamia in the late summer of 1182. ‘Imâdeddîn makes it clear that he had come north with the genuine intention of attacking Aleppo and that only after his arrival there were his plans unexpectedly changed by Geukburi's representations. Ibn el-Athîr (XI, 317 [I, 653-654]), on the other hand, declares that Geukburi had been in communication with Saladin during the abortive attack on Beirut in August and that the subsequent advance on Aleppo was a feint. The reason for his substitution of this version for the firsthand statement of ‘Imâdeddîn is not clear. It may be that it was the version current in Mosul and that for that reason he preferred it, but it rather closely resembles a feature which is repeatedly found in his work, to be discussed later. The operations in Mesopotamia are described in both sources to much the same effect, Ibn el-Athîr's only addition being a small personal anecdote relating to the siege of Edessa. ‘Imâdeddîn's narrative is elaborately ornamented, and Abû Shâma in his résumé reduced every page to a single line (II, 32^*), but in doing so he omitted the reference to the siege of Edessa which is found in the original (fol. 20^r). Thus, for the second time in these abstracts, what would have appeared, from Abû Shâma's abridgement, to be supplements by Ibn el-Athîr to ‘Imâdeddîn's narratives, are seen to have been equally parts of the original text.

With the investment of Mosul Ibn el-Athîr is on his own ground, but it must be admitted that his narrative (XI, 319-320) makes no very favorable impression. His patriotism expends itself in trivial and imaginative anecdotes (which the editors of the Recueil, I, 656-657, mostly omit), to the exclusion of the general factors in the situation which are, on the contrary, so well brought out in the few lines of his fellow-citizen Bahâeddîn. His summary of the negotiations with Saladin, however, agrees, at least as to their outcome, with the account given by ‘Imâdeddîn (Barq, V, 11-16), who was the actual negotiator on Saladin's behalf.

The immediately following narrative of operations in the Jezîra (XI, 321-323^*) adds no positive information to the statements in the Barq (17 ff., 49 ff.), but, as in his account of the siege of Mosul, Ibn el Athîr introduces some anecdotal details and general reflections which have little or no historical validity. It should be remembered that it is one of the common forms of Arabic historiography to present a situation in terms of imaginary conversations or statements by the persons concerned, and there is no justification whatever for regarding them as records of actual events. Ibn el-Athîr carries this ‘romantic’ technique to excess, but ‘Imâdeddîn too occasionally resorts to it, sometimes successfully, sometimes misleadingly, as, for example, in representing what he supposes to have been the policy or attitude of the Crusaders at a given moment.

The naval operations in the Red Sea called out by Reginald's exploits were certainly announced by despatches to all parts of the Muslim world. Ibn el-Athîr's statement (XI, 323 [I, 658]) combines, apparently, ‘Imâdeddîn's preliminary account (V, 42^v = Abû Shâma, II, 35 [IV, 230 ff.]) with his despatch on Saladin's behalf to Baghdad (45^v-46^v = Abû Shâma, II, 37 [IV, 233-235]). The death of Farrukhshâh and his replacement as governor of Damascus by Ibn el-Muqaddam (XI, 324 [I, 659]) are, of course, described at much greater length in the Barq (36^r ff., 46^r).

A. H. 579. This opens with Saladin's siege and capture of Âmid (XI, 324-325^*), to which ‘Imâdeddîn had devoted one of the most finished sections of the Barq (49^r-65^r; Abû Shâma, II, 37-38^*). There can be no reasonable doubt that this is the source of Ibn el-Athîr's narrative, which diverges from it in only one detail. In order to explain Saladin's unexpected success, Ibn el’Athîr, somewhat lamely, blames the governor's cupidity, in direct contradiction to the express statements of ‘Imâdeddîn (fol. 60^r). The artificial nature of this device is thrown into greater relief by the fact that only a page or two later Ibn el-Athîr uses it again to explain away Saladin's success in capturing Aleppo.

The account of the capture of Tell Khâlid and ‘Aintâb (XI, 325^*) follows closely the lines of the Barq and the despatch of the kâdî el-Fâdil quoted there (V, 77^v-78^r). The immediately following account (loc. cit. [I, 660]) of the capture of a crusading galley and the repulse of a Frankish raid on Egypt is obviously taken from the despatches quoted in Barq, 105^r ff. (Abû Shâma, II, 47 [IV, 239]). The narrative of the capture of Aleppo (XI, 327 [I, 661]) contains little more than the bare facts and some resentful jibes at its prince, ‘Imâdeddîn Zangi. But the following story of a prediction of the capture of Jerusalem (omitted in Recueil) comes straight out of the Barq (cf. Abû Shâma, II, 45^*). Ibn el-Athîr then quotes two phrases taken from a despatch—not, however, from a public despatch, but from a private despatch sent by the kâdî el-Fâdil to el-‘Âdil, Saladin's brother and governor in Egypt. Furthermore, by a method familiar to propagandists in all ages, he isolates one of these sentences from its context and interprets it in a manner which the quotation of the context would immediately show to be false.⁴

The story of the death of Saladin's brother appended to the narrative of the capture of Aleppo (XI, 328^*) is also based upon ‘Imâdeddîn's section in Barq, fol. 96^v (cf. Abû Shâma, II, 44^*). Ibn el-Athîr has, however, worked it up in a more ‘romantic’ manner, with the dubious addition that Saladin had intended to give Aleppo to him. The following transfer of Hârim is again related on the same lines as in the Barq (89^v = Abû Shâma, II, 47 [IV, 238]), where it is described mainly by quotations from despatches.

The next entry is crucial for an estimate of Ibn el-Athîr's trustworthiness. After relating the transfer of their allegiance to Saladin by several vassals of Mosul, he briefly relates (XI, 230^*) the negotiations which followed at Damascus between the envoys of the Caliphate, of Mosul, and Saladin. This episode is handled at length in the Barq (127^r-132^v), since ‘Imâdeddîn played a leading part in it. By an exceptional chance, we have also a statement from the other side, since Bahâeddîn was a member of the Mosul delegation. His brief narrative (Schultens, 57 [III, 78-79]) confirms the accuracy and precision of ‘Imâdeddîn's account. Nevertheless, Ibn el-Athîr substituted for the real point at issue a totally different formula, in order to present Saladin as unalterably hostile to any accommodation with Mosul.⁵

The year ended with an expedition to Beisan (end of September) in an endeavor to bring the Franks to battle, and an equally fruitless siege of Kerak. The former is described by ‘Imâdeddîn in two parallel despatches (111^v-116^v; Abû Shâma, II, 50-51 [IV, 244-248]), of which Ibn el-Athîr's narrative (XI, 230 [I, 663]) is an abstract; the latter is described directly (118^r-119^r, 126^r, interrupted by the appointments of el-‘Âdil to Aleppo and Taqîeddîn to Egypt, with their respective patents of appointment). A detail included in Ibn el-Athîr's narrative (XI, 231 [I, 664]), namely the excuse of insufficient siege equipment, clearly indicates his source, for it is taken directly from the narrative in the Barq (f. 126^r), although omitted by Abû Shâma (II, 51 [IV, 248]).

The extant portions of the Barq end at this point, but the preceding analysis is sufficient to show: (i) that it is the principal source used by Ibn el-Athîr for his accounts of Saladin's activities, which are, indeed, little more than short paraphrases of its main sections; (ii) that where Ibn el-Athîr supplies details not found in Abû Shâma's abstracts, they are nevertheless generally found in the original text; (iii) that Ibn el-Athîr occasionally changes the statements of his source or perverts their meaning out of hostility to Saladin. In the light of these conclusions, it is now possible to compare Ibn el-Athîr's narratives for the remaining years with Abû Shâma's abstracts from the Barq, and to estimate what value they have as independent historical sources. This is obviously too lengthy a task to be undertaken within the limits of an article, but from a number of examples it may be justifiable to reach some fairly definite results.

In regard to Saladin's early years in Egypt, before the death of Nûreddîn, i.e., from 1169 to 1174, Ibn el-Athîr has often reproduced in the Kâmil the relevant paragraphs of his earlier History of the Atâbegs of Mosul. These sections are presumably independent of ‘Imâdeddîn's works, but like his previously-quoted independent section they are scrappy and anecdotal. ‘Imâdeddîn, on the other hand, was at this time one of Nûreddîn's secretaries at Damascus, and of course well informed on Saladin's activities. His admiration of Nûreddîn was as sincere as that of Ibn el-Athîr, and at this period least of all can his statements be open to the charge of excessive partiality for Saladin. It is the more surprising, therefore, that although ‘Imâdeddîn differs on many points from Ibn el-Athîr (notably in regard to the manner and date of the substitution of the ‘Abbâsid for the Fâtimid allegiance in Egypt in 1171), his narratives should have been universally neglected by modern historians. Even Ibn el-Athîr himself did better than this; we shall see later that he did introduce, though with considerable adjustments, materials from ‘Imâdeddîn into his history of these years, adapting them to his earlier imaginative and colorful picture of an ambitious Saladin thwarting Nûreddîn's plans for the Holy War.⁶

Before looking into these, however, we may examine Ibn el-Athîr's narratives of the two campaigns of Saladin against Aleppo in 1175 and 1176, which offer several interesting indications. There was, apparently, no account of these campaigns (in which the armies of Mosul were twice defeated) in the History of the Atâbegs. In each campaign Saladin was attacked by Assassins; Ibn el-Athîr's accounts of these two assaults (XI, 277, 285 [I, 618, 623-624]) are recognizably transcribed, in spite of the verbal paraphrases, from ‘Imâdeddîn's narratives (Abû Shâma, I, 240* 258* cf. the parallel transcription of the first by Ibn Abî Taiy, I, 239). But it was only to be expected that the circumstances of the two battles in which Saladin routed the forces of Mosul would be presented by Ibn el-Athîr somewhat differently in detail, which is, indeed, carried to the last degree of absurdity by the assertion (XI, 283*) that in the second battle only one man was killed out of the two armies.

In an appendix to this narrative (omitted in the Recueil) Ibn el-Athîr refers directly for the one and only time to ‘Imâdeddîn: ‘El-‘Imâd, the Kâtib, in the book of el-Barq el-Shâmî on the history of the reign of Saladin, has stated that Saifeddîn's army in this engagement included 20,000 cavalry.’ That this statement is absurd he proceeds to demonstrate, very justly, on the basis of the army records at Mosul. ‘Imâdeddîn does in fact share, though in a relatively moderate degree, the tendency of most mediaeval chroniclers to magnify the figures of opposing armies, and we have already seen (p. 62 above) an instance in which Ibn el-Athîr puts an implied question-mark to a similar estimate of his. In this instance, however, ‘Imâdeddîn may be partially excused; he did not assert that Saifeddîn's army was 20,000 strong, but stated more cautiously that, as Saladin advanced northwards, ‘the report came to us that they numbered 20,000 cavalry, exclusive of the train and the reinforcements behind them’ (Abû Shâma, I, 255, ll. 1-2*). But apart from the controversy, Ibn el-Athîr here gives direct proof of his utilization of the Barq, even though he introduces it only by a casual reference—which is (as is well known) the most by which he ever acknowledges his literary debts; and it is not fanciful to discern in his remarks a certain pleasure at being able to find ‘Imâdeddîn out for once in a misstatement of fact.

For the rest, it can be said generally that, apart from comment, there is little in Ibn el-Athîr's chronicle relating to the history of Saladin in these two years or in any of the other years not covered by the extant volumes of the Barq, which is not found in a fuller and more satisfactory presentation in Abû Shâma's extracts. We have already seen that in a number of cases Ibn el-Athîr by no means confined himself to shortening and paraphrasing ‘Imâdeddîn's narratives, but arbitrarily rearranged them when it suited his purpose to do so. The comparison of the Kâmil with The Two Gardens (and with the Fath for the years after 1187) leaves little doubt that the same explanation is to be given in several passages where the two sources diverge in statements of fact.

Two particularly notable instances of this are furnished by the narratives of Saladin's siege of Mosul in 1185 and of Tyre in 1187. As related by Ibn el-Athîr, ‘Izzeddîn sent out the ladies of the Zangid family to intercede with Saladin on his approach to the city in June 1185, but he refused their intercession and began to prosecute the siege (XI, 337*). ‘Imâdeddîn, on the other hand, definitely places this incident towards the end of the conflict with Mosul when, after temporarily interrupting the siege, Saladin returned to Mosul in November of the same year (Abû Shâma, II, 64*). Both historians were at Mosul when these events took place, and the conflict of evidence seems to be absolute. But there can be no question that ‘Imâdeddîn's narrative is the more natural and consistent in itself and with the circumstances, whereas Ibn el-Athîr, having transferred it in order to represent Saladin in the worst possible light, has rather lamely to explain away an action so extreme: ‘It was not out of any weakness that they were sent, or inability to defend Mosul, but he sent them out of a desire to prevent the evil of war by a better course of action.’ Moreover, ‘Imâdeddîn asserts that in response to their appeal Saladin, though unable to grant all that they requested, agreed to accept the mediation of ‘Imâdeddîn Zangi of Sinjâr, through which the conflict was in fact ultimately settled.

The second instance is still more obvious. In his account of the siege of Tyre in the winter of 1187, as of all the events in Palestine during that year, there can be no doubt that Ibn el-Athîr's source was ‘Imâdeddîn's Fath. But when he presents the reasons for the discontinua ce of the siege (XI, 368 [I, 709-711]) he deliberately inverts the paragraphs in the Fath relating to Saladin's consultations with the amîrs and to his withdrawal (cf. Abû Shâma, II, 119-120 [IV, 343-344]). The result is that Saladin is represented as having taken the decision to give up the siege before the mutiny of the amîrs, and their action in refusing to fight and withdrawing their men thus becomes an absurdity. And Ibn el-Athîr, not content with distorting the facts and presenting a confused and inconsistent picture, proceeds to administer severe censure upon Saladin for an action for which his own fellow-soldiers of Mosul were largely responsible.

In analyzing Volume V of the Barq, two instances were found in which Ibn el-Athîr deliberately altered the facts related by ‘Imâdeddîn. The total number of similar cases is fairly large, and two flagrant examples may be adduced here. The first is the passage relating to the relief of the garrison of Acre during the winter of 1190 (XII, 35-36 [II, 1, 32-33]). This paragraph is in its entirety a transcript of one in the Fath (cf. Abû Shâma, II, 181 [IV, 519-520]), and some of its details are not even fully intelligible without the aid of the fuller narrative of the Fath. ‘Imâdeddîn, it should be noted, is critical of the wisdom of Saladin's action on this occasion, as on some other occasions, but plainly describes the vigor with which he conducted the operation and the energy with which he spurred on his agents and officers to greater efforts. All of this last passage is omitted by Ibn el-Athîr, who substitutes: ‘Added to this was Saladin's inertia, and his throwing of all the responsibility upon his lieutenants.’⁷

The second is still more remarkable. On his return from the East in 1186 Saladin stopped for a time at Hims, where his nephew Nâsireddîn ibn Shîrkûh had just died, leaving a minor son. Saladin confirmed the boy in possession of his father's fiefs, under guardianship of an officer of Shîrkûh's old regiment, the Asadîya. ‘We had an inventory made of Nâsireddîn's treasures (says ‘Imâdeddîn, quoted by Abû Shâma, II, 69*), and we divided up his inheritance; the Sultan's sister el-Husâmîya, the wife of Nâsireddîn, was entitled to one-eighth, and the remainder was divided between his daughter and his son. The estate, in lands, specie, and furnishings, was beyond reckoning and in any case well over one million dinars. The Sultan did not give it a glance, but turned it all over to the lawful heirs.’ Ibn el-Athîr begins his account of the episode (XI, 341*) by relating an intrigue on the part of Nâsireddîn with some of the Damascus troops during Saladin's illness, followed by his own sudden death. Then, without mentioning his authorities, he proceeds: ‘And they say—but the responsibility rests with them—that Saladin instigated a man called el-Nâsih b. el-‘Amîd, of Damascus, who came to him, joined his drinking-party, and gave him a poisoned cup. … When he died Saladin gave the fief to his son Shîrkûh, who was twelve years old. Nâsireddîn left a vast fortune in moneys, horses and goods, and Saladin came to Hims, inventoried the estate, and took most of it for himself, leaving only what was of no use.’ Finally the story is backed up by a piquant anonymous trailer: ‘And I was told that. …’ It may be observed that this is the one and only time in which Ibn el-Athîr finds an opportunity to charge Saladin with the practice of assassination and appropriation which features so prominently in the political annals of the age. He made the most of it, and the latter part of the story, at least, was repeated in almost all subsequent biographical notices of Saladin, even those of panegyrists like Ibn Khallikân and Tâjeddîn el-Subkî.⁸ Indeed, so successful has Ibn el-Athîr's invention been in this instance that even the Baron de Slane, in translating the relevant paragraph of Bahâeddîn's Life (III, 87), rebuked the faithful kâdî for the ‘blind admiration’ of Saladin which had led him to conceal, in compiling his book, an event first published to the world in such dubious circumstances some years later.

In this last instance, it may be said that Ibn el-Athîr did not simply alter ‘Imâdeddîn's narrative, but related a totally different version, which does not depend in any way upon ‘Imâdeddîn. Yet it is set in a framework of chronology and events which is entirely derived from the Barq, and it is inconceivable that Ibn el-Athîr was unaware of ‘Imâdeddîn's statement, made in the first person. Thus the account he gives must be regarded as a deliberate denial of ‘Imâdeddîn's statement, and the substitution of another statement derived from sources which he does not care to name, with the object of making Saladin out to be no better than any other prince of his time.

Often, however, Ibn el-Athîr's distortions seem to be evolved out of passages and phrases from ‘Imâdeddîn by combination or interpretation. An example can be found in his statement already referred to, attributing the surrender of Aleppo to the avarice of its prince ‘Imâdeddîn Zangî (XI, 327 [I, 661]). Ibn el-Athîr expresses this, as usual, in the pictorial terms of an argument between the prince and his troops. But the basis for it appears to be ‘Imâdeddîn's statement in the Barq (V, 84^V) that the prince ‘found that he was paying out 30,000 dinars a month to the troops and amîrs, and if the siege were prolonged without hope of success he would lose all the gain and become utterly bankrupt,’ after which calculation he opened negotiations with Saladin.

A single example does not, of course, constitute a proof, and owing to the loss of most of the Barq it may be difficult to detect other cases. In this very instance the passage quoted above is omitted from Abû Shâma's abstract (II, 42*). But a similar case is probably to be seen in Ibn el-Athîr's account of the Crusaders' siege of Damietta in November-December 1169 (XI, 231 [I, 569]), although in this instance the ‘correction’ has not been made on the narrative of ‘Imâdeddin, since the same account is given in the History of the Atâbegs [II, 2, 259]. According to this story, Nûreddîn, on Saladin's appeal to him and representations that he could not risk sending his own troops to Damietta in view of the danger of a rising in Cairo, ‘sent troops to him in successive contingents, one after another.’ On the other hand, ‘Imâdeddîn (who, it may be recalled, was then in Damascus in Nûreddîns service) states that ‘Nûreddîn sent a powerful army by sea … which arrived in the middle of Rabî‘ I [ca 10 December], a week before the withdrawal of the Franks' (Abû Shâma, I, 181 [IV, 151⁹]). At the same time, he relates, Saladin remained in Cairo and ‘kept sending reinforcement after reinforcement.’ Both narratives are presumably based upon a circular despatch issued by Nûreddîn, and the most likely explanation of the divergence is that Ibn el-Athîr transferred the statement about Saladin and applied it to Nûreddîn, in order to draw a striking picture of Saladin's dependence upon him. William of Tyre (XX, 15-16; trans., II, 363-367), it will be noted, agrees, as usual, with ‘Imâdeddîn against Ibn el-Athîr.

A clearer instance of ‘reinterpretation’ occurs a few pages later (XI, 258 [I, 593]), when Ibn el-Athîr relates that—after failing to cooperate with Nûreddîn in the siege of Kerak in September 1171—Saladin withdrew from a combined expedition to Kerak for the second time in July 1183, on receiving news of Nûreddîn's approach. According to ‘Imâdeddîn, whose account is supported by the terms of an official report on the operations submitted by Saladin to Nûreddîn, the purpose of Saladin's campaign was to drive out the bedouins who were serving the Franks of Kerak as guides, and thus to render communications between Egypt and Syria more secure (Abû Shâma, I, 206 [IV, 156-157]). This statement is again entirely confirmed by William of Tyre (XX, 28; trans., II, 389-390). When he wrote the History of the Atâbegs Ibn el-Athîr had no knowledge of this incident; and it can hardly be doubted that, finding it in ‘Imâdeddîn's work, he used it to build up his story of Saladin's persistent refusal to cooperate with Nûreddîn in the Holy War, without regard to the fact that only a few lines earlier he had stated that at this very time Nûreddîn was engaged in a campaign in Anatolia.

One final example should be sufficient. Ibn el-Athîr (XI, 347 [I, 674]) relates briefly the events following the death of Baldwin IV and the split between Raymond and Guy, leading up to the alliance between Raymond and Saladin. This is taken without any doubt from ‘Imâdeddîn's paragraph in the Fath (17-18), which concludes with the words: ‘And he [Raymond] encouraged the Sultan's determination to attack them so that he might restore the kingdom to him’ (Abû Shâma, II, 74 [IV, 257-258] omits this phrase). In place of these words Ibn el-Athîr substitutes: ‘And Saladin promised to aid him and to strive to attain for him all that he desired, and guaranteed to make him future king of all the Franks.’

If the preceding argument is correct, the conclusion to which it points is rather a disconcerting one. Instead of a group of contemporary, firsthand, and largely independent sources for the history of Saladin on the Arabic side, we have, until Bahâeddîn joined Saladin in 1188, only one major firsthand source, supplemented by fragmentary additions from other sources, the most important of which is Ibn Abî Taiy. Still worse, even of that major source, two-thirds have come down to us only in the form of Abû Shâma's abstract, to which we are indebted also for nearly all that has survived of the histories of Ibn Abî Taiy.

We are left therefore with two questions to answer. Firstly, how far can we rely upon the veracity and, so to speak, ‘historical conscience’ of our sole major source, the Secretary ‘Imâdeddîn? It has already been pointed out that when the verbiage is stripped away from his narratives, his statement of events is sober and free from extravagance. But it might be expected that he was to a considerable extent biassed in his statements by his admiration for Saladin. On this, it is possible to make two observations. While Ibn Abî Taiy is open to the suspicion of denigrating Nûreddîn, and Ibn el-Athîr is certainly guilty of denigrating Saladin, ‘Imâdeddîn seems to have served both with an equal loyalty and shows no partiality between them. The second observation is that it would be a serious error to imagine that the rhetorical elaboration of the Barq is directed to mere eulogy of Saladin and fulsome flattery. There is scarcely a sentence, even in its loftiest flights, of direct panegyric of Saladin himself. Certainly ‘Imâdeddîn shows a deep admiration for Saladin, but his greatness appears wholly as a corollary from the facts themselves. Throughout the Barq he is presented in human and realistic terms, even more than in Bahâeddîn's biography. While Bahâeddîn's feeling for Saladin is that of a kindred spirit, the impression left by the Barq as a whole is that it is the work of a trained and self-controlled civil servant, familiar with the ways of Sultans and other officials, accustomed to dealing with them and, if need be, managing them, setting down their actions with the precision of his craft, and with all his fertility of verbal imagination never swept off his feet.

There is also another argument for ‘Imâddedîn's accuracy of statement which is less open to the charge of resting upon subjective impressions. When his narratives can be compared with other firsthand statements, whether those of Williamof Tyre, Ernoul, and other Latin chroniclers of the Third Crusade, or those in which Bahâeddîn also writes from firsthand knowledge, there is an astonishing degree of identity in general substance, which often extends even into details. It is fortunate, therefore, that when we are reduced to a single original source for the greater part of Saladin's public career that source is both exceptionally authoritative in regard to its author's knowledge of the facts and trustworthy in regard to his presentation of them.

The second question is raised by the relation of Abû Shâma's abstract to the original text of the Barq. Since we have to rely on this for about two-thirds of the entire work, how much reliance can be placed upon it as a careful and accurate summary? The answer is a straight one: in regard to the actual historical content of the Barq, Abû Shâma's abridgmeent is generally made with both skill and care. It lacks, of course, the intimate and personal quality of the original, and only occasionally presents something of its vivid and epic character, but compensates for this to some extent by ruthlessly excising all its purely literary elaboration. Whole pages are cut out or reduced to a single line; lengthy despatches quoted in excerpts; many other documents which throw light on the principles of Saladin's administration omitted altogether. Sometimes, too, the material is rearranged, but everything that Abû Shâma regards as pertinent is inserted in its proper place. Necessarily, he omits much, and sometimes what he omits is of considerable importance in our estimation. But what he himself adds to ‘Imâdeddîn's narratives is always carefully distinguished, and we can therefore be reasonably certain that his summaries faithfully represent the content of the original, even though, with the loss of the original, much valuable material is (for the present) irrecoverable.

In conclusion, then, the Arabic sources for the history of Saladin are to be classified as follows:

(1) The original texts of ‘Imâdeddîn, i.e. the extant volumes of the Barq, and (from 1187) the Fath.

(2) The Life by Bahâeddîn, from 1188.

(3) For the remaining years (i.e., 1169 to 1176, middle of 1180 to middle of 1182, middle of 1184 to beginning of 1187) the summaries from ‘Imâdeddîn given by Abû Shâma in The Two Gardens, supplemented by the extracts from Ibn Abî Taiy.¹⁰

These are the fundamental written sources, to which the other chronicles add occasional details of varying importance and credibility. As for Ibn el-Athîr, he can be regarded only as a secondary authority in regard to the main historical events, although in regard to certain local details, either closely or remotely connected with Saladin, he has some firsthand information. But he is a direct witness to one important aspect of the history of Saladin. Playing the useful, if rarely attractive, part of devil's advocate, he portrays for us the hostility and party-spirit with which Saladin had to contend in building up his political and military force, and the moral effects of which continued to hamper his operations throughout the period of the Third Crusade.

Notes

1. See Cl. Cahen, ‘Une Chronique Chiite au temps des Croisades,’ C. R. de l’ Acad. des Inscriptions et Belles Lettres (Paris 1935), pp. 258-269.

2. Passages from Ibn el-Athîr are quoted firstly in the standard edition of Tornberg; those from Abû Shâma in the Cairo edition of 1287 H. (1870). References to the Recueil text (Historiens Orientauz) are given in square brackets. An asterisk after the reference indicates that the passage has been omitted from the Recueil.

3. In R. H. C. Or., IV, 196, this is included by error under A.H. 573.

4. The phrase is ‘We have given him [‘Imâdeddin Zangi] that which has not left our hand,’ which he interprets as ‘meaning that he could take it back again whenever he wanted to do so, because of the weakness of its defences.’ But the original text runs ‘Its lord [i.e. of Aleppo] has received in exchange for it certain territories in the Jezîra on the stipulation of service in the Holy War with a full complement of troops; thus they remain in our hands in reality, since what we desire from territories is their men, not their revenues’ (Abû Shâma, II, 43, from Barq, v, 94^v).

5. Ibn el-Atbîr, XI, 230: ‘Salâh ed-Dîn said “You have no say in the matter of Jezîrat ibn ‘Omar and Irbil”; Muhyiddîn (the Mosul delegate) refused to accept this and said “They belong to us.” But Salâh ed-Din would not agree to peace except on the terms that Jezîra and Irbil should belong to him.’ Both ‘Imâdeddîn and Bahâeddîn are agreed that the formula put to Muhyiddîn and rejected by him was that these two princes should be free to choose between the suzerainty of Saladin or of Mosul. But no doubt it came to much the same thing in the end.

6. In a later instance, not directly relevant to Saladin, Ibn el-Athîr had to discard one of these early stories altogether. After relating in the History of the Atâbegs (II, 2, 335-336) ‘Izzeddîn's siege of his brother Sanjarshâh in Jezîrat ibn ‘Omar in Rabî’ I, 581 (June 1185), he discovered from ‘Imâdeddîn that in that precise month Sanjarshâh and his troops were accompanying Saladin in his second march upon and siege of Mosul. The latter fact is duly chronicled in Kâmil, XI, 336, and ‘Izzeddîn's siege of Jezîra has disappeared entirely from its pages.

7. Michaud (Bibliothèque, IV, 297-298) goes one better by translating ‘inertia’ by ‘indolence accoutumée.’

8. Tabaqât el-Shâfi‘îya (Cairo, 1324 H.), IV, 329.

9. The Recueil translation has ‘Salâh ed-Dîn’ by mistake for ‘Nûr ed-Dîn’ in line 14, and mistranslates ‘one week’ (bi’ usbû‘in) by ‘quelques semaines.’

10. Even for the years 1187-1192 Abû Shâma sometimes quotes from the Barq details which are not found, or are not so fully elaborated, in the Fath.