[In the following essay, MacKenzie reviews Laski's A Grammar of Politics.]

Those who are acquainted with previous writings on political subjects by Mr. Laski will expect much from his new book [A Grammar of Politics], and they will not be disappointed. Perhaps the title of it may prove a little misleading. Some may think that a Grammar should be concerned either with the discussion of fundamental principles or with an account of the way in which they are illustrated in the structure of existing societies. Mr. Laski seems to understand Grammar as being essentially an art; and his book is largely occupied with the exposition of a definite political programme. For the majority of readers this may be a more interesting subject than a purely theoretical one would have been; but it is more difficult to deal with satisfactorily in a philosophical Journal. The book is, however, by no means lacking in theoretical interest; and it is mainly from this point of view that it must be regarded here.

The general basis of Mr. Laski's treatment is not quite easy to characterise. His references to writers on political theory are surprisingly slight. The most definite is to Bentham. He says (p. 24) that his own doctrine 'is a special adaptation of the Benthamite theory to the special needs of our time. It follows Bentham in its insistence that social good is the product of coordinated intelligence; that, though the difficulties be admittedly great, we must plan our way to the end in view. It follows Bentham, also, though from a different basis, in urging that social good means the avoidance of misery and the attainment of happiness. It applies reason, that is, to the task of discovering ways in which wants can be satisfied; and it evaluates the quality of wants according to the degree in which, when satisfied, they minister to the permanent happiness of the whole community. Where it differs from the Utilitarian outlook is in its rejection of the egoistic nature of impulse and the elaborate calculus of pains and pleasures.... Our view is rather, first, that individual good cannot, over a long period, be usefully abstracted from the good of other men and, second, that the value of reason is to be found in the degree to which it makes possible the future, not less than the immediate, harmony of impulses.... Social good is thus such an ordering of our personality that we are driven to search for things it is worth while to obtain that, thereby, we may enrich the great fellowship we serve.' This is somewhat vague; and, as we proceed with the reading of the book, it becomes apparent that some conceptions are made prominent that have little, if any, connection with the teaching of Bentham. Perhaps they are somewhat akin to the view of Prof. Hobhouse. But the idea of co-operative creation is much emphasised throughout; and this appears to bring Mr. Laski's work into close relation to the brilliant writings of Miss M. P. Follett; yet, though he refers to her twice (once to her Creative Experience), neither of his references is to The New State, in which the general doctrine of co-operative creation is most definitely explained and illustrated; and it can hardly be said that he himself supplies any clear and complete explanation and defence of that doctrine. However, if it is not fully explained, it is at least vigorously applied. It may be regarded as a substitute for Rousseau's conception of a 'General Will,' which he rejects (p. 68).

Apart from this conception of co-operative creation, perhaps the most distinctive feature in Mr. Laski's theory lies in the definite province that he assigns to the State. This term is apt to be used in very different senses by different writers. Some—as in the famous phrase that is ascribed to Louis XIV—understand it as meaning the supreme Government. Others tend to identify it, more or less completely, with the whole community. Mr. Laski seeks to avoid both these extremes; but his statements are not quite as definite as one might wish. The following is the clearest that I can find. 'There is a difference,' he says (pp. 26-27), 'between the State and society. The State may set the key-note of the social order, but it is not identical with it.... Granted that, in any ultimate analysis, the real rulers are undiscoverable, the legal source of daily power is resident in those who legislate. .. . In practical life, therefore, the effective source of State-action is the small number of men whose decisions are legally binding upon the community.. .. They are at once the trustees and governors of the whole. . . . Our ultimate allegiance is always to the ideal; and to the legal power that seeks to bind us our loyalty is conditioned by the purpose and substance we can discover in its effort.' Thus I understand his view to be that the State is the community regarded as a single whole in which laws are made and enforced, the validity of which is always subject to the consent of the individual citizens. It is at this point that it is important to understand Mr. Laski's conception of sovereignty.

His view about this has been to a large extent made plain in some of his previous writings, especially The Foundations of Sovereignty. His contention, which is here reinforced, is that it is not possible to point to any one element in the life of a community in which it can properly be held that sovereignty resides. He urges (p. 271) that the citizen's 'ultimate allegiance is not to some collective entity outside himself, but to the ideals his experience has taught him in his conscience to accept. It makes decision his business and his choice.' This seems to imply that the only ultimate sovereign is a man's own conscience, guided by the spiritual traditions of the race. This, however, does not involve anarchy. The community is essentially co-operative: it forms institutions through which welfare is creatively achieved. In general, loyalty to these is the citizen's duty; but he must have perfect liberty to criticise, and, if necessary, to rebel. It is in connection with this right that Mr. Laski is led to emphasise his well-known view about the importance of a complete separation between Church and State. A State Church is his bête noire. 'Religious toleration,' he urges (p. 119), 'cannot be fully attained so long as a State maintains special relations with a given Church.' It seems to me that this contention is somewhat unduly emphasised by Mr. Laski; though, of course, his plea for toleration must be cordially approved. The special prestige that attaches to the State Church in England, against which he so strongly protests, is due to obvious historical circumstances, and cannot properly be used as a ground for attacking all national institutions of a religious character. Mr. Laski does not appear to have any similar objection to national schools; and in that case it is pretty obvious that no special prestige is attached. Might it not be maintained that it is the duty of the State to provide some form of civic education for adults, and would not this have at least a quasi-religious character? It might even be urged that Mr. Laski's conception of man's chief end as lying in the achievement of what he calls 'happiness in a creative sense' (p. 98) is essentially a religious conception; and perhaps a hostile critic might suggest that what Mr. Laski really contends for is that there should be no State religion except his own. I do not urge this; but I do not find it altogether easy to understand, apart from the question of special prestige, on what grounds it is to be held that religion should be regarded as lying entirely outside of the province of the State. Is it really possible to make a sharp division between the things of Caesar and the things of God?

The complete exclusion of religion tends to concentrate attention on the purely legal and economic aspects of the nation's life; and on the latter, in particular, Mr. Laski supplies a great deal of interesting material. He says roundly (p. 587) that 'politics includes economics'. He is not a communist, and it is only in a rather wide sense that he can be described as a socialist. He appears to have a good deal of sympathy with the Guild socialists, but criticises several of their proposals (pp. 544 sqq.). He emphasises, like Veblen, Tawney and others, the evils that are generated in an 'acquisitive society'; but he defends private property when it is definitely associated with service. Perhaps he treats it a little too much as a reward of service, rather than as an instrument of service; but he urges that, on either of these grounds, it is not easy, in general, to justify its inheritance (pp. 527 seq.). This can only be approved when there are specific grounds for the assignment of property to some particular persons, such as a wife or children or others who are competent to use it for the common good. His suggestions about this are interesting; and his proposals seem, on the whole, equitable. The chief doubt would be on practical grounds, especially as to whether any authority could decide on the propriety of particular bequests in a way that would be recognised as just. But this is a problem for the practical statesman. In general, it is not apparent that there is any essential difference between the relations of the State to economic problems and its relations to those that are more purely spiritual or cultural. In both cases it is comparatively easy to see what are the desirable ends, but very difficult to see how they are to be secured without complex regulations that would generate a regrettable amount of friction and interference with individual freedom. In both cases it would seem that some degree of compromise must be allowed in practice.

The problem of international relations is dealt with by Mr. Laski in a particularly comprehensive and thorough fashion. He has evidently made a careful study of the working of the League of Nations, and has far-reaching hopes for its future development. He speaks confidently (p. 227) about 'the disappearance of the sovereign nation-State,' and believes that it is quite 'possible to administer and to legislate internationally'. He thinks that the League may already almost be described as containing the beginnings of a super-State (p. 588); though it has to be admitted that it is not as yet 'a super-State in any administrative sense of the word' (p. 625). In connection with this he emphasises the need of 'a liberal education in that cosmopolitan outlook which the needs of humanity have made so essential' (p. 642). He thinks that this is gained in the working of the League. But would it not be well to supplement it in other ways? If so, this seems to supply an additional reason for doubting whether States can afford to stand altogether aloof from the spiritual and cultural aspects of life.

The book as a whole is undoubtedly very able, interesting, forcible and clearly written. There are a considerable number of small misprints in it; but they can be easily detected. I have found the Index somewhat inadequate.