a fine. The myriad erosions of the Fourth Amendment have encouraged law enforcement to use these tactics to conduct volume drug sweeps on highways across the country. However, upwards of ninety-five percent of these searches result in zero discovery.

Alexander then shifts to a discussion of why police departments would have made enforcement of low-level drug crimes a priority in the first place, as drug use was declining nationally at the time. She reveals that, starting during the Reagan administration, state and local law enforcement agencies received cash awards for making drug crime a top priority in their precincts. Besides federal aid, agencies also began competing for access to equipment and weapons to prepare their officers for increasingly-militaristic operations. With access to such resources, agencies in cities across the country formed specialized paramilitary units aimed at combating drug crime. These SWAT teams are often responsible for serving narcotics warrants or conducting drug raids in dramatic fashion with flash-bang grenades and riot shields. Alexander notes that these violent incidents often result in injury or death—even for innocent bystanders. 

Alexander calls this shift in law enforcement “military policing,” in which officers conduct drug operations as literal battles. Further incentivizing this militarization in the name of the drug war are a series of laws that allow law enforcement agencies to seize cash and property believed to have been involved in or paid for with drug activity—even if no criminal charges are ever filed. The majority of the funds earned through asset forfeitures can legally be kept by local police, who can put it toward their budget. This gives law enforcement a financial incentive to maintain the drug war rather than focus on actually resolving alleged drug crime.

Alexander then discusses what often happens to people of color who find themselves arrested for a drug-related crime. Despite public perception that defense attorneys for the indigent are plentiful, many defendants must wait in jail for extended time before ever meeting with a lawyer. Even if the attorneys are available, many states have extremely restrictive criteria that make it difficult for defendants to even qualify for public defense. More than any other kind of criminal activity, drug charges are most often resolved using plea-bargaining, a tactic in which a defendant pleads guilty in exchange for a lesser sentence. Many defendants fear the harsh mandatory minimums imposed on drug crimes, and this motivates them to plead guilty even if they are, in fact, innocent. 

Many states including California have “three strike” laws, which state that anyone convicted of three felonies must receive sentences of twenty-five years to life. Alexander cites several instances in which courts have upheld lengthy mandatory sentences of individuals for minor crimes—like videotape theft—that technically count as a “third strike.” Judges cannot use discretion to sentence in cases involving mandatory minimums, and many judges have spoken out against the overly harsh sentences they have been forced to hand out to low-level drug offenders.

Alexander argues that these felony convictions trap individuals in a cycle of incarceration, as felons are subjected to increased surveillance and parole restrictions once they are released from prison. Even simple parole violations, such as missing a meeting with one’s designated worker, can result in arrest and a return to jail. In fact, more than one third of prison admissions are parole violators. Thus, Alexander claims, the criminal justice system, by design, produces lifelong criminals. Alexander notes that society also contributes to this phenomenon by stigmatizing felons, which makes it difficult for them to successfully reintegrate after prison. As a result, mass incarceration creates a permanently disadvantaged, racialized undercaste.