[In this essay, Rosow explores the relationship between Montesquieu's study of history and his ideas about international politics, with a focus on the development of commerce.]

What we remember most today as the liberal tradition of international relations theory are the free trade theories of the nineteenth century and the idealist theories of organization and world order of the early twentieth. That pre-nineteenth century formulations should have used liberal theories of commerce and international law explicitly as a realistic critique of military power seems all but lost. Although there has been a revival of what might be called a liberal-realist orientation to world politics by “neo-Grotian” theorists, our understanding of the liberal tradition in this respect still seems limited by the presumed dichotomy between realism and idealism.¹ The purpose of this essay is not to bring the liberal tradition up to date but to redress the historical imbalance somewhat by describing in detail the international reflections of a prominent eighteenth-century liberal philosopher, Montesquieu, that fall neatly into neither the idealist nor realist camp.

Recapturing the early liberal tradition can be especially useful in the current context in which a variety of liberal theories of international politics have begun to flourish. In addition to the revival of neo-Grotian theories liberal social scientists in the functionalist tradition are exploring an approach to international political economy beyond the realist-idealist dichotomy.² Likewise, the revival of neo-Kantian political philosophy has encouraged a lively debate on international justice, human rights and the relevance of national boundaries and the state for world order.³ Surely these theories develop using different language and categories from Montesquieu. However, I would suggest, without developing it further here (although I intend to in future work), that the historical retrieval of Montesquieu's reflections undertaken in this essay may help us better understand the current context and possibilities for world politics. I hope, then, that this essay may prove useful both to intellectual historians, who might profit from viewing Montesquieu's theory in a slightly different light, and political scientists and theorists concerned with contemporary world politics.

My interpretation of Montesquieu is not without its guides. Most importantly, Albert O. Hirschman has recently argued that Montesquieu's theory of domestic politics was linked to a defense of international commerce.⁴ He argues that Montesquieu's economic emphasis on the expansion of credit and the bridling of passions by economic self-interest implied possibilities for international peace. These connections, Hirschman argues, form a neglected aspect of Montesquieu's political theory. This essay argues that Montesquieu's theory of international relations combines a theory of a capitalist structure of international trade with a historical appreciation of the impossibility of projects of universal monarchy in Europe. Capitalist commerce encouraged peace by developing more genteel characters in men and by creating a structure for international trade which demanded regular relations and an atmosphere of trust among merchant classes. Likewise, Montesquieu's critique of universal monarchy demonstrated both the futility of imperial expansion and the moral value of international law and a defensive orientation to force. In his view, these economic, political and legal strategies were mutually reinforcing.

The evidence for my interpretation is drawn from various of Montesquieu's texts. He does not develop the argument in any single place. Hence, the argument proceeds as a reconstruction of a theory of international relations which seems justified by Montesquieu's texts and his own understanding of the context of European politics. I begin by situating his interest in a theory of commerce in his appreciation of structural changes in European history, moving then to his argument about the benefits of commerce and his critique of universal monarchy. Finally, I address the implications he draws for the use of force in international law and morality.

Montesquieu considered himself a citizen of the world. He felt allegiance to particular associations, the family and the state, but his final allegiance was to humanité. All men belonged to a single community that knew no “national” boundaries. This cosmopolitan vision defined the universal context within which citizenship could be appraised. That context was the European state system with its rules for relatively peaceful coexistence among states, and its commercial system based upon a “capitalistic”⁵ contractarian ethic which drew men together in the common pursuit of a true international community. Montesquieu's description of the European state system was nurtured by his vision of world peace and human felicity.

In Montesquieu's view eighteenth-century statesmen were presented with a new historic moment, different both from antiquity and from the universalism of the Middle Ages. New economic forces coalesced to form a vast commercial system, and a new conception of power rendered traditional empire building obsolete. Commerce impressed upon European nations the benefits of international felicity and law, and the pursuit of empire based upon the Roman model of political expansion could only have harmful effects. In the newly discovered lands of America and in the East, expansion succeeded only when based more on economic than political goals. Universal monarchy had to be banished from international politics. The aim of Montesquieu's description of the European system was to demonstrate to European rulers the imperative of encouraging commerce, together with the pernicious consequences of universal monarchy.

COMMERCE: THE INTERNATIONAL MARKETPLACE

In Montesquieu's view commerce had not developed steadily since antiquity. Trade first flourished in the Greek world under the rule of the Athenian Empire. Situated by the sea Athens naturally developed a mercantile economy. Its wealth derived from trade and its power from the ability to protect that trade and to colonize new areas for economic advantage. Athens was successful as a world power because its expansion pursued commercial advantage rather than the glory of conquest. Roman policy was exactly opposite. Lacking the commercial spirit of the Athenians they gloried in pure conquest. They sought colonies not in order to establish firm trading partnerships but in order to exact tribute (Lois, XXI: 14 and 15, pp. 632-33).⁶ Hence, the creation of secure trading networks gave way in the Roman experience to concrete political and military domination. With the decline of Athens and the rise of Rome commerce receded from the center stage of world events. It was no wonder, then, that when the Germanic tribes overran the West commerce was nearly obliterated. Oriented primarily toward agriculture and hunting these tribes had not developed the prerequisites for flourishing commerce. Isolated from one another, knowing little of the arts or of craftsmanship, they perceived little need for peaceful intercourse with others in order to exchange different goods.⁷ It would take several centuries for trade routes to reopen and for trade to increase in volume. When the Roman Empire split, the East did continue to trade, but most of this was turned eastward toward Asia and remained isolated from the rest of Europe.

Montesquieu's study of the historical decline of commerce demonstrated to him the unique opportunities of his contemporary Europe. Commerce now penetrated the fabric of life far more than for the ancients. All nations participated in the exchange of a great variety and volume of goods. Perhaps most important, the power of nations depended more upon the extent of commercial activity than the maintenance of great armies.

Montesquieu argued that the revival of trade in Europe owed much to certain key technological inventions. “The compass,” he claimed, “opened the universe” (Lois, XXI: 21, p. 641). It facilitated broader knowledge of Asia and Africa and led to the discovery of America. The changing direction of trade toward the New World and the expansion of its volume gave the larger states of Central and Northern Europe, which had easy outlets to the Atlantic Ocean and greater resources to increase trade, a strong competitive advantage over the traditional commercial powers in Italy. The supplanting of the Italian city-states was crucial for the development of the European commercial system. Furthermore, the discovery of the Cape of Good Hope meant that the Western and Northern states of Europe could trade with the Levant directly, bypassing Italy. The center of trade shifted to the larger powers of the North. “Italy was no longer the center of the commercial world” (Lois, XXI: 21, p. 642). Rather, it had become “no more than an accessory.” First the Portuguese and the Spanish began the rush to colonize the New World, but everyone followed.

Montesquieu used the Spanish colonial effort and its eventual failure to demonstrate the altered structure of international relations. Although initially successful the Spanish failed because they pursued political empire at the expense of economic enterprise. Of course the Spanish did not ignore the wealth of the colonies. Their emphasis on military power and their related concern for important ever-greater quantities of precious metals led them to create new technologies in order to exploit the mines more efficiently, or at least in greater volumes. But their failure to translate the precious metals into exchangeable commodities merely cheapened their value in Spain.⁸

However, if the Spanish did not realize the commercial potential of the New World others did, at Spain's expense. The Dutch and the English put the increased wealth to work, establishing banks and forms of credit in order to expand trade networks throughout the world. Montesquieu considered England unique, and potentially uniquely successful, because it had a tradition of subordinating political interests to economic interests.

The discovery of the Americas along with the opening up of unknown parts of Asia and Africa dramatically altered the basis of international power and the nature of empire. Appealing to the classical parallel, Montesquieu asserted that the Roman model had to give way to the Athenian model. Increased circulation of commodities and expansion of markets determined power more than military expansion. Indeed, the latter was limited by the former. Spain's emphasis on political expansion left the economic fruits of their conquests in the grasp of the commercial powers of England and Holland. To understand the immense importance of this situation for Montesquieu's theory we need to look more closely at that policy which he believed could lead to real commercial power.

THE ECONOMICS OF THE EUROPEAN SYSTEM

The Spanish concern for political dominion was coupled with what was later called a mercantilist view of wealth and power. They considered the quantity of precious metals directly proportional to the amount of political power. But according to Montesquieu this view failed to understand the nature of money. The increased trade could not be financed by increasing quantities of gold and silver, partly due to the impracticality of the metals as a medium of exchange. In place of the metals the expanding commercial system required new forms of credit and paper money. In the new system wealth required abstract signs which could represent both the value which the community of merchants considered it to have and which could represent the long-term contracts necessary to facilitate and encourage the financing of risky commercial ventures. The mercantilist equation of wealth and power could fulfill neither of these. Montesquieu saw the need for a new theory of money and value which understood that wealth was created by the process of exchange, a process he considered both social and economic.

In Montesquieu's theory of money and exchange, which appears in book 22 of De L'Esprit Des Lois, the prince established the “positive” value of money, essentially how much its value was in relation to the other coins of that state's currency.⁹ But more important, money had a value relative to the currencies of other states. This relative value, governed by the many factors that converge in the international marketplace, is subject to fluctuations. However, relative value was not free from political power. Indeed, Montesquieu recognized that it could and would be used to reinforce the power of dominant states. The most powerful commercial state generally served as the leader in establishing the relative value of money. Holland, whose banks and merchants controlled more trade than any other state in the early eighteenth century, gained considerable power by setting the standard which all European merchants followed.

The prosperity of the state, in Montesquieu's view, is determined by the quantity of international trade and by a balance between the amount of money and the total value of commodities in the market. The value of money remains stable only when it is mirrored by an equal level of commodities. “Money is a sign which represents the value of all merchandise” (Lois, XXII: 2, p. 651). The state is prosperous only when there is an equilibrium established between money and the commodities which make up its value; in other words, that sufficient money exists (and only that amount) to purchase the commodities that exist and vice versa.¹⁰ This restricted but did not vitiate the use of credit. Montesquieu feared the impact of inflation and particularly the wild speculation of the sort of John Law's system. He wanted to limit credit and paper money to an actual amount of commodities (these could be projected to be delivered in the fulfillment of contracts at a later time). Money had to be freed from the confines of the precious metals but should not be freed from the goods it represented.

The preeminence of exchange in the market implied that the individual European economies have become mutually dependent. States played different roles in the international economy. Some produced goods to fill the needs of other states while some, like Holland, acted as bankers and middlemen to facilitate exchange. The necessity of exchange was crucial to the new system. Economically, states could not isolate themselves without risking being dwarfed by the small but commercially potent states of England and Holland.

The fact that European nations shared their economic destinies had more than just economic consequences. “Now, the commerce of the Indies is not that of Spain but of all Europe” (“Richesses,” [“Considérations sur les richesses de l'Espagne,”] p. 15). Montesquieu believed that this mutual economic dependence implied a need for all states to actively protect trade. The international economic community implied a community of the nations in Europe. The bonds of economic necessity created by commerce had to extend to social and political bonds as well. In contrast to the isolation of the times before the expansion of commerce, Montesquieu described the modern condition of Europe as united almost as one state, even if states participated on unequal levels (“Richesses,” p. 10).

The international market could not be limited merely to facilitating an efficient trade network but also had to generate its own ethical foundation based upon the mutuality of contracts. The success of the commercial ethic depended upon its penetration into the political and social lives of individual states. Rulers had to recognize the beneficial effects of commerce on moeurs and manières. By doing this statesmen could mold the diverse interests of independent states into a peaceful universe. Montesquieu's conception of the universal benefits of commerce led him to impress upon merchants and intellectuals a consciousness of universal citizenship. Let us now look more deeply at what he considered those universal benefits to be.

THE UNIVERSAL BENEFITS OF COMMERCE

Montesquieu distinguished two sorts of commerce: the commerce of economy and the commerce of luxury (Lois, XX: 4, pp. 587-88). Whereas the latter is most appropriate to monarchies the former is more appropriate to republics. In a commerce based upon luxury merchants seek grand projects with the aim of “procuring to the nation which promotes it all that which serves its pride, delights and fantasies.” Unlike the commerce of economy, the commerce of luxury seeks large short-term gains. The symbols of success are physical signs: quantities of gold, ornamental dress, opulent consumption, etc. This economy of grand style was clearly appropriate and necessary to court life where action was motivated by honor and the purpose of rewards was to distinguish the worth of men from that of others. However, the merchant dealing in luxuries is susceptible to charlatan schemes such as John Law's system—the promise of a great increase in wealth is irresistible, and the more outrageous Law's promised rate of return, the more enticing the deal becomes.¹¹

The commerce of economy operates on very different logic. The economic rationality appropriate to it is that of the capitalist free market based upon an ethic of work and moderate accumulation. Merchants begin with little and grow wealthy through moderate increases in profit, always content with small short-term gains, even occasional losses, in order to increase profits in the long run. “One commerce leads to another,” Montesquieu claims in book 20 of De L'Esprit Des Lois, “the small to the middling, the middling to the great, and the one who has had so much a desire of gaining little, puts himself in the position of gaining much.” The capitalist merchant is more efficient than his counterpart who deals in luxury. He must be cautious, always concerned with prudent investments with an eye toward long-range profit.

The benefits of the commerce of economy far outweigh those of the commerce of luxuries. The former encourages an international system by seeking trade wherever it is profitable, in the process expanding the horizons of any particular nation. The capitalist merchant is able to exploit the unlimited potentials of world trade whereas the merchant dealing in luxuries limits himself only to trade which leads to immediate wealth. The commerce of luxury depends upon a privileged class of nobility. Workers and merchants must be kept from acquiring independent means, for this removes their incentive to work well, bringing about general ruin in the state. The capitalist merchant is in less danger of becoming wealthy enough to discourage continual work. The spirit of republican commerce does not encourage conspicuous signs of wealth, but rather a judicious poverty. When the proper laws are adopted, such as those limiting inheritance, merchants and craftsmen are induced to work continually. Montesquieu's law that the rationality of continual small investments can lead to maximum profits assures the expansion of commerce. Work represents man's harmony with nature, establishing a natural balance between man and his world. “Nature is just towards men,” rewarding him in proportion to his efforts (Lois, XII: 2, pp. 459-60).

The commerce of economy has social as well as economic benefits, both domestically and internationally. Within states the support of work implied by capitalist commerce produces, if not the virtuous citizens of ancient republics, citizens who are absorbed in activities which increase the wealth of the state while minimizing social conflict. Capitalist accumulation must have clear limits in order to prevent merchants from becoming too wealthy. Excess wealth would create a desire and need for luxuries for merchants to distinguish themselves from their fellows. Extremes of wealth and poverty cause tension and insecurity in the state. Rather, the ethic of contracts and relative equality feed a social morality of fairness. This accommodation between republicanism and private wealth must be reinforced by scarcity rather than fear. Despotisms produce poverty by threatening the security of private property. Profits must be secure if merchants are to risk their capital in order to increase it. The fear of arbitrary confiscation of property in despotisms destroys incentives to accumulation, destroying the means of commerce (Lois, XX: 4, p. 588). The “judicious” poverty created by scarcity, on the other hand, encourages work, reinforces trade and encourages peaceful social interaction. The ethic of moderate accumulation creates a social life which limits conflict to manageable proportions. Montesquieu's well-known proclamation of the overwhelming virtue of commerce at the beginning of book 20, chapter 2 of De L'Esprit Des Lois is worth quoting:

Commerce undermines destructive prejudices, and it is almost a general rule that wherever there are softened moeurs, there is commerce, and wherever there is commerce there are softened moeurs.

Thus it is not so astonishing that our moeurs are less ferocious than they used to be. Commerce has brought about the acquaintance with the moeurs of all nations, causing them to penetrate throughout the world: we have compared them with each other, and this has resulted in great benefits.

Domestically, the commerce of economy provides the possibilities for a stable republic. However, this is not a pure republic. In republics based upon virtue conflicts are resolved organically in the processes of everyday public action. Self-interest is understood to depend upon the public good. But in commercial republics based upon capitalist commerce and work, self-interest, not the public good, must form the basis for resolving conflicts. Commercial republics must give up the organic virtue of classical republics and replace it with the “work ethic” of the commerce of economy. Given contemporary geopolitics, Montesquieu considered this a minor problem. The geopolitics of physically large states together with the expansion of world commerce rendered classical republics obsolete, except, perhaps, within federative republics. Under modern conditions the capitalist commercial ethic could replace the virtue of classical republics, just as the federative republic could replace the small self-contained republic of antiquity. The moeurs of capitalist commerce do not encourage the self-sacrifice of authentic republican virtue, but they do encourage fairness in dealings with others even if that fairness is primarily formal.

The benefits of a commercial work ethic according to Montesquieu extend beyond individual states. Most importantly, the spirit of commerce limits the warlike nature of man. Social conflict is certainly not eliminated, but commercial social relations encourage the formal adjudication of rival claims rather than violent conflict (at least among merchants and between them and the state). The ethic of contracts, that commercial relations can only take place if both parties accept the fundamental rule of performing contacts made, implies a formal-legal procedure. Merchants seek gain according to their own self-interest. Yet they recognize the necessity of the mutuality of their condition—that the self-interests of other merchants are also legitimate.

The Hobbesian analogue of international relations as a state of war is undermined by Montesquieu's view. Within a system based upon the self-interest of states exists a preestablished ethical system based upon the sanctity of contracts. For Montesquieu the ethic of contract establishes far stronger social and moral bonds than the sovereign's power ever could—witness Montesquieu's critique of the poverty implied by fear. The ethical interactions of merchants could explain far more of the development of the international system than could the pure power politics of the Hobbesians. A peaceful universe could emerge out of the cosmopolitan ethic of the merchant class.

Within the international commercial system amity and peace, not war, must reign. The mutual dependence of states requires a consciousness that Europe's shared destiny is in increased dependence. Contractual ethics are inconsistent with war. Relations among merchants must be predictable. Merchants in England who have contracted to buy wine in Bordeaux must be sure that nothing will interfere with the fulfillment of the agreement. War cannot be allowed to disrupt the free flow of goods, and states must be encouraged to protect the property of merchants and neither encourage nor practice piracy, common in the eighteenth century. The creation of the armies necessary for war drains valuable resources which could be utilized better by merchants, and thus, as I will show below, Montesquieu believed that no amount of military power could render a state more secure. In short, the mutuality inherent in the international system requires peace.

The social as well as the economic benefits from international commerce incline toward peace. “The history of commerce,” Montesquieu claims, “is that of the communication of peoples” (Lois, XXI: 5, p. 604). Intellectuals play a crucial role in the commercial system. The international travelers such as Usbek and Rica in the fictional Lettres Persanes, as well as Montesquieu himself, must have a secure place in the international community spreading knowledge and developing man's universal Reason. As Thomas More's Utopia argued, and the more reflective travel journals of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries reasserted, the intellectual traveler has the task of spreading the knowledge of all cultures on the globe to all others. Montesquieu's historical and comparative method was rooted in the positive value of this universal human community. It was method not only as scientific tool but as moral imperative. By comparing different cultures one could learn the defects of one's own and cement a universal brotherhood based upon reason and knowledge. Francis Bacon's New Atlantis had made a similar point. Montesquieu's theory of the benefits of international commerce raised the utopian notions of More, Bacon and others to the self-conscious level of scientific theory. While not the laissez-faire economics of later free trade advocates, Montesquieu's ideas on commerce contain a nascent liberal vision of a peaceful world order based upon capitalist commerce.¹²

THE CRITIQUE OF UNIVERSAL MONARCHY

The international commercial system requires a political parallel. Montesquieu is adamant that universal monarchy had no future in European politics. It was incompatible with the cosmopolitan ethic which had been developing among merchants and which the spread of commerce required. Yet Montesquieu was not blind to a certain force in the doctrine of raison d'état. States were sovereign powers and often did act on the assumption of an international state of war. But the international commercial system implied a compatible political system in which the state's interest could be freed from raw power and instead tied to the recognition of mutuality. Montesquieu argues for international politics wherein the interests of states are mediated through an international balance of power and are determined by maxims of international law derived from universal principles of justice.

Montesquieu declares in the opening of “Réflections sur la monarchie universelle,” published with the Considérations sur les causes de la grandeur des Romains et de leur décadence, in 1734, that universal monarchy is impossible in contemporary Europe. Here as well as in De L'Esprit Des Lois, especially in books 9 and 10, Montesquieu develops an argument against universal monarchy which weaves together three elements: economic, geopolitical and legal-moral. In place of the pursuit of universal monarchy Montesquieu urges the recognition that modern Europe forms a single community governed by necessary and generally accepted rules of action. In the “Réflections” Montesquieu argues that “today all civilized nations are, if I may say it, members of a great Republic” (p. 21). The growth of commerce has meant a relative equality among the nations of Europe.

Montesquieu asserts that the stability of the state is determined by its geopolitical relation to other states. As a general rule large states such as monarchies are more stable than smaller republics. But stability cannot be found in unlimited military deployment and expansion. The contemporary European policy of raising larger and larger armies only leads to greater insecurity. Military expansion, contradicted by those prudent maxims which could be drawn from history, has severe consequences for the political and economic stability of the state. As one nation expands its military force others must follow, thereby nullifying the positive benefits the initial increase might seem to have meant. Therefore, as the state expands, more and more troops must be deployed, draining the state of resources which could be put to more productive use. Moreover, the spirit of conquest creates the desire for honor and luxuries among the troops, making it more difficult to keep them under control. Paradoxically, then, a policy to strengthen power actually results in the ultimate ruin of the state. The economic waste caused by ever-expanding armies combines with changing ethics of war and conquest to decisively challenge universal monarchy. The ancient practice of pillaging a conquered people in order to pay one's army is no longer sanctioned either by law or custom. Modern men recoil in horror at such barbarian practices (“Monarchie Universelle,” p. 19). Hence the state must itself furnish the economic necessities of war. This strains the national economy both in manpower and in wealth, in eighteenth-century France's case requiring the increase in already burdensome taxes on the poor.

The changed nature of modern conquest causes deeper problems for the state. The modern spirit of conquest, in accord with a commercial spirit, must be conservation not destruction. It must aim to preserve the conquered area so that it can be exploited for the good of the conquered as well as the good of the conqueror. Expansion of this sort tends to undermine the power of the conquering state rather than enhance it. The maintenance of occupying armies requires that wealth be transferred from the conquering state to the conquered, impoverishing the aggressor and enhancing the ability of the victim to raise its defenses and eventually expel the enemy. As the Spanish case demonstrated, the dynamic of conquest in modern Europe makes it impossible for a nation to enjoy the fruits of conquest.

The history of the changing structures of European states demonstrates that there are natural limits to a state's growth. The small ancient republics were inherently unstable. In their world it was possible for a republic to subsist so long as its power could be put in a balance with other republics of similar size. But the rise of forms of political organization based upon greater extension threatened the security of those republics. In this context republics can best survive as federative republics, general unions of small republics.

A federative republic is more than a mere system of alliance. Rather, it is a “society of societies” (Lois, IX: 1, p. 370). The union is secured internally by the republican virtue of the individual republics, and by a balance of power between them. If one state should aspire to supremacy, the others would bind together against it. In order to secure the whole, the autonomy of the individual republics, especially in the sphere of foreign policy, must be limited.

It is clear that such nations should not be expansionist. By their nature as associations they must incorporate all conquered areas into the responsibilities of the association. Montesquieu's argument that democracies should not conquer other states holds for federative republics as well. Aggressive democracies, he argues drawing from his study of Roman history, have two possible courses of action, both equally dangerous. They may choose to extend citizenship to the conquered peoples. However, the extension of the number of citizens beyond that natural number appropriate to them opens the state to countless instabilities. If they choose the alternative course, governing the conquered territories directly, they invite the creation of a class of magistrates too powerful and too ill-spirited to remain within republican rule. Likewise, as Montesquieu's study of the Roman empire taught him, soldiers must be imbued with the spirit of war not peace.

It is important to stress the precarious nature of republics, for this insight provides the key to Montesquieu's defensive orientation to force. He opens book 9 of De L'Esprit Des Lois by declaring the natural insecurity of republics: “If a republic is small, it is destroyed by a foreign force, if it is large, it is destroyed by an interior vice.” Federative republics solve these difficulties only when they renounce offensive force. If they have armies, the state must be carefully insulated from them, ensuring that they cannot usurp power, a major failing of the Roman republic. Those armies should be used only for defense, not to expand the state beyond its natural limits. The same principle also applies to monarchies.

No less than republics, monarchies should limit their expansion. The spirit of monarchy encourages aggrandizement. Its commercial practices based upon pursuit of luxury and its principle, honor, seem to imply that imperial expansion is natural to them. Generals can best distinguish themselves by conquest, and monarchs are constantly looking to expansion to enhance the grandeur of their power. But even for monarchies continued expansion only leads to ruin. These limits are reached in several ways.

The fundamental defense of the state rests upon its ability to deploy troops along its borders quickly and efficiently. The larger the state becomes the more difficult the maxim becomes to enforce. If a monarchy becomes too large it will have trouble defending its borders. As in republics, Montesquieu concludes, military policy in a monarchy should emphasize defensive not offensive force. Monarchies require greater extension than do republics, but their extension cannot go beyond natural limits established by the population and wealth of the state. If it is too small it can be conquered by larger states, but if it is too large it will be unable to defend itself completely. Seams will necessarily open in its defenses, and enemies will quickly perceive its vulnerability and exploit it. Monarchies, then, should not conquer beyond their “natural limits.” “Prudence demands that she (monarchy) stop herself as soon as she possesses those limits” (Lois, X: 9, p. 384).

For monarchies, as well as for republics, the external threats are compounded by even greater threats from within. The dynamic of conquest in the case of monarchies threatens the state with erosion due to “interior vice.” Political conquest, driven by the luxury of the state, leads to the creation of decadent centers of luxury, particularly in the capital city. As did many of his contemporaries, Montesquieu associated cities in a monarchy, particularly a single capital city, with luxury, and the rural countryside with a more simple and natural lifestyle. The more a monarchy conquers, the more polarized the relation between city and country becomes. The result is to impoverish the countryside. Wealth in the form of basic necessities is drained off from the provinces in order to maintain the troops necessary for either defense or further conquest. Wealth in the form of greater and greater luxury swells the city. The draining of resources must surely result in destroying the internal domestic commerce, so crucial to rural producers. Montesquieu, the wine producer from Bordeaux, clearly diagnosed the dangers of expansion for the rural economy. His critique of conquering monarchies elicits from him some of his most vivid imagery:

Such is the necessary state of a conquering monarchy; a frightful luxury within the capital, misery within the far away provinces, and abundance in the extremities. It is the same as with our planet; fire at the center, plush green at the surface, and an arid, frigid, and sterile earth between.

(Lois X: 9, p. 385)

The prudent monarchy, attentive to domestic and international pressures, must thus know when and how to limit expansion.

The grim future of universal monarchy relates to the need for commercial expansion. By establishing new criteria for measuring the wealth of the state commerce establishes a balance of power among the nations of Europe. As Montesquieu claims, “prosperity itself sets its own limits” (“Monarchie Universelle,” p. 20). But the spirit of military expansion defies limits. European states can aspire to universal monarchy or they can encourage commerce, not both. Given the already developed economic dependence within Europe universal monarchy is virtually impossible to achieve.

Although by the eighteenth century commerce extended well beyond Europe's borders, the international commercial system was centered in Europe. “Europe at present,” Montesquieu claims, “does all the commerce and all the navigation of the universe” (“Monarchie Universelle,” p. 20). Within Europe the distribution of power is determined by the extent that nations partake of this trade. Economic power thus sets new requirements for foreign policy. If states seek to increase their power, conquest must be subordinated to economic development. They must encourage their citizens to enter trade and to develop an interest in the smooth flow of goods. Together with the instabilities in the nature of the international market (natural disasters, crop failures, etc.) government policies based upon military aggrandizement actually threaten to reduce the power of the state. Over the long run military force is ineffective; security could only be assured by a strong commerce preferably based on capitalism but possibly based on the acquisition of luxuries. The thrust of Montesquieu's argument is that the modern commercial system determines wealth in a much more flexible way than mercantilist supporters of the idea of universal monarchy thought. Prosperity and the good of the state derive from the advantageous participation of the citizens in commerce, not merely from the quantity of gold and silver that the state is able to control. Political conquest must be secondary to economic movement.

Throughout European history, in Montesquieu's reading, military conquest had played a far less important role than is customarily thought. Montesquieu's theory of general and particular causes in history led him to argue that the fundamental changes that have affected the course of European history have not been military. “If histories are examined,” he states in the “Reflexions,” (p. 21) “they will show that wars have not been responsible for the great changes that have taken place in Europe during the past four hundred years.” Rather “civil dispositions” have caused European states to change. Revolutionary changes are changes in moeurs and manières, not in forms of political dominion. Certainly, politics can affect these. The traditional diplomacy of the last several centuries in the form of “marriages, successions, treaties and edicts” had produced important changes. But in the end even these have been less important than changes in “civil dispositions.” And it is commerce that has brought about the most important revolution in moeurs and manières.

DEFENSIVE FORCE AND INTERNATIONAL LAW

When we turn to Montesquieu's view of offensive force in book 10 of De L'Esprit Des Lois we complete his theory of the modern European state system. The international community created by commerce has its political complement in the prudent orientation to defensive force and in international law and morality. Although Montesquieu allows the use of offensive force under certain conditions these must be clearly determined by international law. “Offensive force,” he argues, “is ruled by the ‘droit des gens’ which is the political law of nations considered in their relations to one another” (Lois, X: 1, p. 377). Any use of offensive force, indeed any use of force, must have both utilitarian and moral justifications.

Under particular conditions necessity can justify war. But here Montesquieu's emphasis on defense is primary. Clearly, a state has a right to respond when attacked. Indeed, following Grotius he goes even further, accepting a state's right to initiate a preemptive war, drawing the parallel, as Grotius had done, between private and public war.¹³ Just as individuals have a right of self-defense, so does a state.

Conservation must be the spirit of war as well as of conquest. Consequently, if offensive war is undertaken strict rules for the treatment of the citizens of other states must be followed. The rule of conservation must apply to both the conqueror and the conquered. Montesquieu's thesis relies on the abstract concept of state sovereignty as logically equivalent to a free individual. Arguing that conquering states have no right to destroy either the population or the social fabric (moeurs and manières) of a conquered state, Montesquieu asserts that “society is the union of men, not the men; the citizen may perish but the man remains.”¹⁴ The society of the conquered state is not to be dissolved by conquest and the conquering state must respect its social and political customs.

It is crucial to recognize the combination of right and necessity in Montesquieu's theory of war and conquest. The laws of international conduct follow Montesquieu's views of dynamic laws of history, they have both moral and utilitarian force. The Spanish treatment of the natives in America is the exception which proves the rule. Concerned more with political conquest than commercial expansion, the Spaniards disregarded the spirit of conservation. They enslaved the natives and slaughtered them when they thought it best served their purpose. Morally indefensible, this policy also led to the decline of Spanish power with relation to other European states, causing rebellion in the colonies and draining Spain of support in Europe. The injustice and imprudence of their behavior made it impossible for them to enjoy the fruits of conquest.

Montesquieu states clearly that the Spanish case is not an isolated one and that it represents a more general principle. Monarchies especially are prone to violate the prudent principles of conquest. Certainly with France in mind he warns that a monarch's advisers must be careful to follow correct principles rather than seek the glory of the prince. Glory, he asserts, “is a passion, not a legitimate right” (Lois, X: 2, p. 378). The crucial principle is that international right and morality must constitute part of the definition of the raison d'état. States must make war only when necessary (i.e., the state is threatened) and then only according to strict principles of justice.

Although not as widely accepted and practiced as necessary, Montesquieu believed, the rise of general respect for international law in modern Europe had produced a more peaceful and less cruel system than did the practices of the ancients. The emphasis on defensive force and the strict rules regarding the use of offensive force cement a truly international community in which commerce can flourish. Modern reason, religion, philosophy and moeurs, Montesquieu asserts, limit the brutality of the clash of sovereign states pursuing their own interests. Clearly, for Montesquieu, Hobbes's characterization of international relations does not adequately capture the experience of the new European system.

Montesquieu's principles also extend beyond Europe to include the territories of the New World. However, there are important differences. While dismissing cruel treatment of natives as unjust and imprudent, Montesquieu does not outlaw colonialism so long as it follows from the spirit of conservation.

The rights of sovereignty did not extend to those nations which did not partake of European traditions of commerce and reason. If used properly conquest of primitive nations could be universally beneficial, bringing more refined moeurs to cruel and unenlightened nations and prosperity to the European economy. Montesquieu rationalizes conquest outside Europe by arguing that conquered states are almost always in disarray, so that the conquest can actually benefit them by providing a security that did not exist. If the conquering state has the best interest of the conquered in mind the conquest can be justified, so long as the conqueror preserves the customs and moeurs of the nation to the greatest extent possible. The mistake made by the Spanish in Mexico was that they attempted only to exploit and to dominate the native population. Had they used their conquest in order to teach the Mexicans the true tenets of religion and morality, leaving them their own customs, both Spain and Mexico would have drawn great benefits. In short, Montesquieu allows colonial conquest so long as the conquering nation accepts the responsibilities which conquest entails.

Montesquieu's allowance for a right of conquest is rooted in an idea of progress which leads to the universality of the European system. On one level he agrees with Bacon that the spread of science and knowledge constitutes new possibilities for the happiness of mankind. Technology leads to improved commerce and the subsequent spread of knowledge, in turn, encourages a softening of moeurs which makes moderate government possible. The development of new modes of scientific inquiry broadens man's knowledge of the physical universe and man's relation to it, leading to more rational forms of social organization. The peaceful world order that commerce and international law make possible has resulted from historical development according to rational laws. By the eighteenth century it was possible for this European-centered system to spread throughout the globe.

But on another level Montesquieu did not draw the optimistic conclusions as did others. He was not optimistic about the prospects of the new system. There was no determinism in Montesquieu's view, no eschatological vision. Commerce and international law established the preconditions for a peaceful and universally beneficial world order. However, men had to put it into practice. Montesquieu only flirted with the internationalist idealism of the proponents of perpetual peace, just as he accepted a limited truth in Machiavellianism. If men acted according to true principles, history provided the responsibility, not certainty, of a happy future, at least for a time. The possibility of a pacific world order resulted from the scientific understanding of history, from understanding the historical conditions which both made possible and limited the choices of statesmen. Furthermore, contrary to much of the international idealist tradition, there was considerable variety in Montesquieu's vision. He did not have a single vision regarding the constitutions of all states. He only sought a world in which all states and individuals would develop their particular potentialities in peaceful harmony with others. Under particular conditions he could be either a monarchist or a republican, depending upon what form of government best fit particular nations and so long as they recognized a sense of universal citizenship which would allow them to recognize and want to preserve the particularity of others.

The purpose of this essay has been to bring together Montesquieu's various discussions of international relations. My interpretation demonstrates that his historical view of the development of capitalist commerce in Europe implied a cosmopolitan appreciation of rules for cooperation and the limitation of force in international politics. In addition, this interpretation suggests similarities between Montesquieu's arguments and those of recent theories of economic interdependence and world politics. Both see in capitalist commerce valuable inducements to cooperation and peace. Yet, the relevance of my interpretation of Montesquieu's theory for current debates lies less in agreements and disagreements between them than in the clarity and depth which follows from understanding the historical roots of contemporary arguments. Montesquieu's analysis of capitalist interdependence and its implications within a more fully developed political theory may illuminate connections and implications of current arguments which are often only dimly perceived.

Notes

1. The most prominent neo-Grotian is Hedley Bull. See especially The Anarchical Society (New York: Columbia University Press, 1977). Also, Michael Walzer's work on international politics seems within this orientation. See especially Just and Unjust Wars (New York: Basic Books, 1977) but also see his article “The Distribution of Membership,” in Boundaries: National Autonomy and Its Limits, eds. Peter G. Brown and Henry Shue (Totowa, New Jersey: Rowman and Littlefield, 1981), pp. 1-35.

2. See especially Robert O. Keohane and Joseph S. Nye, Jr., Power and Interdependence: World Politics in Transition (Boston: Little Brown, 1977) and their edited volume, Transnational Relations and World Politics (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1972). For a good collection of articles suggesting that the liberal emphasis on interdependence constitutes the formation of a more-or-less unified approach to world politics see Ray Maghroori and Bennett Ramberg, eds., Globalism vs. Realism: International Relations' Third Debate (Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1982).

3. See Charles Beitz, Political Theory and International Relations (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1979), and Robert Amdur, “Rawls' Theory of Justice: Domestic and International Perspectives,” World Politics, 29, no. 3 (1977), 438-61.

4. Albert O. Hirschman, The Passions and the Interests (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1977).

5. I use the term capitalism to refer to a general orientation towards economic activity. In this I follow Fernand Braudel, Capitalism and Material Life, 1400-1800, trans. by Miriam Kochan (New York: Harper and Row, 1973), especially the “Introduction.”

6. All references to Montesquieu's writings are to the Pléiade edition of his works: Oeuvres Complètes, 2 vols. (Paris: Gallimard, 1949-51). All translations are the author's.

7. “Considérations sur les richesses de l'Espagne,” Pléiade, 2:10. Hereafter cited in the text as “Richesses.”

8. Montesquieu argues that the Spanish were caught in an inflationary cycle, that the profits from the mines were necessarily reduced by the proportion of the augmentation of the amount of gold and silver extracted from the mines and brought to Europe. Had the colonies been able to provide commodities which the Spanish could trade for them their wealth would be increased. The Spanish failed to realize that the more silver and gold they mined in surplus to the expenses of extracting it and shipping it to Europe, the less effective the metals became as mediums of exchange. See Lois, XXI: pp. 22-23.

9. The “positive” value of money consists of four elements: (1) a proportion between a quantity of metal and the same quantity of money; (2) the proportion between the various metals; (3) the weight and standard of every piece of money; (4) the “ideal” value—i.e., the level of debasement of coinage (Lois, XXII: 10).

10. Lois, XXII: 2, p. 651. See Joseph Schumpeter, History of Economic Analysis, ed. Elizabeth Boody Schumpeter (New York: Oxford University Press, 1954), especially pp. 235-37; and N. E. Deuletoglou, “Montesquieu and the Wealth of Nations,” The Canadian Journal of Economic and Political Science, 29, no. 1 (February 1963).

11. Montesquieu's strongest denunciation of Law's system is in book 2, chapter 4, p. 248, where he says that the system threatened to plunge the French monarchy into despotism. In book 22, chapter 10 he also criticizes it for creating severe imbalances in trade, threatening the value of French money (p. 666).

12. See especially Hirschman, Passions and Interests.

13. See Grotius, The Law of War and Peace, bk. 2, chap. 1, sections 16-18, where he argues that the right to self-defense of sovereign states must be interpreted more broadly than the right of self-defense for individuals.

14. This is the same fundamental insight that Rousseau develops in his maxim that governments, not people, make war. Important modern laws of warfare, such as the immunity of noncombatants (already enunciated in Grotius) can be derived from this principle.