[In the following essay, originally delivered as a lecture in 1951, Stevens examines instances in De Bello Gallico in which Caesar conceals the truth or interprets events self-servingly.]

It is not possible to consider the Bellum Gallicum as a work of propaganda unless a position can be taken up on the date of its composition. We know from external evidence only that it was published not later than 46 b. c.¹, but the fact that the story of the campaign of 51 b. c. is written by another hand would lead us to suspect that Caesars's own books of the commentaries were written, as has long been the general belief of scholars², in the winter of 52-51 b. c. The campaign of 52 b. c., though not the end (and realised by Caesar, as his legionary dispositions and his determination to winter in Gaul prove³, as not the end of the war), marked nevertheless the end of the national resistance, with the supplicatio of twenty days to crown it⁴. If Caesar had left the writing of the commentaries to 50 b. c., as Holmes, for instance, was inclined to believe⁵, we may ask why he did not complete them; book viii, even with the post-war politics from Hirtius' more prolix pen, is not a long book. I accept then the date of 52-51 b. c. for publication. I accept also the inference drawn by Nipperdey and accepted by Holmes⁶ and others of the simultaneous composition and publication of all seven books⁷.

Nevertheless there is a point to be made. Though it should be true that the seven books of our commentaries were published simultaneously, it was Caesar's duty to send regular despatches to the senate⁸, and on more than one occasion in the commentaries he mentions these litterae⁹. They would remain on the senatorial files, indeed a summary, if not the full text, could presumably be read by the public in the acta diurna. It would be impossible grossly to garble facts which were already on the record, though the point of view in presenting them could be altered (and I hope to show on one occasion that it was). Salomon Reinach¹⁰ has done good service in calling attention to these despatches, ephemerides, as they seem to have been called, with special reference to the circumstances of Caesar's first campaign, that of 58 b. c. Indeed I am not sure that the quotation of Servius (ad Aen., xi, 743)¹¹ and perhaps the anecdote of Plutarch (Caes., xxvi, 4) which seems to go with it, may not be truly from the ephemeris behind our book vii, introduced by Caesar as rather a good joke but not thought worthy of inclusion in the commentaries¹².

If we accept the simultaneous publication and the date of 52-51 b. c., an interesting point emerges. Balsdon and I have argued that Caesar intended to stand at the consular elections of 50 b. c.¹³. If this is so, then on the analogy of Cicero's canvass¹⁴, Caesar's should have begun in 51 b. c. He himself used to send home from Gaul commendatory documents for candidates that he favoured¹⁵. The commentaries then should be a kind of immense self-commendation to take the place of the prensatio of Caesar, absent during the canvass and to be absent by the Law of the Ten Tribunes during the election itself. It may even have overshot the mark. One would like to think that M. Marcellus' motion of recall, first broached in May 51 b. c.¹⁶,—quoniam bello confecto pax esset ac dimitti deberet victor exercitus¹⁷—was motivated precisely by the publication of the commentaries.

These circumstances of publication will perhaps bring into even clearer relief certain passages well known to scholars. In 52 b. c. Pompey, whom public opinion had expected to be consul in that year with Caesar himself as colleague¹⁸, had sold himself to the optimates, but the bargain was far from sealed. In 51 b. c. Pompey, we remember, was responsible for quashing the motion, hostile to Caesar, of M. Marcellus¹⁹; with Pompey, again if Balsdon and myself are right, Caesar was to make the negotium in the autumn of that year²⁰. It is natural, therefore, in commentaries published in 52-51 b. c. to find Pompey complimented on the virtus with which he has restored order in 52 b. c.²¹, even though the restoration was accompanied by an assault against enemies of the optimate party²². Pompey is thanked for the legion which he had put at Caesar's disposal in 54-53 b. c.; his continued residence close to the city is declared to be in the public interest, and the transfer of the legion is due to private friendship and sense of the public weal²³. The sense of public duty attributed to Pompey is given point by the frequent mentions of the populus Romanus, whose interests are always before Caesar as he fights²⁴. And here it is surely the popularis, the heir of Marius who speaks. It is populus Romanus always, senatus populusque Romanus never²⁵. Caesar avenges the honour of the populus Romanus and is pleased to note that he is at the same time avenging the honour of his wife's family, the Calpurnii Pisones²⁶. Even his dignitas, dearer to him than life itself, as he was later to assert²⁷, demands that the Rhine be crossed not on ships but by a bridge; but is it not his own dignitas, it is not less the dignitas of the populus Romanus²⁸. Thus we can easily believe that, while Caesar and Pompey are both actuated by patriotism, “it is the optimates who are prepared to sacrifice their country's good for political ends. As Ariovistus is made to tell Caesar²⁹, if he killed Caesar, he would gratify many leaders of the Roman people: this he knew for certain by messengers from them”. We are not to forget the contrast between these principes populi Romani (who have so styled themselves in correspondence with a barbarian) and Caesar, who is fighting its battles.

Not that these battles, after the difficulties of the first year have been got round, are felt to need justification. Victory, as Cicero could remind even an audience of optimate pontifices, justifies any means that the victor uses to gain for himself the position to win it³⁰. “En deux ans”, as Camille Jullian³¹ well describes the campaigns of 58 and 57 b. c., “il avait combattu tour à tour pour garantir sa province, pour protéger ses alliés, pour contenir ses adversaires et pour soumettre les indifférents”. After all, the senate had in a manner ratified those actions of his, which enabled him to say pacata Gallia in 57 b. c., by an unparalleled supplicatio³², and who was he to contradict this or such jingoism as Cicero's in the senate next year³³? In point of fact, the words of Cicero find no echo in Caesar's narrative. It may pay materially to be on Caesar's side, as it paid the Remi and the Aeudi³⁴, but there is no clap-trap of an imperial mission. Dumnorix proclaims with his last breath that he is a free man and citizen of a free community³⁵, and Vercingetorix, as he goes into captivity, proclaims (and Caesar says no word to impugn the claim) that he has taken up arms for the liberty of all³⁶. Though we may wish to suspect that the massacre of the Usipetes and Tencteri was not really justified by the treachery of their cavalry³⁷, the story which so horrified Cato is told straight³⁸. Perhaps all that one can say is that an ambiguity is allowed to be present in the reader's mind on the precise signification of Gallia. While in book I and the beginning of book II it normally means the restricted, Celtican region³⁹, its meaning slides later into that of the whole area⁴⁰, as provincialised in 51 b.c.⁴¹. Indeed we are introduced to this ambiguity in the famous first chapter of book I⁴².

Justification after 58 b. c. then is not attempted, though points which would lead a reader to congratulate himself that Gaul was conquered are given their weight. He is not to forget the Cimbri and Teutones who are mentioned wherever relevant⁴³ and even dragged into a rather tasteless speech in oratio recta put into the mouth of an Arvernian shut up in Alesia⁴⁴. Caesar has saved Rome—Cicero had made that clear⁴⁵—from repetitions of that alarm. And a trick can be picked up in praise not only of Marius, the family connexion, but of Marius' army⁴⁶. Caesar is the political heir of Marius, his army the military heirs of the military machine that Marius made.

But while justification of the campaigns need not be attempted, nothing must be written which will sell Caesar short. Minor checks may be admitted, but Caesar must be seen to have the initiative throughout, and the felicitas⁴⁷ which inspires his directing mind must inform all. Even the great Labienus, who realises in a crisis that in the absence of his imperator the strength of character on which he must rely is his own⁴⁸, twice advises his troops (he is the only legatus who is allowed a reported speech) to fight as though the imperator were at hand⁴⁹. Legions will not fight, the Gauls are made to assert, unless the imperator is back in the province⁵⁰. It is the good legatus, Cotta, together with most of the tribunes and centurions, who urges that winter-quarters must not be shifted without Caesar's express permission⁵¹; and the contrary decision leads to a disaster. A slight disregard of formal instructions by Q. Cicero nearly leads to another and is gently reprimanded⁵². When real calamities occur, they are due to the foolishness of a legatus—Aduatuca⁵³ or the over-confidence of soldiers—Gergovia⁵⁴. Nevertheless I hope to show that on two important occasions in the Gallic war Caesar did not have the initiative. On one his plan went completely astray and he has not told us. On the other his moves conformed to those of his adversary and he has written as far as possible to show that his adversary's moves conformed to his.

The former is the Invasion of Britain. We learn from Strabo⁵⁵ that the motive for the revolt of the Veneti was to stop Caesar from invading Britain and ruining their trade. According to Caesar its motive was the taking of hostages from the Veneti and their attempt to blackmail Crassus into returning them by detaining his commissaries⁵⁶. It may be true to say ut sunt Gallorum subita et repentina consilia⁵⁷, but it needs more than that to explain why the revolt of the Veneti was joined by precisely those states which are likely to have been interested in British trade (including the far-distant Morini and Menapii⁵⁸) and why the Veneti obtained help from Britain itself⁵⁹. And there may be more. Caesar tells us that he had a fleet built for this campaign. Nevertheless he attempted to subdue the Veneti by land operations without using it at all⁶⁰. Of course it is true, as Caesar reminds us⁶¹, that the Romans did not like trusting themselves to the sea. Nevertheless we can see that when it became necessary to decide the campaign by naval operations, Caesar's fleet was found to be not at all satisfactory for a battle in Atlantic waters. The suspicion must surely arise that the ships that fought it were intended for a different purpose.

The suspicion is deepened when we notice that Caesar seems to be juggling with the facts about the fleet in more than one way. In one passage⁶² he states that he gave orders to build galleys—naves longae—on the Loire immediately on the news of the revolt. A little later, however, he tells us that he put D. Brutus in command not only of the “fleet” but of “the Gallic vessels which he had ordered to concentrate from the territories of the Pictones, the Santoni and the other pacified regions⁶³”. But where are these regions from which ships were requisitioned which appear to be distinguished from those of the “fleet”, and what sort of ships are they likely to have been? To take the first question, we cannot place them to the south of the Garonne, for that is Aquitania, which Caesar is preparing to “pacify” at this very moment. Dio Cassius, whose narrative at this point may be independent⁶⁴, seems to imply that they were constructed higher up the Loire—and this, though Caesar's narrative implies requisition rather than construction, might seem possible and has an analogy⁶⁵. Nevertheless it would surely be strange if Caesar, intending a distinction between shipyards on the lower and upper reaches of the Loire, should express this distinction by the Loire simpliciter in one passage and “the other pacified regions” in the other. Moreover it would appear that Dio's remarks on the fleet are really nothing more than misreadings and misinterpretations of Caesar⁶⁶. In truth it is difficult to seek these “pacified regions” except on the north coast, from which, as any yachtsman knows, it would be no attractive matter to sail them through the Four and the Raz into Venetic waters. To take the second point, Caesar makes clear that the ships of the Veneti were superior to his own in every respect save in speed and oarsmanship⁶⁷. In other words is is clear that he fought the battle with the naves longae that had been built for him on the Loire. Then were the requisitioned ships naves longae too? This is surely improbable, for he tells us that naves longae were unfamiliar to the Britons whom he invaded next year⁶⁸. For this invasion he embarked his troops all on 98 naves onerariae⁶⁹. It is true that this fleet was partly requisitioned ex finitimis regionibus, nevertheless we must not forget that it was also composed of the fleet that he had ordered to concentrate for the compaign against the Veneti⁷⁰. Remembering again the difficulty of taking ships round Finistère, we may find it likely that Caesar has been deceiving his readers. He had been requisitioning ocean going vessels some time in 56 b.c. from tribes along the Channel coast for a purpose which was not a “campaign against the Veneti” at all.

But when in 56 b. c.? Here we find Caesar juggling with the times. The purpose of my argument is to show that the Veneti had revolted because a naval force had been ordered, not that a naval force had been ordered because the Veneti had revolted; in other words that Caesar did intend to invade Britain in 56 b. c. and the Veneti knew it. Caesar could rebut that quick enough if he showed that the requisitioning of ships, which we have shown to be probably ocean going vessels from Channel ports, occurred late in 56 b. c.—too late for an invasion of Britain and thus too late to inspire a revolt of the Veneti. And one may suspect that his mind was working in that way when in book IV he dates the requisitioning to the summer of 56 b. c.⁷¹. But this will not fit his narrative of book III. Here the chronology dates the outbreak of the revolt to the winter of 57-56 b. c.⁷², and the order for the construction of the naves longae in the Loire while he was still away, but about to return as soon “as the season allowed”⁷³. The order for requisitioning is not timed, but it had already been, given⁷⁴ before the appointment of D. Brutus as naval commander which was among the measures taken by Caesar on his way to Brittany⁷⁵. This appointment preceded the abortive land campaign which occupied him for “the great part of the summer”⁷⁶. Thus by this narrative the naval concentration is not in the summer of 56 b. c. but much earlier; but the revolt is early too and so is Caesar's arrival in Gaul in response to it. This narrative is self-consistent and also avoids the suspicion of a British project in 56 b. c.; but it is not consistent with external chronology. This was the year of Luca and we can check Caesar's movements from Cicero's letters. He did not leave for Gaul “as soon as the season allowed”; he was still in Italy at least as late as the first week in April⁷⁷.

Now perhaps we may be allowed to throw another small point into the scales. In his account of the winter-quarters of 57 b. c.⁷⁸, Caesar states that the legions were sent to the territories of Carnutes, Andes, Turoni, “and the states which were near the areas where he had made war”. There is by no means necessarily here evidence of intent to deceive. Nevertheless we can remind ourselves that Caesar's readers had no maps⁷⁹; and in fact the states must be located among the Belgae, for it is clear that here Labienus himself was posted⁸⁰. Caesar has, to say the least, not helped his readers to discover that a body of his troops under his chief subordinate was not far from those Morini who joined the Veneti in revolt, who needed a campaign later in 56 b. c.⁸¹ and from whose territory there was the shortest crossing to Britain⁸².

Perhaps it may be permissible to attempt a reconstruction of the plan. It is possible that both the eastern and the western controllers of British trade routes, the Morini and Menapii on the one hand, the inhabitants of the Breton peninsula on the other, were simultaneously nervous because they were simultaneously affected⁸³, that Caesar planned a double invasion, not only by the route of 55 and 54 b. c., but by the age-old prehistoric sea-route to south-west Britain⁸⁴, and that the ocean-going vessels of the Veneti would have transported the western force, had not their revolt compelled Caesar to sink them. It might be plausible to suggest that the voyage of a certain P. Crassus, reported by Strabo⁸⁵, was undertaken by Caesar's quaestor as a reconnaissance for it.

It may be possible to indicate the relation of this projected invasion to the political manoeuvres at Rome. In passages which will be examined below, Cicero speaks of a proposal to despatch decem legati to Gaul. A commission of ten legates is virtually invariably the precursor to the conversion of a conquered area into a province of the Roman Empire; and it would be natural to refer such a proposal to the projected provincialisation of “pacified” Gaul⁸⁶. Scholars refuse it, however, and refer the words to the appointment of ten subordinate generals to work under Caesar for further Gallic campaigns⁸⁷, because they cannot see how Caesar could seem to welcome the provincialisation of Gaul on the one hand and to press for an extension of command on the other. It looks, however, as though this difficulty will disappear if we are allowed the plan for an invasion of Britain in 56 b. c. The news of the pacification of Gaul, which reached Rome in the autumn of 57 b. c.⁸⁸, indeed inspired on Cicero's proposal and with Pompey's approval the grant of a supplicatio, the longest ever known⁸⁹; nevertheless it is unlikely that a senate whom Caesar had so flouted as consul was thus honouring him entirely for his beaux yeux. The news of pacification would lead politicians, especially hostile politicians, to think of provincialisation connoted by the despatch of these decem legati, for this could enable them to claim, at least on grounds of equity, that Caesar should come home and disband his army⁹⁰. Domitius Ahenobarbus seems to have been taking this line early in 56 b. c.,⁹¹ and it even seems to have received the support of Pompey, jealous of Caesar's success⁹². Caesar's reply, if we have interpreted events rightly, was to make plans for an invasion of Britain in 56 b.c., a plan involving orders for the construction of galleys, recruitment of their crews and requisitioning of ocean-going craft. If he could show that an invasion of Britain was necessary to secure peace in his pacified Gaul (and he could use the sort of arguments that he uses in the commentaries to justify the later invasions⁹³), then he could well submit to the despatch of decem legati to provincialise what he had already conquered, for he would be making new conquests further away, and would submit the more cheerfully if the decision to send them was accompanied by that approval for his plan of new conquests connoted by a grant of pay for the troops and by legal action which implied the prolongation of his command certainly until the end of 54 b. c., which would seem time enough to make the new conquests, if they proceeded with the speed of the old⁹⁴. Discussions on this point would seem to have been proceding during March 56 b. c., in the shadow of the Luca agreement⁹⁵, and it is to that date and surely to that motivation that we should attribute the outbreak of the revolt among the Veneti and their allies. But the revolt meant that Gaul was not pacified, ready for provincialisation and the despatch of decem legati yet. The grant of pay and the prolonged command must now be used for mopping-up operations inside Gaul, and when Cicero was put up to speak for Caesar in Gaul, this is what he said⁹⁶. Not a word of an expedition to Britain from him—nor, in this year, from Caesar. He has concealed a British scheme that went astray.

And not the only time. Before ever he sailed for Britain in 54 b. c., Caesar is careful to prepare the reader for the necessity of its return by proclaiming that he feared trouble in Gaul during his absence⁹⁷. Nevertheless he took more than half his legions—five out of eight—and half his cavalry⁹⁸, and lets slip that he intended to winter in the island but was prevented by Gallic disturbances⁹⁹. Clearly then Britain was meant to produce better results than he was able actually to report. I suspect indeed, as the late Martin Charlesworth used to say to me, that he intended to conquer not only the whole of Britain but Ireland as well in the five campaigning seasons put at his disposal by the Lex Pompeia Licinia passed the year before¹⁰⁰, Ireland that he, like others, believed to be quite close to Spain¹⁰¹, close in fact to that promontory which he had visited himself¹⁰², where a lighthouse was to be erected from which, it was alleged, Britain could be seen¹⁰³. And it all ended in a treaty patched up for him by his own henchman, Commius, and the uncertain prospects of tribute from Kent and Hertfordshire¹⁰⁴.

The failure of the great expedition of 54 b. c. made it necessary to modify the account of that of the year before. This was intended, as I have argued elsewhere¹⁰⁵, as a reconnaissance of Roman public opinion no less than of Britain, possibly to show to all the necessity and the justification of the further years of command which his triumviral colleagues were to grant him by the Lex Pompeia Licinia¹⁰⁶. And it was a treasure hunt into the bargain (as we learn from Cicero, naturally not from Caesar)¹⁰⁷—which, of course, would increase its propaganda value. As propaganda, therefore, for the proposed conquest, it was loudly trumpeted as the triumph over Oceanus itself, the same triumph that struck the imagination of Claudius a century later¹⁰⁸. Caesar indeed triumphs over Oceanus in his despatches of 55 b. c., as we shall demonstrate; in the commentaries it needs a sharp eye to discover that Oceanus exists¹⁰⁹. But when Lucan put into the mouth of Pompey in reproach of Caesar the words—Oceanumque vocans incerti stagna profundi / territa quaesitis ostendit terga Britannis¹¹⁰, he cannot be criticising the treatment of Oceanus in the commentaries. Authorities such as Plutarch¹¹¹ place Lucan's jibe in its context. “Caesar was the first to launch a fleet upon the western ocean and to sail through the Atlantic sea carrying an army to wage war. The island … furnished matter of dispute to multitudes of writers, some of whom averred that it never had existed and did not then exist.” And Dio Cassius, using similar language¹¹², tells us outright that this verification of the unknown was the reason why Caesar was awarded the longest supplicatio that the or any man in Roman history had ever had. Caesar stated himself that he received a supplicatio of twenty days¹¹³, but the reasons for the longest ever—he does not tell us so, but we can work it out—he does not give (nor any hint of its connexion with the Lex Pompeia Licinia), because, if I am right, it was given on receipt of despatches written as propaganda for a great conquest—which did not come off.

In the other case it is a question of Caesar's operations at Gergovia and Alesia. Caesar's account can be summarised as follows. He was besieging Vercingetorix in Gergovia and the siege was proceding with success when a mutiny of the Aeduan cavalry engineered by Litaviccus was followed by a rising of the Aedui against the Roman citizens quartered among them. He then realised that a more extended Gallic rebellion was probable and hoped accordingly to obtain some prestige success at Gergovia which would give him an excuse for raising the siege¹¹⁴. He would have obtained such a success, which consisted in capturing camps outside the city wall, had it not been for the indiscipline of his own soldiers. After quitting Gergovia he saves himself by extraordinary marches, defeats Vercingetorix in a cavalry battle, coops him up in Alesia, defeats the relieving force—and then it is the end. Thus Caesar, though obstructed by his own soldiers at Gergovia and by Vercingetorix and the relieving army at Alesia, in essence retains the initiative throughout.

But the picture does not fit the facts. According to Caesar an essential factor in his attempt not on Gergovia, we remember, but to obtain a prestige success at Gergovia, was the employment of 10.000 Aedui on his right flank¹¹⁵. Can we believe that if the state had been in open revolt, murdering Roman citizens wherever they could be found (which is what Caesar says¹¹⁶), he would have used so many troops whose temper must have become so unreliable simply in the hope of a prestige success? He would have risked the annihilation of his legions. And that is not all. After he had failed to obtain this prestige success, he was told by Eporedorix that the mutineer Litaviccus has gone off ad sollicitandos Haeduos, and Eporedorix asked if he could go to stop him. Etsi multis iam rebus perfidiam Haeduorum perspectam habebat atque horum discessu admaturari defectionem civitatis existimabat, says Caesar, he let him go. But admaturari defectionem civitatis is sheer nonsense. The defectio had already happened; according to Caesar himself, while the siege of Gergovia was going on, the chief magistrate of the Aedui, the Vergobret, was leading the massacre of Roman citizens¹¹⁷.

The truth must be that Caesar was not in the least satisfied, as he asks us to believe¹¹⁸, with the capture of three empty camps outside the town-wall. He did not want a prestige success; he wanted to capture Gergovia. He failed and his failure was the cause of the general rebellion of the Aedui. Caesar has magnified a mutiny of certain patriotic units among the Aedui during the siege into such a general rebellion as made it necessary to look for a prestige success; and then he blames his soldiers for overconfidence (blame which soldiers would be proud to take), because he did not get it. He has used the mutiny of certain patriots to antedate the general rebellion of the tribe which was caused in fact simply because he had suffered a serious reverse. Indeed it is possible that Dio Cassius, though his narrative is somewhat confused, has seen the truth¹¹⁹.

Moreover Caesar, to keep the initiative, must defeat Vercingetorix in the cavalry battle and force him to take refuge in Alesia. But Caesar's own narrative makes clear that Vercingetorix had already made preparations to stand a siege¹²⁰; indeed it seems likely that the whole plan of a pan-Gallic relief force had already been conceived¹²¹. The fact is that strategically Vercingetorix had the initiative. His strategy was conceived, I submit, on simple lines. The original plan was to force the Romans out of free Gaul by a policy of scorched earth¹²². But this might be difficult to impose on other tribes, and his experience outside Avaricum led him to give this plan a second member. He had enticed Ceasar's troops to appear before his own—in his own absence—on unfavourable ground from which they had been forced to make an ignominious withdrawal¹²³. I think that Vercingetorix, who had thus duped Caesar more probably than not by accident, drew a deduction. To encourage and reinforce the policy of scorched earth, Caesar should be induced to make fruitless moves against Gauls in impregnable hill-forts. With this plan he succeeded brilliantly at Gergovia and intended to try the same at Alesia, where he had made preparations accordingly. His cavalry skirmish was thus an attempt, as it were, to pick up a trick on the way, which Caesar has magnified into a decisive battle, compelling Vercingetorix to stand a siege. In fact, it is not Caesar who has trapped Vercingetorix in Alesia, but Vercingetorix who has trapped Caesar between himself in Alesia and the relieving army. And what a place Alesia was! We learn from Diodorus (not from Caesar!) that it was “honoured by the Gauls as the hearth and metropolis of the whole of Gaul”¹²⁴. Vercingetorix meant to trap Caesar at the holy centre of Gaul—and he had done it. When we remember the speech put into Vercingetorix' mouth, that he “would make one council of Gaul against which the world would not prevail¹²⁵”, we may be allowed to conjecture that he intended after victory to proclaim himself in Gaul's metropolis the king of Gaul. As a king who had lost, he rode grandly caparisoned (we do not hear this from Caesar) around the tribunal of Caesar, the “imperator”, who had won¹²⁶. It was one of the tragic moments of the world's history if I have interpreted the story aright. How titanic then appears Caesar who could conceal it all for the stern duty of impressing his own continual felicitas and mastery of events upon the electors at the consular comitia of 50 b. c.!

Notes

1. Cicero, Brutus, 75, 262.

2. Holmes, Caesar's Conquest of Gaul (cited as Gaul), 202.

3. B. G., VII, 90, 8 (All references are to the Bellum Gallicum unless otherwise specified).

4. VII, 90, 8.

5. Gaul, 209.

6. Gaul, 203.

7. The view of Halkin (Mélanges Paul Thomas, 407-416), that the commentaries were published in three instalments, books I and II, III and IV, V-VII, though accepted by Carcopino (César, 762, n. 66) is not seriously argued, and I have refuted it by implication in the text.

8. Cicero, De Prov. Cons., 6, 14; In Pisonem, 16, 38.

9. II, 35, 4; IV, 38, 5; VII, 90, 8.

10. Revue de Philologie, XXXIX, 29-49.

11. C. Julius Caesar, cum dimicaret in Gallia et ab hoste raptus equo eius portaretur armatus, occurrit cuidam ex hostibus, qui eum nosset, et insultans ait: ‘cecos ac cesar’ (v. l. ‘caesar caesar'), quod Gallorum lingua ‘dimitte’ significat: et ita actum est ut dimitteretur; hoc autem ipse Caesar in ephemeride sua dicit, ubi propriam commemorat felicitatem. …

12. Reinach assumes that these stories were fraudulently attributed to ephemerides by anti-Caesarian authors such as Tanusius Geminus; this seems to me neither necessary nor likely.

13. A. J. P., LIX, 178; J. R. S., XXIX, 176.

14. Cicero, Att., I, 1, 1.

15. Suetonius, Divus Iulius, 23, 2.

16. Caelius ap. Ciceron., Fam., VIII, 1, 2.

17. Suetonius, Divus Iulius, 28, 2.

18. Suetonius, Divus Iulius, 26, 1; Dio, XL, 50,3 - 51,1.

19. Cicero, Att., VIII, 3, 3; Appian, B. C., II, 26.

20. A. J. P., LIX, 178; J. R. S., XXIX, 176.

21. VII, 6, 1.

22. Asconius (Clark), p. 56, ll. 3-5.

23. VI, 1, 2, 3.

24. But not always as he writes! For the populus Romanus ceases to appear in book VII after 17, 3 (Avaricum). It looks as though the approach to a climax of the thrilling narrative caused Caesar to forget his propaganda.

25. The contrast with Cicero, who, after early coquetting with the cause of populares, never left senatus out, is piquant—and instructive. See Mommsen's elucidation of his practice, Staatsrecht, III, 1257, 1258.

26. I, 12, 7.

27. B. C., I, 9, 2.

28. IV, 17, 1.

29. I, 44, 12.

30. De Domo, 8, 18.

31. Hist. Gaule, III, 276.

32. II, 35, 1, 4.

33. De Prov. Cons., 13, 33.

34. VI, 12, 6-9; VII, 54, 3.

35. V, 7, 8.

36. VII, 89, 1.

37. IV, 7-15.

38. Suetonius, Divus Iulius, 24, 3; Plutarch, Caes., XXII, 3; Cato minor, LI, 1; Appian, Celtica, XVIII.

39. Gallia means Celtican Gaul always in book I (except in the geographical introduction, I, 1) and in II, 1, 2 and II, 2, 3 (but not II, 1, 1); exceptionally, describing the Celtican empire of Celtillus, VII, 4, 1.

40. Gallia is clearly Gaul in the wide sense (best seen perhaps in VI, 5, 4) onwards from II, 4, 2—which may, however, still exclude the Aquitani, until they have been subdued (II, 35, 1; III, 11, 3—but compare III, 20, 1).

41. Fasti Cuprenses (Inscr. Italiae, XIII, 1, p. 244); Sallust, Hist., I, 11; Suetonius, Divus Iulius, 25, 1; Eutropius, VI, 17, 3.

42. I, 1, 1, 2, 4-6 (I see no good reason for condemning sections 5-7).

43. I, 33, 4; II, 4, 2; 29, 4.

44. VII, 77, 12.

45. De prov. cons., 13, 32.

46. I, 40, 5. Holmes, following Meusel, is surely wrong in expelling the capital propaganda point about the army.

47. I, 40, 13. Is there a slight hint that he must be regarded as not inferior to Pompey (compare Cicero, De Imp. Cn. Pompei, 10, 28; 16, 47)?

48. VII, 59, 6.

49. VI, 8, 4; VII, 62, 2.

50. VII, 1, 7.

51. V, 28, 3.

52. VI, 42, 1; possibly more strongly in a letter to Marcus (Charisius, I, 126, 9—Keil; Tyrrell and Purser, VI, 295).

53. V, 52, 6.

54. VII, 52.

55. IV, 4, 1, p. 194. …

56. III, 8, 2. Moreover Caesar strains truth by calling these praefecti tribunique militum (III, 7, 3) in later passages legati (III, 16, 4 and 9. 3—the latter passage again wrongly ejected by Meusel and Holmes).

57. III, 8, 3.

58. On the evidence of coins for trade with south-east Britain see Brooke, Antiquity, VII, 269-274; Num. Chron., XIII, 99-107, who warns us, however, that the ascription of a type widely diffused in Britain to the Morini may be incorrect.

59. III, 9, 10.

60. III, 12.

61. III, 12, 5.

62. III, 9, 1.

63. III, 11, 5.

64. Jullian thinks so (Hist. Gaule, III, 297, n. 4).

65. XXXIX, 40, 3; compare v. 5, 2.

66. The bringing of ‘swift ships’ (? naves longae) round from the Mediterranean (XXXIX, 40, 5) looks like simple careless copying of III, 9, 1.

67. III, 13, 7.

68. IV, 25, 1.

69. IV, 22, 3, 4. We are not told the number of galleys (naves longae) used in 55 b. c. In the next year he had about 600 transports and 28 naves longae (v. 2, 2).

70. IV, 21, 4; 22, 3, 4.

71. IV, 21, 4; quam superiore aestate ad Veneticum bellum fecerat classem.

72. III, 7, 1.

73. III, 9, 2 cum primum per anni tempus potuit.

74. III, 11, 5 D. Brutum … classi Gallicisque navibus, quas ex Pictonibus et Santonis reliquisque pacatis regionibus convenire iusserat praefecit.

75. III, 11, 5.

76. III, 12, 5.

77. Carcopino, César, 776; Holmes, Roman Republic, II, 295. The exact date with reference to the seasons of the year depends on the adjustment of the traditional to the Julian calendar. I choose Holmes's forensically as less favourable to my argument; Carcopino's would bring it fairly to the middle of April.

78. II, 35, 3.

79. Compare Cicero, Qu. fr., III, 8, 2; ubi enim isti Nervii et quam longe absint nescio.

80. III, 11, 1, 2.

81. III, 28.

82. IV, 21, 3.

83. Ireland may already have been in Caesar's mind, in which case the evidence cited below would be relevant now, and see Appendix.

84. See most recently, Wheeler, Maiden Castle, 386. A third line of attack, to Southampton Water, as subsequently achieved in the ‘Second Belgic Invasion’ of c. 50 b. c. (on which see Hawkes, Hants Field Club, XIII, 160) is also possible, though there is no actual evidence for it.

85. III, 5, 11, p. 176. Save that he does not make the point of reconnaissance for a projected invasion, this is more or less how Holmes (Ancient Britain, 497) looks at Strabo's account.

86. See on this notably Balsdon, J. R. S., XXIX, 171.

87. E. g. Holmes, Roman Republic, II, 294; Carcopino, César, 781.

88. The time is established by the chronological series of events as Cicero gives them, Fam., I, 9, 14.

89. II, 35, 4; Cicero, De Prov. Cons., 10, 25; 11, 27; Pro Balbo, 27, 61.

90. Compare Suetonius, Divus Iulius, 24, 3. But I am very doubtful whether the senatus consultum really contained a clause donec debellatum foret, as Balsdon believes (J. R. S., XXIX, 170).

91. Suetonius, Divus Iulius, 24, 1.

92. Dio, XXXIX, 25, 2.

93. IV, 20, 1; V, 12, 2.

94. Cicero, Fam., I, 7, 10: nam et stipendium Caesari decretum est et decem legati et ne lege Sempronia succederetur facile perfectum est. Compare Cicero, De prov. Cons., 11, 28; Pro Balbo 27, 61; Plutarch, Caesar, XXI, 3-4 (misdated) and see Appendix.

95. It is with these discussions, still conducted, as I believe, in the context of a projected invasion of Britain in 56 b. c. that I would connect Cicero, ad Qu. fr., II, 4, 5.

96. De Prov. Cons., 12, 29. The speech would have been very different if the Veneti had not revolted!

97. V, 5, 4.

98. V, 5, 3; 8, 2.

99. V, 22, 4.

100. He comes near saying it in The Lost Province, 5.

101. V, 13, 2. I believe that chapters 12-14 were copied out rapidly by Caesar from an authority (like the chapters on Druidism), but I do not think that they are spurious. Compare Tacitus, Agricola, 24, 1.

102. Dio, XXXVII, 53, 4.

103. Orosius, I, 2, 71, 81; compare the Irish traditions based on Orosius which Macneill examines, Phases of Irish History, 93. O'Rahilly, it may be worth noting (Early Irish History, 208), is convinced of an invasion of Ireland by refugees from Caesar's Gallic campaigns. This might well make Ireland interesting to Caesar.

104. V, 22, 3-5.

105. Antiquity, XXI, 3-9.

106. This novel point needs more than a footnote; I argue it in Appendix.

107. Att., IV, 16, 7.

108. I. L. S., 212: iactationem gloriae prolati imperi ultra Oceanum; compare Anth. Lat., 419-426.

109. IV, 29, 1.

110. Pharsalia, II, 571, 572. Moreover when the panegyrist of Pan. Lat., VIII, 11, 3 states—for what he is worth—of Caesar: alium se orbem terrarum scripsit repperisse, he is attributing to Caesar what is not in the commentaries. I assume that both derive from the despatches by way of Livy, who should be the source of Eutropius' statement—contradicted implicitly by Caesar (II, 14, 4; III, 9, 10; IV, 20, 1)—that the Britons had never heard of Rome before (VI, 17, 3).

111. Caesar, XXIII, 2.

112. XXXIX, 53. Compare the language of the Proscription edict of 43 b. c. (not genuine, but probably an early invention) as given by Appian, b. c., IV, 8.

113. IV, 38, 5.

114. VII, 43, 5.

115. VII, 34, 1; 50, 1.

116. VII, 42, 4-6.

117. VII, 54, 2.

118. VII, 47, 1: consecutus id quod animo proposuerat.

119. XL, 38, 1.

120. VII, 69, 5; 71, 7.

121. As Carcopino, César, 824 supports, with plausible arguments. Latomus XI. - 2.

122. VII, 14, 4-10.

123. VII, 19. Holmes, Gaul, 744, following Paul Menge, thinks that Vercingetorix planned to deceive Caesar. I feel doubtful.

124. IV, 19, 2.

125. VII, 29, 6.

126. Florus, I, 45 (III, 11), 26; Plutarch, Caesar, XXVII, 5; Dio, XL, 41.