[In the following excerpt, Woodruff examines the role of Bacon as a critic of and among the Schoolmen, comparing his philosophical emphases with those of Thomas Aquinas, Alexander of Hales, and others.]

Bacon was somewhat critical of the intellectual world around him, and it is important to consider his comments on some of the great individuals of his day. At first he seems to have studied with a docile spirit, and to have been appreciative of his teachers. Indeed to judge from his earlier writings there is little to distinguish him from the general tone of the time. For instance, in his treatise Questions on Aristotle, which belongs to his early Paris life, there is hardly a trace of that emphasis on the appeal to experience which is the great characteristic of his more famous works. As Professor Little, who has edited some of Bacon's less notable writings, puts it:

They are not commentaries on the text, but discussions of questions arising from the text. They proceed in the scholastic manner with arguments pro and con and solution, and are almost entirely argumentative. Thus he begins his discussion "whether it is possible that living things can be generated by putrefaction" with "it seems that… not", followed by a series of abstract arguments. Then "on the other side it is the authority of the scientists". That single line is the nearest approach in the whole argument to an appeal to experience and it is an appeal to authority. (Roger Bacon. British Academy lecture.)

In the same essay, Professor Little calls attention to an important passage in Opus Tertium to show that Bacon himself divided his intellectual life into two parts. Bacon writes:

During the last twenty years, in which I have laboured specially in the study of wisdom after leaving the beaten track (abandoning the ordinary methods), etc.

This was written in 1267, so we may consider that Bacon's method changed somewhere about 1247, in the latter part of his first sojourn in Paris. He then ceased to be a conventional scholastic with his emphasis on reasoning and appeals to authority, and began to stress the value of actual experiment. It was this attitude which caused him to get out of harmony with his age, and to become its foremost critic. But even in his early period his mind was not in tune with much that passed for intellectual eminence in the Schools.

We have mentioned that he formed an opinion of the celebrated Alexander of Hales, who was lecturing in Paris when Bacon first went there about 1240, and died in 1245. We will now see what he has to say on the subject of Alexander. In the Opus Minus he is listing the obstacles to the progress of study among the "Latins", that is, the Western part of Christendom. Obstacle three is that theologians are ignorant of the sciences they need to make use of. He mentions two "leading doctors" whom he blames for much of the trouble. One is already dead, the other living. The first is named and is Alexander of Hales, who entered the Order of Friars Minor in its early days. He says that from the very start the brethren and others exalted Alexander to the skies, they gave him authority over all their studies, and ascribed to him a great Summa or compendium of knowledge, which not he but others had compiled. Before he entered the Order and was gaining the reputation which led the Friars to think so highly of him, the principal books and translated commentaries necessary for a sound basis of study were not in use at the University, their use being in many cases forbidden. Hence Alexander could not but be deficient in natural Philosophy and Metaphysics, and quite unworthy of the trust that had been placed in him.

The other doctor, who is described as living, is not named. According to Brewer he is simply another Franciscan professor, but Professor Little and others have taken the view that no less a personage is referred to than the Angelic doctor Thomas Aquinas himself.

"Another who lives", writes Bacon, "became a Friar as a mere lad, he never read Philosophy, nor heard it in the school, neither did he study much before he became a Theologian, nor could he be taught in his own Order, because he himself is the first Master of Philosophy they have had. He taught others, hence what he knows himself is self-taught. And indeed I praise him more than all the crowd of students, because he is a very studious man, and he looks into the infinite, and has gone to expense, so that he is able to collect much that is useful from a sea of authors. But because he has not the foundation, since he was not instructed nor exercised in listening, reading, disputing, he is necessarily ignorant of the common sciences. Since he is no linguist, his learning cannot be of great value, for the reasons I have urged in treating the subject of languages. Again he knows nothing of perspective, and cannot know much about Philosophy. As for those matters which I have dealt with, experimental sciences, alchemy, and mathematics, he can have no reason to boast. For these are greater than the other sciences. And if he does not know the lesser, how can he know the greater? God is witness that I have only exposed the ignorance of these men for the sake of truth in study.… For the common people believe everything these have written, and adhere to them as though they were angels. They are referred to in disputations and lectures as 'authors'. And he that lives has the greatest name of any Doctor in Paris, and they take him as 'author' in the schools, which cannot be without confusion and the destruction of wisdom, because his writings are full of falsehoods and endless vanities. There was never such a scandal in this world. There are some useful things in his work, but not as people think.… These have neither heard nor read the common Sciences, especially natural Philosophy and Mathematics [an inclusive term as far as Bacon was concerned]… they know not the Sciences and Languages about which I write to Your Holiness, without which nothing can be known about Philosophy as the treatise shows."

To understand what Bacon meant by these severe strictures on those whose reputations were very much greater than his own, we must remember the bent of his mentality, and what a great trial it must have been to him to see the world about him satisfied with what for him was not enough. The work of men like Alexander of Hales seemed adequate to the age, because they expounded fully the religious truth that was necessary for man's salvation. There was no idea of divorcing knowledge from immediate spiritual profit, and the sources of profitable knowledge were thus identical with those of Divine Revelation. Bacon, as we have seen, shared this general view to some extent. Study was for spiritual profit, but God's revealed Word was not confined to the supernatural revelation for which one went to Scripture and Tradition. There was also a natural revelation of God in nature, so nature must also be studied if the full message of God's truth was to be discovered and profited by. Moreover, he was shrewd enough to realise that Scripture and Tradition required a large amount of subsidiary natural knowledge for their adequate study. Reasoning based on a string of texts or extracts from the Fathers of the Church might well be mis-leading if not founded on a proper knowledge of the languages involved, and the conditions under which the writings were composed. Hence Bacon could not be satisfied with the imposing array of Scriptural and Patristic quotations with which the schoolmen about him were wont to "prove" their points. He sought, consciously, for something more basic, and seems to have had some vision of the great increase of knowledge that the use of his methods would bring. Hence the urgency of his appeals to the Pope for the reform of the Schools, hence the vehemence, one might say the impatience, of his language. Hence also his true greatness. But while we sympathise with him, we must not blind ourselves to the real virtues of those whom he criticised. They produced many a monumental work, they often displayed great industry and reasoning power, and explored every logical conclusion that could be drawn from the data of existing knowledge.

The foremost textbook of the Schools when Bacon came on the scene was the famous Sentences of Peter Lombard. This was later superseded by the Summa of Thomas Aquinas, but it enjoyed unrivalled sway for about a century. The Sentences consisted of propositions clearly set out with a large number of Scriptural and Patristic passages which had a bearing on the matter under discussion. In dealing with this most learned work, Bacon is most severe. His fourth obstacle to the progress of study among the Latins is indeed simply that there is an exaggerated respect paid to those who read the Sentences. The theologians, as he puts it, place the burden on this one horse; and, after reading this mere summary, set up as Masters of Theology; but not a thirtieth part of the sacred text of Scripture is to be found here expounded, so the student of the Sentences has only made a beginning in grasping the full treasure of the Bible, but, alas, simply being a reader of this book is enough to give a man a reputation for learning, and favoured treatment among religious people. The Sentences are preferred, he goes on, to the study of the Bible itself, and even the Holy Doctors are not referred to except as they are quoted in this all-pervading book. Thus the works of great moderns like Grosseteste and Adam Marsh are unfortunately neglected, to the great loss of true learning.

In the Opus Tertium, Bacon refers to the writings of a certain Professor of Paris as having four short-comings. First, childish vanity, then unutterable falsehood, thirdly, they are far too long, what he says could be said in a twentieth of the space, and lastly, the omission of all that is most useful and beautiful in Philosophy. The influence of this man he considers detrimental to both Philosophy and Theology. It seems that he is here referring to the same Professor that he was referring to in the passage previously quoted from Opus Minus. In both passages the Professor is linked with Alexander of Hales. Bacon's words in this connection are:

And he gave not only great detriment for the study of Philosophy, but of Theology, as I show in the Opus Minus, where I speak of the Seven Sins of the study of Theology, and the third Sin is mainly directed against him, in as far as there is more open discussion on his account, for there I note too, that he is the principal offender, though the other of a greater name is dead.

Now the dead man referred to is certainly Alexander of Hales, and the living must certainly be Aquinas if it is he that is meant in the other passage. It is difficult to believe that Bacon would have so failed to appreciate the great work of the Angelic Doctor, though if we consider the very different mentality of the two men and the fact that the age was only able to appreciate one of them, Bacon may have been tempted to be unduly critical of one whom he alone felt it his duty to criticise.

A comparison of the two men will not be out of place here; for if we understand the main differences between them we shall go far to understand the age in which they lived. Thomas Aquinas was considered the greatest intellect of his time, he studied the things that really mattered, and wrote in such a clear concise way that even the most difficult theological problems appear in his pages as clear as day. His reasoning is always lucid. He proves his contentions point by point in a series of short chapters, he announces first various difficulties against what he is going to say, then proclaims the truth and finally answers the difficulties one by one in the order in which he has given them. Such concise writing would have been impossible for Bacon, who always seems anxious to do his subject full justice by painting a long word picture. He cannot be concise. But it is not only in the manner of writing that these men differ, there is a great and noticeable difference in their subject-matter. Both share the same faith and believe in the vital place of Theology in human learning, but whereas for Bacon God's truth is to be found every where, Aquinas lays his emphasis on revealed truths. Bacon would never have thought of writing at length on such difficult theological topics as the knowledge of God, or the nature of the Angels. He was not concerned to make the mystery of the Blessed Trinity or that of the Incarnation of God in Man clearer by a long, reasoned exposition, whereas in the pages of Thomas Aquinas these matters hold the stage, and are indeed made to appear almost simple. Aquinas therefore was the greater man in that he spoke to his age a language that it was ready and able to listen to, he accomplished a great work in reconciling Aristotle's philosophy with the Christian Faith, and the truths proclaimed by the Church he made to appear perfectly sound and reasonable. Bacon, on the other hand, was a voice crying in the wilderness; compared with the great truths of the Faith, natural Science appeared a trivial affair unworthy of serious attention, but to Bacon the truths of Science were of the greatest importance to Theology, and he realized that the state of man in this world could not be satisfactory, even from a religious point of view, if any branch of truth were neglected.

Another great man of the age who entered into Bacon's life was Bonaventure, who was General of the Franciscans from 1257 until his death in 1274. It was shortly after Bonaventure's appointment as General that Bacon was recalled to Paris, and the difficulties that he found in pursuing his work were no doubt to some extent of Bonaventure's making. He is, however, not mentioned critically by Bacon, though we may deduce that Bacon had him in mind when he used the phrase "my Superiors" the mentality of Bonaventure was in great contrast to that of Bacon, he also differed from Thomas Aquinas in not laying such great store on the works of Aristotle.…

In 1271 Bacon wrote his Compendium of Philosophy, which ontained much severe criticism of the clergy and schoolmen of the time. It is thought that this may have been the cause, first of his unpopularity and then of his condemnation, but it seems more probable that a condemnation on account of novelties would have referred to his actual work rather than to his criticisms.