SOURCE: Dumont, Stephen D. “Theology as a Science and Duns Scotus's Distinction between Intuitive and Abstractive Cognition.” Speculum 64, no. 3 (July 1989): 579-99.

[In the following essay, Dumont probes the distinction between two types of thought—intuitive and abstractive cognition—within Scotus's definition of theology as a true science rather than simply the product of faith and beatific vision.]

By all accounts one of the most influential philosophical contributions of Duns Scotus is his distinction between intuitive cognition, in which a thing is known as present and existing, and abstractive cognition, which abstracts from actual presence and existence.¹ Recent scholarship has focused almost exclusively on the role given intuitive cognition in the justification of contingent propositions and on the debates over certitude which arose from the critiques of Scotus's distinction by Peter Aureoli and William of Ockham.² However warranted this focus on the problem of certitude and the role of intuition in its solution might be, it has obscured the actual context in which fourteenth-century thinkers very often discussed Scotus's famous distinction. As the Appendix [see Speculum 64 no. 3 (July 1989): 594–99] to this article makes clear, Scotus's contemporaries, including Ockham and Aureoli, nearly always treated intuitive and abstractive cognition under the rubric of the scientific character of theology.³ I wish to argue, first, that this nearly uniform application of Scotus's distinction to the issue of theology as a science can be traced to the original problem Scotus intended his distinction to solve and, secondly, that abstractive rather than intuitive cognition played the important and controversial role in solving that problem.

The fourteenth-century pattern of using the distinction between intuition and abstraction to address the problem of theology as a science is not traceable to Scotus in a direct way. Theologians of the period typically treated theology as a science in the prologues to their commentaries on the Sentences of Lombard. Scotus, however, mentioned intuition only once in the prologue to his early Oxford commentary on the Sentences known as the Lectura, and then not in its technical sense of knowledge of an object as existing and present.⁴ In the prologue to the Ordinatio, a greatly expanded revision of the Lectura, Scotus still mentioned intuition without comment.⁵ In neither of the above Oxford commentaries did Scotus broach any express discussion of his distinction until well into the second book, when dealing not with theology as a science, but with angelic cognition.⁶ How is it that thinkers after Scotus so often discussed intuitive and abstractive cognition in the context of theology as a science, while Scotus, in his great Oxford commentaries that influenced nearly all subsequent treatments of both intuition and theology as a science, did not? To answer this question, we must first examine the emergence of Scotus's distinction in his Oxford works on the Sentences, especially in the earlier Lectura, and then its context in his slightly later Parisian commentary.

1. THE OXFORD COMMENTARIES

Book 2, distinction 3, of the Lectura contains, as far as we know, Scotus's earliest explicit appeal to the distinction between intuitive and abstractive cognition.⁷ In fact, the term “intuition” only occurs in the Lectura six places before the second book, and of these only one seems to be contrasted with abstraction.⁸ The doctrine, however, of a type of cognition which grasps an object as existing is found more frequently in the first book of the Lectura but in the terminological garb of vision, not intuition. The proof of this is that in revising the Lectura for publication as the Ordinatio Scotus glossed several of these earlier occurrences of visio with cognitio intuitiva.⁹ Thus, in the second book of the Lectura Scotus was not so much developing a new doctrine of intuitive cognition as giving it a highly technical and precise vocabulary. This would indicate that Scotus was entering particularly controversial ground requiring the exactness of technicality. What remains to be seen is the exact point of controversy.

Scotus first treated intuitive and abstractive cognition in a developed way while addressing the problem of the “natural” cognition of the divine nature by angels.¹⁰ In this context, “natural” refers to the concreated or in via, as opposed to beatific, knowledge angels possess of God.¹¹ According to Scotus, Henry of Ghent and Aquinas both denied that angels have distinct knowledge of the divine nature and that they can know God through some representing species. In the absence of any appeal to species to explain angelic cognition of God, Aquinas held that an angel knows God through its own essence as imago Dei, while Henry, at least according to Scotus's version, failed to supply any positive account. Against both Henry and Aquinas, Scotus argued that angels naturally know the divine essence distinctly and that they do so by means of a species.¹² To explain how this is possible Scotus distinguished two types of cognition: “I respond to the question. First it should be known that a twofold cognition or intellection in the intellect is possible, for there can be one that abstracts from all existence and a second that is of a thing insofar as it is present in its own existence.”¹³

Scotus did not immediately give these two types of cognition technical labels but did so only in the second of three ensuing arguments to prove their asserted possibility. There Scotus said that the first cognition, according to which a thing is understood by abstracting from all existence, is called “abstractive” (cognitio abstractiva), while the second, by which a thing is seen in its own existence, is called “intuitive” (cognitio intuitiva). Scotus carefully specified that “intuitive” is here taken narrowly, opposed not to discursive reasoning but to cognition through a species.¹⁴ Scotus then argued that these two types of cognition are distinct because we expect intuitive, not abstractive, cognition of God in beatitude.¹⁵ Thus, in his earliest text on the matter Scotus introduced the term “intuitive” only when dealing with the beatific vision and seems to have regarded this usage as uncontroversial.

Having established this difference in cognition, Scotus responded to the question. Everyone agrees angels cannot naturally have intuitive knowledge of God, since this is beatific. Nor is it befitting that an angel should be limited to merely confused and imperfect knowledge of the divine nature, since we in the present state can achieve that much.¹⁶ It remains that angels naturally have distinct knowledge of the divine nature. This knowledge is abstractive, not intuitive, since it is caused not by the divine nature as actually present to the intellect but by some properly representing species.¹⁷

What is here so controversial that Scotus would trouble to draw these technical refinements in types of cognition? It is certainly not the application of intuitive cognition to beatific knowledge of God. In the first book Scotus had repeatedly used without comment the term visio to refer to the beatific knowledge of the divine essence in the same sense as he here used cognitio intuitiva.¹⁸ The argument in which Scotus introduced the term assumes that the description of beatific vision as intuitive is current and acceptable.¹⁹ Scotus's immediate source of this terminology was Henry of Ghent, who regularly used the term intuitus to describe beatific knowledge of God in the very texts Scotus had read to reconstruct Henry's position on angelic cognition.²⁰ While it is true that Scotus explicitly and with Henry in view shifted the meaning of intuition from nondiscursive to existential knowledge, this would not have been seen as problematic, at least regarding the beatific vision. Henry had already prepared the way for this usage by associating vision with cognition of a thing as existing and present.²¹

Rather, the controversial aspect to Scotus's doctrine on this point was his application of abstractive cognition to the divine essence so that angels can have a distinct knowledge of the divine nature short of beatitude. Elsewhere Scotus defined distinct cognition as the complete and explicit grasping of all the necessary features of a nature. It is related to confused cognition as definitional knowledge is to nominal aquaintance.²² It is not difficult to see why Scotus was concerned about being misunderstood on this point. The assertion that angels naturally have a distinct knowledge of the divine essence could easily be construed to mean that angels naturally enjoy the beatific vision. Scotus apparently thought his position susceptible enough to such an interpretation that he repeated seven times in this short question that the distinct cognition angels have of God is not intuitive.²³ Originally, then, the controversial aspect to Scotus's distinction between intuitive and abstractive cognition did not lie in an innovative use of intuitive cognition. On the contrary, Scotus's original innovation was to exploit abstractive cognition so as to isolate from beatitude a distinct knowledge of the divine nature.

To summarize, then, Scotus used the term intuition in the first book of his Lectura to mean nondiscursive as well as existential cognition. When used according to the latter meaning, intuition and the related term vision refer, in this early work, only to the beatific knowledge of the divine essence, whether by the created or uncreated intellect. Such usage went unremarked until 2 Lectura d.3, where Scotus distinguished at length intuitive from abstractive cognition in order to deal with the natural knowledge of God by angels. If this text is the earliest place Scotus detailed intuitive and abstractive cognition, its context shows that the distinction had its origin in Scotus's attempt to find a middle way of knowing the divine nature which fell between the intuitive knowledge of God in beatitude and the confused knowledge of the divine essence presently available to us through transcendental concepts. But how does all this account for the close association found in subsequent literature between intuitive and abstractive cognition and the scientific character of theology? Let us follow Scotus on his short but important journey from Oxford to Paris.

2. THE PARISIAN COMMENTARY

Before Scotus began lecturing on the Sentences at Paris in the fall of 1302, his revision of the Lectura for publication as the Ordinatio was already under way. By that time the prologue, which saw a threefold expansion, was certainly finished. Despite such a thorough revision, the prologue of the Ordinatio gives no more developed treatment of the distinction between intuitive and abstractive cognition than its counterpart in the Lectura. Intuitive cognition is mentioned only obliquely in the prologue of the Ordinatio in the course of explaining how contingent theological truths can be ordered.²⁴ The prologue of the Reportatio Parisiensis, however, is another matter.²⁵ There Scotus explicitly appealed to his distinction to address perhaps the most fundamental debate in theology, which had recently become heated at Paris. That debate was over the scientific status of theology itself.

On one side was Henry of Ghent, who held that there is demonstrative or scientific knowledge of the truths of faith in the present life, even concerning the Trinity, and that such demonstrative knowledge is compatible with faith as regards the same truth in the same intellect. Put in other terms, the theologian can attain a knowledge of the objects of belief beyond that given in faith which is sufficiently clear and evident to be called scientific.²⁶ Henry was aware that his position was at odds with the current view, and he attempted to clarify it throughout his career by distinguishing between fides, intellectus, and visio.²⁷ According to Henry, faith is knowledge of things not present to the intellect. In faith assent is caused not by any evidence on the part of the object itself, but from the testimony or authority of another. Opposed to faith is visio, in which the object in its own nature is immediately (praesto) and evidently (clare) present to the intellect. Here evidence is from the object itself so present.²⁸ Between the extremes of fides and visio is intellectus, in which the object is present to the intellect not in itself but through a species, whether this be the species of the same object or of another.²⁹ In intellectus evidence is provided not by the present object itself but by reasoning (discursus) about the object, whether in definition or syllogistic deduction.³⁰ In this way, for example, the scientist knows from astronomical calculations that an eclipse is occurring even though he does not actually view it, and the mathematician has a science of geometry even when corporeal figures are not actually present.

Applying this division to theology, Henry obviously held that if “science” or “understanding” is taken in the narrow sense of visio, then there is no scientific knowledge of theological truths in the present state, nor can they be held by faith and understanding at the same time. The immediate presence of God to the intellect in visio constitutes beatitude, which puts us outside the present state and displaces all faith.³¹ Henry argued, however, that theology is truly scientific in the sense of intellectus; otherwise the whole project of faith seeking understanding would be trivial.³² The theologian, beginning with belief, burrows beneath the divine mysteries, as Henry described it, by means of definition, division, and demonstration. Such discursive investigation produces enough evidence so that what was previously held on faith alone is now known with sufficient clarity to warrant the status of true science.³³ The evidence supplied by intellectus, however, is never so great as that given in visio, and it can never entirely displace all obscurity of faith. In this way, the same truth is both believed and understood by the same intellect.³⁴ Obviously, a theologian using natural methods cannot penetrate the mysteries of faith unless aided by supernatural illumination. This supernatural light, which Henry said is between the lumen fidei of belief and the lumen gloriae of beatitude, came to be called simply lumen medium.³⁵

Clearly, intellectus and its associated lumen medium were attempts by Henry to clear out a middle ground between mere faith and the beatific vision, where the theologian could lay claim to a true science. Henry did so by bringing some finesse to the dividing line between the present state and the beatific vision. To the simple distinction between absence of the divine nature in faith and presence in beatitude, Henry added the more refined distinction between presence in itself (visio) and mediated presence in a species, or discursive reasoning (intellectus).

Henry's position proved to have many detractors but none greater than Godfrey of Fontaines.³⁶ Godfrey contended that absolutely no evidence could be found to support any lumen medium.³⁷ For example, both the simple believer and the most learned theologian alike confess on their deathbeds that they believe the articles of faith, nor has a theologian ever been able to communicate through teaching any true understanding of the articles of faith. While conceding that the theologian moves beyond simple faith, Godfrey denied that such theological knowledge is sufficiently different from, or clearer than, what is given in belief that it can be called science in any strict sense of the term. Consequently, in Godfrey's view there is no need to invoke any supernatural light beyond faith to explain theology. The theologian simply investigates the tenets of faith by purely natural means.³⁸

Debate between Henry and Godfrey on the point seems to have been personal and acute. Doubtless Godfrey was among those “certain theologians in the faculty” whom Henry called the ruination of the church because they denied theology to be a true science and instead exalted philosophy.³⁹ Godfrey found intolerable Henry's assertion that only those who already possessed the lumen medium could see any evidence of it.⁴⁰ According to Godfrey, Henry “claimed much but proved little” about his lumen medium.⁴¹ Although Godfrey did not think Henry's hidden theological light could be equated with the gnosticism of the Manichees, he was dismayed at Henry's obstinance in maintaining this light, “which Henry totally lacks as much as others.”⁴²

Such were the tensions in the faculty of theology at Paris over its own discipline a few years before Scotus came there to read the Sentences. When Scotus arrived, Godfrey was still alive and active.⁴³ Under the circumstances he could hardly have ignored such a contentious and fundamental issue. Indeed, Scotus's prologue to his Parisian commentary is structured differently from its Oxford predecessors to meet the exigencies of this debate. This is most apparent in the second question, in which Scotus asked whether it is possible for the wayfarer to have a completely strict and rigorous science of theology.⁴⁴ Here Scotus examined at length the opposing views of Henry and Godfrey given above.⁴⁵ This question was clearly precipitated by circumstances at Paris, since neither it nor the report of the opinions of Henry and Godfrey on this point are found in the Oxford prologues. This can be further confirmed from Scotus's Quodlibet question 7, disputed at Paris, in which Scotus re-used this prologue material to address a related problem.⁴⁶ Scotus's reply to the second question of his Parisian prologue can thus be taken as his part in the debate at Paris over the status of theology.⁴⁷

Although Scotus did not think Henry could sustain his own claim for a proper science of theology given his rejection of the intelligible species, he appears sympathetic to Henry's position.⁴⁸ He dismissed Godfrey's arguments against Henry as inconclusive and insisted, despite Godfrey's statement to the contrary, that Godfrey demeaned theology. At one point he even chided Godfrey for preferring one text of Averroes to Henry's thirty authorities from Augustine and the saints.⁴⁹ In reply to both sides, Scotus maintained that it is possible for the wayfarer (viator) to have an unqualified (simpliciter) and perfect science of theology. It is an absolute or unqualified science since it is a priori and not merely a posteriori; it is perfect since superior to faith. That is, Scotus here argued nothing less than that a fully rigorous propter quid science of theology is compatible with the wayfarer state.⁵⁰ In the remarkable words of the parallel text in his Quodlibet, Scotus said that it is possible for the wayfarer to be a perfect theologian.⁵¹

Scotus argued that such a science of theology is available to the wayfarer because it is possible for the wayfarer to know the divine nature under the proper aspect of its Deity (sub propria ratione Deitatis).⁵² Since, as Scotus had already shown, the divine nature so considered is the subject of theology, and since the subject of a science virtually contains all truths in that science, it follows that the wayfarer can have an a priori science of theology superior to that of faith.⁵³

After having read the above text from the Parisian prologue, Robert Cowton, a younger colleague of Scotus at Oxford, remarked that “Scotus's position is scarcely believable and his argument for it even less so.”⁵⁴ As Cowton pointed out, the rub is Scotus's assertion that it is possible for the wayfarer to know the divine nature under the proper aspect of its Deity. To explain how such knowledge of God does not violate the wayfarer state, Scotus appealed to the distinction between intuitive and abstractive cognition. Here abstractive cognition is defined as knowledge through a species of a thing not present in itself and intuitive cognition as knowledge of a thing as it has being in actual existence. Scotus argued that abstractive cognition of the divine nature, which is nonetheless distinct, is available to the wayfarer since only intuitive cognition of God constitutes beatitude.⁵⁵ This distinct, abstractive cognition of the divine essence suffices for an a priori science of theology superior to faith, at least as regards necessary theological truths.

Thus Scotus, like Henry, made a strong case for the scientific character of theology but distinguished his position from Henry's on two points. First, and most important for our concern, Scotus rejected Henry's lumen medium unless it refers to the species that distinctly represents the divine nature in abstractive cognition. In other words, Scotus himself saw his abstractive cognition as taking up the role played by Henry's lumen medium in the debate over theology.⁵⁶ Secondly, Scotus held that although such a strict science of God under the aspect of Deity is compatible with the wayfarer state absolutely speaking, it is nonetheless not available according to common disposition. The distinct knowledge of God from which this strict science of theology is derived results from a divine action, which, while going beyond common revelation, does not violate the wayfarer state.⁵⁷ Apparently Scotus had in mind some sort of infusion by God of a species distinctly representing the divine nature, or perhaps the retention of such a species in abstractive cognition after the intuitive cognition of God given in rapture had passed.⁵⁸

In sum, then, Scotus followed Henry in attempting to negotiate the boundary between the wayfarer state and the homeland in order to preserve a rigorous science of theology outside the beatific vision. Indeed, both did so in similar ways and, at least for Henry's earlier texts, in nearly identical language. Where Henry distinguished between visio as knowing the thing as clearly present in itself and intellectus as knowing it as present in a species or through discursive reasoning, Scotus distinguished between cognitio intuitiva as grasping the object as existing and present and cognitio abstractiva as knowledge of the nonpresent thing in a species.⁵⁹ Such similar formulations in identical contexts indicate that Scotus's distinction derived from Henry's. Scotus himself left little doubt about this. While giving an otherwise accurate report of Henry's lumen medium, he slipped into his own vocabulary of intuition and abstraction.⁶⁰ The many contemporaries of Scotus who associated his distinction between intuitive and abstractive cognition with Henry's lumen medium show that they were perceived as closely related doctrines designed to perform the same function. The most explicit case of this is the Carmelite master Gui Terrena in his Quodlibet 1.2 (1312): “And in this way some hold that in matters of belief God can communicate an abstractive cognition through which we can understand and know in particular, determinately, and evidently those things we believe. … This opinion does not seem different from that which holds a middle light between the light of faith and the light of glory, in which light matters of belief are understood but not seen. What the former call abstractive cognition, the latter call intellective, and what the former call intuitive cognition, the latter call vision.”⁶¹

The reason that fourteenth-century discussions on intuitive and abstractive cognition so often took place under the rubric of the science of theology is now apparent. The reason is that Scotus himself so applied the distinction in response to the debate over theology at Paris. This obvious, albeit overlooked, historical explanation reveals, however, another less obvious and more profound one about the origins of Scotus's distinction.

Scotus's use of the distinction between intuitive and abstractive cognition in 2 Lectura to explain angelic cognition of God and his use of it again in his Paris prologue to explain how the wayfarer can have a strict science of theology are in fact one and the same application of the distinction. For Scotus, the angelic and human intellects are, in their natures, powers of equal scope.⁶² Thus, for Scotus to have solved the problem of angelic cognition of God is for him to have already solved the problem of the scientific status of theology in the wayfarer, at least absolutely speaking. In other words, the second book of Scotus's Oxford commentaries and the prologue to his Parisian reports point to the same motivation for the distinction between intuitive and abstractive cognition. The distinction originated in Scotus's attempt to explain how a created intellect, whether angelic or human, could have a distinct or strictly scientific knowledge of the divine nature short of seeing it beatifically. When seen in the proper context of its origin, Scotus's own distinction between intuition and abstraction emerges as a development of Henry of Ghent's distinction between visio and intellectus, between lumen gloriae and lumen medium.

According to this deeper historical account, Scotus's distinction between intuitive and abstractive cognition appears originally designed not so much to account for the certitude of contingent, naturally known truths as to guarantee scientific knowledge of necessary, theological ones. From the point of view of this original function, it is abstractive rather than intuitive cognition that has an important and controversial role.

Notes

1. On Scotus's notion of intuition see Sebastian J. Day, Intuitive Cognition: A Key to the Significance of the Later Scholastics (St. Bonaventure, N.Y., 1947); Camille Bérubé, La connaissance de l'individuel au moyen âge (Montreal, 1964), pp. 176-224; C. K. Brampton, “Scotus, Ockham and the Theory of Intuitive Cognition,” Antonianum 40 (1965), 449-66; John F. Boler, “Scotus and Intuition: Some Remarks,” Monist 49 (1965), 551-70; Richard E. Dumont, “Scotus's Intuition Viewed in the Light of the Intellect's Present State,” in De doctrina Ioannis Duns Scoti, 4 vols. (Rome, 1968), 2:47-64; Ludger Honnefelder, Ens inquantum ens: Der Begriff des Seienden als solchen als Gegenstand der Metaphysik nach der Lehre des Johannes Duns Scotus, Beiträge zur Geschichte der Philosophie und Theologie des Mittelalters, n.s. 16 (Münster, 1979), pp. 218-67. Most recently Allan B. Wolter has tried to trace the development of Scotus's notion of intuition. Wolter, however, gives no attention to the Reportatio Parisiensis, which, as I hope to show, represents an important stage historically. See his “Duns Scotus on Intuition, Memory, and Our Knowledge of Individuals,” in History of Philosophy in the Making: A Symposium of Essays to Honor Professor James D. Collins on His Sixty-Fifth Birthday, ed. Linus J. Thro (New York, 1982), pp. 81-104.

2. On intuition and certitude, see Anton C. Pegis, “Concerning William of Ockham,” Traditio 2 (1944), 165-80; Philotheus Boehner, “Notitia intuitiva of Non-Existents according to Peter Aureoli, O.F.M. (1322),” Franciscan Studies 8 (1948), 388-416; Marilyn M. Adams, “Intuitive Cognition, Certainty, and Skepticism in William of Ockham,” Traditio 26 (1970), 389-98; Armand A. Maurer, “Francis of Meyron's Defense of Epistemological Realism,” in Studia mediaevalia et Mariologica P. Carolo Balić OFM dicata (Rome, 1971), pp. 203-25; Leo D. Davis, “The Intuitive Knowledge of Non-Existents and the Problem of Late Medieval Skepticism,” New Scholasticism 49 (1975), 410-30; Paul Streveler, “Ockham and His Critics on Intuitive Cognition,” Franciscan Studies 35 (1975), 223-36; Luciano Cova, “Francesco di Meyronnes e Walter Catton nella controversia scolastica sulla ‘notitia intuitiva de re non existente,’” Medioevo 2 (1976), 227-51; Alessandro Ghisalberti, “L'intuizione in Ockham,” Rivista di filosofia neo-scolastica 70 (1978), 207-26; John F. Boler, “Intuitive and Abstractive Cognition,” in The Cambridge History of Later Medieval Philosophy, ed. Norman Kretzmann et al. (Cambridge, Eng., 1982), pp. 460-78; Katherine H. Tachau, “The Response to Ockham's and Aureol's Epistemology (1320-1340),” in English Logic in Italy in the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Centuries: Acts of the Fifth European Symposium on Medieval Logic and Semantics, ed. Alfonso Maierù (Naples, 1982), pp. 185-218; Rega Wood, “Intuitive Cognition and Divine Omnipotence: Ockham in Fourteenth-Century Perspective,” in From Ockham to Wyclif, ed. Anne Hudson and Michael Wilks (London, 1987), pp. 51-61; Onorato Grassi, Intuizione e significato: Adam Wodeham e il problema della conoscenza nel XIV secolo (Milan, 1986). Of utmost importance on the issue of certitude in this period is Tachau's recent book, Vision and Certitude in the Age of Ockham: Optics, Epistemology, and the Foundations of Semantics, 1250-1345 (Leiden, 1988).

3. The Appendix lists the questions under which intuition and abstraction were discussed in the fourteenth century after Scotus. Relevant parts of the larger unedited texts are transcribed. Some authors, such as Gerard of Bologna, did not discuss intuition and abstraction in a question expressly on theology as a science, but the distinction is nevertheless associated with that problem. There are, of course, exceptions to this pattern even within Scotistic circles. Cf. Alexander of Alexandria, Quod. 1.9 (1307-8), “Utrum Deus possit causare cognitionem intuitivam sine exsistentia rei et sine reali praesentia obiecti” (Vatican City, Biblioteca Apostolica Vaticana, MS Vat. lat. 932, fols. 15r-16r). It should also be noted that a number of the questions listed ask whether abstractive or even intuitive knowledge of God can be communicated to the wayfarer (viator). As will be evident, after Scotus this became a chief issue in deciding whether theology is a science, at least with respect to the wayfarer.

4. 1 Lect. prol. n.108 (Vat. 16:39-40). Wolter has found six instances of the term intuition in the first book of the Lectura. See “Duns Scotus on Intuition,” p. 100, n. 18.

5. 1 Ord. prol. nn. 169-71 (Vat. 1:113-14). Here Scotus appealed to intuitive cognition to ground theology as a science of contingents, an innovation which saw great development in the fourteenth century. Steven P. Marrone has drawn attention to this innovation in his paper “Concepts of Science among Parisian Theologians in the Thirteenth Century,” forthcoming in the proceedings of the Eighth International Congress of Medieval Philosophy: Knowledge of the Sciences in Medieval Philosophy.

6. 2 Lect. d.3 p.2 q.2 (Vat. 18:315-30): “Utrum angelus habeat actualem notitiam naturalem et distinctam essentiae divinae.” See also 2 Ord. d.3 p.2 q.2 (Vat. 7:544-69).

7. On the chronology of Scotus's works, see Wolter, “Duns Scotus on Intuition,” p. 83; C. K. Brampton, “Duns Scotus at Oxford, 1288-1301,” Franciscan Studies 24 (1964), 5-20. It is certain that the Ordinatio is after the Lectura and that the prologue of the Ordinatio is before the Reportatio Parisiensis. Indeed it is very likely that Scotus was at work on the second book of the Ordinatio before lecturing at Paris (Wolter, “Duns Scotus on Intuition,” p. 104, n. 64). As for Scotus's discussion of intuition in his Quaestiones in Metaphysicam, Wolter (ibid.) puts it after the Lectura but before book 3 of the Ordinatio. The date of the Quaestiones in Metaphysicam is still uncertain, however. It has traditionally been regarded as an early work, and recent evidence suggests that parts were written before or at the same time as the second book of the Lectura. See Luke Modrić, “Rapporto tra la Lectura et la Metaphysica di G. Duns Scoto,” Antonianum 52 (1987), 504-9. There are other indications of a later dating, at least for parts. See 1 Ord. “De Ordinatione historice considerata” (Vat. 1:155*-57*).

8. See n. 4 above. By 1 Lectura d.8 Scotus was employing intuitive to mean existential knowledge: 1 Lect. d.8 n.174; d.10 n.3; d.13 n.17 (Vat. 17:62-63, 115, 170).

9. Compare 1 Lect. prol. n.118 (Vat. 16:42-43) and 1 Ord. prol. n.169 (Vat. 1:112-13); 1 Lect. d.1 nn.41-43 (Vat. 16:74) and 1 Ord. d.1 nn.34-36 (Vat. 2:23-24); 1 Lect. d.2 n.81 (Vat. 16:140) and 1 Ord. d.2. n.129 (Vat. 2:204); 1 Lect. d.2 n.264 (Vat. 16:213) and 1 Ord. d.2 n.394 (Vat. 2:352). R. G. Wengert notes the shift in terminology in the second pair of these passages and speculates that “when he got to Paris Scotus read something which led him to revise his terminology” (“The Sources of Intuitive Cognition in William of Ockham,” Franciscan Studies 41 [1981], 446). Scotus had already begun to revise his terminology by 1 Lectura d.8 (see n. 8 above) but in any case had probably finished 1 Ordinatio d.1 before he got to Paris.

10. See n. 4 above.

11. See 2 Ord. d.3 n.325 (Vat. 7:555-56).

12. 2 Lect. d.3 nn.291-97 (Vat. 18:323-26).

13. “Ad quaestionem igitur respondeo. Ad quod primo sciendum est quod in intellectu potest esse duplex cognitio et intellectio, nam una intellectio potest esse in intellectu prout abstrahit ab omni exsistentia, alia intellectio potest esse rei secundum quod praesens est in exsistentia sua.” 2 Lect. d.3 n.285 (Vat. 18:321).

14. That is, angels naturally have intuitive cognition of the divine nature in the sense of nondiscursive knowledge. This is the usual emphasis given to the term intuitus by Henry of Ghent, who does not seem to have made a clear distinction between knowledge which is nondiscursive and that which derives from an object present in itself. See texts of Henry cited at n. 20 below and Scotus, 1 Lect. d.13 n.17 (Vat. 17:170). See also R. G. Wengert, “Three Senses of Intuitive Cognition: A Quodlibetal Question of Harvey of Nedellec,” Franciscan Studies 43 (1983), 408-31.

15. 2 Lect. d.3 nn.288-89 (Vat. 18:322).

16. According to Scotus, the created intellect, even in the present state, can achieve a proper, albeit not particular, concept of God: “Tertio dico quod Deus non cognoscitur naturaliter a viatore in particulari et proprie. … Quarto dico quod ad multos conceptus proprios Deo possumus pervenire, qui non conveniunt creaturis …” (1 Ord. d.3 nn.56, 58 [Vat. 3:38, 40]). This is possible because being and the divine attributes can be conceived as univocally common to God and creature. For a summary of Scotus's doctrine of univocity, see Allan B. Wolter, The Transcendentals and Their Function in the Metaphysics of Duns Scotus (St. Bonaventure, N.Y., 1946), pp. 31-57.

17. 2 Lect. d.3 nn.291-92 (Vat. 18:323-24).

18. See n. 9 above.

19. “… secundum omnes, angelus non possit habere cognitionem intuitivam de Deo ex puris naturalibus …” (2 Lect. d.3 n.292 [Vat. 18:323]).

20. “… tres personae a beatis omnino nisi unico intuitu videri non possunt” (Quod. 2.7 [ed. Wielockx, p. 35, lines 28-29]); “… cum Deus in sua nuda essentia videtur aut intelligitur, ex tali visione nullo verbo complexo concipi potest, sed tantummodo simplici intelligentia, qua simplici intuitu repraesententur ipsa et quod in ea intelligitur” (Quod. 5.26 [ed. 1518, 1:205 P]); “… sed solum ea cognoscendo in simplici intuitu divinae essentiae, cum scilicet omnem nostram scientiam uno simul intuitu videbimus” (op. cit., 1:205 Q); “… si intellectus apprehendens divinam naturam sub ratione essentiae stet in sola apprehensione tali et nequaquam ulterius operetur suae considerationis intuitu circa sic apprehensum …” (Quod. 13.1 [ed. DeCorte, p. 5, lines 43-45]); “… de necessitate ergo beatus unico et simplici intuitu videt in ipsa divina natura omnes illas rationes simul …” (op. cit., p. 6, lines 60-62); “… propter suam obtusitatem non sufficit eam primo intuitu clare conspicere, sed oportet eum per discursum notitiam illius investigate …” (op. cit., p. 7, lines 83-85); “… de cognitione habita de illis in vita ista, quia non est nisi discursiva. Et sic non est simile de cognitione rationum Dei in patria, in qua omnes simul sub uno intuitu iugiter permanente …” (op. cit., p. 9, lines 30-32). See also SQO 40.5, 49.5 (1:258 O-R, 2:37 O).

21. “Dicendum quod dupliciter contingit cire rem aliquam esse: uno modo per seipsam ex evidentia exsistentiae suae apud scientem, ad modum quo scit ignem esse ille qui videt ignem praesentem oculis. … Alio autem modo contingit scire rem aliquam esse non per se ex rei evidentia, sed per medium notius deducens via ratiocinativa ad illud cognoscendum tamquam ignotius ex colligantia exsistentiae unius ad exsistentiam alterius, quorum unum ex rei evidentia videt per seipsam, alterum vero non visum per se ex rei evidentia. …” (SQO 22.1 [1:130 L]); “Ad cuius intellectum sciendum quod tripliciter contingit scire de re aliqua an sit in actu exsistens. Uno modo ex praesentia eius, ad modum quo scitur ignis esse praesens oculis. … Primo modo non cognoscitur Deus esse nisi videndo eius nudam essentiam, sicut vident eam sancti in patria, scientes per hoc Deum esse, sicut videns ignem prae oculis, per hoc scit ignem esse. Et hac via cognoscendi scire Deum esse impossibile est homini ex puris naturalibus in quocumque statu” (SQO 22.5 [1:134 C]); “Dicendum ad hoc, quod ad modum triplicis cognitionis sensitivae contingit imaginari de Deo triplicem cognitionem intellectivam. Est enim quaedam cognitio sensitiva rei ex eius praesentia nuda per essentiam suam, sicut oculus videt colores in pariete. Est autem alia cognitio sensitiva rei in eius absentia, et haec est duplex. Una qua res ipsa cognoscitur per suam propriam speciem. … Alia qua res cognoscitur per speciem alienam. … Ad modum primae cognitionis sensitivae Deus cognoscitur immediate per nudam essentiam, et hoc simplici intelligentia, non ratione collativa per aliquod medium rationis. Unde et illa cognitio dicitur cognitio visionis, quia in ea videt Deum oculus mentis, ad modum quo videt oculus corporis formam coloris. …” (SQO 24.2 [1:138 I]).

22. 1 Lect. d.2 n.16; d.3 nn.69, 75 (Vat. 16:115, 250, 252-53).

23. 2 Lect. d.3 (Vat. 18:324, lines 1-2, 9-11, 26-27, 28-31; 325, lines 4-6; 326, lines 3-5; 329 line 19-330 line 5).

24. 1 Ord. prol. n.169 (Vat. 1:113).

25. The text printed as the Reporatio Parisiensis in vol. 22 of the Vivès edition is, as Wadding himself indicates, based upon Vatican City, Biblioteca Apostolica Vaticana, MS Vat. lat. 876 (Censura Lucae Waddingi [Vivès 22:4-5]). For the first book, however, this manuscript carries the Additiones magnae, extracted by William of Alnwick from Scotus's Parisian and Oxford lectures, not a Reportatio Parisiensis. See “De Ordinatione I. Duns Scoti: Disquisitio historico-critica” (Vat. 1:38*-42*, 145*); “Adnotationes” (Vat. 7:4*, n. 2). I have consulted the copy of the Reportatio Parisiensis examinata contained in Vienna, Österreichische Nationalbibliothek, MS 1453, for the text of Scotus's Parisian commentary. In fact, the prologue in the Vivès edition is generally very close to the Reportatio examinata, and thus for convenience references are to the former unless the two versions differ significantly.

26. SQO 13.4 (1:92 M-93 O); 13.6-7 (1:94 A-97 Z); Quod. 8.14 (ed. 1518, 2:324 G-326 O); 12.2 (ed. DeCorte, pp. 14-27); 13.1 (ed. DeCorte, pp. 3-9). Note especially: “Et patet plane, quia in omnibus huiusmodi dictis Augustinus loquitur de intelligere huius vitae, contra eos qui exponunt illud Esaiae, ‘Nisi credideritis non intelligetis’, solummodo de intellectu futurae vitae, ad quem necessario praeambula est fides huius vitae, quamvis enim hoc verum sit, tamen non solum hoc verum est. Verum enim simul est et pro intelligere praesentis vitae. … Absolute igitur dicendum quod discens hanc scientiam ut congruit super habitum fidei acquirit habitum intellectus, ut quae primo credit fide postmodum intelligit ratione, et cui primo assentit ita suasus alterius auctoritate quasi audiendo, deinde assentit motus ab ipsa credibilis veritate vere intelligendo …” (SQO 13.6 [1:94 F-95 G]); “Et de tali intellectu dictum est supra, quod credibile fit homini in vita ista quodammodo intelligibile” (SQO 13.7 [1:96 Q]); “Sic ergo patet quomodo articuli fidei probari possunt veridica ratione generante verum intellectum et scientiam de ipsis, quod appellamus demonstrationem. Hoc tamen non nisi fide supposita” (Quod. 8.14 [ed. 1518, 2:326 M]); “Immo potius suadendum est quod certa ratio haberi potest de credibili, per quam vere sciri et intelligi potest in vita ista …” (Quod. 12.2 [ed. DeCorte, p. 21, lines 49-51]); “Et per hoc habetur habitus intellectivus de principiis tam extrinsecis quam intrinsecis theologiae, et scientificus simpliciter de conclusionibus credibilibus” (op. cit., p. 27, lines 99-1). See Jean Leclercq, “La théologie comme science d'après la littérature quodlibétique,” Recherches de théologie ancienne et médiévale 11 (1939), 360; Paul DeVooght, “La méthode théologique d'après Henri de Gand et Gérard de Bologne,” Recherches de théologie ancienne et médiévale 23 (1956), 61-87; Josef Finkenzeller, Offenbarung und Theologie nach der Lehre des Johannes Duns Skotus, Beiträge zur Geschichte der Philosophie und Theologie des Mittelalters 38/5 (Münster, 1961), pp. 184-85; Hermann Theissing, Glaube und Theologie bei Robert Cowton OFM, Beiträge zur Geschichte der Philosophie und Theologie des Mittelalters 42/3 (Münster, 1970), pp. 135-37; Joachim D'Souza, “William of Alnwick and the Problem of Faith and Reason,” Salesianum 35 (1973), 480-81.

27. SQO 13.6 (1:94 B-D); 13.7 (1:95 O-R); Quod. 8.14 (ed. 1518, 2:325 K-L); 12.2 (ed. DeCorte, p. 23 line 6-p. 24 line 33).

28. “Illa autem proprie dicuntur videri, quae praesto sunt vel animi vel corporis sensibus, quibus intellectus proprio testimonio assentit propter evidentiam veritatis ex natura ipsius rei vel rationis. Sed distinguendo notitiam visionis proprie sumptae a notitia intellectus vel scientiae, proprie dicitur esse notitia visionis quando res est praesto videnti per seipsam, sicut visui corporali praesto sunt in lumine visibilia corporalia et intellectui angelico et humano in gloria praesto sunt ea quae vident in verbo et luce increata” (SQO 13.7 [1.96 P]); “De cognitione autem visionis, quia ipsa propter rei praesentiam claram in seipsa, nullam in se patitur obscuritatem, sed est omnino clara et perfecta …” (ibid.).

29. While accepting it at first, Henry ultimately rejected the impressed intelligible species, even in the case of an absent object. See Theophiel Nys, De Werking van het menselijk Verstand volgens Hendrik van Gent (Louvain, 1949), pp. 51-98; Steven P. Marrone, Truth and Scientific Knowledge in the Thought of Henry of Ghent (Cambridge, Mass., 1985), pp. 5-6; 21, n. 25; 143. Accordingly, in his earlier texts (SQO 13.6-7) given in n. 30 below, Henry associated intellectus with both discursive reasoning and presence of the known object through a representing species, while in the later texts (Quod. 8.14 and 12.2) he described it solely in terms of discursive knowledge. See also texts at n. 59 below.

30. “Tertius modus est medius quo cognoscuntur credita, non solum auditu nec apparentia rei quasi visu, sed ex rationis evidentia, qua intellectui conspicuum est naturam rei sic se habere sicut fides tenet” (SQO 13.6 [1:94 C]; “Proprie autem dicitur notitia intellectus quando res est praesto intelligenti vel scienti per speciem solum suam vel alienam, sicut geometra habet intellectum et scientiam figurarum corporalium ad absentiam earum secundum rem per veridicam rationem quam habet de eis adminiculo specierum suarum apud animam. … Sed loquendo de intellectu proprie dicto, cui res praesto est per speciem et maxime per speciem alienam … non est ex rei praesentis evidentia, sed ex veridicae rationis efficacia …” (SQO 13.7 [1:96 P-Q]); “Intelligere autem est verum aliquid cognoscere perspicue per medium certius ex sensus cognitione in primis certificatum, quemadmodum conclusiones intelligimus intellecto medio proprio notiori complexo et applicato” (Quod. 8.14 [ed. 1518, 2:325 K]); “Intelligere autem est cognoscere aliquid ex alio per discursum rationis, vel definitivum vel syllogisticum, qualiter doctor astrologus intelligit per demonstrationem nunc solem eclipsari, quod oculis non videt” (Quod. 12.2 [ed. DeCorte, p. 23, lines 13-16]).

31. SQO 13.7 (1:96 R).

32. “Omnis de hac re sermo quid agit, nisi ut non solum credatur verum etiam intelligatur et sciatur quod dicitur. Aliter enim vanum esset multo studio insistere expositioni sacrae scripturae, postquam credita sunt illa firmiter circa quorum notitiam laboramus” (SQO 13.6 [1:95 G]).

33. SQO 13.6 (1:94 D-95 G).

34. “Notitia enim quae est hic per intellectum de credibilibus nunquam est pura ab omni obscuritate fidei” (SQO 13.6 [1:95 I]); cf. SQO 13.7 (1:96 R-T); Quod. 8.14 (ed. 1518, 2:325 K-L). As Henry explained it, the whole basis for the obscurity of the truths of faith is that they concern particulars while intellectus is limited to universals: “Quod, quia nunc fide non cognovimus nisi indeterminate, in hoc consistit fidei aenigma, quae evacuatur si nobis huiusmodi particulare determinetur …” (op. cit., 2:326 L).

35. SQO 13.6 (1:94 D-G, 95 M); Quod. 12.2 (ed. DeCorte, pp. 14-21).

36. Godfrey's Quod. 8.7 (PB 4:69-82) is an extended refutation of Henry's position, which it quotes at length and verbatim. Two other early opponents of Henry were James of Therine and Gerard of Bologna. See the articles by Leclecq and DeVooght at n. 26 above. Henry did have his defenders, however, such as the Oxford Augustinian Robert Walshingham. See his Quod. 1.10 (1312-13), “Utrum unum et idem possit ab eodem intellectu simul esse scitum et creditum” (Worcester, Cathedral Library F. 3, fols. 131r-33r): “Sequitur videre de tertio articulo quod evidentia quam facit scientia de credito non repugnat inevidentiae fidei, et per consequens possunt simul stare. Illud declaro sicut facit doctor quem sequor in hoc, cuius declarationem si multi adverterent, non facerent tales rationes quales faciunt contra eum” (fols. 132v-33r). Walshingham went on to give Henry of Ghent's position as found in SQO 13.6-7. Francis of Marchia also had a view of theology very close to that of Henry. See his 1 Sent. prol. q.3 (1320), “Utrum theologia sit scientia proprie dicta” (Vatican City, Biblioteca Apostolica Vaticana, MS Vat. lat. 1096, fols. 4va-6va). For a summary of Francis's position, see Gregory of Rimini, 1 Sent. prol. q.1 a.4, in Gregorii Ariminensis OESA Lectura super primum et secundum Sententiarum, ed. A. Damasus Trapp, OSA, et al., 7 vols. (Berlin, 1981-87), 1:40 line 11-43 line 33.

37. Quod. 8.7 (PB 4:69-71).

38. “His visis, ulterius est dicendum quod ad scientiam huiusmodi habendam non est necessarium lumen aliquod speciale ultra lumen fidei et naturalis intellectus, quia non acquiritur notitia tam diversa nec tam clara ad quam haec non sufficiant” (PB 4:77-78); “Dicitur autem talis scientia [sc. ultra fidem] certa certitudine qua et certa fides est …” (PB 4:80); “… quia licet magistri in theologia non studeant frustra, quia ultra notitiam simplicem fidei, etiam quam habent fideles communiter, acquirunt notitiam evidentiorem, quae tamen non attingit ad tantam evidentiam quantam requirit notitia quae scientia proprie dici debet” (PB 4:81).

39. “Et est magnum mirabile quod in quacumque alia facultate peritus nititur scientiam suam, quantum potest, extollere, soli autem theologi quidam, ut philosophiam videantur exaltare, theologiam deprimunt, adserentes ipsam non esse vere scientiam, nec credibilia posse fieri vere intelligibilia in vita ista. Tales sibi viam sciendi et intelligendi credibilia praecludunt, et aliis desperationem intelligendi illa incutiunt, quod valde perniciosum est et damnosum Ecclesiae et periculosum dicere. Immo potius suadendum est quod certa ratio haberi potest de credibili, per quam vere sciri et intelligi potest in vita ista” (Quod. 12.2 [ed. DeCorte, p. 20 line 43-p. 21 line 51]).

40. “Quod ergo Iudaeus quaerit: ‘ostendere lumen illud clarius’, idem est ac si diceret Pelagius Augustino: ‘Tu dicis quod liberum arbitrium non potest velle bonum sine gratia; ostende ergo nobis illam gratiam’, aut si diceret Iudaeus christiano: ‘Tu dicis gratiam dari in baptismo; ostende illam’. Re vera spirituale lumen vel gratia non est tale quid quod non habenti possit ostendi, sed ille solummodo bene novit, qui accipit” (op. cit., p. 20, lines 37-42). Cf. “Quod autem dicitur quod hoc, scilicet quod non inveniuntur sic perfecte habentes habitum scientificum de his quae fidei sunt, provenit ex universali indispositione in auditoribus aliis qui hoc lumen negant, et ideo non immerito lumine carent et non sunt doctibiles Dei, non videtur tolerabile” (Godfrey, Quod. 8.7 [PB 4:71]).

41. “… qui multa ponunt sed pauca declarant de hoc lumine …” (PB 4:70)

42. “Unde paucis mutatis, possunt alii dicere istis quod dicit Augustinus Contra Epistolam Fundamenti manichaeis, qui promittebant evidenti ratione se manifestaturos veritatem eorum quae credenda suadebant. … Non tamen intelligo istos, absit, aliquo errore notandos sicut erant manichaei qui talem evidentiae notitiam promittebant, quam tamen exhibere non poterant; sed de hoc videntur notandi quod ita vehementer asserunt et affirmant esse possibile illud a quo ipsi sicut et alii penitus deficiunt” (PB 4:71-72).

43. It is doubtful that Godfrey was chancellor of the University of Paris when Scotus was there. See John F. Wippel, The Metaphysical Thought of Godfrey of Fontaines: A Study in Late Thirteenth-Century Philosophy (Washington, D.C., 1981), p. xvi, n. 14.

44. “Utrum veritates per se scibiles de Deo sub ratione Deitatis possint sciri ab intellectu viatoris” (1 Add. magn. prol. q.2 [Vivès 22:336-45b]). The expression “sub ratione Deitatis” indicates that Scotus was asking about theology in its purest form. Cf. “Concedo igitur … quod theologia est de Deo sub ratione qua scilicet est haec essentia, sicut perfectissima scientia de homine esset de homine si esset de eo secundum quod homo …” (1 Ord. prol. n.167 [Vat. 1:109]). See n. 52 below on the notion that Scotus identified the ratio Deitatis with God as haec essentia.

45. I Add. magn. prol. q.2 nn.6-14 (Vivès 22:36a-41a).

46. “Utrum Deum esse omnipotentem possit naturali ratione et necessaria demonstrari” (Vivès 25:282-95; ed. Alluntis, pp. 249-68). Cf. John Duns Scotus, God and Creatures: The Quodlibetal Questions, trans. Allan B. Wolter and Felix Alluntis (Princeton, 1975), p. 163, nn. 10-11.

47. Of course, the question of whether theology is a science can be asked from viewpoints other than that of the wayfarer. For Scotus, theology could be considered as it is found in either the divine, blessed, or human intellect. In each case, theology can be of either necessary or contingent truths. On these divisions, see 1 Ord. prol. nn.141, 150, 208-9 (Vat. 1:95-96, 101, 141-43). In addition to Finkenzeller, Offenbarung und Theologie, the fundamental studies on Scotus's treatment of theology as a science are Aegidius Magrini, Ioannis Duns Scoti doctrina de scientifica theologiae natura (Rome, 1952), and Edward O'Connor, “The Scientific Character of Theology according to Scotus,” in De doctrina Ioannis Duns Scoti, 3:3-50.

48. “Contra tamen praedictam opinionem arguitur dupliciter. Primo sic: In quocumque lumine non habetur notitia distincta terminorum, ut sunt termini alicuius principii, in illo lumine non potest illud principium distincte intelligi. Sed in isto lumine quod ponunt, non potest haberi distincta notitia Dei, ut terminus principii pure theologici. Ergo etc. Probo minorem: Impossibile est habere distinctam notitiam Dei, nisi sit in se praesens in intellectu, vel in alio repraesentativo, quod distincte ipsum repraesentat; sed hoc non est possibile viatori, quia si esset per se praesens intellectui viatoris, tunc esset in eo beatitudo; nec est aliquid aliud quod ipsum distincte repraesentat, quia secundum illos, nullum est repraesentativum intellectui viatoris, nisi phantasma; sed hoc non potest distincte essentiam divinam repraesentare” (1 Add. magn. prol. q.2 n.14 [Vivès 22:40b-41a]). As we shall presently see, Scotus accepted Henry's lumen medium if it is interpreted as a species representing the divine nature. It is well known that Scotus rejected Henry's attendant position on the relation between faith and reason. See 3 Ord. d.24 q.un. (Vivès 15:34-54): “Utrum de credibilibus revelatis possit aliquis habere simul scientiam et fidem.”

49. Here the Vivès text and the Vienna manuscript of the Reportatio Parisiensis (see note 25 above) differ somewhat. I quote the latter: “Similiter quod aliquis doctor, propter unam auctoritatem Averrois … dimittat [commitat MS] aliam opinionem, quae innititur forte plus quam 30 auctoritatibus Sanctorum Augustini et aliorum …” (fol. 7ra).

50. “Respondeo ad quaestionem quod viator potest scire veritates per se scibiles de Deo sub ratione Deitatis, scire, inquam, simpliciter et perfecte; simpliciter non a posteriori, sed a priori sub ratione Deitatis; perfecte, quia cognitione superiori quam sit cognitio fidei” (1 Add. magn. prol. q.2 n.15 [Vivès 22:41a]).

51. “Iuxta istam conclusionem haberi potest corollarium, quomodo theologia potest esse scientia in intellectu viatoris, stante simpliciter statu viae, quia intellectus potens habere conceptum virtualiter includentem omnes veritates de ipso necessarias ordinatas, immediatius scilicet, et mediatius, potest de illo obiecto habere scientiam completam, sic autem potest intellectus viatoris habere de Deo; ergo etc. … Esset ergo viator perfecte scientifice theologus …” (Quod. q.7 n.10 [Vivès 25:290b-91a; ed. Alluntis, pp. 262-63]).

52. According to Scotus, the divine nature is known under the aspect of Deity when it is known as a nature which is of itself singular (essentia de se haec). See 1 Ord. d.3 nn.56, 57, 192; d.4 nn.3, 11; d.8 n.200; d.21 q.un. (Vat. 3.38, 39, 118; 4:2, 5, 265, 5:339-47).

53. “Probatio primi: intellectus potens intelligere aliquod subiectum sub propria ratione subiecti, potest scire veritates per se scibiles de eo, quia talis intellectus potest intelligere principium complexum, et sic conclusionem inclusam virtualiter in illo principio; sed hoc potest intellectus viatoris; ergo etc.” (1 Add. magn. prol. q.2 n.15 [Vivès 22:41a]).

54. “Illud dictum est mihi valde mirabile et ratio mirabilior, si talis sit, sicut vidi eam scriptam et iam recitatam. Nam primo falsum sumitur secundum seipsum alibi in alia materia, in hoc quod accipit, quod viator potest habere cognitionem Dei sub propria ratione Deitatis ut ex tali notitia posset cognoscere a priori et propter quid omnia complexa quae de Deo concipi possunt, licet cognitione abstractiva. …” (1 Sent. prol. q.2 in Theissing, Glaube und Wissenschaft, p. 266, lines 7-13).

55. 1 Add. magn. prol. q.2 n.15 (Vivès 22:41a).

56. “Ex his patet, quod in duobus discordo ab opinione praecedente. Primo, quia non pono haberi scientiam per quodcumque lumen de Deo, si non sit obiectum in se praesens, nec in suo repraesentativo; si autem vocant lumen illud rationem repraesentandi, admitto, sed tunc non in illo lumine, sed per lumen habetur” (op. cit., n.17 [Vivès 22:43a-b]). Scotus made the same point in the parallel text of his Quodlibet: “Ex hoc sequitur quod si poneretur theologiam esse proprie scientiam in quodam lumine citra lumen gloriae et supra lumen fidei, et illud lumen poneretur talis cognitio, sive conceptus obiecti, vera esset opinio de lumine. Sed sic non videtur intellexisse, qui posuit lumen, quia videtur posuisse lumen in quo cognosceretur obiectum, non autem quod esset formalis ratio, sive formalis cognitio ipsius obiecti, sicut hic est positum” (Quod. q.7 n.10 [Vivès 25:291b; ed. Alluntis, p. 263]). Katherine Tachau has passed on to me corroborative evidence drawn from Scotus's theory of physical light. Scotus accepted the distinction made in the perspectivist tradition between lux, which is a generating light source, and lumen, which is the visible species produced by the light source and multiplied to the perceiver. That is, when speaking of physical light, Scotus identified lumen with the visible species. See Scotus, 2 Ord. d.13 q.un: “Circa distinctionem 13 quaero simul de luce et de lumine. Et quero primo: utrum lux gignat lumen tamquam propriam speciem sensibilem sui. … Hic sunt tria videnda. Primo, quid sit lux. Secundo, quid sit lumen. Tertio, qualiter lumen a luce gignitur. … Hoc modo dico quod lumen est proprie intentio sive species propria ipsius lucis sensibilis …” (Edward McCarthy, “Medieval Light Theory and Optics and Duns Scotus's Treatment of Light in D. 13 of Book II of His Commentary on the Sentences” [Diss., City University of New York, 1976], pp. 24-27). On the distinction between lux and lumen see David C. Lindberg, Theories of Vision from Al-Kindi to Kepler (Chicago, 1976), pp. 96-97, 113, and Tachau's own Vision and Certitude, p. 58. I am indebted to Professor Tachau for the above information on Scotus's treatment of lux and lumen and its background in perspectivist treatises.

57. “In alio etiam discordo, quia huiusmodi scientia de Deo sub ratione Deitatis, non habetur per studium, sed est donum gratis datum ad utilitatem ecclesiae …” (1 Add. magn. prol. q.2 n.17 [Vivès 22:43b]). Note that Godfrey said that his position was not taking into account any such special action by God: “Sed ita suppono et firmiter credo esse in omnibus quantumcumque perfectis in vita ista vitam communem ducentibus et non raptis vel aliquo modo singulariter elevatis” (Quod. 8.7 [PB 4:70]).

58. Scotus did not, as far as I know, explicitly say how such abstractive cognition of the divine nature is produced. See Wolter and Alluntis, God and Creatures, p. 163, nn. 10-11. In his second response in the Parisian prologue, Scotus argued that God can bypass the representing species and directly cause in the wayfarer the required cognition, such as the “inner voice” experienced by the prophets. Scotus regarded this directly caused knowledge as equivalent to that given in abstractive cognition through a representing species. See 1 Add. magn. prol. q.2 n.17 (Vivès 22:42b-43a).

59. A comparison of Henry's texts with the corresponding ones of Scotus is striking: Cf. “De cognitione autem visionis, quia ipsa propter rei praesentiam claram in seipsa …” (SQO 13.7 [1:96 P]) and “… alia intellectio potest esse rei secundum quod praesens est in exsistentia sua” (2 Lect. d.3 n.285 [Vat. 18:321]); “Sed loquendo de intellectu proprie dicto, cui res praesto est per speciem et maxime per speciem alienam … non est ex rei praesentis evidentia …” (SQO 13.7 [1:96 Q]) and “… quaedam quidem est per speciem, quae est rei non in se praesentis, et haec vocatur cognitio rei abstractiva …” (1 Add. magn. prol. q.2 n.15 [Vivès 22:41a]).

60. “Alia est opinio Gandavensis Quodlibet 8 q.4. … Dicit enim quod est triplex lumen: unum sufficiens ad apertam visionem habendam de his, quae nunc credimus, scilicet lumen gloriae, in quo credita nobis clare videntur cognitione intuitiva et propter quid. … Contra conclusionem in se: ipse dicit quod ista duo lumina [sc. medium et fidei] simul stant. … Hoc videtur falsum quod stant simul, quia lumen illud non facit cognitionem intuitivam de credibilibus, sed scientiam abstractivam …” (3 Ord. d.24 q.un. nn.5, 8 [Vivès 15:39a, 41a]).

61. Gui Terrena, Quod. 1.2 (Vatican City, Biblioteca Apostolica Vaticana, MS Borgh. lat. 39, fols. 15vb-16ra). For the text see the Appendix. Later Hugolino of Orvieto made the same identification in his 1 Sent. prol. q.3 a.2 (1365): “Ad hoc dubium respondet Gandavensis ubi supra articulo 13 quaestione 7 dicens ‘Triplex est cognitio,’ scilicet ‘fide, visu, et intellectu’; seu sub aliis terminis: Est fidei adhaesio; evidentia intrinseca seu intuitiva perfecta visio ac intuitio; et media intelligentia, quae est abstractiva cognitio melior fide, sed tamen infra intuitivam evidentiam” (Hugolini de Urbe Veteri OESA Commentarius in quattuor libros Sententiarum, ed. Willigis Eckermann, O.S.A., 4 vols. [Würzburg, 1981-88], 1:116, lines 46-50).

62. “… obiectum adaequatum intellectui nostro ex natura potentiae non est aliquid specialius obiecto intellectus angelici, quia quidquid potest intelligi ab uno et ab alio” (Quod. 14 n.12 [Vivès 26:47a; ed. Alluntis, p. 513]).

The following abbreviations have been used for the works of Duns Scotus: Add. magn. = Additiones magnae; Lect. = Lectura; Ord. = Ordinatio; Quod. = Quaestiones quodlibetales. Authors have been cited according to the following editions and series: ed. 1518 = Quodlibeta Magistri Henrici Goethals a Gandavo doctoris solemnis, 2 vols. (Paris, 1518; repr. Louvain, 1961); Alluntis = Obras del Doctor Sutil Juan Duns Escoto: Cuestiones quodlibetales ed. and trans. Felix Alluntis (Madrid, 1968); DeCorte = Henrici de Gandavo Quodlibet XIII, ed. J. DeCorte (Leuven, 1985) and Henrici de Gandavo Quodlibet XII, ed. J. DeCorte (Leuven, 1987); PB = Les philosophes belges; SQO = Henry of Ghent, Summae quaestionum ordinariarum, 2 vols. (Paris, 1520; repr. St. Bonaventure, N.Y., 1953); Vat. = I. Duns Scoti Opera omnia studio et cura Commissionis Scotisticae ad fidem codicum edita praeside Carolo [Illegible Text] vols. 1-7, 16-18 (Vatican City, 1950-82); Vivès = Joannis Duns Scoti Opera omnia, editio nova secundum editionem Waddingi XII tomos continentem recognita, 26 vols. (Paris, 1891-95); Wielockx = Henrici de Gandavo Quodlibet II, ed. R. Wielockx (Leuven, 1983).