[In the following essay, Tritton surveys Ibn Hazm's thought, touching on his methods of argumentation as well as on his views concerning epistemology, theology, metaphysics, the natural world, and other subjects.]

Ibn Hazm was a man of many interests; in addition to theology, on which he wrote two big books, and law on which he wrote a bigger volume, he had an eye on the common things of life. He records trivialities and, of course, shared many of the beliefs of his age. The common folk thought that the earth was flat and sunrise was at the same time all over the world. His own view is a mixture. Every moment the sun rises on one horizon, then ascends on a second, at noon on a third, begins to decline on a fourth, is near sunset on a fifth, and sets on a sixth. At the first, third and fifth horizons the devil is with the sun and at the second, fourth and sixth, he leaves it.¹ The eggs of snakes and lizards are different from those of birds; a young bull uses its head as a weapon of offence before its horns are grown; a scorpion engraved on a ring under the sign of the Scorpion is a guard against the insect; talisman will protect fields against locusts and frosts. A man suffering from two boils let a woman charm one which disappeared while the other remained. Gourds and cucumbers, which grow while the moon waxes, can be heard growing. He shared the common belief that moles are blind. He noted that crabs can look both forwards and backwards. He recorded methods of divination from the flight of birds, inspection of shoulder-blades, and tossing stones into the air to see in what patterns they fell. It was a common saying that the planet Venus had been a harlot who had been raised to the sky; his comment was, “if this were true, no woman would stay chaste.”² Entertainment was not ignored; he knew the conjuror's knife the blade of which slips back into the handle and trick snakes filled with quicksilver.³ He can poke fun at those with whom he disagrees, saying that a Jew can tell lies and swear falsely so long as he does not speak Hebrew, for that is the only language known to the angels who report to God on terrestrial affairs.⁴

To turn to more scholarly matters. He had an exact knowledge of the Bible. Though he is unsympathetic, he knows what he is talking about; he asks why it was necessary to send quails for the children of Israel to eat in the wilderness seeing that they had taken their herds and flocks with them out of Egypt. He knows that the early chronology of the world is given differently by the Hebrew, Greek and Samaritan texts of Genesis. It is the same with pre-Islamic Arabia: in Ansāb al-‘Arab he gives facts about religion which are not in Kitāb al-Muḥabbar of Ibn Habīb. In his attack on the Si'ah he shows a like knowledge of Muslim history; he has a list of imāms who married their daughters or sisters to Sunnīs to prove that the rank and file were more strict in their ideas than their leaders.

Tawq al-Hamāmah is his most attractive work; it shows his knowledge of human nature in his analysis of love in all its aspects and illustrates his ideas by anecdotes drawn from his own feelings and observations and from the experiences of his friends. He proves himself to be an acute observer with a good prose style and a true poet. He reveals his own character and the life of his day.

In some ways Ibn Hazm was an independent thinker. He argued that Arabic could not claim a special position as the language of revelation because earlier revelations had been made in other tongues. Hebrew, Aramaic and Arabic were one tongue which had developed variations; the oldest form of it being that spoken by Abraham.⁵ The details may be wrong but the existence of the idea is striking. Again, as Muḥammad could neither read nor write, the orthography of the Qur’ān is not important; it is not part of revelation. So in verse XX: 63 it is permissible to read the correct oblique case, hādhayni, instead of the accepted nominative hādhāni, although the use of the correct grammatical form means changing the spelling.⁶ On one question he is more drastic than modern scholars, saying that only two of the five daily prayers are mentioned in the Qur’ān. His pedestrian good sense comes out in other places. It was an accepted dogma that one act could not be produced by two agents; he spurns the idea, quoting against it several verses from the Qur’ān, among them VIII: 17: “When thou didst throw, it was not thou but God Who threw”.⁷ In the same way he rejects the standard view that one accident cannot inhere in another but only in a substance.⁸ To those who argued that, because everything was ordained by the foreknowledge of God, it was wrong to seek medical aid, he replies that on their premises it was equally wrong to eat and drink.⁹ The gūl, nisnās and ‘anqā’ are old wives' tales.¹⁰ Angels and prophets cannot sin, so the tales about Hārūt and Mārūt are rubbish; Solomon's horses did not cause him to sin by making him forget to say, “if God wills” and he would not have killed them, for that would have been a waste of God's gifts. Ibn Hazm knew the story of Uriah the Hittite but did not believe it, for prophets did not do such things.¹¹ Some argued that as a man knows that he knows, so there must be an existence for him to exist in, and similarly for everything phenomenal and eternal. There is no support for this argument either in the Qur’ān or Tradition.¹² Of prayer he says that it is ordered by God, not in order to change any of His decrees, not so that something may happen which otherwise would not happen, but God in His foreknowledge made the prayer (which He knew would be answered) the cause of what He foreknew would happen.¹³ To those who said that suffering in this world was a source of pleasure, like a bitter medicine which brought back health, he cried in scorn, “Can God bless a man without first causing him pain and yet not do so?”¹⁴ The following tale shows the best side of his religion. A man, who had done no good works, gave orders that his body should be burned and the ashes scattered half in the sea and half on land, because God would punish him more severely than He had punished any one else, if once He got hold of him. God gathered the ashes together, restored the man to life and asked him why he had done this. He said, “From fear of Thee”. For these words God forgave him.¹⁵

His opinion of some of his contemporaries was low. Some say, he relates, that every sect, whether religious or philosophical, argues and justifies itself; sometimes one wins in a disputation and sometimes another, according to the power of the debater in putting forward his ideas clearly and in using rhetoric or sophistry. This is true, he admits, but it does not support the claim that the arguments for and against are equally balanced, because a temporary victory is no argument and the true scholar will not be satisfied with one, whether it is for him or against him. Only those are disturbed by it or use it, who form the noisy, ignorant crowd, content to cry, “Zayd has defeated ‘Amr” or “Zayd is a champion debater” and do not care whether truth is established or error exposed. There is no sense in victory in debate, especially for men of our day who have only a few tricks beyond which they never say a word, or for the hard-headed who overcome by abuse and shouting, for such noise can fill a room with words without meaning. If a third party is present, their approval of those who agree with them and their welcome to their success is noisy. So, too, with defeat. It is easy to put them to shame and we have often done so. To those who approved our arguments we say, “Repeat the arguments which convinced you—not in the same words—only the sense”. They tried to do this at every meeting till they dropped the bad habit and kept quiet. Such folk can only say, “Zayd has won” or “This is true” and do not understand what the speaker says. Seekers after truth examine all arguments, drop appeals to emotion and party and confine their attention to arguments based on reason.

Ibn Hazm says: Our method in all debate, whatever the subject, is to tell our opponent that we do not desire anything except the truth. We promise him that if he brings forward a convincing argument, we will adopt his opinion; but he must make us a like promise. This is not due to any doubt about our own faith but obedience to the command given to the Prophet, “Bring a book from before God that I may follow it; it will be a better guide than these two” (XXVIII: 49). Few argued against us. Those who want to know, study their opponents' arguments and after demolishing them consider everyone, whether provocative or specious, abandon these and seek proofs. In the last resort argument is based on the senses and self-evident truth. Those, who try to solve an isolated problem or defend a pet theory for which they have no proof, are far from distinguishing truth from error. They say that there is no belief which triumphs because of an illuminating argument; if there were, no dissension would be possible as the senses and intuitive reason would support it, as happens in arithmetic. This is nonsense; there is no general answer to the propositions in Euclid and similarly in grammar, each problem must be taken separately, and so in theology.¹⁶

Ideas about the nature of mind are confused. Arabic terminology is not the same as English; to the Arabs knowledge is either necessary or acquired, and ‘necessary’ has a wider meaning than intuitive for it includes knowledge derived from a general report—e.g., that a town named Mecca is in Arabia. It is often hard to decide whether nafs should be translated “self, soul”, or “desire,” i.e., nafs which bids us do wrong (Qur’ān, XII: 53). Ibn Hazm says that nafs, rūḥ, nasamah all mean the same thing, though rūḥ is usually said to be a subtle body which diffused through the human frame is the cause or accompaniment of life and it is different from nafs, which is a celestial body from the spheres, lighter than air, that strives upward. Souls existed before their bodies and after death are purified from the humours of bodies.¹⁷

The body makes the soul forget. Reason is only a tool, an accident in the soul, by which the self distinguishes things as they are and recognises the difference between what God has made obligatory and all else. It is called also intuitive distinction and primary distinction.¹⁸ Ibn Hazm can say, “Reason, the perfect light of God, by which we know things as they are and truth is marked off from error”.¹⁹ Its use is to distinguish virtue from vice, to practise the first and avoid the second; it is faith and all good works. Reason is not the cause of any duty being obligatory; it does not make swine unclean, for chicken and old goats are fouler feeders than pigs.²⁰ It did not decide that it is better for men and animals to have two eyes rather than three.²¹ If wine were forbidden because it intoxicates, it would have been forbidden to Adam.²² It is useless to seek reason in laws by measuring one against another, by asking why four witnesses are needed to prove adultery, two to settle a lawsuit about money, and one to establish the authenticity of a tradition. Christians worship three gods and are always ready to fight Muslims, yet they must not be killed if they are dhimmīs; dualists have only two gods and are not specially hostile to Muslims, yet they may be killed at sight.²³ By revelation men know not to trample on the rights of others and reason approves this.²⁴ As we have seen there is no sharp division between thought and action. The first actions are instinctive like sucking. Early in life some knowledge (al-ma‘ārif) is gained because by initial understanding a child comes to know that the whole is greater than its part, the principle of contradiction, etc.; though he cannot express these things clearly, he is sure of them. He knows first what the senses tell him, then gains further knowledge from premises depending, directly or indirectly, on the senses and intuition. There can be no proof of the evidence of the senses or of intuitive knowledge. Knowledge is belief in a thing as it is and is based on the evidence of the senses, intuition or revelation, i.e., the agreement of belief in the thing as it is with the acceptance of what God has ordered to be done without asking for proof.²⁵ An unusual definition. Knowledge established by proof is necessary for man can do no other than accept it; what is not established by proof is opinion; the search for truth, which is voluntary, produces acquired knowledge. There is no difference between the quality of our knowledge of God, which is got by experience (musāhadah) or rational necessity (ḍarūrat al-‘aql), and the knowledge of our other experiences. Knowledge given by revelation is necessary like that given by the senses. A belief must be either true or false, there is no half-way; so it is absurd to say that a statement is near or like the truth. To contradict one opinion another can always be found; nothing can contradict the truth.²⁶

Ibn Hazm tells of his own experience. He believed firmly in Islam and his mind was at peace, hating all doubt, but the devil cast evil thoughts into his mind and he abhorred them so much that he could hear the fluttering of his heart in his disgust. He quotes this tradition:—Muḥammad was told of one who had thoughts (doubts about religion) but would rather die than speak them out; Muḥammad said, “This is faith indeed”.²⁷

The Qur’ān and Tradition (ḥadīt) are the only foundation of religion, so it is no use arguing from analogy (qiyās); the least suspicion of it horrified him. Iblīs led Adam into sin by suggesting that God had a reason for forbidding him to eat of the tree and Iblīs sinned by refusing to bow down to Adam because he used analogy, arguing that he was better than Adam because created from fire.²⁸ Other examples of the failure of analogy follow. One dose of medicine may be beneficial but a double dose dangerous. By diet and training a man can add to his strength but only to a certain limit and no increase in food or exercises will take him beyond that. The flesh of fowls that eat garlic or leeks tastes of them but a man does not become a bird though he eats chicken for years.²⁹ Agreement (ijmā‘) was no better as a source of law. Abū Bakr forbade the cutting down of fruit trees during war but his example was not followed. The controversy about the penalty for drunkenness is notorious. During the lifetime of Muḥammad and Abū Bakr an umm walad could be sold.³⁰ In al-Hijāz, a slave, who stole, did not lose his hand; ‘Umar b. ‘Abd al-‘Azīz reprimanded a governor who followed the “why of the people of al-Hijāz”.³¹

Some believed that the arguments for and against belief were equally balanced and so became agnostics who fall into three main classes: those who believe that—

(1) there is no proof of the existence of God;

(2) the existence of God can be proved but not the existence of prophecy:

(3) it can be proved that God and prophecy exist and that Muḥammad is a prophet.

There are two divisions of this last class:

(i) some have no convictions about other Muslim doctrines and are, as a whole, given up to pleasure:

(ii) some say that a man must have a religion to restrain him from evil; a man without religion should be killed like a snake.

Of these last-mentioned there are two sub-divisions, those who believe that:

(i) a man should stay in the faith in which he was born for evidently God has chosen it for him;

(ii) there is no harm in staying in the father's religion even if a man cannot uphold it by argument but he must accept what all religions accept, the ordinary moral law, and must suspend judgment where religions differ.³²

These people argue that mathematics is infallible; Ibn Hazm did not agree; one of his arguments was based on human frailty in the presence of complicated mathematical problems.³³

The relation between name and object was a subject of debate. “Names which you and your fathers gave” (Qur’ān XII: 40) was used as an argument. These words must be taken literally but may be explained in two ways:

(i) men worship what is indicated by the name; the text does not mean by “names” the objects worshipped, for men did not originate them; God created them,

(ii) men worshipped idols of stone and other materials; the essential parts of these had existed before the names, Lāt, Ba‘l, etc., were given so it is obvious that worship was paid to the names and not to the objects. The text from the Qur’ān proves that the name is not one with the thing named. To suppose it depends on a narrow interpretation of “literal meaning”; Ibn Hazm does not draw the inference that Lāt and Ba‘l had no real existence. He denied that, ism (name) is derived from smw or wsm: there is no proof of either derivation, so both are false. Can anyone believe that ism is a derivative? Compare jabal and kalb which are not derived forms. If ism comes from smw (height, exaltation) then the names dung, pig, polytheism are an exaltation of these unclean things. Even were the derivation correct, it is no argument for the identity of name and object for the object is not derived from smw. One result of such identity would be that God's name would be God and as the name is derived so is God.³⁴

In the material world there is no such thing as an atom.

(1) A memory of “Achilles and the tortoise” lies behind the question whether a walker goes through a finite or an infinite distance. If the distance is infinite, so is the number of atoms.

Answer: Everything in the universe is finite; the only infinite is the power of God. The walker is not occupied in dividing a distance but in reaching a place. (In religious matters one item of likeness between two things does not mean that both are enjoined, forbidden or indifferent.) A crowd of atoms which do not occupy space cannot make a body which does. Then Ibn Hazm plays with words; what does not occupy space cannot be measured, so the walker passes through an infinite space.

(2) Two bodies touch at a point; in each this point is an atom.

Answer: The point or surface which is the limit of a body, is itself liable to division. God did not create the universe by collecting its parts; He said to each part, “Be” and it was. God can divide anything to infinity.

(3) Can God divide a body till there is no “union” left in it and the resultant parts cannot be further divided? The answer must be “yes” and this affirms the atom.

Answer: Creation is not the assembling of parts which is not mentioned in the Qur’ān. God has not created some things which He might have created, a body which cannot be divided, an accident inhering in itself, i.e. things contrary to reason. God can do anything but has not done some things and so has left them impossible; had He done them, men would have known and practised them, like the other things which He has created. Language cannot put any limit to God's Omnipotence; He can do what He wills, even to the furthest limit of human impossibility; even what cannot be understood God can do it.

(4) The parts of one grain of mustard seed are fewer than the parts of two grains or of a mountain; this is a denial of infinites. The orthodox condemn the Dahrīyah (materialists) for affirming that time and the number of persons are infinite.

Answer: The actual is always finite; God can divide a thing to infinity, add to time or the number of persons, but these are only potentials, not yet number and so non-existent.

(5) Is there a sum of the parts of a grain of mustard? Does God know how many there are? Affirmative answers admit the existence of the atom, and denials admit an infinity of things, which is unbelief.

Answer: These questions are about what does not exist; like asking how many children a barren woman has. The answer is that given to the previous problem.³⁵

Less abstruse questions are also dealt with. The substance of the world is one which is differentiated by qualities of two sorts, essential and superficial; the change of wine into vinegar is the change of an essential quality but blushing is a change of a superficial. The spheres and stars do not change and the substance of the world endures, only its form changes. Animals eat food which turns to flesh, blood and dung; the dung turns to earth and this again to plants which are eaten, to begin the circuit again. Elsewhere Ibn Hazm contradicts this and asserts that essential qualities and some non-essential do not change; more than once he says that lead cannot be turned into gold. Magicians cannot turn men into donkeys or lead into gold; if such changes occurred they would be miracles, the work of a prophet. Some things, which God does, can be done by men if they work along His lines, e.g. the preparation of salt. Some things seem to change, like a drop of ink in water but this is only seeming; if the drop is big enough, it is the water which seems to change, Nazzām said that one object moved faster than another because it leaped over some space while the slower object passed through it. Ibn Hazm allows this to happen with light because a distant action is seen before the noise of it is heard; then he goes on to argue that there is no interval between willing and acting.³⁶

Accidents vary in degree, bodies do not; but bodies act though accidents cannot.³⁷ Motion is not seen, only colour.³⁸ Ibn Hazm does not agree that rest is strain (al-sukūn ḥarkat i‘timād), an absurd idea.³⁹ The centre of the earth is below, absolutely; nothing can be underneath it.⁴⁰ God is always creating the whole universe without destroying what already exists.⁴¹ Some say that at the first creation all was in motion because it passed from non-being to being; an absurd idea for motion is from a place and not-being is not a place.⁴² Once a man has been created he cannot become nothing; his body goes back to the earth and his soul to paradise or hell.⁴³ Some say that the earth stands on a fish, the fish on the horn of a bull, the bull on a rock, the rock on the shoulder of an angel, the angel on darkness, and the darkness on God knows what. This is impossible because it makes the world infinite. Others say that when God made the world, He made a great body to hold it up, destroyed this body at the moment of creation and created another and so on. The argument being that such support is possible because at creation a body is neither moving nor at rest.⁴⁴ Ibn Hazm prefers to say that God upholds the world by His power.⁴⁵ The nature (dhāt) of God is above human comprehension⁴⁶ and His knowledge differs in kind from that of men.⁴⁷ Ibn Hazm condemns mystics of all religions by affirming that religion has no inner secret.⁴⁸

Theologians differed about the non-existent; the discussion here is in the form of a dialogue. “Does faith exist in Abū Jahl?” “No, it does not”. “Is this non-existent faith good or bad?” If they say, “Neither”, we ask, “Can faith be other than good?” If they say, “Good”, then Abū Jahl has in himself something good. Again, “Is the unbelief, which is not in the prophets, bad?” If they say, “No”, they admit an unbelief which is not bad. If they say, “Yes”, they admit that qualities exist in the non-existent.⁴⁹ Ibn Hazm is only playing with words.

Theologians found it hard to explain the change from unbelief to belief. The problem was bedevilled by the theory of “capacity”. This was due to the mechanical interpretation of a verse in the Qur’ān (III: 97) which says that the pilgrimage is a duty for those who can perform it, meaning, those who can afford it and are not otherwise prevented. This “ability” has been generalised into something attached to every act. Some thought that capacity was before the act, which involved the unbeliever being able to believe while still an unbeliever, which is absurd; others held that capacity was with the act, which denied to the unbeliever the possibility of believing. Ibn Hazm's own view is that the possibility of conversion rests on a double capacity:

(i) Soundness of body and mind combined with an absence of obstacles;

(ii) help from God which sets the act in motion.⁵⁰

This means that at the moment of conversion a man unites in himself the two contraries of faith and unbelief as a result of this special help—in Christian terms—of grace.

Opinions about the next world are confused. A believer, who has not committed a great sin, yet has repented of venial sins, will have these forgiven and go straight to Paradise, however many his misdeeds. One, who has committed a great sin without repenting, will have his work weighed; if good predominate, all else is ignored and he goes straight to Paradise. It is obvious that “straight to Paradise” means after the Judgment. One, whose works just balance, will be in al-A‘rāf for a space and will then enter Paradise. When sins predominate, he is punished in the Fire—anything from one whiff to 50,000 years—and then enters Paradise through the intercession of the Prophet and the mercy of God. An unbeliever is punished in the Fire for his unbelief and for his sins, so there are degrees of punishment.⁵¹ At present only prophets and martyrs are in Paradise and the Fire is empty.⁵²

Some of the statements about history are curious. The sooth-sayers ceased to function when Muḥammad came forward as a prophet.⁵³ The document which he wished to write during his last illness would have appointed Abū Bakr his successor.⁵⁴ Some of the Companions, who fell at Uḥud, drank wine on the morning of the battle.⁵⁵ Some of Muḥammad's sayings about children were said before he knew the truth of the matter through revelation.⁵⁶

No attempt is made here to deal systematically with Ibn Hazm as a lawyer; he delighted in inventing unlikely problems. One of the least unreasonable is whether it is a crime to take from a man goods or money which he has acquired unlawfully. If a man died while fasting, his legal representative might or ought to finish the fast for him.⁵⁷ Contrary to the view of the Kawārij, unavoidable ignorance of the law was a valid excuse for not keeping it; the Emigrants in Abyssinia proved this.⁵⁸ The head of the state might suffer from bodily infirmities.⁵⁹

He has a little to say about education. A jurist in Spain would study the Mudawwanah and perhaps the Mustakrajah of Muḥammad b. Aḥmad al-Qurṭubī and was then qualified. Abū Bakr Muḥammad b. Sāliḥ al-Abharī (d. 375 a.h.) said that such a man had no right to give legal opinions.⁶⁰ A certain Abu 'l-Qāsim said that books of speculation ought not to be sold for they might not be true, while the Qur’ān and books of Tradition might be sold because they were true.⁶¹ A popular reader of the Qur’ān in Cordoba, while working with a pupil read taḥīdun instead of tahīdu (L: 19) the student reported this to a scholar Yahyā b. Mujāhid al-Fazāri (d. 366 a.h.) who corrected the teacher: note added that the reader “had no syntax”.⁶² A preacher, while delivering his Friday sermon recited ‘anantum in place of ‘anittum in verse IX: 128 and when someone complained, took the critic to his house, fetched his copy of the text and showed him ‘anantum written there. Unfortunately the ink was still wet!⁶³ The idea that women might be prophetesses was modern and centered on Cordoba.⁶⁴

Several instances of inconsistency have already been quoted; here are others. If a man consults two or more jurists and their answers differ, he must not choose the one he prefers; neither the easiest because it is the least inconvenient for him, nor the strictest because it is the most meritorious: he should do nothing and God will forgive him because he does not know.⁶⁵ On the other hand, when two traditions contradict each other to think that both may be ignored is wrong.⁶⁶ The words, “If you ascribe partners to God, your work will be in vain” (Qur’ān, XXXIX: 65) were addressed to Muḥammad. In them God gave a ruling in case certain things should happen though He knew that they would not happen.⁶⁷ Yet Ibn Hazm can say that nothing is more futile than speculation about what can never happen.⁶⁸ He follows the orthodox doctrine that truth and falsehood are what they are because God has so made them, yet he can say that falsehood is false in its own nature.⁶⁹ Desertion by God (kadhlān) is not mentioned in the Qur’ān⁷⁰ so there is no such thing yet many paragraphs of the book end with “may God desert them”.

Notes

1. al-Fiṣal fi ’l-Milal wa ’l-Ahwā’ wa ’l-Niḥal, Cairo, 1317-21 A.H., V: 14.

2. al-Iḥkām fi Uṣūl al-Aḥkām, Cairo, 1345-47 A.H., V: 166-7.

3. al-Fiṣal, V: 6.

4. al-Iḥkām, I: 35.

5. ibid., I: 31-4.

6. ibid., IV: 167.

7. al-Fiṣal, III: 76-7.

8. ibid., III: 88 ff.

9. ibid., II: 134; British Museum MS. Or. 843, folio 142r.

10. al-Iḥkām, I: 79.

11. al-Fiṣal, IV: 18.

12. ibid., V: 49.

13. ibid., II: 134.

14. ibid., III: 113.

15. ibid., III: 252.

16. ibid., V; 128-9; Or. 843, folio 215r.

17. ibid., V: 74-8, 91-2.

18. ibid., V: 128.

19. al-Iḥkām, VIII: 122.

20. ibid., VIII: 130.

21. ibid., I: 28.

22. ibid., VIII: 106.

23. ibid., VIII: 129.

24. ibid., I: 52.

25. al-Fiṣal, V: 108-9.

26. ibid., III: 76 and 116, V: 109, 114 and 125.

27. ibid., IV: 38-9.

28. al-Iḥkām, VIII: 112-3.

29. al-Fiṣal, Or. 843, folio 143r.

30. al-Iḥkām, IV: 157-162.

31. ibid., II: 99 and 134.

32. al-Fiṣal, V: 1191-2.

33. ibid., V: 131.

34. ibid., V: 27 ff.

35. ibid., V: 92 ff.

36. ibid., V: 65 and 78, Or. 843, folio 143r.

37. al-Iḥkām, VIII: 131.

38. al-Fiṣal, V: 58.

39. ibid., V: 56.

40. ibid., II: 99.

41. ibid., V: 55.

42. ibid., V: 57.

43. al-Iḥkām, VII: 85.

44. al-Fiṣal, II: 94 and IV: 221.

45. ibid., V: 58.

46. ibid., V: 35.

47. ibid., V: 109.

48. ibid., II: 116.

49. ibid., V: 44.

50. ibid., III: 52 ff.

51. ibid., IV: 45-6 and 54.

52. ibid., III: 135.

53. ibid., V: 17.

54. al-Iḥkām, VII: 124.

55. ibid., VII: 202-3.

56. al-Fiṣal, IV: 76.

57. al-Iḥkām, II: 66 and III: 59.

58. al-Fiṣal, IV: 60.

59. ibid., IV: 167.

60. al-Iḥkām, V: 129.

61. ibid., VI: 174.

62. ibid., IV: 163.

63. ibid., IV: 164.

64. al-Fiṣal, V: 17.

65. al-Iḥkām, VI: 159-60.

66. ibid., II: 38.

67. al-Fiṣal, III: 260.

68. ibid., III: 256.

69. ibid., III: 74 ff.

70. ibid., III: 162.