SOURCE: Haren, Michael. “From Ancient World to Middle Ages: Adaptation and Transmission.” In Medieval Thought: The Western Intellectual Tradition from Antiquity to the Thirteenth Century, pp. 37-82. Hampshire, England: Macmillan Publishers Ltd, 1985.

[In the following excerpt, Haren provides an overview of Eriugena's background, career, and major writings.]

THE BACKGROUND TO ERIUGENA'S WORK

The Visigothic culture which had produced Isidore of Seville was submerged in the Islamic invasion which swamped the Spanish peninsula—with the exception of the Basque land and the adjoining coastal region—in 711. From then until the Carolingian renaissance, some seventy years later, the focus on intellectual developments moves to the north-western periphery of Europe. Ireland had never been part of the Roman empire but Christianity had brought with it a Latin culture which continued, at least as far as grammar and rhetoric were concerned, in Irish monasticism during the sixth century. Columbanus in particular was widely read in classical poetry and was himself a fine metric poet and rhetorician. He was the greatest of the Irish missionaries to Europe (c. 591-615) and the founder of Bobbio, later to become a major centre. Northern England, where Irish and Roman Christianity met somewhat stormily in the mid-seventh century, proved an especially fruitful area of cultural exchange. The Northumbrian, Benedict Biscop, founder of monasteries at Wearmouth and Jarrow, knew Greek as well as Latin. He had studied on the continent and visited it often. He was also for a time an associate of Archbishop Theodore of Tarsus, the Greek monk who was appointed to Canterbury in 669, and of Theodore's companion, Abbot Hadrian, a monk of African extraction imbued with the Greek culture of southern Italy. The fusion of these various influences produced at Wearmouth and Jarrow an outstanding scholar in the Venerable Bede (673-735). A little later they produced Alcuin, at York, the centre of a thriving school and library. It was with Alcuin (c. 730-804) that the northern learning came to be formally transplanted into the Carolingian empire. In 782, Alcuin accepted an invitation from Charlemagne to become head of the king's palace school at Aix-la-Chapelle.

The history of general learning and literary activity during this period lies beyond the scope of the present survey. Charlemagne's policy was aimed at raising the level of basic education, especially in the church. Through the work of teachers like Alcuin and the latter's pupil, the encyclopaedist, Rhabanus Maurus (c. 776-856), who became archbishop of Mainz in 847, and through the establishment of monastic and capitular schools, he promoted an expanding knowledge of the liberal arts. The ‘renaissance’ was not directly concerned with furthering speculative thought. However there are some suggestions of philosophical interests. Alcuin was not an original thinker but his writings show an understanding of the philosophical content of ancient texts—those of the Fathers, especially St Augustine, and of Boethius. He was keenly interested in logic and promoted the study of it both through his own textbook on the subject, De Dialectica, and through the copying of texts, notably the pseudo-Augustinian Categoriae Decem (‘Ten Categories’). Moreover, evidence of the philosophical activity of Alcuin and his circle has been augmented by the case for the provenance of a number of texts from the period, preserved most fully in a Munich manuscript and referred to accordingly as the ‘Munich passages’.¹ One of these passages, the Dicta Albini (‘Sayings of Albinus’), may probably be taken to be by Alcuin himself. The remaining fourteen seem to have been written or collected by his friend and pupil, the Anglo-Saxon monk, Candidus. These texts raise such questions as the soul's capacity to know, the nature of existence, the existence of God and the implications of his creation of man in his ‘image’. They also provide evidence of contemporary assimilation of the doctrine of the Categories and preoccupation with the technique of argument. Although greatly indebted for their starting points to St Augustine's De Trinitate (‘On the Trinity’), among other works of late antiquity, they reveal considerable sophistication of interest and of treatment. Candidus may also have written several sermons of philosophical import, in which, among other matters, the topics of ‘being’, ‘potentiality’ and ‘volition’ are examined.² He was probably the author too of a treatise on the beatific vision.³ All in all, he emerges as a figure of considerable importance for his period. Certainly, the material with which he is associated is an important demonstration of the concerns of his milieu.

To the evidence of the ‘Munich passages’ and related material may be added the work of another pupil of Alcuin, Fredegisus of Tours (d. 834). His letter On Nothing and Darkness (De Nihilo et Tenebris) treats nothingness as substantial—as being something. From a letter written c. 830 by Agobard, bishop of Lyons, to refute his views, it appears that he subscribed to a Platonic theory of the pre-existence of the soul which may have had some currency in Alcuin's circle.⁴

Further documentation of a philosophical outlook, contemporary with the century's greatest thinker, comes from the controversy over the soul between Ratramnus of Corbie, writing probably before 864, and an unnamed monk.⁵ The discussion here started from St Augustine's analysis of soul in On the Quantity of the Soul. Augustine had set out three approaches to the subject without a firm decision in favour of any: that all souls are one—a statement of their specific and generic unity; that individual souls are quite separate—a statement of the opposite perspective; and the synthesis that they are both one and many, a position which he seems to have found absurd. In his treatment, Ratramnus was at pains to show that genera and species were mental constructs abstracted from individuals. In this he relied on Boethius, particularly on the first commentary on the Isagoge, but his bias was unequivocally towards the absolute priority of individuals. His opponent, by contrast, seems to have insisted on the reality of genera and species at the expense of allowing for real individuating difference. The unnamed monk attributed his views to his master, an Irishman, Macarius, who is not otherwise known.

Apart from their intrinsic interest, the discussions and views which we have been considering of Alcuin, Candidus, Macarius, his pupil and Ratramnus are important for another reason. They help to place in context the work of the Irishman, John Scotus Eriugena. This is particularly so of the controversy over the soul. It supplies a record, though meagre and somewhat tenuous, of ultra-realist teaching on the part of another Irish master, Macarius. Its interest is the more in view of the contacts which Irishmen on the continent at this time are known to have maintained with one another.⁶ Eriugena remains a towering figure in his originality and genius but it is now more apparent than formerly that there existed among his immediate predecessors and contemporaries a certain level of philosophical literacy which gives his work the greater point.

ERIUGENA'S CAREER AND WRITINGS

Eriugena's biography is very imperfectly known. Since he was writing up to 875, an approximate date of 810 has been arrived at for his birth. He was called ‘Scottus’—or ‘Irishman’—by his contemporaries and the best manuscript tradition of his works preserves the tautology, ‘Eriugena’, ‘of the Irish race’, as part of his name. In addition, the contemporary writer Prudentius of Troyes testifies to his Irish provenance. Apart from these references, however, he appears to history only as a continental figure. Professor Bieler has pointed out that the Irish exiles in the Gaul of Charlemagne and his successors were a different historical phenomenon from the missions of the seventh and early eighth centuries.⁷ They were attracted both by the intellectual life of the Carolingian court and the episcopal sees and by the security which Gaul afforded them at a time when Irish monasteries were being subjected to the Viking raids. The question whether Eriugena could have obtained his knowledge of Greek, which was by no means perfect, and his generally advanced training in Ireland is a controversial one. In reaction to exaggerated earlier accounts of what the Irish had to offer to the continent, Dom Cappuyns was dismissive; his views have been challenged by Professor O'Meara.⁸

A point more susceptible of definitive statement is Eriugena's acquaintance with his main Greek authority, Dionysius the pseudo-Areopagite. This was reputedly the convert made by St Paul at Athens; hence the great reverence accorded him by Eriugena and the later mystics. In reality, he was a fifth- or early sixth-century Christian writer who may have been a Syrian monk. Due to a further confusion between the pseudo-Areopagite and the undated Parisian martyr, Bishop Denis, who became France's patron saint, his works were of peculiar local interest. In 827, the Greek emperor, Michael II, had presented Louis the Pious, Charlemagne's son and successor, with the Greek text. An earlier attempt to translate them had resulted in an unsatisfactory version and in 860 Charles the Bald commissioned Eriugena to do the work.

The treatises of the pseudo-Dionysius comprise the Celestial Hierarchy, the Ecclesiastical Hierarchy, the Mystical Theology and the Divine Names, as well as ten separate Epistles. The Mystical Theology and the Divine Names were the most influential. Besides their general Neoplatonist content, their central theses are the inadequacy of the common attributes, just, good and so on, as names for God and, as an extension of this point, the distinction of three levels of theology. These are the affirmative (cataphatic), by which an attribution is made, the negative (apophatic), by which it is at once denied, and the superlative, which is both affirmative and negative, in that it uses attributes in a transcendent sense while denying that predicates derived from knowledge of finite things can apply to God. Eriugena translated the Dionysian corpus and commented on most of it. He also translated a Greek commentary upon it, the Ambigua of Maximus the Confessor (580-662). Maximus had modified the doctrines in the light of his special expertise in Aristotelian logic and had related them to a Christological pattern. According to this, Christ was the Logos or Word through whom the ideas or archetypes of creation were realised and through whom the Neoplatonist return of all things to their source was to be effected. In addition, Eriugena translated On the Creation of Man, a work of St Gregory of Nyssa (d. 394). Its Christianised account of the Neoplatonist descent and return of the soul heavily influenced his own treatment of this topic in the Periphyseon.

Eriugena's precise indebtedness to Greek authors may be summarised by recalling the important point made by Professor Sheldon-Williams.⁹ It is that apart from his dialectical doctrine of the fourfold division of nature, which seems to come directly from Alexandrian logical theory, he had no first-hand knowledge of the pagan philosophers. Even of Aristotle his knowledge is confined to Boethius' commentary on the De Interpretatione and to the pseudo-Augustinian paraphrase of the De Categoriis. His Greek sources therefore are Christian and his Neoplatonism largely the product of the pseudo-Dionysius, Maximus the Confessor and Gregory of Nyssa.

Because the Periphyseon, written c. 864-6, is so heavily indebted to the pseudo-Dionysian corpus it is difficult to imagine what form Eriugena's ideas would have taken had he not come into contact with it. There are, however, some indications of the direction in which he would have tended. According to Prudentius of Troyes, he had already embarked on a radical line of cosmological speculation before his discovery of the pseudo-Dionysius. The source for it was said to be Martianus Capella's Marriage of Philology and Mercury, on which Eriugena was writing a commentary in 859-60. It could have provided the basis for reflection on the soul's journey through the planetary spheres and on the impossibility of a local hell, since there was no space outside the cosmos.¹⁰ Another possible source was the Commentary on the ‘Dream of Scipio’ (Somnium Scipionis), by the early fifth-century author, Macrobius. The ‘Dream of Scipio’ was an extract from the Republic of Cicero and contained a statement of the Platonic doctrine of the soul. It became influential as a school text in the early middle ages. Eriugena shows some evidence of having read Macrobius.¹¹ On the theological level, Eriugena's preference for a naturalistic, quasi-Pelagian approach to human perfectibility is detectable as early as 850 in his treatise On Predestination.¹² This was directed against the extreme Augustinianism of Gottschalk, whose doctrine of double predestination, that is of the damned as well as of the elect, had been condemned two years before by the Council of Mainz. Eriugena's defence of free will, his criticism of the concepts of predestination and prescience as applied to God, his insistence on the unreality of evil and his denial that it is a proper object of divine knowledge made a sufficiently disturbing package for his own treatise in turn to be condemned at two local synods. Finally, like all Christians, he had in the Fourth Gospel a stimulus to philosophical interpretation of salvation history. It is significant that after the completion of the Periphyseon he was drawn to write both a homily on the Prologue to that Gospel and a commentary on the Gospel itself.

These various pointers combine to suggest that the broad lines of Eriugena's thought as elaborated in the Periphyseon may have developed before he began his translations. In particular, the general structures round which the work is built must have been deeply laid in his outlook. They are dialectical method and confidence in the power and role of reason. The two are complementary. Eriugena's rationalism has a metaphysical basis. For him, reason is the natural impulse of the soul towards its source. It is a part of the divine creation and its object is the theophanies or manifestations of God in his progress from unity to multiplicity.¹³ Eriugena's definition of nature too relates it closely with the One, so that philosophy extends to a consideration of the ‘divine, eternal and immutable’. This is the explanation of his astonishing observation in the commentary on Martianus Capella that ‘no one can enter heaven except by philosophy’.¹⁴ The high value set upon reason emerges even more explicitly from a passage in the Periphyseon where Eriugena expounds the difference between reason and authority. The ‘Master’ of the dialogue has made the Dionysian point that the nature of God is ineffable and that names are inadequate. The ‘Disciple’ requests that the argument be supported by references to the Fathers. But the Master urges that this would be to imply a false priority, ‘For authority proceeds from true reason but reason certainly does not proceed from authority. For every authority which is not upheld by true reason is seen to be weak, whereas true reason is kept firm and immutable by her own powers and does not require to be confirmed by the assent of any authority.’¹⁵ The dialectical method is an unavoidable corollary to this. For Eriugena there is no question of dialectic's being an order imposed on reality by the mind. It is an order rooted in the nature of things: ‘The art of dialectic, which divides genera into species and resolves species into genera, was not fashioned by human devices, but created in the nature of things by the Author of all arts that are truly arts; and discovered by wise men and, by skilful research, adapted to use.’¹⁶ Theology and analysis of the universe are inextricably connected and dialectic is the method appropriate to both.

ERIUGENA: THE PERIPHYSEON

The Periphyseon or On the Division of Nature¹⁷ comprises five books in dialogue form between a master and his disciple. In the first chapter of Book i a twofold scheme of the division of nature is proposed. The first scheme is the more fundamental and defines Eriugena's concept of nature. It is a startling comprehensive term: ‘The first and fundamental division of all things which either can be grasped by the mind or lie beyond its grasp is into those that are and those that are not. Nature is the general name for all things, for those that are and those that are not.’¹⁸ In other words, every object of thought is embraced in the term nature. Idealism can go no further.

Later, five modes of interpretation are distinguished in this primary division, ‘this basic difference which separates all things’. In the first place, being or non-being is considered according to perceptibility—that is according to whether or not it can be predicated by intellect or sense. God is not perceived in this way and according to this mode shall be said not to exist. Secondly, being and non-being is determined according to its place in the Neoplatonist concept of the hierarchy linking creator with the lowest creation and vice versa. In this, the intellectual power is highest. To the extent that being is predicated of a creature of a higher order it is denied of a lower and vice versa. This is what constitutes the difference in things. Thirdly, it is considered according to actualisation, a mode which recalls the Aristotelian distinction between potentiality and actuality. Fourthly, it is considered according to the faculty of perception. This is really a subdivision of the first mode. If a thing is perceptible to the intellect it is said truly to be, if perceptible to the senses it is said not truly to be, in accordance with the Platonic doctrine that it is the intelligible which is fully real. Fifthly, there is a mode pertaining to man only, as having in Eriugena's system freedom of will. This is the mode ‘according to the realisation of God's image’: to the extent that a man is removed from similarity to God, he is said not to be.

The second scheme of the division of nature is introduced between the statement of the first scheme and its elaboration. It is less radical though it is better known as a feature of Eriugena's thought. The scheme is a fourfold division between: (i) that which creates but is not created—that is God, the source of creation; (ii) that which is created and creates. This concept, which is the subject of Book ii, is a fusion of Neoplatonist and Christian idioms. The Neoplatonist Logos—the expression of the divine mind and the eternal embodiment of the archetypes of creation—is identified with the second person of the Trinity; (iii) that which is created but does not create—that is, the created universe which is the subject of Book iii; (iv) that which does not create and is not created—the subject of Books iv and v. This is God considered as the end of the universe in a Neoplatonist reversion up the hierarchy, of bodies to souls, of souls to causes and of causes to God, who will be all in all.

Eriugena's analysis, which can only be briefly outlined here, raises a number of problems in the context of Christian theology. The first problem is peculiarly one for a tradition where the authority of St Augustine was paramount. He considered Augustine to be a major support for his position and cites him more frequently than any other single writer. But it is Augustine as interpreted in the light of the pseudo-Dionysius when there is any conflict between the two.¹⁹ In particular, Eriugena's endorsement of the Neoplatonist return of all things to their source is an implicit statement of a theology of man's perfectibility which is radically different from that of St Augustine. He upholds the role and efficacy of grace but it is a grace which is given to the elect to proceed beyond the state of original, primordial perfection which all are considered capable of achieving. The special status accorded to the elect is referred to as ‘deification’, which is ‘the passing of the saints into God not only in soul but in body, so that they are one in Him and with Him when nothing animal, corporeal, human or natural remains in them’.²⁰ The term is highly contentious, as Eriugena was well aware. However, despite the language in which the process is described, it is clear that he wished to safeguard the continued distinct existence of the individual soul.²¹ In this respect the claims of Christianity and of Neoplatonist mysticism agreed.

The second problem is whether Eriugena's notion of nature, particularly as regards the cosmic return, is a pantheistic one. He was certainly conscious that his scheme might be interpreted in that sense and was anxious to disavow the doctrine, which was in any case incompatible with a Neoplatonist regard for the transcendence of the One. Yet the insinuation of pantheism is at some points very strong and indeed the Periphyseon was to be condemned on this count by Honorius III in 1225.

The third problem is related to the first. What is the place of evil in Eriugena's system? He followed the Platonist tradition and Augustine closely in ascribing the origin of evil to the will. But what becomes of evil in the cosmic return? Since it is not part of God's creation it cannot be subsumed and if it cannot be subsumed it cannot exist in the final condition of nature when God is all in all. Is it possible therefore to have eternal damnation? Eriugena goes to considerable lengths in fact to reconcile the scriptural datum with his Neoplatonist system. There is no localised hell but the wicked are eternally punished, despite their having regained the state of pristine perfection. Their unhappiness consists in a continuing attachment to the memory of their former temporal state. It is a subtle solution, similar to the psychological doctrine of hell propounded by Origen.²² One feels, however, that the Disciple is justified in his puzzlement over the apparent permanence of tension in a nature which has been purified. One feels also that Eriugena would have been happier to have followed the doctrine to its logical, Origenist conclusion and to have regarded hell as an incomplete state, capable of remedy. That he did not do so illustrates how a philosopher's bias can be restrained by overriding considerations—in this case, the force of established theology.

ERIUGENA: THE SUBSEQUENT TRADITION

The sources for assessing Eriugena's influence are scattered and fragmentary. Recent important research into it has drawn skilfully on two pieces of evidence: a set of contemporary notes and glosses which have been variously taken to have been written by Eriugena himself but which it is now argued are in the hands of two of his closest circle, and the manuscript witness to an evolution in the text of the Periphyseon.²³ The evidence shows both that he had associates who read him attentively and that he in turn was conscious of his readership. Among identifiable figures connected with him is his friend, Wulfad, a monk at the court of Charles the Bald, who is known to have possessed his translations of pseudo-Dionysius and Maximus as well as the Periphyseon.²⁴ The Irishman, Martin of Laon, master of the cathedral school there, can be shown to have read the Periphyseon at an early stage though he was not expert enough to have been much influenced by it.²⁵ Moreover, a body of glosses on Boethius' sacred treatises, on Martianus Capella's Marriage of Philology and Mercury and, most importantly, on the pseudo-Augustinian paraphrase of the Categories (Categoriae Decem) bear the influence of his thought. In particular, Heiric, master of the monastic school of St Germain at Auxerre c. 865, drew on Eriugena in writing his glosses on the Categoriae Decem and Eriugena's influence is also apparent in the work of Heiric's pupil, Remigius of Auxerre. Remigius wrote commentaries on a range of classroom texts—Scripture, the grammatical authors, Donat and Priscian, Boethius' Consolation of Philosophy and Martianus Capella. He taught probably first at Auxerre, then at the cathedral school of Reims in the last decade of the ninth century and perhaps afterwards at Paris.

While it is clear therefore that Eriugena's readership in his own time and in the next generation was greater than has usually been recognised, his influence when viewed in longer perspective was much less than he deserved. St Anselm of Bec's follower, Honorius Augustodunensis, made substantial borrowings from the Periphyseon and there are other indications that it had some currency in northern France in the twelfth century. The Latin corpus of the pseudo-Dionysius did carry a small part of the Periphyseon in the form of a gloss²⁶ and further work in the history of mysticism may reveal as yet undiscovered disciples of its doctrine. But its effects so far known are trifling for a system of such power and challenge. Even before the pronouncement of Honorius III, which followed use of it by the heretic Amaury of Bène, Eriugena's reputation was tarnished. Berengar of Tours appealed, mistakenly, to his authority against the possibility of transubstantiation and suffered condemnation at the Council of Rome (1050). If the legend that Eriugena was stabbed to death by the pens of his students is apocryphal it contains perhaps an element of truth. At all events, the relative obscurity into which his synthesis fell was a misfortune for western thought. It had opened a window on a parallel view of the universe, that of the Greek patristic tradition. Latin Christendom had lost contact with this other vision and on the whole it was to remain uncomprehending, even hostile, towards it.

Eriugena was the last systematic thinker before St Anselm of Bec in the late eleventh century, and St Anselm springs from a different tradition. In the interval between them activity was more humdrum though it was ultimately to be fruitful for the speculative movement. The kind of explanatory writing which has been noted in the case of Heiric and Remigius of Auxerre was continued. It produced new glosses, reworkings of already existing glosses and, occasionally, independent treatises. Martianus and Boethius continued to be read. In particular, metric 9 of Book iii of the Consolation of Philosophy—a passage inspired by Plato's Timaeus—called on all the philosophical reserves which contemporary scholars owned. Gradually there came more direct contact with the Timaeus, through increasing use of Chalcidius. Macrobius' commentary on the Dream of Scipio also gradually became better known. By the eleventh century Chalcidius and Macrobius had joined the syllabus as standard authors.²⁷ This is one area in which the ninth-century achievement was continued and augmented. Scholarship on Boethius, on Martianus, on Chalcidius and on Macrobius would eventually reach its peak in the cosmological writing of the twelfth century. Another area is the development and expansion of logical expertise. Extension of the logical programme was the foundation of the major speculative endeavours of the eleventh and twelfth centuries. It is only by following its course that they can be understood.

Notes

1. See J. Marenbon, From the Circle of Alcuin to the School of Auxerre: Logic, Theology and Philosophy in the Early Middle Ages (Cambridge, 1981), pp. 44-55, 151-66.

2. See ibid., pp. 57-62.

3. Ibid., pp. 39-40.

4. Ibid., pp. 64-5.

5. See ibid., pp. 67-70 and CHLGEMP [The Cambridge History of Later Greek and Early Medieval Philosophy, ed. A. H. Armstrong (Cambridge, 1970).], pp. 573-5.

6. See Marenbon, From the Circle of Alcuin, pp. 105-11; cf. J. J. Contreni, ‘The Irish Colony at Laon during the time of John Scottus’ in Jean Scot Erigène et l'Histoire de la Philosophie (Actes du Colloque no. 561 du CNRS à Laon, du 7 au 12 juillet 1976, organisé par R. Rogues; Paris, 1977), pp. 59-67.

7. See L. Bieler, Ireland, Harbinger of the Middle Ages (Corrected reprint, Oxford, 1966), p. 166.

8. M. Cappuyns, Jean Scot Erigène: sa vie, son oeuvre, sa pensée (Paris, 1933); J. J. O'Meara, Eriugena (Cork, 1969).

9. I. P. Sheldon-Williams, ‘Eriugena's Greek Sources’ in J. J. O'Meara (ed.), The Mind of Eriugena (Dublin, 1973), pp. 2-5.

10. See CHLGEMP, pp. 577-8 and O'Meara, Eriugena, p. 19.

11. See CHLGEMP, p. 523, n. 5.

12. Eriugena already knew Origen's De principiis by this time, see ibid., pp. 583-4.

13. Cf. M. L. Uhlfelder and J. A. Potter, John the Scot, Periphyseon, On the Division of Nature (Indianapolis, 1976), pp. xxvii-xxviii.

14. Annotationes in Marcianum, ed. C. Lutz (Cambridge, Mass., 1939), 57.15, p. 64. This might be thought, from the context, to apply to the classical heaven only but as the editor shows, pp. xvi-xvii, it is part of a general emphasis in the work on the power of reason.

15. Periphyseon, i. 69. I. P. Sheldon-Williams, ed. and tr. John Scotus Eriugena, Periphyseon, i (Dublin, 1968), pp. 197-9.

16. Periphyseon, iv. 4; tr. Uhlfelder and Potter, John the Scot, p. 215.

17. Periphyseon (‘Concerning Nature’) is the more general title; cf. CHLGEMP, p. 520, n. 2.

18. Periphyseon, i. (Prologue); Sheldon-Williams, p. 37.

19. Sheldon-Williams, ‘Eriugena's Greek Sources’, p. 5.

20. Periphyseon, v. 38; tr. Uhlfelder and Potter, John the Scot, p. 351.

21. See, for example, Periphyseon, v. 8; Uhlfelder and Potter, John the Scot, pp. 288-9.

22. On Origen's doctrine, see, e.g. CHLGEMP, pp. 190-2.

23. Marenbon, From the Circle of Alcuin, pp. 88-109.

24. See ibid., pp. 111-12.

25. See ibid., pp. 109-11.

26. See CHLGEMP, pp. 532-3. Cf. Periphyseon, ed. Sheldon-Williams, i (Dublin, 1968), 24.

27. See M. Gibson, ‘The Continuity of Learning circa 850-circa 1050’, Viator, vi (1975), [1-13], 12.