of knowledge, rather than to comparisons of his views with those of other philosophers. Although Baier admits that Hume shares some of the prejudices of his age, such as the idea that women restrain and refine the more energetic gender, she offers evidence to show that he opposed all tyranny, including that inherent in a patriarchal society.

The next four essays all explore the issue of trust. “Trust and Antitrust” presents various examples in order to develop an adequate definition. Trust, Baier concludes, means making another the custodian of something one cares about. She discusses trust as it operates between adults and as it applies in child rearing. She also deplores the male obsession with contracts, which she thinks are both unreliable and essentially immoral. It is preferable, she argues, to depend on one’s own judgment.

In “Trust and Its Vulnerabilities,” Baier presents some specific examples of situations in which trust was betrayed, either by another individual or by an institution. She concludes that it is almost impossible to make a set of rules that guide one in determining whom to trust and whom to distrust, whom to offer another chance, even how to react after a breach of trust becomes evident. “Sustaining Trust” begins by pointing out the degree to which all people are vulnerable and goes on to suggest how to differentiate between trust that has no real basis and trust that is based on good judgment. Finally, in “Trusting People,” Baier offers support for her belief that trust should be considered the primary virtue and that therefore every effort should be made to bolster the trustworthiness of individuals and of institutions.

The tenth essay in Moral Prejudices concerns a very different issue, violence, and specifically terrorism. After pointing out that what are called in the title “Violent Demonstrations” will not themselves bring about the changes the demonstrator desires but will merely publicize the cause, Baier proceeds to consider the motivations of terrorists and to suggest moral responses to what are evidently immoral, if often understandable, actions. She concludes by urging the study not only of what makes individuals violent but also of how they can be reared to be gentle.

“Claims, Rights, Responsibilities” and “How Can Individuals Share Responsibility?” are both incisive discussions of important philosophical concepts. In the first of these essays, Baier illustrates how human beings claim rights but also compromise concerning their claims, often trading one right for another. She also explains the relationships among the concept of rights, the development of language skills, and the increasing awareness of oneself as an individual. However, she also points out that without a sense of responsibility, the assertion of rights will never produce a civilized society. Baier begins the second essay by tracing the conflict between individualism, or libertarianism, and communitarianism, a conflict linked inevitably with the matter of responsibility and with the question of the status of women. As long as women were considered the responsibility of men, for example, they could never make their own decisions, and as long as women’s responsibilities within the home and within society were assigned by the patriarchs who ruled both, women were little more than servants. Nothing changed until women finally claimed their rights and took the responsibility for revising the male and female roles in the family and in society. Asserting that many of our ideas are derived from Kant’s form of individualism, which is actually elitist, sexist, and patriarchal, the author ends her essay with a call to Americans to reject Kant and become true philosophical revolutionaries. In “Moralism and Cruelty: Reflections on Hume and Kant,” Baier compares the statements of the two philosophers on such matters as crime and punishment, guilt, and shame. Rather than espousing the rigid moralism of Kant, she encourages her readers to become Humeans, holding that the worst vice is cruelty and that gentle mockery is often the best way to remedy wrongs.

In the final essay in Moral Prejudices, entitled “Ethics in Many Different Voices,” Baier returns to the subject her Oxford mentors had emphasized so many years before. Now, she reports, there are many more women’s voices in philosophy. The plural is important, for, as she points out, women philosophers do not speak with a single voice. Indeed, they differ as markedly, both in manner and in matter, as men do. One issue that concerns the author is the professional risk women encounter when they specialize in feminist philosophy or even are candid about their feminist interests; another is that of timing, because the very years when young academicians need to concentrate all their energy on obtaining tenure are those when women are most likely to be bearing and rearing children. If the academic world altered its invidious practice of measuring a scholar’s worth by the quantity of published works rather than on their quality, this problem could be solved.

From these practical matters, Baier moves to a personal testimony on the impact one woman philosopher had on her own thought. If anyone knew about evil and forgiveness, Baier comments, it was the German-born Jewish writer and activist Hannah Arendt. The author admires Arendt not only for her accomplishments but also for the breadth of her vision. The book concludes by urging contemporary women ethicists not to limit themselves but to listen to all the voices, old and new, male and female; perhaps even to become a bit androgynous; and certainly to appreciate the beauty of diversity.