SOURCE: Dunbabin, Jean. “Robert Grosseteste as Translator, Transmitter, and Commentator: The Nichomachean Ethics.” Traditio: Studies in Ancient and Medieval History, Thought, and Religion 28 (1972): 460-72.

[In the following essay, Dunbabin examines Grosseteste's translation of the Nichomachean Ethics, commenting on its accuracy, range of scholarship, clarity, logical precision, and philosophical skill, and lauding it as an example of the foundation Grosseteste laid for future commentators on Aristotle's work.]

Because Robert Grosseteste's translation of Aristotle's Nicomachean Ethics is now seen as having provided the framework for a dynamic study of Aristotle's moral philosophy, more significance must be attached to what itself became the standard translation in the Middle Ages. That Grosseteste was responsible both for the full translation of Aristotle's text and for the translation of the Greek commentaries which accompany the Ethics in twenty-one known manuscripts¹ modern scholars are now in agreement.² Grosseteste's work on the Nicomachean Ethics has been dated confidently to the 1240s, arguably to 1246-47,³ and scholars have tended to stress the rapidity with which the Aristotelian ethics were assimilated in the thirteenth century,⁴ in contrast, for example, with the slow progress recorded by John of Salisbury on the Posterior Analytics in the twelfth.⁵ These results of recent research seem, it should be noted in passing, strangely at odds with the verdict of Roger Bacon, that there was comparatively little work on the Ethics in his period. He, Grosseteste's most ardent admirer, appears not to have known that this master translated the text and comments: ‘Tardius communicata est Ethica Aristotelis et nuper lecta a magistris et raro.’⁶

Grosseteste's work is interesting not only for the insight it offers into one of the outstanding minds of the thirteenth century, but also for the direction it gave to future studies. Not all the seeds that he sowed in the course of his ethical labours bore fruit later. But it is surely safe to say that, without his translations and annotations, it would have taken far longer for thirteenth-century scholars to have reached the sophistication found in, for example, Albertus Magnus' two commentaries on the Nicomachean Ethics. I hope, in the course of this article, to show what kind of foundations the bishop had laid for them to build on.

Robert Grosseteste's ability to contribute to scholarship while at the same time running the largest episcopal see in England has always excited admiration. It is interesting that it is to these busy years, rather than to the comparatively tranquil period of his Oxford studies, that his great works of translation belong. Bacon explains this by saying that it was only towards the end of his life that he got the help he needed from southern Italy, where many people still spoke Greek, and where Greek texts were to be found.⁷ Grosseteste's chosen texts for translation cover a wide range, theological, philosophical, and glossarial; probably his best-known and most used were the Pseudo-Dionysian works. But in the philosophical sphere, the Nicomachean Ethics was by far his most ambitious and important project.

As it stands, Grosseteste's work on the Ethics consists firstly of a full Latin translation of Aristotle's text, books I - X. This is preceded in many manuscripts by the Summa in Ethica Nicomachea, a neat index which Grosseteste provided to the whole work. After each section of the text there follows a commentary by a Greek author. In addition, there are notes interspersed into the text of the Greek commentaries by a thirteenth-century Latin author. And there are marginal notes, several of which are definitely ascribed to Grosseteste in some manuscripts. Finally, in Peterhouse 116, one of the oldest manuscripts, all this is rounded off by translations of two more brief works, the De passionibus of Pseudo-Andronicus, and the De virtutibus et vitiis, generally ascribed to Aristotle in the thirteenth century. These were probably originally intended to be part of what Fr. Callus has described as ‘a corpus of Aristotelian ethics.’⁸

I. THE TRANSLATION

The labor involved in all this translating must have been immense. So large was the work that few medieval scribes could copy out the whole text, and no complete version of the marginal notes is known. In his task Grosseteste almost certainly received help from his familia, probably from Magister Robertus Graecus, Magister Nicolaus Graecus, and John of Basingstoke. But modern scholars have tended to stress that these men played a very subsidiary role.⁹ Perhaps more important, Grosseteste could and did draw on a number of existing partial translations of the Ethics. Since the end of the twelfth century books II - III had been known to the Western world in a translation called Ethica vetus and book I in a translation known as Ethica nova.¹⁰ Parts of books VII and VIII, fragments known as Ethica Borghesiana, had been used shortly before the appearance of Grosseteste's work by Albertus Magnus.¹¹ All these parts seem to have belonged to a full translation, additional fragments of which are to be found interspersed in the later text in Cambridge (Mass.) Bibl. Hoferiana typ. 233 H.¹² So the bishop was not ploughing entirely virgin ground. He also had more than one manuscript available to him. Eton 122 fols. 26^r, 195^v, and 219^v refer to variant readings.

But even where he was following a previous translator, Grosseteste's meticulous attitude towards his task caused him to alter extensively. Perhaps he, like his younger disciple Roger Bacon,¹³ was afraid that most translations of Aristotle were doing harm because they were so carelessly rendered. Professor Franceschini in an important article¹⁴ has made plain Grosseteste's aim: he hoped to translate de verbo ad verbum in such a way that not one jot or tittle of the original meaning should be lost. Inevitably, this was a frustrating task.

Sciendum quoque quod in translatione latina … in quantum occurrit transferenti facultas, necesse est pluries esse multa ambigue et multipliciter dicta, que in greco ydiomate non possunt esse multiplicia.¹⁵

Where possible, he kept Greek constructions, and at the places where he felt the result was confusing, he inserted a marginal note to assist the reader. So, against ‘non expectandum autem neque causam in omnibus similiter’ (Mercken 110), he notes that in Greek two negatives do not cancel out, but rather strengthen each other (Eton College 122 fol. 16^r). And against ‘omni autem passioni et omni actui sequitur delectatio’ (Mercken 181), he points out that since the Greek word for ‘follow’ always takes a dative, he has kept the construction in Latin (Eton 122 fol. 35^r).

Such pedantry leads to a disjointed piece of ugly-sounding prose which demands constant effort on the part of the reader. Every letter of the original may be there, but the true meaning is often elusive. This said, it must be conceded that Grosseteste's translation was a great improvement on its precursors and that it had lasting value. The subsequent recension (of William of Moerbeke?) changed the text only slightly; and the Renaissance scholar Leonardo Bruni Aretino used it as the basis of his translation, even while denouncing it in violent terms.¹⁶

At last, then, by about 1247, the schoolmen had available to them a full translation of a major ethical work, the presuppositions of which were entirely alien to them, and yet which was couched in a convincingly rational form. The stage was set for an intriguing display of intellectual gymnastics as scholars tried to cope.

II. THE TRANSLATION OF THE GREEK COMMENTATORS

But it is doubtful whether serious work could have begun so soon—Albertus Magnus' first quaestiones belong to the period 1250-52¹⁷—if Grosseteste had not done his fellow-scholars a further service. Not only did he provide them with the Summa in Ethica, which helped them to find their way around in the text, but also, and much more importantly, he translated the Greek commentaries on the Ethics which had been put together and edited in Byzantium in the late-twelfth or possibly the early-thirteenth century.

These commentaries have long been valued by Byzantine historians for the light which they shed on the standards of classical scholarship in that period, and for the continuity of the classical tradition. In the form in which Grosseteste found them, they consist of: Eustratius of Nicaea on book I; an early Anonymous, tentatively placed in the sixth century, on books II - V; a second commentary, by Michael of Ephesus amplifying that of the Anonymous, on book V; Eustratius of Nicaea on book VI; a later Anonymous, perhaps a twelfth-century figure, on book VII; the second-century Peripatetic Aspasius on book VIII; Michael of Ephesus, precursor of Psellos and Italos in the eleventh-century Byzantine revival, on books IX and X. Eustratius of Nicaea also produced an introduction to the whole work.¹⁸

All the commentaries are literal, having as their object the elucidation of the text sentence by sentence. But as they differ in date, so they differ in standpoint. Aspasius shows some Stoic influence (the text of book VIII in the Latin is longer and fuller than any surviving Greek one, so it is possible that Aspasius was not responsible for all that is found in Grosseteste's work). The early Anonymous shows no Christian influence, and has a very wide knowledge of Greek literature. Eustratius' contributions are very heavily imbued with Christian Neoplatonism. Those of Michael of Ephesus are truer to Peripatetic tradition.

But in the Latin West, all this went unmarked. Very little attention was paid to the commentaries as works of philosophy in their own right. Even so, their contribution to the task of assimilation was considerable, particularly initially. Put at its lowest, a reader who found Aristotle's meaning elusive in the stilted Latin rendering could refer to the explanation below, which would usually be in different words. Often the examples used by Aristotle to illustrate his point were more fully explained in the commentary (e.g. Mercken 75 and 191). Furthermore, all the Greek authors provided the West with good models for future literal commentaries, being solid, workmanlike, and untainted by possibly dangerous Arab influences. Eustratius in his introduction with its strongly Neoplatonic overtones may have played his part in lulling the fears of early Western readers by stressing that enquiry into human goodwill necessarily shed light on the supreme good:

Ad imaginem enim Dei plasmati sumus et similitudinem, et necesse est nosmet ipsos abdolare ad archetypum (id est principalem formam vel principale exemplar), omne quod praeter naturam est repurificantes et materialem irrationabilitatem excutientes et eam quae ad mortale corpus habitudinem persequentes et propriam nobis ipsis bonam vitam coinducentes, siquidem cura est nobis incausatae causae copulari

(Mercken 8).

After the pioneer work of Grosseteste and Albertus Magnus, the importance of the Greek commentaries almost certainly declined in the West. Fr. Gauthier has shown that St. Thomas Aquinas used his memory of Albertus' lectures rather than referring back to the Greeks in his Sententia super Ethicam,¹⁹ and lesser men probably followed suit. Nevertheless, several important points raised by the commentators found their way into the standard Scholastic treatment of the Ethics. For example, when Eustratius of Nicaea amplifies Aristotle's argument on whether happiness comes immediately from God or not, he adds that the answer to this problem relates to the value of prayer (Mercken 127). Fr. Gauthier has shown that the stress on human effort in the acquisition of happiness, which is found in all thirteenth-century commentators in the West, is sometimes accompanied by statements which come perilously near to undermining the value of prayer, particularly among those commentators who cite Eustratius' argument.²⁰ And, as we shall see, the Anonymous commentator's treatment of expediency in book III contributes a very important element to Grosseteste's own interpretation of the Ethics. So, even when readily-available Latin commentaries made the Greek ones redundant for the purpose of understanding the text, they continued to have a certain amount of influence indirectly on the questions which scholars raised.

III. THE INSERTIONS

In his work on the Latin version of the Greek commentaries in 1871, Valentin Rose pointed to passages which have no Greek source.²¹ Professor Harrison Thomson discovered many more such insertions, studied them, and came to the conclusion that

There is no apparent divergence, among the manuscripts, as to these insertions. We have but a simple tradition, and it reaches back to the lifetime of Grosseteste.²²

Most of the insertions deal with technicalities of translation, or add further information to the brief explanations of the text. Often such information comes from the Suda,²³ extracts of which Grosseteste himself translated. Therefore there seems to be very little doubt that the bishop was the author of the insertions.

At this point, the breadth of Grosseteste's aims as a transmitter becomes visible. It was not enough for him simply to provide accurate translations; he also hoped to rouse his reader's interest in Greek studies in their own right. As an example, the following passage serves well:

Quando autem Graeci auctores enumerant quattuor virtutes principales, scilicet fortitudinem, temperantiam, iustitiam et prudentiam, semper ponunt in significationem temperantiae hoc nomen sophrosine. Quod nomen et nos hic transtulimus in nomen sobrietatis, ut qui epistolas beati Pauli transtulerunt, et librum Sapientiae, in quo scriptum est: Sobrietatem enim et sapientiam docet, et iustitiam et virtutem

(Balliol 116 fol. 68^ra).

Here we see Grosseteste, in his painstaking way, facing the fact that no Latin word exactly fits sophrosine, explaining that he picked the one which he believes to be the best, and showing, in passages which would be immediately familiar to his readers, how the word is elsewhere used. In fact, this is only one of the many passages in which it seems that he is deliberately trying to enrich the philosophical vocabulary of the Latin West with common Greek terms. Perhaps the frustrations of searching for Latin equivalents had convinced him that this was the best long-term solution. In any case, he habitually keeps Greek abstract nouns in their original form, following them with a Latin explanation; for example, philantropiam, id est amorem hominum (Balliol 116 fol. 267^va) and theophilestaton, id est deo amatissimum (Balliol 116 fol. 262^vb).

Then, relying largely on the Suda, he imparts a wealth of Greek history. He gives an extensive biography of Sardanapalus, far more than is needed to understand Aristotle's fleeting reference (Mercken 53). And when Speusippus is mentioned, he produces every detail he knows about him:

Erat autem Speusippus Eurymedontis filius fratruelis Platonis philosophi a Potona ipsius sorore, auditor ipsius Platonis et successor effectus Akademiae in centesima octava olympiade. Hic autem conscripsit plurima et maxime philosophica. Austerus secundum aspectum et ad summum velocis irae

(Mercken 76).

This seems to be going beyond strict editorial needs in order to enlarge his readers' horizons.

Most of the insertions are linguistic or historical. But there is one which is the comment of a thirteenth-century bishop. Where the Anonymous commentator on book III says:

Mentiri autem turpe, sed si pro utilitate non turpe. Et miscere aliene mulieri, sed si pro tyranni ablatione non turpe

(Balliol 116 fol. 52^vb).

Grosseteste expresses vehement dissent:

Christiana autem religio fatetur et tenet non esse peccandum alicuius utilitatis consequendae vel alicuius incommodi vitandi gratia. Unde cum mentiri et aliene uxori miscere utrumque sit peccare, neutrum est aliquo modo faciendum. Unde superior doctrina non doctrina, sed error est in exemplis propositis. Non enim sunt facienda mala peccati ut eveniant bona

(Balliol 116 fol. 52^vb).

It may well be that he chose to insert this passage into the text, rather than writing a marginal note on it, because he attached special importance to it.

IV. THE MARGINAL NOTES

The insertions were meant to be incorporated into the text in all manuscripts, and in fact are so. They are almost never confused with the marginal notes.²⁴ This does suggest that to the author and to his early scribes there was a distinction in purpose between insertions and notes; but if so, it is not clearly discernible. Admittedly there are far more marginal notes than insertions which offer comment on the text, but equally there are many marginal notes which are philological and historical.

The marginal notes have not survived in their entirety in any known manuscript. Eton 122 (fol. 106^v) refers to the Liber episcopi,²⁵ presumably the original text, but this has not been found. The number of manuscripts which carry any notes at all is fairly small—Harrison Thomson found eight—and in the three which I have used, there are considerable variations. The neat synopses of Aristotle's meaning in diagram form to be found in All Souls 84 do not appear elsewhere, while Paris Arsenal 698 reports more fully than the other two Grosseteste's arguments on the question of virtue. Eton 122 is on the whole closer to Arsenal 698 than All Souls 84, but there are still many differences. All Souls 84 also contains notes by another scholar, and therefore there is a possibility of confusion.

Many of the marginal notes reflect the same scrupulous treatment of Greek words seen in the insertions, though it is perhaps fair to say that in the notes, Grosseteste feels freer to deal with full derivations. So he analyses and traces to their origin urbanitas (All Souls 84 fol. 10^vb, relating to Mercken 3), synesis (All Souls 84 fol. 140^v, Eton 122 fol. 124^v, Arsenal 698 fol. 88^v) and epeiekeia (Arsenal 698 fol. 8^v). Then he sorts out philodoni, philopluti, philotimi, and philodoxi (Eton 122 fol. 8^v, relating to Mercken 43). He points out that what the Greek commentator says of the derivation of temperance is not true in Latin (Eton 122 fol. 53^r, Arsenal 698 fol. 40^v). He defends his own translation:

In graeco, omnis ars et omnis methodus; nos autem pro hoc nomine methodus posuimus hoc nomen doctrina, quia alii ante nos sic transtulerunt

(Eton 122 fol. 2^v, relating to Mercken 18).

A fair number of notes are purely explanatory. One calls attention to the Peripatetic habit of using letters of the alphabet to show the order of books in a work (Eton 122 fol. 194^r, Arsenal 698 fol. 136^v). Another produces information about Homer and Hesiod, using a florilegium for quotations (Eton 122 fol. 46^r).²⁶ A third appears to be misleading. Where Phalaris is mentioned, Grosseteste recounts the story usually told of Procrustes, that he had a bed to which he fitted his victims, cutting off the legs of the long and stretching the short (Arsenal 698 fol. 100^vb, Eton 122 fol. 141^v).

All these notes reflect most accurately Grosseteste the scholar, trying to convey as broad a base as possible of Greek grammar, syntax, history, myth, and custom to his relatively ignorant readers. Few editors of texts have seized the opportunity for transmission so wholeheartedly.

Then there are the marginal notes which simply clarify Aristotle's argument, using the familiar vocabulary of the schools. One of the best, and the most quoted,²⁷ puts together the teaching of book I and book X on the nature of happiness:

Felicitas est animae operatio secundum virtutem perfectam cum delectatione (vel non sine delectatione) in vita perfecta, optimum, perfectum, pulcherrimum, delectabilissimum, et a deo datum, possessum per virtutem et disciplinam, et studium et exercitationem, et est communissimum, et non laudabile quia supra laudem, sed honorabile et beneficabile

(All Souls 84 fol. 34 N, Eton 122 fol. 25^r, Arsenal 698 fol. 18^v).

The same function is served by the notes in diagram form, to be found only in the All Souls manuscript. One is particularly interesting because it introduces the distinction between aspectus mentis and affectus mentis which Grosseteste himself developed:²⁸

Fines hominis per quos ad primum bonum refertur	{impassibilitas, in affectu in	{tristitia, timore, concupiscentia, voluptate
	veritas in aspectu	{in practico, in speculativo,

(All Souls 84 fol. 11^vb).

Clarification of Aristotle's meaning is particularly necessary where Grosseteste feels that the Greek commentator might mislead his readers. Eustratius of Nicaea, understandably enough in a Neoplatonist, takes issue with Aristotle on the origin of ideas, regarding his treatment of the summum bonum as self-contradictory (Mercken 68). Grosseteste comments:

Notandum quod Aristoteles non intendit improbare opinionem Platonis quoad hoc quod ponebat unum bonum separatum a quo dependent omnia bona. Nam et ipse Aristoteles in 12 Metaphysicae ponit quoddam bonum separatum a toto universo ad quod universum ordinatur, sicut exercitus ad bonum ducis. Improbat autem eam in hoc quod ponebat idem bonum separatum esse quandam idealem rationem omnium bonorum

(All Souls 84 fol. 21^rb).

The same motive, to clear up possible confusion, lies behind Grosseteste's extensive treatment of voluntary and involuntary actions. This had been a problem on which earlier commentators on the Ethica vetus had expatiated. And, as Dom Odo Lottin has shown,²⁹ some of them saw a conflict here between Aristotle's teaching and the traditional Augustinian doctrines of the Church. So it is hardly surprising that the bishop should seek to make Aristotle's meaning as clear as possible by stressing the logic which lay behind it:

Quaecumque operationes quae sunt circa consiliabilia voluntariae sunt. Virtutum autem operationes sunt circa consiliabilia; ergo virtutum operationes sunt voluntariae. Hanc autem conclusionem subiecit Aristoteles more suo, ex qua sequitur quod virtus est voluntaria et eorum quae est in nobis. Cum enim ex operationibus sint virtutes, et operationes sint voluntariae, erunt virtutes voluntariae, et a simili et malitia voluntaria, et in nobis. Quod probat sic: Quaecumque in nobis est operari, in nobis est et non operari illa; et e converso, quae in nobis est non operari, in nobis est et operari illa. Et hanc universalem propositionem insinuat per haec verba

(All Souls 84 fol. 59^v, Arsenal 698 fol. 34^v).

And:

Et quia in nobis est esse studiosos et pravos, dicere quod nullus volens est malus, mendacium; et dicere quod nullus nolens beatus, verum est. Unde sententia dicentium hoc partim est mendax, partim verax, quia verum est nullum nolentem esse beatum, et verum est malitiam esse voluntariam, quia et ipsius oppositum falsum

(Arsenal 698 fol. 34^v).

And on the next page, he again rams home Aristotle's belief in the moral responsibility of individuals, who cannot be excused for sin:

Unde falsum supponunt opinantes peccata involuntaria, decepti per hoc quod [ipsi] non distinguunt inter necessitatem determinatam et necessitatem simpliciter, nec inter praedicationem quae per se est et praedicationem quae per accidens

(All Souls 84 fol. 60^v, Arsenal 698 fol. 35^r).

Here the now-familiar logical distinctions of the Analytics are used to sum up the teaching of the Ethics. Grosseteste had added nothing to Aristotle's argument, but has phrased it in a way to which it would be hard to take exception.

Another point which Grosseteste treats at length is whether good actions make good habits, or good habits come first. Again, this is a problem which had much exercised the earlier commentators on the Ethica vetus, particularly the anonymous author of Paris B. N. lat. 3894 A, who had seen a clash here between Aristotle's acquired virtues and Augustine's infused virtues.³⁰ Grosseteste simply crystalizes Aristotle's conclusion, making it quite plain that the relationship between habit and action is a reciprocal one, even in philosophical terms:

Ostendit quod non solum ex operationibus et ab operationibus generentur et amittantur habitus, et ex operationibus deficientibus et superabundantibus corrumpantur, sed quod e converso, operationes ab habitibus fiant et sint in habitibus sicut in causis. Quod manifestatur satis evidenter a similitudine et inductione

(All Souls 84 fol. 44^v).

He then goes on to examine the objective and subjective aspects of a virtuous act, using a much tighter syllogistic form than is found in the Ethics:

Res enim operatae in se consideratae dicuntur iustae et temperatae, quando in se ipsis sunt tales, quales operabitur ille qui iustus et temperatus. Nec sequitur quod qui tales operatur iam sit in se ipso talis, sicut patet ex praedictis. Non sequitur autem quod licet res operatae sint tales in se ipsis, ideo sint iuste vel temperate operatae. Et ideo non secundum perfectam significationem iuste temperate operatae. Et ideo non secundum perfectam significationem iusti et temperati iustae et temperatae sunt. Perfectum enim non solum ab esse, sed a bene esse est. Secundum perfectam igitur significationem iusti et temperati, comprehendentem in se tam esse, quam bene esse, sequitur quod qui facit iusta et temperata iam iustus et temperatus est. Secundum vero alterum modum, non sequitur

(All Souls 84 fol. 46^r, Arsenal 698 fol. 26^r).

These two points, the freedom of human actions and the relationship between virtue and action, are treated more fully than any others in the book. That Grosseteste should have been interested in them is hardly surprising, in view of the contemporary absorption with such topics. What is remarkable about these notes is the absence of Christian influence, and the systematically logical approach. Here Grosseteste is at his most Aristotelian.

But there are two or three places where a slight Christian bias may be detectable in the notes. For example, in a note specifically ascribed to him in the All Souls manuscript, but which appears to be out of place, he says:

Non orat quis de virtutibus et operationibus ipsius in quantum sunt in nostra potestate, sed tamen est de his oratio in quantum sunt a Deo data

(All Souls 84 fol. 83^v).

If this is authentic, its purpose seems to be to preserve a sphere for prayer in human life. Then there are two notes in which he stresses the positive contribution to human happiness which suffering can make, where Aristotle only shows that suffering cannot destroy happiness.

Semper igitur existet felix homo et felix vir studiosus, qui ab operando secundum virtutem non desistit, et in summis adversitatibus non etiam per has impeditur ab operari secundum virtutem. Decidet tamen per magnas adversitates a felicitate politica, quae est operatio secundum virtutes politicas. Non tamen decidet ab ipsis virtutibus politicis, cum sint habitus animi. A virtutibus autem speculativis et earum operationibus non cogunt decidere adversitates, quapropter neque a felicitate simpliciter, sed magis occasionem praestant et velut quandam compulsionem ad maiorem felicitatem

(Arsenal 698 fol. 20^v).

This point is also illustrated by reference to the story of Job:

Job … Priamicis seu maioribus incidit infortuniis, in medio quorum summe philosophabatur. Et felicitate speculativa quae ex sola speculatione constituitur non impeditus, sed magis adiutus tribulationibus iocundabatur

(All Souls 84 fol. 170^r, Eton 122 fol. 151^v, Arsenal 698 fol. 108^r).

This extension of Aristotle's words is of the same kind as another note on friendship. Where Aristotle says that a man wishes all good things for his friend, except the one supreme good, that he should become a god (Stinissen 43), because friendship between man and god cannot survive, Grosseteste adds a note which specifically separates love from friendship, making it possible for love to survive:

Non adhuc remanet amicitia, non quin Deus amet hominem et homo Deum, sed quia tam superexcellens est distantia, ut non possit omnino salvari aequalitas secundum quantitatem vel analogiam quae significatur per naturam amicitiae

(All Souls 84 fol. 180^v, Eton 122 fol. 160^r, Arsenal 698 fol. 114^v).

In this small and unimportant group of notes, then, Grosseteste's comments seem to be coloured by his religious interests; he seems to be bridging the gap between Aristotle and Christianity. Yet there are other places where those same religious interests lead the bishop sharply to take issue with the text. He returns again to the argument that circumstances may make wrongful acts less wrong, and to the Anonymous commentator's examples of lying and adultery. He declares ‘secundum perfectionem vitae Christianae nullo modo mentiendum’ (All Souls 84 fol. 50^v, Arsenal 698 fol. 29^r). He then modifies this slightly, by referring to the example of Abraham who passed Sarah off as his sister, and explains that it is acceptable to hide the truth if necessary. Awareness of the Christian position does not prevent him from following Aristotle in book IV; he agrees that lying by overstatement is a worse offence than lying by understatement, though neither should happen:

Quid veretur mendacium non solum eo quod turpe, sed secundum seipsum eo quod est mendacium, laudabilis est. Talis enim non mentietur nisi alicuius evidentis utilitatis gratia, ut scilicet propter alicuius salutem. Et cum sic mentitur, magis et libentius declinat a vero in minus, hoc est in eironeam, quam in maius, hoc est in iactantiam. Prudentius enim est in hoc declinare ad minus, eo quod superabundantiae in hac parte sunt onerosiores et peiores defectionibus. Sicut enim ipse dixit superius, ambo mendaces, scilicet eiron et iactator, sunt vituperabiles, magis autem iactator

(All Souls 84 fol. 80^r, Eton 122 fol. 62^v, Arsenal 698 fol. 48^v).

But it is characteristic that he should immediately add:

Sicut autem in superioribus diximus, secundum perfectionem Christianae religionis, nec pro salute alicuius est mentiendum

(All Souls 84 fol. 80^r, Eton 122 fol. 62^v, Arsenal 698 fol. 48^v).

Lying is the point at which Grosseteste most clearly sees the conflict between Christianity and Aristotelianism. Still, the connection between lying and adultery made by the Anonymous commentator, quoted above, rests at the back of his mind, and against Aristotle's treatment of incontinence, he puts a firmly episcopal note:

Venerea agere necessarium esse coniugato et non alio, nec illi nisi aut uxore petenti debitum aut spe prolis procreandae ad Dei servitium. Et hoc solum est commensurate venerea agere

(All Souls 84 fol. 171^r, Eton 122 fol. 152^r, Arsenal 698 fol. 108^r).

Christian ethics cannot be stretched to accommodate circumstances in the same way as pagan ethics.

On courage, the conflict is not so fundamental; Grosseteste takes issue not so much with the doctrine as with the examples cited. Homer's heroes are not in the fullest sense brave because they fight for love of honour or to avoid shame (Arsenal 698 fol. 37^r). He then makes a sweeping condemnation of other motives for death mentioned in classical literature, and contrasts the pagan suicides with those who chose to die in order to achieve some good more worthwhile than life itself—surely the Christian martyrs:

Quidam semet interficiunt ne patiantur inopiam, magis eligentes mori quam inopiae miseriam sustinere. Et quidam propter cupidinem, id est propter amorem qui dicitur eros, se interficiunt. Sicut leguntur in poetis quaedam mulieres fecisse, magis volentes mori quam talis amoris angustias et afflictiones sustinere. Quemadmodum legitur apud Vergilium in 4 Aeneidos de Didone. Sed non est fortitudo mortem eligere et assumere, ut altera transitoria quaecumque poena vitetur, sed fortitudinis est mortem assumere, ut bonum melius quam sit hac vita transitoria ex morte perveniat

(All Souls 84 fol. 62^v, Eton 122 fol. 49^v, Arsenal 698 fol. 37^r).

These notes, then, reflect the spontaneous reaction of a thirteenth-century theologian to something recognizably un-Christian. It is interesting that it is only on the doctrine of expediency and its ramifications that Grosseteste is drawn to make very positive statements. Other parts of the text which bothered later commentators, as for instance the nature of magnanimity and the apparent discounting of immortality, draw no notes at all. And elsewhere Grosseteste is at pains, as we have seen, to stress the convincing nature of Aristotle's argument and even at times to give it a slightly ‘benign’ interpretation.

The mere form of a marginal note leaves Grosseteste freer to express his own opinion than would the form of a commentary per modum quaestionis. He has no need to justify his views at length, nor to be too precise over whether he is speaking secundum theologum or secundum philosophum. The result is that the notes offer an illuminating glimpse into the mixed reactions inspired by the brilliant but alien Aristotelian ethics in the mind of the only Latin commentator who knew them in the original.

.....

As a whole, Grosseteste's corpus of Aristotelian ethics bears witness to the breadth of his aims in producing the work. Accuracy in translating, broad scholarship in editing, logical skill in clarifying, and a combination of philosophical and theological knowledge in commenting, all play their part. And through it all there is great sensitivity to the needs of his readers. In fact, the annotations enable us to picture a typical reader, trying to cope with complex philosophical concepts in a language insufficiently flexible to convey their full meaning, bothered by strange syntax, overwhelmed by passing references to unknown figures, and unable to see in the Philosopher's subtle thought-patterns the strict lines of logic which he had expected of him. Grosseteste not only coped with the reader's problems, but also by his comments stimulated and on occasion warned him. Here was a flying start to the study of the whole of the Ethics in the schools. The fact that Albertus Magnus was able to produce his quaestiones—the model for almost all future study—within three or four years of Grosseteste's work's appearance, is in itself a tribute to the bishop's achievement.

Notes

1. Lists of the manuscripts and editions of Grosseteste's works on the Aristotelian Ethics are provided by S. Harrison Thomson, The Writings of Robert Grosseteste, Bishop of Lincoln 1235-1253 (Cambridge 1940) 65f. (Ethica), 68-70 (Greek comms.), 85f. (Notulae), 88 (Summa). Books I-II of the translation of the Ethics have been edited by H. P. F. Mercken, Aristoteles over de menselijke Volkomenheid (Brussels 1964), Books VIII-IX by W. Stinissen, Aristoteles over de Vriendschap (Brussels 1963). For citations of the text of these books these editions have been used; elsewhere I have used Oxford Balliol College MS 116, a late-thirteenth or early-fourteenth-century MS, in which the text of Grosseteste's work fills fols. 1^r-266^v. For the text of Grosseteste's Notulae I have used the following MSS: Eton College 122 (s. XIII) fols. 1^r-221^v; Oxford All Souls College 84 (s. XIII) fols. 10^r-240^v; Paris Bibliothèque de l'Arsenal 698 (s. XIII) fols. 3^r-155^v.

2. A. Jourdain, Recherches critiques sur l'âge et l'origine des traductions latines d'Aristote (nouv. éd.; Paris 1843) 59-63; V. Rose, ‘Über die griechischen Commentare zur Ethik des Aristoteles,’ Hermes 5 (1871) 61-113; C. Marchesi, L'Etica Nicomachea nella tradizione latina medievale (Messina 1904) 57f, 62-7; L. Baur, Die philosophischen Werke des Robert Grosseteste (Münster i. W. 1912) 24*-29*; M. Grabmann, Forschungen über die lateinischen Aristotelesübersetzungen des XIII. Jahrhunderts (Münster i. W. 1916) 220-37, 251-6; P. Minges, ‘Robert Grosseteste Übersetzer der Ethica Nicomachea,’ Philosophisches Jahrbuch 32 (1919) 230-43; A. Pelzer, ‘Les Versions latines des ouvrages de morale conservés sous le nom d'Aristote en usage au XIII^e siècle,’ Revue Néo-Scolastique de Philosophie 23 (1921) 316-41, 378-400 (repr. in his: Études d'histoire littéraire sur la scolastique médiévale [Louvain-Paris 1964] 121-87); F. M. Powicke, ‘Robert Grosseteste and the Nicomachean Ethics,’ Proceedings of the British Academy 16 (1930) 22p.; E. Franceschini, ‘Roberto Grossatesta, vescovo di Lincoln, e la sua traduzioni latine,’ Atti del Reale Istituto Veneto di scienze, lettere et arti 93, II (1933-34) 1-138; S. H. Thomson, ‘The “Notule” of Grosseteste on the “Nicomachean Ethics,”’ Proceedings of the British Academy 19 (1934); E. Franceschini, ‘Una nuova testimonianza su Roberto Grossatesta traduttore dell'Etica a Nicomaco,’ Aevum 27 (1953) 370-1.

3. D. A. Callus, ‘The Date of Grosseteste's Translations and Commentaries on Pseudo-Dionysius and the Nicomachean Ethics,’ Recherches de théologie ancienne et médiévale 14 (1947) 186-210. A convenient summary of all this research may be found in D. A. Callus, ‘Robert Grosseteste as Scholar,’ Robert Grosseteste, Scholar and Bishop (ed. Callus; Oxford 1955) 62-5.

4. M. Grabmann, ‘Das Studium der aristotelischen Ethik an der Artistenfakultät der Universität Paris in der ersten Hälfte des 13. Jahrhunderts,’ in his: Mittelalterliches Geistesleben III (Munich 1956) 128-41; O. Lottin, ‘Saint Albert le Grand et l'Éthique à Nicomaque,’ Aus der Geisteswelt des Mittelalters: Festschrift Grabmann (Münster i. W. 1935) 611-26; M. Grabmann, ‘Der lateinische Averroismus des 13. Jahrhunderts und seine Stellung zur christlichen Weltanschauung: Mitteilungen aus ungedruckten Ethikkommentaren,’ Sb. Akad. Munich (1931) Heft 2; R.-A. Gauthier, ‘Trois commentaires “averroïstes” sur l'Éthique à Nicomaque,’ AHDLMA [Archives d'Histoire Doctrinale et Litteraire du Moyen–Age] 16 (1947-48) 187-336 at 244f, 203f. Cf. D. A. Callus, ‘Introduction of Aristotelian Learning to Oxford,’ Proceedings of the British Academy 29 (1943) 229-81 at 252-5; R.-A. Gauthier and J. Y. Jolif, L'Éthique à Nicomaque: Introduction, Traduction et Commentaire (3 vols.; Louvain-Paris 1958-59) I 78*-85*.

5. Metalogicon IV 6 (ed. C. C. J. Webb [Oxford 1929] 170f.).

6. Compendium studii theologiae (ed. H. Rashdall [Aberdeen 1911] 37). Cf. S. D. Wingate, The Mediaeval Latin Versions of the Aristotelian Scientific Corpus (London 1931) 112-17.

7. Opus tertium 25 (ed. J. S. Brewer, Opera quaedam hactenus inedita I [London 1859] 91). Cf. Franceschini, ‘Roberto Grossatesta’ 10f.

8. Callus, ‘Robert Grosseteste’ 65.

9. Ibid. 43.

10. These texts have been edited by C. Marchesi, L'Etica Nicomachea Appendice l-xxvi (Ethica vetus), xxvii-xl (Ethica nova). Cf. Aristoteles latinus Codices I (Rome 1939) 67-71; II (Cambridge 1955) 788; Supplementa altera (Bruges-Paris 1961) 21.

11. Pelzer, ‘Les Versions latines’ 329-35.

12. Aristoteles latinus Supplementa altera 21.

13. Opus maius III 5 (ed. J. H. Bridges, The Opus maius of Roger Bacon I [Oxford 1897] 67-9; revd. ed. [Oxford 1900] 82). Cf. Franceschini, ‘Roberto Grossatesta’ 10.

14. Franceschini, ‘Roberto Grossatesta.’

15. Ibid. 75.

16. R.-A. Gauthier and J. Y. Jolif, L'Éthique à Nicomaque: Introduction, Traduction et Commentaire (3 vols.; Louvain-Paris 1958-59) I 77*-81*, 85*. Cf. also the literature cited by C. H. Lohr, ‘Medieval Latin Aristotle Commentaires, Authors: Johannes de Kanthi—Myngodus,’ Traditio 27 (1971) 251-351 at 316f. s. v. Leonardus Brunus.

17. W. Kübel, ‘Prolegomena,’ in: Alberti Magni Opera omnia: XIV, 1 Super Ethica (Münster i. W. 1968) vi.

18. Rose, ‘Über die griechischen Commentare.’

19. R.-A. Gauthier, ‘Praefatio,’ in: Sancti Thomae de Aquino Opera omnia XLVII, 1 Sententia libri Ethicorum (Rome 1969) 254*.

20. Gauthier, ‘Trois commentaries’ 277.

21. Rose, ‘Über die griechischen Commentare’ 109-113.

22. Thomson, ‘The “Notule”’ 204f.

23. Franceschini, ‘Roberto Grossatesta’ 63-7.

24. Thomson, ‘The “Notule”’ 214.

25. Ibid. 204.

26. On the Florilegium see Franceschini, ‘Roberto Grossatesta’ 67 note 2.

27. E.g. Albertus Magnus, In I Ethicorum tr. VII cap. 8 (ed. Borgnet VII 118f.).

28. Callus, ‘Robert Grosseteste’ 21.

29. O. Lottin, Psychologie et morale aux XII^e et XIII^e siècles I (2. éd.; Gembloux 1957) 515-19.

30. Ibid. 521f.