[In the following essay, Devereux responds to critics who have maintained that Aristotle's doctrine of the good is either dominant or inclusive, and who have noted that inconsistencies resulting from characterizing the good in this manner are apparent in the doctrine. Devereux asserts that neither view coincides with Aristotle's doctrine of the good and he suggests that Aristotle's ideas need not be understood as inconsistent.]

I

Recent discussions of Aristotle's doctrine of the good often take up the question whether his doctrine is inclusive or dominant. The distinction between an "inclusive" and a "dominant" conception of the final good can be briefly explained as follows. Let us suppose, first, that A, B, and C are the only goods which are desirable for their own sake and, second, that A is more desirable than B or C. According to the "dominant" conception, the final good will be identical with A, and one who seeks to be happy should devote all of his energies to the pursuit of A. On the "inclusive" conception, the good will consist of A, B, and C together, and one can achieve a happy life only by pursuing all three of these goods, paying special attention to A on account of its superiority.

W. F. R. Hardie, who first introduced this distinction some years ago, argued that Aristotle did not have a clear grasp of it, and, as a result, the discussion of the final good in Book I of the Nicomachean Ethics (NE I) suffers from a basic confusion.¹ In some passages Aristotle speaks of the good as if it were an inclusive end, but in other places he clearly treats it as a dominant end. Hardie's view has been challenged by J. L. Ackrill, who tries to show that Aristotle's conception of the good in NE I is consistently inclusive.² Ackrill believes (as does Hardie) that in NE X Aristotle commits himself to a dominant conception, but he finds no evidence of this conception in the rest of the treatise. Hardie and Ackrill are thus in agreement that Aristotle's account of the good is inconsistent. They disagree about the location of the inconsistency, Ackrill holding that it is between NE X and the rest of the treatise while Hardie thinks it can be found in NE I itself. As if to round out the picture, Anthony Kenny has recently argued that in both NE I and X Aristotle consistently adheres to a dominant conception of the end.³ Surprisingly enough, the passages he bases his argument on are the very ones appealed to by Hardie and Ackrill.

I shall not take sides in this debate, for I believe that the question at issue is ill conceived. Asking whether Aristotle's conception of the good is inclusive or dominant presents us with two models, neither of which really fits his view. If there are inconsistencies in the discussion of happiness in the NE, they do not have to do with the contrast between dominant and inclusive conceptions of the end. Before attempting to explain and substantiate these sweeping claims, let me begin with an examination of the passages in NE I and X which have given rise to the controversy.

II

In an important and difficult passage in NE I, 7 Aristotle asserts that the final good is "self-sufficient." The tail end of this passage is cited by both Hardie and Ackrill as evidence of the inclusive conception of the end. Kenny, however, claims that the very same passage commits Aristotle to the dominant conception. As might be expected, their preferred translations differ markedly. I shall first give the translation favored by Hardie and Ackrill.⁴

And further we think it [happiness] most desirable of all things, without being counted together with others … if it were countable along with other goods, it would clearly be made more desirable by the addition of even the least of goods (1097bl6-18).

As Hardie and Ackrill understand the passage, Aristotle's point can be explicated in the following way. Goods like health, honor, and friendship are apparently such that they can be "counted together" with other goods; they are like discrete quantities, and we can say, e.g., that health plus friendship is more desirable than health by itself. The passage implies that happiness differs from other goods in this respect—it cannot be made more desirable by the addition of other goods. If happiness were identical with a single good like philosophical contemplation, the addition of other goods would seem to make it more desirable: philosophical contemplation plus the possession of good friends would surely be more desirable than philosophical contemplation by itself. Only if happiness includes or presupposes the other goods could it not be made more desirable by the addition of other goods. Taken in this way, the passage clearly indicates that Aristotle was here thinking of happiness as an inclusive and not a dominant end.

The translation favored by Kenny differs mainly in the second part (the part following the semicolon).

… clearly if it is counted together with others, it is more desirable with even the least additional good.⁵

On this reading, happiness can be "counted together" with other goods, and if other goods are added to happiness, the sum is more desirable than happiness by itself. Happiness is thus the most desirable of all goods, taken singly. If the passage is understood in this way, it implies that happiness is just one good among others and, therefore, presupposes a dominant rather than inclusive conception of the end.

Kenny's translation seems possible, but there are strong reasons in favor of the standard translation preferred by Hardie and Ackrill. In NE X, 2 we find a parallel passage in which Aristotle says quite clearly that the final good (or happiness) cannot be made more desirable by the addition of any other good. I shall quote the passage in full.

And so it is by an argument of this kind that Plato proves the good not to be pleasure; he argues that the pleasant life is more desirable with wisdom than without, and that if the mixture is better, pleasure is not the good; for the good cannot become more desirable by the addition of anything to it. Now it is clear that nothing else, any more than pleasure, can be the good if it is made more desirable by the addition of any of the things that are good in themselves. What, then, is there that satisfies this criterion, which at the same time we can participate in? It is something of this sort that we are looking for (I172b28-35, Ross's translation).⁶

This passage is clearly designed to make the same point as the self-sufficiency passage in I, 7. But if we accept Kenny's translation of the latter, we have a glaring contradiction between the two passages. This is, I think, a clear and decisive reason in favor of the standard translation. And given that translation, we can safely affirm that Aristotle, at least at one point in NE I, was thinking of happiness as an inclusive end.

III

However, Aristotle's official definition of happiness, as Hardie points out⁷, evidently exemplifies the dominant rather than the inclusive conception. The definition, which is formulated near the end of I, 7, reads as follows.

Happiness … is activity of soul in accordance with virtue, and if there are more virtues than one, in accordance with the best and most perfect … (1098al6-18).

Of course, it does turn out that there are more virtues than one, so the last clause effectively tells us that happiness should be identified with one particular kind of activity—that in accordance with the best and most perfect virtue. In NE X, 7, resuming his discussion of happiness, Aristotle says: "If happiness is activity in accordance with virtue, it is reasonable that it should be in accordance with the highest … virtue; and this will be that of the best thing in us.… That this activity is contemplative we have already said" (1177a l2-18). Here the activity of the best or most perfect virtue is identified as philosophical contemplation; in the following lines Aristotle tells us that the best virtue is philosophic wisdom (1177a22-25).

In view of the close relationship between this passage in X, 7 and the definition in I, 7, most commentators have supposed that Aristotle must have had philosophical contemplation in mind when he formulated his definition of happiness. In other words, Aristotle deliberately sets up an equation between happiness and the activity of contemplation in I, 7, but the reader can only see this in retrospect. If this is true, Aristotle's definition seems to exemplify a dominant rather than inclusive conception of the good; instead of a combination of goods, happiness turns out to be the single good of contemplation. So, as Hardie points out, within a couple of pages of I, 7, we find Aristotle first thinking of happiness as an inclusive end in the self-sufficiency passage but then committing himself to the dominant conception near the end of the chapter.

Ackrill believes that this common way of understanding the definition of happiness is based on a mistake. We need not assume that when Aristotle speaks of the "most perfect" or "most final" virtue he means some one, single virtue. Ackrill draws our attention to a passage earlier in I, 7 in which the same superlative, "most final" …, is used in talking about ends (1097a28-34);⁸ here a "most final" end is one which is "final without qualification," and Aristotle uses the phrase to refer to the comprehensive end which includes all partial ends. With this passage as a guide, we may understand the phrase "most final virtue" in the definition of happiness as referring to comprehensive virtue—the combination of all the virtues.

Ackrill further points out that in the parallel passage in the Eudemian Ethics Aristotle defines happiness as "activity in accordance with complete virtue" …, and it is clear from the context that "complete virtue" here means the combination of all the virtues (1219a34-39)⁹. Towards the end of NE I, there is a passage which apparently refers back to the definition in I, 7 in the following way: "Since happiness is an activity of soul in accordance with complete virtue …, we must investigate virtue" (1102a5-6). Aristotle here seems to treat the definition in NE I, 7 as having the same meaning as the definition in the Eudemian Ethics. So this passage, taken together with the definition in the Eudemian Ethics, provides confirmation of Ackrill's suggestion that by "most final virtue" Aristotle means comprehensive or total virtue.

On Ackrill's interpretation, Aristotle's definition of happiness in NE I, 7 represents an inclusive conception of the good. If Ackrill is right, the conception of happiness throughout NE I is consistently inclusive. However, there are several difficulties with Ackrill's interpretation of the definition of happiness. First of all, in the passage in which Aristotle talks about the "most final" end, although he does seem to be referring to an end which is comprehensive and includes other ends, this is not what he means by saying it is most final. According to his explicit account, an end which is "most final" is one which is always chosen simply for its own sake and never for the sake of anything else (1098a28-34). This account does not imply that a "most final" end must include other ends. So the appeal to what Aristotle means by "most final" in this passage does not give us a basis for understanding the "most final virtue" as comprehensive virtue, i.e., the combination of all the virtues.¹⁰

More importantly, we should notice that Aristotle does not simply say "in accordance with the most final virtue" but "in accordance with the best and most final virtue." He is implying, in other words, that if there are several virtues and not just one, we should determine which of these is best, and happiness will be identical with the activity of this one virtue. The use of "best" implies that we should rank the virtues and single out the one which is first or highest.¹¹ Still another difficulty for Ackrill's interpretation is posed by the following passage in NE I, 8.

Happiness then is the best, noblest, and most pleasant thing, and these attributes are not severed as in the inscription at Delos, … For all these properties belong to the best activities; and these, or one—the best—of these, we identify with happiness (1099a24-31).¹²

The upshot of this passage is clear and unambiguous: happiness should be identified not with a combination of activities but with one single activity—the best. In the light of this passage, it seems obvious that the definition of happiness in I, 7 exemplifies a dominant conception of the good.¹³

Ackrill thinks that Aristotle consistently adheres to an inclusive conception of the end in NE I-IX but that he then switches to a dominant conception in NE X. I have argued that the apparent inconsistency in NE I cannot be eliminated in the way that he proposes. It is interesting to note that the same apparent inconsistency also crops up in NE X. In X, 7-8 Aristotle singles out philosophical contemplation as the activity which constitutes "perfect" happiness, and all the commentators agree that this commits him to the dominant view. But in X, 2, in the passage quoted above (in which Aristotle says that the good cannot be made more desirable by the addition of any of the things that are good in themselves), we find clear evidence of the inclusive conception. Just as we cannot say that NE I consistently adheres to an inclusive conception, so we cannot say that NE X consistently adheres to a dominant conception.

IV

We seem to be forced back to Hardie's view: there is an inconsistency in Aristotle's doctrine which runs right through the NE, from beginning to end. However, I think there is a way of understanding the doctrine which does not saddle Aristotle with this inconsistency. I said at the outset that I believe the distinction between inclusive and dominant conceptions presents us with two models, neither of which really fits Aristotle's view. Let me now try to spell out what I have in mind.

As Hardie understands the distinction, the various goods which might be ingredients in an inclusive conception of the end are "separable" in the sense that one could possess any one of them without possessing the others. One who pursues a dominant end concentrates exclusively on one of these goods and forgoes the rest; this would only be possible if the goods were independent of each other.¹⁴ But it is clear that Aristotle does not think that goods are separable in this way. In I, 9, for instance, he says:

Happiness was said to be a certain kind of activity in accordance with virtue; of the remaining goods, some belong [to the definiens] necessarily, while the others are in their nature helpmates and useful as instruments (1099b26-28).¹⁵

Aristotle is in effect denying that virtuous activity is independent of other goods; he is claiming that we cannot possess this good without possessing certain other goods. One of the chief aims of I, 8 is to show that the definiens, "virtuous activity," guarantees possession of the most important goods commonly thought to be essential to happiness. Earlier in I, 7, virtue, intellect, honor, and pleasure were mentioned as primary examples of intrinsic goods (1097b2-4). In 1, 8 Aristotle first points out that virtue and wisdom are implicit in his definition (1098b22-31). He then argues that another intrinsic good, pleasure, necessarily accompanies virtuous activity; moreover, the kind of pleasure associated with virtuous activity is of the best and most satisfying kind (1099a7-21).¹⁶ Finally he speaks of certain goods which are instrumentally necessary, or at least useful, for the performance of a full range of virtuous activities.

Yet evidently, as we said, it needs the external goods as well; for it is impossible, or not easy, to do noble acts without the proper equipment. In many actions we use friends and riches and political power as instruments (1099a31-b2; cf. 1099b27-28).

Insofar as one's ability to carry out virtuous activity is impeded if one lacks friends or is very poor, the goods of friendship and moderate means are also presupposed by Aristotle's defining formula, "virtuous activity."¹⁷

The general point Aristotle argues for in I, 8 is that most of the goods commonly thought to be ingredients in a happy life are entailed by his definition. We might say that his definition of happiness, as he understands it, is implicitly inclusive. Why doesn't he make it explicitly inclusive? To answer this question, it will be helpful to draw attention to some general and, I hope, uncontroversial points concerning Aristotle's theory of definition and essence.

V

A definition, for Aristotle, is a formula giving the essence of the thing defined. Fortunately we do not need to try to explain here what an Aristotelian essence is; a few very brief comments will be sufficient for our limited purposes. An essence is a necessary attribute of a thing and one in virtue of which other necessary attributes belong to that thing. Thus, Aristotle speaks of using the essence to demonstrate various properties of a thing.¹⁸ One of the most important functions of an essence, then, is explanatory: ideally one should be able to explain by means of the essence why a thing has various necessary properties.

In some places Aristotle argues that it is not possible to distinguish certain types of entities from their essences;¹⁹ in the case of such entities, it seems clear that all of their necessary properties will either be included in or entailed by their essence. But with entities which are distinguishable from their essences, it seems that not all their necessary properties need be entailed by their essences. For instance, Aristotle considers it possible that the intellect is the essence of a human being, while at the same time recognizing that a human being cannot exist without certain biological capacities and that these capacities are not entailed by possession of intellect—God possesses intellect but no biological capacities.²⁰ The key point, however, is that the essence of a thing does not include all of the properties which are severally necessary and jointly sufficient for the existence of the thing.²¹ A definition which consisted of a list of such properties would be considered defective by Aristotle insofar as it would fail to indicate the important explanatory relations among the necessary properties of the thing.

In view of these general considerations about definition and essence, 'we would not expect Aristotle to mention all of the necessary ingredients of a happy life in his definition of happiness. A definition of happiness should single out that attribute which best explains how other necessary attributes are involved in a happy life. Aristotle's definiens meets this requirement: other goods such as pleasure, friendship, and external prosperity either follow from or support virtuous activity, or are related to it in some other way. An explicitly inclusive definition would treat happiness as simply a collection of goods; a formula which singles out the essence, on the other hand, points to a unity and structure among the goods which are necessary features of the happy life.

In the preceding section, we pointed out that Aristotle's definition of happiness, as he understands it, is implicitly inclusive. In this section we have noted some general points about Aristotle's theory of definition which show why he would not approve of an explicitly inclusive definition. The general lesson is clear: the fact that only one good is mentioned in the definition of happiness does not mean that Aristotle is recommending pursuit of one single good to the exclusion of all others.

VI

In trying to show how Aristotle's definition of happiness is implicitly inclusive, we construed his definition—as he does himself in I, 8—in terms of the active life involving the exercise of the moral virtues. The goods which are implicit in the definition are goods related in one way or another to morally virtuous activity. But in taking the definition in this way, we are ignoring the factor which originally led Hardie and others to claim that it exemplifies a dominant conception of the end. We have agreed that the final clause of the definition sets up an equation between happiness and a life of philosophical contemplation. Thus, unless we can show that the contemplative life, as Aristotle understands it, includes more than the single good of philosophical contemplation, we shall have to admit after all that the definition of happiness does exemplify a dominant conception of the final good.

There is one line of reasoning in NE X, 7-8 which seems to presuppose a dominant conception of the good. Aristotle contends that contemplation is the characteristic activity of god, and he says that we partake of this activity insofar as we have a share of the divine in us (1178b8-22). Aristotle's god is a supremely happy being, and his happiness apparently involves nothing but contemplation; it would be absurd, he says, to attribute moral virtues and other goods to god. Clearly Aristotle subscribes to a dominant conception of god's happiness.

Now if the philosophical life is modelled after the supremely happy life of god, it would appear that this life must consist of the single activity of contemplation. Of course, the philosopher is not a god; he must live with other men and, therefore, must practice the virtues and partake of other human goods (1178b5-7). Although these other goods are ingredients in the happiness associated with the active life, perhaps they need not be considered parts of the philosopher's happiness.²² Some scholars have argued that in NE X, 7 Aristotle identifies each person with his theoretical intellect;²³ the activity of the intellect would then be the only activity which is truly the person's own. Activities of other faculties (e.g., morally virtuous activity) would properly belong to some other being with whom the person is somehow associated (cf. 1178a3-4). The happiness of the philosopher would then have the same simplicity and purity as the life of god. And it would be true after all that the definition of happiness in NE I, 7 expresses a dominant conception of the end insofar as it equates happiness with philosophical contemplation.

Although this is a plausible way of reading some of Aristotle's remarks in X, 7-8, it does not make for a satisfactory interpretation of his general position in these chapters. We should note, first of all, that Aristotle's very tentative suggestion that the individual might be identical with his intellect²⁴ is effectively cancelled a few lines later when he says "… if this [the intellect] most of all is man."²⁵ He is surely not saying both (a) that an individual is a composite of several elements and (b) that an individual is identical with one of these elements. The wording suggests that an individual is made up of several different elements and that one of these elements is more responsible than any of the others for the whole entity being a man. Other passages in these chapters clearly imply that an individual human being is not simply identical with his theoretical intellect.²⁶

In his praise of the self-sufficiency of the philosophical life, Aristotle is sometimes taken to be claiming that the philosopher can and should emulate god by living apart from other men and spending all his time philosophizing. Actually, he says that the philospher (in contrast to god) will be better off if he spends his time with friends and associates (1177a34). However, if the philosopher should suffer the misfortune of being separated from friends, he will still be able to philosophize and derive satisfaction from that activity. In this respect, the philosopher's happiness is less dependent on external factors, and therefore more self-sufficient, than the happiness of the active life (1177a27-b1).

If the philosopher is happier spending time with friends than living by himself, then his friendships with others will be a part of his happiness. These friendships will presumably be of the best kind—the kind which presupposes possession of the moral virtues and is expressed by morally virtuous actions.²⁷ The philosopher will therefore partake of the goods associated with the active life of moral virtue, and insofar as (a) he is a human being and not just pure intellect and (b) these goods are desirable (for human beings at least) for their own sake, they will make up a part of his happiness.²⁸

As I understand Aristotle's last words on the good for man in NE X, 7-8, there are two forms of happiness, one associated with the active life of moral virtue and the other with the contemplative life. The latter he characterizes as "perfect happiness," the former as "happiness of a secondary degree."²⁹ Both of these forms of happiness are implicitly inclusive, though in different ways. The essence of the secondary form of happiness is morally virtuous activity. Aristotle holds that this activity by its very nature depends upon and produces other goods, and thus the life of morally virtuous activity must include a variety of other goods. The essence of what Aristotle calls "perfect happiness" is contemplation. Now it is not true that this activity by its very nature presupposes a variety of other goods; as we have seen, Aristotle's god engages in this activity and is in no way handicapped by lacking other goods like friends and moral virtue. But a human being who pursues a contemplative life will be handicapped if he lacks friends and moral virtue. It is not the activity of contemplation itself which presupposes other goods but, rather, this activity as engaged in by human beings.

Notes

¹ W. F. R. Hardie, "The Final Good in Aristotle's Ethics," Philosophy (1965): 277-95. Hardie's article has been reprinted in Aristotle, A Collection of Critical Essays, ed. J. M. E. Moravcsik (Garden City, 1967). I shall refer to page numbers of the reprint. A condensed version of the article appears as part of chapter II of Hardie's book, Aristotle's Ethical Theory (Oxford, 1968).

² J L. Ackrill, "Aristotle on Eudaimonia," Proceedings of the British Academy, vol. 60 (1974): 339-59.

³ Anthony Kenny, The Aristotelian Ethics (Oxford, 1978), pp. 204-6.

⁴ Ackrill translates [mē sunarithmoumenen] as "not being counted as one good thing among others" (op. cit., 348). I have changed this slightly in order to make it more neutral; this way attention can be focussed on the second clause, for it is the real locus of disagreement between Kenny on the one hand and Hardie and Ackrill on the other. Another point about translation: throughout the paper I use "happiness" as a translation of [eudaimonia] and this is criticized by Ackrill (op. cit., 348-9) and others. Richard Kraut has recently given a very persuasive defense of the traditional translation in his article "Two Conceptions of Happiness," Philosophical Review (1979): 167-97. However, I should note that I have tried to use "happiness" simply as a stand-in for [eudaimonia] nothing that I say depends upon the correctness of Kraut's contentions.

⁵ Kenny, op. cit., 204.

⁶ This passage is not mentioned by Kenny. Gauthier and Jolif in their commentary (L 'Ethique à Nicomaque [Louvain, 1970]) see the relevance of this passage in X, 2 to the self-sufficiency passage in I, 7; cf. II, 1, on 1097b l6-20. This passage incidentally indicates that the goods which happiness must include are not any and all goods but rather the intrinsic goods. Cf. also 1169b5-10.

⁷ Hardie, op. cit., 299-300.

⁸ Ackrill, op. cit., 353.

⁹ Ackrill, op. cit., 353-4.

¹⁰ Even if we understand the definition in the way that Ackrill proposes, it would still not be inclusive in the required sense. To be inclusive in the way sketched by the self-sufficiency passage and 1172b28-35, the good would have to include all intrinsic goods; activity in accordance with "complete" or "comprehensive" virtue would apparently fall short of being inclusive in this way; if not, we need some explanation of how the other intrinsic goods are entailed by activity in accordance with complete virtue.

¹¹ This point is mentioned by Kenny (op. cit., p. 205); cf. also John Cooper, Reason and Human Good in Aristotle (Cambridge, Mass., 1975), p. 100, n. 10.

¹² Cf. 1153b9-12 and 1176a26-27.

¹³ Ackrill also points out that the definition of happiness is put forward as the conclusion of an argument appealing to man's characteristic activity and that if the last clause of the definition is understood as a reference to philosophical contemplation, the conclusion of the argument becomes a non sequitur; nothing in the argument justifies restricting man's characteristic activity to the exercise of the theoretical intellect (op. cit., 351-52). Ackrill's claim is justified only if the definition is understood as a simple identification of happiness and philosophical contemplation. But Aristotle formulates the definition in such a way that it can be construed as referring to the active life involving the exercise of the moral virtues, and this is the way in which he understands it in I, 8. From the vantage point of X, 7-8, taking the definition as a reference to the active life turns out to be a mistake but not a complete missing of the mark; the active life is a form of happiness, though not the highest form. So in the usual way of understanding the definition in I, 7, it both is and is not a non sequitur. In any case, the evidence is overwhelming that the final clause of the definition is a reference to philosophical contemplation.

¹⁴ Cf. Hardie, op. cit., p. 300: "… to put the question thus is to rule out the obvious and correct reply; that the life which is best for a man cannot lie in gaining only one of his objects at the cost of losing all the rest. This would be too high a price to pay even for philosophy."

¹⁵ In defense of my insertion of "to the. definiens," it should be noted that this passage refers back to points made earlier, and the earlier points concern the necessary tie between virtuous activity and various other goods; cf. 1098b22-31, 1099a7-21, 1099a31-b2.

¹⁶ Honor is apparently omitted from the list because Aristotle does not actually believe that it is an intrinsic good; cf. 1159al6-27.

¹⁷ Cf. 1153bl4-25. When Aristotle says at 1099bl-2 that "we use friends … as instruments," he might be taken to mean that friends are mere instruments to the good man. Later in his discussion of friendship, he makes it clear that in his view the best type of friendship—that in which friends value each other partly for their good moral qualities—is desirable for its own sake. Moral virtue is a necessary condition of this kind of friendship, and the friendship is expressed at least partly through the exercise of the virtues. Cf. NE IX, 9.

¹⁸ This is implied by the doctrine that definitions are "first principles" … of demonstrations; cf. Posterior Analytics 72al4-24, 72b23-25, 89al6-19, 90b24-27, 96b21-25; cf. Joan Kung, "Aristotle on Essence and Explanation," Philosophical Studies (1977): 361-83.

¹⁹Metaphysics VII, 6; cf. 1036al6-25, 1043bl-4, De Anima 429b 10-22.

²⁰ Cf. NE 1178a6-7, 1178b22-28 and 33-35.

²¹ Cf. Eudemian Ethics 1214bll-27 where Aristotle distinguishes between factors which should be included in the definition of happiness and necessary conditions which are often confused with the former; cf. Politics 1328a21-35.

²² I am assuming that the active and contemplative lives are two alternative lives, not to be combined in a single best life. I have tried to give some support to this view in "Aristotle on the Active and Contemplative Lives," Philosophy Research Archives 3, no. 1138 (1977).

²³ Cooper, op. cit., pp. 174-76; G. Rodier, Etudes de philosophie grecque (Paris, 1926), pp. 213-17.

²⁴ Note the use of [doxeie] "this would seem to be each individual."

²⁵ 1178a7; compare the very similar formulations at 1166a22-23 and 1169a2. Cooper claims that there is a very important difference between these passages in NE IX and the passage in X, 7 about the intellect (op. cit., pp. 169-75). In the former passages, Aristotle is thinking of the intellect primarily as a practical faculty—a faculty which guides action and makes decisions—but in X, 7 he is thinking of it exclusively as a theoretical faculty. He gays "… Aristotle in the tenth book sharply separates the practical from the theoretical reason, associating the former with the syntheton, the living body, while making the latter a godlike thing apart" (op. cit., p. 175). Cooper seems to overlook 1177al2-15: "Whether it be reason [or intellect … or something else that is this element which is thought to be our natural ruler and guide and to take thought of things noble and divine.…" Here intellect cannot be understood as a purely theoretical faculty. Gauthier and Jolif seem closer to the mark: "Au-dessous de cette activite [contemplation] qui est son activite propre, I'intellect a une autre activite, qu'il n'exerce pas en tant qu'il est lui-meme, mais en tant qu'il est uni au corps: c'est de commander à la bête, de régler les passions, de diriger la partie irrationnelle (cf 1177al4-15)" (op. cit., II, 2, p. 895). The [suntheton] which Aristotle refers to at 1177b28 and 1178a20, need not be understood as the living body; it may be taken, as Gauthier and Jolif suggest (ibid.), as the combination of the intellect and the other elements in human nature.

²⁶ For instance, the following passages speak of intellect as an element in man: 1177al5-17, 1177b27-28, 1177b34; cf. 1178b5-7, and 1178b33-35.

²⁷ Cf. 1170blO-19, 1156b6-24.

²⁸ Ackrill would apparently agree that the contemplative life includes these other goods (op. cit., 356-57); it is therefore puzzling that he regards the conception of happiness in NE X as dominant (cf. 340-41).

²⁹ 1177al7, 1177b24, 1178b8, 1178a7-10.