Capitalizing on [the continuing interest of the fortieth anniversary of Hitler's invasion of France], Len Deighton—author of "The Ipcress File," "Fighter," and "SS-GB"—has produced ["Blitzkrieg,"] a concise, interesting account of the blitzkrieg. Much, of course, has already been written about the events of the spring of 1940. Little, if any, new documentary evidence is now bound to come to light. But Mr. Deighton, like a musical composer, has chosen to write a variation on a somewhat tired theme by concentrating on technology and personalities and showing how these combine, with some luck, to produce the chapters of history.

This technique will be familiar to those who have read Mr. Deighton's other nonfiction book, "Fighter," in which he injected new life into an account of the Battle of Britain. By comparison, however, "Blitzkrieg" is something of a disappointment, though it makes fine reading for buffs of World War II history.

The word blitzkrieg came into common use after the German armies quickly encircled western Poland in September 1939. But Mr. Deighton argues that the attack on Poland was "very conventional," relying on the old-fashioned foot soldier and horse transport. German propaganda played up the use of tanks and Stuka dive bombers, but they actually contributed little to the success of the invasion. Moreover, the strategy employed in Poland was basically the old concept of encircling the enemy….

Mr. Deighton traces in some detail the development of the German war machine that technically made the blitzkrieg possible. The book outlines the evolution of the modern tank, armored units, communications improvements and air power. This method of warfare, he says, was also facilitated by German military training which emphasized individual initiative in case of a breakdown in communications. By contrast, General Gamelin, commander of the French forces, had no radio at his headquarters, located near Paris, and he admitted that his orders took about two days to get to the front….

"Blitzkreig" also includes an easy-to-follow account of the actual invasion by German troops and their movements towards the Channel coast. The narrative is complemented by a series of illustrations of battle plans and depictions of weaponry.

The book's main drawback is its rather shallow handling of the personalities who were instrumental in the success of the German strategy. This deficiency is most apparent in the first fifth of the book, in which Mr. Deighton races through the history of Hitler's rise to power and the development of his army at a pace not unreminiscent of the blitzkrieg itself. Mr. Deighton drops names ceaselessly without giving much explanation as to why they were important.

In the end, however, Mr. Deighton does pinpoint the "fatal flaw" of the blitzkrieg; the reason why it ultimately was not successful in establishing a permanent German empire across Western Europe. This, he says, was the failure of the German army to follow Hitler's orders and annihilate the remaining British troops at Dunkirk. Ending on that note, one suspects the subject of Mr. Deighton's next book.