SOURCE: Ingham, Mary Elizabeth. “Scotus and the Moral Order.” American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly 67, no. 1 (winter 1993): 127-50.

[In the following essay, Ingham evaluates Scotus as a moral philosopher and assesses his discussion of the moral life.]

Twenty years ago, scholarship on Scotist thought centered upon the question: Is Scotus a voluntarist? Thanks to the serious research advanced by notable scholars,¹ this question no longer preoccupies us. Scotus's “voluntarism,” if the term must be used, is not the radical advocacy of an indetermined will, but the reasoned presentation of a view of reality in which selfless love for the good, and not merely knowledge of the good, is the principal activity characteristic of human perfection.

What interests us today is the ethical model or paradigm which Scotus presents for moral activity. We seek to understand the workings of the intellect in mutuality with a will which is free for self-determination, free to love the highest good in and for itself, free to move beyond concerns of self-preservation. The intricate dynamic between reasoning and willing provides the basis for moral objectivity. Notwithstanding the emphasis placed upon subjective acts of love and choice, the Scotist ethical presentation affirms the existence of a rational, objective moral order. As the following pages will illustrate, the centrality of the will and the personal exercise of freedom by no means ignore the deeper issue of moral objectivity or rational moral norms. In fact, the intricate dynamic between reason and willing constitutes the core of Scotist ethics.²

My purpose here is to offer nothing new in terms of Scotist research but rather to integrate the will's freedom into the larger moral context of right reasoning and virtue. I shall also refer to contemporary scholarship in an effort to acquaint readers with current research on Scotist thought, now appearing in critical editions. Overall, this article has two main components. First, I shall present and clarify the key moral elements within Scotist thinking, showing how their intricate relationship is at the heart of his theory. Second, I shall draw out some reflections for the study of Scotist ethics today. It is my contention that, when we accept Scotus on his own terms, he has much to offer contemporary moral thinking.

I

It would be unfair to isolate the will's freedom as the sole moral element within Scotist thought. For within the natural constitution of the will, the Franciscan identifies broader dispositions toward moral goodness which incorporate rationality and excellence or virtue. Key moral aspects, like freedom, moral goodness, rationality and virtue, are parts of a human dynamic interwoven within the domain of choice. It is no surprise, however, that for Scotus all four are presented from the perspective of the will.

THE WILL AND FREEDOM.

Love, and not knowledge, is the supreme expression of human perfection. Consequently, the Scotist analysis of the will and its operation of excellence in freely choosing the good is firmly grounded upon a conviction about the goodness of natural human willing. Not all choice is self-centered choice; not all desire is egotistical desire. Within the will's natural constitution lies a double orientation toward objects around it.

Some objects have value as means to other, better ends. These objects are useful goods, called bonum utile in the Patristic tradition. Money would be such a good.

There exist other objects which possess a type of absolute goodness. These are called bonum honestum, goods worthy of love not because of any use we make of them, but because of their internal value. These absolute goods ought to be loved in and for themselves, never possessed or used to further egotistical motives. Aristotle calls eudaimonia such a good, and for Kant, the person possesses absolute value. Scotus identifies God as the primary candidate for this type of good and draws forth moral norms from the primary commandment to love God above all things and for God alone.

The will is endowed with the natural capacity to respond to these two types of goods. Following Anselm, Scotus identified within the natural constitution of the will both a desire for perfection and well-being (affectio commodi) and a natural orientation for moral objectivity, that is, to love according to the value of the object (affectio justitiae).³ These two affections in the will are directed toward the utile and honestum respectively.

Allan Wolter, OFM, clarifies these desires in his analysis of native freedom within the will.⁴ The will's natural (or native) rational freedom for self-determination does not exist in a vacuum; rather, it always exists in relationship to the Good (as object of desire), and this in two ways. The will can either love the Good as good in and for itself alone (affectio justitiae) or the will can love the Good as possession to be used (affectio commodi). Wolter argues convincingly for the centrality of this distinction within the will at the heart of Scotist ethical thinking.

Affectio justitiae is the key moral desire within the will. It is for Wolter the basis for the Scotist contention that moral truth is accessible to natural reason.⁵ As the will's higher tendency for justice or objective goodness, it represents the ultimate specific difference of the will.⁶ Thus, for Scotus, the will is not simply desire but rational desire. Selfless or other-centered loving is an activity for which the will is naturally constituted, although its maximal perfection can only be realized with the aid of divine grace.⁷

Beneath this double orientation toward the good is found the will's capacity for self-determination. This is the heart of willing. Scotus identifies two manifestations of this capacity: the external act of choice and the internal act of self-control. The will looks out toward objects for choice and is in constant control of its own act of willing. It can, in the presence of an object, suspend judgment and choose not to choose. “In regard to any object, then, the will is able not to will or nill it, and can suspend itself from eliciting any act in particular with regard to this or that.”⁸

To understand the importance of this internal freedom, we can refer to an early Scotist distinction between natural and free causality.⁹ In a very early commentary on Aristotle's Metaphysics, Scotus discusses the difference between irrational and rational potencies. Their difference, he states, is identical to that between what is natural and what is free. Natural causes operate according to necessary laws and do not deviate from a pre-ordained effect. Free causes, in contrast, are capable of self-determination and admit of different effects. Consequently, the will (a free cause) is superior to the intellect (a natural cause), because the will is capable of self-determination and the intellect is not. Since the will alone operates “along with reason,” Scotus concludes that it is the only rational faculty.

As the work of Lawrence Roberts¹⁰ has shown, this distinction has clear implications for questions of causal responsibility. The dimension of self-control or self-determination, defining the realms of praise and blame, is the basis for the moral order. Insofar as the will is within its own control, it is capable of moral choices: choices for which it can be held responsible, at least to some degree. Freedom for self-mastery is then a significant element of moral goodness.

The exemplar for human freedom is, of course, the divine will. The background provided by God's action as the supreme paradigm for Scotus's discussion of human freedom is no small element in his overall theory. It heightens the importance and value of moral objectivity and the essential perfection of freedom (and thus, the will) as an imitation of and participation in divine activity. Correct understanding of the will and freedom within Scotist thought is impossible in abstraction from consideration of divine perfections.

Against those who, like Aquinas, consider the will only a passive appetite to be directed by the intellect, Scotus distinguishes within the will both a passive (natural) and, more importantly, an active (free) aspect. “Properly speaking, however, the will is more than an appetite, because it is a free appetite coupled with reason …”¹¹ Thus it is a desire which reasons. The natural or passive dimension can be understood more clearly when we compare it with other natural objects which tend toward perfection. One such example used by Scotus is the natural inclination of a stone to the earth's center. This is no different from the stone's weight. Hence, the will's natural inclination toward the good (desire) is no different from its operation as free, rational will.¹² The term “natural will” then, refers to the will insofar as it is inclined to its proper perfection (rational freedom). This can be termed “passive” in a formal sense only, since by “natural” will Scotus means the inclination of the will toward its own perfection, its perfectibility or the tendency by which it inclines passively to receive what perfects it,¹³ just as a stone naturally inclines passively toward rest.

The will can be considered doubly: as active, that is operative and choosing its act, or as passive, not insofar as it receives the act, but insofar as it is receptive of passivity for the supernatural, of which Augustine speaks in De Moribus Ecclesiae. Hence all passions of the will are reduced to love.¹⁴

This passive/active distinction enables Scotus to accept a definition of the will which places within it both the capacity for free choice (and thus mastery over its own acts) as well as an orientation toward God (and thus an openness to a perfection greater than itself).

The perfection of freedom, which begins in the will as self-mastery, is gradually realized via the will's natural love for the good in itself and with the help of grace. Hence by virtue of its own acts of choice the will moves toward an increasingly better exercise of love for the highest good. This entire dynamic of moral praxis takes place against the background of divine goodness and within a context where the natural and supernatural collaborate. The harmony of grace with nature, a major concern for Scotus, is especially operative within the moral domain.¹⁵

THE WILL AND MORAL GOODNESS.

Given the Scotist insistence upon the primacy of the will for self-determination, it is important to understand how he presents moral goodness. It is certainly not sufficient to state that the human will defines goodness by its own choices. While this does characterize the divine will, the finite will has no such moral authority. Although the presence of affectio justitiae within the natural constitution of the will does create the possibility for a self-perfecting moral dynamic, there is much more to the Scotist presentation than the interaction of two finite affections.

Like most aspects of Scotist thought, the discussion of goodness involves intricate levels of relationships. In Ordinatio I, 17 Scotus defines moral goodness as “the harmony of all circumstances [belonging to an act] in accord with right reason.”¹⁶ From this we see that moral goodness is determined by an appeal to right reason or prudence.

In Quodlibetal Question 17,¹⁷ Scotus places the rational or moral dimension within a larger dynamic of goodness. He identifies four possible orders of goodness: the natural, moral, charitable and meritorious.

In this connection note the order that obtains between the bare act to which blame or praise is imputable, the virtuous act, which stems from moral virtue, the charitable act, and the meritorious act. The first expresses a relationship to the potency which freely elicits the act; the second adds to this a relationship to the virtue which inclines to such an act, or rather to the rule of virtue, i.e., a dictate of right reason; the third expresses a relationship to charity which inclines the will to such an act; the fourth adds a relationship to the divine will which accepts the act in a special way. The third adds some goodness over and above that conferred by the second and is itself required for the fourth, not indeed by the very nature of things, but rather by a disposition of the accepting will.¹⁸

It is clear from this passage that the rational perspective is one dimension of goodness among many within the act. There is no act which can be evaluated in abstraction from the will which chooses it (the natural order), reason which dictates it (the moral order), charity which should inspire it (the order of perfection), and the divine will which accepts it (the order of merit). Every act can be judged according to a fourfold order and is capable of degrees of goodness, where the higher dimensions depend upon the lower.

A second aspect present here is the placement of moral or virtuous goodness between the act as free and the act as inspired by charity. Although freedom of choice is a pre-requisite for moral actions (making them human), and thus for moral goodness, a freely chosen act is not automatically a moral act. The act must also fall within the appropriate relationship to right reason, the rule of virtue.

A third and final aspect is the manner in which moral goodness is placed within an order leading toward charity and ultimately, to divine reward. All four orders, the higher along with the lower, constitute the complete reality within which goodness exists and can be defined. Although the highest order (merit) is not required “by the very nature of things,” there is nothing in this text to indicate that the divine will is predisposed not to accept human actions. This means that divine activity is not absent from the Scotist consideration of moral goodness, yet it is not an essential element in the morally good act. Also implied here is that all moral goodness points beyond itself to the dimension of eternal reward.¹⁹

The necessity for grace in the completion of the human journey toward perfection is an important aspect which supports Scotus's ethical insights. God is intimately present to the Scotist universe, both as epitome of creative freedom and as gracious judge whose acceptance (acceptatio) raises natural goodness to its supernatural reward.²⁰ That Scotus introduces the order of charity in this question (where earlier texts had just spoken of three orders: natural, moral and gratuitous), may indicate his desire to make precise just how far the human capacity for goodness extends.²¹ In this passage, charity is presented as natural fulfillment of virtuous goodness. Thus, the human capacity for goodness (which is based upon love) extends naturally to acts of charity or generosity out of love for God.

We can go even deeper into the dimensions of moral goodness with a passage from Ordinatio II, 7. Here Scotus deals with what he calls the “natural dimension,” that is, a moral act insofar as it is ordered to an appropriate object.

The first [order of goodness] pertains to volition because the object willed is something appropriate to this act, not merely on natural grounds, as sunlight is suited to an act of vision, but according to the dictates of right reason. This is the first moral goodness, and hence it can be called “generic” because it is as it were the material basis for all further goodness in the category of mores. … The second goodness pertains to volition on this score that the act is elicited by the will under such circumstances as right reason approves of in full.²²

It appears here that the first two orders mentioned in Quodlibet 17, the natural and moral, are intimately related to one another by means of the notion of volition. It belongs to the will to be in command of acts of volition: this is the natural dimension of willing which entails freedom for self-determination. In addition, it belongs to the will to act rationally; this is its moral or virtuous dimension. The appropriate object referred to in the passage from Ord. [Ordinatio] II, 7 above is the most important of the moral conditions, and volition of the appropriate object is fundamental to any discussion of moral goodness. Moral grounds are rational, and at the most fundamental level of being within an act, there is a rational order of appropriateness which exists between the will and its object. This level is not the voluntary level of choice (volition) nor is it the purely natural level of the will's general orientation toward the good. It is a pre-volitional rationality, or better still, a pre-volitional disposition toward rationality, one whose metaphysical foundation is the rational soul and whose primary principle is “Do good and avoid evil.”²³

Because of the importance of the object in the determination of moral goodness, Scotus suggests that some acts may be “indifferent” or morally neutral. These are acts whose object is not inappropriate or irrational, but which all the same is not approriate in a moral sense.²⁴ Thus, there are some human acts which, though freely chosen, do not fall into the category of “moral” for lack of an appropriate object of desire.²⁵

Despite the importance of an appropriate object as primary moral dimension, this alone is not sufficient to constitute the fullness of goodness. Here the will must choose in light of all circumstances approved of by right reason.²⁶ It is not simply the object which determines moral goodness, but the use of the object which is also morally relevant. Moral goodness then has both objective and subjective components: proper objects should be loved according to a manner appropriate to rational behavior. Here is a clear indication of the importane of both Aristotle and Augustine for Scotist thought. The Franciscan brings together both the means-end relationship of the Stagirite and the uti-frui (use-delight) understanding of the Bishop of Hippo.

Several conclusions are to be drawn from the Scotist presentation of moral goodness. First, there is not just one manner in which the goodness of an act may be considered, but several, depending upon a number of perspectives. The higher dimensions of moral or virtuous goodness refer to the relationship existing between the will, circumstances surrounding the act, the appropriateness of the object and the overall conformity of the choice to right reason. Moral goodness is situated at an intermediate order between natural goodness (that goodness relative to appropriate objects and having suitable circumstances) and meritorious goodness (that goodness accepted and rewarded by God). It is a function of reason and will, defined generally in terms of the harmony of all aspects under the direction of the virtue of prudence.

Second, the fundamental metaphysical orientation of the will towards the good is at the heart of appetite toward any object whatsoever. Where the will's appetite is ordered toward an appropriate object, this constitutes the natural dimension of goodness within the act. For the act to be moral or virtuous, right reason must adjudicate between the object and circumstances surrounding the object (time, place, manner), to harmonize the act of love with all aspects required by reason. If the act were done out of love, or from a charitable motivation, its goodness would be enhanced even more. And finally, were divine acceptance to enter into the dynamic, the act could be called meritorious.

Finally, it is clear from this how moral goodness is in fact a product of the interchange between affectiones commodi and justitiae. The natural orientation toward the good which defines the will enters into a rational dynamic with the notion of an absolute good. Natural goodness is a prerequisite for moral rectitude. The good will is a rational will seeking its own perfection and order. Since the good act is morally good not as means to a good end, but rather as the conformity of all aspects to the demands of right reason, reason objectively guarantees moral goodness. Harmony of all circumstances justifies the morally good act. Right reasoning is norm or measure, a rational dynamic operative between intellection and choice.

THE WILL AND RATIONALITY.

While love is clearly at the heart of Scotus's philosophical enterprise, it is ordered and rational loving which appears as the moral goal. Scotus clearly distinguishes between desire and love, stating that desire, while also an experience of the will, is not always ordered.²⁷ The rational act of love is an other-centered act, whose goal is not possession or use, but benevolence and charity.

The noblest human act is love for the highest good. This act should not be motivated by self-interest (affectio commodi) but out of respect for goodness as absolute and infinite (affectio justitiae). The goal of human moral life is the perfection of such love, not only in regard to God, but to all persons as having God-given value and to creation as a divine gift.

The two-fold structure of affections within the will appears within the operation of human desire and love as it relates to the goods within the world according to use (possession) or respect (honor). The rational person seeks to love goods of value in an appropriate manner, and to use certain lesser goods insofar as they promote goods of value. Such perfection of human loving would both imitate the divine act of love (which loves all reality in accordance with its value) and emerge as the result of the process of self-perfecting loving within the will. This development of the natural human capacity for ordered love takes place under the direction of prudence, the primary virtue of the practical life.²⁸

For Scotus, love for God is the self-evident first principle of praxis. Indeed, “Deus diligendus est” (God is to be loved) is that per se nota and necessary axiom according to which the entire cosmos (including divine activity)²⁹ is ordered. While this principle is based upon the Aristotelian and Stoic maxim: “Good is to be pursued, evil avoided,” it receives an obvious theological tone, once Scotus demonstrates that God is infinite being, and therefore infinite goodness. To pursue the good is in fact to pursue God, since the divinity is the proper object of the human will.

“Deus diligendus est” is the first principle of the natural order (or natural law) and admits of no exception. No human action, motivated by love for God and by the desire to promote God's glory, can fail to be morally good, even where the action cannot be executed.³⁰ The moral question for Scotus is the question of motivation. Why we do what we do, and whether or not our action is informed by love for God, are perhaps more important than the act itself. The act of almsgiving, for example, may admit of several motivations.³¹ One might have the mere desire to appear generous in the eyes of others. The highest moral motivation, however, derives from the nature of the act itself: generosity to the poor out of love is an appropriate moral act. It belongs to the highest and purest moral motivation to perform such an act simply because it is the right thing to do. It belongs to the prudential will to perfect such motivation.

As first principle, “Deus diligendus est” belongs to moral science as intellectual habitus and is accessible to the human will via affectio justitiae.³² This axiom is grasped by the will insofar as it is rational, that is insofar as it operates “with reason” [cum ratione] and has to do with opposites,³³ that is, insofar as it has any control over its own acts (to will or not) and over the object of its act (to will this or that).

Here is that pre-volitional rationality referred to earlier. The will is constituted to seek the good as known in a manner which is not necessitated by any external force, but which is realized according to self-determination. The rational information available to the will appears prior to any single act of willing. It belongs to the structure of willing to tend toward what is good. Thus, the object (the good) is primary to any activity of the will. The proper object of any faculty is determined by means of reflection upon the nature of the agent and the power by which the agent acts.³⁴

The central moral issue for Scotus, however, seems to be found not in identifying objects which are good (since all creation is both good and ordered), but rather working out the adequation of loving relative to each object, and thus the increasing control of affectio justitiae over affectio commodi. The solution to this problem lies in a reflection upon the scale of value present in creation.

The highest moral act is absolute love for God,³⁵ because God is infinite goodness and, as such, the object most worthy of such love. Scotus states clearly (Ord. III, 27) that love for God is a natural activity accessible to all moral agents.³⁶

If, however, we are naturally capable of love for the highest object, why do we fail? In Scotus's discussion of the fall of Lucifer (Ord. II, 6, 2), he suggests three possibilities which explain how a rational will can know the highest object and still fail to respond appropriately. One might try to possess God as an object or fail to respect the appropriate divine timetable, or even wish to control the reception of a divine gift, by trying to earn what is given freely. In every case, the issue of control is at stake, whether it be control of God or of those circumstances surrounding divine friendship. All three reflect the triumph of affectio commodi over affectio justitiae.³⁷ All three are to be regulated through the operation of right reasoning (prudence).

In the same manner that the will is constituted according to a double structure, prudence has a double dimension.³⁸ The first is termed “moral science” and involves intellectual knowledge of the first practical principle (“Deus diligendus est”) as well as any moral norms which might flow logically from this. These would be norms promoting love for God. The second dimension is referred to prudence “as such.” Here is the operation of the will in the rational perfection of self-control. The prudential dynamic belongs to the operation of affectio justitiae and is immediate to praxis.

I say the definition of prudence ought to be understood as active, proximate habit, acquired from acts. Just as arts are the habit of the expert, so are actions to prudence, since the habits of arts and morals are quasi remote to direction, because they are universal; but prudence, generated by actions, is particular and near to direction. This is necessary, otherwise no practical science [would exist] which deals with art or praxis.³⁹

As these two dimensions of prudence apply to the three areas of weakness mentioned above, we see that prudence as moral science deals adequately with the first, since to know God as the highest good is to know a being of absolute value, and thus not an object for selfish possession. As virtue, prudence controls both the second and third areas of weakness, both of which deal with the human response. Prudence looks for the adequation of all circumstances (time, place, manner) in accord with right reason or the rule of justice. Thus, the prudential will is especially sensitive to timing and to the degree of control to be exercised over a divine gift.

The science-virtue moral dynamic within the prudential will is developed over time. Prudence is an acquired virtue, whose natural excellence involves rational norms and particular circumstances. Like the artist, the moral agent seeks to create beauty, balancing responses with concrete situations, under the guidance of general principles.⁴⁰

Love for God is not the only piece of rational information at hand for moral actions. There is found within revelation a more precise set of norms by which the first principle of praxis is to be actualized. Found in the last seven commands of the Decalogue, these norms deal with love for others. If we truly seek the moral goal, then we must follow the command to love one another.⁴¹

Thus, the rational will has access to moral information and develops the excellence of self-control through the virtue of prudence.⁴² As moral science, prudence determines right action based upon an understanding of means leading to a designated end (love for God); as practical virtue it directs this action toward a morally good end.⁴³

The relationship which exists between the virtue of prudence and right appetite is that of mutual conformity and is a dynamic interchange,⁴⁴ where reasoning informs right action and desire points rational choice toward the correct object. The operation of virtuous loving (or moral goodness) involves moral science as normative term, desire (which when perfected becomes right appetite) and the existence of an appropriate object which corresponds to such love. The virtue of prudence joins these and, in so doing, enters the dynamic both as regulator and as product. It is prudence as right reasoning which links desire to an object and to circumstances consistent with the norms of moral science. As intellectual disposition or virtue, prudence develops greater facility over time and strengthens the will in its ability to control itself and to direct its love appropriately. One might argue, then, that prudence is the dynamic product resulting from the natural interaction of affectiones commodi and justitiae in the presence of the good object. It is the acquired excellence of the rational will finalized by what is good.

In this way, prudence is that virtue which is naturally generated by the rational will within its operation of loving. The natural appetite for moral rectitude (affectio justitiae) enters into dynamic interaction with the desire for the good (affectio commodi). Increased interaction of the two affections focuses and develops the natural ability to reason and choose rightly. Thus prudence is the acquired habit of rational, moral excellence. It is the direct result of the will's capacity for rational loving, its fundamental love for goodness, and the objective order in nature constituted by divine love.

THE WILL AND VIRTUE.

If love for God is the highest moral act, one of which the will is naturally capable, then which virtue corresponds to it? It is in Scotus's discussion of this question that we uncover the intricacy of nature and grace at the heart of the Franciscan's vision of human activity. In Ord. III, 27 Scotus clearly maintains that love for God is a natural act of which the will is capable, and yet it is charity (a theological virtue) which intensifies and perfects this act of love. To understand how the act of love has both moral and theological dimensions, we must consider briefly how any virtue affects the will.

From the will's perspective, moral virtue is directly related to ordered loving, and the result of the operation of prudence. The virtues are proper dispositions for love which intensify the activity of the will. Virtues result from frequent choices and are inclined toward a repetition of similar acts. “… therefore since the will is not more determined of itself toward one [act] than the intellect, a certain facility inclining to similar acts can be generated in it by frequently elicited acts, and this I call virtue.”⁴⁵ There is no virtue separated from the operation of right reason, “… since virtue is an elective habit determined by right reason …”⁴⁶ Thus, virtue is an integral part of moral life.

It is, however, not the most important part.⁴⁷ Just as free choice is morally superior to natural inclination, the will's rational and self-determined activity dominates the discussion of virtue as moral disposition in Scotus's presentation of the moral dynamic. This is not surprising, since the virtues possess a natural quality, insofar as they are the product of repetition and can become unreflective habits.

Since virtue is not the central element in Scotus's vision, the moral virtues (justice, courage, temperance) are not necessarily related to one another,⁴⁸ but are each related to prudence. Thus, one may possess a single virtue in the absence of any one of the others, just as one may possess one of the five senses without another.⁴⁹ There is no natural or necessary connection among the virtues; there is, however, a necessary connection of each to prudence.

The theological virtues (faith, hope and charity) belong to a superior order, since they are infused and not acquired. Charity perfects the highest nature of the will (affectio justitiae) and hope perfects affectio commodi in directing them to God. Thus, the theological virtues relate to the object of the affections (external dynamic) and the moral virtues perfect the exercise of the affections (internal dynamic).⁵⁰ The theological virtues finalize the operation of the will, since they are directed toward God alone, infinite goodness and the ultimate object of all love.

The virtues, whether moral or theological, intensify the activity of the will. Therefore, they do not replace the will as central moral element but rather increase the ability of the will to will properly. Scotus explains this relationship clearly in Ord. I, 17:

However, it [the will] works less perfectly without the habitus [virtue] than with it (and this granted equal effort on the part of the will) as when two causes concur toward one effect, one alone cannot by itself [cause] the effect as perfectly as the two can together. And in this way [the position] is saved whereby the act is more intense [intensior] coming from the will and virtue than from the will alone … because two concurring causes can produce a more perfect effect than either one alone,—which effect however in itself is a whole and per se one from two causes, but in diverse relations to the causes.⁵¹

Here he explains simply the influence of any virtue (as habitus) upon the moral act. This explanation takes the form of a causal analysis, where he examines the double order (natural and free) which produce the moral act. Together, natural and free choice produce moral excellence, since the fullest perfection of the moral act requires both the choice of a rational will and the influence of natural disposition.⁵² Virtue, habitual excellence, is a disposition toward goodness developed over time and in accord with moral reasoning. The virtues offer that natural, habitual facility which enhances the will's ability to make the right moral choices.

It is clear to Scotus that, while virtue does not replace the will as central moral element, an act performed solely “by the will” in the presence of no natural inclination or disposition would indeed be less perfect than one performed both freely (through the will) and naturally (through virtue).⁵³ The moral act is one, yet it has two separate relational orders: to the will and to virtue. The moral order does not exist independently from the natural. As we saw above, both in the treatment of the will itself and of moral goodness, Scotus nowhere identifies a “purely moral” dimension within the will which does not somehow rely upon what is natural. This does not, however, prevent the will from acting freely, and thus in a way which might, at times, run counter to natural inclination. To say the will functions freely is not to say that it is totally separated from natural dispositions.

Just as the moral order is not independent from the natural, so too is it intimately related to the higher order of merit, whose primary virtue is charity. Love for God is, of course, the supreme virtue and goal of the moral life. In contrast to hope, which is directed to the perfection (in God) of the desire for gain or satisfaction (affectio commodi), charity seeks no personal reward. In charity there is no trace of selfish love or concupiscence. Charity increases the natural capacity of the will to love God not as a personal good, but as that infinite good which alone is worthy of absolute love.⁵⁴

As formal object of the act of charity, God also responds to human love, creating a bond of reciprocity and satisfaction. This is the bond of friendship (amor amicitiae), that state of mutuality in which a person loves God with her whole heart and is loved in return. Consciousness of this friendship produces delight, which, while not being the motivation for the relationship, always accompanies it. Friendship with God is, then, the highest human activity and the goal of the moral life.⁵⁵ Christian love is best expressed in that love of friendship which looks beyond selfish interests toward the good of the other. Thus the goal of all moral action is an act of selfless love, totally determined by the value of the beloved. This is the perfection of affectio justitiae.

First I say that charity … is called that habitus by which God is held dear … since God, who is common good, does not wish to be anyone's personal good … therefore, God, infusing the habitus by which the soul moves orderly and perfectly toward him, gives the habitus by which he is held dear, as common good and to be loved jointly by others …⁵⁶

Within the moral dimension of human activity, the theological virtue of charity never threatens the will's primacy. What natural reason commands (love for the highest good) charity intensifies (love for God alone). In this manner charity specifies the will's love for God as its object and introduces the will into the order of merit.

The meritorious order transcends the moral, as divine liberality rewards the charitable act. Every moral act is thus potentially meritorious, given proper motivation. The virtue of charity lies at the frontier between the orders of morality and merit. Love for God alone is within the capacity of the natural will, and yet the intensity of love for God is increased with the presence of charity as infused inclination.

The human moral domain involves a complex relationship between inclination and choice under the dictates of right reason and the influence of grace. As to the specifically moral dimension of any act, this has no other efficient causes than those which enable the will to perform a naturally good act of loving in conjunction with the rational determination that an action is in accord with right reason, and thus the correct thing to do. Moral perfection requires a dynamic for loving which is both natural and free, and involves the self-perfecting operation of the will. The natural inclination of the will toward the good, and that mutuality of will and intellect in affectio justitiae create a process by which moral excellence, that excellence of the will in conformity with right reason, is attained.

Meritorious perfection is the fulfillment of the moral order. Here the will's highest motivation is rewarded as it enters into a intensified personal dynamic of friendship with God, no longer seen as “infinite goodness” but as this very personal being, whose essence is selfless love and who wills to be in relationship with all. Thus the moral order perfects internal motivation while the meritorious finalizes the moral act by creating a relationship with God.

II

Scotus presents a portrait of moral life which may contribute significantly to contemporary moral discussion. He struggles to harmonize the best of Aristotelian thinking with Christianity,⁵⁷ especially within the Augustinian tradition. In this way, his discussion deals both with objective goodness and its foundation (in God) and with the subjective realm of human moral choice. While highlighting the will's freedom, he does not endow the finite will with the authority to create goodness. While emphasizing the role of right reason, he refuses to maintain a position which dismisses natural inclination as morally insignificant or detrimental. The will is naturally and rationally constituted to achieve moral excellence.

In this concluding section, I shall highlight aspects of this moral vision which appear to be particularly interesting, especially in light of contemporary moral discussion. These aspects involve both pre-suppositions and implications.

First, let us consider several pre-suppositions. Given his position within the Augustinian tradition (with its heavy emphasis on Original sin), Scotus presents an extremely optimistic view of human nature. The human will is naturally constituted for goodness, attracted to goodness and enters into its own dynamic toward goodness naturally. There is indeed a gap between knowing what should be done and having sufficient self-control to do it. This is the human condition yet not an insurmountable problem. The gap between what is and what ought to be can be overcome by means of the internal, rational dynamic of the will's affections, aided by divine grace.

In addition, the human moral will is rational. The ability to perceive goodness, to make sound moral judgments based upon knowledge of the good and awareness of norms for goodness are both present within the natural constitution of the will. Human choices move naturally toward ordered, rational consistency. The continual interaction of affectio commodi and affectio justitiae promote increasingly higher levels of moral awareness. This process of self-perfecting rational free choice does not occur in the absence of natural human inclinations toward such perfection.

Finally, a twofold order undergirds all reality. This is the order which is both natural and free. Together these two orders cut across the moral domain and constitute a natural human dynamic toward self-transcendence. Every human moral act points to an infinite goodness and rationality against which it is measured.

To say that there is a twofold order sustaining reality is to identify causality, and not ethics, at the heart of Scotist thought. His description of the primacy of the will and the subsequent relationship of the will to other elements within the moral realm (goodness, reason and virtue) are approached from the perspective of the essence of a free cause, one which is capable of self-determination and indifferent to external influence. Thus, his thought presents a metaphysical analysis of the components of the moral realm. Nowhere does Scotus identify pure autonomy as the moral goal. The will is autonomous, and capable of free choices, but in light of rationality and the natural disposition to love what is good in and for itself.

In addition to these pre-suppositions, Scotus's choice to organize moral elements around the will and, thus, to place love at the core of the moral life has several interesting implications for contemporary moral discussion. Perhaps most important among these is the fact that, for Scotus, the moral order is a relational order. Not only is the will related to the highest good as its object, and to rationality, but the functioning of this relational order produces an ethic of mutuality whose moral goal is friendship with God and whose exemplar is the Trinity.

The moral experience of friendship with God creates an expanding dynamic of inclusivity. Love for God does not exclude love for self and others. Consciousness of these reciprocal relationships produces delight within the will, as it experiences moral excellence. Joy, then, is the hallmark of the truly moral agent. With mutuality, joy and friendship as the moral goal, there is no sense in which true moral excellence can be considered an individual effort or achievement. The moral person is always in relation to goodness, to God, to others. Scotus advocates an other-centered moral dynamic: love motivated by the value of the other, love culminating in self-sacrifice for the other. This moral goal creates a community where each member seeks the good of all. The fullest expression of moral life is relationship to others, not in manipulation or control, but in respect and love.

Here, then, is no moral vision based upon obligation as primary motivation, but upon a love which rationally seeks to respond appropriately to the goodness that manifests itself in each being and to extend membership in the moral community to all. It is a particularly Christian ethical vision where love for God dominates all love, but does not exclude others. In imitation both of Trinitarian mutuality and Incarnational selflessness, human moral action is that action whereby persons enter into the dynamic of divinity.

Moral life begins with the rational perception of goodness. It develops through the interaction of the desire for possession and the desire to love justly. Its culmination is that mutuality characteristic of friendship, where each person seeks the good of another and experiences profound delight. The moral goal is then a work of art, harmonized both internally (in the will's operation) and externally (in the performance of moral actions).

Thus, Scotus's moral perspective offers an important basis from which to approach a number of areas of contemporary discussion. First the affirmation of goodness in all being and the emphasis upon respect for creation as a divine gift has particular implications for an ethic of environmental concern. The order of nature is one upon which all moral action depends, therefore nature is neither to be abused nor manipulated.

Second, the importance of mutuality among persons with creation, with one another and with God clearly has implications for personal, national and international dimensions. The First World-Third World situation, where multi-national corporations defy regulation and promote exploitation of poorer peoples runs counter to the moral goal. Profit-dominated capitalism does not promote relationships of cooperation and friendship, but stimulates competition.

In addition, the disproportionate consumption of the goods of the earth by a fraction of its inhabitants cannot be morally justified. If mutuality is the moral goal, then all persons have a right to share equally in all goods. Private property is not an absolute right. The use of goods takes second place to the value of persons. National policies which treat persons as objects run counter to the creation of a truly moral society.

We can learn much from Scotus's presentation of the moral life. When moral excellence is not an intellectual achievement, but rather the perfection of selfless love, then the human heart is called to do what it does best: respond rationally to what is good. Self-controlled love is the highest moral response. In a universe created freely out of a divine act of rational love, a universe overflowing with goodness, the human will moves gradually toward better and better choices about the many goods which surround it. To be a moral agent for Scotus is to develop continually the ability to love in an orderly manner. For this perfection, the will is naturally and rationally well-equipped.

Notes

1. Significant in this regard have been publications by Bernardine Bonansea, “Duns Scotus' Voluntarism” in John Duns Scotus: 1265-1965. Ryan/Bonansea (ed.) (Washington: Catholic University Press, 1965), 83-121; “The Divine Will in the Teaching of Duns Scotus” in Antonianum, 56 (1981): 296-335; William Frank, “Duns Scotus' Concept of Willing Freely: What Divine Freedom Beyond Choice Teaches Us” in Franciscan Studies, 42 (1982): 68-89; Laszlo Paskai, “Die Heutige Freiheitsproblematik im Lichte der Skotistichen Freiheitslehre” in Deus et homo ad mentem I. Duns Scoti, (Rome: 1972), 401-07.; Lawrence Roberts, “A Comparison of Duns Scotus and Thomas Aquinas on Human Freedom of Choice” in Homo et mundus, (Rome: 1984), 265-72; “The Contemporary Relevance of Duns Scotus' Doctrine of Human Freedom” in Regnum hominis et regnum Dei, (Rome: 1976), 535-44 and “John Duns Scotus and the Concept of Human Freedom” in Deus et homo ad mentem I. Duns Scoti, (Rome: 1972), 317-25; Roberto Zavalloni, “Personal Freedom and Scotus' Voluntarism” in De Doctrina I. Duns Scoti II, (Rome: 1968), 613-27.

2. This term is, of course, used in a restricted sense. It is well known that Scotus presents nowhere in his writings a full-blown ethical theory, or even one to compete with that of his famous predecessor, Thomas Aquinas. What Scotus does present, however, is a fascinating analysis of the will and the metaphysical explanation of freedom. These are by no means foreign to an ethical theory. Scotist ethics has little textual material from which to draw conclusions. What can occur, however, is study of implications possible from his presentation and centrality of freedom.

3. Cf. Ordinatio II, 6, 2, n. 8 (Vivès 12, 353-55). Portions of this text appear in Wolter, John Duns Scotus on the Will and Morality, (Washington, DC: Catholic University Press, 1986), 463-46.

4. Allan Wolter, “Native Freedom of the Will as a Key to the Ethics of Scotus” in Deus et Homo ad Mentem I. Duns Scoti, (Rome: 1972), 359-70, reprinted in The Philosophical Theology of John Duns Scotus, Marilyn McCord Adams (ed), (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1990), 148-62.

5. “If one considers the nature of any rational being, the fact that he is endowed with free will as Scotus conceives this, and that there exists but one supreme good, infinitely perfect and the author of man, then it follows that no act is more becoming to such an agent or has a more suitable object than to love God for his own sake. This friendship love of God is the one will act that has all that is required for complete moral goodness by reason of the object alone or by reason of its generic goodness. Such love as it were contains its own good intention. It can never be ill-timed, out of place, or inordinate.” Wolter, “Native Freedom,” 365. Wolter refers to texts taken from Ord. II, d. 6, q. 2 (Vivès 12: 346); IV, d. 26 n. 3 (Vivès 19: 148); and Rep. Par. IV, d. 28, n. 6 (Vivès 24: 377-78).

6. “This native liberty or root freedom of the will, in short, is a positive bias or inclination to love things objectively or as right reason dictates.” Wolter, “Native Freedom,” 362.

7. Scotus lays the groundwork for this position in his Prologue to the Sentence Commentary where he insists that the natural desire is fulfilled by a power beyond nature, and that this position is superior to that of the philosophers who argue for nature. “Igitur in hoc magis dignificatur natura, quam si suprema sibi possibilis poneretur illa naturalis; nec est mirum quod ad maiorem perfectionem sit capacitas passiva in aliqua natura quam eius causalitas activa se extendat.” Ord. Prol., p. 1, q. u. n. 75 (Vatican 1:46).

8. Unde quodlibet objectum potest voluntas non velle nec nolle, et a quolibet actu in particulari potest se suspendere circa hoc vel illud. Ord. IV, suppl. d. 49, qq. 9-10, Codex A f. 282va (cf. Wolter's Will and Morality, 194). In Rep. I A, 39, f. 116ra, Scotus refers to the will's indifference regarding diverse acts, objects and effects. “Voluntas enim nostra indifferens est contingenter ad actus diversos, quam mediantibus est ad plura objecta et ad plures effectus. Prima indifferentia est imperfectionis; secunda est perfectionis et ideo ponenda est in divinis. Indifferentia ergo ad effectus non est prima indifferentia, quia alia est prior ea in ratione voliti vel non voliti; et nec illa indifferentia quae est respectu actuum diversorum, quia in hoc, i.e. in voluntate, est potentia receptiva respectu actuum. Similiter actus unius objecti. Amoveamus ergo ista quae sunt imperfectionis a voluntate divina, quae non est indifferens ad actus per quos respiciat obiecta diversa, quia hoc est imperfectionis in nobis, sed actus eius, scilicet divinae voluntatis, est unus et simplex et indifferens ad diversa objecta.” On the authenticity of this text, see Allan Wolter's “Scotus' Paris Lectures on God's Knowledge of Future Events” in The Philosophical Theology, p. 286: “The Scotistic Commission in charge of the Vatican edition of Scotus's Opera Omnia have to date identified five manuscripts containing this version, which they call “Reportatio I A,” and point out that what appears in the Wadding-Vivès edition is only an abbreviated account of this report, done by Scotus's disciple, William of Alnwick.” This manuscript passage would thus represent a later, better formulated position by the Subtle Doctor.

9. Cf. Quaest. in Metaphysicam IX, 15 (Vivès 7: 606-17). An English translation of portions of this text appears in Wolter, Will and Morality, 144-72. In this text Scotus compares nature and will with irrational and rational potencies, respectively. Allan Wolter's presentation and analysis of this text appears in “Duns Scotus on the Will as Rational Potency” in The Philosophical Theology of John Duns Scotus, 163-80.

10. Lawrence Roberts, “Indeterminism in Duns Scotus' Doctrine of Human Freedom” in Modern Schoolman, 51 (1973-74): 1-16; “John Duns Scotus and the Concept of Human Freedom” and “The Contemporary Relevance of Duns Scotus' Doctrine of Human Freedom.”

11. “Sed proprie voluntas addit super appetitum, quia est appetitus cum ratione liber. …” Ord. III, 17, Codex A, in Wolter, Will and Morality, 180-81.

12. “Dico quod appetitus naturalis in qualibet re generali nomine accipitur pro inclinatione naturali rei ad suam propriam perfectionem, sicut lapis inclinatur naturaliter ad centrum, et si in lapide sit inclinatio illa aliud absolutum a gravitate, tunc consequenter credo quod similiter inclinatio naturalis hominis secundum quod homo ad propriam perfectionem est aliud a voluntate libera. Sed primum credo esse falsum … Igitur ultra gravitatem non dicit nisi relationem inclinans eius ad centrum ut ad propriam perfectionem.” Ibid., 180.

13. “Dico quod voluntas naturalis sic, et, ut naturalis non est voluntas ut potentia, sed tantum importat inclinationem potentiae ad tendendum in propriam perfectionem suam. …” Ibid., 182. This idea must be read against the background of the Prologue, where Scotus argues for the dignity of nature which must be completed by supernatural agency (grace).

14. “Voluntas tamen potest dupliciter considerari, vel prout est activa, sive operativa et elicitiva actus sui, vel prout est passiva, non in quantum recipit actus, sed in quantum est receptiva passionum supernaturalibus, de quibus passionibus loquitur Augustinus De moribus Ecclesiae. Unde omnes passiones voluntatis reducit ibi ad amorem.” Rep. IV, 49, q. 7, Codex A 280va. I am grateful to Fr. Allan Wolter for making this text available to me.

15. Van der Walt takes issue with Scotus's formulation of the nature-grace dynamic and counters that the distinction is grace-sin, not grace-nature. While sympathetic to his intent, I disagree somewhat with his perspective which is post-Reformation and reads back into Scotist thought a dichotomy which I do not find present at the end of the 13th century. The entire discussion of natural and supernatural (as elaborated by DeLubac and discussed by many 20th century thinkers) does not seem a deep concern for the 13th century thinkers. See Van der Walt's “Regnum Hominis et Regnum Dei: Historical-Critical Discussion of the Relationship between Nature and Supernature According to Duns Scotus” in Regnum Hominis et Regnum Dei, 219-29.

16. “Principaliter ergo conformitas actus ad rationem rectam—plene dictantem de circumstantiis omnibus debitis istius actus—est bonitas moralis actus.” Ord. I, d. 17, q. 2, n. 62 (Vatican 5:164). Elsewhere at nn. 55 and 92 are found variations on this definition (Vatican 5: 160-84). Wolter, in Will and Morality, gives an English translation of this, 206-08.

17. The probable dating for this is either Advent 1306 or Lent 1307. Since Scotus died in 1308, these questions have the advantage of being among the most definitive of his works. See the introduction to God and Creatures: the Quodlibetal Questions (Alluntis/Wolter, Princeton University Press, 1975), xxvii.

18. n. 13 (Vivès 26: 225). See also Quodlibet, 17.34 (God and Creatures, 398).

19. For Scotus, this would be “supernatural” not according to the nature of the act, but insofar as the order of merit would be dependent upon the action of a higher power, one which surpassed the capacity of the natural agent. See Scotus's discussion of this definition of “supernatural” in the Ordinatio Prologue. I mention this dimension of the act merely to note that, for Scotus, there exists an intimate harmony between the workings of the order of nature and the order of grace.

20. The presence and importance of divine action, both for creation, as objectum voluntarium and for acceptatio are important themes in the research of Paul Vignaux. Vignaux takes the divine will as model for liberality (not liberty) and gracious generosity (not arbitrariness). “Par son acte et celui de l'intellect qui l'accompagne, la volonté donne aux êtres, avec l'existence, la bonté et la vérité qui en font des objets d'amour actif et de connaissance distincte. Nous en revenons toujours à cette pensée que, dans sa réalité et dans la vision que Dieu en a, comme par avance, le monde de la nature et de la grâce procède d'un acte libre, libéral, gratuit, mais ordonné: c'est là tout le sens et la nuance propre, du “voluntarisme” de Duns Scot.” Justification et prédestination au XIVe siècle, (Paris, 1934), 41. See also his comments on this in “Valeur morale et valeur de salut” in Homo et mundus, 53-67.

21. An extensive treatment of this dimension of Scotist thought can be found in Fernand Guimet's “Conformité à la droite raison et possibilité surnaturelle de la charité” in De Doctrina I. Duns Scoti, Vol. III, 539-97.

22. “Prima autem competit volitioni ex hoc quod ipsa transit super obiectum, conveniens tali actui secundum dictamen rectae rationis, et non solum quia conveniens actui naturaliter sicut sol visioni. Et haec est prima bonitas moralis, quae potest dici “ex genere,” quia est quasi materialis respectu omnia boni ulterioris in genere moris … Secunda bonitas convenit volitioni ex hoc quod ipsa elicitur a voluntate cum onmibus circumstantiis dictatis a recta ratione debere sibi competere in eliciendo ipsam.” Ord. II, d. 7, n. 11. in Wolter, Will and Morality, 221.

23. This idea of pre-volitional rationality will be developed in the next section.

24. By “indifferent” Scotus refers to an act performed in the absence of moral intent. “This is proved first from the Philosopher in Ethics II: The habit of justice is not produced by doing what the just do, but by doing such things in the way that the just do them” (II, 41). Conscious intent to perform a moral action in a moral manner is key to the moral act. Later in the same article, Scotus identifies the indifferent act as one “where the act is referred to the end only habitually or not at all.” (See Wolter, Will and Morality, 231-33).

25. “For it can happen that an act is performed under circumstances that are not all they should be [to make the act morally good], yet neither are they so improper that they ought not to be there, for instance, when an action is neither directed to an appropriate end nor to an inappropriate one.” Quodl. 18, n. 7. See also Vivès 26: 237-38. “… such as stroking the beard or brushing off a bit of straw and suchlike.” Ord. II, 41, in Wolter, Will and Morality, 233.

26. The importance of right reason for higher levels of moral goodness is clear in Ord. I, 17, where Scotus devotes a lengthy discussion to the relationship of prudence to the virtuous life. In this text, moral goodness is described as decorative to an act, similar to that beauty which is the harmony of all parts. “… one could say that just as beauty is not some absolute quality in a beautiful body, but a combination of all that is in harmony with such a body (such as size, figure, and color), and a combination of all aspects (that pertain to all that is agreeable to such a body and are in harmony with one another), so the moral goodness of an act is a kind of decoration it has, including a combination of due proportion to all to which it should be proportioned (such as potency, object, end, time, place and manner), and this especially as right reason dictates. … Ord. I, d. 17, n. 62 (Vatican 5: 163-64).

27. “Furthermore, there is a twofold like or love, one which can be called love of friendship [benevolence], another called the love of desiring or wanting or coveting.” Ord., II, d. 6, q. 2 (Wolter, Will and Morality, 463).

28. “… the intellect is perfected most perfectly by prudence, if that virtue is most perfect. For then one would have the most perfect practical knowledge about every possible action and under every possible circumstance.” Ord. III, suppl. d. 34, in Wolter, Will and Morality, 355.

29. “Deus est diligendus … est veritas practica praecedens omnem determinationem voluntatis divinae.” Ord. IV, 46, q. 1, n. 3 (Vivès 20: 400).

30. “Indeed, the decision to do something for a worthy purpose is no less good when the external act that ensues fails to achieve that end than when it succeeds.” Quodl. 18.15 (God and Creatures, 403).

31. See the discussion of this in Ord. II, d. 7, nn. 28-30. Wolter provides an English translation of a section of this question (nn. 28-39) in Will and Morality, 218-25.

32. For Fernand Guimet, “Deus diligendus est” is “la transposition de la normative anselmienne de rectitude et de justice dans les perfectives de la noétique d'Aristote.” “Conformité à la droite raison et possibilité surnaturelle de la Charité” in De Doctrina I. Duns Scoti, vol. III, 544.

33. QQ. de Metaphysica, IX, q. 15, n. 7 (Vivès 26: 611). See Wolter, Will and Morality, 157.

34. This appears in Quodl. 18.13: Question 18: “Every judgment begins with something certain. Now the first judgment about the appropriateness cannot pre-suppose some knowledge determined by another intellect; otherwise it would not be first. Hence it presupposes something certain but judged by this intellect, namely: the nature of the agent and the power by which he acts together with the essential notion of the act. If these three notions are given, no other knowledge is needed to judge whether or not this particular act is suited to this agent and this faculty.” (n.5) There follows here an example of the intellect, human nature and the act of understanding. “Knowing what it means to attain knowledge, it would also be clear to him what it is not appropriate for his mind to reach.” (English text in God and Creatures, 402-03.)

35. “As for the first, I say that to love God above all is an act conformed to natural right reason, which dictates that what is best must be loved most; and hence such an act is right of itself; indeed as first practical principle of action, this is something known per se, and hence its rectitude is self-evident. For something must be loved most of all, and it is none other than the highest good, even as tis good is recognized by the intellect as that to which we must adhere the most.” Ordinatio III, suppl. d. 27, established by Wolter on the basis of Codices A (ff. 171ra-72rb) and S (ff210va-12rb), in Wolter, Will and Morality, 425.

36. “Natural reason reveals to an intellectual creature that something must be loved in the highest measure, because among all objects, acts, and habits that are essentially ordered to one another, there is something supreme, and thus there is some love that is highest and also some object that is supremely lovable.” in Wolter, Will and Morality, 435.

37. “First, the initial inordinate desire did not proceed from an affection for justice, as no sin proceeds from such. Hence it must have come from an affection for the advantageous, because every act elicited by the will stems from an affection either for justice or for the advantageous, according to Anselm.” Wolter, Will and Morality, 465. Thus, Lucifer “coveted happiness immoderately.”

38. On the development of the doctrine of prudence as speculative wisdom prior to 1250, see Gauthier's “Arnoul de Provence et la Doctrine de la Fronesis, vertu mystique suprême” in Revue du Moyen Age latin, 19 (1963): 129-70. In addition, Avicenna's doctrine of the two faces of the soul lent itself to the development of a double interpretation of prudence: as theoretical virtue of moral science and practical virtue of moral action. As this influenced the Franciscans, see J. Rohmer's “Sur la doctrine franciscaine des deux faces de l'âme,” AHDLMA 2 (1927): 73-78.

39. “Ideo dico quod definitio prudentiae debet intelligi de habitu activo proximo, qualis est habitus acquisitus ex actibus. Unde sicut ars se habet circa factibilia ad habitum experti, ita circa agibilia se habet scientia moralis ad habitum prudentiae, quia habitus artis et scientiae moralis sunt quasi remoti ad dirigendum, quia universales; sed habitus prudentiae et experti, quia generati sunt ex actibus, sunt particulares, et propinqui ad dirigendum. Ista expositio est necessaria, alioquin nulla esset scientia practica, quia quaecumque est habitus activus vel factivus. …” Ordinatio Prologue p. 5, q. 1-2, n. 350 (Vatican 1: 228).

40. “Hence just as an artist with a knowledge of his art in mind (habens artem in mente) is more remotely practical than one who knows [how to do or make something] simply from experience and not deductively from any art he possesses, so too one who knows the science of morals is more remotely practical than one who possesses prudence.” Lectura Prologue, (Vatican 16, in Wolter [Will and Morality], 141). The rationality proper to moral action involves both deductive (moral science) and inductive reasoning (prudence).

41. It is true that the last seven commands of the Decalogue are divine commands and do not belong to natural law stricte loquendo. On this aspect of Scotus's moral thinking, see Robert Prentice, “The Contingent Element Governing the Natural Law on the Last Seven Precepts of the Decalogue, According to Duns Scotus” Antonianum, 42 (1967): 259-92.

42. A. Borak explains the dynamic as follows: reason provides the capacity and prudence the disposition for human participation in moral rectitude. See his “Libertà e prudenza nel pensiero di Duns Scoto,” Laurentianum 10 (1969): 112.

43. “Alia enim est prudentia que est habitus generatus in intellectu recte sillogizante et tamen cum hoc voluntas male eligit: iste habitus est prudentia in intellectu, quia recta ratio; non tamen est prudentia moralis, quia inquirit tantum media fini prestituto, et non prefigit finem virtuti. Sed quid plus? Dico quod si sillogizatur ab intellectu vel ratione esse recte vivendum, tunc est habitus intellectualis qui dicitur scientia moralis, sed non prudentia. Unde duplex est differentia duo: prudentia enim que est virtus est recta ratio consona appetitui recto, 6 Ethicorum; quando autem in intellectu generatur habitus non confesse se habens habitui recto, est scientia moralis, non prudentia.” Text established from two manuscripts: Barcelona Ripoll 53 f66rb-66va and Oxford Merton Coll. 62 f226r-226v, in Lottin Psychologie et Morale aux 12-13e siecle, IV, Gembloux 1949, 654.

44. Fernand Guimet calls it a dialectic of three terms: the normative value of a supreme term, the excellence of an act and the reality of a supreme object worthy of love. Within the context of the will this dialectic results in a joining of obligation, love and freedom epitomized in the first commandment of the Decalogue, to love God above all things. “C'est dans cette perspective qu'un texte admirable de la suite de l'Ordinatio lie l'une à l'autre dans une sorte de dialectique à trois termes, grâce à une démarche de la raison naturelle d'un rigoureux intellectualisme, la valeur normative d'un terme supreme (“aliquid summe diligendum”), l'excellence d'un acte (“aliqua dilectio suprema”) et la réalité d'un objet suprême qu'il est ainsi possible d'aimer (et ita supremum obiectum sic diligibile) [cf. Ord. III, d. 27, q. u., n. 13 (Vivès 15: 367)]. Et en ce qui concerne la volonté, cette dialectique à trois termes se retrouve, dans la liaison qu'elle établit entre le devoir, l'amour et la liberté: de cette liaison, Duns Scot n'hésite pas à conclure dans ce texte que par les seules ressources de sa nature (“ex puris naturalibus”), la volonté peut aimer Dieu par dessus tout.” “Conformité de la Charité à la Droite Raison,” De Doctrina I Duns Scoti, vol. III, 555-56.

45. “… cum igitur voluntas non sit magis determinata ex se ad unum quam intellectus, potest in ipsa ex actibus ejus frequenter elicitis quaedam habilitas generari inclinans ad similes actus, et illam voco virtutem.” Ord. III, d. 33, q., n. 5, (Vivès 15: 442).

46. “… cum virtus sit habitus electivus determinatus recta ratione …” (Collationes, I, n. 11 Vivès 5: 137).

47. “For Duns Scotus, just as for St. Augustine, virtue is not something valuable simply because it is a way of acting that is measured by, and in accordance with, nature, as Aristotle teaches, but because of the act of love by which the virtuous act is directed to God.” Bettoni, Duns Scotus: Basic Principles of his Philosophy (Washington, D.C.: Catholic University Press, 1961), 169.

48. Borak, [“Libertà e prudenza,” 133] claims that Scotus cares more about the person who has virtues than about the interconnection of the virtues themselves.

49. “While virtue is a perfection of man, it does not represent complete perfection, for then one moral virtue would suffice. But when something has several partial perfections, it can be simply perfect according to one perfection and simply imperfect according to another, as is apparent in the case of man, who has many organic perfections and can have one in the highest degree and not have another. For example, someone may be disposed in the highest way as to sight and touch but lack any hearing. Someone can possess the highest degree of perfection in matters of temperance and not have the perfection required as regards another perfection …” Ordinatio III, suppl. d. 36, revised by Wolter, Will and Morality, 389, with Codices A and S.

50. “Dico igitur, quod charitas perficit voluntatem, inquantum est affectiva affectione justitiae, et spes perficit eam, inquantum est affectiva affectione commodi, et ita erunt distinctae virtutes non tantum ex actibus, qui sont amare et desiderare, sed etiem ex susceptivis, quae sunt voluntas secundum illam duplicem affectionem affecta.” Ord. III, d. 26, q. u., n. 18 (Vivès 15: 341).

51. “… tamen minus perfecte operatur sine habitu quam cum habitu (et hoc, posito aequali conatu ex parte potentiae), sicut quando duae causae concurrunt ad effectum unum, una sola non potest per se in ita perfectum effectum sicut ambae simul. Et hoc modo salvatur quare actus est intensior a potentia et ab habitu quam a potentia sola … quod ambae causae concurrentes possunt producere perfectiorem effectum quam altera sola,—qui tamen effectus secundum se totum et ut “per se unus,” est a duabus causis, sed in diverso ordine causantibus.” Ord. I, d. 17, n. 40 (Vatican 5: 154).

52. Wolter's discussion is especially enlightening here, as he elaborates on Scotus's reference to geometric and arithmetic proportional increases: “Suppose for example, the natural capacity is doubled; then a will capable of loving naturally with an intensity of only two will be able to love with an intensity of four, whereas a more perfect will capable of loving naturally with an intensity of eight will be able, with charity, to love with an intensity of sixteen. … Hence, speaking simply or in an unqualified sense, the more perfect the will's natural capacity to love God is, the more it has to gain by having charity.” Wolter, Will and Morality, 93-94.

53. “Briefly, then, I say, as I said there [Ord. I, d. 17] the reason habits are needed because of acts, especially the act of charity, is due to something that is a circumstance of the act. As for the substance of the act, however, I maintain what I said there, that the habit is not required.” Ord. III, d. 27 in Wolter, Will and Morality, 443.

54. “This virtue which thus perfects the will insofar as it has an affection for justice, I call charity.” (Wolter, Will and Morality, 427).

55. Scotus's development of this position relies heavily upon Aristotle's discussion in Books 8 and 9 of the Nicomachean Ethics.

56. “De primo dico quod charitas … dicitur habitus, quo Deus habetur carus … quia Deus, qui est bonum commune, non vult esse bonum privatum alicujus … igitur Deus infundens habitum, quo anima ordinate et perfecte tendat in ipsum, dat habitum, quo habeatur carus, ut bonum commune, et condiligendum ab aliis; et ita habitus ille, qui est Dei, inclinat etiam ad velle ipsum haberi carum et diligi ab alio.” Ord. III, d. 28, q. u. (Vivès 15: 378).

57. Borak maintains that it was the Christian notion of imago dei which provided a more perfect depiction of human nature as a spiritual reality, and thus enabled Scotus to accept Aristotle's definition of “rational animal” and reject any determinism or intellectualism in favor of freedom. See his “Libertà e prudenza,” 105.