SOURCE: Burr, David. “Scotus and Transubstantiation.” Medieval Studies 34 (1972): 336-60.

[In the following essay, Burr studies the reasoning and conclusions of Scotus on the subject of the Transubstantiation of Christ, comparing his arguments with those of St. Thomas Aquinas and subsequent Scotist theologians.]

John Duns Scotus remains somewhat of an enigma to the average student of intellectual history. Since the so-called “Thomistic synthesis” is usually accepted by the non-specialist as the quintessence of medieval religious thought, Scotus is relegated to a rather shadowy existence as the “other great medieval theologian,” without any clear notion of what was so great about him. His identification as the Subtle Doctor does little to ease doubts on this score, since some observers wonder if this subtlety may have been achieved at the cost of catholicity.

In no area of Scotus' thought is the ambiguity of his position more apparent than in his eucharistic thought. It has long been recognized that his notion of transubstantiation differs from Thomas' view in some very basic ways. The precise nature of this difference is less clear than one might imagine, however, since much of the relevant research has been prompted by something resembling ulterior motives.¹ The following study will attempt to provide reasonably objective answers to two questions. First, how did Scotus' formulation actually differ from Thomas' view? Second, how did Scotus and his followers react to that difference? In order to answer these questions, Scotus must be approached by a rather circuitous route. Some attempt must be made to sketch at least the outlines of the Thomistic formulation. Even St. Thomas makes a very poor starting point, since it is important to recognize that common sentiment within the church had already placed significant limitations upon the way in which a theologian in Thomas' day might understand the nature of Christ's eucharistic presence. Nevertheless, one must start somewhere.

Perhaps Thomas Aquinas' main significance in the history of eucharistic theology is that he was the first theologian in whose writings Aristotelian terminology and Christian affirmations were galvanized into a systematic, relatively coherent formulation in which all of the major questions concerning eucharistic presence found what a large number of succeeding churchmen would consider a sufficient answer.

It is, of course, always dangerous to select a single aspect of a man's thought as the starting point from which any explanation of his views should proceed. In the case of Thomas' eucharistic thought, however, one could do worse than to choose as a starting point his reflections on the nature of bodily presence. For Thomas, the central fact to be considered is that Christ's body, by the very fact that it is a body, must be subjected to the same physical limitations placed upon any other body. The fact that it is united to divinity is actually irrelevant in this context. Thus Christ's bodily presence in several places at once is, in itself, no more explicable than anyone else's, and Christ's bodily presence in several places in the same way that he is present in heaven is, in fact, impossible.² Again, Thomas sees the union with divinity as equally irrelevant to the question of how the body of Christ comes to be present in the eucharist.³ For Thomas, there are only two ways in which a thing can come to be present where it formerly was not. The first, local motion, demands certain correlative phenomena such as movement in time through a succession of places and the relinquishing of a previous place. Thus, it is inapplicable to the present case. We are left with the second alternative, conversion. Here one begins to appreciate the absolutely central place of conversion in Thomas' eucharistic thought, a centrality which is seen, not only in the substance of his thought, but in the very shape which that thought assumes in the Summa theologiae. A comparison with his sentence commentary will demonstrate this point.

Peter Lomard's Sententiae are not tightly organized, but the general order in which the Lombard deals with Christ's presence in the eucharist is that of the mode of presence, the manner of conversion and the nature of the eucharistic accidents.⁴ Such is, in essence, the general order found in the multitudinous sentence commentaries that followed, including Thomas' own. In the Summa theologiae, however, Thomas was freer to structure according to his own design. Here a significant change takes place. Thomas chooses to begin with the nature of conversion, then proceed to the nature of Christ's presence. The prime importance of conversion is strikingly illustrated in the very structure of the work.

If, then, Christ is to be present in the eucharist at all, he must become present through conversion of one substance into another. Thus Thomas feels that it is quite impossible for the substance of bread either to remain or to be annihilated.⁵ Either alternative would compromise the key notion of substantial conversion.

Thomas is not quite out of the woods yet, however, since he must still face the objection that it is inherently impossible for Christ to be in two places at once in the same way that he is in heaven. Here again the idea of substantial conversion plays a key role. Thomas asks what sort of presence requires that a thing be in one place at a time.

No body is related to a place except by means of the dimensions of quantity; and thus a body is present as in loco where the dimensions of that body are commensurated with the dimensions of the place (locus); and the body of Christ is in only one place in this way, i. e. in heaven.⁶

To be in a place in this way is, in Thomas' words, to be there “according to the mode of dimensive quantity” (secundum modum quantitatis dimensivae)⁷ or circumscriptively.⁸

What, then, is the alternative? Thomas finds his answer in a very literal understanding of the expression “transubstantiation” and in an equally literal reading of the words of institution. On the one hand, the conversion is one of substances, not of accidents. On the other hand, it is the substance of the body and blood which terminates the conversion. Thus, considered from the viewpoint of the instrumental power inherent in the words of institution—in Thomas' words, ex vi sacramenti—Christ's divinity and soul are as thoroughly excluded from the conversion as are the accidents. Moreover, considered from the same viewpoint, Christ's blood is excluded from the species of the bread and his body is excluded from the species of the wine.⁹

The idea of Christ's presence as a presence of his substance brought about by substantial conversion seems to solve a number of problems. In the first place, it explains how Christ can be in a small portion of the broken host.

The proper totality is contained indifferently in a small or large quantity, just as the whole nature of air is contained in a large or small amount of air and the whole nature of man is contained in a large or small man.¹⁰

It also explains how Christ can be in every part of the host and on several altars at once.

The whole nature of the substance is under every part of the dimensions under which it is contained, just as the whole nature of air is under every part of air and the whole nature of bread is under every part of bread.¹¹

If the change is a substantial one, however, how does one reach the affirmation of Christ's full presence demanded by the faith? The answer lies in the fact that the body which is present in the eucharist is the same one which sits in heaven, and Christ as he sits in heaven is not divided. Thus, if Christ's body is under the species of bread and his blood under the species of wine ex vi sacramenti, each is present with the other by natural concomitance: ex naturali concomitantia. If Christ's body and blood are present on the altar ex vi sacramenti, his divinity, soul and accidents are present ex naturali concomitantia.¹²

Through the idea of natural concomitance, Thomas insures Christ's total presence in such a way as to neutralize the effects of dimensive quantity. It is present, but not in its own proper mode, i. e. with the whole in the whole and single parts in single parts of the locus. Instead, it is present per modum substantiae, with the whole in the whole and in every part.¹³

Such is, in bare outline, Thomas' formulation of the way in which Christ comes to be present in the eucharist. Other problems remain, of course, but they lie outside the scope of the present study. We can now turn to Duns Scotus.

Since Scotus' Opus Oxoniense is a sentence commentary, its treatment of eucharistic presence follows the usual order for works of this kind, beginning with a discussion of Christ's presence and proceeding to a discussion of the nature of conversion. As will be seen, however, this order is as natural for Scotus as the opposite order was natural for Thomas. Scotus begins by acknowledging as an article of faith the assertion that the body of Christ is truly present, then turns to investigate “how that which is believed is possible.”¹⁴ This question is divided into two more specific questions which he examines in turn. First, how can the body of Christ begin to be present on the altar without local motion? Second, how can this body be present as a quantum but not in a quantitative mode?

Scotus inaugurates his consideration of the first question by launching an attack on the “common opinion,” which explains Christ's presence by refering to the eucharistic conversion. Against this thoroughly Thomistic notion he argues that, since substance is the per se terminus ad quem of the conversion, nothing posterior to it is gained per se through that conversion. Thus the eucharistic presence cannot be a per se result of the conversion.¹⁵ In other words, existence of a substance qua substance is prior to the presence of that substance in a particular place. Substantial conversion relates to the former, not the latter. The question of eucharistic presence relates to the latter. Therefore, the idea of substantial conversion seems irrelevant to the question at hand.

Scotus himself chooses to approach the problem by another path. He begins with an analysis of what sorts of motion are involved in action of eucharistic presence. When a body is moved from one place to another, expelling another body in the process, four mutationes and eight termini are involved. First, there is the mutatio in the expelling body from presence in a certain place to loss of that presence; second, the mutatio in the same body from lack of presence in the new place to acquisition of such presence; third, the mutatio in the expelled body from presence in the old place to lack of such; fourth, the mutatio in the expelled body from lack of presence in a new place to acquisition of such presence.¹⁶ When a body moves from place to place without expelling another body, two mutationes and four termini are involved. When it gains a new place without leaving the old one, one acquisitive mutatio between two termini is sufficient. Here one reaches the absolute minimum of mutationes possible in the gaining of any new place.

Thus the body of Christ becomes present in the eucharist, not (as some have affirmed) without any mutatio at all, but through a single acquisitive mutatio. Scotus emphasizes that this mutatio does not alter the form of Christ's body. It simply involves the acquisition of a new respectus extrinsecus adveniens.¹⁷

Scotus' treatment of the second question also begins with the statement and refutation of the Thomistic view. In response to the suggestion that the quantity of Christ's body is present concomitantly and therefore not in a quantitative mode, he asserts that anything which is really present must be present with all of the attributes which naturally and necessarily belong to it.¹⁸ The idea of quantity as present sub modo substantiae makes little sense to him. Having dispensed with the Thomistic solution, he allots a significantly smaller space to the refutation of what would soon be identified as the Ockhamist view, a view holding the body of Christ to be present without the extension of parts.¹⁹ Scotus observes that such an argument is not probabile, since it denies to the body of Christ that positio and figura necessary to any animated body.²⁰

Duns' use of the word positio offers a preview of his own plan of attack. If his answer to the first question proceeds from an analysis of motion, his answer to the second one proceeds from an analysis of position. He distinguishes positio as a differentia of quantity (involving an order of parts in the whole) from positio as a predicament (involving an order of parts to a locus).²¹Positio in the first sense is necessarily present in any quantum. Positio in the second sense is not. A quantum may be deprived of the latter through God's omnipotence by simple negation of any locus. If, for example, God were to place a cat outside the universe, it would still have internal order of parts—its nose would still be in front of its tail and between its whiskers—but these parts would not be ordered to any locus, since the cat would not be present to any locus. The important thing for Scotus, however, is that such a negation of any locus is not required in order for a thing to be without positio in the second sense. The same cat could be present to a given locus in such a way that there is no commensuration or coextension of the parts of the cat with the parts of the locus, for such would be nothing more than the presence of one extrinsic relation: respectus extrinsecus adveniens in the absence of another.²²

How, then, is this distinction to be applied to the case at hand? Scotus' argument is somewhat obscured by the complexity of his terminology. Having distinguished between the two senses of positio, he comments that the second sense, positio as a predicament, is what is called the quantitative or dimensive mode of existence. Had he stopped at this point, the discussion might have retained at least the appearance of clarity. Unfortunately he chooses to make four more distinctions. First, there is the aforementioned distinction between coexistence and coextension (or commensuration). Next, there is a distinction between ubi, which is a respectus extrinsecus of the whole circumscribed thing to the whole circumscribing thing (e.g. of the whole cat to the whole locus in which the cat is present), and positio, which “adds (superaddit) a respectus of parts to parts.”²³ Third, there is a distinction between coexistence and ubi.²⁴ Finally, there is a distinction between simple presence (praesentia simplex) and ubi.²⁵

How does one go about fitting all of these distinctions into a coherent pattern? The first sense of positio can be dispensed with at once, since it is intrinsic to the substance and obviously has nothing to do with the other categories, which are described as respectus extrinsecus advenientes. The second sense of positio, positio as a predicament, can be identified with that positio which is contrasted with ubi.²⁶ Both of these can, in turn, be identified with coextension.²⁷

The other pieces of the puzzle are a bit harder to fit together, but it can be done. The difficulty lies partly in the fact that Scotus is trying to describe a phenomenon which cannot be classified within the context the of Aristotelian predicaments as Scotus himself understands them. The sort of presence he envisages for Christ in the eucharist is described by him as coexistence or simple presence. Such presence is not equivalent to the predicament positio, since there is no coextension of parts involved. Thus he is left with a single possibility, the predicament ubi. While he grants that eucharistic presence might be referred “more properly” to this predicament than to any other,²⁸ he is unwilling to assign it there unconditionally, since he sees ubi as presence in a single place, while eucharistic presence involves presence in two or more places at once.²⁹ Thus he seems to be heading toward a threefold distinction according to which presence can be simple, definitive (i. e. limited to one place, or circumscriptive (i. e. with coextension of parts). Such is, in fact, precisely the solution offered by the Scotist Johannes de Bassolis,³⁰ but Scotus himself is less definite about the matter.³¹

In reality, Scotus' argument is sufficient for his own purposes. He has contrasted the intrinsic sense of quantity and position with the extrinsic one. In terms of the first, the body of Christ by virtue of its very nature is of a different shape and size than the eucharistic species; yet no particular form of respectus extrinsecus adveniens follows from this fact. That is, the fact implies no limitation to a single place and no particular type of commensuration or coextension of the parts of Christ's body with the parts of a locus.³² Thus the body of Christ has one part outside of another in itself, but it does not follow that it has one part outside of that part of the locus in which another part is located.

There is a great deal of truth in Seeberg's observation that Scotus, while apparently complicating the problem, has actually simplified it.³³ His distinction between two senses of positio enables him to separate the problem of the shape and size of Christ's body from that of how it is present in a particular place, and the latter problem is neutralized, if not completely solved, by his classification of presence in terms of different types of respectus extrinsecus adveniens. Christ is present in the eucharist by a simple presence which implies neither limitation to a single place nor presence in a quantitative mode.

It might be noted in passing that there is no necessary connection between this praesentia simplex and the possibility of presence in several places at once. It follows from Scotus' understanding of a respectus extrinsecus adveniens that Christ could be present in a quantitative mode in several places at once. (So, for that matter, could our aforementioned cat.) Scotus cites Thomas' arguments against the possibility of such a phenomenon, adds a few of his own, then refutes them all. He first appeals to God's omnipotence. All that does not include an evident contradiction or from which an evident contradiction does not follow is possible for God.³⁴ This appeal hardly settles anything by itself, of course, since it must still be demonstrated that the matter in question does not imply a contradiction.³⁵ In attempting to demonstrate that such is the case, Scotus first argues by way of a comparison with the simultaneous presence of two bodies in one place. Such a phenomenon, no less inconveniens than the one now being discussed, actually occurred after Christ's resurrection.³⁶ Thus no logical impossibility should be posited in the present case. The most obvious line of argument, however, flows smoothly from his notion of a respectus extrinsecus adveniens. The multiplication of such respectus seems no less possible than the multiplication of respectus intrinsecus advenientes; yet the latter can indeed be multiplied, as is seen in the fact that two different relations of similitude can relate a single whiteness to two other whitenesses.³⁷ Such an argument may strike the modern reader as less than convincing. Scotus seems to be saying that, if our aforementioned cat can be the same color as several other cats, then a fortiori he can sit on several front porches at the same time. The present task is, however, to present his position rather than to criticize it.

Seeberg comments that the basic presupposition of Scotus' whole argument is his realistic understanding of place, which enables him to separate it from the substance in question.³⁸ One might observe that Scotus' view of place is not strikingly different from that held by other scholastics if one means by “place” that containing thing to which the located substance is related. If, however, one takes Seeberg to mean “place” in the sense of “being in a place,” then he is correct. Duns Scotus' view of a respectus extrinsecus adveniens might be called “realistic” inasmuch as he sees it as capable of being absent even though the two termini of the respectus are present. Thus a body can coexist with a locus without being related to it by any particular respectus of positio in the predicamental sense.

It should be obvious by now that Scotus' understanding of presence as a respectus extrinsecus adveniens and his view of substance as prior to any such respectus are absolutely central for an understanding of his eucharistic theology. Any misrepresentation of these ideas can only lead to a distorted interpretation of his thought. Seeberg is probably a case in point. He continually represents Scotus as one who has reduced the bodily presence of Christ in the eucharist to a mere relation.³⁹ Again, he tends to think of the distinction between Christ's sacramental presence and his presence in other places as one between the sacramental and the real Christ.⁴⁰ Once one takes Duns' view of presence seriously, however, it becomes apparent that Christ's presence in the eucharist is just as “real” as his or anyone else's presence in any other place.⁴¹ Christ may be present in the eucharist “only” by a respectus extrinsecus adveniens, but it is also “only” by such a respectus that the statue of liberty is present in New York harbor.

Such is, in essence, the view of Christ's presence advanced by Scotus in liber IV, distinctio 10 of the Opus Oxoniense. However dense some of his explanations may seem, they are always clear enough to show the striking dissimilarity between his approach to the problem and the one advocated by Thomas Aquinas. To what extent does this difference extend to his understanding of transubstantiation? Even in distinctio 10, which is primarily devoted to other matters, the issue of eucharistic conversion is very much in evidence. It is seen, first, in Scotus' criticism of the relationship between conversion and presence offered by the Thomistic view. We have seen Scotus' argument that, since the presence of a thing is posterior to its essence, transubstantiation does not in itself furnish an adequate explanation of Christ's presence. God could, in fact, convert the bread into the body of Christ existing in heaven, just as he could effect the presence of the body without converting the bread. This claim is consistently stated throughout distinctio 10 and serves as a major weapon against the Thomistic position.⁴² Even if such an explicit challenge were not uttered, however, Scotus' own positive formulation would suffice to make the point. The notion of eucharistic presence as a respectus extrinsecus adveniens seems to suggest that the idea of a eucharistic conversion—a fortiori the idea of a transubstantiation—is unnecessary and even irrelevant. It is with this issue that Scotus must wrestle in distinctio 11.

Scotus' ex professo treatment of conversion in this distinctio begins with two relatively harmless quaestiones regarding the possibility of transubstantiation. These can be ignored for the moment, since it is in the third quaestio, concerning whether the bread actually is converted into the body of Christ, that the most striking features of the Scotist system begin to appear. He begins by citing three opinions on the subject which he describes as those listed by Innocent III: (1) that the bread remains and the body of Christ is present with it; (2) that the bread is not converted, but ceases to be through annihilation, resolution into matter or change into another thing (corruptionem in aliud); and (3) that the bread and wine are transubstantiated into the body and blood of Christ. All of these opinions, Scotus says, wish to maintain the real presence of Christ's body and blood, since such an affirmation is demanded by faith.

He then turns to a long and tightly packed discussion of the arguments for each position, beginning with the first. These arguments are so important for the present study that they must be described in some detail.

The first argument for the permanence of the bread is based upon a species of what was later to be called “the principle of parsimony” or “Ockham's razor,” a principle which actually entered the minds of medieval philosophers through their study of Aristotle. The basic intention of the principle is a fairly simple one: No explanation of any phenomenon should introduce more factors than are necessary for the understanding of that phenomenon. If event X can be explained by positing causes A, B and C, one should not throw in D and E for good measure. Such a rule, Scotus suggests,⁴³ applies to theological as well as philosophical matters.⁴⁴ Thus one must ask how essential a role transubstantiation plays in the explanation of Christ's real presence.

Here two factors seem to militate against transubstantiation. First, it is clearly unnecessary for Christ's presence since, as Scotus has already agreed in distinctio 10, the body of Christ could be present along with the bread and wine.⁴⁵ Thus transubstantiation simply adds an additional miracle without contributing anything necessary for the presence itself.⁴⁶ Second, conversion is unnecessary for the symbolic aspect of the eucharist, since the substance of bread, far from ruining the signification of the species by its presence, would actually be a better sign of Christ's body than the accidents themselves.⁴⁷

Again, “this way of understanding the real presence [i. e. transubstantiation], which is harder to understand and seems to lead to more inconvenientia, does not seem to have been handed down to us as an article of faith.”⁴⁸ Here the main clause, which actually receives thorough treatment in the next argument, can be ignored for the moment and attention can be concentrated upon the subordinate clause. Scotus does not enumerate the difficulties involved in the idea of transubstantiation, and we are left to assume that they are the same ones confronted later when Scotus takes up the cudgel for transubstantiation. Instead, he concentrates upon the effect these difficulties have upon those following natural reason, who, he says, would find more apparent inconvenientia in this one idea than in all the articles of faith regarding the Incarnation. Thus the doctrine would tend to prevent such men from accepting the faith. “And it seems strange that concerning one article, which is not even a principal article of faith, something should be asserted which lays the faith open to the contempt of all those following natural reason.”⁴⁹

Again, “nothing is to be held as part of the substance of faith except what is expressly found in the scripture or expressly declared by the church or evidently follows from something plainly contained in the scripture or determined by the church.”⁵⁰ None of these sources of authority seems to require belief that the substance of bread is absent. If it is argued, “as one doctor says,” that the words hoc est corpus meum demand the assertion that the substance of bread does not remain, one might easily respond that, given the permanence of the bread, the phrase could easily mean “this entity contained under this sensible sign is my body,” just as it does if we grant the truth of transubstantiation, since even if such is granted the hoc cannot refer to all that is present on the altar but must somehow exclude the accidents of the bread.⁵¹

Finally, the sacrament of truth should contain no falsity. Accidents naturally signify their substance and should do so in the eucharist. If it is objected that they signify the body of Christ, it can be replied that the natural signification should not be altered through the imposition of a new, freely instituted signification when the truth of both significations could be conserved if the substance were to remain.⁵²

The case for the second alternative, annihilation, is presented by Scotus with great brevity. He points out that the first three arguments already cited in favor of the first opinion can also be adduced to prove the superiority of annihilation over transubstantiation as an explanation of the eucharistic presence. That is, it involves less miracles and less inconvenientia while seeming equally permissible in the light of scripture and tradition.⁵³

Having thus set forth the arguments for the first two opinions, Scotus proceeds to refute the counter-arguments advanced against them by “a certain doctor.”⁵⁴ In response to the objection that the permanene of bread would lead to idolatry, Scotus asserts that in such a case the latria allotted to the sacrament would be directed toward the body of Christ contained in the bread rather than toward the bread itself, just as it is now directed toward the body of Christ contained under the accidents rather than toward the accidents themselves. Here again Scotus has managed to show that the Thomistic arguments can be turned against the Thomistic formulation. In response to the objection that such permanence would ruin the signification of the sacraments, Scotus repeats what he has already said on this score. In response to the objection that it would detract from the function of the sacrament as spiritual food, making it corporeal food, Scotus observes that it is corporeal as well as spiritual food, citing St. Paul's testimony in I Corinthians 11 as proof of this fact. Against the objection that Christ cannot become present in the eucharist except through substantial conversion, Scotus simply cites his own argument in distinctio 10, quaestio 1. In response to the objection that, given such permanence, the biblical text should read hic est corpus meum rather than hoc est corpus meum, Scotus again raises the spectre of the same problem within the objector's own formulation.

Duns then turns to examine the same doctor's arguments against annihilation. That doctor is represented as arguing that, if the substance of bread were resolved into matter, it would become either pure matter (materiam nudam) or matter with some other form. The first would be impossible, since, given the existence of matter without form, the “act of matter” (actus materiae) would simultaneously be and not be. In the second case, the resultant new substance would either be present in the same place as the body of Christ or be moved to a different location, both of which are inconveniens. Scotus replies that the argument against reduction to materiam nudam depends upon an equivocal use of the word actus, since it refers in one sense to that “difference of being” (differentia entis) opposed to potentia, whereas in the second sense it refers to that habitudo which form has to the informable. The argument is based upon an equally equivocal use of potentia. As opposed to actus in the first sense it refers to a being which is diminished (diminutum) in its being, being less complete (completum) than an ens in actu. As opposed to actus in the second sense it refers to a principle receptive of an actus in the second sense. Thus matter, after being created by God but before being informed, would be in actu in the first sense and in potentia in the second. In defense of the second possibility, that of the bread being reduced to matter under a new form, Scotus argues that there is no more contradiction involved in the coexistence of the new substance with the body of Christ than in the coexistence of the body of Christ with the quantity of bread, since quantum is more repugnant to quantum than substance to substance. Nor, on the other hand, has it been demonstrated that it is impossible for God to move the new substance to another place. Thus all three possibilities are defensible.

Scotus has finally finished his presentation of the first two opinions. It is hardly necessary to observe that this presentation represents a conscious effort to refute both chapter and verse of the Thomistic argument for transubstantiation. Having thus demolished the argument, however, Scotus must still deal with the thesis which the argument was designed to support. At this point he must stand with Thomas and assert the truth of transubstantiation, not for Thomas' reasons, but because it is commonly held and principaliter because it is held by the holy Roman Church. Although Duns cites Ambrose and provides a brief indication of two points at which the belief is “congruent” with established church practices, he makes it quite clear that the authority of the Roman Church is the crucial factor in his decision.

What, then, of the arguments for the first two opinions? Scotus observes that the principle of parsimony is valid, but that it does not militate against transubstantiation, since it is necessary to posit transubstantiation in order to preserve “the truth of the eucharist”: veritas Eucharistiae. Had God instituted the eucharist in such a way as to make the body of Christ coexist with the substance of bread, the veritas Eucharistiae could have been saved without positing transubstantiation. Since he did not do so, however, the situation is entirely different.

One is tempted to see in Scotus' response a somewhat superficial bow to churchly authority, less impressive than the original argument; yet such a response may simply betray the degree to which Duns' attitude toward doctrine differs from our own. At any rate, there is more to his response than first meets the eye. In stating implicitly that God's actions are not in themselves governed by the principal of parsimony, he provides a clarification which is of more than passing interest when seen in the context of the age in which he was writing. The opposite notion was hardly untenable in the early fourteenth century.⁵⁵ It would, in fact, be hard to avoid if the role of God's reason were emphasized at the expense of his will. Scotus' response places a check upon this sort of thought by stressing God's freedom in regard to the created order. He could have done it in one way if he had chosen, but he chose to do it in quite another way.

The reverse side of the same coin might be said to contain an important warning for theologians. If emphasis upon the contingency of the divinely instituted order involves greater attention to divine freedom, it also involves greater awareness of the limitations imposed upon rational argument in theology. Here the greatest caution is necessary. Scotus is not advocating a new irrationality. In fact, it is possible to judge from what has been said that his theology is more rational than Thomas' own, inasmuch as it is based upon a more penetrating analysis of the extent to which theology can be supported by natural reason. Thomas' argument for the necessity of transubstantiation is rejected, not because it is rational, but because it is not rationally convincing. It does not prove what it claims to prove.

Thus two different factors would seem to coalesce in the formation of Scotus' more “positivistic”⁵⁶ approach. On the one hand, emphasis upon divine freedom leads to emphasis upon the contingency of the divinely instituted order, which in turn leads to greater emphasis upon revelation as opposed to natural theology. On the other hand, a critical evalution of the “proofs” provided by previous theologians leads to a greater awareness of the insufficiency of these “proofs,” which in turn leads to a similar emphasis upon revelation as opposed to natural theology. Thus the theologian is encouraged to place more and more reliance upon authoritative revelation concerning the divinely instituted order. If that revelation can be supported by rational arguments, such support is to be welcomed; yet the theologian is made suspicious of such arguments both by theoretical considerations concerning the divine freedom and by his own empirical observation that many arguments have hitherto been proved inconclusive.

The same general attitude is manifested in Scotus' reply to the second argument. All other things being equal, one should not accept the explanation which is more difficult to believe. Nevertheless, such a rule cannot be used to refute what we know to be the truth.⁵⁷ Here again one is tempted to protest that Duns the philosopher has been betrayed by Duns the churchman. Here again, however, such an evaluation would be premature. Once a theologian is aware of the extent to which natural theology falls short in its construction of rational proofs for Christian doctrine, he should be equally skeptical concerning any attempt to construct a rational disproof of some doctrine. Such an attitude need not result in a precipitous flight from rationality. It could just as easily result in a rational awareness of the limits inherent in human thought and a healthy distrust of any rational argument which concerns matters lying at the fringe of our understanding. So far Scotus' admonition is open to the latter interpretation. Whether such an interpretation can be maintained throughout his discussion of eucharistic conversion can only be decided after viewing the entire discussion.

It is noteworthy that Scotus' responses to the first two arguments contain explicit reference to an authoritatively revealed truth which counterbalances the claims of any strictly rational argument. Thus both of these responses anticipate his response to the third argument, that regarding authority. Here Scotus reveals the precise source of the truth which he is defending. It is, of course, the Fourth Lateran Council.⁵⁸ The earlier arguments regarding the Bible and early tradition are true as far as they go. Neither the Bible nor the early church presents an explicit doctrine of transubstantiation. Nevertheless, this question has been settled once and for all by the decree of the Fourth Lateran, “in which the truth of some things to be believed is set out more explicitly than in the Apostles', Athanasian and Nicene creeds.”

Thus Scotus' formulation of the doctrine is striking, not only on its refusal to offer rational justification for the doctrine, but also in its apparent willingness to base the doctrine upon the decision of a council less than a century old in his day, a decision admittedly based upon no clear-cut biblical or patristic precedents. On what basis, then, could the church have arrived at “such a difficult interpretation of this article,” especially “when the words of scripture would support an easy and apparently truer interpretation”?⁵⁹ Scotus' answer is that in choosing this interpretation the church was guided by the same spirit through which the scriptures were written and handed down. Thus it chose the true interpretation.⁶⁰

Such a view demands a new look at what Duns has to say about the scriptural authority for transubstantiation. As Antonius Vellico rightly suggests,⁶¹ Scotus is not placing the Fourth Lateran Council alongside the Bible as an independent authority. On the contrary, the Council was interpreting scripture when it demanded belief in transubstantiation. No matter how vaguely scripture may have put the matter, its true meaning is now clear.

Such an explanation tells us everything and nothing. It clearly states the conciliar claim to doctrinal authority, yet it says absolutely nothing about the sorts of criteria which would enter into the doctrinal decision. Granting that the bishops at the Council were guided by the Holy Spirit, their interpretation must have been based on some concrete evidence. What evidence does Scotus think was decisive? This question must, unfortunately, remain unanswered, since there is nothing in his formulation which would help us to answer it.

So far, we have examined Scotus' presentation and refutation of the arguments for the first two opinions and his assertion that the third opinion, transubstantiation, is the correct one. He must also show in good scholastic fashion that it is possible, that it is neither a contradictory notion in itself nor does it lead to such. It is in these sections that one would expect him to come to terms with the inconvenientia seemingly entailed by the doctrine, and it is in the context of this confrontation that one might expect to discover what Duns really means by “transubstantiation.”

The first stage of this confrontation actually takes place with his answer to the question “whether transubstantiation is possible.”⁶² Here, having defined transubstantiation as “the transition of a total substance into a substance,”⁶³ he argues that “it is not repugnant for whatever is able to be entirely new to succeed that which is able to cease to be entirely … consequently this is able to be converted totally into that and thus transubstantiated.”⁶⁴ Whatever may be the merits of such an explanation, it is obvious that it does not support the possibility of transubstantiation in the sense in which Thomas wants to use the word. What it does support is the possibility of a succession of being to being or, more precisely, of the ceasing-to-be of one to the beginning-to-be of another. This apparent insufficiency represents something more than an oversight on Scotus' part, as will be seen in a moment.

Even a casual reading of Scotus' explanation seems to uncover a major fallacy. It seems to apply to any situation except the one to which he intended it to apply, since the body of Christ, being preexistent, is not really produced de novo in the eucharistic conversion. Here the striking dissimilarity between Scotus and Thomas is again demonstrated. Whereas for the latter Christ's preexistence is an important part of the argument for the necessity of transubstantiation, for the former it seems one of the gravest threats to the same doctrine.

Scotus replies that two modes of transubstantiation must be distinguished. In the first, the substance takes on being (esse). In the second, it takes on “being-here” (esse hic).⁶⁵ The first is productive (productiva) of its term, the second adductive (adductiva). The first mode of transubstantiation cannot have a preexistent substance as its term, but the second can. The sort of transubstantiation involved in the eucharistic conversion is, then, of the second type.

Scotus immediately acknowledges the inevitable objection to this line of thought: The second type is not transubstantiation at all, since its term is not substance in itself but presence, which is an accident of substance. He replies that substance is indeed the term of transubstantiation in the second sense, since substance succeeds substance.⁶⁶ Such an argument would not seem to be completely at odds with the Thomistic view. It simply focuses attention on the area in which the concept of transubstantiation is relevant. The concept refers, not to the mutation which occurs in Christ (which involves change of presence rather than change of substance), but to the change which occurs upon the altar. The latter does involve a change of substance. This rather obvious affirmation is the only one Duns needs in order to make his point. His argument requires a quiet revision of his earlier distinction between transubstantiation and presence,⁶⁷ but once this revision is made his defense of transubstantiation is assured, provided that the word is not taken to mean anything more than a succession of substance to substance.

Unfortunately, the term was assumed to mean something more in the later thirteenth century. Transubstantiation meant conversion, and conversion meant more for Thomas, Bonaventure and others than simple succession. At least a minimum degree of assent to this view was exacted through the practice of answering in the negative the question of whether the bread is annihilated in the conversion. For a theologian like Thomas, the “strong” sense of transubstantiation is so obvious and so necessary for his understanding of eucharistic presence that the question of annihilation hardly needs be asked. For Scotus, the situation is entirely reversed. His understanding of presence and his definition of transubstantion are such that one eagerly turns to his consideration of the question of annihilation, half expecting him to answer in the affirmative.

The expectation is not completely unfulfilled. Scotus' treatment of this question is a strange one. After beginning, according to his usual pattern, with the presentation and refutation of various opposing arguments, Scotus makes an explicit statement “that the bread is not annihilated, or at least that the bread is not annihilated by this conversion”;⁶⁸ yet his determination, rather than taking the form of a sustained argument, might almost be termed a dialogue. At times one gets the impression that Scotus is thinking out loud.⁶⁹ Within this section one can isolate at least four answers to the problem. The first three are immediately followed by refutations. The fourth provides the traditional negation, but in as minimal a form as one could expect to encounter. The conversion is between the bread as present and the body of Christ as present. Thus, within this conversion, the bread does not lose “being-in-itself” (esse simpliciter) but only “being-here” (hic esse). What, then, do we make of the fact that the bread ceases to be as well as to be present? This phenomenon must come about through a different act than that involved in transubstantiation.⁷⁰ This “ceasing-to-be,” although concomitant with the conversion, is not a term of the conversion.⁷¹ Thus, even though this “ceasing-to-be” might be described as annihilation, the conversion is not thereby implicated.⁷² Returning for a moment to the assertion with which Scotus began his determination, we see that he has succeeded in backing at least the second of his two claims. The bread is not annihilated by the conversion.⁷³

What is one to make of this conclusion? It is of course impossible to agree with one of his more extreme defenders that Scotus is in complete agreement with St. Thomas on the matter.⁷⁴ On the other end of the spectrum, it is equally impossible to accept Seeberg's attempt to present Scotus' theory of adductive transubstantiation as essentially a doctrine of consubstantiation phrased in accordance with the demands of orthodoxy.⁷⁵ There is no compelling reason to believe that Duns' initial case for the permanence of the bread represents his own secret opinion or that it is the only opinion consistent with his view of eucharistic presence. It is noteworthy that the most striking aspect of that case, his reference to the ridicule heaped upon transubstantiation by those following natural reason, argues against transubstantiation rather than for consubstantiation. Again, one must not fail to note that the most forceful arguments advanced by Duns Scotus in favor of the permanence of the bread are also listed by himm as valid arguments for the superiority of an annihilation theory over that of transubstantiation. In other words, although it is true that the permanence theory is supported with one more argument than is accorded to the annihilation theory, the main point of the opening section is not so much the superiority of one of those views to the other as the superiority of both to transubstantiation.

Furthermore, if we are to take seriously the rebuttals of these opening arguments offered by Scotus himself—rebuttals which, in their emphasis upon divine freedom and the centrality of revealed truth, accord well with Scotus' views elsewhere—we must recognize that he would not accept as decisive any slight rational superiority on the part of a given theory. Thus, as was suggested earlier, the real problem is one of how prodigious the difficulties accompanying transubstantiation actually seem. Scotus might be expected to find transubstantiation a major stumbling block only if the inconvenientia seem so unassailable as to involve any formulation in hopeless self-contradiction.

Once we examine Scotus' own formulation in the light of these considerations, we might be moved to conclude that he is, in fact, unable to formulate a thoroughgoing doctrine of transubstantiation in the “strong” Thomistic sense of that word. Is there anything especially sinister about this conclusion? In the long run, one would guess that there is not, even if we choose to measure Scotus by the canons of Roman Catholic doctrine. His view of transubstantiation is not explicitly contradicted by the definition of transubstantiation produced by the Council of Trent, nor did the great theologians of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries interpret the tridentine definition as a condemnation of Scotus.⁷⁶

In the short run, the situation is more ambiguous. Scotus himself may well have felt somewhat uncomfortable about his position. He seems to see himself as moving in a tradition which clearly expects a negative answer to the question of “whether the bread is annihilated.” He states the problem in such a way as to demand such an answer, since he introduces the theory of annihilation as an alternative to transubstantiation. He eventually escapes from his dilemma through an artful application of the two theories to different phenomena. As the discussion ends, one senses an atmosphere of relief rather than exultation.

Interestingly enough, Scotus' definitive solution was not universally adopted by early fourteenth-century Scotists. Hugo de Novo Castro⁷⁷ and Johannes de Bassolis⁷⁸ both argue that the bread is not annihilated because the termini of transubstantiation are both positive. These termini are seen as the bread and the body of Christ. Thus both men adopt the solution which Scotus accepts in the Reportata Parisiensia but rejects in the Opus Oxoniense.⁷⁹

Other Scotists seem less resolute. In answer to the question of whether the bread is annihilated Franciscus de Mayronis⁸⁰ replies that it is not, since it is converted. God, he says, can cause a thing to cease to be in two ways, either secundum se or in ordine ad aliud. The first case alone can be called annihilation. Then, unfortunately, Franciscus provides an illustration. God decides not to destroy a man unless he creates an angel. Since He intends something positive, it can be argued that the man is not annihilated. Thus, in the same way, He does not effect the nonbeing of the bread secundum se, but rather in ordine ad aliud, namely the sacramental body of Christ.

Needless to say, the illustration does not support a very “strong” sense of transubstantiation. In fact, the author is still not satisfied. He goes on to offer four more arguments in favor of annihilation, then answers them in less than six lines which leave one wondering precisely what Franciscus did think about the matter.

To the first argument I say that it is true if the thing is reduced to nothing which is not in ordine ad aliud. And the same response can be made to the other arguments. Because, therefore, God has ordered the nonbeing of the bread to another terminus, there seems to be no better way of arguing against annihilation. He who can understand, let him understand!⁸¹

Perhaps the most ingenious improvement upon Scotus' view was made by a man who, although hardly a Scotist, seems to have been one of Scotus' more discerning readers. It was William of Ockham who decided that Scotus' main difficulty lay, not in his conclusion regarding annihilation, but in his way of formulating the problem. Like Scotus, Ockham denies the close connection posited by Thomas Aquinas between eucharistic presence and conversion.⁸² Like Scotus, he offers an extremely “weak” definition of transubstantiation.⁸³ Like Scotus, he presents and discusses several alternative theories regarding the nature of the eucharistic conversion.⁸⁴ It might be suggested (1) that the bread remains and the body of Christ coexists with it; (2) that the substance of bread is moved to another place while the accidents remain, the body of Christ coexisting with them; (3) that the substance of bread might be understood to be reduced to matter, either remaining without a form or receiving a new one; or (4) that the substance of the bread is reduced to nothing. Like Scotus, Ockham grants an a priori possibility to all the alternatives, explicitly recognizes the rational advantages enjoyed by the theory of permanence, but finally rejects that hypothesis because the Fourth Lateran Council has chosen differently.

Note, however, that Ockham has effected a quiet revolution in his listing of the alternatives. Unlike Scotus, he does not have to face a choice between transubstantiation and annihilation. Thus he is in a position to accept annihilation, not as an alternative to transubstantiation, but as one aspect of it.⁸⁵

Such a clarification was not without its dangers. It is noteworthy that none of Ockham's later works contains an explicit affirmation of annihilation. Moreover, his lone affirmation of annihilation in the sentence commentary appears among those aspects of his thought censured by a papal commission in 1325/26.⁸⁶ The problem of eucharistic conversion was hardly settled by Ockham or anyone else in his time. Succeeding theologians might well have taken to heart the warning with which Ockham's contemporary, Durandus a Sancto Porciano, prefaced his thoughts on the matter.

It is to be noted that since this is one of the greatest miracles contained by our faith … it is not our intention to provide any rigorous explanation of how it happens—for it is beyond the understanding of any mortal—but simply to provide some insight into what the faith holds regarding this sacrament and what the church holds concerning the way in which the body of Christ exists there. Nor should anyone be proud of himself if he finds that he can argue against our formulation, since it is the easiest thing in the world to attack the faith in its various formulations by the use of human reason and philosophy. Moreover, it is most difficult—perhaps impossible—to provide unquestionable refutations for all such attacks … If anyone is not satisfied with our formulation, let him try another in the knowledge that perhaps he will suffer as many or more slanders than we. Nor is it sufficient for anyone to say in general that there is another formulation, although unknown to us; for any ignoramus can say that.⁸⁷

Notes

1. Thomists have been more than ready to attack Scotus for his deviation from Thomism. See for example, Vincentius Cachia, De natura transsubstantiationis iuxta S. Thomam et Scotum (Rome, 1929). Franciscans have rallied to his defense by either minimizing the deviation or justifying it as consistent with that formulation accepted by the Council of Trent. The latter course is seen in a perceptive article by Antonius Vellico, “De transsubstantiatione juxta Joannem Duns Scotum,” Antonianum, 5 (1930), 301-302. The former, more difficult course is attempted by Hugolinus Storff, De natura transsubstantiationis iuxta I. Duns Scotum (Quaracchi, 1936).

   Protestant authors have brought their own concerns to the study of Scotus' eucharistic thought, occasionally attempting to picture him as a harbinger of the Reformation. See, for example, the classic study by Reinhold Seeberg, Die Theologie des Johannes Duns Scotus (Leipzig, 1900), hereafter cited as Duns Scotus. In his discussion of Scotus' eucharistic thought, Seeberg betrays a strong desire to interpret Scotus in as Protestant a manner as the text will allow. See, for example, the general interpretation in Ibid., 383 which concludes “Das wäre ungefähr lutherisch gedacht, aber ist sich auch nicht unscotistisch gedacht.” Protestants are hardly the only ones moved by such desires, however. See Kilian McDonnell, OSB, John Calvin, the Church and the Eucharist (Princeton, 1967). McDonnell sees in Scotus' formulation an attempt to affirm the continued presence of the bread and wine without contradicting the doctrine of transubstantiation.

2. See especially the Commentarium in quatuor libros sententiarum magistri Petri Lombardi, liber IV (henceforth abbreviated as IV Sent.), d. 10, q. 1, a. 1 ad 8, in Opera (New York, 1948-50), 71.

3. Summa theologiae (Rome, 1948), III, q. 75, a. 2. (The Summa theologiae will hereafter be cited as ST.). See also IV Sent., d. 11, q. 1, q. 1a 1; Questiones quodlibetales (hereafter cited as Quodl.), III, q. 1, a. 2, in Opera, 9.

4. Libri IV sententiarum (Quaracchi, 1916), liber IV, dd. 10-12.

5. It must be noted in passing that Thomas' refutation of the theory that the bread remains—a theory which, for reasons of brevity, will hereafter be characterized as the theory of permanence—does not rest entirely upon his argument for the necessity of conversion. In ST III, q. 75, a. 2 he presents a detailed argument for the necessity of conversion and then adds, in briefer form, the following arguments: (1) The idea of permanence is contrary to the words of consecration, which would have to be hic est corpus meum if the bread remained; (2) the idea is contrary to the veneration given to the sacrament, which could not be worshipped with the adoration of latria if the bread remained; (3) the idea is contrary to the custom of the church forbidding the eating of any food before communion and yet allowing priests to partake of successive consecrated hosts. In IV Sent., d. 11, q. 1, a. 1, q. 1a 1 he cites all of the preceding arguments plus the observation that if the bread remained the function of the species as a sign would be frustrated, since the species would point, not to the body of Christ, but to the substance of bread.

   Thomas also advances other arguments in his refutation of annihilation. These arguments can be summarized as follows: If the bread were not converted into the body of Christ, it would be either resolved into matter or annihilated. If the former, then it must be resolved into matter without form (which is self-contradictory, implying that the matter is in actu without that form which is its actus) or into its material elements. If it is resolved into its material elements, these elements must either remain in the same place (thus involving all the inconvenientia implied in the theory of permanence) or move elsewhere (which is impossible, since no such movement is perceived and since such motion would be gradual, whereas transubstantiation is instantaneous). Thus if the bread is not converted into the body of Christ it must be annihilated. Thomas then refutes the idea of annihilation by reference to the previously noted argument that presence must come about through conversion. ST III, q. 75, a. 3; IV Sent., d. 11, q. 1, a. 2. In both cases Thomas describes the theory of annihilation as “false,” while he brands the theory of permanence as “heretical.”

6. IV Sent., d. 10, q. 1, a. 1: … nullum corpus comparatur ad locum nisi mediantibus dimensionibus quantitatis; et ideo ibi corpus est aliquid ut in loco, ubi commensurantur dimensiones ejus dimensionibus loci; et secundum hoc corpus Christi non est nisi in uno loco tantum, scilicet in caelo.

7. ST III, q. 76, a. 5.

8. ST III, q. 76, a. 5.

9. ST III, q. 76, aa. 1 and 2.

10. ST III, q. 76, a. 1 ad 3: Propria autem totalitas continetur indifferenter in parva vel magna quantitate; sicut tota natura aeris in magno vel parvo aere, et tota natura hominis in magno vel parvo homine.

11. ST III, q. 76, a. 3: … natura substantiae tota est sub qualibet parte dimensionum, sub quibus continetur, sicut sub qualibet parte aeris est tota natura aeris et sub qualibet panis est tota natura panis. The idea of substantial conversion also explains several other things, such as why the conversion is instantaneous and why Christ is not increased in size by daily conversion.

12. ST III, q. 76, a. 1. For the historical development of the idea of concomitance, see James J. Megivern, Concomitance and Communion (Freiburg, 1963).

13. ST III, q. 76, aa. 4 and 5.

14. Fratris Ioannis Duns Scoti … in quartum lib. sententiarum perutiles quaestiones (Venice, 1598), d. 10, q. 1, fol. 40K. All references to the work in question, hereafter cited as IV Sent., will be given in terms of this edition, although all passages cited have been checked against the text in Opera (Paris, 1891-95). Until Opera (Vatican City, 1951) offers a complete text of the Opus Oxoniense, any edition must be regarded with some suspicion.

    One important observation must be made at the outset. It has been accepted since the fourteenth century that Scotus commented upon the Sentences at least twice. The Paris, 1891-95 edition of his works (like its ancestor the Lyons, 1639 edition) includes not only the Opus Oxoniense but the so-called Reportata Parisiensia. Recent scholarship has shown that the story is even more complicated. For discussion and bibliography see especially Charles Balić, Les Commentaires de Jean Duns Scot sur les quatre livres des sentences (Louvain, 1927) and the new Opera, 1, 140-75. It takes little more than a glance at the Reportata Parisiensia to realize that Scotus' formulation of eucharistic doctrine is not uniform throughout his sentence commentaries. Moreover, quaestio 10 of his Quaestiones quodlibetales (St. Bonaventure N.V., 1950) deals with some of the same material discussed in the sentence commentaries and is closer to the views of the Reportata Parisiensia than to those of the Opus Oxoniense. In both cases the difference involves a move closer to the Thomistic position. Thus any attempt to present the teaching of the Opus Oxoniense as the Scotist view of eucharistic presence would seem ill-advised.

    Nevertheless, such a course is precisely the one the present work proposes to take. The priority of the Opus Oxoniense is dictated both by its nature and by chronological considerations. In the first place, it would seem to be an ordinatio, a work that Scotus himself revised for circulation, while the Reportata Parisiensia is a reportatio, recorded by his students from his lectures. In the second place, Scotus seems to have used his Oxford and Paris lectures in writing the ordinatio, which means that the ordinatio marks a late stage in his development. Thus the reportationes are interesting as reflections of his development, but the ordinatio represents the views of the mature Scotus. See the conclusion offered by Charles Balić, “The Life and Works of Duns Scotus,” Duns Scotus, 1365-1965 (Washington, 1965), 21 “… whenever disagreement exists between the teaching of the Ordinatio and the teaching of the Reportationes, the text of the Ordinatio is to be followed as that which reflects Scotus' final and definitive doctrine.”

15. IV Sent., d. 10, q. 1, fol. 41B.

16. Ibid., fol. 41D-K.

17. Here we encounter a term which defies translation. In essence, it refers to a relation of one thing to another, but a relation of such a sort that it is not directly determined by the nature of the thing in question. As will be seen, Scotus' formulation of eucharistic presence is dependent upon his essentially “realistic” notion of a respectus extrinsecus adveniens.

18. Ibid., fol. 41H-I.

19. In the marginal reference provided by the Venice, 1598 edition it is described as such. Since Scotus is also aware of what would eventually be thought of as the Ockhamist view of quantity, one is tempted to put the two together and affirm that Scotus is refuting an essentially Ockhamist view at this point, well before Ockham himself appeared on the scholarly scene. The possibilities are more varied than one might suppose, however, and are unfortunately beyond the scope of the present work.

20. Ibid., fol. 41K-A.

21. In the latter case positio is equal to what some scholastics call situs. Scotus' distinction is not entirely foreign to Thomas Aquinas. In his Commentarium de physico auditu, liber IV, lectio 5, in Opera, 18 Thomas distinguishes between situs as a predicament (involving ordo partium in loco) and situs as a differentia quantitatis (involving ordo partium in toto). On the whole, however, Thomas uses situs in the predicamental sense.

22. IV Sent., fol. 42A-D: … possibile esset Deum conservare quantum et coexistentiam eius ad aliud quantum, et tamen sine ista coextensione partium unius ad partes alterius quam dicit positio ista, de qua loquimur. Note that positio in the second sense is here identified with “coextension of parts.”

23. Ibid., fol. 42B.

24. Ibid., fol. 42C: … coexistentia … non tamen formaliter est ubi.

25. Ibid., fol. 41C: … terminus istius mutationis non est ubi, … sed terminus est quaedam praesentia simplex.

26. Such is seen to be the case, not only because of the identity of names, but also because of the similarity of definitions. Positio as a predicament is described as an: ordinem partium ad locum, sive ad partes loci, vel locantis … See Ibid., fol. 42B.

27. See ibid., fol. 42C, which refers to: ista coextensione partium unius ad partes alterius, quam dicit positio ista, de qua loquimur.

28. Ibid., fol. 41F-G.

29. Ibid., fol. 41F-G: … praesentia corporis Christi speciei magis recedit a vera ratione ubi, quia nullo modo per istam praesentiam determinatur sic ad unum ubi, quod sibi repugnat aliud.

30. In librum sententiarum opus (Paris, 1517), IV, d. 10, q. 1, fol. 38r. Johannes sees all three types as contained within the predicament ubi.

31. He remarks that the divergence between eucharistic presence and the predicament ubi does not necessarily suggest the existence of more than ten predicaments, but may simply reflect our failure to define the ten as satisfactorily as we might. See also Scotus' Quaestiones quodlibetales, q. 11, where he limits the notion of ubi properly speaking to praesens modo quantitativo or as coextensum loco, but grants that the presence of the whole to cuilibet parti illius loci—as in the case of angelic presence—may improperly be called ubi.

32. IV Sent., d. 10, q. 1, fol. 42D.

33. Duns Scotus, 371.

34. IV Sent., d. 10, q. 2, fol. 43C. See also fol. 431.

35. Perhaps the main significance of the statement for the historian of theology is simply that it is there at all, that Scotus considers it necessary to begin with an appeal to God's omnipotence. Here one sees evidence of a tendency which, although not entirely absent from thirteenth-century theology, was to exert even greater influence upon the fourteenth century, the tendency toward an increased awareness of and reference to God's omnipotence, along with great effort to use the doctrine as a major tool for attacking any number of theological and even philosophical questions.

36. The example of the virgin birth is also used. Ibid., fol. 45C.

37. Ibid., fol. 43K: … respectus intrinsecus advenientes, de quibus minus videtur possunt plurificari fundamento eodem manente ad diversos terminos, ut super eandem albedinem possunt duae similitudines fundari ad duos terminos …

38. Duns Scotus, 373. See also his Lehrbuch der Dogmengeschichte, 3, (Graz, 1953), 526-27.

39. See Duns Scotus, 376, where it is called “nur eine logische Beziehung.” See also 374-75, 383.

40. See Ibid., 374-75.

41. Scotus does distinguish between Christ's presence sub modo sacramenti and his presence sub modo naturali, but he does not consider the latter to be any more “real” than the former. See IV Sent., d. 10, q. 4, fol. 47D-E.

42. See, for example, IV Sent., d. 10, q. 1, fol. 41B-C; d. 10, q. 3, fol. 46D-E; d. 10, q. 4, fol. 48A-B.

43. It must be remembered that Scotus is speaking in the person of an anonymous exponent of the first view, not expressly for himself. The nature of Scotus' own view will be discussed later.

44. Ibid., d. 11, q. 3, fol. 55G: Sicut in naturalibus non sunt plura ponenda quam ratio naturalis necessario convincit … quia pluralitas est superflua, ita in credibilibus non sunt ponenda plura quam convinci possit ex veritate creditorum. Si veritas Eucharistiae salvari potest sine ista transsubstantiatione, ergo etc.

45. Ibid., fol. 55H: … non magis repugnat substantiae esse simul cum substantia, quam cum quantitate illius substantiae.

46. The principle of parsimony extends to miracles: … ponenda sunt pauciora miracula quantum possible est.”

47. Note that this argument, like the others in this section, opposes a recognizably Thomistic argument.

48. Ibid., fol. 551: In creditis nobis secundum intellectum universalem traditis, non videtur ille modus determinandus, qui est difficilior ad intelligendum, et ad quem plura videntur sequi inconvenientia.

49. Ibid., fol. 55K: Et mirum videtur quare in uno articulo, qui non est principalis articulus fidei debeat talis intellectus asseri, propter quem fides pateat contemptui omnium sequentium rationem.

50. Ibid., fol. 56A: Nihil est tenendum tanquam de substantia fidei, nisi quod potest expresse haberi de scriptura vel expresse declaratum est per ecclesiam, vel evidenter sequitur ex aliquo plane contento in scriptura vel plane determinato ab ecclesia.

51. Ibid., fol. 56B-C.

52. Ibid., fol. 56E.

53. Ibid., fol. 56D.

54. Ibid., fol. 56. These arguments are the same ones advanced by Aquinas in IV Sent., d. 11, q. 1, art. 1.

55. See M. de Gandillac in Histoire de l'Église, 13: Le Mouvement doctrinal de XI^eau XIV^esiècle (Paris, 1951), 373.

56. See Seeberg, Duns Scotus, 381.

57. IV Sent., d. 11, q. 3, fol. 561-K.

58. Ibid., fol. 56K: Ecclesia declaravit istum intellectum esse de veritate fidei in illo symbolo edito sub Innoc. tertio in concilio Lateranensi Firmitur credimus etc.

59. Ibid., fol. 57A: Et si queras quare voluit ecclesia eligere istum intellectum ita difficilem huius articuli, cum verba scripturae possent salvari secundum intellectum facilem, et veriorem secundum apparentiam de hoc articulo …

60. Ibid., fol. 57A: Dico quod eo spiritu expositae sunt scripturae quo conditae. Et ita supponendum est, quod ecclesia catholica eo spiritu exposuit, quo tradita est nobis fides. Spiritu scilicet veritatis edocta, et ideo hunc intellectum eligit, quia verus est. Non enim in potestate ecclesiae fuit facere istud verum vel non verum, sed Dei instituentis, sed intellectum a Deo traditum ecclesia explicavit directa in hoc ut creditur spiritu veritatis.

61. “De transsubstantiatione iuxta Ioannem Duns Scotum,” Antonianum, 5 (1930), 308. For a recent investigation of Scotus' views on the relation of tradition and scripture, see Eligius Buytaert, “Circa doctrinam Duns Scoti de traditione et de Scripturae sufficientia adnotationes,” Antonianum, 40 (1965), 346-62.

62. Ibia., d. 11, q. 1.

63. Ibid., fol. 53K: … transitio totalis substantiae in substantiam …

64. Ibid., fol. 531-K: Quicquid potest esse totaliter novum non repugnat sibi succedere alii, quod potest totaliter desinere esse … et per consequens hoc potest converti totaliter in illam, et ita transsubstantiari.

65. Ibid., d. 11, q. 3, fol. 57K.

66. Ibid., fol. 57G: … substantia est terminus ipsius transsubstantiationis secundo modo dictae, quia ipsa substantia succedit substantiae, non tamen habet esse substantiale novum, sed tantum praesentiam novam.

67. Duns now says that his distinction, employed with gusto against the Thomistic opinion in d. 10, q. 1, applies only to the first mode of transubstantiation.

68. Ibid., d. 11, q. 4, fol. 62B: … quod panis non annihilatur, vel quod est facilius, quod panis ista conversione non annihilatur.

69. In view of the arrangement of the arguments in this quaestio and the relation of some of these arguments to those used by Scotus himself in Quodl., q. 10 and the Reportata Parisiensia, liber IV, d. 11, q. 4, it is tempting to see the discussion of the Opus Oxoniense as a relatively late formulation incorporating former views, later refinements of these views and the final solution of the question in the light of the distinction between productive and adductive transubstantiation.

70. IV Sent., d. 11, q. 4, fol. 63A: … oportet quod desinat esse alia desitione, quae est a simpliciter esse eius ad simpliciter non esse eius …

71. Ibid., fol. 63A: … illud autem non esse eius, licet quasi concomitetur praesentiam corporis, ut hic, non tamen, ut terminum eiusdem generis …

72. Ibid., fol. 63B: … et per consequens si ista desitio secundum se considerata sit annihilatio, tamen nullo modo ista conversio est annihilatio.

73. He explicitly recognizes this fact. Ibid., fol. 63C: Potest ergo teneri tertium scilicet secundum membrum disiunctivae positae supra.

74. Storff, De natura transsubstantiationis iuxta I. Duns Scotum, 74.

75. See Lehrbuch der Dogmengeschichte, 3, 522-23; Duns Scotus, 382-83, 386-87, 393-94.

76. See Vellico, “De transsubstantiatione,” 323-31. Although the prehistory of Scotus' stand is of less concern in the present context, it might be observed in passing that, although Scotus' “weak” view of transubstantiation is a departure from trends inherited from the late thirteenth century, it would seem to fall within the limits of orthodoxy recognized by some important earlier authorities. See Petrus Lombardus, IV Sent., d. 11, p. 1, cap. 2; Innocentius III, Mysteriorum evangelicae legis et sacramenti eucharistiae libri sex, liber IV, cap. 20, in PL 217, 870-71.

77. Quaestiones super quartum librum sententiarum (MS., Holy Name College, Washington, D.C.), d. 11, q. 3.

78. In libros sententiarum opus, IV, d. 11, q. 4.

79. In the Opus Oxoniense it is the second possible solution to be considered and rejected. See d. 11, q. 4, fol. 62E-G.

80. Praeclarissima … scripta … Francisci de Mayronis in quatuor libros sententiarum (Venice, 1520), liber IV, d. 11, q. 20.

81. Ad primum dico quod verum est si sit deductum ad nihil quod non est in ordine ad aliud. Et per idem ad alia argumenta potest responderi; quia igitur deus ordinavit desinitionem istius panis esse ad alium terminum non apparet alius modus melior per quem salvetur quod non sit annihilatio. Qui potest capere, capiat.

82. Super 4 libros sententiarum, liber IV, q. 4 in Opera Plurima (London, 1962), 4.

83. Ibid., q. 7: … transsubstantiatio … est successio substantiae ad substantiam desinentem esse simpliciter in se sub aliquibus accidentibus propriis substantie precedentis.

84. Ibid., q. 6.

85. Ibid., q. 6. Ockham observes that annihilation is quite acceptable as long as one does not take it to mean that the bread is reduced to non-being without being converted into anything else.

86. The committee preferred to see annihilation as opposed to transubstantiation. See David Burr, “Ockham, Scotus and the Censure at Avignon,” Church History, 37 (1968), 144-59.

87. Petri Lombardi iu sententias theologicas commentariorum libri IIII (Venice, 1571), liber IV, d. 11, q. 1. The translation does not entirely do justice to the Latin, which is as follows: Advertendum est quod cum inter omnia miracula quae continet fides nostra istud sit unum de maximis, sc. quod corpus Christi manens caelo localiter et circumscriptive sit simul in hoc sacramento, non est intentionis nostrae dare modum evidentiae per quem hoc possit fieri quia hoc est super omnem humanum intellectum cuiuslibet viatoris, sed intendimus solum dare modum persuasibilem per quem aliqualiter manducamur in illud quod tradit fides de hoc sacramento, et illud quod tenet ecclesia de modo existentiae corporis Christi in ipso. Nec glorietur aliquis si sciat arguere contra modum quem intendimus ponere, quia facillimum est impugnare per humanam rationem, et Philosophiam ea quae sunt fidei et omnes modos declarantes fidem, et difficillimum est, et forte impossibile est evidenter omnes tales impugnationes solvere; ut ostensum fuit I lib. super prologum sententiarum. Sed cui non placuerit ille modus quem ponere intendimus studeat alium ponere et sciat quod forte patietur tot vel plures calumnias quam noster. Nec sufficiat alicui dicere in generali quod est alius modus, quamvis nobis incognitus et occultus; quia hoc posset dicere quilibet idiota et ignarus. The passage is not without its irony, since Durandus, no stranger to censures himself, served on the papal commission that censured Ockham.