SOURCE: Nederman, Cary J. “Aristotelian Ethics and John of Salisbury's Letters.” Viator: Medieval and Renaissance Studies 18 (1987): 161-73.

[In the following essay, Nederman traces the influence of Aristotle's ideas in John's letters and suggests that their presence indicates a consistency in principle, in both practical and philosophical application.]

To philosophers and political theorists, John of Salisbury represents the pinnacle of twelfth-century learning, his Policraticus and Metalogicon reflecting the breadth and depth of medieval intellectual accomplishment.¹ To political and ecclesiastical historians, John is primarily valuable for the observations about great events and important men reported in his extant correspondence and chronicles.² Of course, this somewhat schizophrenic image of John's work is overshadowed by his more general reputation as the Latin humanist and man of letters preeminent in his age—equally comfortable as administrator, secretary, legal advisor, politician, and schoolman.³ But it is nevertheless the case that little effort has been made among recent scholars to explore in detail John's multicompetent mind by examining the connections between his abstract philosophical speculations, on the one hand, and his more documentary activities as correspondent and chronicler, on the other. In particular, we seldom hear asked (let alone answered) the question of how (or whether) John's theoretical insights are brought to bear on his analyses of contemporary political occurrences and personalities.

One potentially fruitful line of approach in this regard may be the examination of the relation between the moral categories which John developed in his philosophical works and the character profiles on which he based the political recommendations of his correspondence. Much of John's ethical thought, as expounded in the Policraticus, benefits from an “underground” tradition of Aristotelian moral theory running throughout the Middle Ages.⁴ Thus, although John enjoyed no direct access to the moral and social writings of Aristotle,⁵ he extracted from various sources many of the important terms and concepts of Aristotelian ethics. Since this linguistic and intellectual apparatus originated uniquely with Aristotle, John's reliance on it is relatively easy to identify. Is it possible, however, that John applied the same doctrines to his more concrete work as secretary, advisor, and correspondent? Careful examination reveals that two aspects of Aristotelian thought employed in the Policraticus can be isolated in John's letters as well: first, virtue arises from a fixed disposition to act which is acquired through regular practice; and second, all the virtues consist in following the moderate or mean course between extremes. In both cases, John's use of these ideas, far from being ancillary, is central to his purposes as a corresondent. We shall proceed by first establishing the Aristotelian provenance and transmission of each precept, and its place in the Policraticus, as a prelude to the investigation of the influence of Aristotle's philosophy within John's letters. Ultimately, we shall begin to see the consistency with which John employed certain philosophical principles, regardless of whether he was composing a speculative treatise or an epistle on current events.

I

One of the cornerstones of Aristotle's moral psychology is the notion of hexis (commonly mistranslated as “habit,” but more properly rendered as “disposition” or “state”). As a general concept within the Aristotelian system, hexis refers to a type of quality, that is, the ascription of a qualitative property to a subject or substance. In particular, hexis denotes those qualities which become so firmly rooted in what they qualify as to form a “second nature.” Such qualities, accordingly, are difficult or even impossible to change. In the realm of moral philosophy, Aristotle claims that “hexis is the genus of virtue” and that “the virtues are hexeis.”⁶ By addressing virtue in terms of hexis, Aristotle posits the relative permanence and stability of the virtue of the good man without the need to specify that moral qualities are inborn or natural. Aristotle maintains that virtuous hexeis are acquired by exposure to and practice of virtuous actions. The repeated performance of virtuous deeds, through which a course of conduct is rendered habitual, constitutes the Aristotelian recommendation for moral education.⁷ To develop the correct moral habits is to mold one's hexeis aright, since “hexeis arise from corresponding activities” and the “quality of our hexeis depends on what we do.”⁸ At its core, Aristotle's definition of virtue by reference to hexis assures that moral action will spring “from a firm and unchangeable character.”⁹ For whoever possesses a hexis which disposes him towards good conduct will without fail or deviation do what is virtuous; the mature hexis prevents the individual from committing uncharacteristically immoral acts. (Aristotle's doctrine is, however, symmetrical; it is likewise true that a vicious disposition, once acquired, is equally difficult to alter or improve.¹⁰) In sum, Aristotle assigns to the concept of hexis the function of guaranteeing the stability and fixity of one's moral attributes.

The classical and Christian Latins normally translated hexis as habitus, facilitating transmission of the term and its conceptual implications to the twelfth century. John of Salisbury was intimately familiar with at least three distinct Latin sources in which the Aristotelian doctrine of habitus was articulated. First, Cicero's De inventione defines virtue generally, and justice more specifically, in terms of habitus, while explaining that “we call habitus a constant and absolute feature of the soul or body in some particular, such as the acquisition of virtue or an art or some special knowledge or again some bodily capacity not give by nature.”¹¹ Similarly, Boethius remarks in De topicis differentiis that virtue may be defined as “habitus mentis bene constitutae,” a definition which he infers from the claim that all species of virtue are themselves dispositional qualities of a well-ordered mind.¹² Finally, the most thorough source for the notion of habitus in the twelfth century was Aristotle himself, whose Categories and Topics were available in Latin translation during John's time.¹³ In both works, virtue and its species are defined with reference to habitus.¹⁴ In addition, Aristotle clearly explains that habitus entails a quality which is “stable and long lasting,” so that “through length of time [it] ultimately becomes a part of man's nature and as such immovable or exceedingly difficult to change—this one would call habitudo.”¹⁵ Thus, not only did John of Salisbury have access to an ample number of intermediary texts which reported the Aristotelian idea of habitus, but he was exposed directly to Aristotle's own statements on the matter.¹⁶

It is hardly surprising, then, that we find habitus accorded a role by John in the Policraticus. One of the central lessons of the Policraticus is that a good or well-formed moral character (mos or mores) is indispensable to the proper performance of the public functions of the warrior, the courtier, and the king. Consequently, John holds that an unstable body politic is directly attributable to the vicious qualities of those who guide it, especially its royal head. Similarly, a stable and well-governed polity reflects the incorruptible virtue of its leaders and great men.¹⁷ Thus, the essential prerequisite for good government is the correct moral education of those who rule. But how does such education occur? John's explanation of the process through which moral character is acquired is redolent of the Aristotelian conception of hexis/habitus.

Mos is a mentis habitus from which proceeds assiduously particular acts. If [an act] is done once or more often, it does not immediately become part of mores, unless by assiduous practice it passes into usage … When anyone is said to acquire reverence because of mores, it is meant that he has virtues which deserve honor. Who ought not to revere and respect him who is wise, brave, temperate, and just?¹⁸

The Policraticus thereby defines moral character in terms of habitus, and stipulates that the possession of such a disposition occurs only after repeated practice of certain sorts of actions. This disposition toward virtue assures constancy and permanency of conduct, at least once the acquisition process is completed. These typically Aristotelian elements of moral psychology seem to support John's insistence elsewhere in the Policraticus that habits (consuetudines) inculcated through steady repetition are rendered quasi-natural: “Usage … is hard to unlearn, and habit becomes second nature.”¹⁹ In the formation of such nature-like habitual behavior, habitus performs a kind of regulative function. The development of a habitus requires regular practice or usage (usus), out of which emerges those qualities of moral character whose stability and fixity are guaranteed by the mature mentis habitus itself. On two counts, then, John's presentation of habitus parallels the Aristotelian idea: first, the formation of moral disposition occurs through the repetition of particular actions; and second, the disposition, once fixed, is relatively constant in the sense that the agent's conduct will consistently reflect an ingrained disposition of mind.

In John of Salisbury's letters, likewise, the Aristotelian principle of habitus as a necessary constituent of moral character finds a place. Throughout the period of his most intense correspondence (1154-1170), John was ambassador for and advisor to two active and influential archbishops of Canterbury, Theobald and Becket, and confidant to many other prominent men besides.²⁰ In this capacity, John was expected to report his evaluations of the personalities and behavior of the great laymen and clerics of mid-twelfth-century Europe. Even in his more private correspondence, John often dissected the qualities of particular individuals, especially with regard to their moral character. Thus, we receive quite honest appraisals not only of John's political and personal enemies—Henry II, Frederick Barbarossa, John of Oxford, Gilbert Foliot, and their ilk—but also of his friends and allies—Becket, successive popes (in particular Alexander III), the French king Louis VII, and so forth. Perhaps as significant, we gain insight into John's own character and intellect. At their core, John's sketches of and remarks about his contemporaries return to two themes: first, those who have by previous word and deed shown themselves to be opponents of right and justice are not to be trusted in future dealings despite the appearance of contrition; and second, constancy of moral commitment, even in the face of physical adversity, is to be admired as the preeminent token of well-formed character. The first theme arises in the context of John's recommendations to his archiiepiscopal masters regarding the moral and political reliability of those who had once oppressed the church or who had not opposed such oppression; the second emerges from John's sustained praise for men (like himself) who steadfastly endured empoverishment, exile, and outlawry in the name of ecclesiastical liberty and moral rectitude. Common to both themes, however, is the assumption that human conduct remains fundamentally consistent over time because of the ingrained features of a mature character.

We could hardly expect that John's letters, which are after all mainly nonspeculative in nature, would contain any articulation or explication of the premises from which his character studies proceed. But on occasion John does let slip in his correspondence the otherwise implicit principles of his moral psychology; and these passages parallel closely the Aristotelian views expressed in the Policraticus. In a particularly reflective letter to William of Diceia, dating from about 1168, John noted that, while it is relatively easy to comprehend the “intellectual principles” (“praecepta intellectu”) of a skill, the acquisition of the skill in “usus” is a considerably greater challenge. This applies most especially to the realm of morals. For a man to possess true virtue, John asserts, he must practice it from an early age (“huic ab ineunte operam dedi”). John offers as an example (drawn from personal experience) the acquisition of a charitable and amenable disposition: “assiduousness in friendship has conferred on me an usus, and use rendered into habitus compels me to be friendly even to the unfriendly.”²¹ Through long usage arises a habitus, John tells his correspondent, and once that habitus is fixed the acts flowing therefrom cannot be varied. The individual who has evolved through practice a firm moral characteristic such as charity will continue to behave charitably even towards those who show no charity in return. John thus employs the Aristotelian doctrine of habitus in order to explain how men are able, even in the face of extreme adversity, to follow a particular course of moral action—it is because they can do no other.

This view is confirmed by an earlier letter from John to Bishop Bartholomew of Exeter, written in July 1166, which distinguishes between mankind's “primitiva natura” and the quasi-natural elements of “mos.” Our “primitiva natura” springs from God's grace, whereas “mos” is the result of human effort for good or ill unaided by direct divine intervention. But because it rests on practice, “mos” can appear to have virtually the same permanence as nature. “Use is second nature,” John observes (citing Cicero as authority), “from which escape is very difficult.”²² Although character is not the work of God acting through nature, we should not expect to encounter vast inconsistencies in the moral behavior of a given individual. Because of its acquisition through repeated practice, character becomes second nature. The essentially Aristotelian doctrines of moral character, habitus and usus, incorporated into the Policraticus have thus been included in John's correspondence as well, where they would seem to provide the underlying assumptions of the moral psychology on the basis of which he advised his friends and masters. The presence of this Aristotelian account of the acqusition of moral character can hardly be dismissed as extraneous to the understanding of John's correspondence. On the contrary, the realization of John's purpose in composing many of his letters—to deduce from the previous behavior of individuals what could be expected of them in the future—depended on his adherence to the Aristotelian principles we have surveyed. Therefore, John could not abide any separation between the abstract philosophical precepts of the Policraticus and the more practical aim of his letters. Instead, the Aristotelian evaluation of moral character in terms of habitus explicated by his correspondence illustrates a consistency and continuity in John's thought regardless of audience or tool of expression.

II

A similar yet even more striking example of continuity within John of Salisbury's corpus is afforded by the definition of virtue as a mean between excess and deficiency. Of course, this conception of virtue also has its source in Aristotle's philosophy. In the Nicomachean Ethics, Aristotle argues that acquisition of the truly virtuous soul requires learning all the virtues in their proper measure. Goodness in human action is thus defined as achieving the mean between extremes; evil results from an agent whose behavior is either “too much” or “too little.” For example, one ought to be neither timid nor temerarious when the virtue sought is courage. “Whereas the vices either fall short of or exceed what is right in feelings or actions,” Aristotle insists, “virtue ascertains and adopts the mean.”²³ Thus, in Aristotle's account moderation—as distinct from temperance or self-control—is meaningless separate from the specific virtues. If good or virtuous action consists in following the middle path between opposite vices,²⁴ then the mean can never be construed as a virtue in its own right. Rather, moderation or the mean is a structural property of each of the virtues, an indispensable feature of any form of moral rectitude.

While the general precept of “moderation in all things” pervaded classical and Christian thinking, comparatively few sources known to the twelfth century provided a thorough articulation of the specifically Aristotelian equation of virtue with a mean between excess and deficiency. In particular, John of Salisbury would likely have had access to only two authors (although there may be others I have failed to identify) in whose work Aristotle's conception of moderation was incorporated. First, Cicero sometimes followed Aristotle regarding the doctrine of the mean, as in De officiis where he praises “moderation … which is between defect and excess,”²⁵ and in a lengthy passage of De inventione which shows how the virtues are contrary both to their customary opposites and to another set of qualities representing virtue taken to excess.²⁶ Second, in Aristotle's Organon we once again can detect significant traces of his moral teachings, this time with regard to moderation. The Topics explains that “defect and excess are in the same genus—for both are in the genus of evil—whereas what is moderate, which is intermediate between them, is not in the genus of evil, but that of good.”²⁷ Likewise, in the Categories Aristotle observes that “what is contrary to a bad thing is sometimes good, sometimes bad (for excess, which is bad, is contrary to deficiency, yet the mean is contrary to both and is good).”²⁸ Both writings reiterate the view of the Nicomachean Ethics that virtue consists in measured conduct, in charting a moderate course between excess and deficiency. A well-read twelfth-century thinker like John of Salisbury could hardly have avoided the doctrine of the mean or overlooked its Aristotelian provenance.²⁹

Indeed, the Policraticus shows considerable evidence of the benefits which its author accrued from his familiarity with the Aristotelian conception of each of the virtues as a mean between excess and deficiency. Throughout the Policraticus, we encounter reliance on the position that “what exceeds the mean verges on fault. Every virtue is marked by its limits and consists in the mean; if excessive, one is off the road, not on it.”³⁰ A characteristic of genuine moral goodness, in John's eyes, is that it follows a middle path between opposing evils. Bad men, accordingly, “recede from the mean between vices, which is the ruler of virtue.”³¹ Nor does John seek to avoid the logical implication of this doctrine, namely, that it is just as evil to be overzealous in the pursuit of virtue as to be negligent. To illustrate this point, John employs the spatial metaphor of inclining towards the left or the right.

To incline to the right is to insist too vehemently upon the virtues themselves. To incline to the right is to exceed the mean in works of virtue, which consists in the mean. Truly all vehemence is inimical to salvation, and all excess is a fault; nothing is worse than the excessive practice of good works … The Philosopher says: beware what is excessive; because, if one departs from caution and moderation, he will recede in his incaution from the path of virtue itself.³²

The reference to “philosophus” suggests John's awareness of the Aristotelian origins of this doctrine. But in any case, John has captured the essential elements of Aristotle's notion of the mean. For John as for Aristotle, any and all of the virtues may be attained solely when pursued with definite limits. Overstepping the bounds of goodness in the name of goodness itself is necessarily as repugnant as the complete absence of moral propriety. Moderation pertains to the inherent structure of virtue, since an act is virtuous if and only if it remains within the boundary fixed by the measure or mean. Thus, the agent must take special care in the selection of a correct course of action by affording particular attention to the conditions under which the act(s) shall occur: “Discretion with regard to place, time, amount, person, and cause readily distinguishes what is excellent. … This is the fount and origin of all moderation, without which no duty is rightly performed.”³³ In deciding how to conduct oneself, one must determine all relevant circumstantial considerations and choose the course of action which is appropriately moderate in its context. According to John, most actions cannot be judged apart from their circumstances because the mean path between vices can only be ascertained once all relevant variables are identified. John thereby recognizes that the necessary corollary to the Aristotelian doctrine of the mean is the principle of measuring one's acts so as to fit the particulars of the situation.³⁴

Even in the Policraticus, John's Aristotelian emphasis on the virtuous mean does not remain an abstract moral teaching. Rather, John translates moderation into a practical precept applicable to the behavior of the princes, courtiers, and knights whom he is discussing. This means that many activities (such as hunting and musical performance) which John personally abhors he nevertheless allows to be practiced “if true moderation forms the limit.”³⁵ John's counsel is always guided by the rule: “Nothing decorous is without the mean.”³⁶ The same impulse to recommend the moderate course in practical affairs extends to John's letters, regardless of the person or issue in question. For instance, in reference to the schism provoked by Emperor Frederick I which had commenced in 1159,³⁷ John remarks, “I do not believe that the thing is to be approached contentiously, but is to be completed by a happy moderation, especially when the wise man recalls that the moderation of wisdom disposes all things according to their proper place.”³⁸ The man of virtuous wisdom will no more seek to impose his knowledge by force than to embrace ignorance; instead, he will pursue a middle path towards truth. John applies this principle to himself no less than to the behavior of others. In a letter to Ralph of Lisieux, he suggests that it may not be proper to quote excessively from Scripture: “I prefer to employ the bridle of moderation, keeping my pen still rather than collecting articles of divine law which, even rightly quoted, nevertheless lead to the harm of listeners.”³⁹ In sum, even zeal for the citation of God's word must be held in check by the moderating reins of virtue. Just as the Policraticus objects to those who insist to excess upon virtue, so John in his letters denounces conduct which strays from the bounds of moderation in the name of truth or religion.⁴⁰

John's use of an Aristotelian doctrine of the mean in his correspondence was not, however, limited to a few isolated references. On the contrary, moderation forms a central theme in the decade-long running commentary on the Becket conflict which the bulk of his letters compose. John emphasizes moderation in his analysis of the three primary contestants in the dispute—Henry II, the English bishops, and Becket himself—and criticizes each at various points for adopting immoderate views and acting altogether excessively. The condemnation of Henry on these grounds is probably the most expected, given John's affiliations.⁴¹ A missive addressed to John of Canterbury, bishop of Poitiers, observes that Henry would enjoy universal praise and acclaim “if only he would defer more to the Church of God, and act more moderately with those who reason with him, and inhibit his language and spirit from outbreaks of anger and other reprehensible emotions, according to a measure of royal dignity.”⁴² It is for precisely this reason, John tells Gerard Pucelle, that Henry so desperately needs to reconcile himself with Becket: “The archbishop of Canterbury will inspire the soul of the lord king to employ moderately his divinely given license.”⁴³ John perceives Becket as a counterbalance to Henry, as a defender of the liberty of the church whose exile has allowed the king to give full play to his tyrannical tendencies. John's letters regularly style Henry “tyrannus,”⁴⁴ a term which in the usage of the Policraticus means an individual of authority who has employed his power in order to suppress the personal liberty of those subject to him.⁴⁵ The true king rules within the bounds of moderation, tolerating faults when possible, punishing only when necessary—but always according a proper measure of freedom to those over whom he reigns.⁴⁶ The danger, both to the king's soul and to his realm, occurs when he departs from the moderate course. Such a ruler, John asserts in a letter of 1168 to Baldwin, archdeacon of Totnes, is Henry of England, who shows no moderate inclination towards his subjects: “It is the man's nature to make light of all the merits of one who for whatever reason breaks or postpones obedience to a single mandate, no matter what it is. The ‘moderation’ of his requests … is such that it is sometimes necessary to disobey.”⁴⁷ John's lesson is not to be missed: it is incumbent upon the subjects of immoderate rulers like Henry to resist those commands which disturb and disrupt the liberty of individuals and communities. By crossing the appropriate bounds fixed by the proprietous mean in his treatment of Becket and the English church generally, Henry's eternal soul and quite possibly his kingdom are imperiled.⁴⁸ Henry's propensity towards excessive behavior renders him morally unfit to govern the English realm and to serve the English church.

John cites similar grounds for condemning those bishops of England who actively sided with Henry in the Becket dispute or who chose the route of neutrality. John believed that the behavior of such men represented a fundamental threat to ecclesiastical liberty in England. He could only explain their actions by imputing to them an immoderate desire to preserve or enhance their lives and fortunes at the expense of the church. Thus, in one letter John remarks that God knows of and will surely judge harshly the lack of “modestia” exercised by the bishops;⁴⁹ to another correspondent John complains about the conduct of the bishop of Worcester, whose antipathy towards Becket was reportedly “more than manly moderation dictates” (“plus quam tante modestiae virum deceat”).⁵⁰ That these observations ought to be read as more than passing jibes is clear from a lengthy letter to his brother, Richard, dating from mid-1166. The topic of the letter is the collective behavior of the English bishops, who had just filed a joint appeal against Becket to Rome;⁵¹ its main theme is moderation. John initially expresses concern about Richard's own master, the bishop of Exeter, whose sympathies seem to have been uncertain: “In this conflict of power and right he should behave with such moderation, with law guiding, grace leading, and reason supporting, that he ought not to seem temerarious in opposing the power which God ordains, nor consent to iniquity to the detriment of the church for fear of power or love of transitory goods.”⁵² John's counsel of moderation, then, is specifically intended as a warning against the vice of temerity (an excess of courage) in episcopal dealings with the archbishop, Becket. While John acknowledges that it is difficult for anyone to remain faithful in practice to the “golden mean” (“aurea mediocritas”), he nevertheless insists that whoever truly wishes to serve his church and his God must approximate the virtuous mean insofar as possible. This has been a failing of other of the English bishops, whose conspiratorial behavior against Thomas could only occur because they are “worried and timorous, and this beyond the mean.”⁵³ Instead of aiding and abetting the royal attack on the liberties of the English church, John encourages the bishops “to imitate the good deeds we read about, such as Hushai the Archite, who strove to dissipate the evil counsel of Achitophel by moderation.”⁵⁴ In effect, the contents of the letter represent an impassioned plea for the bishops to subordinate their private interests and personal safety to the pressing need of the church. John accomplishes this task by arguing that the bishops lack the moral courage (the mean virtue between temerity and timorousness) to stand up to the demands and threats of Henry II. Thus, John's repeated references to moderation have a strict Aristotelian connotation: the bishops stand accused of departing from that path of moderate conduct whose source can only be the soul which has acquired the virtues in their proper measure.

Henry II and the English bishops are, of course, obvious targets for John's accusations of immoderation, since they were responsible for the exile of Becket and his supporters. It may be somewhat surprising, however, to discover that the greater number of John's discussions of virtuous moderation came in letters to or about his friend and master, Archbishop Thomas.⁵⁵ The eccentricities and peculiarities of Becket's personality, and their impact on his conflict with Henry, are commonly acknowledged in contemporary scholarship.⁵⁶ But John, too, was well aware of the defects of his master's character, which he largely attributed to Becket's compulsive tendency to exceed all moderate bounds in his behavior. In the early years of John's exile, when he was desperately seeking to reconcile himself with Henry II, he repeatedly admitted this fault in Becket's personality. To Humphrey Bos, John bluntly states, “I have kept the faith owed to the church and archbishop of Canterbury, and I have stood faithfully by him in England and on the Continent when justice and moderation seemed to be his. If ever he seemed to detour from justice or exceed the mean, I stood up to him to his face.”⁵⁷ John's message is clear: he will not follow Becket blindly. When the archbishop adheres to a moderate course in his behavior, John is obliged to keep faith with him; but whenever Thomas strays from the mean, John will oppose him strenuously. The difficulty is that Becket shows little sense or discretion witth regard to judgments of circumstance. John tells Bartholomew, bishop of Exeter, that “He who inspects our hearts and judges our words and acts knows that I—more than any other mortal—have upbraided the lord archbishop on the grounds that he has from the beginning inadvisedly provoked the resentment of the king and court by his zeal, since many provisions should have been made for place and time and persons.”⁵⁸ This passage echoes two of the key moral teachings of the Policraticus: first, that overzealous pursuit of virtue is just as vicious as a lack of enthusiasm, if not more so; and second, that identifying the moderate course requires careful consideration of the conditions under which action is to occur. John believes that Becket has learned neither lesson very well (despite the fact that the Policraticus was addressed to him). As for John's contention to Humphrey and Bartholomew that he has condemned his master's immoderation to his face, we find confirmation in two letters of counsel to Becket dating from mid-1166. In one missive, John advises Becket on an appropriate response to the latest machinations of his disobedient English inferiors. Clearly fearing Becket's propensity toward rash behavior, John exhorts the archbishop to seek reconciliation with, rather than further alienation of, his church by approaching his opponents with virtuous moderation. “It is especially expedient that your moderation be known to all,” John recommends. “With moderation write and state the conditions, since it seems to be certain that the souls of the enemies of God's church are so hardened that they will admit no condition at all.”⁵⁹ With regard to the oft-heard accusation that Becket's actions are not motivated by considerations of virtue, but by pride and hatred, “this opinion should be answered by exhibiting moderation, in deeds and words, in conduct and dress, which is not very profitable in God's eyes unless it is the product of our deepest conscience.”⁶⁰ A few lines later, John is again extolling the moderate path. Becket is encouraged to exercise “modestia” in framing his response; he should imitate “modestissimus David,” so that “you can moderately reply” to “those who reprove, indeed severely deride you.”⁶¹ Generally speaking, this counsel is repeated in the second letter directed to Becket. There as before, John suggests to the archbishop that “in all things behave such that your moderation may be known to all.” But John specifies that such moderation can only be achieved by reference to present circumstances: “Attend to the state of the times, the condition of the Roman church, the needs of the English realm.”⁶² Consideration of such factors is an indispensable prerequisite for judging which actions approximate the virtuous mean. In his observations about Becket's moral character, then, John comes closest to a complete restatement of the Aristotelian doctrine of the mean articulated in the Policraticus. Yet in the background of all his remarks about moderation—whether they pertain to Becket, the bishops of England, or Henry—remains John's conviction that the virtuous path in every matter of religion and politics lies between the twin evils of excess and deficiency.

.....

It should by now be quite clear that Aristotelian language and concepts permeate the ethical components of John of Salisbury's correspondence. What may temper in some measure our initial surprise at this conclusion is our awareness that John, without direct knowledge of Aristotle's ethical writings, still had access to a wide range of sources through which he could familiarize himself with the Philosopher's moral teachings. From the roots of this “underground tradition” of Aristotelian thought grows a trunk with many branches, most of which have yet to be explored. But just as important, tracing Aristotelian argumentation from the Policraticus into the letters illustrates an essential unity in John's intellectual perspective. John did not discriminate radically between his speculative and his practical work. On the contrary, he seems to have been quite prepared to incorporate philosophical precepts into his analysis of contemporary events and persons, as the examples of habitus and moderation demonstrate. Surely, this represents one of the cornerstones of John's much vaunted humanism: the attempt to impart to current affairs a distinctly philosophical cast intrigued John as much as it would his successors in the Renaissance. Indeed, John's composition of the Policraticus appears to have crystallized the views on moral character and its political significance which he espouses in his correspondence. The Policraticus was completed in 1159; it is only in the letters written after this date that the language of moderation and the dispositional evaluation of personal qualities become regular elements of his correspondence. Where John's earlier letters are the work of a sound legal intellect, his later missives reflect philosophical principles which he had already developed and defended in the Policraticus.⁶³ Thus, reading John's correspondence as an extension of the Policraticus can be a fruitful enterprise. As the case of the doctrines derived from Aristotelian moral thought demonstrates, John of Salisbury believed that philosophy was not to be left at the schoolhouse steps.⁶⁴ Rather, philosophical discourse had a place in the world at large: its task was to aid in discerning the good from the evil, the right from the merely expedient, the true from the false, and so to illuminate the path of rectitude in matters of politics and personal conduct. This devotion to the practical implications of abstract thought is all the encouragement that should be required for philosophers and political theorists to examine John's correspondence and for political and ecclesiastical historians to pay closer attention to his philosophical teachings.

Notes

1. For example, Ewart Lewis, Medieval Political Ideas (London 1954) 169 describes the Policraticus as “the outstanding treatise on political theory before the work of Aquinas: a rich storehouse of the opinions which were current in the minds of scholarly churchmen before the discovery of the Politics of Aristotle.” Similarly, Frederick Copleston, A History of Philosophy: Medieval Philosophy pt. 1 (Garden City, N.Y. 1962) 190 regards John as “the most gifted of the humanist philosophers. … He represents what was best in twelfth-century philosophic humanism.”

2. To cite but two cases, consider the use made of John's work by D. C. Douglas, The Norman Fate, 1100-1154 (Berkeley 1976) and Robert Somerville, Pope Alexander and the Council of Tours (Berkeley 1977).

3. The classic treatment of John's humanist strain is that of Hans Liebeschütz, Mediaeval Humanism in the Life and Writings of John of Salisbury (London 1950).

4. This thesis has been developed in somewhat greater detail in C. J. Nederman and J. Brückmann, “Aristotelianism in John of Salisbury's Policraticus,” Journal of the History of Philosophy 21 (1983) 227-229, and C. J. Nederman, “Bracton on Kingship Revisited,” History of Political Thought 5 (1984) 76-77. For some pre-medieval sources of this “underground tradition,” see Richard McKeon, “The Hellenistic and Roman Foundations of the Tradition of Aristotle in the West,” Review of Metaphysics 32 (1979) 677-715.

5. Unless one is willing to accept Michael Wilks's dubious speculation that “John has access (presumably in France or Italy rather than in Canterbury Cathedral library) to some sort of rudimentary version, or perhaps epitome, of Aristotle's Politics”; see M. Wilks, “John of Salisbury and the Tyranny of Nonsense,” in The World of John of Salisbury, ed. Wilks (Oxford 1984) 280. Wilks multiplies sources beyond necessity (and beyond evidence), insofar as he does not survey the similarities in doctrine between Aristotle and Cicero, which would account for many of the Aristotelian political views he identifies in the Policraticus. I hope to offer a corrective to Wilks's interpretation in a forthcoming essay, “The Ciceronian Tradition and the ‘Aristotelian Revolution’ in Late Medieval Political Thought.”

6. Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, ed. H. Rackham (Cambridge, Mass. 1934), 1106a14 and 1143b24-25. All translations from Greek into English are my own.

7. Ibid. 1103a31-33 and 1103b1-3.

8. Ibid. 1103b22-24.

9. Ibid. 1105a35-b1.

10. Ibid. 1114a18-21.

11. Cicero, De inventione, ed. H. M. Hubbell (Cambridge, Mass. 1961) 1.25, 36: “Habitum autem appellamus animi aut corporis constantem et absolutam aliqua in re perfectionem, ut virtutis aut artis alicuius perceptionem aut quamvis scientiam et item corporis aliquam commoditatem non natura datam.” This and all other translations from Latin are my own. Also see 2.9, 30 and 2.50, 159-160.

12. Boethius, De topicis differentiis, PL [Patrologia Latina] 64.1188c-d.

13. A recent evaluation of John's knowledge of the Organon is provided by Edouard Jeauneau, “Jean de Salisbury et la lecture des philosophes,” in World of John (n. 5 above) 103.

14. See Aristotle, Categories, 8b29 and 8b33-35; Topics, 121b27-39, 144a16 and 144a17-18. Latin citations will follow the Boethius translations of the Categories (in L. Minio-Paluello, ed., Aristoteles latinus 1.1-5 [Bruges 1961]) and the Topics (in L. Minio-Paluello, ed., Aristoteles latinus 5.1-3 [Leiden 1969]).

15. Aristotle, Categories, 8b28 and 9a2-4: “Permanentior et diuturnior … Per temporis longitudinem in naturam cuiusque translata et insanabilis vel difficile mobilis, quam iam quilibet habitudinem vocet.”

16. Professor Brückmann and I (n. 4 above) 206 argue for the likelihood that John's use of Aristotelian doctrines derived directly from the Organon rather than from intermediary sources. This hypothesis may, at least with regard to habitus, be confirmed by the fact that in the midst of a summary of the Categories in his Historia pontificalis, John comments, “In ethicus proprium dicitur esse virtutis, ut habitum bene componat” (ed. M. Chibnall [London 1956] 34). Strangely, Chibnall attributes the phrase to Boethius and Cicero despite the fact, as we have just seen, that habitus is repeatedly discussed in the Categories.

17. See John of Salisbury, Policraticus, ed. C. C. J. Webb (1919; repr. Frankfurt a.M. 1965) 538c-d, 626b-d, and 633d-634b.

18. Ibid 544a-545a: “Mos autem est mentis habitus ex quo singulorum operum assiduitas manat. Non enim si quid fit semel aut amplius, statim moribus aggregatur nisi assiduitate faciendi vertatur in usam … Cum itaque a moribus quis reverentiam contrahere dicitur, ei virtutes, quibus honor exhibendus est, inesse significatur. Quis, enim non veneretur et vereatur illum quem prudentem fortem temperantem credit et iustam?”

19. Ibid. 489b: “Usus enim … egre dediscitur, et consuetudo alteri naturae assistit.”

20. Far and away the best study of John's career, mapped against the background of his network of personal and political connections, is by Klaus Guth, Johannes von Salisbury (1115/20-1180): Studien zur Kirchen-, Kultur- und Sozialgeschichte Westeuropas im 12. Jahrhundert (St. Ottilien 1978). This book, along with Guth's contribution to World of John (n. 5 above) 63-76 (“Hochmittelalterlicher Humanismus als Lebensform: Ein Beitrag zum Standethos des Westeuropäischen Weltklerus nach Johannes von Salisbury”), represents a notable exception to the scholarly tendency of separating John's topical writings from his philosophical works. Even Guth, however, makes little attempt to demonstrate how John's philosophy was brought to bear on his judgments in the realm of practical politics.

21. John of Salisbury, Letters 2, ed. W. J. Millor and C. N. L. Brooke (Oxford 1979) 512: “Assiduitas ergo amandi et obsequendi contulit usum, et ille versus in habitum me semper amare compellit etiam non amantes.”

22. Ibid. 144: “Usus altera natura est … a quo difficillium est avelli.” For the appropriate passages from Cicero, see ibid. 145 n. 18.

23. Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics 1107a2-6.

24. See ibid. 1108b11-35.

25. Cicero, De officiis, ed. W. Miller (Cambridge, Mass. 1913) 1.89: “mediocritatem … quae est inter nimium et parum.”

26. Cicero, De inventione 2.65.

27. Aristotle, Topics 123b27-30: “Instantia quoniam egestas quidem et superhabundantia in eodem genere (in malo enim ambo), mediocre autem cum sit medium horum non in malo sed in bono est.” See also 107a11-13 and 113a3-7.

28. Aristotle, Categories 14a2-6: “Malo vero aliquotiens bonum contrarium est, aliquotiens malum (diminutioni enim, quae mala est, superfluitas quae et ipse mala est contrarium est).”

29. Thus, it is insufficient to argue, as B. Munk Olsen has suggested, that John's infatuation with moderation is due primarily to his affection for Cicero's thought; see his “L'humanisme de Jean de Salisbury, un cicéronien au 12e siècle,” in M. de Gandillac and E. Jeauneau, eds., Entretiens sur la Renaissance du 12e siècle (Paris 1968) 53-83.

30. John of Salisbury, Policraticus 480d: “Qui si modum excesserit, vergit ad culpam. Omnis enim virtus suis finibus limitatur et in modo consistit; si excesseris, in invio est et non in via.”

31. Ibid. 762c: “recedentes a medio vitiorum, quae regio virtutis est.”

32. Ibid. 531c-d: “Ad dextram declinare est virtutibus ipsis vehementer insistere. Ad dextram declinare est in virtutis operibus, quae in modo consistit, modum excedere. Omnis vero vehementia salutis inimica est, et excessus omnis in culpa; bonarumque rerum consuetudo nimia pessima est. … Et philosophus: Cave quod est nimium; quia, sic haec ipsa cautela modestiam deserit, eo ipso a tramite virtutis incaute recedit.”

33. Ibid. 671d-762a: “Haec autem facillime distinguit loci temporis modi personae et causae superius memorata discretio. … Haec est enim fons et origo totius modestiae, sine qua nichil recte in officiis exercetur.”

34. Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics 1106a expresses essentially the same position by insisting that the mean course is always relative to the agent.

35. John of Salisbury, Policraticus 402d: “si vero moderationis formula limitantur.”

36. Ibid. 761b: “Nichil decorum est sine modo.” This remark is reminiscent of Cicero, De officiis 1.93.

37. On John's interest in German affairs, see Timothy Reuter, “John of Salisbury and the Germans,” in World of John (n. 5 above) 415-425.

38. John of Salisbury, Letters (n. 21 above) 2.70: “Nec credo rem istam adeundam iurgiis, sed felici moderatione complendam, praesertim a sapiente qui meminit quia modestia sapientiae a fine suaviter usque ad finem universa disponit.”

39. Ibid 298: “Malo enim moderationis habena calamum cohibere quam divinae legis articulos congerere qui, etsi recte prolati fuerint, interdum non nisi ad subversionem proficiunt auditorum.”

40. It is surely for this reason that John, in an early letter authored on behalf of Theobald, urges the pope to temper his commands with “moderatio” so as not to cause undue friction between the church and lay magnates; Letters 1, ed. W. J. Millor, H. E. Butler, and C. N. L. Brooke (London 1955) 41.

41. For John's attitude toward Henry II, see Guth, Johannes (n. 20 above) 207-213.

42. John of Salisbury, Letters (n. 21 above) 2.634: “Si ecclesiae Dei ut oportet deferret magis, et cum his modestius ageret qui cum eo contrahunt aliqua ratione, et impertu irae vel alterius reprimendi affectus ad mensuram regiae gravitatis linguam cohiberet et animum.”

43. Ibid. 686: “Cantuariensis … inspirabit animo regis ut divinitis indultam sibi licentiam moderetur.”

44. For instance, see ibid. 237, 429, and 455-456. A careful accounting of the various uses of the word “tyrannus” in John's letters and elsewhere has been prepared by Jan van Laarhoven, “Thou Shall Not Slay a Tyrant! The So-Called Theory of John of Salisbury,” in World of John (n. 5 above) 333-341.

45. For a more thorough articulation of this notion of tyranny, see Nederman and Brückmann (n. 4 above) 224, and C. J. Nederman, “The Aristotelian Doctrine of the Mean and John of Salisbury's Concept of Liberty,” Vivarium (1987), forthcoming.

46. John of Salisbury, Policraticus 529a, 530b, and 531d-532b.

47. John of Salisbury, Letters (n. 21 above) 2.468: “Ea enim est natura hominis, ut apud eum iacturam faciat omnium meritorum qui quacumque ratione praeterierit aut distulerit unum, qualecumque sit, adimplere mandatum. Ea autem est moderatio precum … ut ei quandoque necesse sit obviari.”

48. See ibid. 454, 456.

49. Ibid. 242.

50. Ibid. 464.

51. This is explained in ibid. #171.

52. Ibid. 128: “In hoc conflictu potestatis et iuris ea moderatione incedat, praevia lege, duce gratia, iuvante ratione, ut nec temeritatis videri debeat adversus potestatem quam Deus ordinavit, nec metu potestatis aut amore bonorum evanecentium iniquitati consentiat in depressionem ecclesiae.”

53. Ibid. 130: “turbari et timere, et utrumque supra modum.”

54. Ibid. 130, 132: “imitetur quod bonos fecisse legimus, ut Cusai Arachitem, qui consilium et malitiam Achitophel moderatione adhibita studuit dissipare.”

55. For recent evaluations of the relationship between Becket and John of Salisbury, based on the letters and other evidence, see Guth, Johannes (n. 20 above) 239-251, and Anne Duggan, “John of Salisbury and Thomas Becket,” in World of John (n. 5 above) 427-438.

56. The literature on Becket is far too enormous to summarize effectively here. An especially balanced appraisal of Becket's character and behavior may be found in C. N. L. Brooke, “Thomas Becket,” in Medieval Church and Society (London 1971) 121-138.

57. John of Salisbury, Letters (n. 21 above) 2.20, 22: “Ecclesiae et archepiscopo Cantuariensi debitam servari fidem et ei, ubi iustitia et modestia videbantur adesse, et in Anglia et in partibus cismarinis fideliter astiti. Sicubi vero aut exorbitare a iustitia aut modum excedere videbatur, restiti ei in faciem.”

58. Ibid. 48: “Novit enim cordium inspector et verborum iudex et operum quod saepius et asperius quam aliquis mortalium corripuerim dominum archepiscopum de his, in quibus ab initio dominum regem et suos zelo quodam inconsultius visus est ad amaritudinem provocasse, cum pro loco et tempore et personis mu ta fuerint dispensanda.”

59. Ibid. 168: “Modestia vestra, quod plurimum expedit, omnibus innotescat … eoque modestius scribendum et condiciones conseo exigendas, quo michi certior esse videor animos adversantium ecclesiae Dei sic induratos esse ut nullam omnino conditionem admittant.”

60. Ibid. 170: “Huic opinioni occurrendum est exhibitione moderationis, tam in factis et dictis quam in gestu et habitu; quam tamen apud Deum non multum prodest, nisi de archano conscientiae prodeat.”

61. Ibid. 172: “Poteritis modeste respondere … istis increpatoribus, immo detractoribus vestris.”

62. Ibid. 190: “Ita per omnia incedatis ut modestia vestra omnibus innotescat … Attendanda enim est instantia temporis, condicio ecclesiae Romanae, necessitas regni Angliae.”

63. I discuss a similar case of John's use in a letter of a doctrine originating with the Policraticus in a forthcoming essay entitled “The Physiological Significance of the Organic Metaphor in John of Salisbury's Policraticus.”

64. This partially accounts for the various antischolastic jibes that John includes in his letters, such as the remark that “scolaris exercitatio interdum scientiam auget ad tumorem” (Letters [n. 21 above] 2.34).