SOURCE: Smith, Andrew. “General Conclusion.” In Porphyry's Place in the Neoplatonic Tradition, pp. 145-50. The Hague, The Netherlands: Martinus Nijhoff, 1974.

[In the following excerpt, Smith offers an assessment of Porphyry's views on the human soul and his treatment and exposition of Neoplatonism.]

Porphyry's exposition of Neoplatonism led him to adopt a number of phrases and terms which occur again and again in his writings. It is, perhaps, one of the qualities which made him such a good teacher of Neoplatonism. One word which dominates his thought is σωτηρία, the salvation of the soul. It was until recently thought that Porphyry's main, if not sole, contribution to the history of thought lay in his treatment of this theme at different levels. But if Hadot's reconstruction of Porphyry's metaphysics is correct he made an equally important and far more original contribution to that field. Our treatment here has been restricted to the “traditional” Porphyry, not because the newly discovered metaphysics is unimportant but in order to clarify a little more, and to keep fresh in the mind, the role which he played in developing the concept of salvation. The new and the old Porphyry in some ways exemplify the two spheres of interest that we have distinguished in the first part of this work—the ontological, concerned with the metaphysical framework of salvation, and the spiritual, which concerns itself more with the actual search for personal salvation, and its integration into the metaphysical structure. The Parmenides Commentary has little to contribute about the role and aims of man and the soul. It is precisely on these aspects that the other works lay such great emphasis.

For Porphyry the problem of the ascent or return of the soul (which, of course, presupposes an understanding of the fall of the soul) involved a clarification not only of the metaphysical relationship between soul and body and the relationship of man to the hypostases but also an assessment of the role of religion and theurgy. … Porphyry explained soul's presence in body as an immanent power derived from and subordinate to the higher soul of man. This theory can be understood in the light of Plotinus' concept of double ἐνἑργεια. Nor is this idea inconsistent with the emphasis placed on derived δύναμιs in the Parmenides Commentary and in Synesius. Soul in body is as real for Porphyry as it was for Plotinus and is thus not an illusion of thought. An important basic concept for the understanding and evaluation of Porphyrian and Plotinian psychology is the distinction we have drawn between the ontological and spiritual life of man. This distinction allows us to evaluate properly Plotinus' optimism about the ascent of the soul. It is only by stressing the independence of the spiritual life of man that we can understand the transition in the ascent from one level of reality to another, especially at the level of Nous. Unfortunately the extant works of Porphyry do not allow us to draw any final conclusions about his attitude to transition. He certainly believed that we could rise to the level of Nous, but how remains unclear.

A good pointer to a philosopher's estimate of man's role in the world may be obtained by examining what he thinks about his fate after death. Porphyry did not think that the soul became totally cut off from the material world when it returned to the Father. He is faithful to Platonic tradition here. But he did believe in an escape from the cycle of rebirth. This seems to be something of an innovation and there is no evidence that Plotinus ever taught it. A second point is that Hades as a place for the dead is taken seriously by both Plotinus and Porphyry but is of relatively little importance. In Plotinus' case this is because he thought that the philosopher could transcend Hades and the material world. Porphyry, on the other hand, thought that the philosopher would eventually escape from them by an ultimate return to the Father. The difference between the two philosophers is not only doctrinal but, more importantly, in spirit. Plotinus is so confident at times that man can transcend the world of the lower soul with its succession of earthly lives and sojourns in Hades or Heaven that death becomes irrelevant. Porphyry is less optimistic. His stress on fleeing the body seems to imply not merely a spiritual transcending of the material world but a final ontological escape. His mysticism is less secure than that of Plotinus. It is true that Plotinus is sometimes pessimistic and stresses the weaknesses of man, just as Porphyry can be optimistic, but on balance the optimistic is more dominant in Plotinus whilst Porphyry, despite his theoretical optimism, tends towards a pessimistic interpretation of the human predicament. Whether the melancholy which almost led him to suicide was cause or result of this view of human life is difficult to say, but one has the impression that it was a difference of spirit which led to his adopting the new doctrine of permanent escape. Plotinus was more able to keep in balance the essential Platonic polarity of matter and spirit, pessimism and optimism.

The search for salvation also took Porphyry into the field of religion and theurgy. No doubt much of his attention to religion is due to his extraordinary wide ranging learning and curiosity but there is also a genuine zeal to discover a discipline or way of salvation that would be common to all nations and, more important, to all levels of mankind. This desire is one example of Porphyry's outgoing attitude, a characteristic that helped the spread of Plotinus' ideas which might not otherwise have been so widely published.

Porphyry would seem to have distinguished traditional piety (ad Marcellam) and theurgy about whose efficacy and usefulness he had some serious doubts. He is undoubtedly more religious-minded than Plotinus. The most important change here is his introduction of theurgy into Neoplatonism. Plotinus may have recognised the effect of theurgy on the lower soul but he never professed that it could bring salvation or lead upwards at all. Porphyry's role here can only be judged by giving careful consideration to the nature of theurgy as it was progressively integrated into the Neoplatonic system, Iamblichus and Proclus being the best exponents of this trend. Porphyry seems to have limited the designation “theurgy” to the more magical elements of religion or, at least, if he did not use the term very precisely he distinguished traditional piety and practices from those which seemed to him to involve magic. Iamblichus on the other hand includes all the traditional religious rites within the ambit of theurgy. His more thoroughgoing attitude is based on a more comprehensive and harmoniously constructed supporting theory. Both Plotinus and Porphyry accepted the phenomenon of magic as based on the concept of universal sympathy. But whilst for them this sympathy was “natural,” an element in the world of φύσιs—though ultimately dependent on the intellectual world—Iamblichus stressed the link with the higher world. Moreover he coupled this with a more personalised form of divine will. With this combination the divine is seen working more directly in specific parts of the universe. This development at once removes some of the restrictions and contradictions of magic and theurgy as conceived by Plotinus and especially by Porphyry. Because magic was simply the use by man of the given sympathies of the natural order the virtue of the operator was for Plotinus and Porphyry irrelevant. Porphyry had scarcely distinguished theurgy from black magic. This was a rather dangerous confusion and Iamblichus does not make the same mistake. The clear vertical connection of sympathy with the noetic gods ensures that the theurgist, when morally and ritually pure, is under divine providence. It is this connection with the higher levels of reality that Porphyry denies to theurgy. For him it is limited to the world of sympathy, the material universe. At best theurgy may save the lower soul, a restriction which Iamblichus emphatically opposes.

Porphyry sees theurgy as an alternative to virtue as a means of saving the lower soul. For the higher aspirations of man he ultimately concludes that there is no alternative to philosophy. Iamblichus extends theurgy to the “higher soul.” It does not replace νόηsιs but helps to foster it. This idea is particularly prominent in Proclus' connection of theurgy with unity, a concept that may well go back to Iamblichus. In de Mysteriis it is clear that, whilst human reason is subordinate to theurgy, there is a form of νόησιs the attainment of which is aided by theurgy, and which might be similar to Plotinian νόησιs, or at least does not rule out genuine mystical experience.

Of course for Proclus and Iamblichus the human soul is considerably reduced in status. Porphyry still believed that man should and could reach the noetic level by his own efforts. Iamblichus thought that man needed divine help. Theurgy for him means the activity of the gods towards men rather than man acting on the gods and is thus the means to divine help. Plotinus, too, speaks of a kind of spiritual “assistance” from above which takes the form of a goad to spiritual aspirations. The One is ultimately the cause of return and in one passage is said to give out an ἀπορροή which acts as a stimulus to all levels to return upwards. Porphyry stresses even more than Plotinus the element of “grace” and lays special emphasis on the fact that man cannot reach perfection in this life but only after death through god's assistance. But he remains, nevertheless, ultimately loyal to the Plotinian ideal that man has it in himself to reach upwards. Only virtue brings us to god. This is one of the sound Plotinian convictions¹ which made it impossible for him to integrate theurgy and philosophy.

It remains possible that Porphyry at some stage toyed with the idea of a theurgy operating at a level higher than that of the lower soul. There are spiritualising passages in the Chaldaean Oracles which could act as a precedent, and it is possible that the Oracles made some kind of distinction between a lower and a higher theurgy. The concept of levels of theurgy occurs in Iamblichus and Proclus and is very important for our understanding of the role of theurgy in Neoplatonism. It is not enough to say that they adopted a higher theurgy which was non-ritual. Although there is less direct manipulation of the forces in material objects in what we are calling the “higher” theurgy there does remain a ritual element in at least some of its branches. The real distinctive mark is found in the difference of goal. There is a theurgy which concerns itself with worldly or material benefits from the intramundane gods working through sympathy, and another higher type of theurgy which makes use of the lower level of reality but which transcends it. The human agent is raised to the divine level by φιλία and communes with the transcendent gods for immaterial benefits which concern the very salvation of the soul and union with the divine. Porphyry rejected the idea that the philosopher needed the aid of theurgy to achieve this goal or even that he needed theurgy to purify his lower self. But Iamblichus saw it as essential to the philosopher and despite some dubious elements it cannot be denied that the higher theurgy, as Iamblichus saw it, could act as a support for genuine mystical and religious experience. The lives of Iamblichus and Proclus bear this out. Porphyry, however, because of his sound Plotinian attitude to the dignity of man could neither extend the sphere of theurgy to the higher self nor see it as other than magical coercion of inferior gods.

This brings us to the final point with regard to theurgy. Iamblichus criticises Porphyry for applying the canons of philosophical thought to the consideration of religious and theurgical ideas. The type of integration of religious and philosophical ideals that Porphyry attempted proved impossible. Iamblichus, in his turn, wanted to speak theurgically when dealing with theurgy and philosophically when dealing with philosophical questions. But one cannot deny that he was also concerned to integrate philosophy and religion. Iamblichus' approach is, however, subtler than that of Porphyry. He attempted integration without confusion. Porphyry is first and foremost a philosopher. Iamblichus, in the de Mysteriis at least, takes the stance of a theologian. Religious data are there to be accounted for. When they do not contradict reason, all is well; if they do, one must remember that human reason cannot adequately comprehend the divine. Is it not possible that in the final experience of the divine Iamblichus is as close to Plotinus, if not closer, than Porphyry? Iamblichus clearly distinguished human reasoning and transcendent νόησιs attained with the help of theurgy. Porphyry sometimes gives the impression that contemplation is a continuation at a higher level of abstract reasoning. Whatever Plotinian νόησιs is it is not simply abstract thought. It is an experience, and one feels that Iamblichus was familiar with it.

… Porphyry seems to have been a fairly persistent critic and questioner in Plotinus' school, and on at least one occasion it is recorded that he changed his mind on a concept after stiffly opposing it.² Augustine, Iamblichus and Eunapius testify that Porphyry was often hesitant and frequently changed his mind.³ His excessive melancholy and failure to maintain the Plotinian transcendental optimism also point to a certain insecurity. He seems to lack the conviction of Plotinus and the single-mindedness of Iamblichus. To a large extent Porphyry's philosophical experience was that of a questioner and his life-long search for salvation was full of contradictions. It has been said that Plotinus is an island in the development of philosophical thought.⁴ This is especially true where he shows little concern for the religious elements which played an important part in Pre-plotinian philosophers such as Numenius and the Post-plotinian thinkers.⁵ We have had occasion to remark that Plotinus was more inward-orientated than Porphyry. It fell to Porphyry, who was intellectually more involved in the contemporary world of religious experience, to account for it in terms of the new philosophy developed by his master. He failed in his task because he was too close to Plotinus. He remained a “philosopher” and it was left to the “divine” Iamblichus of the next generation to make the necessary philosophical concessions to accommodate a more thorough “popularisation” of Neoplatonism.

Notes

1. Porphyry also believed in an undescended part of the human soul. This Plotinian doctrine would seem to be implied by the reference to an ever active νοῦs in de Abst. i 39, 115, 9.

2. Vita Plotini ch. 18.

3. Augustine records his hesitancy about theurgy; Civ. Dei. X. 9. … Iamblichus in Stob. i. 365. Eunapius V. Soph. iv. 2.6, 457 πολλὰs γοῦν τοῖs ἤδη προπεπραγματευμἑνοιs βιβλίοιs θεωρίαs ἐναντίαs χατἑλιπε, περὶ oν οὐχ ἔστιν ἑτερόν τι δοξάζειν, e ὅτι προϊoν ἑτερα ἐδόξασεν. But we have noted already that Iamblichus is not an altogether reliable witness for inconsistency in Porphyry and Plotinus and Eunapius probably relies on him here. It is significant that they only “surmise” … Porphyry obviously never explicitly denied some of his earlier views and it always remains an open possibility that Iamblichus saw contradictions and signs of retraction where he failed to understand the complexity and flexibility of Plotinus and Porphyry. This is not meant to refute what has been said above but merely to point out the possibility that Iamblichus might have been over-severe and a little insensitive in some of his criticisms.

4. Dodds, Greeks and the Irrational, University of California, 1968, p. 286 “Plotinus is a man who,” as Wilhelm Kroll put it, “raised himself by a strong intellectual and moral effort above the fog-ridden atmosphere which surrounded him.’”

5. One might add the Neopythagorean movement.

Bibliography

I. Ancient Sources Refered to in the Text

Eunapius, Vitae Sophistarum, ed. J. Giangrande, Rome, 1956.

———, Ed. and tr. W. C. Wright, Heineman, New York, 1922.

Eusebius, Praeparatio Evangelica, ed. Dindorf,Leipzig, 1867.

Iamblichus, Les Mystères d'Egypte, Texte établi et traduit par E. Des Places, Paris, 1966.

———, De Mysteriis, ed. G. Parthey, Berlin, 1857.

———, De Mysteriis, übersetzt, eingleitet und erklärt von T. Hopfner. Quellen-schriften der griechischen Mystik, i, Leipzig, 1922.

Porphyry, De Philosophia ex oraculis haurienda librorum reliquiae ed. G. Wolff, Berlin 1856 (reprinted Hildesheim, 1962).

———, Ad Gaurum, ed. K. Kalbfleisch, Abhandlungen der preussischen Akademie der Wissenschaften, phil-hist. kl. 1895, 33-62.

———, Porphyrii Opuscula Selecta (Histor. Philos. Fragm., Vita Pythagorae, de Antro Nympharum, De Abstinentia, Ad Marcellam) ed. A. Nauck, 2nd Edn., Leipzig, 1886 (reprinted Hildesheim, 1963).

———, Porphyrios PΡΟΣΜΑΡΚΕLLΑN Herausgegeben, übersetzt, eingleitet und eklärt von Walter Pötscher, Leiden, 1969.

———, Lettera ad Anebo, ed. and tr. A. R. Sodano, Neapoli, 1964.

———, Sententiae ad intelligibilia ducentes, ed. B. Mommert, Leipzig, 1907.

———, Porphyrios' “Symmikta Zetemata” ed. H. Dörrie. Zetemata, Monographien zur Klassischen Alterumswissenschaft. Heft 20, München, 1959.

———, … [Aristotelous] ed. A. Busse, Commentaria in Aristotelem Graeca, vol. iv, pars 1, Berlin 1887.

———, Anonymus Taurinensis, ed. and trans. P. Hadot, Porphyre et Victorinus vol. ii, Paris 1968.

———, Anonymus Taurinensis, ed. W. Kroll, “Ein neuplatonischer Parmenides-commentar in einem Turiner Palimpsest,” Rh.M. [Rhenisches Museum] 47 (1892), 599-627.

II. Modern Works Quoted in the Text and a Selection of Other Works Which Have Been Found Particularly Useful

General Works

Dodds, E. R. The Greeks and the Irrational, Univ. of California Press, 1968.