[In the essay that follows, Morgan argues that La Rochefoucauld used theological concepts to present his secular ideas because of the familiarity of those concepts.]

Recent discussion on La Rochefoucauld has tended to rehabilitate the Maximes by taking seriously the moral analysis they contain instead of reading them simply as the expression of a personal disillusionment. More serious consideration of the text seems to have resulted primarily in disagreement as to how far La Rochefoucauld is “sceptical” of the validity of value judgments.¹ At the same time, however, the rediscovery of the theological overtones of the term amour-propre has led to a more systematic examination of the use of that key term and especially of the origins and rather enigmatic history of 563, which calls itself “la peinture de l'amour-propre”.² It has not yet been adequately explained, however, why La Rochefoucauld was attracted to the term amour-propre, nor why, having presented his first edition in such a deliberately Augustinian form, he later suppressed precisely those elements which linked his work to a theological framework. Any discussion of La Rochefoucauld's use of the term amour-propre or of his “scepticism” must surely take account of this apparent inconsistency. One way of approaching the problem seems to be to start with the one feature of the editions prepared by the author himself which remained entirely constant: the frontispiece depicting the unmasking of Seneca by a figure called “L'Amour de la vérité”. By considering in what way the Maximes continue to exemplify this engraving, it may be possible to arrive at an understanding of the underlying consistency of the work.

A number of the maximes depend for their effect on the neat reversal of a stoic formula or idea. All three versions of 42 are built on the familiar formulation of the stoic ideal, accedere Rationem, or in French suivre raison:³

Nous n'avons pas assez de force pour suivre toute notre raison.

154 has the same effect by elevating fortune at the cost of reason:

La fortune nous corrige de plusieurs défauts que la raison ne saurait corriger.

For the stoics fortune stood in opposition to reason by being the source of those external vicissitudes which threatened Man's constancy. La Rochefoucauld reverses another familiar stoic opposition when he regards as uncontrollable those disruptive elements within Man, the passions, which the stoic sage claimed to eradicate completely (5, 188 etc.). Stoic misapprehensions such as these make unacceptable to La Rochefoucauld the sage's claim to indifference (46, 54) and especially his claim to constancy in the face of death (20, 21, 22), and the fact that all the official editions leave the reader with an extended reflection on the falseness of the stoic attitude to death serves to suggest that this was for La Rochefoucauld the most significant as well as the most misguided aspect of their philosophy. His objections are principally that they misunderstood human nature and were in fact guilty of pride (589).

The charge of pride reveals a not unfamiliar confusion among seventeenth-century writers about the meaning of the term reason for the stoics. Ratio was for the stoics the law implanted by God in nature and in Man, the divine principle or spark and as such Man's ethical norm. Since the Ratio was present in all men it was not impossible to suivre raison, although the forces which threatened both within and without were such that only a few, the sages, actually achieved the ideal. The neo-stoic moralists, however, had confused this view of reason which Scholastic ratiocinatio or speculative reason with the result that Justus Lipsius, for example, can talk of reason in the stoic sense as the source of all values and at the same time talk of it concluding and defining as if it were the speculative faculty of the soul.⁴ Confusion arises from the fact that the speculative faculty of the Scholastic tradition makes no claims to being a divine principle and is indeed often regarded as notoriously fallible. Formulations of the moral norm in terms of rationality were acceptable therefore only so long as reason was understood as the stoic divine principle. Once the stoic usage was misunderstood or ignored, however, stoic claims to constancy and “rational” behaviour could only be regarded as expressions of an unwarrantable pride. Thus for La Rochefoucauld the stoic claims are psychologically impossible: “nous n'avons pas assez de force … la durée de nos passions ne dépend pas plus de nous …” (42, 5). A number of the texts concerning stoic claims consist in fact of a series of psychological explanations which he finds more convincing than that offered by the stoics themselves:

Le mépris des richesses était dans les philosophes un désir caché de venger leur mérite de l'injustice de la fortune par le mépris des mêmes biens dont elle les privait; c'était un secret pour se garantir de l'avilissement de la pauvreté; c'était un chemin détourné pour aller à la considération qu'ils ne pouvaient avoir par les richesses.

(54)

It is nevertheless clear that stoicism had a haunting fascination for La Rochefoucauld. Some of the claims made in the Portrait of 1659, for example, recall classic features of the stoic sage:

J'ai toutes les passions assez douces et assez réglées: on ne m'a presque jamais vu en colère et je n'ai jamais eu de haine pour personne … L'ambition ne me travaille point. Je ne crains guère de choses, et ne crains aucunement la mort.⁵

The subsequent distinction between compassion and pity is particularly indicative of neo-stoic influence (compare Justus Lipsius, Manuductio, book 3, diss. 19 and De Constantia, ch. 12). It is revealing that he chose to strike such a pose in a self-portrait which was signed and intended for publication, and at a period (1659) when it seems likely that stoic ideals were rather outmoded. He was surely aware that it would strike his readers as at least a nostalgic reminder of an age now past, but it is hardly credible that he should thus publicly associate himself with values he regarded as worthless or demeaning. A similar ambivalence emerges from a study of 504. This text is an extended commentary on the stoic attitude to death designed, it seems, to end the collection as it had begun with a forceful unmasking of Seneca. The passage nevertheless betrays some interesting terminological difficulties, for if La Rochefoucauld systematically condemns stoic constance in the face of death, he is forced apparently to borrow the adverb constamment when he tries to define the attitude which, by contrast, he can indeed recommend: “souffrir la mort constamment”. It looks as if he has been attracted to stoicism by the kind of behaviour it seemed to encourage and is yet forced to reject it because, as the frontispiece makes clear, the constancy and serenity it claims to achieve are for the most part only a mask.

The same pattern of argument can be seen in those maximes which deal with the values of the heroic ethic—the only difference being that here the tension in La Rochefoucauld between admiration and rejection is more apparent. Some of the maximes enable us to understand what true heroism consisted in for La Rochefoucauld. It was not enough to possess great qualities nor to execute glorious feats (159, 160, 437, 602). To be authentically great, heroic actions had to be the fulfilment of some great design, the visible, outward manifestation of grandeur d'âme (24) or of the individual's purpose and control of forces (l'économie of 159). And yet it was precisely at this point that there was cause for doubt since experience showed that many apparently great actions were not the effect of some great design, but of passion (24) or of chance (53, 57). The heroic ethic, therefore, was inadequate in so far as it depended upon assuming an essential connection between cause and effect which in practice proved to be unverifiable:

L'amour de la gloire, la crainte de la honte, le dessein de faire fortune, le désir de rendre la vie commode et agréable, et l'envie d'abaisser les autres, sont souvent les causes de cette valeur si célèbre parmi les hommes.

(213)

The successive stages of 246 on générosité give some indication of this process of disintegration in action. The Liancourt manuscript reads:

La générosité c'est un désir de briller par des actions extraordinaires, c'est un habile et industrieux emploi du désintéressement, de la fermeté en amitié, et de la magnanimité, pour aller promptement à une plus grande réputation.

(L.40)

This version sees générosité as the management (l'économie?) of certain qualities which are virtuous in themselves—for the purpose of acquiring public recognition. It seems to be for La Rochefoucauld the successful outward manifestation of inner virtues. There seems little reason to see the term as carrying pejorative overtones. The first edition reads:

La générosité est un industrieux emploi du désintéressement pour aller plus tôt à un plus grand intérêt.

(CCLXVIII)

Here the references to the inner virtues are omitted and the replacement of réputation by intérêt has the effect of revealing the ambivalence of the désintéressement involved so that the total effect by a noticeable increase in irony is to cast serious doubts on the authenticity of the heroic virtue involved. The definitive version reads:

Ce qui paraît générosité n'est souvent qu'une ambition déguisée qui méprise de petits intérêts, pour aller à de plus grands.

(246)

This version alters the focus: it no longer offers an assertion of what générosité in fact is, but satisfies itself with underlining the gulf between appearance and reality so that the maxime itself no longer talks of générosité, but only of “ce qui paraît …”. Likewise the introduction of the word souvent underlines again the question of uncertainty.

It is clear that La Rochefoucauld wants to be able to believe in the heroic values which inspired his youth and indeed those values remain intact in texts such as 217, where action is seen as the reflection of force de l'âme. The addition of qualifying terms like souvent, quelquefois, pour la plupart in the second edition, however, are not always intended to soften the impact of the maxime but rather, I think, to underline the growing uncertainty. It is not that all heroic actions are hollow, but that any particular one might be; the authentic and the unauthentic exist side by side and we have no way of distinguishing them because, as 504 notes, “bien que les motifs soient différents, ils produisent les mêmes effets”. La Rochefoucauld's attention becomes focused on identifying whatever it is that breaks into the unity between action and intention to prevent us from making value judgments about behaviour from the evidence simply of action. The Maximes seem to offer two possible explanations of the problem—humeur and amour-propre—and these are to be seen, I think, as two different and alternative attempts to answer the same problem.⁶

The hypothesis of physiological determinism is mentioned in four maximes: 61, 297, 435, 564. The notion of the part played in behaviour by the bodily humours is of course still perfectly familiar to seventeenth-century readers. Even the more specifically deterministic interpretation of the theory of the humours is not original to La Rochefoucauld, since it seems very likely that he found the idea in a work entitled L'Art de connaître les hommes (1659) by the doctor Cureau de la Chambre, another member of Mme de Sablé's salon.⁷ What is significant about La Rochefoucauld's use of the theory, however, is the nature of the problem which he saw the theory as answering:

Les humeurs du corps ont un cours ordinaire et réglé, qui meut et qui tourne imperceptiblement notre volonté; elles roulent ensemble et exercent successivement un empire secret en nous: de sorte qu'elles ont une part considérable à toutes nos actions, sans que nous le puissions connaître.

(297, c.f. l. 50)

The point which emerges from this text is that there is a force which plays a considerable part in our behaviour and which is nevertheless beyond our range of perception. Three times in this final version La Rochefoucauld stresses the fact of our unawareness: imperceptiblement, secret, sans que nous le puissions connaître. The theory of the humours as presented in the Maximes had therefore the advantage from La Rochefoucauld's point of view of offering some kind of explanation as to why action is not always an accurate reflection of conscious purpose or design.

The theory of the humours, however, received little elaboration in the Maximes in comparison with the second hypothesis evolved by La Rochefoucauld, amour-propre. This is a dominant theme of all the printed editions, and especially of the first. We know that the long “portrait” of amour-propre which introduced that edition was an early piece, first published in a prose collection by Sercy in 1660. It offers therefore interesting evidence of what La Rochefoucauld saw in the concept of amour-propre at a time when the idea of making a collection of maximes had not perhaps occurred to him.

E. D. James has already pointed out⁸ that the theological reference contained in the parody of the catechism definition of charity at the beginning of the “portrait” is not entirely in accord with the perspective of the rest of the passage. There is only one subsequent theological reference in the text and that is the mention of the three concupiscences which seems to recall a passage from Senault.⁹ These two references serve to indicate that La Rochefoucauld was fully aware of the currently familiar Augustinian use of the term amour-propre but the absence of any reference whatever to sin or grace in the passage suggests also that La Rochefoucauld was not primarily interested in the theological aspect of the term. What the “portrait” in fact describes is a living but secret force working in the recesses of the mind, enforcing its own random desires, elusive but irresistible:

Rien n'est si impétueux que ses désirs, rien de si caché que ses desseins, rien de si habile que ses conduites; ses souplesses ne se peuvent représenter, ses transformations passent celles des métamorphoses, et ses raffinements ceux de la chimie.¹⁰

Above all—and here is the point of contact between the notion of amour-propre and the theory of the humours for La Rochefoucauld—this force exists beyond our range of perception:

On ne peut sonder la profondeur, ni percer les ténèbres de ses abîmes. Là il est à couvert des yeux les plus pénétrants, il y fait mille insensibles tours et retours.

One particularly interesting feature of this passage is La Rochefoucauld's uncertainty about whether this force is self-conscious. He suggests at first that it is not:

Là il est souvent invisible à lui-même, il y conçoit, il y nourrit, et il y élève, sans le savoir, un grand nombre d'affections et de haines. (my italics)

But this is virtually contradicted in the rest of the sentence when he talks of amour-propre refusing to recognise its own progeny, and unable to make up its mind to acknowledge them; for both these activities imply self-conscious deliberation. Moreover, La Rochefoucauld goes on to attribute to amour-propre in its dealings with things outside itself a range of cognitive faculties normally attributed to the soul of Man:

Il voit, il sent, il entend, il imagine, il soupçonne, il pénètre, il devine tout.

La Rochefoucauld seems to see this force as existing both at a rational level and at a non-rational or unconscious level. The confusion derives in part from the shifting reference of il, which seems intended to refer throughout to amour-propre (since the passage is a “portrait”) and yet which is often more easily interpreted as referring to “Man” or “men”. Indeed, the passage in which La Rochefoucauld talks of its unwillingness to acknowledge its progeny recalls another text in which the same observation about human behaviour is made in terms of the power of amour-propre over human thought processes:

Ce qui fait voir que les hommes connaissent mieux leurs fautes qu'on ne pense, c'est qu'ils n'ont jamais tort quand on les entend parler de leur conduite: le même amour-propre qui les aveugle d'ordinaire les éclaire alors, et leur donne des vues si justes qu'il leur fait supprimer ou déguiser les moindres choses qui peuvent être condamnées.

(494)

In this reflection it is human power of deliberation which is said to be modified by the separate force of amour-propre, whereas in the “portrait” deliberation and therefore rationality is attributed—intermittently—to amour-propre itself. A comparison of these two passages illustrates the way in which the “portrait” differs from most of the other texts. They normally take as their point of departure an observation about human behaviour—thus in 494, for instance, our habit of presenting our own actions always in the most favourable light. That observation is then accompanied by an explanation in psychological terms, usually designed to reveal the part played in our actions by self-interest. The “portrait”, however, attempts to present this major psychological force in the abstract; to synthesise all its particular manifestations into a coherent whole—as it were to define and not illustrate it. The shift in perspective from the first sentence and the lack of clarity in the rest of the passage are surely indications that La Rochefoucauld has set himself an extremely difficult task. After the theological definition of the first sentence he adopts the literary device of personification, although initially at least he does not make that personification very clear and one might almost more readily imagine that he is talking of an animal, scurrying round in some dark and hidden burrow. The omission of the letter signed “Amour-propre” from the version of the passage published in the Maximes makes it perhaps more difficult to follow than the original version in Sercy's collection.

La Rochefoucauld seems to be interested in the analysis of psychological phenomena and in exploring ways of presenting that analysis in a pleasing and cogent form. The fact that the mode adopted in the “portrait” was not perhaps as clear as he wished it to be may well account in part at least for his suppression of the text from the second edition. In attempting to assess how far the passage is successful in its purpose it is worth remembering that his contemporaries were used to the presentation of psychological discussion in imaginative form. The Carte de Tendre which emerged from an earlier attempt to chart the complexities of emotional states makes use not only of allegory but of allegory in the visual form of a map. La Rochefoucauld refers to the Carte when he talks of “des terres inconnues” in 3 and it is not perhaps fanciful to see the composition of the “portrait” of amour-propre as belonging to the same literary tradition. The Carte, however, is unsatisfactory as a piece of psychological analysis in the same way as the “portrait” since it shifts its perspective. Social gestures or manners are presented as belonging to the same level of analysis as moral or psychological features so that the journey from Nouvelle Amitié to Tendre-sur-Estime, for instance, takes one through Grand esprit, Jolis vers, Billet galant, Billet doux, Sincérité, Grand cœur, Probité, Générosité, Exactitude, Respect and Bonté. It is evident that La Rochefoucauld is attempting in his “portrait” a much more consistently psychological analysis.

Whatever we might infer from consideration of the literary form of the “portrait” of amour-propre, the concluding section at any rate states the central theme explicitly:

Il ne faut pas donc s'étonner s'il se joint quelquefois à la plus rude austérité, et s'il entre si hardiment en société avec elle pour se détruire, parce que, dans le même temps qu'il se ruine en un endroit, il se rétablit en un autre.

The phrase “la plus rude austérité” seems to be an oblique reference to the stoic ideal and it replaces the phrase “la plus sévère piété” from the original version. The correction suggests that La Rochefoucauld found the reference to piety to be more relevant to the person he was originally addressing,¹¹ whereas he is now bringing the text into line with the theme of the Maximes as set out in the frontispiece. Such a correction does not, however, affect the consistency of the point that is being made: the explanation for the gap which can exist between action and conscious intent is to be found in the existence of some secret force which we are unable to penetrate.

It is clear, therefore, that La Rochefoucauld was not interested in amour-propre as the theological concept, used by the Augustinians to define the state of soul of Fallen Man. The reason for this seems to be that his interest in Man is psychological rather than spiritual or theological and indeed the only maxime which offers a totally theological definition of the term amour-propre (509) was never published during his lifetime, although it dates from 1663. But although La Rochefoucauld's interest in the workings of the human soul is not the same as theirs, it is quite possible that the writings of some of the Augustinian moralists may first have focused his attention on the psychological problems which came to concern him. The fact is that the founder of the particular form of Augustinian devotion which characterised Port-Royal, the Abbé de Saint-Cyran, was himself only too well aware that if in theory it was easy to distinguish a state of sin from a state of grace by means of the quality of love in the soul in practice it was impossible because God alone could penetrate to the soul's depths. The result was a view of Christian devotion which stressed Man's uncertainty as far as his spiritual state was concerned and which accordingly emphasised the need for contrition and for penance. The following passages are characteristic of Saint-Cyran's devotional writing:

il n'y a nul effet extérieur de discipline et de vertu, qui ne puisse être produit par un autre principe que par celui de la grâce: sans laquelle néanmoins l'âme ne peut avoir aucune véritable vertu …¹²

Vous n'avez pas sujet d'appréhender la mort, ni de vous mettre tant en peine en ces rencontres si vos larmes en ces occasions sont de l'amour-propre ou du vrai amour. [La connaissance de ce secret] n'appartient qu'à Dieu. C'est une humilité pour vous que de pleurer [sans vouloir discerner] d'où viennent vos [larmes].¹³

The association of spiritual uncertainty with the theological term amour-propre was frequent among the Port-Royal moralists whom La Rochefoucauld encountered in Mme de Sablé's salon. Nicole, for instance, chooses to begin his treatise “De la charité et de l'amour propre” thus:

Quoiqu'il n'y ait rien de si opposé à la charité qui rapporte tout à Dieu, que l'amour propre qui rapporte tout à soy, il n'y a rien néanmoins de si semblable aux effets de la charité, que ceux de l'amour-propre.¹⁴

In the same way his conclusion to the essay speaks of “la pénétration d'un certain fond qui est dans le cœur, et qui n'est connu avec évidence que de Dieu seul”.¹⁵ La Rochefoucauld could have found in these religious texts his own recognition of the ambivalence of empirical evidence about behaviour and the use of the concept of amour-propre to explain the forces at work behind what was visible. It seems very probable, therefore, that he found in religious texts such as these his awareness of the inadequacy of making moral judgements on the basis of external evidence and chose to explore the potential of the term amour-propre because it seemed to offer a means of describing an aspect of the psychological complexity which interested him.

If then La Rochefoucauld's interest in amour-propre seems to be independent of the term's theological overtones, it becomes necessary to explain why he so carefully presented his first edition of the Maximes within the literary tradition of the Augustinian moralists. The first edition begins with an “Avis au lecteur” which refers to the Maximes as the “abrégé d'une morale conforme aux pensées de plusieurs Pères de l'Église” and warns the reader against movements of amour-propre which may encourage him to dismiss the work as unjust. It also invites us to see in the Lettre which follows an accurate reflection of the author's own views. The Lettre in question is the Discours of M. de la Chapelle. In it he attempts to defend the Maximes by identifying the view of Man they present with the Christian (and especially Augustinian) view of Fallen Man. The text of the first edition itself opens with four maximes on amour-propre, introduced by the lengthy “portrait”. When the second edition appeared in 1666, however, the “Avis au lecteur” contented itself with merely stating that the view of nature described was that of Fallen Man, omitting thus all reference to the Fathers. Moreover, M. de la Chapelle's Discours was omitted together with the “portrait” of amour-propre and other texts like 585, 613, 630 which contained theological references. Of those which remained some, like 65, were modified in order to suppress their religious origins.

The reason for La Richefoucauld's presentation of his first edition is to be found in the results of an enquête organised by Mme de Sablé in 1663. Perhaps with a view to publishing the maximes, she circulated manuscript copies to her friends and invited their comments. The replies proved to be very significant. Many people admitted to being shocked and thought the maximes dangerous in discouraging any attempt at virtuous behaviour.¹⁶ But there was one group who found the maximes entirely justifiable and they were those who immediately identified the description of human nature with that of the Augustinian tradition of moral writing.¹⁷ It must have been clear to La Rochefoucauld, therefore, that he could do much to ensure a favourable response for his work by presenting it in this light, and there is in fact some evidence that he made available to M. de la Chapelle as he wrote the Discours some of the most favourable replies received by Mme de Sablé.¹⁸ Once the work had been accepted, La Rochefoucauld seems to have felt free to omit these diplomatic passages and in so doing he makes clearer what was already implied by the “portrait” of amour-propre in any case—that his own interests are not theological.

If then we interpret the main focus of interest in the Maximes as the uncertainty of empirical evidence for the quality of behaviour and see this uncertainty explained in terms of the possible existence of an area of experience which is both the primary source of activity and yet beyond our conscious awareness, we are obliged to reformulate some of the problems posed by the work. La Rochefoucauld's “scepticism”, for instance, relates not to the existence of virtue (69, 183, 186, 380, 388, 481, etc. all imply the reality of some virtue) but only to our powers of perception. He is concerned more with the complexity of behaviour and the limitations of analysis than with the possibility of moral behaviour. The maxime which finally replaces the “portrait” of amour-propre as the first of the collection has the merit of making this point very clear:

Ce que nous prenons pour des vertus n'est souvent qu'un assemblage de diverses actions et de divers intérêts, que la fortune ou notre industrie savent arranger; et ce n'est pas toujours par valeur et par chasteté que les hommes sont vaillants, et que les femmes sont chastes.

It is not that any action may not be the genuine reflection of virtuous intent or of conscious and deliberate purpose (notre industrie), but that it may not always be; that the use of moral terms like valour and chastity is dangerous not because these virtues do not exist, but because the more important task is to look behind the apparent unity of motive and action and define the complexity which is often to be found there. La Rochefoucauld's “scepticism” can really be said to relate therefore only to human powers of perception. But it is perhaps unwise even in this limited sense to talk of his approach as “sceptical”, for whatever the Maximes say, it is evident that their author regards himself at least as something of an exception. His aim is not so much to make us accept the inevitability of our ignorance, but to reveal for us by striking formulas the complexity of human behaviour in order to make observation and analysis of that behaviour the true study of men and of gentlemen:

Il n'est plus nécessaire d'étudier les hommes que les livres.

(550)

It can, I think, be argued that when in the Réflexions he attempts to define what for him constitutes the ideal of honnêteté, his attempts readily focus on qualities of perceptiveness. He tends to define these qualities in terms which are more familiar to aesthetic than to psychological discussion—goût, sentiment, esprit fin—but he relates them to a much wider range of perceptions and seems finally to prize them above merit itself.

The significance of La Rochefoucauld's consideration of human behaviour lies in the evidence it affords of the emergence of the secular study of Man and of the problems posed by such an undertaking. The study of human behaviour in the seventeenth century was still thought of largely as a branch of theology. The potentialities of human nature and the definition of ethical norms depended for their formulation on the philosophical or theological presuppositions of the particular system concerned. Thus, for example, the neo-stoic moralists formulated their ethical norms in terms of their concept of the Ratio, and made claims for the sage which were in accordance with that concept. What seems to have happened during the second half of the century is the emergence of a new concern for what one might call empirical criteria for the consideration of behaviour. Thus La Rochefoucauld finds it increasingly difficult to accept stoic or heroic norms when his own experience shows them to be psychologically unrealistic. There is a visible tension between his “Amour de la vérité”, which seeks to unmask Seneca, and his aspiration towards certain modes of behaviour which stoicism seemed to inspire.

What finally emerges from this tension is not the acceptance of an alternative system of explanation (although it seems that he looked closely at some of the Augustinian doctrines), but an exploration of behaviour as presented to him by his own experience. This kind of exploration seemed to reveal whole areas of experience which were not adequately accounted for by any of the systems of thought with which he was familiar. And it is not surprising that this was the case, for while the inner workings of the human soul and the significance of human behaviour were considered always within the framework of Man's wider destiny, the perspectives were bound to be different, as were the ranges of exploration. The departure marked by the Maximes is epitomised by the fact that La Rochefoucauld borrows the term amour-propre from a theological system because it was a term which he found used in contexts where a problem very like his own was being discussed, and not because it would enable him to make a theological statement about Man. Once human behaviour is approached empirically—that is, outside the framework of any system of thought—there is an inevitable difficulty in the choice of terminology because all the traditional terms for defining behaviour carry with them the overtones and presuppositions of the systems which gave rise to them. The only answer is to develop a wholly new vocabulary and this, it would seem, is what La Rochefoucauld does when, like Pascal, he takes over non-technical terms such as finesse, goût, sentiment and tries to invest them with psychological meaning.

Notes

1. Particularly J. Starobinski, “La Rochefoucauld et les morales substitutives”, NRF 28, 1966, 16-34, 211-229; E. D. James, “Scepticism and positive values in La Rochefoucauld”, FS 23, 1969, 349-61.

2. See especially A. Levi, French Moralists, Oxford, 1964, pp. 225-33; P. Sellier, “La Rochefoucauld, Pascal et S. Augustin”, RHL 69, 1969, 551-75; D. Westgate, “The concept of amour-propre in the Maximes of La Rochefoucauld”. Nott. FS 7, 1969, 67-79; J. Plantié, “L'Amour-propre au Carmel”, RHL 71, 1971, 561-73.

   563 appeared in print first in Sercy's Recueil de pièces en prose, 3^e partie, 1660, where it was preceded by a letter from Amour-propre to Mademoiselle ***. In the letter Amour-propre refers to “les derniers outrages” which he has just received at her hand and offers his portrait as a reminder of the “tendre amitié” she once had for him and which he still hopes to revive. The discovery made by Mlle Plantié suggests that this letter may originally have been addressed to Mlle d'Esperon, who took the veil in 1657 against the will of parents and friends, after leading the life of a mondaine for some years. If “les derniers outrages” are taken to refer to this event, an opposition is set up between Amour-propre and religious devotion which makes it clear that the term is being used with full theological implications. La Rochefoucauld chose to open the first edition of the Maximes (1665) with this portrait of amour-propre but his deliberate omission of the reference to “les gens de piété” as special enemies and his replacement of a subsequent reference to piety by austérité seem to indicate already an attempt to detach the term from its theological context. The use of austérité might indeed suggest that he now sees amour-propre as a possible focus for an attack on stoic pride. Whether or not this was so, he removed the text from its position of prominence in the second edition (1666) and it remained thereafter suppressed.

3. For convenience reference is made to the numbering of the Grands Écrivains de la France edition of the Maximes, Paris, 1868. Information about the history of the text is more usually derived, however, from the excellent modern edition by J. Truchet in the Classiques Garnier series, Paris, 1967.

4. Manuductionis ad stoicam philosophiam, Bk. 2, diss. 11, Antwerpiae, 1604, p. 91.

5. Maximes, ed. J. Truchet, 1967, p. 256.

6. In his article on amour-propre, D. Westgate concludes on the contrary that “‘l'humeur’ is a manifestation of amour-propre” (p. 78).

7. Maximes, ed. J. Truchet, Paris, 1967, p. xlii. On the habitués of Mme de Sablé see N. Ivanoff, La Marquise de Sablé et son salon, Paris, 1927.

8. Art. cit., p. 350.

9. De l'usage des passions, Leide, 1658, pt. 2, tr. 1, dis. 2. The texts of Senault and La Rochefoucauld agree against tradition by replacing the second concupiscence of curiosity with a reference to riches. Other textual similarities reinforce the suggestion that La Rochefoucauld was familiar with the work of the Oratorien: 72 cf. De l'usage … Pt. 2, tr. 1, dis. 1; 182 cf., Pt. 1, tr. 3, dis. 4.

10. The text quoted is that of the first edition, 1664, reproduced by Truchet, pp. 283-5.

11. See the article by J. Plantié referred to in note 2.

12. A. Barnes, Lettres inédites de … Saint Cyran, Paris, 1962, p. 58 (Vol. 4 of J. Orcibal, Les Origines du Jansénisme).

13. Ibid., p. 127.

14. Essais de morale, vol. 3, Paris, 1693, p. 146. The Essais did not appear until 1671.

15. Ibid., p. 202.

16. The reactions, for instance, of Mme de Schonberg and Mme de Lafayette, letters 30 and 37 of the selection reprinted by Truchet in his edition of the Maximes. See also letter 34 by an unknown author.

17. See especially two anonymous letters, numbers 31 and 35 in Truchet's selection.

18. This seems to be the meaning of La Rochefoucauld's letter to Père Thomas Esprit of February 6, 1664 (Truchet edition, pp. 577-9); and there are in fact textual parallels between the Discours and the anonymous letters numbered 31 and 36 by Truchet.