[In the following excerpt, Dawson summarizes the significance of Bacon's thought and its originality, citing him as a key example of the pursuit of knowledge for its own sake.]

[It] is difficult to overestimate the influence of Grosseteste's thought on the mind of one of the most remarkable figures of the thirteenth century, whose fame has indeed overshadowed that of his master—I mean Roger Bacon. It was from Grosseteste that Bacon derived not only his distinctive philosophical and scientific views, above all his conviction of the importance of mathematics, but also his interest in philology and in the study of Greek and the oriental languages, of which Grosseteste was one of the pioneers. But if Bacon owed far more to his predecessors than has usually been supposed, he was none the less a profoundly original mind. His originality is however to be found less in his scientific theories than in his personality, andin his general attitude to contemporary thought. To a far greater extent than Grosseteste he stands apart from the main current of scholastic philosophical study, he belongs rather to the tradition of the men of science who were responsible for the introduction of Arabic science into the West, such as Adelard of Bath, Gerard of Cremona and Plato of Tivoli. It is true that he speaks with contempt of the translators, but this is owing to a somewhat exaggerated sense of their linguistic incompetence and not from any doubt as to the value of Arabic science, which he regards as the main channel by which Christendom could recover the wisdom of the ancient world. He resembles Adelard above all in his critical attitude to Western scholasticism; indeed, he quotes the actual words of Adelard with regard to the danger of a blind reliance on authority. In Bacon's view, the four fundamental obstacles to the progress of philosophy are dependence on authority, the influence of custom, the ignorance of the populace and the false pretensions of those who esteem themselves to be learned. He cannot find words strong enough to express his contempt for "these new theologians" of the teaching orders who become masters in theology and philosophy before they have studied, and who console themselves for their ignorance by belittling the sciences and display their emptiness before the eyes of the ignorant multitude.

Yet although Bacon includes the great Dominicans, Albert and Thomas, in his wholesale condemnation, he is far far from hostile to the new learning. He dismisses Alexander of Hales, precisely because the latter had had no training in Aristotelian physics and metaphysics "which are the glory of our modern studies." The works of Aristotle are for him "the foundation of all wisdom," and he blames his contemporaries not for their cultivation of Aristotelian science, but for their misunderstanding and corruption of it.

Still less can we regard his attitude to scholasticism and authority as an attempt to free science and reason from their dependence on theology. In this respect he is distinctly reactionary in comparison with St Thomas. The unity of science in which he believes is a purely theological unity. To an even greater extent than the earlier Augustinians he is prepared to subordinate all human knowledge to the divine wisdom that is contained in the Scriptures. All knowledge springs ultimately from Revelation. The first and most perfect scientists were the patriarchs, and the philosophers of the Gentiles merely collected the crumbs that had fallen from the tables of Shem and Abraham and Solomon. He admits the possibility of scientific progress, for there is no finality in this life, and knowledge must continue to increase with the rise and fall of the world religions. All the signs, he believed, pointed to the approaching end of the age and to the coming of Antichrist, and it was to arm Christendom for the struggle and to prepare the way for its renovation under the leadership of a great Pope and a great king that he propounded his schemes for the reform of studies and the utilization of the power of science.

Thus Bacon was no devotee of knowledge for its own sake. His attitude is fundamentally far less rational and far less intellectualist than that of Aristotle or even that of St Thomas. But though this detracts from the philosophic value of his work, it does nothing to diminish his personal originality and his historical significance. For the greatness of Roger Bacon consists not in his scientific achievement, which was small, nor in his scientific method, which was inferior to that of his master, Peter of Maricourt, the obscure Magister Experimentorum. His greatness is to be found in the scientific vision and imagination which made him the discoverer of a new scientific ideal and the prophet of the new world of modern science.