SOURCE: "Mannheim's Historicism," in Social Research, Vol. 19, No. 3, September, 1952, pp. 300-24.

[In the following essay, Wagner analyzes the concept of a "sociology of knowledge" as developed in Ideology and Utopia.]

With increasing recognition of the need for broader theoretical orientations, American sociologists have become increasingly interested in the problems of a sociology of knowledge. In pursuing this interest they have not fallen back on earlier American "armchair" traditions—on such heritages, for example, as Summer's theory of ethnocentricity, Keller's evolutionary extensions of it, Veblen's combination of class interpretation with a theory of social-evolutionary stages, Robinson's critique of social conceptions and thought control. Rather, attention has been fixed on a series of European theoreticians, among them such positivistic thinkers as Pareto and Durkheim and such "idealistic" philosophers as Scheler. The dominant influence, however, has been that of karl Mannheim.

Actually, this influence stems from but one publication, the three essays combined in the English edition of Ideology and Utopia. This book represents Mannheim's most persistent effort toward an all-inclusive sociology of knowledge. Ontology, epistemology, and logic are here subsumed under a theory of the social conditioning of thought—a theory that serves both as a basis for a general sociology and as a potential instrument of social change. The radicalism as well as the scope of this undertaking is challenging. It seems that Mannheim has set the stage for the highly controversial discussions concerning a sociology of knowledge to take place on all conceivable levels: philosophical-epistemological; logical-methodological; sociological-empirical; political-activistic.

These discussions have involved philosophers and logicians of different schools, as well as social theoreticians and researchers of diverse interests. Their extent and tone seem to indicate, first, that Mannheim has challenged widely accepted postulates, and second, that he has posed problems that demand attention, even though they may have been only obliquely approached. Such problems are numerous: the social preconditions of human cognition; the social processes of the origination and distribution of knowledge on the commonsense level; the formation of social and political ideologies; the influence of social factors on the formulation of scientific theories and the steering of scientific interests; the selection of particular items of research for popularization, and the transformation of specialized into general knowledge on the scientific level; the eventual limitations imposed on cognitive processes by the particularities of cultural situations and social structures; the subtle influences that "feeling tone," "climate of opinion," and the "relative natural aspect of the world" exert in different social units on the general ideas and orientations of thinkers and researchers, on their operational frame of reference, and on both the direction of their inquiries and the interpretation of their findings.

It shall not be asserted here that Mannheim has seen these problems with that clarity which would be a first condition for their solution; nor can it be taken for granted that he has pointed out reliable ways for solving them. In fact, he has been assailed on almost every point, and often with cogent arguments. Most of his critics, however, have confined themselves to a discussion of certain individual postulates, without duly considering the universal theoretical context in which they have been offered: thus most of the philosophical criticism advanced against him reads like a spirited continuation of the age-old controversies concerning the certainty of philosophical truths and the relativism of knowledge. And well-meaning supporters of Mannheim have often conceived of his theories as instructions for empirical sociological research; consequently they have run into seemingly glaring contradictions between different parts and postulates of Ideology and Utopia for which the only apparent explanation that could be advanced was the confusion of the author.

Neither friends nor foes have sufficiently understood that Mannheim's sociology of knowledge represents—if we refrain from harping on occasionally ambiguous formulations or other minor details—a quite consistent system of social thought, and one that can be properly understood only in its total spirit, with due consideration of Mannheim's general philosophical intent. To grasp this is no easy matter, however, for thinkers who have grown up in an intellectual atmosphere rather remote from the particular social-philosophical traditions out of which this sociology of knowledge arose. It is for this reason that I shall here trace the outlines of Mannheim's system of a sociology of knowledge, as contained in and implied by the essays in Ideology and Utopia, and appraise this system with regard to its possible significance for a modern sociological theory which is not bound by its underlying orientations and presuppositions.

I

Mannheim's sociology of knowledge cannot be viewed as a frame of reference for empirical inquiry as long as we understand the latter term to mean procedures based on nominalistic considerations, such as have been developed by Max Weber, or on pragmatic approaches, such as may be traced to John Dewey, or on any of the currently recognized ways of selecting, collecting, appraising, and interpreting data according to research hypotheses which are thereby subjected to empirical test. To be sure, Mannheim demanded that every "idea" be judged by "its congruence with reality." But the concept of reality, as he understood it, was so much at variance with the prevailing presuppositions of social research that he planned to construct a different epistemological system which, he hoped, would allow a justification of his theoretical postulates.

Rejecting a Platonic as well as a "mechanistic" concept, Mannheim spoke of the "dynamic character of reality," that is, the everchanging aspects of the world within the flux of social evolution, and the varying pictures of it gained by different groups of social actors within this process. Thus "reality" is not only an embodiment of social existence within the ongoing historical process, but also the necessarily restricted or partial comprehension of that existence by members of individual groups or social strata. This comprehension tends to become more inclusive, and the historical process itself drives toward the point from which it will become possible to reveal its immanent meaning.

Mannheim's conception of reality is thus historicistic. In fact, his whole sociology of knowledge is closely related to those interpretations of the social process which have been philosophically postulated by Hegel and sociologically reinterpreted by Marx. In the tradition of a Hegelian-Marxian historicism, he wrote Ideology and Utopia as an attempt to offer new solutions where Marx's imposing ideas had obviously failed. Mannheim's sociology of knowledge is understandable only as a historicistic system. If it lacks the intrinsic coherence and the compelling logic of his predecessors' systems, it is because he tried to avoid their most contested assumptions, to modify their excessive claims, to salvage historicism from destruction by its many adversaries, and to open up new lanes for its future development, including new fields for its application.

His central preoccupation was interest in a basic change of modern society. Like Marxism, Mannheimian sociology of knowledge was meant to serve both as a theoretical instrument of political engineering and as a philosophical promise of social salvation. This dual purpose governs the whole system, defining the meaning of its concepts, indicating the tone of its interpretations, and serving as final point of reference for the criteria by which its basic postulates can be vindicated and validated. In other words, Mannheim's sociology of knowledge is more than a sociology of social thought. It is a historicistic theory of "knowledge" in the service of an idea directed toward basic social change.

II

This becomes strikingly clear in Mannheim's conception of knowledge. Here he excluded from consideration all forms of mathematical reasoning, but he made no basic distinctions between the remaining types of cognition, although he had definite ideas as to their epistemological order of rank. Priority he gave to what he called political sociology, having as its focal point the "relation between theory and practice." Although not quite established as yet, it represents "a quite different form of knowledge from one customarily conceived"—that is, a governing one. The fact that it is in contradiction to the present-day conception of science should be only "a stimulus to the revision of our conception of science as a whole."

Mannheim advanced three reasons in justification of this quite extraordinary demand. Politics as a science, he argued first, is directly connected with, and emerges from, the Social Process, and thus is the most adequate expression of Social Becoming; in simpler words, social existence finds its most elementary, and therefore most genuine, expression in the spheres of political thinking. Secondly, politics was for Mannheim the basic instrument for the assertion of social groups within the social process; whatever political thoughts emerge from group existence, they become expressions of group or class desires—or, as [Jacques J.] Maquet has expressed it, "means of combat in the pursuit of collective objectives" and instruments of "adaptation to the conditions of the struggle for domination." In these ways, thirdly, political thinking reverses itself into political action, and political "practice," in turn, represents itself as a potential instrument for a volitional change of the social process.

Thus the claim of priority for political sociology is based on historicistically cogent reasons. Whether that claim would withstand examination on the grounds of a scientific methodology is another matter. But if we eliminate from present consideration the problem complex of "political practice," and concentrate on the cognitive aspects of this sociology of knowledge, we are left with a theory that may be summarized as follows.

Knowledge emerges out of the social process in the struggle of social groups for self-assertion and political survival. Thus active existence within the dynamic structures of a society is the source of socially relevant cognition. Being immersed in the social process, a group possesses, first of all, a common undertone of sentiments or, as Mannheim called it, a collective unconscious. This unconscious, it seems, acts as a driving force behind the social assertions of the group, and at the same time becomes the basis from which the elements of the group's Weltanschauung develop. The collective Weltanschauung appears as a product of a common historical fate, and unites the group spiritually; common people simply "absorb" it, but even "the profound insight of the genius" stems from the same grounds.

The Weltanschauung governs the "thought style" of the group, the mode in which its members conceive of the "world" from the vantage point of their particular social position. The outlook thus attained consists of an interpretation of the group's "world," a conception of its place in society and history, a hierarchy of group values and norms, and, in general, a partly emotionally charged, partly rationalized total frame of reference of the collectivity. The more or less systematic verbalization of this Weltanschauung appears as the ideology of the group. And knowledge, finally, is the system of rational explanations and rules for all types of action which emerge from the application of these spontaneous orientations to the practical matters of group existence—primarily to its self-maintenance and assertion.

The theory, as presented so far, leans heavily on the Marxian conception of ideology and class consciousness. But Mannheim's conception of knowledge, being tied up with the Weltanschauung of a social group and thus with its collective unconscious anchored directly in the stream of an unfolding social process, represents cognition only as an indirect manifestation of historicistic group existence—as a rationalization of that existence for the social-technical purposes of an essentially political activity.

This functionality of knowledge eludes positivistic interpretation not only with regard to its historicistic genesis. In addition, the rationality of the means applied is not matched by rational ends. Rather, it is governed by a historical teleology: a social group, or class, tends to conceive of its role in society in terms of a "mission," as defined by its Weltanschauung and expressed in its "utopia," that is, in its ideological anticipation of a state of society which is to be brought about, and which thus transcends given realities as well as given knowledge.

This conception of knowledge explains Mannheim's rejection of the conventional conception of science. It reveals the incompatibility of his type of reasoning with that expressed in rules of procedure governing the practical fields of social research. And it clarifies his attempt to place a "science of politics" at the top of a hierarchy of all fields of knowledge.

III

Mannheim's conception of knowledge is embedded in his historicistic ontology. Operating on the basis of a Hegelian theory of emanation, he was confronted with two problems of a crucial character.

One concerns the modes, and also the possibilities, of theoretically recognizing the process of social becoming and its spontaneous ideological products out of the conditions of the process itself. The explanation had to be intrinsic; that is, Mannheim's sociology of knowledge itself had to appear as product, or emanation, of the same social process which it was meant to interpret, or which it had "discovered". Consequently Mannheim attempted to distinguish his own position from that of Marx by effecting a transition from what he called the partial to the total conception of ideology. The partial conception claims absolute validity for one's own theory, while disposing of the thoughts of others as ideological mystifications of the realities of class existence. The total conception admits the relativism of its own postulates, that is, their explanation in terms of the social conditions of their genesis.

This, however, brings the second problem to the fore. Mannheim was not willing to accept the position taken by those skeptical philosophers who disclaim the possibility of a philosophical or scientific certainty in favor of a universal relativism. On the contrary, he was seriously concerned with an ultimate vindication of his theories, and he made considerable efforts to show that his sociological system was capable of producing valid knowledge. Epistemologically, Mannheim rejected a universally relativistic position. Thus he was forced to fall back on ontological assertions, and these were derived essentially from Hegel's conception of history as the process of a gradual self-recognition of the Objective Mind of the World Spirit.

Mannheim, like his historicistic predecessors, saw himself at a crucial stage within the historical process. "It is only now," he maintained, "that the new historical sense is beginning to penetrate and a dynamic concept of ideology can be conceived of."

The emergence of modern mass society, accompanied by a "process of democratization," leads to a confrontation of different ideologies with equal claims to validity. Sociology of knowledge has thus been prepared for politically. Intellectually, it has been initiated by the emergence of epistemology as an investigation of the conditions and possibilities of cognition, by the rise of the "psychogenetic approach" as a mode of explaining thought, and finally by the adoption of techniques for debunking ideologies and reducing ideas to their social preconditions. Through the cumulative effects of these three critiques of knowledge it has finally become possible to construct a sociological system which allows a systematic comprehension of the actual conditions for the formation and assertion of social thought, and knowledge in general.

Having comprehended this unique situation, Mannheim had only to develop a corresponding methodology that would allow him to describe the social processes underlying the genesis and functioning of ideologies and knowledge. He did this with the help of a few conceptual tools and a particular procedure. As regards the tools, I have already discussed the rationally ascending order of the concepts of group unconscious, Weltanschauung, ideology, and knowledge. Methodologically, the series is completed by the concept of thought system. On the other hand, the link between social existence and thought system is accomplished by the operational tool of imputation.

A thought system, in Mannheim's sense, is a construct. In contrast to a Weltanschauung, which emanates spontaneously out of the social ground of group existence, a thought system is the systematic creation of a sociologist of knowledge. Neither the individual members of a group nor their abstract sum total "can legitimately be considered as bearers of this ideological thought system as a whole." The latter has to be constructed out of such discrete elements as those to be found in the utterances of group members or in the writings of intellectuals who make themselves the ideological mouthpieces of certain social classes. [In a footnote, the critic explains: "It was Mannheim's contention, for example, that in Germany the whole ideology of conservatism had to be created by hired intellectuals, since the conservative classes were incapable of formulating their own world views and outlook. See his essay, 'Das Konservative Denken,' in Archiv fur Sozialwissenschaft und Sozialpolitik, vol. 57 (1927) nos. 1 and 2."]

This process of construction consists in tracing back particular statements to the Weltanschauung out of which they have apparently arisen. Thus Mannheim was confident that he could make explicit the whole thought system that is implicit in the discrete segments of ideologies. He spoke of uncovering the "underlying unity of outlook." But this is only a part of the task. If the Weltanschauung remains hidden behind discrete segments of thoughts, rather than being manifest in comprehensive and closed systems of ideology, and if these discrete segments are produced not only by group members but also by intellectuals who attach themselves to the group, the process of construction has to be extended from the thought system to the group itself.

Mannheim did not develop a theory of social stratification, even though he leaned toward an acceptance of the Marxian class concept. His social groups remain undefined and indefinite, and appear as intangible as his Weltanschauungen. In this connection it is of interest to note that in his only comprehensive, and highly interesting, representation of an ideology, that of German conservatism, he did not deal with the actual conditions and situations of the classes whose world view he constructed. It is clear, however, that if he had decided to do so, he would have wound up with exactly the same process of construction with which he attempted to reduce discrete segments of thought to "implicit" Weltanschauungen.

Mannheim established the link between his key concepts of thought system and social group by his procedure of imputation. This methodological device was derived not so much from Max Weber's ideal-typical procedures as from the sophisticated dialectics of Georg Lukacs. The latter, a radical Marxian theoretician, defined class consciousness as the consciousness "which men in a definite position in life would have if they were capable of completely comprehending that position." It is the men in possession of the superior knowledge of Marxism who "completely comprehend" class positions, construct ideological systems adequate to them, and impute these systems to classes which likewise exist only as historicistic potentialities.

Mannheim's central concern, like that of Lukacs, was the imputation of the construct of thought system to the construct of class. Both constructs, whatever they denote, are extremely remote from the historicistic-existential assumptions of his ontology. They have no connection with the asserted immediateness of concrete social experience, they lead to no direct comprehension of social realities, and to no spontaneous revelation of intrinsic meanings. The imputation of social thought to social reality is practically the opposite of emanation and discovery.

IV

The inherent relativism of Mannheim's sociology of knowledge is evident not only from his considerations on the historicity of human thought, that is, its dependence on, and limitation by, the historically created conditions prevailing in a specific culture at a specific time. On the contrary, his emphasis was on the relativity of human thought with regard to position in social space. In a stratified society, he reasoned, thought products and knowledge are expressions of group or class situations. It is not only the content of ideologies that varies from group to group within the same society; also the members of different groups see and comprehend even the same things with different eyes. Their "thought styles" are as different as their thought systems.

Group and class ideologies, in their dual function as thought systems and thought styles, have been called Aspektstrukturen, roughly translatable as universes of discourse. They represent the common frames of reference of the group members. Within these frames, meaningful discussions are possible; errors of thought may be eliminated as accidental deviations from the common outlook, and truth may be established by reference to universally recognized group values. Usually, universes of discourse are conceived of as the unquestioned sources and preconditions of valid knowledge. The detached observer, however, is aware that a number of universes of discourse exist, and he may recognize their partial correctness as well as their particular social slant. This particular nature of universes of discourse, which opens up a view upon the social "world" as seen from a specific social angle, has been described as perspectivism.

If a sociologist of knowledge decides to adhere to a non-evaluative treatment of his subject matter, he must establish the partiality, the perspectivism, of all socially encountered group ideologies, without attempting to construct postulates that would be valid for all of them. A recognition of perspectivism leads to the acceptance of a universal relativism, and thereby excludes the establishment of a generally valid knowledge.

Such relativism, however, would have defeated Mannheim's philosophical intentions, which demanded a validation of his system. Thus he spoke not of relativism but of relationism, meaning that social thoughts, while related to the positions of their bearers, are not equally relative. On the contrary, they can be evaluated as to their possible contribution to social knowledge. Mannheim established an "evaluative conception of ideology" which was to make it possible to recognize valid components of perspectivistic thought systems. Further manipulation was to make it possible to recombine these into systems of knowledge which, with regard to their comprehension of the whole of society as well as their own understanding, would transcend single universes of discourse.

In investigating successive ideologies Mannheim asserted a "necessary regularity" in their sequence, a regularity leading to an understanding of the "inner meaning of history" itself. Relationism here refers to the gradual and partial unfolding of genuine social insights, and is therefore a way toward valid knowledge. In a somewhat similar way he held that the elements of a higher social cognition, as contained in various contemporaneous thought systems, are merged into systems of greater comprehension and correctness. Thus Mannheim assumed an inherent tendency, in the development of ideologies, toward a socially total and non-perspectivistic knowledge.

Methodologically, he was faced with the task of showing how his sociology of knowledge, as a system of social inquiry, could serve as an instrument for the systematic liquidation of the ontologically postulated relativism, and how it could establish generally valid knowledge within the framework of his epistemological assumptions. In other words, he had to answer the question how sociology of knowledge is possible in the face of his historicistic pre-suppositions.

V

Mannheim's argumentation, in agreement with the structure of his sociological system, had to follow two lines. Holding that thought is connected with and dependent on the social position of its proponents, he had to search for a social position within the class structure of a stratified society from which it would be possible to view the historical variations and the contemporaneous multiplicity of thought systems with sufficient detachment to evaluate them properly. And holding that universes of discourse are of a perspectivistic and partial character, he had to design methods by which the occupants of the aforementioned detached position would be able to recognize and manipulate the partial segments of knowledge contained in given thought systems in such a way as to arrive at a socially universal knowledge. The first problem, in Robert Merton's terminology, is that of supplying the "structural warranties" of Mannheim's theory. The second concerns warranties of a methodological character.

For the structural warranties Mannheim referred to the "socially unattached intelligentsia." Modern intellectuals occupy a sphere between the struggling classes of their society, and are not bound by those classes' vested interests. Given to intellectual pursuits, they are inclined to honor the code of objectivity which guides the reasoning of scientists, in contrast to the bias that permeates the thinking of the men who fight for economic and political gains.

Mannheim realized, of course, that most intellectuals are socially attached, and render services to the big classes. But he believed that they are in a position to gain a group consciousness of their own, and to become aware of the possibilities of their situation. These possibilities are unique. The intellectuals may achieve "things which are of indispensable significance for the whole social process," foremost among them the "discovery of the position from which a total perspective would be possible," that is, from which the totality of the social process could be comprehended. Even when they are attached to political parties, they could manage to arrive at a universal understanding of the society which they try to influence from a specific position. This too is the particular "mission" of the intelligentsia.

Mannheim spoke here of potentialities rather than of actualities. His expectations are strongly reminiscent of those that the Marxians attach to the class of their choice. The workers, reason the Marxians, have a historical mission to fulfil which they have not yet fully grasped but which they will attend to in the near future, under the guidance of those exceptional intellectuals who, for the first time in history, have discovered the intrinsic meaning of the Historical Process and can thus not only foresee its ulterior goal but also recognize those social forces that will bring it about.

Under the disillusioning influence of the political experiences that he shared with his European contemporaries during the years 1918 to 1924, Mannheim recognized the collapse of the Marxian hopes. But since he did not intend to abandon the scheme of his historicistic expectations, he shifted the "historical mission" from the proletarian class to his "socially unattached intelligentsia." Since the failure of the former it has become the latter, he believed, which occupies the crucial position within modern society, a position that offers all possibilities for the solution of the great problems of our time. At present this mission has been grasped by only a small group of exceptional intellectuals. But the progress of society itself, and its exposure to the shock of severe crises, make it likely that the whole intelligentsia will become aware of it. Theirs is the power to recognize the interests of the whole society, as against the partisan interests of the parties. And theirs is the power to transform their knowledge into political practice, by penetrating into the ranks of the political factions "in order to compel them to accept their demands."

In this, Mannheim paid homage to another principle of militant Marxism, that of the "unity of theory and practice." For the creators of the new "politics as science" there is no time for contemplation: in order to understand the dynamics of social development they have to participate, whether pro or con, in the "struggle for the ascendance of the lower strata," thus immersing themselves in "the dynamic unfolding of conflicting forces" out of which alone the knowledge aspired for can arise. By means of his political activities the Mannheimian "political scientist" attains contact with the elementary stream of social becoming.

This outlook sheds light on another of Mannheim's ideas, one that has been widely overlooked. He devoted long pages of his Ideology and Utopia to representing the development of the "utopian mentality," and this effort culminated in a search for the possibilities of a new social utopia, that is, a prophetic outlook on the future which would be inspiration and guide for those social forces aiming at a basic change of their society—a society which, in 1929, was drifting toward the dangerous rapids of economic collapse, depression, fascism, and a new world war.

Mannheim used the concept of utopia in a different sense from its usual meaning. For him it denoted not a striving for the impossible, but an ideological anticipation of the future of society. In Marxian theory, he held, the "utopian mentality" reached its highest and most adequate stage so far; also, Marxism marked the turning point from speculation to science. Henceforth it will be possible to erect a sociological system that will not only serve as a "key science" but also represent the utopia of our time.

As yet, this utopia does not exist, but the situation seems to be ripe for it, and the sociologists of knowledge have to take part in the coming struggle between a "complacent tendency to accept the present" and the new "utopian trends." In a way, the future of humanity depends on the emergence of these trends. Thus Mannheim alerted the intelligentsia to "the necessity of being continuously prepared for a synthesis in a world which is attaining one of the high points of its existence."

All this should show that Mannheim's "socially unattached intelligentsia" enters the historical stage as a historical potentiality, indeed as an almost chiliastic expectation. Agreement or disagreement with this idea of the intelligentsia and its mission is no sociological matter, but a matter of Weltanschauung and belief. As far as sociology of knowledge is concerned, Mannheim has in no way demonstrated that this idea supplies the structural warranties of his theory. What remains is not the intelligentsia as a socially functioning group, but isolated social philosophers presenting his historicistic theories and expectations in the form of a particular sociological system.

VI

This leaves Mannheim's sociology of knowledge as an intellectual system and a rational instrument for attaining knowledge. Thought systems are characterized by their partiality and their relationism. Their content, however, may be systematically manipulated by thinkers who decide to detach themselves from their ideological subject matter.

Social detachment may take place on the level of commonsense experience: the member of a closed community who moves into another environment becomes acquainted with different modes of living and thinking, and is thus in a position to compare their respective values and limitations; hence formerly absolute beliefs become relativated. Or a community may undergo such changes that previous outlooks become obsolete, and are replaced by new ones; the old beliefs are then recognized as having been historically conditioned rather than absolute. Finally, a community may become so differentiated that contrasting modes of interpretation confront one another, one of them becoming dominant.

What appears in such processes may be systematized into a sociological procedure. By conscious detachment a sociologist of knowledge may categorize the perspectivistic outlooks that apply to, and are valid in, a given social area. This is called particularization, that is, a definition of the range and limits of the perspectives contained in ideologies. As soon as thought systems are properly particularized, they are fit for further manipulation by way of selection and synthesis.

Synthesis takes place on several levels, and in different areas. It may be possible to ascertain the "common denominator" of two neighboring universes of discourse, and to translate the terms of the one into those of the other. Or two perspectives may be of different value, and then it may be possible to select the better one as a starting point for further synthesis. If particularization of ideas is carried out with sufficient detachment, it amounts to a neutralizing of the factors making for a situational determination of thought. Thus a sociologist of knowledge may not only arbitrate between divergent views, but also proceed to integrate some of their elements into a higher system of social knowledge. In such a procedure, sociology of knowledge shifts from the descriptive to the theoretical level. From comparison of the substantive assertions of different thought systems, and integration of their content, it proceeds toward a synthesis of thought styles, a synthesis with a broadened "categorical formal scope."

Mannheim saw theoretical synthesis as a kind of rational parallel to the ideological syntheses that go on in a highly dynamic and highly differentiated society by way of group contacts and interpenetration in different spheres, especially in the sphere of political action, interaction, conflict, and cooperation. The sociologist of knowledge, so to speak, executes intellectually what occurs spontaneously within the social process he observes. Here too the link between theoretical reflection and social existence is maintained, and stressed.

The syntheses that are reached, whether through the activities of social groups or through the theoretical elaborations of sociologists of knowledge, cannot be taken as final. They are progressive steps toward further and more comprehensive syntheses, and thus are only transitory phases within the process of Social Becoming. Mannheim may have seen this process itself as unending, and an ultimate synthesis as the limitary point of human thought tending toward infinity. On the other hand, he displayed great confidence in his sociological system, regarding it as at least a reliable instrument for an optimal synthesis of social knowledge. This, again, remains an unsubstantiated evaluation. Its plausibility depends entirely on the acceptance of Mannheim's historicistic presuppositions. If social thought is an emergent of the social process and a manifestation of social existence, then it may be said that Mannheim's system is an adequate means of interpreting what emerges.

VII

Mannheim's sociology of knowledge tends to be self-contained. It is based on a system of historicistic assumptions, and it can be used to reinforce these assumptions by quasi-methodological procedures. The philosophical assumptions justify the gnosiological means, and the gnosiological means vindicate the historicistic assumptions.

If this cycle is broken—for example, by a treatment of Mannheim's sociology of knowledge as an empirical system—difficulties arise which seem to be of a forbidding nature. Thus the methodological manipulation of the processes of synthesis poses questions that have not been satisfactorily answered by Mannheim, questions as to sociologically acceptable criteria and methodologically acceptable procedures of validation. This difficulty may be made evident by a short survey of the criteria of validation contained in his sociology of knowledge.

First, Mannheim was of the opinion that the genesis of propositions has an effect on their validity But as to the nature and extent of this effect he was deliberately imprecise. A proposition, according to him, can be validated by reference to "dynamic criteria," that is, by reference to its "situational adequacy," its usefulness for the practical assertion of a group. On the other hand, the fact that an idea "works" does not establish its "truth." Thus Mannheim's "dynamic criteria" cannot stand on their own feet. If single propositions are to be validated within his system, this can be done only by a delegation of meaning, or by subsuming them under more inclusive postulates. This would be a strictly non-empirical procedure, and it would cause individual propositions to participate in the historicistic meanings that attach to the total system. As a result of this particular methodological situation, generally accepted procedures of validation are not applicable to statements contained in Mannheim's sociology of knowledge.

Second, it is a basic tenet of Mannheim's sociology of knowledge that a group's specific position within the social structure tends to condition its intellectual outlook. The perspective inherent in a given universe of discourse is a direct expression of social position—a social-existential factor. It is for this reason that the persons sharing a thought system are able to ascertain the validity of observations, propositions, and ideas within their own socially defined range. The criterion for establishing this partial validity is unanimity of observation and conclusion. Knowledge derived in this way may be said to be authentic for the universe of discourse under consideration, but it must be stated that here the criterion of unanimity has no logical relation to processes of validation. All it allows one to establish is the existence of common beliefs and the absence of deviating opinions: whether the former constitute "truths" and the latter "errors" is not dependent on the unanimity of the group members' judgment. At best, unanimity could establish the "social adequateness" of a prevailing view; but this is tautological. Again the "truth content" of opinions can be determined within Mannheim's system only by delegating the "validity" ascribed to the given thought system as a whole, with the latter conceived of as a particular station in the historicistic development of a certain idea (for example in the dialectical progression of the "utopian mentality").

Third, the possibility of a non-perspectivistic and thus universal knowledge would have been demonstrated if Mannheim had shown that there is a particular and unique position within the social structure, the occupants of which are situationally equipped to overlook and comprehend the totality of the social process. He believed that he established such a stratum in his "socially unattached intelligentsia," but this proves to be a historicistic construction without empirical counterpart. Mannheim failed to link his theoretical system to the existence of a specific social group.

Fourth, a comprehensive or overall social insight may be gained through various means of synthesis. In so far as such syntheses are accomplished by conscious intellectual effort they may be subjected to what Maquet has called the criterion of objectivity. But since this turns out to be only another name for the criterion of unanimity, which we have already disposed of, nothing new is added by applying it to a unification of several perspectives. For selecting the "best perspective" among several, Mannheim suggested "empirical fruitfulness" as a measure: the best perspective is that which reveals the "decisive features of the object." This suggestion begs the question, however: what is regarded as most fruitful depends on the purpose in hand and the frame of reference used. In this case the frame of reference has to exist outside the perspective under consideration. Thus the selection of a "best perspective" for purposes of synthesis, or of the "best elements" out of several perspectives, must rest on acceptance of a preestablished theory. The suggested procedure seems to be subject to, or dependent on, an acceptance of Mannheim's sociological system.

Fifth, Mannheim offered a particular mode of validation in regard to his concept of utopia. In his view, utopias are anticipations of future states of society; consequently they can be validated by the course of historical events. Unfortunately, however, such a validation occurs only ex post facto. Only the historian can ascertain what ideologies have helped to "shatter" a previously existent reality and have thus proved themselves to have been utopias. Moreover, Mannheim's representation of the four stages in the development of the "utopian mentality" produces results that are a far cry from even such ex post facto verification. The "orgiastic chiliasm" of the peasant Anabaptists proved unfounded, and many of its proponents perished; the rest did not manage to "make history." The "liberal-humanitarian idea" of the "ascendant bourgeoisie" was only vaguely formulated, and, to say the least, it is a considerable exaggeration to speak of the realization of the "idea of freedom" within liberal society. The "conservative idea" of the old ruling classes was created in ideological defense against liberal critics, as an attempt to glorify and justify the present by appeal to the past; it was in itself an ex post facto creation, pointing backward, not forward, and by Mannheim's own definition it cannot be accepted as a utopia. And finally the "socialist utopia" has not materialized either; its Bolshevist variation has led to social constellations completely outside the Western cultural sphere to which Mannheim's reasoning applies, while its social-democratic variation has been reduced to a basically conservative reform movement. Thus if any general methodological significance attaches to Mannheim's notion of utopia, it has not been demonstrated by his historical representation.

Sixth, and finally, although Mannheim hesitated to work out the epistemological system that is needed as a foundation for his sociology of knowledge, he operated in fact—partly implicitly, partly explicitly—on the assumptions of a historicistic theory of knowledge. Ultimately all his criteria for the validation of his gnosiological propositions can be reduced to a single historicistic postulate: socially valid cognition and knowledge are emergents of the social process. Acceptance of his argumentation presupposes acceptance of this postulate.

In brief, then, while Mannheim has touched on a series of questions that are relevant for modern sociology, the solutions he has provided within his historicistic frame of reference are open to question. Certainly they are hardly acceptable by social researchers who believe that the interpretation of social processes must be based on established observational methods within the fields of social experience. And even for inquiry into the sociological aspects of ideologies and of knowledge—their forms, foci, dispersion, and limitations—it might be advisable to select a theoretical basis less dependent on historicistic presuppositions than that offered in Mannheim's system.