SOURCE: Evans, G. R. “Wyclif on Literal and Metaphorical.” In From Ockham to Wyclif, edited by Anne Hudson and Michael Wilks, pp. 259-66. Oxford, England: Basil Blackwell, 1987.

[In the following essay, Evans illuminates Wyclif's views on the significance and usefulness of figurative interpretation of the Bible in his De vertitate sacrae scripturae.]

Origen encouraged readers of the Bible to try to penetrate beneath the literal meaning to deeper truths which lay hidden in the figurative and metaphorical senses.¹ Augustine and Gregory the Great made it a commonplace in the mediaeval West that the literal sense is only one of several possible intepretations of a given passage, and that the figurative meanings are full of spiritual riches, and bring the reader closer to the Divine Author's intentions. For Origen the Bible, taken spiritually, is the ultimate source of truth. The same high doctrine of the spiritual sense is apparent in the rules of Tichonius the Donatist, to which Augustine gave such lasting currency. Tichonius sees his rules as ‘keys’ to open up and ‘lamps’ to reveal the secrets hidden above all in the treasury of truth. He is interested in clarifying the spiritual senses.²

The idea that the spiritual sense is more profound than the literal did not entirely disappear in the thinking of the reformers of the sixteenth century.³ But we find the reformers loudly challenging what had, to their eyes, become an abuse. Calvin sometimes concedes that the allegory proposed by one of the Fathers is ‘not displeasing’,⁴ and he is able to point to at least one ‘blunder’ when Lactantius and others take what is clearly meant to be a figure as a literal statement.⁵ But in general he claims to find allegorising unsatisfactory. He accuses Augustine of triviality and Origen of playing games.⁶ He calls the allegories of Origen and others a device of the devil to make the Bible's teaching ambiguous and its interpretation uncertain;⁷ he accuses the papists of having ‘come to an arrangement with Satan’ to obscure the meaning of Scripture.⁸ Luther levels the same accusation of lightmindedness in a comment on one of Jerome's allegories,⁹ and he, too, was suspicious of the abuse of the method by a number of the fathers and by more recent interpreters who have followed them.

Ironically, it was not to obscure but to clarify that resort had normally been made to figurative interpretations. The Bible contains passages of the greatest difficulty, of which it is hard to make any acceptable sense at all if they are read literally. Origen did not believe that every passage necessarily had a literal sense. In these cases, figurative interpretation would get round the difficulty, provide a means of reconciling any apparent contradiction and give a reading in accordance with faith.

To take a figurative or metaphorical reading it is necessary to find more than one meaning for a word or phrase. It is, as Wyclif points out, ‘a famous principle of logic’ that equivoca are not contradictory.¹⁰ He can show that the method of using equivoca to resolve apparent contradictions was used by the fathers,¹¹ but in its modern technical refinement, the study of equivoca owed most to work on the new logic of Aristotle, especially the Sophistici Elenchi, during the late twelfth century and after. It is in this context that Wyclif thinks of it as a ‘principle of logic’.

If you insist upon the rules of ordinary grammar such as children learn, Wyclif says that you will become entangled in massive inconsistencies. You must learn that the Lord spoke according to a hidden grammar and logic (logicam sibi et gramaticam … absconditam).¹² The theologian has to learn first ordinary grammar and then the gramatica scripture,¹³ first ordinary logic and then God's logic. The reader who grasps this will see that the word ‘hand’, for example, is equivocal. Sometimes it refers to the bodily organ, sometimes to ‘power’.

Although the technical preoccupations of the terminists were something new, and had a sophistication in Wyclif's day which they lacked in Augustine's time, Wyclif is able confidently to illustrate the point about manus from Augustine. He is stating a classic and long-standing method of resolving obscurities and contradictions, which holds good in a new scientific world.¹⁴ There are, says Wyclif, very many sayings in Scripture in quibus notatur equiovocacio terminorum.¹⁵ These were seized upon by keen disputants in the schools of the later Middle Ages, and Wyclif devotes a good deal of space in the De Veritate Sacrae Scripturae to explaining that where they see contradiction they ought to be seeing equivocation. The exegete should read in no combative spirit; he should look for humilis et quieta concessio equivocacionis signorum,¹⁶ rather than search for contradictions with which to prove that not all of Scripture is true.

The reformers of the sixteenth century certainly objected to what they felt to be an abuse, sheer fanciful interpretation. But given the practical usefulness of the method of resorting to a figurative meaning in places, were the reformers really proposing to do without figurative interpretations altogether?

Their Biblical commentary makes it plain that they were not. Melanchthon, Luther, Calvin and others speak of figurative senses in places as naturally as though there were no controversy about their use. What appears at first sight a double standard begins to seem a perfectly consistent position if we take account of the developments of the later Middle Ages in the understanding of the nature and definition of the literal sense. In this as in much else Wyclif, while not wholly an innovator, takes a position which does a great deal to illuminate the process by which the assumptions of the Reformation came to be established. As a result of this late mediaeval work, Luther and Calvin and their contemporaries were in a position to get over the difficulties the literal sense sometimes presents by enlarging the literal sense to include a certain amount of figurative usage.

In the late twelfth and thirteenth centuries some knowledge of Hebrew and an increasing technical expertise in the analysis of the grammatical structure of language and its signification made the study of the literal sense much more interesting to scholars.¹⁷ In the light of new insights into the way signification works, it began to seem that where the figure is clearly being used deliberately, and there is no question of the interpreter's ‘reading’ of a figurative usage where none is intended, the literal sense could be taken to include the figurative. The literal sense thus becomes the ‘primary’ meaning.¹⁸

The enlargement of the literal sense was not universally adopted. The old love of playful, speculative and evocative allegory, the old desire to penetrate to the depths of the mystery, persisted, especially among preachers and writers of spiritual works. But for scholars engaged in pioneering work on exegesis in the later Middle Ages, it began to seem possible to approach the definition of allegory in a rather different way, by asking whether the transference from literal to metaphorical involved in a given figurative usage is so clearly intentional that it becomes the primary meaning of the passage. This willingness to call the figurative meaning ‘proper’ in such cases is already apparent in Alan of Lille's Liber Dictionum Theologicalium in the late twelfth century. Bracchium ‘properly’ means, he says, not ‘arm’ but ‘Christ’ in certain passages of Scripture.¹⁹

In Psalm 6.6 Luther finds an example of a figure in which the intention is clear. ‘I will wash my bed with my tears’ cannot be meant literally. Noone could weep so copiously. This is an exaggeration and exaggeration is a rhetorical figure. But the statement is still ‘true’, in that it conveys truly the depth of feeling of one who has many tears to shed. ‘What is lacking of truth in reality is more than enough in intention,’ Luther comments. He is even able to find a parallel in ordinary usage. We might talk of washing our hands and feet with an excess of tears (compare Luke 7.38).²⁰

Luther is pointing in this example to the two aspects of the interpretation of allegory with which later mediaeval scholars had come to be concerned: the question of intention and the question of usage, and the way they were balanced against one another (what Wyclif describes as the concordantia intencionis mentis et vocis).²¹ Luther sets out the two more clearly in another passage, on Ecclesiastes. There are two reasons, he says, why this book has proved difficult to understand. First, those who have interpreted it have not seen the purpose and aim of the author ‘which it is important to keep in mind and to follow in every kind of writing, and even more important here’. The other reason is ignorance of the way the language is being used, of Hebrew itself, and also of the special style of the author, ‘which often diverges from the ordinary usage of the language, and is very strange to our way of speaking’.²²

In his De Civili Dominio Wyclif sets out the problem of the relationship between usage and intention as he sees it. The words of Scripture are immutabiliter vera. It follows, per consequens, that they are proprie vera; they take their ‘propriety’ not from their signification, but from the intention of the author (iuxta sensum propriissime loquentis). Were we ourselves to follow the same usage in talking of our own human affairs we should be using the words improperly; human language must always in that sense be improper (locuciones nostre sunt improprie), because we cannot speak with God's intention.²³

The straining of ‘propriety’ of usage which especially concerns Wyclif here is that which occurs when Scripture speaks in figures. It is one thing to say, ‘It is improper to call God a lion’ (Deus improprie est leo). It is another thing to say, ‘The expression “God is a lion” is improper’ (Ista locucio est impropria, “Deus est leo”). The expression is indeed figurative and if it were used in a human context it would be ‘improper’, that is, not literally true. But in its Biblical context it is in a special sense ‘true’. It is, says Wyclif, vera de virtute sermonis. This vis or virtus sermonis—a common expression of Wyclif's, perhaps borrowed from Grosseteste, who also uses it—seems to be the intention of the divine author.²⁴

The effect of God's authorship, then, appears to be this. Usages which would be clearly improper in human mouths are made ‘proper’, that is, literally true, in the Bible because there they are used by God. The divine author's intention overrides the rules of ordinary usage.

The words of the Bible are true in every detail: secundum quamlibet eius particulam, as Wyclif puts it.²⁵ This is the principle which the ‘sophists’ are challenging when they claim that the Bible cannot be all true because it contradicts itself, and it is the purpose of the De Veritate Sacrae Scripturae to show that when usage and intention are properly understood, everything the Bible says proves to be true. Wyclif's criteria for the truth of Scripture in every part are demanding: every syllable, every letter, every dot.²⁶

But we need to settle what we mean by ‘true’. Wyclif distinguishes three ways of being true or false. God himself is Truth and any falling away from him is falsehood. A creature is ‘true’ when it is as it ought to be, as it was created to be (forma debita quoad mores), and it is ‘false’ when it ceases to be and to act as it should.²⁷ The third sort of truth and falsity is that of language and is the concern of logicians (tercio famosius apud logicus verbales). They say that a sign is false when it is made to signify what is either not so in the context or not so ever and absolutely.²⁸

All three are relevant when we ask whether a given passage of Scripture is true. If what it says conforms with the truth about God which is God himself, then regardless of any bending of the rules of usage which may have been necessary, it is a true statement. The second we shall return to in a moment. The third is illustrated neatly by Wyclif by means of what was clearly a commonplace example in the debates of the day. What of the statement made by the Fool in the Psalms: Deus non est?²⁹ That is in the Bible, but how can it be true? It is certainly false that God does not exist. But that is not what is being said, Wyclif points out. The text says that ‘the Fool said, “There is no God”.’ That is certainly true; the Fool made such a statement.³⁰

The second sort of truth has to do with things being what they are. The Bible calls Christ a lion.³¹ It does so figuratively, by making a comparison between Christ and a lion (figurative et per similitudinem). He seems to be ‘properly’ called a lion in the sense that he is indeed powerful in battle and so on, and to be ‘improperly’ called a lion in the sense that he is not actually a roaring quadruped.³²

We must look both to the figure and to what it stands for, figura and figuratum, says Wyclif.³³ A figurative usage may be ‘proper’ if the two fit together. Or we may take (with Gregory the Great) the opposite view, that since no words can signify the essence of God as he is, all speaking of God is figurative.³⁴ In either case, we must free ourselves of the habit of thinking of the figurative as necessarily different in kind from the literal, for ‘proper’ significations are to be found in figures.

There are many instances in Scripture where it will be necessary to decide that there is ‘propriety’ of this sort. Christ called himself ostium³⁵ and fundamentum and ‘the vine’ and ‘the way’, and so on. There is clear impropriety if we point out that Christ could not be a ‘corner-stone’ if no stone-mason shaped him, but then we are applying the word to the wrong thing, the creaturely thing. If we apply it to Christ, as he did himself, we see the points of similarity, the fittingness which makes the usage proper.³⁶ By paying attention to the virtus sermonis, the force the author intended the words to have, we can see that Christ is agnus, ovis, vitulus, aries, serpens, leo, vermis that is in that sensus mysticus which is supremely literal, qui est ut plurimum literalis.³⁷

The notion that there might be in some sense a literal truth in statements which take certain aspects of creatures and creaturely things and compare them with God attracted scholars who were anxious to enlarge the conception of the literal sense. The name of a creature is being attributed to God. There must be rules which govern the propriety of doing this. They are rules of ‘proportionality’.³⁸ Attributes of the creature are attributed as they are appropriate, and quite different attributes may be chosen which make it equally proper to call a very different being by the same creature's name. For example, taking one set of attributes, Christ may be said to be a lion, and taking another, Satan may be said to be a lion (when he goes about seeking whom he may devour).³⁹

But surely this is stretching the definition of truth too far? There were those in Wyclif's day who argued that there are many parts of Scripture in both Testaments which speak enigmatice and parabolice and are satis false.⁴⁰ A parable is surely nothing but a fiction, a fable?⁴¹ Augustine is helpful here. He contended with the same problem in the Contra Mendacium.⁴² Indeed, he says, taking the example of Jesus on the road to Emmaeus making as though he would go further, that would have been a lie if he had intended what he seemed to say. But he was really intending it to be understood that he would not go further. The meaning is true, the expression metaphorical.⁴³ Thus, as Aquinas says, ‘the metaphorical usages of Scripture are not false’ (metaforice … locuciones scripture non sunt false).⁴⁴

Wyclif gives three kinds of figures in which there is truth.

1. The allegory, when something which actually happens (facta ad literam) signifies something which is to come, as the lamb sacrificed in the Old Testament signifies Christ.⁴⁵

2. The parable, when a story is told which is not history but which is like history and could actually have happened.⁴⁶

3. Fictitious speech (locucio similitudinaria ficta); although it is not true ad literam nevertheless it sometimes signifies truth ut mistice.⁴⁷

Although these figures can be said to tell the truth, there remains the difficulty which Wyclif acknowledges Augustine had pointed out, that they are still fiction (ficte). How are we to say that such locuciones parabolice are true ad literam? ‘I have often reflected on this’ (sepe musitavi), says Wyclif.⁴⁸ He has come to the conclusion that there is no parable or similitude without a solid foundation. There can be no similitudo at all between things which do not exist. We can take it that the comparison works only because there is truth in it. These sayings are ‘as it were truths’ (tamquam verae).⁴⁹ Many things are ficta and tamen vera in this way.⁵⁰ The key to their truth is the divine intention, which modifies the rules of ordinary usage and makes the figurative literal in this larger sense.

The technical problems with which Wyclif takes issue in this part of the De Veritate Sacrae Scripturae and elsewhere were commonplaces of contemporary discussion in the schools. Wyclif works within an established tradition in proposing this method of salvaging the truth of passages which appear to be nonsense or to be contradictory or to be clearly fictional.⁵¹ But he also points the way forward. The enlarged literal sense took in a select group of figures, those about whose intention there can be no reasonable doubt, most notably perhaps those used by Christ himself. This segregation of the fanciful from the common sense in allegorical interpretation helped to pave the way to a new criticism which was to attempt above all to along intelligently with Scripture's usages, without forcing or elaborating interpretations. To restrict oneself to these is not to lose those glimpses into the spiritual depths which so attracted Origen and Augustine and Gregory and their successors to meanings beyond the strictly literal. But it is to look to the virtus intencionis verbi.⁵²

Notes

1. Origen, De Principiis IV, ed. P. Koetschau Leipzig 1913, gives Origen's main principles. See, too, J. W. Trigg, Origen, the Bible and Philosophy in the Third Century Church (Atlanta 1949) p. 120.

2. The Book of Rules of Tichonius, ed. F. C. Burkitt (Cambridge 1895) Preface p. 1/1-3.

3. Luther on Psalm 45.4, D. Martin Luthers Werke, ed. J. C. F. Knaake (Weimar 1883-) [Weimarer Ausgabe; hereafter WA] 3 p. 262.

4. Calvin on Genesis 27.27, Ioannis Calvini Opera Quae Supersunt Omnia, ed. G. Baum and others, Corpus Reformatorum 59 vols. (Brunswick/Berlin, 1863-1900) [Hereafter CO] 23 p. 406.

5. Calvin on Genesis 6.3, CO 23 p. 114.

6. Calvin on Genesis 6.14, CO 23 p. 123.

7. Calvin on Genesis 2.8, CO 23 p. 37.

8. Calvin, Harmony of the Gospels, on Luke 4.4, CO 46 pp. 605-6.

9. Luther on Deuteronomy 21.1, WA 14 p. 698.

10. Wyclif, De Ver. Sac. Scrip. i. 9/7-9.

11. Ibid., i. 174/11, 20.

12. Ibid., i. 11/2-5.

13. Ibid., i. 44/12-13.

14. Ibid., i. 11/4-14.

15. Ibid., i. 10/19-20.

16. Ibid., i. 94/11-12. On equivoca in this context, see G. R. Evans, The Logic and Language of the Bible: the Earlier Middle Ages (Cambridge 1984) pp. 140-63 and The Logic and Language of the Bible: the Road to Reformation (Cambridge 1985) pp. 114-19

17. On Andrew of St. Victor, see B. Smalley, The Study of the Bible in the Middle Ages (3rd ed. Oxford 1983) pp. 112-95.

18. On the sensus primarius, see Wyclif, De Ver. Sac. Scrip. i. 42/1.

19. PL 210 col. 722.

20. Luther on Psalm 6.6, WA 3 p. 71. Compare Luke 7.38.

21. Wyclif, De Ver. Sac. Scrip. i. 53/25.

22. Luther on Ecclesiastes, WA 20 pp. 8-9.

23. Wyclif, De Civ. Dom. i. 441/3-19.

24. Ibid., and De Ver. Sac. Scrip. i. 43/12 for a citation from Grosseteste.

25. De Civ. Dom. i. 440/29-30.

26. De Ver. Sac. Scrip. i. 86/11-13, 87/4 ff.

27. Anselm of Canterbury discusses truth of action in his De Veritate cap. 5, Opera Omnia, ed. F. S. Schmitt (Rome and Edinburgh 1938-68) 1 pp. 181-2.

28. Wyclif, De Ver. Sac. Scrip. i. 81/15-24.

29. Psalms 13.1, 52.1.

30. Wyclif, De Ver. Sac. Scrip. i. 87/10-12.

31. Revelation 5.5

32. Wyclif, De Ver. Sac. Scrip. i. 40/4-15.

33. Ibid., i. 40/16-17.

34. Ibid., i. 40/15-19.

35. Ibid., i. 41/5 ff.

36. Ibid., i. 7/1-11.

37. Ibid., i. 5/1 ff.

38. Ibid., i. 14/20-3.

39. Ibid., i. 15-16.

40. Ibid., i. 63/3-5.

41. Ibid., i. 63/24.

42. Ibid., i. 64/3.

43. Ibid., i. 64/14-15.

44. Ibid., i. 65/6, Aquinas, De Potentia, Questions 6 and 7.

45. Wyclif, De Ver. Sac. Scrip. i. 65/18-19.

46. Ibid., i. 66/16.

47. Ibid., i. 66/22

48. Ibid., i. 74/13-75/1.

49. Ibid., i. 75/8.

50. Ibid., i. 75/14-15.

51. See The Logic and Language of the Bible: the Road to Reformation, pp. 114 ff.

52. Wyclif, De Ver. Sac. Scrip. i. 43/12.