the result of either coercion or ignorance; it must issue from a voluntary choice. Second, it must not be the result of a whim; it must have a specific purpose. After briefly explaining his “dialectically necessary method,” Gewirth asserts that this method, applied to action, will result in everyone’s accepting a single “supreme principle of morality.”

In the second section of Reason and Morality, Gewirth explores “The Normative Structure of Action.” Although any individual’s view of what is “good” can vary from time to time, Gewirth explains, as human beings, we always seek gains, rather than losses; we work for whatever will ensure our well-being, at least in the long run; we pursue what we value. Moreover, not only do human beings claim well-being as a right, but they also assert a second right, the freedom to work toward that well-being. As the author points out, if everyone believes that he or she has those two rights and also admits that all other human beings have the same rights, then the basis for a universal moral system has been established.

Before he can proceed with his argument, however, Gewirth must deal with the fact that there is an almost infinite number of variables in life, both differences between individuals and differences between one set of circumstances and another. Gewirth proceeds to outline the ways that philosophers have tried to deal with the fact of variability, which range from accepting it as inevitable to attempting to accommodate it, while still arguing for universal principles. As is his habit, Gewirth looks for an answer not to abstractions but to the concrete and to “agents,” or human beings. Although one cannot include children too young to vote in the category of voters, for example, because all of those of a certain age will be able to vote at the same future time, clearly they participate in the general category of voters. Obviously, then, one can be a “prospective purposive agent.” The point is that, upon close examination, variables may be only superficial.

In the third section, Gewirth asserts the core of his argument, the “Principle of Generic Consistency,” or the PGC. Reminding his readers that he has established freedom and well-being as “necessary goods” for everyone, and that because action is impossible without freedom and well-being, it is only logical that every human being, or “agent,” will claim both freedom and well-being as rights. Moreover, every rational agent will realize that the only way one can exercise one’s rights is to allow others to do so as well. In other words, the agent’s self-interest will motivate him or her to make sure that others have the freedom to work for their own well-being. Thus Gewirth moves from “is” to “ought,” and to what he identifies as the supreme principle of morality, or the Principle of Generic Consistency, defined as follows: “Act in accord with the generic rights of your recipients as well as of yourself.” The PGC is strikingly similar to the Golden Rule, which commands Christians to treat others as they would wish to be treated, and to Kant’s categorical imperative, which directs human beings to proceed with an action only when the rule governing it could be elevated into a universal law.

Having stated his PGC, Gewirth proceeds to detail the logical argument that led eventually to his assertion of the PGC, to defend it as being both a formal and a material necessity, and to discuss questions he anticipates being raised, such as the relationships between analytic truth and morality and between motivation and rationality. At the end of this section, Gewirth comments that he has now accomplished the main purpose of his book: to show how one can move logically from the concept of generic moral action to a universal principle of morality.

The last two sections of Reason and Morality suggest and analyze direct and indirect applications of the PGC. For example, consistent with his interest in political philosophy and his concern about social justice is Gewirth’s formulation of what he terms an “Equality of Generic Rights.” He considers such practical matters as the difference between providing equal opportunity and basic needs and working to reduce everyone to the same level; ensuring justice and providing for self-defense; the duty to rescue, which the author demonstrates is not as simple as it might seem; and rights as they apply to losing and gaining goods. Section 4 concludes with a thoughtful discussion of the implications of the PGC as to what limits should be set on individual freedom. Sensibly, Gewirth concludes that one person’s freedom should be limited only when it is “needed to prevent or remedy interferences with other persons’ necessary conditions of action.”

In the final section of his book, Gewirth applies the PGC to social rules and institutions. Having explored the various possibilities of social and political structures, he concludes by describing what he sees as the state that best fulfills the moral rule he has established. Gewirth rejects the libertarian ideal, which would preserve the status quo, assuming that the wealthy had acquired their worldly goods in a just and legal manner; similarly, he rejects the egalitarian ideal, which would redistribute wealth so as to benefit the poorest members of society. Noting that these extremes violate claims to well-being and to freedom, Gewirth suggests instead a democratic and “supportive state,” which, as he explains, is consistent with the PGC.

There follows a closely reasoned defense of the PGC against anticipated objections, in which Gewirth argues that his system is complete—in other words, that it can be used to determine right and wrong in every situation and for every individual, and, moreover, that it is consistent and, therefore, can be used to resolve what are perceived as conflicts between duties. In “Some Concluding Reflections,” the author sums up the process by which he arrived at his supreme moral principle and reiterates the statement of faith on which Reason and Morality and the PGC are based: that the human reason is the only certain guide to truth.