SOURCE: C. J. De Vogel, in an introduction to Pythagoras and Early Pythagoreanism: An Interpretation of Neglected Evidence on the Philosopher Pythagoras, Van Gorcum & Comp. N.V., 1966, pp. 1-19.

[In the following excerpt, De Vogel surveys modern criticism of Pythagoras, especially of his presumed dual role as a religious leader and as a scientist-philosopher.]

1. The problem

We have all grown up with the idea that very little was to be known about Pythagoras. From contemporary evidence, we saw, he appears as a kind of 'shaman'. And can a shaman be a man of science?

Whatever one might be inclined to say in reply to this question, this much was certain, that the texts in which something like a Pythagorean philosophy of number and numerical proportions appears date from the fourth century B.C., this applying most probably also to the Philolaus texts. Now, whatever may be said, the fourth century is not the sixth. And is not this the limit by which we are strictly bound?

One thing that seemed of particular importance was the fact that in his chapter on Pythagorean philosophy in Metaph. A Aristotle never mentioned Pythagoras by name. He spoke of 'those who were called Pythagoreans' and of 'the Italian philosophers'. What could this mean other than that even for Aristotle the figure of the historical Pythagoras had vanished into the mist of a remote past? And had anyone remarked that at least in another book Aristotle spoke about Pythagoras mentioning him by name, no doubt we would have answered that there it was the 'shaman' he was dealing with and not the philosopher.

As to the three existing Pythagoras biographies and any later so-called Pythagorean texts, it was obvious that they could not be brought in as 'evidence' at all: they were all under the radical suspicion of being 'Neopythagorean hagiography' or, say, falsification.

This, then, was for us the state of the problem, as it is still for many others. And was it not justified?

I should like to point out that three things have not been taken into the account.

1. There is the fact that it is part of Aristotle's style, when he is speaking of for instance Plato and his followers, to mention Plato's name only rarely, even if he is definitely referred to, or the name of any of his successors in particular—say Xenocrates or Speusippus—even if one of these is meant. Aristotle likes to speak of 'these men' or of 'some people', or of 'those who speak of ideas' or 'who posit the existence of ideas'; of'those who first posited two kinds of numbers', or of 'those who maintain the existence of unchangeable existences'.

2. The Pythagorean Society was of such a character that the tradition was most carefully kept, so that a high degree of continuity may be supposed.

3. It is possible that earlier, say 4th century B.C., material is preserved in later sources (the Vitae) while the earlier sources may go back to a still earlier tradition.

It is the scope of this work to inquire into these possibilities and, in the case of positive results, to consider what is implied in this for the reconstruction of the philosopher Pythagoras.

To put it more concretely, it may happen that one day we will come across some passage in a Hellenistic or Roman writer of history, be it Diodorus or Pompeius Trogus, and find a picture there of Pythagoras' arrival at Croton coinciding with a moral break-down; next, a short account of how Pythagoras by repeatedly speaking to the people, at his request gathered together in four different social groups, brought them back to a strict rule of sober living, the women willingly giving up their precious garments, the men dismissing their concubines.

Is that an early sample of Neopythagorean hagiography (falsification)? Or is it what these first century writers found in the Sicilian historian Timaeus who, writing the history of Southern Italy and Sicily, inquired into the local tradition still alive in those parts?—Next, if sufficient grounds are found to corroborate the substance of the above-cited short account, what then do we learn from this concerning Pythagoras, the man and the philosopher? Granting that the cosmic philosophy of number and numerical ratios, found in fourth or perhaps fifth century texts, had its origin in him, how should we incorporate the social activity of education of the masses into his philosophical personality?

These are our problems. Let us now consider, first, what the evidence is, next what has been done by others about the reconstruction of the philosopher Pythagoras, both in the present and in previous generations.

2. The evidence

There is, first of all, a fragment by Xenophanes that clearly refers to the doctrine of metempsychosis; next, a few lines by Heraclitus, who is obviously irritated at Pythagoras' 'polymathy'; some lines by Empedocles, who expresses his deep admiration for a man of unusual wisdom. Add to this a few passages in Herodotus, who knows Pythagoras as a great Sage and places him among the so-called Orphies, not to forget Ion of Chios, who says that Pythagoras 'wrote some things in verse' and put these in the name of Orpheus—a way of saying that he was the author of one or more Orphic hymns.

We can then pass on to the 4th century. In Plato we find very important evidence about the way of life by which the Pythagoreans differed from everybody else … ; also the curriculum of those mathematical subjects which—as is expressly stated—were studied in the school of Pythagoras; finally a praise of 'wise men'—anonymous but clearly referring to the Pythagoreans—who introduced a doctrine of τ ά ξ ι ς and χόσμος, an order based on numerical proportions which should serve as norms also in human society. Next there is Isocrates, who talks of Pythagoras' journey to Egypt. We also hear of this in Strabo, who mentions Babylon as well as Egypt. Especially a journey to Babylon is by no means improbable, since recent investigations in the field of the history of mathematics have shown that Pythagoras obtained his knowledge of mathematics from Babylon.

In the second half of the fourth century mention is made of Pythagoras in a few fragments by Heraclides Ponticus; about the prohibition of eating meat and beans; about what he calls 'knowledge of the perfection of the numbers of the soul' (according to Pythagoras happiness would have consisted in this); about Pythagoras' various incarnations; and finally about the term philosophia, which he introduced. Next we come to our most important witness about Pythagoras and early Pythagoreanism: Aristotle. Guthrie rightly points to the importance of this testimony, [in his A History of Greek Philosophy, 1962] which, however, has only partly been preserved. The brief description of Pythagorean philosophy which is extant in Met. A 5 is undoubtedly one-sided, but nevertheless important. In it we are told that through intensive mathematical studies the Pythagoreans came to consider number as being a primary principle of the universe: number is the 'essence' of things, things 'resemble' numbers and the elements of numbers are at the same time the elements of all things…. Together with number, 'harmony' is also mentioned by Aristotle as being a fundamental cosmic principle, a doctrine which we find clearly stated in the fragments of Philolaus, which, if they do not date from the fifth century, in any case date back to the fourth century.

In the table of opposites, stated in this chapter as being early Pythagorean doctrine, early Pythagoreanism is depicted as a dualistic way of thought. We must un doubtedly look upon this as a reaction to the Milesians and also as the doctrine which, a little later in the sixth century, was strongly opposed by Parmenides.

Furthermore, there is in Aristotle a passage about the cosmology attributed to Philolaus. The famous doctrine of the 'harmony of the spheres' was also handed down by Aristotle.

If we add to this fairly ancient description of Pythagorean doctrine the fragments handed down in the name of Philolaus and those of Archytas, we have the evidence by which we can say that nowadays most 'progressive' scholars use to construct a picture of Pythagoras and Pythagoreanism before Plato. The three Vitae of Pythagoras that have been preserved—that by Diogenes Laertius, who certainly used Apollonius of Tyana as one of his sources, and those by Porphyry and Iamblichus—are still considered as belonging rather to the genre of hagiography than to history; and the Pythagorean texts further at our disposal all show such admixture with Platonism, Aristotelism and occasionally Stoic philosophical ideas that their later origin is unmistakable.

From what follows it will be apparent how impossible it is to restrict ourselves to the sources mentioned.

(1) The historian Polybius reports on the events connected with the setting fire to the Pythagoreans' house in Croton about the middle of the 5th century or a little later. The description clearly shows that a whole popular movement was concerned, not only in Croton but throughout Southern Italy,—a movement which had a political background. Polybius obtained his information from the Sicilian historian Timaeus, who wrote the history of Magna Graecia in the second half of the 4th century. Timaeus is a very important witness: he must have known about the tradition concerning the part that Pythagoreans played in politics during the 5th century, and here and there even in the 4th century, from local sources. Polybius' testimony, therefore, is based on reliable authority. It shows us a side of Pythagoras' person and work of which we hear nothing in the above-mentioned sources.

(2) There is archaeological evidence—coins from Croton and other towns in Southern Italy and Sicily—which confirms the political influence of Croton in the time of Pythagoras and the generation after him. We may ask ourselves how this evidence should be interpreted: was it a question of territorial expansion on the part of Croton, of conquest, and do we have to imagine that at that time there was a great Crotonian empire centrally governed by the Pythagorean Society? Or was the hegemony of Croton of a different, more modest character? Does the coin-alliance revealed by archeological discoveries mean that Croton had a wide sphere of influence without there being any question of conquest? Should not we rather suppose that Croton as a commercial and maritime power extracted economic privileges from the places concerned: landing-rights and permission to use the harbours? Again, was it the Pythagorean Society as such that ruled, or was it rather a certain group in the Society which concerned itself with governmental business? And if the latter was true, have we to suppose that this group formed the βονλή and held governing posts? Or were these Pythagoreans members of the Senate of Croton together with others who did not belong to the Society, and should we suppose that, together with other men, they sometimes held high offices, in the same way as elsewhere in Southern Italy and Sicily Pythagoreans who came from the School at Croton must sometimes have filled important official posts in the towns they came from?

These and similar questions may be asked. They need not be answered merely conjecturally, since there are texts that tell us about the political activities of the Pythagoreans. They are found in later authors, such as Diogenes Laertius and Pompeius Trogus (in Justinus' Epitome), but they go back to 4th-century sources: to Timaeus, partly also to Aristoxenus and Dicaearchus.

(3) These texts do not only tell about the political activities of the Pythagoreans in the more restricted modern sense of the term, i.e. the part they played in the business of government both in their own town and in the surrounding districts. They also refer to what we would rather call the social activities of Pythagoras: his teaching to the larger circle of the people of Croton, the way in which he spoke to different groups of the population, a summary of this teaching. They also make some mention of the effect of this preaching, if one wishes to call it so, on his audience. The fact that these things are reported by historians from the 1st century B.C.—so before the 'hagiography' of Apollonius of Tyana and the later writers who used his work—, historians who took their information directly from Timaeus, Aristoxenus and Dicaearchus, should keep us from doing what so many who have written the history of Greek philosophy have done, that is pass this testimony by. On the contrary, they prompt us to have a closer look at the accounts by the scorned hagiographers, Porphyry and Iamblichus, who have something to say about these things.

(4) Some information about the internal organization of the Pythagorean Society—rules pertaining to the entry of new members and the way of life within the Order—also go back to Timaeus. This is demonstrably true….

(5) The well-known story of Damon and Phintias, told in Iamblichus V. P. 235-237, goes back to Aristoxenus. It is also found in Diodorus and is founded on the firmest possible historical basis (since Aristoxenus says that he has often heard Dionysius telling it). What is more important, however, is that this story which happened about the middle of the fourth century, is not isolated. If we want to understand something about Pythagoras and Pythagoreanism we shall have to 'place' it in its historical context, i.e. we shall have to take it from its isolation and understand it in the light of the spiritual background of Pythagorean thought. It is not only a fact … it refers back to the thought of the founder of the Pythagorean Society, the philosopher Pythagoras. The available texts definitely enable us to perform this task of placing Pythagoreanism in its historical context and of interpreting it philosophically. Up to now too little use has been made of these texts.

These few points should suffice to make it clear that it is impossible to confine ourselves to Aristotle and the previous testimonies and Pythagorean texts if we want to reconstruct an acceptable picture of Pythagoras and early Pythagoreanism. There were three more important witnesses in the fourth century B.C.: Timaeus, who, just because he was historian of Southern Italy and Sicily, is a very important authority; Aristoxenus of Tarentum, who as a Pythagorean must have been wellinformed about the tradition within the School, and Dicaearchus, who as a writer on the cultural history of Greece also took an interest in the Pythagoreans of Magna Graecia. It is impossible to deny the importance of these witnesses. It may be objected, of course, that their works have not come down to us directly. Nevertheless Aristoxenus and Dicaearchus are often quoted by name by Porphyry and Iamblichus. And as to Timaeus, we know that his work was used by all who later on wrote the history, including the cultural history, of these regions; not only by Diodorus and Pompeius Trogus, but also for example by Strabo and Diogenes Laertius when they write about Pythagoras and the Pythagoreans. Apollonius of Tyana also used Timaeus. Hence it is possible to find in Porphyry and Iamblichus, who read and used Apollonius' Life of Pythagoras, information taken from the Sicilian historian. This can be verified by comparison with other writers who also drew upon him, such as Diodorus and Trogus.

For the fragments of Aristoxenus and Dicaearchus we now have Wehrli's excellent collections; Timaeus' fragments with commentary are in Jacoby, F.G.H., vol. III. Jacoby's opinion of Timaeus as historian is not unfavourable.

3. Interpretations and Source-books

The foundations of the modern critical interpretation of Greek philosophy were laid in Zeller's detailed work. In the German speaking countries it was followed by the three volumes of Th. Gomperz, dating from the end of the 19th century (fourth edition 1922, English translation 1913-1929) and somewhat later by K. Joël's big volume on the period before Plato (Tübingen 1921). In none of these works has there been a systematic and careful investigation into the source material after Aristotle for the reconstruction and interpretation of early Pythagoreanism, in particular of the figure of its founder. We are assured that he had 'disappeared into the mists of a distant past' before Aristotle's time, for Aristotle nowhere mentions him by name, but always speaks of 'the Pythagoreans'. This view has been a dogma for generations, and it still survives. All the later source material had been labelled Neoplatonic apocrypha by Zeller and was dated as belonging to the first century before and the first century after Christ at the earliest.

The basic collection of source material for Pre-Socratic philosophy was compiled by Hermann Diels; it was published in 1903 and bears all the marks of the abovementioned view. This is still true of the sixth corrected impression, edited by W. Kranz, 1951. In the Testimonia on Pythagoras (14 A) there is hardly anything about Pythagoras' social and political activities and influence. The fragments of Timaeus are for the most part not mentioned. In 8a we find Porphyry, V.P. 18-19, in which Dicaearchus (fr. 29 F.G.H.) is quoted: a brief mention of Pythagoras' four speeches to the inhabitants of Croton, and of the foundation of the Societas. One gets the impression, however, that Kranz, who inserted this testimony, hardly took it seriously—the parallels in Pompeius Trogus (Justinus) and Iamblichus V.P. 35 ff. are lacking. In 13 he gives texts about Pythagoras' marriage. Here we find Timaeus fr. 78, which tells about Pythagoras' daughter, who as an unmarried girl was a girls' leader, and who later as a married woman was a women's leader. It is obvious, however, that the quotation is not meant to illustrate Pythagoras' social activities, even less as an aid to the understanding of the philosophical background, for it is simply put under the heading of Personalia. It is revealing that here Diels only quotes the last line from Justinus, in which we are told that Pythagoras' house in Metapontum was turned into a temple. From Iamblichus D.-K. only quotes V.P. 248-257 (about the catastrophe) in this section, as well as Polybius II 38.

In the section Pythagoreische Schule, fifth century (58), D.-K. gives under A the testimonies in Aristotle, under C and D various groups of 'related texts'. Under C … we find Iamblichus, V.P. 82-86; under D (from Aristoxenus) Iamblichus V.P. 163 ff. (on Pythagorean medicine and music), V.P. 137 (on the general trend of the Pythagorean life; Delatte, who has important remarks about this, Litt. pyth. p. 296, is not quoted), V.P. 173 ff. (that in controlling human nature one must start with the gods; next follow state, law and justice; that anarchy is the greatest evil and that traditions must be preserved.) Cf. Aristoxenus fr. 19 (from Stob.) and 18. Next we find Iamblichus, V.P. 233-239: on friendship (in these chapters is the story of Damon and Phintias, and the story of the Pythagorean who was taken ill on a journey), 200-213 (various ethical injunctions, in the first place that one should not take any notice of the opinions of the masses), and 230-233 (do away with rivalry in friendship; and always keep one's trust).

All phis is carefully separated from Pythagoras. Moreover, some important passages are lacking, for instance, 229 f., and the parallels that could be cited. It is clear that the compiler of the Fragmente, also in their later form, did not consider these Pythagorean texts of any importance for obtaining an insight into the real basis of Pythagorean philosophy. There is a certain unmistakable arbitrariness in all this. Why, for example, is Timaeus fr. 78 cited among the testimonies on Pythagoras, but not fr. 77 (on the organisation of the Pythagorean Society)? Why only include the brief mention of the four speeches in Porphyry and not the parallel tests in Iamblichus and in Pompeius Trogus? If the reply is: "because Dicaearchus is quoted in Porphyry by name", then my answer is: is it then so certain that the text of the four speeches found in Iamblichus does not go back to Timaeus? And would it, from this point of view, not have been worth while to acquaint the user of a source book with these texts? And finally, do the texts on the purport of Pythagorean life, on friendship and on certain ethical injunctions not provide any information about Pythagoras? If it be answered: "in the form in which we have them they definitely do not go back to Pythagoras himself; we do not know what exactly he taught", my objections are not answered. For, why mention Porphyry 18 with its brief report of the four speeches and the founding of the Society? And who can state with any certainty that the contents of Iamblichus V.P. 137, 173 ff. and 229-239 are not of a very early date? If these texts are attributed to the Pythagoreans of the fifth century, is it then impossible that they should have preserved a school-tradition going back to the founder?

Meanwhile, towards the end of the nineteenth century, the work of J. Burnet, Early Greek Philosophy had appeared, a book that has often been reprinted and may be regarded as the foundation of a glorious tradition in the English-speaking countries. The great work recently started by Guthrie may be regarded as the ripe fruit of this tradition. Burnet distinguished two aspects in early Pythagoreanism: on the one hand it bears the marks of a primitive religion, on the other hand it studied mathematical science—primitive taboos by the side of scientific principles. In the later history of the School these two lines have their own development: the 'acousmaticians' were the religious who preserved the early traditions, the 'mathematicians' (Aristoxenus was one of them) formed 'the more enlightened sect of the Order'. Burnet finds examples of primitive taboos in the Vitae of Diogenes Laertius, Porphyry and Iamblichus; the moralizing interpretation is of later date. This may be largely true—later writers did apply themselves to interpreting certain taboo injunctions of early Pythagoreanism allegorically—it should be pointed out, however, that Burnet had no eye for the ei/zz'co-religious character of the β ί ο ς founded by Pythagoras and for the essential connection of this aspect with the so-called scientific principles. He was guided by the essentially correct principle that 'what is most primitive is earliest in date'. Conclusion: what is most primitive must have belonged to early Pythagoreanism. Put like this, it is logically correct. If, however, it is concluded that ergo anything that is not primitive cannot be attributed to the founder, one makes a logical mistake. There are no premisses to base this conclusion on.

In 1915 A. Delatte published his important study on Pythagorean Literature [Etudes sur la Littérature Pythagoricienne]. It was followed, in 1922, by his Essai sur la politique pythagoricienne, and at the same time by a detailed examination of the sources of the Life of Pythagoras by Diogenes Laertius. Delatte's studies are still of fundamental importance as inquiries into the sources. At about the same time as Rostagni … and together with him Delatte was the first to go a way of his own in this matter. He recognized that much in the later Vitae is based on reliable sources, dating from the fourth century B.C. He argued that there must have been current a Ιєρς λόγος of Pythagoras which was ancient as to content, and which, although it need not have been put into writing by the founder of the Society himself, must have been recorded in his immediate circle in the fifth century, in all probability in the first half of the fifth century, when unity in the Order was still intact. The traces that have been preserved show that mixture of primitive, religio-ethical and scientific elements which must have co-existed peacefully in early Pythagoreanism but which caused a schism as early as the second half of the fifth century. Finally Delatte clearly recognized the social-political character of Pythagoras' activity in Croton. He examined the Pythagorean political writings that have come down in the name of Archytas and others, found that the tradition regarding the speeches attributed to Pythagoras by Iamblichus goes back to reliable fourthcentury sources, and that their contents have parallels in the earliest-known Pythagorean texts or those that are related to Pythagoreanism (Archytas and Alomaeon). He assumes that the essence of the contents of these speeches goes back to early Pythagoreanism….

What Delatte did not realize, however, is the unity of Pythagoras' thought. He regards the Ίєρòς λόγος as a complex of heterogeneous elements: philosophy, morals and rules of communal life. The connexion between these three escapes him. Pythagoras 'attempted', he says, to connect Orphicism and philosophy, because he had a certain affinity to both. "Entre les Orphiques et les Philosophes, il a oscillé". The doctrine of number and harmony is a philosophical doctrine. That the philosopher as such was bound to apply these principles, established as a divine order in the cosmos, also to man and society, in other words that, as a matter of fact, Pythagoras' thought was one all-embracing philosophical conception, that is what Delatte failed to see.

Strangely enough, others, too, have failed to integrate the results of Delatte's work, in so far as these laid more stress on Pythagoras' social and political activities, into the total picture of his personality as a philosopher. Almost twenty years were to pass before, in another part of the world, attention began to be devoted to this aspect of early Pythagoreanism, in the studies by K. von Fritz [Pythagorean politics in Southern Italy] (New York 1940) and E. L. Minar [Early Pythagorean politics in practice and theory] (Balti-more more 1942), which both were concerned with early Pythagorean politics. These scholars clearly recognized that our knowledge of the social-political aspect of early Pythagoreanism is based on a solid foundation. Von Fritz included the archaeological material of the coins in his investigation of the literary sources and he subjected Kahrstedt's results to a critical examination. But for him, too, 'Pythagorean politics' is a separate chapter, obviously standing apart from philosophy. Minar concludes from the same material that Pythagoras was 'rather a shrewd politician', an aristocratic reactionary at a time of rising democracy—and that all this had nothing to do with philosophy.

Italian scholars have taken a lively interest in Pythagoras and early Pythagoreanism. It was A. Rostagni who, in two lectures to the Academy of Sciences at Torino in 1914, laid the foundation of the chronology of Pythagoras' life and of the Pythagorean School till the early fourth century. Later scholars, such as Delatte, Von Fritz and Minar, start from this basis. In a later study, published in 1922, Rostagni dealt with the four speeches attributed to Pythagoras in Iamblichus V.P. Struck by a certain similarity of ideas between the Pythagoras speeches and Gorgias, he found that the notion of χαιρό ς which had such an important place in the thought of the rhetor of Leontini, was of Pythagorean origin and apparently goes back to Pythagoras himself. Moreover, Rostagni defends the theory that Pythagoras actually was the founder of the art of rhetoric, as stated by Iamblichus, an assertion which till now has hardly been taken seriously. This study of Rostagni deserves careful attention, especially as it seems to have been little read.

Another work by the same author, Il verbo di Pitagora, Torino 1924, examines Ovid, Metam. XV, and finds in it the traces of a Ί ε ρος λόγο ς of Pythagoras (not written down by himself, but recorded by pupils). Rostagni has called attention to a number of interesting problems, but in discussing Pythagorean texts he did not always recognize the characteristics of later thought, even where they are clearly discernible. What he is concerned with in this volume is the doctrine of the transmigration of souls, of nature and God, not with the social-political aspect of early Pythagoreanism.

In Mondolfo and V. Capparelli also we find little attention devoted to this side.

There was a clear reaction against the one-sided philosophical treatment of Pythagoras and early Pythagoreanism immediately after the second world war. It came from two sides: (1) in O. Gigon's work, Der Ursprung der griechischen Philosophie (1945); (2) in Werner Jaeger's Theology of the early Greek philosophers (1947). These two authors have rightly pointed out that the pre-Socratic philosophers were by no means so exclusively natural philosophers as Aristotle's name oí φνσιχοί seems to suggest; more particularly in Pythagoras the ethical-religious element must have been considerable. Gigon regards the transmigration of souls as central in Pythagoras' doctrine. He also recognizes its ethical implications and the development of 'cathartics', both in medical and in musical science. He admits the fact of the influence of the Pythagoreans in the political sphere. However, it is impossible to say anything in detail about this, for are we not already in the inextricable forest of the second half of the fourth century where Academic and Peripatetic concepts are inseparably mingled with Pythagoreanism?

In England, J. E. Raven followed the lead given by Burnet and Comford: [in Pythagoreans and Eleatics, 1948] he investigated more closely the connexions with the Milesians on the one side, and with the Eleatics on the other. It is again clearly the natural-philosophical aspect that is the centre of interest. This is also true of the source-book by Kirk and Raven, The Presocratic Philosophers, 1957.

Mrs. Timpanaro-Cardini published at Firenze, in 1958, the first volume of her Pitagorici, Testimonianze e Frammenti, which contains the testimonies concerning Pythagoras. This collection presents nothing strikingly new after Diels. There is a note to Porphyry V.P. 18 stating that Pythagoras' speeches in Iamblichus V.P. 37-57 show 'an alteration of the tradition' and an 'amplificazione oratoria evidentemente posteriore'. A different view is quite possible. It is not necessary to suppose that Iamblichus changed the tradition arbitrarily. It is much more likely that he found the speeches in Timaeus, and it is by no means evident that the order of the speeches which Porphyry found reported in Dicaearchus is to be preferred. Delatte thought that the speeches in form date from the fifth or fourth century. 'Il est évident', he says, 'que nous nous trouvons ici en face d'une publication de quelque Pythagoricien du Ve ou du IVe siècle. Il avait imaginé cette fiction et choisi cette forme littéraire pour exposer les doctrines morales de sa Confrérie et présenter à ses coréligionaires des modèles de discours moraux'. Delatte assumes that the contents of the preaching are early Pythagorean.

Robert Joly, who belongs to the school of Delatte, goes a step further: the speeches date from the fifth century and were written by Gorgias—which in itself is not such a bad idea, for it was indeed typical of Gorgias to write 'speeches by Pythagoras'. However, it might well be asked whether, if he had done this, the speeches would not have come down to us in his name, as is the case with his Helena, Palamedes and Epitaphios. Only a thorough stylistic analysis will enable us to answer the question either in the affirmative or in the negative.

As against the bold thesis of Joly—who also maintains that the term φιλοσοφία if not introduced by Pythagoras himself, was certainly used in the circle of his pupils, and that it was in this circle that in the fifth century the ideal of the βίος ϑεωρητιχός developed—there is the cautious but sceptic work of W. Burkert, who prefers to keep to demonstrable fact. When taking this view one can evidently only say that for the tradition of Pythagoras being the 'Urheber' of φιλοσοφία we have to rely on Heraclides Ponticus; that the term occurs earlier, it is true, but in a wider sense, and that the technical sense cannot be shown to occur before Plato. All the same it is of course quite possible that before Socrates and Plato the word was used in a very special sense in Pythagorean circles. It cannot be said that fifth-century use of the word in general militates against this view.

I called Guthrie's History of Greek Philosophy, vol. I, published at Cambridge in 1962, a ripe fruit of the English tradition. This sufficiently indicates the high quality of the work, but at the same time a certain limitation. There are certain aspects of investigation with which the author has not concerned himself, certain insights which he has failed to attain, and a part of the literature whose importance he has not recognized. (I am only referring to the chapter on Pythagoras and the Pythagoreans). Guthrie is a historian of religion, and it was to be expected that he would treat the doctrine of metempsychosis and the Pythagorean 'taboos' from this point of view. And so he does. His Outline of Pythagorean philosophy', in which, as I myself have done in Greek Philosophy I, he starts from Porphyry V.P. 19, begins with these doctrines and discusses them in detail. Ethical-religious aspirations came first for Pythagoras, we are assured by Guthrie; 'nevertheless' his doctrine of number and harmony was of scientific importance. This doctrine, which Aristotle was the first to describe, is then discussed in detail and very well, with occasional interesting personal insights. Rightly Plato's Timaeus is used to illustrate the Pythagorean theory of mathematical proportions in the cosmos.

Has Guthrie recognized and understood the unity of Pythagorean thought—or, as we may safely put it, of Pythagoras ' thought and teaching? One might have expected this. He has clearly seen that for the philosopher of Croton the 'purification' of the soul, a term also used by the Orphies, is attained by study and rational insight, i.e. by understanding the numerical proportions in the universe. Since the cosmic order is a divine order, man has to imitate it in his own life. Guthrie has also clearly recognized that these principles are to be found in Plato: in Gorgias 507 e, in The Republic (e.g. 550 c, 525 b, 527 b, 529 d), and in the Timaeus (47 b-c). He probably would not dissociate the social-political aspect of Plato's philosophy from the core of Plato's philosophical thought. In the chapter on Pythagoras, however, we find a few words devoted to the political activity and influence of this thinker in the section dealing with his life. We are assured that Pythagoras was undoubtedly "a religious and political leader as well as a philosopher".

Anyone expressing himself in these terms suggests that the two first-mentioned things have no concern with philosophical thought,—which means that the unity which existed for Pythagoras is lacking in the modern interpretation. Why should this be?

There are, it seems to me, two reasons for this. In the first place, like so many, Guthrie argues from a modern concept of school philosophy: though he does see that in Pythagoras' complex personality the element of scientific thought was not separated from the ethical-religious element, yet the 20th century English scholar cannot grasp the unity of the two in one philosophical conception that comprehends both the whole of cosmic and of human existence, so that the social and political activities organically flow from the very centre of the philosophical thought. For the modern scholar 'politics' stand apart from 'philosophy'.

Secondly, of course Guthrie knows quite well that there are more fourth-century sources for Pythagoras and the Pythagoreans than Plato, Isocrates and Aristotle. He also mentions Aristoxenus, Dicaearchus and Timaeus, but he makes the reservation that their testimony is at best hardly 'audible' to us because it has come down to us through later and often late writings. To cite but one example, he never proceeds to examine the speeches of Pythagoras mentioned in Diodorus, Pompeius Trogus and Iamblichus. All this is simply left aside. Neither is reference made to Delatte's important investigations into this matter, or to Rostagni's highly stimulating treatment of the speeches.

In doing so the author in his turn has not escaped from the charge of a certain arbitrariness. It is not true that for us uncertainty begins only after Aristotle, nor can it be said that everything that is later does not offer anything solid enough from which conclusions may be drawn with any likelihood. Indeed, Guthrie himself is occasionally by no means averse to making a very bold conjecture: he is even willing to assume that Pythagoras himself engraved certain old Croton coins. For who else could have done so at that time but he, the son of an engraver who, as was the custom in those times, will have learnt the craft from his father?

This hypothesis was put forward by Saltman, in Guthrie's immediate circle. Even if no definite objections could be made—which I do not wish to discuss at this stage—we might feel bound to say that other possibilities have too easily been left out of account.

While thus, with some very few exceptions, the philologist-historians of ancient philosophy took great pains to pass by the testimony about Pythagoras' activities in Croton, based on fourth-century sources, the opposite was happening among archaeologists. The first to explore Magna Graecia from an archaeological point of view was François Lenormant. In the second volume of his great work La Grande Grèce, published in 1881, we find an important and surprising chapter: Crotone et le Pythagorisme. Lenormant is fully conversant with the source material and makes a sensible and sober use both of the archaeological evidence (the coins) and of the historians who go back to the fourth century. The picture he gives of the philosopher Pythagoras and of his activities in Croton shows precisely that integration of the historical data into the philosophical personality of the thinker which is usually lacking in the accounts given by the historians of Greek philosophy. I do not hesitate to say that in this case the archaeologist has shown a deeper understanding.

I quote the following passage to show how François Lenormant understood the real meaning of Pythagoras' thought.

L'originalité de Pythagore, la nouveauté de l'œuvre qu'il osa entreprendre consista en ce qu'il tenta le premier d'embrasser dans un même système tout ce que l'on avait jusqu'alors essayé séparément, de coordonner en une vaste conception encyclopédique puissamment enchaînée dans toutes ses parties et déduite de quelques principes fondamentaux, l'ensemble des choses matérielles et morales. Métaphysique, physique, science, religion, liturgie, morale, législation, et politique, la doctrine pythagoricienne englobait tout, ramenait tout à ses principes établissant entre ces choses diverses un lien étroit, les faisant découler les unes des autres, de manière à les concilier, en une sorte d'harmonieuse symphonie à la fois théorique et pratique. Et afin d'assurer le succès de son œuvre, de donner à sa doctrine plus d'efficacité pour rendre les hommes meilleurs, ce qui était son but principal, il eut l'idée véritablement de génie d'emprunter à l'Orient le principe de l'ascétisme, que les Grecs avaient jusqu'alors ignoré, dont ils n'avaient pas compris la force.

Quite rightly Lenormant describes Pythagoras' activity not as having been confined to the foundation of a kind of monastic order but as a popular mission: a preaching which was addressed to the population of Croton as a whole and which met with a tremendous response. Thus Pythagoreanism was a real spiritual réveil. It is against this background that Pythagoras' political influence must be seen and understood. Lenormant interprets the historical data better than Kahrstedt and Minar did after him, even better than Von Fritz.