[In the following review, Gauthier contends that Zinn makes a well-argued case for immediate withdrawal from Vietnam, a position many critics of the war privately support.]

The most considerable merit of this critique of American involvement in Vietnam is that it presents a clearly argued case for what most critics of the Vietnamese war believe but will not say—that America should withdraw now. Howard Zinn, a Professor of Government at Boston University, rejects the so-called realism of those who muffle their criticism, calling for de-escalation, negotiation, or other half-way measures. Against them he quotes Wendell Phillips—“We must ask for the whole loaf, to get the half of it” (p. 119). The argument that withdrawal is not politically feasible rests on a misunderstanding of the decision-making process. What is possible depends on interests; if enough people demand withdrawal, then political leaders can come to have a sufficient interest to support withdrawal.

But why should withdrawal be demanded? Zinn develops his argument in three stages. First, he attempts to enlarge our perspective of the war, by viewing it from the position of an outsider—the Japanese, and an alienated insider—the American Negro, and from the historical perspective of great power behaviour. In themselves, these chapters are not likely to affect thinking about Vietnam. Although Zinn has evidently been much influenced by his own exposure to these differing perspectives, he can not convey, in a few pages, the impact of protracted experience.

Zinn then turns to what may be called the positive case for American involvement—that it is directed to the creation of a free and progressive society in Vietnam. Zinn shows convincingly that this argument has the character of a never fulfilled but ever repeated promissory note. Social change is always just around the corner; the last attempt has, alas, failed, but a new one is at hand, and surely it will succeed. This thinking, dear to those American liberals who support the Johnson administration, is exposed as continuing self-deception. “Liberal presidents and vice-presidents proclaim that “reform” will be administered by dictators and plutocrats. The result is that American statesmen who are “liberals” at home will sustain a state of terror abroad by surrounding it with the promise of change. The change then turns out to be spurious and picayune, but the devastation which accompanies it is not at all spurious and is dealt out on a grand scale” (p. 48). How much of American foreign policy—not in Vietnam alone but throughout Asia and Latin America—rests on this dishonest foundation!

In the third stage of his argument, Zinn considers the claims of those who insist that involvement in Vietnam is required to combat the evil and aggressive actions of others. First, he examines the moral issues, and shows that there can be no real equation of the moral evils undoubtedly perpetrated by the Vietcong, in massacring village officials, with the evils perpetrated by America, in killing entire village populations. As he summarily puts it, “there can be no justification in carrying on a military action which kills most of the people we claim to be defending” (p. 65).

Next he rebuts the official theory that the conflict is caused by North Vietnamese aggression. What is in doubt is not “the indigenous strength of the Vietcong”, but rather “the indigenous nature of the force attempting to put down the Vietcong” (p. 79). “Almost everybody in the world but Americans could see that, whatever the character of the Vietcong, they were Vietnamese, while the Americans, destroying land and people on a frightening scale, were the only ones who matched the accusation of “outside aggression” (p. 80).

Finally, he turns to the “domino theory” or “Munich analogy”. Zinn argues that the consequences either of crushing Communism in Vietnam, or of creating a unified Communist state in that country are neither obvious nor predictable, and that neither the security of America nor the stability of south-east Asia can be shown to depend in any significant way on either outcome.

Why not withdrawal, then? Zinn disposes of those who claim that American prestige would suffer too heavily. First, American prestige is suffering as a consequence of involvement; it could hardly suffer more from withdrawal. Second, in the words of George Kennan, withdrawal “would be a six months' sensation, but I dare say we would survive it in the end, and there would be another day. Things happen awfully fast on the international scene, and people's memories are very short …” (p. 105). Let the Vietnamese negotiate their own settlement.

There seem to me two evident weaknesses in Zinn's study. The first, to some extent imposed by its brevity, is a failure to examine in sufficient depth the grounds for America's failure in Vietnam. Why has America adopted a policy which imposes great harm on the unfortunate Vietnamese yet fails to secure compensating benefits either for Vietnam or for America? Why has America intervened to combat a nationalist-communist movement in a far corner of the world?

Perhaps the disagreement between critics and advocates of American policy in Vietnam rests on a deeper disagreement about the underlying objectives of American foreign policy—a disagreement which Zinn does not consider, and which may affect the relevance of his analysis and his proposals. If, to take a not absurd possibility, America's real aim is to establish a secure foot-hold in south-east Asia to use as a base for ultimate intervention in China, then a quite different critique of American policy is needed.

The second major weakness is Zinn's naivete in discussing the outcome of American withdrawal. He says, for example, that one desirable development in Vietnam would be “the establishment of a government in which not only the NLF, but Buddhist, Montagnard, and other elements play a role. This we will leave to the Buddhist and others to work for; they are quite militant and capable of pressing for their rights” (p. 112). Or again—“Whatever negotiation goes on should be among the Vietnamese themselves, each group negotiating from its own position of strength, undistorted by the strength of the great powers” (p. 114). And this is supported by such remarks as “In September 1966, the NLF reasserted its willingness to work with other Vietnamese groups in a future government, and to desist from reprisals against former foes.”

Maybe so—we can not be sure of the future. But we have heard this kind of talk before, and surely our memories of eastern Europe, China, and even North Vietnam are sufficiently fresh that we can make a fair guess about the character of “negotiations” among the Vietnamese.

The best argument against American withdrawal from Vietnam—whether it is a good argument or not—is not given a fair run for its money by Professor Zinn. The argument is simply that in the long run south-east Asia will prosper more, and the world balance of power will be more stable, if two world powers (the United States and China) retain an interest in the area, than if it is left entirely to the domination of one. The Americans, by their behaviour in Vietnam, are doing their utmost to show that this argument is mistaken, and that south-east Asia might better be left to the Chinese sphere of influence (which by no means entails Chinese military conquest). But on the other hand the Chinese seem bent on demonstrating, by their example of domestic harmony, that the argument has some merit after all.

Any viable proposal for the termination of conflict in Vietnam must recognize that the only choice now open to America is a choice of evils. Zinn promises far more for withdrawal than it can provide, but his argument may succeed in persuading us that it is the least of the available evils.