SOURCE: Lardinois, A.. “Characterization through Gnomai in Homer's Iliad.” Mnemosyne 53, no. 6 (December 2000): 641-61.

[In the following essay, Lardinois considers the characteristic use of gnomai (or wisdom-sayings similar to proverbs) by Achilles, Nestor, Odysseus, and the gods in the Iliad.]

Characterization in Homer is a controversial subject. For a long time scholars denied the possibility of any consistent characterization in Homer, believing the poems to be written by multiple authors, or perceiving the technique of oral composition or the state of the archaic Greek mind to be insurmountable obstacles.¹ Ulrich von Wilamowitz-Moellendorff, for example, claims that “to speak of a character of the Homeric Achilles or Odysseus at all is a piece of stupidity, as different poets conceive the same hero differently” (1912: 12), and Geoffrey Kirk maintains that “the depiction of the heroic character is limited both by the technique and aims of oral poetry and by the simplicity of heroic virtues and vices” (1962: 265).² Bruno Snell's influential study of the early Greek mind is largely responsible for the notion that Homer could not perceive of the ‘individual’, and although there is some truth to this idea—γνω̑θι σεαυτόν does not mean ‘know your inner self’ but ‘know that you are a mortal human being’ (Burkert 1985: 148)—, one should not go so far as to deny the archaic Greeks the possibility to distinguish between different human beings.³

More recently, the notion of character has been critiqued from a structuralist and semiotic perspective.⁴ I agree that Homer was, like the tragic poets, “concerned at least as much with the objective place of an act in the world, its relation to the human order of house and city or the divine order of the cosmos, as with the interior, mental processes of conflict and decision” (Segal 1981: 8), but this does not mean that figures in Homer cannot exhibit certain recognizable traits. Recent studies have convincingly shown that Homeric poetry is capable of creating distinctive characters, especially in the manner in which figures in the epic speak.⁵ In this paper I would like to examine the use of gnomai, or ‘wisdom sayings’, by three figures in the Iliad: Achilles, Nestor and Odysseus. I will argue that the different manners in which these figures use gnomai agree with other characteristics attributed to them in the epics and help to shape their characters. At the end of the article I will add some comments about the use of gnomai by the gods.

For my analysis of the use of gnomai in the Iliad I have adopted a model which the ethnolinguist Peter Seitel developed for the study of proverbs in their social contexts.⁶ Greek gnomai are not the same as proverbs, but they can be studied effectively in the same way, because both are general expressions applied to a particular situation. When we use a proverb like ‘a friend in need is a friend in deed’ in ordinary conversation, the saying always refers to a specific friend and a specific situation.⁷ The importance of the occasion for the understanding of ancient Greek gnomai is noted by Aristotle, who in his chapter on gnômologia in the Rhetoric observed that ‘people are pleased when they hear said in general terms things which they happened to have grasped before in the particular case’ (χαίρουσι δὲ καθόλου λεγομἐνων a κατὰ μἐροs προϋπολαμβάνοντεs τυγχάνουσιν).⁸ A Greek gnome, like a proverb, is a general expression that is applied to a particular case.

Seitel categorizes proverbs by their applicability to the speaker, the addressee, or a third person (defined as neither the speaker nor the addressee). He refers to these proverbs as first, second or third person sayings, which may be singular or plural.⁹ These designations have nothing to do with grammatical numbers, but refer to the person or persons described by the saying. Thus, according to Seitel's model, a proverb that applies to the speaker is a first person saying, one that applies to the addressee is a second person saying, and a proverb that applies to a third person, either present or absent, is a third person saying. The same proverb can be used in all these different applications.¹⁰

Seitel further observed that second person sayings (that is, sayings that apply to the addressee) generally are restricted to persons in a position of authority, while the other two types of sayings, the first and third person sayings, are employed more freely.¹¹ A survey of the use of gnomai in the Iliad reveals a similar pattern. Of the forty-three second person gnomai in the Iliad, thirty-four are spoken by persons in a clear position of authority over their addressee, as in the case of commanders speaking to their troops, parents to their children, older men to younger men, or gods to humans.¹² The remaining cases may be explained by plausible sub-hypotheses. A speaker may, for example, ignore the rule that social equals are not supposed to address one another with second person gnomai in order to insult the addressee, thus suggesting, in effect, that he or she is a social inferior. Patroclus, for example, uses a second person gnome at Iliad 16.630 when ‘reprimanding’ (ἐνἐνιπε, 626) his fellow Greek warrior Meriones.

The use of first and third person gnomai, which are applicable to the speaker or a third person respectively, is much less restricted. Any speaker may use them, even in addressing a social superior, and they are, as a result, sometimes manipulated in order to say something about the addressee, thus operating in effect as second person sayings. This is nicely illustrated by Raymond Firth in his study of Proverbs in Native Life, with Special Reference to those of the Maori (1926). One of the Maori leaders of the Waikato tribe in New Zealand told his source: “When one of the people of the village will not do his fair share of the common work … we say at meal time so that he can overhear us: ‘It is but a waste of our victuals to give them to pot-bellied Whata-iwi’ (a figurative name)”, or when a greedy person would pick all the tasty morsels from the food baskets, “one would remark to another in a loud voice: ‘Awhato kai paenga’ (‘The grub eats around the edges of the leave’)”.¹³ In this case the Maori speakers switch addressee in order to say something indirectly to the offender.

I have identified five types of indirect second person gnomai in the Iliad: a ‘first person plural/indirect second person gnome’ (an indirect statement about the addressee that takes the form of a first person plural saying), a ‘first person singular/indirect second person gnome’ (an indirect statement about the addressee that takes the form of a first person singular saying), a ‘third person/indirect second person gnome’ (an indirect statement about the addressee that takes the form of a third person saying, singular or plural), an ‘indirect second person gnome with substitute speaker’ (an indirect statement about the addressee that is put in the mouth of another speaker), and an ‘indirect second person gnome with substitute addressee’ (an indirect statement about the addressee that is spoken to another person, like the Maori proverbs quoted above).¹⁴ We will see that Odysseus is particularly fond of using such indirect second person gnomai, but first I will analyze the use of gnomai by Achilles and Nestor.

1. ACHILLES

Achilles generally uses straightforward first person singular gnomai, applicable to himself, not only in his long speech to the assembly, but also, for example, at 16.52-53 (Achilles to Patroclus about himself) and 18.328 (Achilles to Myrmidons).¹⁵ Not only these gnomai, but his similes and indirect second person gnomai generally take the form of first person singular sayings as well: in total, fourteen out of the twenty-one gnomai that he speaks in the Iliad are first person singular.¹⁶ They show Achilles' preoccupation with himself and his standing in the world, although the fact that he is the main hero of the poem could play a role as well: Odysseus, who, as we shall see, in the Iliad speaks mostly complicated indirect second person sayings, uses a great number of first person gnomai in the Odyssey.¹⁷ Achilles' first person gnomai sometimes echo those of the narrator, for example at Iliad 18.328, where Achilles says that he had tried to keep Patroclus safe, but that ‘Zeus does not bring to accomplishment all thoughts of men’ (ἀλλ' οὐ Zεὺs ἄνδρεσσι νοήματα πάντα τελευτa). At Iliad 16.688, the narrator comments similarly that Patroclus would not have been killed if he had heeded Achilles' advice, but that ‘the mind of Zeus is always stronger than that of men’ (ἀλλ' αἰεί τε Διὸs κρείσσων νόοs ἠἐ περ ἀνδρω̑ν). Some of Achilles' other first person gnomai express the same reservations about the war and the heroic ideal that recent commentators have detected in the narrator's comments.¹⁸ There is some evidence that the poet/performers of epic like to identify themselves with the main hero of the story, and it could be argued that in the cases of these gnomai too the poet speaks through the voice of Achilles.¹⁹

Achilles does not voice only first person sayings, however. In two instances he uses a second person gnome while speaking to his Trojan opponents: 20.198 (to Aeneas) and 21.184-85 (to Asteropaios). These cases violate the rule that appropriately only social inferiors are to be addressed by second person gnomai and demonstrate another side of Achilles' character: his uncontrollable anger.²⁰ I remarked above that second person sayings, which are directly applicable to the speaker, are usually spoken by persons in positions of authority over the addressee, such as commanders to their troops, but that they can also be used in angry speeches between social equals. Achilles, of course, has no real authority over his Trojan opponents, but he addresses them with a second person gnome in order to insult them. In the case of Aeneas, Achilles not only addresses a very insulting second person saying to him (ῥεχθὲν δἐ τε νήπιοs ἔγνω, 20.198), but he pretends also to give him an order (κελεύω) in line 196.²¹ Aeneas cites Achilles' speech in 20.178-98 as an example of the kind of insults exchanged by women, ‘who when they have grown angry in soul-devouring strife revile one another in the middle of the street with words true and false. Their anger is in control.’²² The last half line (χόλοs δἐ] τε καὶ τὰ κελεύει, 20.255b) is a fitting description of Achilles' disposition in the poem. This line echoes, among many other passages in the poem, Calchas' gnome in 1.80-83: κρείσσων γὰρ βασιλεὺs ὅτε χώσεται ἀνδρὶ χἐρηϊ· / εἴ περ γάρ τε χόλον γε καὶ αὐτη̑μαρ καταπἐψῃ, / ἀλλά τε καὶ μετόπισθεν ἔχει κότον, ὄφρα τελἐ σσῃ, / ἐν στήθεσσιν ἑοι̑σι.²³ The phrase ‘soul-devouring strife’ (ἔριs θυμοβόροs) is used also of the quarrel between Achilles and Agamemnon (19.58).

Two more exceptions to the rule that Achilles' gnomai generally refer to himself, are the first and the last gnomai in the Iliad, both spoken by Achilles. Achilles addresses the first gnome in the Iliad to Agamemnon when urging him to consult a seer, priest or dream-interpreter about the pestilence that sweeps through the camp: ‘for even a dream comes from Zeus’ (καὶ γάρ τ' ὄναρ ἐκ Διόs ἐστιν, 1.63), Achilles tells him. This saying seems straightforward, until one realizes that it challenges the authority of Agamemnon. The authority of a king (and of Agamemnon) comes ‘from Zeus’ as well (cf. 1.278, 2.197, 2.204-05; Hes. Th. 96: ἐκ δὲ Διὸs βασιλη̑εs), and Achilles seems to suggest, however indirectly, that the army should stop listening to Agamemnon and instead turn to dreams (and dream-interpreters) which come ‘from Zeus.’ This saying points also to the larger issue of the omnipotence of Zeus, whose divine will caused the strife between Achilles and Agamemnon (1.5), and it foreshadows Zeus' deception of Agamemnon in Book 2.

The last gnome in the Iliad comes after two ‘first person plural/indirect second person’ gnomai directed at Priam (24.524 and 525-26). This type of gnome, which applies to the speaker and the addressee, is the preferred form among social equals and friends in the Iliad (the Greek and Trojan heroes among themselves),²⁴ and Achilles' use of this form signals, or confirms, that his anger toward the Trojans has subsided and that he is even willing now to consider Priam his friend. Achilles continues by telling Priam that ‘there are two urns from which Zeus gives mankind evils or blessings, and to whom he gives a mingled lot, that man meets now with evil, now with good, but to whom he gives only of pains, that man is cursed and evil hunger drives him over the face of the earth and he wanders honored neither by gods nor mortals.’²⁵ Achilles applies this extended saying first to his father Peleus (os μὲν καὶ Πηλη̑ϊ θεοὶ δόσαν, 534) and next to Priam (καὶ σὲ γἐρον, 543), pointing out that each of them received a mixed lot. Yet, because Achilles' gnomai so often reflect his own situation and because the previous two are applied to himself as well as to Priam, the reader/listener is perhaps encouraged to ask what kind of lot Achilles himself has received. This gnome is, in its immediate context, both third and second person (applying to both Peleus and Priam), but in the larger context of the story, it is first person.²⁶ It aptly describes the mixture of glory and pain Achilles receives in the epic.

2. NESTOR

Many scholars have noted Nestor's extensive use of gnomic expressions and paradigmatic tales. (Similes and paradigmatic tales are used in very much the same way as gnomai.) In the past, critics have viewed these digressions either as the work of a bad interpolator or as a sign of geriatric loquacity,²⁷ but a better understanding of Homeric poetics and comparisons with other oral cultures have revealed that Nestor in fact embodies the most esteemed manner of speaking in the epic.²⁸ This is clear from the moment Nestor is first introduced in the Iliad: he is said to be a ‘sweet-worded’ and ‘clear-voiced’ speaker, ‘from whose tongue flowed speech sweeter than honey.’²⁹ The only other speakers in epic poetry to receive the epithet ἡδυεπήs are the Muses.³⁰

Nestor is throughout the epic tradition most famous for the advice that he gives. In the Odyssey Athena, in the guise of Mentes, tells Telemachus ‘first to go to Pylus and to question noble Nestor’ (Od. [Odyssey] 1.284), while in the Cypria Menelaus apparently goes to Pylus to consult Nestor about the expedition against Troy (Proclus p. 103 Allen). Twice in the Iliad we are told that Nestor's council always appears the best,³¹ and in Book 11, the narrator tells us that after the sack of Tenedos the Greeks gave the girl Hecamede to him, ‘because in council he was always the best of all’ (οὕνεκα βουλῃ̑ ἀριστεύεσκεν ἁπάντων, 11.627). Most of Nestor's speeches, both public and private, are indeed advice speeches in the Iliad. They contain thirteen gnomai, of which no less than ten are direct second person.³² By comparison, only three of the twelve gnomai spoken by Agamemnon are second person sayings.³³ This simple statistic indicates with whom the real authority in the Greek camp resides. This authority is marked not so much by the amount of gnomai Nestor speaks, which is just one more than Agamemnon, but by the particular form they take: his gnomai are for the most part second person sayings which apply directly to the addressee and are therefore considered authoritative speech.

Nestor's authority rests primarily on his old age, which is the second thing we hear about him in the Iliad: he has outlived already two generations of men and now rules among a third.³⁴ According to Aristotle, experience or empeiria was essential to anyone who wanted to speak in gnomai or tell stories (Rhet. 1395a3-4). It also forms the basis of Nestor's wisdom and allows him to speak ‘wisely’ (ἐὺ φρονἐων, 1.253).³⁵ At least in one case the poet tells us that Nestor is able to produce a paradeigma (4.308-09) to arouse the troops, because ‘he knew well the battles of old.’³⁶ He has the same reputation in the Odyssey, where Nestor is said to be ‘wise in much wisdom of old’ (παλαιά τε πολλά τε εἰδώs, 24.51) and to know ‘judgment and wisdom beyond all others,’ because he ruled already three generations of men.³⁷ He tells Telemachus two direct second person paradeigmata (Od. 3.103 ff., 254 ff.), and ‘orders’ (κἐλομαι, 3.317) him to go to Menelaus. Later Telemachus says to Penelope that Nestor treated him ‘like a father does his son’ (ὡs εἴ τε πατὴρ ἑὸν υἱόν, Od. 17.111).³⁸

Not all of Nestor's wisdom expressions are direct second person statements, however. At Iliad 4.320, he successfully defends himself with a first person/indirect second person gnome against Agamemnon's suggestion that his old age has crippled him.³⁹ At 11.801, he speaks a third person gnome, which also applies to his addressee, to back up his proposal that Patroclus should fight in Achilles' place, and at 14.63 he uses a first person plural/indirect second person gnome, in effect to refer to himself.⁴⁰ It is important to point out that persons in a position of authority over the addressee, such as Nestor, do have the choice of either exercising this authority, by speaking direct second person gnomai, or of resorting to indirect statements instead, in order to express themselves more subtly. Nestor can be very subtle both in his use of gnomai and in his use of paradigmatic tales.⁴¹

3. ODYSSEUS

Odysseus is most famous for his trickery, and this reputation is confirmed by the way he speaks.⁴² As Richard Martin remarks: “If Nestor succeeds as a speaker because he has authority …, Odysseus gets along and survives through a Hermes-like shiftiness” (1989: 120). Almost every gnome Odysseus speaks in the Iliad is highly complex. He has the uncanny ability to present a saying as applicable to one person, but at the same time have it refer to another person as well. In Book 2, for example, when the army runs to the ships and threatens to leave for home, he warns his fellow chieftains that ‘proud is the heart of kings, fostered by Zeus, and his honor comes from Zeus and wise Zeus loves him.’⁴³ The implication of this saying is that the Greek commanders should obey their leader and stop running away. This is not said directly, however, but only implied. Furthermore, while the preceding lines clearly show that Odysseus applies this gnome primarily to Agamemnon, whose mind the Greek commanders misjudged and who may become angry with them (2.192-95), his words could carry still another meaning, namely that his fellow chieftains, who are after all basileis as well, should be careful not to jeopardize their own honor.⁴⁴

Another example is 19.162-70. Here Odysseus speaks an extended double gnome to Achilles about a man not being able to fight without having eaten, ‘not even when eager for battle’:

οὐ γὰρ ἀνὴρ πρόπαν ἣμαρ ἐs ἠἐλιον καταδύντα
ἄκμηνοs σίτοιο δυνήσεται ἄντα μάχεσθαι ·
εἴ περ γὰρ θυμἳ̑ γε μενοινάᾳ πολεμίζειν,
ἀλλά τε λάθρῃ γυι̑α βαρύνεται, ἠδὲ κιχάνει
δίψα τε καὶ λιμόs, βλάβεται δἐ τε γούνατ' ἰόντι.
ὃs δἐ κ' ἀνὴρ οἴνοιο κορεσσάμενοs καὶ ἐδωδη̑s
ἀνδράσι δυσμενἐεσσι πανημἐ]ριοs πολεμίζῃ,
θαρσαλἐον νύ οἱ ἣτορ ἐνὶ φρεσίν, οὐδἐ τι γυι̑α
πρὶν κάμνει, πρὶν πάνταs ἐρωη̑σαι πολἐμοιο.

Odysseus applies these two gnomai to the army in statements preceding and following these lines, but, as several commentators have noted, he really wishes to persuade Achilles to eat.⁴⁵ Both 2.196-97 and 19.162-70 are examples of third person sayings which apply indirectly to the addressee as well, and, indeed, Odysseus has a virtual monopoly on this type of saying in the Iliad.⁴⁶ At 2.284 ff. he cites three gnomai about the army (2.291, 292-94 and 297-98), which, however, apply just as well to their commander and Odysseus' addressee, Agamemnon. One could even argue that the two gnomai he speaks at 11.408-10 pertain both to himself and to his addressee, which in this case is his own thumos.

Odysseus uses several other types of gnomic address that are upon close inspection highly complex. At 2.204-06, following his rebuke of the commanders of the Greek army, he orders the common soldiers to sit down and addresses them with a direct second person saying, as befits a commander talking to his troops. He tells the soldiers that ‘many-masters are not good’ (οὐκ ἀγαθὸν πολυκοιρανίη, 204a). He seemingly combines this second person saying with a ‘third person/indirect second person’ saying, his trade-mark, telling them to ‘let there be one master, one king, to whom the son of crooked-minded Cronus has given the scepter and judgments so that he may counsel the others’ (εῒs κοίρανοs ἔστω, /εῒs βασιλεύs, oδω̑κε Κρόνου πάϊs ἀγκυλομήτεω / σκη̑πτρόν τ' ἠδὲ θἐμισταs, ἵνα σφίσι βουλεύῃσι, 204b-06). Ostensibly, this saying refers to Agamemnon, the supreme commander of the army, but immediately following the gnome the narrator says that Odysseus himself ‘took masterfully charge of the host’ (ἐs ὅ γε κοιρανἐων δίεπε στρατόν, 2.207).⁴⁷ Odysseus is also the one who, at this point in the narrative, holds the king's scepter and counsels the army (after Agamemnon's disastrous attempt). As usual, there are many layers to Odysseus' pronouncements.

In Iliad Book 9, as one of the ambassadors to Achilles, Odysseus cites the authority of Peleus in order to persuade Achilles that ‘gentlemindedness is better’ (φιλοφροσύνη γὰρ ἀμείνων, 9.256).⁴⁸ Somewhat earlier in the same speech he uses a gnomic saying whose referent is ambiguous. He tells Achilles that if the Greeks are defeated by the Trojans, he shall feel sorrow and ‘there is no remedy to be found as a cure once the evil is done,’⁴⁹ which seems to imply that it is Achilles' sorrow for which there will be no cure. He then proceeds, however, by saying that Achilles should ward off the day of evil from the army before it is too late, thus suggesting that he is concerned about the army's sorrow.⁵⁰ In the first instance the gnome would be a (socially unacceptable) direct second person address; in the other case it would be a harmless third person remark about the army. Achilles is well aware of the duplicity of Odysseus' remarks. He answers him by saying: ‘Zeus-born son of Laërtes, Odysseus of many wiles [!], one must verily speak one's words outright,’⁵¹ and a little later in the same speech he remarks that ‘hateful in my eyes is that man as the gates of Hades, who hides one thing in his mind and says another.’⁵²

Odysseus seems similarly to toy with the inappropriateness of a second person address in 19.182-83. Here at the end of a polite speech to Achilles, in which he urges him to eat a little (see above) and to accept Agamemnon's gifts, Odysseus turns to Agamemnon and tells him that ‘it is no cause of indignation for a king to make amends to a man when one first became angry.’⁵³ Most interesting is the problem surrounding the interpretation of the last part of the saying: ‘when one first became angry’ (ὅτε τιs πρότεροs χαλερήνῃ). This phrase occurs in a number of parallel passages, and in all of these τιs refers to the object of the preceding infinitive.⁵⁴ Most commentators, however, believe that in this case it must refer to the subject, king Agamemnon, who should make amends because he started the quarrel,⁵⁵ but this may not be the meaning that Odysseus ultimately wants to attach to these words. The parallel passages invite us to read the saying as an indirect reproach of Achilles and his violent behavior in the poem, which begins after all with ‘the wrath of Peleus' son Achilles’ (1.1), not the anger of Agamemnon. Odysseus disguises his criticism of Achilles as a reproach of Agamemnon. Apparently, Agamemnon also understands the remark in this way, for he replies: ‘Glad am I, son of Laërtes, to hear your muthos, for duly have you set forth the whole matter and told the tale.’⁵⁶

In the Odyssey, Odysseus' use of gnomai is not so much marked by the way in which he hides the addressee, although he makes a fair number of indirect second person addresses,⁵⁷ as by the way in which he masks himself: in Phaeacia he speaks as a xeinos and a poet, in the Cyclops' cave as Outis, and on Ithaca as a beggar.⁵⁸ This ability to hide his true identity is reflected in the formal description of Odysseus' oratory in Book 3 of the Iliad. Here Antenor tells how Odysseus once came as an ambassador to Troy, where he presented himself ‘like a man with no understanding’ (ἀῒδρεϊ φωτὶ ἐοικώs, 219), but delivered a speech no speaker could match. Jean-Pierre Vernant connects this scene with “the ‘duplicity’ of mêtis …, giving itself out to be other than it is” (Detienne and Vernant [1974] 1991: 23). The same duplicity marks Odysseus' use of gnomai in the Iliad.

Odysseus has the same reputation for wisdom as Nestor. In the Odyssey he is twice put on a par with the son of Neleus, once by Nestor himself who says that he and Odysseus ‘with one mind advised the Greeks with wisdom and shrewd counsel.’⁵⁹ One of Odysseus' standard epithets is πολύτλαs (‘much-enduring’),⁶⁰ which suggests that his insights are at least in part based on a rich experience. Unlike the old Nestor, however, Odysseus is not in a natural position of authority in the Greek camp, which is why he has to rely on trickery and indirect gnomic addresses.

4. THE GODS

The gods in Homer have their own language.⁶¹ This is reflected in their different names for certain entities, like the river Scamander (20.74) or the herb moly (Od. 10.305). It is also reflected in their use of gnomai. Whereas the topics of gnomai are usually human beings, even if they comment about the activities of a god, this situation changes once the gods use gnomic sayings. At Iliad 5.383-84, 5.873-74, 15.140-41, 21.379-80 and 24.463-64, various gods deliver general expressions about the relationship between humans and gods, but their concern is clearly with the gods: they are the primary narrative subject and referent of the gnomai. In the human realm it is the other way round. Even when humans refer to the gods in gnomai, they are tied to human activities.⁶²

This shift in emphasis produces some peculiar effects. When Hera, for example, defends her actions before Zeus by saying that ‘even a human being likes to do what he can for another man,’⁶³ humans change from the expected topic and referent to a metaphorical category: Hera in this gnome compares herself to human beings who help one another.⁶⁴ The voice of a god can change the actual meaning of a gnome as well. When Hector at 6.492 tells Andromache that ‘war is the concern of men’ (πόλεμοs δ' ἄνδρεσσι μελήσει), he means ‘males’ by ἄνδρεσσι,⁶⁵ but when Poseidon cites the same gnome at 20.137, he uses ἄνδρεσσι in the sense of ‘human beings.’ He tells Hera that the two of them should stay away from the fighting and ‘let the war be the concern of men.’⁶⁶ One may also notice how in this and other passages the formulaic expression that ‘[gods] are much stronger [than men],’⁶⁷ is turned into an argument about the relative powers of the gods themselves: ‘[gods A] are much stronger [than gods B].’⁶⁸

Finally, when human beings cite gnomai about a particular god they seem to refer to his function, the power he holds over mortals, rather than to the individual, but when the gods speak about other gods they sound more personal. For example, when Hephaestus tells his mother that ‘the Olympian is hard to resist,’⁶⁹ he is talking about her husband who is sitting across the room. This is quite different from Achilles' saying that ‘Zeus does not bring to accomplishment all thoughts of men’ (18.328, quoted above). At the same time, personal remarks made by the gods about another god can sound almost gnomic, like Zeus' comment at Iliad 5.890 to Ares that he is the most hated of all the gods.⁷⁰ Zeus' speeches often couch in personal remarks such perennial truths about himself or the other gods.⁷¹

The gods are full of gnomic wisdom, not just about each other but also about human beings. The most famous example is perhaps Zeus' comment that ‘of all the things that breathe and crawl upon the earth, nothing is more wretched than man,’⁷² which is the only explicit gnome Zeus speaks in the Iliad.⁷³ However, the gods seldom share their wisdom with mortals, at least not when they are speaking in their own guises.⁷⁴ It is interesting to note that Zeus speaks his gnome about the wretchedness of man not to any human being but to Achilles' immortal horses. The only gods in the Iliad who speak gnomai to human beings in their own guises are Iris, as messenger of the gods (18.201),⁷⁵ Thetis to Achilles, as his mother (18.128-29, 24.130-31),⁷⁶ and, somewhat surprisingly, Apollo to Diomedes at 5.441-42. This last scene may be a reflection of Apollo's function as an oracular god, who ‘utters in oracles to humans the unerring counsels of Zeus.’⁷⁷ The sentiment of his gnome (‘Never will be alike the tribes of the immortal gods and of earth dwelling humans’) and its preceding injunction (‘Do not think yourself equal to the gods’),⁷⁸ echo the two sayings which were, at least by the sixth century BCE, displayed on his temple at Delphi: γνω̑θι σεαυτόν (‘Know thyself’) and μηδὲν ἄγαν (‘Nothing in excess’).⁷⁹

CONCLUSION

We may conclude that different characters are given different gnomai to speak, depending on their roles in the poems. Achilles, who is self-centered and the main hero of the Iliad, speaks mostly first person gnomai, or he speaks sayings that reveal his anger and his subsequent friendship toward the Trojans; Nestor, the voice of authority in the Greek camp, uses second person gnomai, although he is capable of speaking more subtly as well, while Odysseus uses a variety of indirect statements that reveal his cunning intelligence. The gods have their own way of using gnomic expressions, which alters the form and sometimes the meaning of the sayings. Their characters, and in particular their relationships to human beings, are also reflected in the gnomai they speak. Gods who either by choice (Thetis, Athena) or profession (Iris, Apollo) are particularly close to human beings communicate to them in gnomai, while others, like Zeus, are more aloof and speak only to the other gods or, at best, to immortal horses. All we mortals can do is with the poets to overhear the conversations of the gods and heroes, and to learn from the gnomai they speak their characters and attitudes toward us.⁸⁰

Notes

1. For an overview of opinions, see Griffin 1980: 50-51, who himself firmly believes in the consistency of the portrayal of the heroes in the epics.

2. Kirk admits that “in a few cases—notably Achilles and Hector, and to some extent Odysseus and Telemachus in the Odyssey—the great epics manage to transcend these limitations” (1962: 265); how they would do so is left unexplained. Richard Martin in Martin 1989 and 1993 has argued that the perceived limitations of the oral poetic style in fact offer great opportunities for the poet to develop subtle character traits.

3. Snell 1948. Martin (1989: 98) cites several studies critiquing Snell's point of view.

4. Lévi-Strauss [1973] 1977: 135, Barthes 1970, and Bal 1977. Some of their ideas have been applied to Homeric poetry in Peradotto 1990 and Katz 1991. For a survey of modern opinion on characterization in ancient Greek literature, see Pelling 1990.

5. See esp. Martin 1989: 88 ff.; see also Griffin 1986, who discusses some earlier studies, Mackie 1996, Worman 1999 and 2001. Martin (o.c., 98 n. 27), citing Dionysius of Halicarnassus and Eustathius, observes that the Homeric heroes were already in antiquity credited with individual styles of speaking.

6. Seitel [1969] 1981, 1977.

7. See Kirschenblatt-Gimblett [1973] 1981: esp. 112-15.

8. Rhet. 1395b5-6 Kassel. Aristotle's treatment of the use of gnomai in rhetorical speeches extends from Rhet. 2.1394a19 to 2.1395b19. On the difference between Greek gnomai and modern proverbs, see Lardinois 2000.

9. Seitel [1969] 1981: 129, 1977: 78.

10. Similarly, the same gnome can be used as a first, second or third person saying. At Iliad 11.793, for example, Nestor says to Patroclus that ‘the persuasion of a friend is good’ (ἀγαθὴ δὲ παραίφασίs ἐστιν ἑταίρου). As Nestor's preceding remarks make clear, this gnomic statement refers to the desired persuasion of Achilles by Patroclus and therefore constitutes a second person saying because it applies to the addressee; it is Patroclus who is to do the persuading of his friend. When Patroclus later repeats the same gnome to the Greek hero Eurypylus at Iliad 15.404, it still pertains to his imminent persuasion of Achilles, but now it constitutes a first person saying because it applies to the speaker. An example of a third person saying is Iliad 9.116-17, where Agamemnon says to the Greek commanders about Achilles, ‘worth many hosts is a man whom Zeus holds dear in his heart’ (ἀντί νυ πολλω̑ν / λαω̑ν ἐστιν ἀνὴρ ὅν τε Zεὺs κη̑ρι φιλήσῃ).

11. Seitel 1977: 84.

12. Lardinois 1997: 226-27. For lists of gnomai in the Iliad, see Ahrens 1937: 12-38, Edwards 1987: 99-100, Lardinois 1995: appendix A, and 1997: 215 n. 15.

13. Firth 1926: 140, 142 (my italics). For another example, see Basso 1976: 106-07.

14. Lardinois 1997: 222-25.

15. All individual book and line numbers from hereon refer to the Iliad, unless specified otherwise.

16. First person singular: 9.318-20, 341-42, 406-09, 16.52-53 and 18.328; first person singular / indirect second person gnomai: 1.218, 9.309, 312-13, 21.190-91 and 193-99. Note also his use of first person singular similes in 9.323-25 and 21.282-83 and of a first person paradigmatic tale in 18.117-19. Similes and paradigmatic tales adhere to the same rules for their use as gnomai; see Lardinois 1995: ch. 3.10.

17. Od. 7.216-18, 8.208-11, 10.383-85, 11.464, 14.228, 15.343, 344-45, 16.211-12, 17.18-19, 286-89, 470-72, 18.52-53, 19.120 and 221-22.

18. Note especially 9.318-20 and 406-09. Cf. De Jong 1987: 43, Renehan 1987, Taplin 1992: 166.

19. See Martin 1989: 233-34 for examples from non-Greek epic. In Od. Bks. 9-12 the voice of the poet/performer and Odysseus would become, in performance, almost indistinguishable (but see De Jong 1992), and in the Iliad, according to Martin, “Achilles comes closer to us because the poet chooses him as the channel to contact his audience” (o.c., 233, cf. 235). One may also think of early tragedy in which the poet played the lead-character: Pickard-Cambridge 1962: 79 f. (on Thespis), Else 1965: 58-59 (on Thespis, Aeschylus, and perhaps Sophocles in his early years). Such performances would have created a strong identification of poet and hero in the minds of the audience.

20. Cf. Griffin 1980: 74. Compare also the extended second person simile Achilles speaks to Patroclus in 16.6-10, which Patroclus interprets as a sign of Achilles' anger (16.22).

21. Menelaus uses the same gnome and command in a speech which is explicitly said to be spoken in anger: μἐγ' ὀχθήσαs, 17.18; see lines 17.30 and 32 for the command and the gnome.

22. ὥs τε γυναι̑καs / αἵ τε χολωσάμεναι ἔριδοs πἐρι θυμοβόροιο / νεικευ̑σ' ἀλλήλῃσι μἐσην ἐs ἄγυιαν ἰου̑σαι / πόλλ' ἐτεά τε καὶ οὐκί· χόλοs δἐ τε καὶ τὰ κελεύει, 20.252-55.

23. Ostensibly, Calchas applies this gnome to Agamemnon, but as I have argued elsewhere (Lardinois 1997: 233) it also applies, indirectly, to Achilles. References to Achilles' kholos are ubiquitous in the epic: e.g. 1.139, 217, 224; 9.525, 646, 675.

24. Lardinois 1997: 228. E.g. 11.469 (Menelaus to Ajax), 12.243 (Hector to Polydamas), 12.326-27 (Sarpedon to Glaucus), 12.412 (Sarpedon to Lycians), 13.115 (Poseidon in guise of Calchas to Greek heroes), 13.237 (Poseidon alias Thoas to Idomeneus), 14.63 (Nestor to Agamemnon), 14.80 and 81 (Agamemnon to Nestor). This type of saying is also used by the sympotic poets when addressing their friends: Archil. fr. 13.5-7a, Mimn. fr. 2.5 ff., Theognis 227 f. (a Solon fr. 13.71 f.), 315 (a Solon fr. 15.1), 985-88, 1048, Alc. fr. 335.1.

25. δοιοὶ γάρ τε πίθοι κατακείαται ἐν Διὸs οὔδει / δώρων οῒα δίδωσι κακω̑ν, Zτεροs δὲ ἑάων· / ἐ μἐν κ' ἀμμείξαs δώῃ Zεὺs τερπικἐραυνοs, / ἄλλοτε μἐν τε κακἳ̑ ὅ γε κύρεται, ἄλλοτε δ' ἐσθλἳ̑· / o δἐ κε τω̑ν λυγρω̑ν δώῃ, λωβητὸν ἔθηκε, / καί ἑ κακὴ βούβρωστιs ἐπὶ χθόνα δι̑αν ἐλαύνει, / φοιτa δ' οὔτε θεοι̑σι τετιμἐνοs οὔτε βροτοι̑σιν, 24.527-33.

26. The only other third person gnome spoken by Achilles concerns the dead Patroclus (23.103-04), but it may simultaneously reflect his own anxiety about death. Achilles does not indicate to whom the gnome refers until after it is spoken.

27. See Austin 1966: 296-97 n. 4 for an overview of opinions. Compare Stanford (1963: 71) who speaks of ‘Nestor's tendency to garrulous reminiscences.’

28. Austin 1966, Martin 1989: 103, Toohey 1994: 153-62. Hainsworth 1993: 67 cites Aristotle Rhet. 1395a2-3 (on the appropriateness of the use of gnomai by elderly men) to explain this aspect of Nestor's style.

29. τοι̑σι δὲ Nἐστωρ / ἡδυεπὴs ἀνόρουσε λιγὺs Πυλίων ἀγορητήs, / του̑ καὶ ἀπὸ γλώσσηs μἐλιτοs γλυκίων ῥἐεν αὐδή, 1.247b-49.

30. Martin 1989: 102: e.g. hHom. 32.2, Hes. Th. 965, 1021; cf. the unique phrase τοι̑σι δὲ πα̑σιν ἑαδότα μυ̑θον ἔειπεν, which is used of Nestor at 9.173 and which looks like an expanded version of the epithet. Theognis ascribes to ‘the good tongue of godlike Nestor’ the same power that Hesiod's Muses have (Th. 27), namely to make lies resemble truths (οὐδ' εἰ ψεύδεα μὲν ποιοι̑s ἐτύμοισιν ὁμοι̑α, / γλω̑σσαν ἔχων ἀγαθὴν Nἐστοροs ἀντιθἐου, Thgn. 713-14). At Hesiod Th. 83, the Muses are said to pour sweet dew on the tongue of a king, from whose mouth honeysweet words will flow (τἳ̑ μὲν ἐπὶ γλώσσῃ γλυκερὴν χείουσιν ἐoρσην, / του̑ δ' ἔπε' ἐκ στόματοs ῥει̑ μείλιχα). In Pind. Nem. 7.21, the epithet ἡδυεπήs is used for the legendary Homer, and in Soph. OT 151 for Apollo's oracle, which is referred to as the ‘sweet-worded saying of Zeus’ (ὔ Διὸs ἁδυεπὲs φάτι).

31. Nἐστωρ, οὔ καὶ πρόσθεν ἀρίστη φαίνετο βουλή, 7.325, 9.94, cf. Od. 24.52.

32. 1.274, 278-79, 8.143-44, 9.63-64, 11.793, 23.315, 316-17, 318, 319-21 and 322-25. Exceptions are: 4.320, 11.801 and 14.63. When Nestor wants his commands to sound more friendly, he uses first person plural imperatives or hortatory subjunctives, but unlike the other heroes he does not accompany them with matching gnomai: e.g. 2.440, 6.70, 7.333, 9.112, 9.165, 10.108, 10.146. In the one case that he uses a first person plural/indirect second person gnome (14.63), he explicitly says that he does not want to issue an order (οὐκ ἄμμε κελεύω, 14.62).

33. 5.531 and 532, 19.79-80. Other gnomai spoken by Agamemnon are 3.108, 109-10, 4.235, 7.409-10, 9.116-17, 158-59, 14.80 and 81, 19.81-82.

34. τἳ̑ δ' ἤδη δύο μὲν γενεαὶ μερόπων ἀνθρώπων / ἐφθίαθ', οἵ οἱ πρόσθεν ἅμα τράφεν ἠδ' ἐγἐνοντο / ἐν Πύλῳ ἠγαθἐ ῃ, μετὰ δὲ τριτάτοισιν ἄνασσεν·, 1.250-52. Nestor likes to point out to his interlocutors that he is older than them and that they therefore should listen to him: e.g. 1.259, 9.60.

35. The words ἐὺ φρονἐων are often translated as ‘with good intent toward (with dative)’ (e.g. Lattimore 1951, Murray 1999), but the introductory formula ὅ σφιν ἐὺ φρονἐν ἀγορήσατο καὶ μετἐειπεν, in which the phrase occurs, is used only of persons whose wisdom is renowned: four times of Nestor (1.253, 2.78, 7.326 and 9.95, cf. Od. 24.53), once of Calchas (1.73), Odysseus (2.283), Priam (7.367), Thoas (15.285, whose excellence in debates has just been extolled) and Polydamas (18.253); cf. Halitherses (Od. 2.160 and 24.453), Mentor (Od. 2.228), Echeneus (Od. 7.158, who has just before been described as the eldest of the Phaeacians, skilled in speech, and with knowledge of the past), and Amphinomus (Od. 16.399, who is in the previous line described as having good phrenes, cf. 18.125). The dative σφιν goes with ἀγορήσατο and/or μετἐ ειπεν and not necessarily with ἐὺ φρονἐων: cf. τοι̑σιν δ' 'Αντίνοοs ἀγορήσατο καὶ μετἐειπε, Od. 4.773, τοι̑σιν δ' 'Αλκίνοοs ἀγορήσατο καὶ μετἐειπε, Od. 7.185, etc. Also, Mentor is not ‘well-minded,’ when he addresses the people of Ithaca in Od. 2.229 ff., but, on the contrary, angry with them (νυ̑ν δ' ἄλλῳ δήμώ νεμεσίζομαι, 239); nor does it make much sense to say that Calchas has ‘good intent’ when he requests Achilles to protect him at Iliad 1.73-83, or to say this of Odysseus when he rebukes the army at Iliad 2.283 ff. The phrase agrees with other occurrences of the participle φρονἐων in Homer, meaning ‘to be wise’ (cf. φρονἐων, 23.343, πύκα περ φρονεόντων, 9.554), not with the adjective εὔφρων or the noun εὐφροσύνη. In post-Homeric Greek, εἐ φρονἐω, used absolutely, also means ‘to think rightly, to be sane’ (LSJ I.2 ad φρονἐω).

36. os ὁ γἐρων ὄτρυνε πάλαι πολἐμων ἐu εἰδώs·, 4.310.

37. Nἐστορ', ἐπεὶ περίοιδε δίκαs ἠδὲ φρόνιν ἄλλων· / τρὶs γὰρ δή μίν φασιν ἀνάξασθαι γἐνε' ἀνδρω̑ν, Od. 3.244-45, cf. Od. 3.20, 52, 128, 11.512, 24.51-53.

38. Compare what Menelaus says at Od. 15.152 and Nestor's treatment of Diomedes at 9.57-58.

39. See Lardinois 1997: 226 on this gnome.

40. Nestor tries to persuade the other Greek heroes to withdraw from the battlefield by saying that ‘in no way is a wounded man to fight’ (οὐ γάρ πωs βεβλημἐνον ἔστι μάχεσθαι, 14.63). His use of a singular topic (βεβλημἐνον) in a saying that should apply to all the Greek heroes suggests that he is most concerned about his own safety and retreat.

41. Norman Austin has noted that most of Nestor's ‘digressions’ are both hortatory and apologetic (that is, second and first person): “As apology they establish the legitimacy of his position in the Greek hierarchy as the wisest counselor; as exhortation they offer a challenge to the younger men to live up to the heroic ideal embodied in his person” (1966: 301).

42. See esp. Stanford 1963: 8 ff., Detienne & Vernant [1974] 1991: 22-23, Martin 1989: 120-24, and Worman 1999. Stanford, while generally acknowledging Odysseus' cunning, maintains that, in the Iliad, “his conduct is scrupulously honest and his words are studiously candid” (o.c., 13). I hope to refute this claim in the following paragraphs.

43. θυμὸs δὲ μἐγαs ἐστὶ διοτρεφἐων βασιλήων, / τιμὴ δ' ἐκ Διόs ἐστι, φιλει̑ δἐ ἑ μητίετα Zεύs, 2.196-97.

44. One may compare 17.251, where Menelaus reminds the Greek leaders of their honor and glory stemming from Zeus (ἐκ δὲ Διὸs τιμὴ καὶ κυ̑δοs ὀπηδει̑).

45. E.g. Stanford 1963: 68, Edwards 1991: 253, Worman 1999: 39.

46. Other examples are: 2.204b-06, 19.221-24, 227, 228-29. One may compare the relative clause which Odysseus tags onto his first speech in the Iliad, 1.441 f. Here he informs Chryses that he has brought back his daughter and asks him to perform a hecatomb sacrifice to propitiate Apollo, ‘who has now brought upon the Argives mournful woes’ (ὃs νυ̑ν 'Αργείοισι πολύστονα κήδε' ἐφη̑κεν, 1.445). This relative clause, which is “strictly unnecessary” (Martin 1989: 121), speaks about the Achaeans, but at the same time holds a warning for Chryses that, if he does not keep his end of the bargain, the same god that harassed the Greeks may turn against him. The only other person who uses this type of gnome in the Iliad is the narrator himself.

47. For the translation of διἐπω as ‘to take charge of, to handle,’ see Vine 1988: 55-56.

48. See Lardinois 1997: 224-25 on this ‘indirect second person gnome with substitute speaker.’

49. αὐτἳ̑ τοι μετόπισθ' ἄχοs ἔσσεται, οὐδἐτι μη̑χοs / ῥεχθἐντοs κακου̑ ἔστ' ἄκοs εὑρει̑ν, 9.249-50a.

50. ἀλλὰ πολὺ πρὶνφ / ράζευ ὅπωs Δαναοι̑σιν ἀλεξὁσειs κακὸν ἣμαρ, 9.250b-51. On this passage with its double meaning, see Martin 1983: 27 f.

51. διογενὲs Lαερτιάδη πολυμήχαν' 'Οδυσσευ̑ / χρὴ μὲν δὴ τὸν μυ̑θον ἀπηλεγἐωs ἀποειπει̑ν, 9.308-309. The use of the article before μυ̑θον could indicate that Achilles is thinking in particular about Odysseus' preceding speech, but it is also possible that the article designates μυ̑θον as a generalized category. Although this use of the article is not yet highly developed in Homer, there are a few examples, notably in line 320 in the same speech, see Hainsworth 1993: ad 9.318-20 and Chantraine 1953: 165.

52. ἐχθρὸs γάρ μοι κει̑νοs ὁμω̑s 'Αῒδαο πύλῃσιν / ὅs χ' ἐτερον μὲν κεύθῃ ἐνὶ φρεσίν, ἄλλο δὲ εἴπῃ, 9.312-13. The ancient commentators are divided as to whom this saying pertains: Eustathius ad 9.309 understands it as referring to Achilles' own candor, whereas the scholia B and T understand it as a taunt directed at Odysseus: cf. Stanford 1963: 18. Both are possible. Hainsworth (1993: 102) further notes that Achilles' remark about the man who is as hateful as the gates of Hades is also a “riposte” to Agamemnon's gnome about Hades at 9.158.

53. οὐ μὲν γάρ τι νεμεσσητὸν βασιλη̑α /ἄνδρ' ἀπαρἐσσασθαι, ὅτε τιs πρότεροs χαλεπήνῃ, 19.182-83.

54. 24.369, Od. 16.72 and 21.133.

55. E.g. Leaf 1902: 331, Murray 1925: 350 n. 1, Edwards 1991: 257.

56. χαίρω σευ̑ Lαερτιάδη τὸν μυ̑θον ἀκούσαs· / ἐν μοίρῃ γὰρ πάντα διίκεο καὶ κατἐλεξαs, 19.185-86.

57. I noted above the great number of first person sayings used by Odysseus in the Odyssey. Most of his indirect second person sayings are also first person singular or plural: Od. 5.447-48, 7.307, 9.3-4, 9.270-71, 11.379 and 18.19. Other indirect second person sayings are Od. 8.479-81 and 9.5 ff.

58. See further Worman 1999: 39-42 on Odysseus' ability in the Odyssey to disguise himself in his speeches.

59. ἀλλ' ἐνα θυμὸν ἔχοντε νόῳ καὶ ἐπίφρονι βουλ ῃ̑/ φραζόμεθ' 'Αργείοισιν ὅπωs ὄχ' ἄριστα γἐνοιτο, Od. 3.128-29; cf. Od. 11.512 (spoken by Odysseus).

60. E.g. 8.97, 9.167, 10.248 etc., Od. 5.171.

61. See West 1966: 387-88, Watkins [1970] 1994, Clay 1972, and Ford 1992: 175 f.

62. E.g. 1.218 (about obeying the gods), 3.65-66 (about respecting gifts of the gods), 4.235 (about Zeus condoning no lies), 4.320 (about the gods not giving all to one man), 5.178 (about the anger of a god being hard to bear).

63. καὶ μὲν δή πού τιs μἐλλει βροτὸs ἀνδρὶ τελἐσσαι, 18.362.

64. Similarly, a mortal can compare himself or another human being to a god through a gnome: e.g. 9.158-59, 497-501, 21.193.

65. Compare Telemachus' and Alcinous' use of the phrase ἄνδρεσσι μελήσει at Od. 1.358, 11.352 and 21.352.

66. It is possible that something of the other meaning nevertheless carries over in this phrase and that Poseidon, very subtly, tries to suggest that whereas the war should not concern Hera, it might be something for him.

67. ἐπεὶ ἣπολὺ φἐρτεροί εἰσιν, 10.557, 20.368, cf. 21.264, Od. 22.289, hHom. 2.148.

68. ἐπεὶ ἣπολὺ φἐρτεροί εἰμεν, 20.135, cf. Od. 5.170, 9.276. The proximity of this line to 20.137, which relies on a similar twist of meaning, is perhaps an argument for its authenticity (contra Leaf 1902 and Edwards 1991 and loc.).

69. ἀργαλἐοs γὰρ 'Ολύμπιοs ἀντιφἐρεσθαι, 1.589, cf. Od. 5.103-04 and 137-38 (Hermes and Calypso about Zeus).

70. ἔχθιστοs δἐ μοί ἐσσι θεω̑ν οi '′Ολυμπον ἔχουσιν, 5.890.

71. Cf. 1.526-27, 547-50, 561, 5.428-30, 766, 891.

72. οὐ μὲν γάρ τί πού ἐστιν ὀϊζυρώτερον ἀνδρὸs / πάντων, ὅσσα τε γαι̑αν ἔπι πνείει τε καὶ ἔρπει, 17.446-47.

73. In the Odyssey Zeus speaks two gnomai, one at the beginning of the poem, saying ‘how ready are mortals to blame the gods’ (o πόποι, οῒον δή νυ θεοὺs βροτοὶ αἰτιόωνται, Od. 1.32), and one in Book 13 to Poseidon (Od. 13.141-42). Other gnomai of gods about human beings are: 5.407-09, 441-42, 18.128-29, 201, 20.137, 24.46-48, 49, 130-31 and Od. 20.52-53.

74. The gods regularly exhort humans with gnomai in the guise of one of their friends: e.g. 2.23-24 = 61-62 (Dream in the guise of Nestor), 13.115 (Poseidon in the guise of Calchas), 13.237 (Poseidon in the guise of Thoas); cf. Od. 2.276-77, 3.231 and 236 ff. (Athena in the guise of Mentor), 4.837 (a phantom in the guise of Iphthime), 7.51-52 (Athena in the guise of Phaeacian girl). They follow in these gnomic addresses the same social conventions their mortal counterparts would.

75. One may compare Hermes at 24.463-64, who speaks a gnome to Priam about himself.

76. Thetis' gnomic addresses of Achilles demonstrate her exceptional close relationship with this hero; cf. Athena to Odysseus at Od. 20.52-53. Similarly, Calypso (Od. 5.212-13) and Circe (Od. 12.109-10) give Odysseus advice after having been intimate with him, and Poseidon to Tyro (Od. 11.249-50). Athena once speaks a gnome to Odysseus' son, Telemachus, in her own guise, but only in his sleep (Od. 15.20-23).

77. χρήσω δ' ἀνθρώποισι Διὸs νημερτἐα βουλήν, hHom 3.132, cf. hHom 4.535-49, Aes. Eum. 19; Burkert 1985: 148.

78. μηδὲ θεοι̑σιν / ῒσ' ἔθελε φρονἐειν, ἐπεὶ οὔ ποτε φυ̑λον ὁμοι̑ον / ἀθανάτων τε θεω̑ν χαμαὶ ἐρχομἐνων τ' ἀνθρώπων, 5.440-42.

79. On the inscription of these sayings at Delphi, see Wilkins 1929: 1-2.

80. This essay was composed with the generous support of the McKnight Landgrant Professorship Program at the University of Minnesota. A shorter, oral version was delivered at the APA conference in Chicago in 1997. I would like to thank the anonymous referee of Mnemosyne, who caught several mistakes in the manuscript, and Michelle Lewis, who corrected my English.

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