SOURCE: Carabine, Deirdre. “Eriugena's Use of the Symbolism of Light, Cloud, and Darkness in the Periphyseon.” In Eriugena: East and West: Papers of the Eighth International Colloquium of the Society for the Promotion of Eriugenian Studies: Chicago and Notre Dame: 18-20 October 1991, edited by Bernard McGinn and Willemien Otten, pp. 141-52. Notre Dame, Ind.: University of Notre Dame Press, 1994.

[In the following essay, originally delivered as lecture in 1991, Carabine examines ambiguous aspects of Eriugena's symbolism.]

The diverse ways in which eriugena employs the theme of light have been given scholarly attention in the past.¹ It is my intention that this essay should complement that aspect of Eriugena's thought through an elucidation of la métaphysique nocturne in the Periphyseon. In doing so, I do not propose to diminish the importance of the carefully constructed light metaphysics so obviously present in that work. Nevertheless, I do suggest that there exists a certain ambiguity regarding Eriugena's application of some aspects of metaphors of both light and darkness in terms of the ultimate epistemological and eschatological consequences of a radical apophasis.

The ambiguity that can be readily detected in following through Eriugena's employment of the light/darkness metaphor is due, at least in some measure, to his reading and assimilation of both eastern and western sources, but it is also a fundamental aspect of the nature of metaphor. Since the mind must use illustrations from things it can understand,² it employs metaphor as an effective means of access to what cannot be expressed literally; metaphor cannot, therefore, be retranslated into literal terms, nor can its application be fully effective in every instance. In forcing the mind beyond the literal, a basic tension is revealed between the literal meaning which is obviously denied and the non-literal meaning which cannot be fully affirmed. Literally speaking, God is not darkness in the same sense as God can be said to be light, for the final darkness of apophasis is always, paradoxically, “inaccessible light” (1 Tim. 6:16)—and yet the non-literal aspect of the metaphor cannot be denied.

In Eriugena's thought, the light metaphor in the service of kataphatic utterances is a means of expressing both the creative movement of the self-manifestation of the hidden³ and, in epistemological terms, the Platonically inspired development of the ascent of the mind from the darkness of unreality and ignorance to the light of truth. The light metaphor cannot, then, be employed usefully in terms of apophatic utterances unless it is adapted, if not indeed fully reversed. The darkness metaphor, as symbolic of the ascent of the soul from the light of creatures to the hiddenness of God, is a development of the allegorical interpretation of the long climb of Moses up the dark mountain of the deus absconditus (see Exod. 20). The Exodus text is interpreted as presenting darkness as a symbol, both for the transcendence of God in its objective sense and also for human “ignorance” in its subjective sense as a prerequisite for the “knowledge” of God.⁴ And yet both these symbolic movements, from light to darkness (the scaling of cloudwreathed Sinai) and from darkness to light (the journey from the depths of the cave up to the light of the Sun, as in Plato's Republic), meet in their ultimate conclusion, for the consequence of both is blindness. In the case of the cave dweller, blindness is a temporary state until the eyes become accustomed to the brilliance of the Sun's light; in the case of the mountain climber, blindness or sightlessness would appear to be a permanent condition. However, in the last analysis, the darkness metaphors of apophasis are understood only in terms of light, be it the excessive light that permanently blinds the eye of the intellect or the lux inaccessibilis which prohibits entry to the restored soul. In the context of the final resolutio, the darkness of God is at some level comprehended: the revelation of the hidden leaves behind some residual understanding of itself before returning once again to darkness.

The ultimate question, therefore, to keep in mind during the course of this discussion is this: Is Eriugena's appropriation and employment of the principles of apophasis faithful to his Cappadocian and Dionysian sources or is it in any way tempered by his reading of Augustine? We shall see that Eriugena does not shrink from the consequences of a rigorous apophasis which is carried through from the “here” to the “there,” as Plotinus would put it, by applying the principle of the unknowability of the divine essence to the state of the restored soul. I believe, however, that Eriugena's position differs slightly from that of Dionysius and Gregory of Nyssa, and that these differences (nuanced as they are) can be found especially in his exposition and interpretation of the final “cloud of contemplation.” Therefore, in order to appreciate, and indeed evaluate, Eriugena's understanding of the darkness of the divine essence as lux inaccessibilis, I begin with some brief remarks on the light/dark symbolism in the Greek and Latin traditions before him.

THE LATIN TRADITION: AUGUSTINE

In general terms, the main focus of Augustine's thought can be stated simply enough in terms of his underlying reliance upon a number of key Pauline texts. The Christian life is characterized by faith in the unseen God, the faith which guides us through the night of this world to the light of the vision of God “face to face” in the next (1 Cor. 13:12).⁵ That God is not known directly in this life but, rather, through his works (Rom. 1:20) is for Augustine a reminder that the next life will be characterized in terms of a more direct knowledge of God (2 Cor. 5:6-7).⁶ Augustine's juxtaposition of faith and sight in terms of darkness and light, based as it is upon the Johannine exposition of the Incarnation, reverses the great apophatic symbols of the Deus absconditus of the Old Testament: the pejorative sense of darkness (in epistemological, ontological, and moral terms) as sin, evil, death, and ignorance (the state of the world before the coming of the light) is contrasted dramatically with the notion of light as symbolic of good, salvation, life, and knowledge. The Augustinian reliance upon the light metaphor, in terms both of Incarnation and redemption and also in an epistemological context, appears to render wholly invalid the term “darkness” either as a symbol for the transcendence of God or as a symbol for the human response to that transcendence. The two most powerful symbols of the journey of Moses (cloud and fire), fade in the light of the splendor of the revelation of Mount Tabor. Augustine's use of the light metaphor, then, renders his account of the journey of the soul in every aspect as a journey which is best portrayed in terms of a movement from the darkness of ignorance to the light of truth.

THE GREEK TRADITION: GREGORY OF NYSSA AND PSEUDO-DIONYSIUS

In contrast to the general direction of Augustine's thought, we find that the fourth-century Cappadocian Father, Gregory of Nyssa, develops a Philonic/Alexandrian theme which was to enter into western thought through Eriugena's use of the works of the Pseudo-Dionysius. Although Philo of Alexandria appears to have been the progenitor of the explicit use of the term “darkness” (γνόφοs) as illustrative of the transcendence of God (and indeed also of man's intellectual condition in the face of that transcendence), his pioneering account of the journey of the soul in terms of the movement from light, through cloud, to darkness, had only faint reverberations in the earlier Christian Fathers. For the most part, ignorance and the darkness of Sinai were not understood as the culmination of the order of knowledge, but as the ignorance of the multitude.⁷

Gregory of Nyssa's scriptural inspiration for his conception of the progress of the soul as a movement from light to darkness would appear to rely chiefly on Exodus and the Song of Songs. In the Life of Moses, he describes the three stages of the journey of the soul as follows: (1) from light, which is knowledge of created effects; (2) through cloud, which involves aphairesis (the removal of foreign matter so that God can be known in the mirror of the soul); (3) and finally to darkness, whereby the soul finally knows and sees God through not-knowing and not-seeing.⁸ In one remarkable passage in the Commentary on Ecclesiastes, he describes the experience of not-knowing most vividly in terms of putting one's foot over the edge of a high cliff (into the area of the nonconcept) and finally pulling back in fear.⁹ Although the soul moves back to what it is familiar with, to concepts, it now knows that knowing God consists precisely in not knowing God. However, Gregory's portrayal of the darkness in which God is known is not a negative darkness but a “luminous darkness” (like “watchful sleep” and “sober intoxication”), for the soul has entered into the place where God is (Ps. 17:11), the “secret chamber of divine knowledge.”¹⁰ “The true vision and the true knowledge of what we seek consists precisely in not seeing, in an awareness that our goal transcends all knowledge and is everywhere cut off from us by the darkness of incomprehensibility.”¹¹ Thus, for Gregory, cloud becomes the not-seeing and not-knowing of existing things, in order that we might “know” that essence which transcends them. Having entered into the place where God is does not mean that the soul now knows the divine essence, however, for that is impossible, even for the resurrected soul. The way Gregory protects the notion of divine incomprehensibility can be seen in his employment and development of Philippians 3:13 and its transference to the post-resurrection era (what has been called his notion of “infinite progress”). The first Good is in its nature infinite; therefore, the enjoyment of it will also be infinite: more is always being grasped and discovered and the search will never overtake its object.¹² God is, therefore, infinitely knowable and infinitely unknowable. It is in Gregory that we find the darkness of Sinai becoming mystical divine darkness wherein the presence of God is experienced; his essence is never seen, not even in theophany.¹³

Pseudo-Dionysius is perhaps Eriugena's most important source for applying equally the symbols of light and darkness to the divine nature. The light metaphors so abundant in the Divine Names are set off against the darkness metaphors of the Mystical Theology.¹⁴ With regard to the familiar Dionysian use of the darkness symbolism as it appears in the Mystical Theology, I note only the following points.¹⁵ The very powerful image of the soul throwing itself sightless (that is, with an “eyeless mind”) against the impenetrable rays of the unapproachable light into unity with the superluminous rays, or superluminous gloom, is based upon the fundamental notion that the soul must voluntarily blind itself through the practice of radical aphairesis: the not-knowing of creatures.¹⁶ If the darkness of God is hidden to the intellect by the light in existing things, then that light must be extinguished.¹⁷ The agnosia of things then becomes the gnosis of God, a knowledge which is, as Dionysius describes it, ἀπερικαλυπτὸs, without the veil of existing things.¹⁸ This ἀπρόσιτον φῶs (inaccessible Light—see 1 Tim. 6:16),¹⁹ is indeed invisible: it is experienced as darkness because the intellect no longer has eyes with which to see. However, at this point I must note that Dionysius (like Eriugena after him) also uses the term “darkness” in a privative sense.²⁰ That the term “darkness” can be used in both senses is due not only to the elasticity of the metaphor itself but also to the basic Dionysian rule of thumb, the ὑπερφατικὴ: God is neither light nor darkness, but beyond both.²¹

THE MEETING OF EAST AND WEST: ERIUGENA

I come now to an exposition of Eriugena's employment and development of the light/cloud/dark symbolism, keeping in mind that these metaphors are always vestigia et theophaniae veritatis,²² means of access to that realm wherein speech and thought are denied full access. The Trinity is contemplated, says Eriugena, at a deeper and truer level than can be expressed in speech, and is understood more deeply than it is contemplated, and it is, that is, exists more deeply and more truly than it is understood, for it passes all understanding.²³

We can begin this discussion of Eriugena's use of nubes and tenebrae with some brief reminders of the general focus of his employment of the light metaphor.²⁴ First, in terms of the cosmic drama of salvation and redemption, light symbolizes the procession of the light of the Father, in Christ, who illumines the hidden places of darkness and ignorance.²⁵ After the expulsion from paradise, the human condition of darkness and ignorance stands in need of illumination and redemption.²⁶ Second, the use of the light metaphor in an epistemological context portrays God as the lux mentium,²⁷ enlightening the ignorant mind with the brightness of pure knowledge.²⁸ Third, the light metaphor is also used as an expression for the diffusion of all things from their causes into created effects. The more Neoplatonic character of this theme, inspired by the Dionysian interpretation of a phrase from James 1:17 (“the Father of lights”),²⁹ explains the primordial causes in their effects as “brightness” and “day” and in their hidden nature as “night” and “darkness.”³⁰ Eriugena's comments on the first day of Genesis interpret creation as a movement from darkness to light, from the unknown to the known.³¹

Eriugena's use of the light metaphor, then, in all three aspects, involves an understanding of the term “darkness” as symbolic of ignorance, damnation, evil, sin, hell, and privation. How can he then adopt the term as a symbolic expression for the transcendence of God's nature? The answer, of course, rests in the fact that Eriugena, following Dionysius, asserts that although we can speak of God in terms of light or darkness, he is neither.³² Apart from the necessary transcendence in dialectical terms of all conceptual and symbolic representations of God, there is no confusion in Eriugena's mind in applying the terms “darkness” and “ignorance” both to God and to the human condition. The reason is that the understanding of God as light (and indeed of Christ as the “light of the world”) belongs to an inner, secondary account, of theological analysis in the Periphyseon. The description of humanity moving from the light of paradise to the darkness of damnation after the fall, and its complementary movement from the light of Christ either to the darkness of the excellence of the divine nature or to the darkness of hell (Eriugena repeats the interpretation of Ambrose in his Commentary on Luke that “outer darkness” is hell)³³ is, I believe, situated within the overall, more general, understanding of the movement from the original dark hiddenness of God into the light of manifestation and back once again to darkness.

It is in this sense that we find Eriugena using the term darkness to describe the primordial causes in the absolute purity of their unfathomable depth: they are tenebrosae abyssi.³⁴ Even when the primordial causes are revealed in the light of manifold forms, they remain always in a dark abyss: in secretissimis divinae sapientiae semper sedeant,³⁵ for the causes, in true Neoplatonic fashion, both remain in themselves and proceed into all things.³⁶ Darkness, then, can be used as an expression either for the excellence of the divine nature,³⁷ or as symbolic of the condition of human nature before redemption. This is the predominant meaning of the use of darkness in the Homily.

I have shown that Eriugena does not diverge significantly from his Dionysian source in his employment of the light/darkness metaphor. It is, however, in his expression of the cloud symbolism that we find some notable differences emerging.

Although Eriugena is often thought of in the same terms as Gregory and Dionysius with regard to apophasis, it is surprising to note that he does not (except for one fleeting mention in book V)³⁸ make use of the cloud of Sinai as expressive of the ultimate ontological and epistemological condition of the restored soul. Instead, we find him focusing upon the clouds of the New Testament, the clouds of the Ascension and Transfiguration, but more especially: (a) the cloud of heaven upon which the Son of Man will come (Dan. 7:13 and Matt. 26:64); and (b) the clouds into which those who have died with Christ will be taken up to meet with the Lord in the air (1 Thess. 4:17).³⁹ Although Eriugena does make use of the Dionysian notion of cloud, it is the context which sets his employment of it apart from the Areopagite's thought. The eschatological dimension of Eriugena's discussion puts it at one remove from the more immediate spiritual and epistemological significance to be found in Gregory of Nyssa and in Dionysius.

The most significant and comprehensive discussion of the cloud symbol can be found in book V of the Periphyseon.⁴⁰ Using both Ambrose and Maximus, Eriugena comments on the clouds into which the saints will be taken up. Repeating Maximus, he explains that each saint will have his own cloud wherein he will see and rejoice in theophanies; he rejects Ambrose's notion that only the patriarchs will have clouds. The rather interesting, and indeed most unapophatic, description of the cloud from Ambrose's Commentary on Luke is repeated by Eriugena: the cloud of light which moistens the mind with the dew of faith and is sent by the Word.⁴¹ The other clouds, those upon which the Son of Man will come, are understood to be the celestial substances which always attend Christ in contemplation through theophany.⁴²

Clouds would appear, therefore, to symbolize the means of experiencing theophany; because God is invisible in himself, he can be seen only in cloud: Deus enim omnino nulli creaturae visibilis per seipsum est, sed in nubibus theoriae videtur.⁴³ The ascent into the “cloud of contemplation” is explained by Eriugena as the highest theophany, the vision of God “face to face,”⁴⁴ wherein each will “see” God according to capacity.⁴⁵

Clouds, as the “theophanies of the righteous,”⁴⁶ would appear to be the final resting place of the soul, for the transcendence of the divine nature is inaccessibilis. Or is it? At 920A of Periphyseon V, Eriugena quotes the Letter of Dionysius to Dorotheus, where cloud and darkness are called lux inaccessibilis. Entry into the cloud, therefore, is entry into inaccessible light: the final stage of the restoration of the elect is described as entry into the darkness of “inaccessible light.”⁴⁷ The accessus to the inaccessibilis is, however, limited, in the sense that God is known and seen by not being known or seen: the resurrected soul knows that God is, not what God is, even in the highest theophanies.⁴⁸ Access to the inaccessible is permitted. Theophany itself is, in some measure, the apparition of the unapparent;⁴⁹ the ineffable light is present to all intellectual eyes, but it is not known as to what it is, only that it is.⁵⁰ Ignorance, in the superlative sense, is the not-knowing which is ineffable wisdom.⁵¹ There is also access to the inaccessible primordial light of the Father through Christ: per quem ad principale lumen, Patrem accessum habemus. Although no one has seen the Father, to have seen the Son (paternum lumen) is to have seen the Father.⁵²

Although Eriugena uses the Dionysian theme of cloud and darkness as expressive of the situation of the restored soul, we do not find him developing the Areopagite's notion of blindness or sightlessness. There is one brief mention in Periphyseon, book II, where, quoting Maximus, he says that through perfect ἀορασία one can attain to God,⁵³ but for the most part, that blindness wherein the sightless intellect experiences God is absent from Eriugena's thought. Even his use of the term “theophany” carries with it something of the sense of vision: the eyes of the intellect are open, even though they do not see the hidden essence of the divine nature. In this sense, I believe that Eriugena's understanding differs slightly from that of his Greek predecessors.

I come now to the final point I wish to make concerning Eriugena's use of the cloud metaphor, one that concerns his appropriation of Gregory of Nyssa's development of Philippians 3:13 in eschatological terms. According to Eriugena, the quest for God is endless, for God is indeed found in theophany, but is not found as to what he is in himself.⁵⁴ His comments on Isaiah 6:2, where the angels hide their feet and faces with their wings (theophanies), are expanded in a direction which emphasizes their infinite search, always being beaten back by the radiance of divine splendor.⁵⁵ While this idea is certainly true to Gregory's formulation, nonetheless there exists a difference between Eriugena's notion of hiding one's eyes from the divine radiance and Gregory's notion of being unseeing in the “luminous darkness” with God. The metaphor changes for Gregory from sight to touch when the soul closes its intellectual eyes and enters into the place where God is. For Eriugena it does not.

In conclusion, I suggest that perhaps this difference between the two thinkers reflects on Eriugena's part, at least in some measure, his acceptance of the light-dominated thought of his greatest Latin authority, namely, Augustine. In this sense, Eriugena would appear to have brought together the diverse elements of eastern and western thought on the subject of the final “vision” of God (although to see the light/darkness symbolism as representative of a clear-cut division between East and West runs the risk of distortion). In the Nyssean/Dionysian sense, the blinded intellect entering into unknowing union with God contrasts forcefully with the Augustinian interpretation of the ultimate vision of God “face to face.” Eriugena understood both only too well, and he would appear to have effected a compromise whereby the vision of God is vision “face to face,” even though that vision is mediated via theophany.

In the last analysis, it is Eriugena's emphasis on the concepts of vision and sight along with his individual use of the cloud symbolism which places him alongside Augustine more than with Gregory or Dionysius. I believe, however, that it is the expression of his thought which is more Augustinian than Dionysian, for Eriugena's apophasis is no less radical than that of either Gregory or Dionysius. In fact, Eriugena's understanding of the absolute incomprehensibility of the divine essence is more elitist even than that of Gregory of Nyssa, for only the elect pass beyond the cloud into the darkness which is itself inaccessible Light.⁵⁶

Notes

1. See, most recently, J. J. McEvoy, “Metaphors of Light and Metaphysics of Light in Eriugena,” in Begriff und Metapher, ed. W. Beierwaltes (Heidelberg, 1990), 149-167.

2. P III 650D-651A.

3. See McEvoy, 161.

4. See V. Lossky, In the Image and Likeness of God (Oxford, 1974), 31-43.

5. Augustine, Enarrationes in psalmos, Ps. 142 10.

6. Augustine, De Trinitate VIII 4 (6); and In Ioannis evangelium tractatus 109 2 (3). For Augustine's employment of apophatic themes, see D. Carabine, “Negative Theology in the Thought of Augustine,” in Recherches de théologie ancienne et médiévale 59 (1992): 5-22.

7. See H. C. Puech, “La ténèbre mystique chez le Pseudo-Denys l'Aréopagite et dans la tradition patristique,” Etudes carmélitaines 23 (1938): 46-49; and V. Lossky, Essai sur la théologie mystique de l'église d'orient (reprint, Paris, 1990), 33-34.

8. Gregory of Nyssa, Vita Moysis II 164.

9. Gregory of Nyssa, In Ecclesiasten, sermo 7.

10. See Gregory of Nyssa, Super cantica canticorum 11. Cf. Vita Moysis II 86-87 and Super cantica canticorum 6.

11. Gregory of Nyssa, Vita Moysis II 87 (6-9).

12. Gregory of Nyssa, Contra Eunomium I 219.

13. Gregory of Nyssa, Super cantica canticorum 11.

14. E.g., Pseudo-Dionysius, De mystica theologia I 4, II 4, III 1, IV 4, IV 5.

15. See Puech, “La ténèbre mystique,” for an invaluable account of the Dionysian use of the symbol of darkness.

16. See, e.g., Pseudo-Dionysius, De mystica theologia I 1, and De divinis nominibus IV 11.

17. See Pseudo-Dionysius, Epistola I.

18. Pseudo-Dionysius, De mystica theologia I 3.

19. Pseudo-Dionysius, Epistola V.

20. See especially Pseudo-Dionysius, Epistola XI.

21. Pseudo-Dionysius, De mystica theologia V.

22. P II 614C.

23. “Sed haec altius ac verius cogitantur quam sermone proferuntur et altius ac verius intelliguntur quam cogitantur, altius autem ac verius sunt quam intelliguntur; omnem siquidem intellectum superant” (P II 614C). Eriugena is repeating here an Augustinian formula: see De Trinitate V 3 (4), VII 4 (7); De civitate dei X 13.

24. I direct the reader to the exposition mentioned in n. 1, above.

25. P II 564B; III 656D, 664D, 684A; and V 963C. See also Homélie sur le Prologue de Jean XI (SC 151:256, 258-260).

26. P III 683C; V 924C, 1002C-D, 1009C, 1018A.

27. P II 684A.

28. P II 683C and 691B. See also P V 1017A, 988C-D; III 651A; Hom. X 289B, XII 290B-C, and XVII 293A-B. Ignorance used in the pejorative sense as representative of the human condition before the coming of the light can be found at P III 708D; IV 761A, 777C, 781C, 813B; and V 867C.

29. See P II 565C; III 684C; as well as the first chapter of the Expositiones in Ierarchiam coelestem (CCCM 31:1-19).

30. P III 692B-693A.

31. P III 619B and ff.; IV 781A and ff.

32. P I 460B; see Pseudo-Dionysius, De mystica theologia V.

33. See P V 936C and 946A.

34. P II 550C; and III 692B-693A.

35. P II 551B.

36. Eriugena's account of this notion is situated within the context of his discussion of Genesis 1:1. See, e.g., P II 552A.

37. See P III 681B; and IV 773C. The only use of darkness in this sense in Hom. is found at XIII 219B.

38. P V 999A. He does refer once in the Commentary on John to vision via the cloud (see Comm. I XXV [SC180:124-126]).

39. At this point, I should note that Eriugena also uses cloud symbolism in a privative sense: the cloud of fleshly thoughts and the cloud of error and faithlessness of the Antichrist (see P III 683C; V 996A-B).

40. P V 998A and ff., and also at 945D-946A.

41. See P V 1000A.

42. P V 1000B-1001A.

43. P V 905C. See also P V 945C-D.

44. P V 926C-D. See also Comm. I XXV [SC 180:124-126].

45. P V 876B and 945C-D.

46. P V 913C, 945C-946A, 982C.

47. P V 1020C-D. On the theme of “inaccessible light,” see P II 579B, 551C; III 633A, 668C.

48. P V 919C, 1010D.

49. P III 633A; II 557B.

50. P III 668C. See also P IV 771B-C: God is more honored in ignorance than in knowledge.

51. See P I 510B; II 590C-D, 593C-D, 597D-598A; and IV 771C.

52. Expositiones in Ierarchiam 2 (CCCM 31:29).

53. P II 534C.

54. P V 919A-D.

55. P III 668A-C and 614D-615A.

56. The Dionysian exhortation to Timothy not to divulge mystical secrets to the uninitiated (see De divinis nominibus I) may have been responsible for this aspect of Eriugena's thought.

Abbreviations

CCCM: Corpus Christianorum, Series Latina, Continuatio Mediaevalis. Turnhout: Brepols, 1966-.

CCSG: Corpus Christianorum, Series Graeca. Turnhout: Brepols, 1977-.

CCSL: Corpus Christianorum, Series Latina. Turnhout: Brepols, 1953-.

P: Periphyseon. Eriugena's major work is cited by book in roman numerals (e.g., book I), by chapter, when needed, in arabic numerals (I, 1), according to the following: Books I-III: Iohannes Scotti Eriugenae Periphyseon (De diuisione naturae), ed. I. P. Sheldon-Williams (Dublin: Dublin Institute for Advanced Studies, 1968, 1972, 1981), with page number and line numbers when needed. And Books IV-V: Ed. H. J. Floss, PL 122, with column number.

PG: Patrologiae Cursus Completus, Series Graeca. Ed. J. P. Migne (Paris, 1857-66). 161 vols.

PL: Patrologiae Cursus Completus, Series Latina. Ed. J. P. Migne. 221 vols.; 4 index vols. Paris, 1844-64.

PLS: PL Supplement. 5 vols. Paris, 1958-74.

SC: Sources chrétiennes. Ed. H. de Lubac, J. Daniélou et al. Paris: Editions du Cerf, 1942-.

Note: Because there is no universally recognized form of his name, the editors have left the contributors free to use Eriugena, John the Scot, John Scottus Eriugena, Johannes Scottus Eriugena.