SOURCE: "Dewey's Psychology," in Guide to the Works of John Dewey, edited by Jo Ann Boydston, Southern Illinois University Press, 1970, pp. 1-14.

[In the following essay, Schneider presents an overview of Dewey's writings on the various aspects of human psychology.]

During his years as a student under George Sylvester Morris, from 1882 to 1886, John Dewey thought of psychology not as a science but as a philosophical method and "standpoint." In part, his studies in Vermont, the influence of Coleridge and the writings of the romantic idealists, and in part, the systematic version of this standpoint as it took shape in the mind of Morris led Dewey to believe that for a "critical" understanding of life-mind-nature as an organic whole, it was necessary to show the identity of psychological, logical, and ontological procedure. Morris had conceived such a "dynamic idealism" as a more adequate "experimental" method than the methods of British Empiricism, which had reduced the idealizing functions of mind to a "hard concretion in the sphere of actual particular fact."¹ The "psychological standpoint" would liberate philosophy and philosophical imagination so that it could "freely work .. . to reach certain intellectual ends."²

Morris, under whom Dewey did his Ph.D. research at Johns Hopkins, had worked out this standpoint during his studies in Germany under Adolf Trendelenburg and Hermann Ulrici. Trendelenburg had worked out a biological and Aristotelian reformulation of Hegel's theory of the objectification of mind. He conceived mind as constructive movement (konstruktive Bewegung) in the context of natural activity (Aktivität) conceived as the process of living, and had applied this philosophy to knowing, willing, and feeling by making the category of purpose (Zweck) basic for both organic and logical analysis. Ulrici had applied this general method to the interpreta--on of religious experience and to problems of pedagogy. Morris's version of this philosophical psychology and psychological philosophy reads as follows:

[The method in which the British Empiricists] put all their trust, and which they style "experimental" is . . . abstract, partial, incomplete, and not commensurate with the whole nature and content of experience; requiring, therefore, to be supplemented by a larger and more liberal, but not less strictly scientific, method, which is not unknown to philosophy and which, not being arbitrarily conceived and forcibly imposed on experience but simply founded in and dictated by the recognition of experience in its whole nature, is alone entitled to be termed fully and without qualification "experimental."

The science of knowledge has nothing to do with unknowable objects. It has no ground on which to posit their existence. It has positive ground for absolutely denying their existence, for knowing that they do not exist. . . . The phenomenal object is not a veil or screen effectually to shut out from us the sight of the noumenal object. Nor is the former separated from the latter by an impassable interval. On the contrary, to thought it instrumentally reveals the true object.

In other words, that is which is known. Knowledge and being are correlative terms. When we know therefore what is the true object of knowledge, we know what is the final and absolute significance of the terms being and reality.³

Dewey's researches as a student, culminating in his doctor's dissertation in 1884 on "The Psychology of Kant" and in his paper on "Knowledge and the Relativity of Feeling"⁴ were preoccupied with a criticism of British Empiricism and of Kant's contrast between feeling and knowing. But when he went in 1884 to the University of Michigan as Instructor under Morris⁵ he cooperated with his teacher in developing the more positive and philosophical aspects of this psychology, which came to be known as "dynamic idealism."

In his articles in Mind in 1886⁶ Dewey referred to "known objects" as "objective consciousness." This use of "consciousness" was attacked at once by Shadworth Hodgson, to whom Dewey replied as best he could, but he was evidently finding it difficult to justify such language and method as empirical and experimental.

Meanwhile, in 1883, Dewey at Johns Hopkins had become acquainted with the more recent trends in experimental psychology as represented by G. Stanley Hall, and had read a paper at a meeting of the Metaphysical Club (presumably in the presence of G. Stanley Hall) on "The New Psychology," later published in the Andover Review.⁷ On this occasion he discussed "the bearings of the theory of evolution on psychology" and in general showed that he was trying to adapt his ideas and expressions to a more naturalistic biology and to shift his conception of psychology as the philosophical standpoint of "objective consciousness" to that of an experimental science.

Arrived at Michigan in 1884, Dewey devoted himself to developing the "newer" psychology in the framework of an ethics of dynamic idealism. A few references to the Psychology and to its 1891 revisions will indicate some of the attempts to bring his science up to date. His first revisions in content, for the 1889 printing, centered in an improved analysis of sensation. The more philosophical changes in his revisions for the 1891 printing reveal that the author's thinking was already moving beyond the idealistic theory of self-realization to which his ethical theory was devoted. The reader should consult the context out of which these references are taken if he wishes to get the evidence for the emergence, even in these oldfashioned pages, of doctrines which transformed his theory of mind from "idealization" to "reconstruction," and from "objectification" to "adjustment."⁸

Retention: Retention is the process by which external, actually-existing material is wrought over into the activities of self, and thus rendered internal or ideal. (1887)

Conception: The conception, like every other mental content, is particular in its existence. . . . It is only its meaning that is universal. . . . What is experienced is only the symbolic quality of the image. (1887)

Compare the revision in 1891:

... as to its existence, every idea must be particular and have more or less sensuous detail. But it is not the existence that we mean by concept. The concept is the power, capacity, or function of the image or train of images to stand for some mode of mental action, and it is the mode of action which is general (p. 179).

Judgment: A judgment expressed in language takes the form of a proposition. . . . [It] may either idealize a real thing, by stating its meaning, or it may, so to say, realize an idea by asserting that it is one of the universe of objects. As matter of fact, it always does both. (1887)

Truth: Truth is but another name for intelligence. . . . [It is] not only harmony with all intelligences, but harmony with the universal working of one's own intelligence. (1887)

Compare the revision in 1889:

The mind always tests the truth of any supposed fact by comparing it to the acquired system of truth . . . if there is irreconcilable conflict, one or the other must be false. . . . The worth of the criterion will evidently depend upon the degree in which the intelligence has been realized and knowledge acquired (p. 190).

Reasoning: There is no such thing as purely immediate knowledge. Any cognition is dependent; that is, it is because of some other cognition (p. 192).

Process of Mind in Knowledge: Fact and law cannot be regarded as anything except two ways of looking at the same content. . . . Each of these functions is an abstraction; in actual knowledge we always identify and distinguish. . . . All actual knowledge proceeds from the individual to the individual (p. 199).

Will: What gives the conflict of desires its whole meaning is that it represents the man at strife with himself. He is the opposing contestants as well as the battle-field. . . . The process of choice is that process by which some one of the conflicting desires is first isolated and then identified with the self to the exclusion of others. . . . Choice is the identification with self of a certain desire (p. 314). We realize the self only by satisfying it in the infinite variety of concrete ways. . . . The self is the end, because it is the organic unity of these various aspects of self-realization (p. 319). The whole process is will (p. 328). The process of our actual life is simply that by which will gives itself definite manifestation, bodies itself forth in objective form. Just what will is, we can tell only so far as it has thus realized itself (p. 330). A man's will is himself (p. 345). Character is the will changed from a capacity into an actuality (p. 352).

The need for reconstructing his psychology more radically did not become critical until 1893 when he began to see that a new ethics as well as a new psychology was forming. In 1893 when Dewey was preparing to get out a revised edition of his 1891 Outlines of a Critical Theory of Ethics, in which the language of the Psychology had been retained, the old bottles burst, and in 1894 when he published the small Study of Ethics: A Syllabus, he explained that the new work was "in no sense a second edition of the previous book." It laid the foundation for his own philosophy and his own terminology.

Dewey's interest and competence in psychology continued to develop throughout his life, and all his works reflect this development. But he abandoned the writing and amending of a textbook on psychology after 1891. Several years after the American Book Company took over the printing of the book, its Editor-in-Chief wrote to Harry Ambrose, then president of the company, "Dewey's Psychology: A revision of this book means entirely rewriting it, and when I last wrote to Dr. Dewey on the subject he was not ready to undertake the job."⁹ Once, during Dewey's years in Chicago, a friend asked him for information about a certain small college in Michigan. Dewey replied that he knew little about it except that "it is benighted enough still to be using my Psychology as a text."

Two radical developments in his thinking during the years 1893 to 1896 gave to Dewey's psychology a new significance and direction. One found expression in his paper presented to the Herbart Society in 1895 at Jacksonville, Illinois, on "Interest as Related to Training of the Will" (published in the Society's Year Book for 1895). The other was published as an article in The Psychological Review in July 1896, under the title "The Reflex Arc Concept in Psychology." Both essays have been reprinted several times and remain basic expositions of Dewey's contributions to psychology.

The idealistic theory of self-realization through the mediation of desires by the will, with which Dewey had struggled, was now transformed by the theory that the self is the organization of interests. The substitution of "interests" for "desires" enabled Dewey to revise his theory of motivation and emotion in terms of Darwinian biology and social psychology. Interests are not "subjective" feelings or desires, but patterns of overt activity that are objectively directed and socially interrelated. Dewey emphasized these points in his 1894 Syllabus: "Interest is active, projective . . . implies an object—the end, or thought, which claims attention, . . . dominates activity, . . . implies the relation .. . to character, . . . expresses the identification of the object with the subject" (p. 54).¹⁰ The educational implications of this psychological insight for the theories of effort and discipline became obvious at once to Dewey and led directly to his own dominant interest in experimental schools and socialized schoolrooms.

His revision of the reflex-arc concept led directly to his "experimental logic." Developing the psychology which he discovered in William James's treatment of "conception," he pointed out that a response to a stimulus leads not merely to a decision that re-directs activity but also to a re-construction of the environment or the stimulating situation, which reconstruction makes a difference in future stimuli. The human art of adapting the environment to the organism as well as the organism to the environment gave Dewey the psychological analysis that he needed for a general theory of the reconstructive power of intelligence. This reconstruction takes place both in the reformation of the habits and character of an individual and also in the reform of institutions. He now had a psychology that implied a philosophy of science, of education, and of democracy. The volumes that followed rapidly—School and Society, How We Think, Democracy and Education—gave systematic expression to his revision of the traditional reflex-arc concept and to his revision of motivation on the basis of interests.

Dewey had worked out this new psychology with the cooperation of George H. Mead and James H. Tufts. As a result, Dewey, during his years at Michigan and Chicago, relied on his two colleagues to develop the social aspects of the psychology while he concentrated on the psychology of intelligence in the individual organism, emphasizing its implications for the theory of knowledge and the self. He continued to use the term "experience" largely in relation to personal conduct and organic action, pointing out that he did not limit the concept to conscious experience nor to the process of experiencing to the exclusion of objects-experienced. His method was to insist on "activity" or "experience" as an operation that implied the co-operation of organism and environment. The separation of the subjective and the objective factors in this activity, as if only the organism were an agent, is useful and valid only for certain technical and subsidiary operations (logical), and is false or arbitrary if interpreted as a presupposition of psychological science. For this reason Dewey became a leader in advocating "behavioral" methods in the human sciences.

The only attempt Dewey made to formulate such a behavioral psychology systematically in both its individual and social aspects was in his Human Nature and Conduct (1922). In the Preface he stated the theme of this volume concisely:

The book does not purport to be a treatment of social psychology. But it seriously sets forth a belief that an understanding of habit and of different types of habit is the key to social psychology, while the operation of impulse and intelligence gives the key to individualized mental activity. But they are secondary to habit so that mind can be understood in the concrete only as a system of beliefs, desires, and purposes which are formed in the interaction of biological aptitudes with a social environment.¹¹

The three parts of the work ("Habit," "Impulse," "Intelligence") were designed to shift the emphasis from the then popular preoccupation in social psychology and ethics with human nature, instincts, moral sentiments and values. Dewey regarded custom and habit as more significant environmental factors than "herd instincts" and universal "drives." Human nature, he thought, is an unorganized mass of reflexes and impulses, which are shaped by custom, habit, institutions, rather than by an order of nature. The changes in the cultural environment necessitate continual re-constructions of habits and impulses through intelligent "deliberation." In the course of such deliberation, ends, values, and ideals are also reformed.

Dewey was thus prepared to accept the growing emphasis in psychology on unconscious factors in motivation. He was especially interested in the discoveries of the physiologists concerning the important functions of the autonomic nervous system, and he discussed critically Sherrington's thesis that the central nervous system is at the service of the autonomic system. He regarded this thesis as an exaggeration, on the ground that no part of man's natural endowment determines fixed ends or values beyond conscious control. For the same reasons he was ready to accept the findings of clinical psychiatry, but rejected the "metaphysical" concepts and construction of the Freudian theory of the subconscious, which he regarded as an inheritance from Schopenhauer's romantic theory of the will. Dewey continued to believe that conflicts tended to generate conscious emotions and that intelligent analysis of the tensions could "sublimate" the emotions into effective interests.

The problem for social psychology that emerged in Human Nature and Conduct was that the analysis of the socalled "interaction" between human nature and cultural habits and customs made it increasingly difficult to give a precise content to the natural or inherited endowment of the organism. It became fashionable among social psychologists to read into human nature a variety of instincts ("herd," "moral," "religious," "imitative," etc.) that were clearly in part cultural acquisitions. It was necessary to make a more careful and physiological examination of the distinction between biological and cultural "inheritance." In Dewey's own interests and method, attention shifted from the analysis of will or of impulses as elements of human nature to an analysis of social behavior. From the beginning of his emphasis on "psychological method in philosophy" it was evident that for Dewey psychology was the handmaiden of ethics and logic; and the problem of "self-realization" was something he had "inherited" from the idealists. He now consciously subordinated psychology to more general methods and problems of human existence as it was exhibited in politics, art, labor, and in human relations generally; his philosophy became intimately associated with the social sciences and cultural anthropology. Accordingly, the problems of self-realization became also problems of cultural reconstruction. He summed up this situation by saying that "what passed as psychology was a branch of political doctrine,"¹² and in more detail:

Any movement purporting to discover the psychological causes and sources of social phenomena is in fact a reverse movement, in which current social tendencies are read back into the structure of human nature; and are then used to explain the very things from which they are deduced. . . . Love of power is put forward to play the role taken a century ago by self-interest. . . . What are called motives turn out upon critical examination to be complex attitudes patterned under cultural conditions, rather than simple elements in human nature.¹³

For this reason the further developments in Dewey's psychology will appear best where they should appear in this Guide, as aspects of broader problems and other sciences. But it may be well to extract from the other chapters a summary statement of the general features of Dewey's later psychology.

In Experience and Nature he presented a general historical outline to emphasize the importance of the shift from the classical to the modern concept of mind. He pointed out that in the classical tradition mind and will were regarded as objective, cosmic entities, and that even in modern times this classic tradition was kept alive by the Cartesian doctrine of "thinking substance," by Spinoza's "conatus," and by the universalization of thought and will in the romantic philosophies of Schopenhauer and Nietzsche and in the Hegelian philosophy of history and Phänomenologie des Geistes. In reaction to such speculation, modern scientific psychology drifted into the opposite extreme of subjectivism, taking consciousness in individuals as the essence of mind. The social scientists were tempted to adopt one or the other of these extremes: thus, the Durkheim School interpreted the mind as a collective construct, while Bergson regarded the individual élan as a source of creative energy. Dewey conceived his own theory of mind as taking an intermediate position between these extremes: mind, self, and personality are active centers of reconstruction and find themselves realized in intelligent reform.

In his Logic he made continual reference to the process of inquiry and to the continuity not only between stimulus and responsive inquiry (which he had been emphasizing) but also between natural relationships or "connections" (to use his technical name for them) and the relations as they are logically formulated by language and conceptual thought.

His political writings and especially his Art as Experience led Dewey to explore the less cognitive dimensions of experience. In addition to the arts of intelligence and inquiry, he analyzed the arts of expression and of "impulsion." He realized that there is an important difference between the scattered raw material of innate impulses and reflexes and urges in human nature and the "impulsion" or propulsion and adventure in the world of objects that is exhibited by sustained imagination and self-expression. These psychical processes are also social and institutional, involving the mind not only in inquiry but also in enjoyments as they are found in the arts and crafts, in politics and sports. The relation of motivation to expression, and of both to culture became an increasing psychological problem to him, especially during the years of war, depression, and revolt. In such a context, he realized how absurd it is to speak of the environment as "external world." To use his own words (taken over in part from his friend Arthur F. Bentley):

The epidermis is only in the most superficial way an indication of where an organism ends and its environment begins. There are things inside the body that are foreign to it, and there are things outside of it that belong to it de jure, if not de facto. . . The need that is manifest in the urgent impulsions that demand completion through what the environment—and it alone—can supply, is a dynamic acknowledgment of this dependence of the self for wholeness upon its surroundings.... But the impulsion also meets many things on its outbound course that deflect and oppose it. In the process of converting these obstacles and neutral conditions into favoring agencies, the live creature becomes aware of the intent implicit in its impulsion. . . . The attitudes of the self are informed with meaning.¹⁴

Dewey developed in many new ways his central idea that the self is not to be conceived as a metaphysical agent but as an agency of responsibility. The problems of self-control over the imagination and other adventures of the mind in view of the demands made upon them by a particular "human situation" or crisis led Dewey to involve psychology and philosophy continually in "the problems of men" as these become urgent. His responsiveness to such problems and his conception of democratic selfgovernment and responsibility induced him to make continual applications of his psychology to a great variety of cultural problems and interests. He became irritated and worried when he witnessed the fashion among philosophers of dismissing such problems as not a philosopher's business. His activities during the last decades of his life gave eloquent testimony to his own character, for to him the critical concern about such problems was a most "consummatory experience."

These interests and insights led him to co-operate gladly with his friends, especially Albert C. Barnes and Arthur Bentley, and the editors of the New Republic, in the critical study of international relations, of the fine arts, and of the behavioral sciences.

During the final decade of his career Dewey was preoccupied with the theory of "transactional" activity which he and Arthur Bentley expounded in joint works. Bentley tried to push Dewey into an extreme behaviorist theory of knowledge. Dewey agreed that the usual conception of the "interaction" of organism and environment failed to do justice to his theory that "activity" is a single process of which organism and environment are merely factors; and he welcomed the term "transaction" as recognizing the "partnership." But he resisted Bentley's suggestion that the concept of "experience" is too ambiguous to be useful. Dewey concluded, on the contrary, that "human experience" in the broad, popular sense that implies nobody's private experience but rather a general process of learning, is still needed in both psychology and philosophy. In this sense, Dewey was quite content to abandon the traditional emphasis on "the subject" and "subjectivity" and to encourage Bentley's pan-objectivism. But he was less willing to agree to the Neo-Positivist doctrine that things are as they are said to be. He continued to the end to think of language as communication and of communication as a kind of manipulation of things for social purposes. This way of thinking about knowledge as endless "inquiry," without ever assuming that any discovery is final, was circumstantial evidence that for John Dewey the most "consummatory experience" or enjoyment was to let things be reconstructing themselves, including his own psychology.

NOTES

¹Psychology (The Early Works of John Dewey, 1882-1898, Vol. II [Carbondale: Southern Illinois University Press, 1967]), p. 175.

²Early Works, II, 175.

³ George S. Morris, Philosophy and Christianity (New York: Robert Carter and Bros., 1883), pp. 28, 44-45, 70.

⁴ "Knowledge and the Relativity of Feeling," in Early Works, I, 19-33.

⁵ For an excellent account of this Michigan period in Dewey's life and development, see George Dykhuizen, "John Dewey and the University of Michigan," Journal of the History of Ideas, XXIII (1962), 512-44.

⁶ "The Psychological Standpoint," Early Works, I, 122-43; "Psychology as Philosophic Method," ibid., 144-67.

⁷ "The New Psychology," Early Works, I, 48-60.

⁸ See Psychology (Early Works, II). All revisions are tabulated in the List of Emendations in the Copy-Text, pp. lix-lxxxvi. Page references are to the Early Works, II.

⁹ H. H. Vail, handwritten annual report (1906?), quoted by Mauck Brammer, letter of 21 May 1965.

¹⁰The Study of Ethics: A Syllabus (Ann Arbor: Register Publishing Co., 1894), p. 54.

¹¹Human Nature and Conduct (New York: Henry Holt and Co., 1922), p. iii.

¹²Freedom and Culture (New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1939), p. 29.

¹³Freedom and Culture, p. 108.

¹⁴Art as Experience (New York: Minton, Balch and Co., 1934), pp. 58-59. Dewey and Bentley had been discussing "the human epidermis" in connection with the "problem of the external world" before the publication of Art as Experience, but Bentley made the point emphatically in an amusing article, "The Human Skin: Philosophy's Last Line of Defense," Philosophy of Science, VIII (1941), 1-19.

CHECKLIST

"Knowledge and the Relativity of Feeling," in The Early Works of John Dewey, 1882-1898, Vol. I, pp. 19-33. Carbondale: Southern Illinois University Press, 1969.

"The New Psychology," in Early Works, I, 48-60.

"The Psychological Standpoint," in Early Works, I, 122-43.

"Psychology as Philosophic Method," in Early Works, I, 144-67.

Response by Shadworth Holloway Hodgson, "Illusory Psychology," in Early Works, I, xli-lvii.

Reply by Dewey, "Illusory Psychology," in Early Works, I, 168-75.

Psychology (The Early Works of John Dewey, 1882-1898, Vol. II). Carbondale: Southern Illinois University Press, 1967. cix, 366 pp.

"Speculative Psychology," [Prof. John Dewey, Feb. 23, 1887]. Class lecture notes, handwritten by C. E. Goddard, University of Michigan. 180 pp. [Michigan Historical Collections.]

"Professor [George T.] Ladd's Elements of Physiological Psychology," in Early Works, I, 194-204. [Review.]

"Knowledge as Idealization," in Early Works, I, 176-93.

"Galton's Statistical Methods," in The Early Works of John Dewey, 1882-1898, Vol. III, pp. 43-47. Carbondale: Southern Illinois University Press, 1969. [Review of Natural Inheritance by Francis Galton.]

"On Some Current Conceptions of the Term 'Self'," in Early Works, III, 56-74.

The Study of Ethics: A Syllabus. Ann Arbor: Register Publishing Co., 1894. iv, 151 pp. [2d ed., Ann Arbor: George Wahr, 1897. 144 pp.]

"The Psychology of Infant Language," Psychological Review, I (Jan. 1894), 63-66.

Review of The Psychic Factors of Civilization by Lester Frank Ward, Social Evolution by Benjamin Kidd, Civilization During the Middle Ages by George Burton Adams, and History of the Philosophy of History by Robert Flint, Psychological Review, I (July 1894), 400-411.

"The Theory of Emotion," I. Emotional Attitudes, Psychological Review, I (Nov. 1894), 553-69; II. The Significance of Emotions, ibid., II (Jan. 1895), 13-32.

The Psychology of Number and Its Applications to Methods of Teaching Arithmetic, with James Alexander McLellan (International Education Series, Vol. XXXIII, ed. William Torrey Harris). New York: D. Appleton and Co., 1895. xv, 309 pp.

Review by Henry Burchard Fine, Science, n.s. III (Jan. 1896), 134-36.

Reply by Dewey, "Psychology of Number," Science, n.s. III (Feb. 1896), 286-89.

Review of Johnson's Universal Cyclopœdia, I-V, Psychological Review, II (Mar. 1895), 186-88.

"Interest as Related to [Training of the] Will," in Second Supplement to the Herhart Year Book for 1895, pp. 209-46. Bloomington, Ill.: National Herbart Society, 1896. [Rev. ed., Chicago: The Society, 1899; reprinted in C-16, pp. 260-85, with the title "Interest in Relation to Training of the Will."]

"The Reflex Arc Concept in Psychology," Psychological Review, III (July 1896), 357-70. [Reprinted in C-7, pp. 233-48, with the title "The Unit of Behavior."]

Review of Studies in the Evolutionary Psychology of Feeling by Hiram Miner Stanley, Philosophical Review, V (May 1896), 292-99.

Educational Psychology: Syllabus of a Course of Twelve Lecture-Studies. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1896. 24 pp.

"The Psychology of Effort," Philosophical Review, VI (Jan. 1897), 43-56.

"Some Remarks on the Psychology of Number," Pedagogical Seminary, V (Jan. 1898), 426-34. (Reply to: Daniel Edward Phillips, "Number and Its Application Psychologically Considered," Pedagogical Seminary, V [Oct. 1897], 221-81.)

"Psychology and Philosophic Method," University [of California] Chronicle, II (Aug. 1899), 159-79. [Reprinted separately, Berkeley: University of California Press, 1899, 23 pp.; also reprinted in C-2, pp. 242-70, with the title "'Consciousness' and Experience."]

Mental Development. [Chicago], 1900. 21 pp., mimeographed.

"Psychology and Social Practice," Psychological Review, VII (Mar. 1900), 105-24; Science, n.s. XI (Mar. 1900), 321-33. [Reprinted separately as University of Chicago Contributions to Education, No. 2. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1901. 42 pp.]

"Interpretation of Savage Mind," Psychological Review, IX (May 1902), 217-30. [Reprinted in C-7, pp. 173-87.]

Review of Analytical Psychology by Lightner Witmer, School Review, X (May 1902), 412.

"Report on the Fairhope [Alabama] Experiment in Organic Education," Survey, XXXII (May 1914), 199.

Human Nature and Conduct. New York: Henry Holt and Co., 1922. [Enl. ed. with Foreword, New York: Modern Library, 1930. ix, vii, 336 pp. Also, Armed Forces ed. (from original plates), 1944.]

Experience and Nature (Lectures upon the Paul Carus Foundation, First Series). Chicago, London: Open Court Publishing Co., 1925. xi, 443 pp. [2d ed., with a Preface, New York: W. W. Norton, 1929. ix, 1a-4a, 1-443 pp. 3d. ed., LaSalle, Ill.: Open Court Publishing Co., 1958. xviii, 360 pp.]

"Foreword," in Human Nature and Conduct, pp. v-ix. New York: Modern Library, 1930.

"Marx Inverted," New Republic, LXX (Feb. 1932), 52. [Review of The Emergence of Man by Gerald Heard.]

Art as Experience. New York: Minton, Balch and Co., 1934. viii, 355 pp.

Freedom and Culture. New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1939. 176 pp.

John Dewey and Arthur F. Bentley: A Philosophical Correspondence, 932-1951, eds. Sidney Ratner and Jules Altman. New Brunswick, N.J.: Rutgers University Press, 1964. ["Means and Consequences—How, What, and What For," pp. 647-54, and "Importance, Significance and Meaning," pp. 655-68, are previously unpublished articles by Dewey.]