SOURCE: Gerato, Erasmo G. “Reality of Illusion and Illusion of Reality in Leopardi's Zibaldone.” South Atlantic Bulletin 41, no. 2 (May 1976): 117-25.

[In the following essay, Gerato traces Leopardi's increasingly negative assessment of reason, which the poet came to identify as the source of humanity's unhappiness.]

Illusion is perhaps the most essential element in the pensiero of Leopardi, becoming in the end the sole concept capable of rendering life bearable not only for the poet himself but for all of humanity as well.

This study aims at tracing the theme of illusion in the development of Leopardi's thought, especially in relation to one of the poet's least-known works, the Zibaldone. We shall further attempt to show how momentous the presence of illusion was for the poet and how with the passing of time its importance increased.¹

Reflecting on reason as it contrasts with nature, Leopardi mentions, for the first time the word illusione in the Zibaldone, which bears the date 1818. From this point on, it is evident that in the opinion of the poet, illusion is not only desirable and gratifying to man, but absolutely necessary if he is to achieve any greatness in life: “Voglio dire che uno uomo tanto meno o tanto più difficilmente sarà grande, quanto più sarà dominato dalla ragione: chè pochi possono essere grandi (e nelle arti e nella poesia forse nessuno) se non dominati dalle illusioni.”² Thus, not only must there be illusion, “e senza le illusioni qual grandezza ci può essere o sperarsi?” (Zib. I, p. 20), but nature itself, which in his later writings Leopardi will transform into a malevolent and deceiving element,³ at this point is still friendly towards man and is “big” in contrast to the “smallness” of reason: “La ragione è nemica d' ogni grandezza: la ragione è nemica della natura: la natura è grande, la ragione è piccola” (Zib. I, p. 19). For Leopardi not only will reason always remain “small” but with the passing of time and with the progression of his thought, reason will acquire an ever more negative aspect and will be identified by the poet as the true source of all man's miseries. In order to illustrate further the contrast between nature and reason, the poet gives the example of a sickly boy who is “assolutamente sfidato e morrà di certo fra pochi giorni” (Zib. I, p. 20). According to reason, the family of the dying boy should stop feeding him, for not only will the nourishment be useless to the boy, but it will also be detrimental to his family which is utterly destitute. Yet according to nature, on whose side firmly also stands religion, to let this young man starve to death would be a most cruel and barbarous act. The result is, therefore, that man places himself on the side of religion and of nature inasmuch as “essa è grande.”

Although at this point Leopardi extols nature and still considers her benevolent toward man, we begin to discern a new concept of nature; that is, of nature which, as a malevolent force, is constantly oppressing mankind. Thus, the young man is kept alive and consequently in a state of constant suffering on account of this malevolent nature.

The theme of illusion was first treated in a poem entitled, l'Appressamento della morte. He wrote it, so he says: “in undici giorni tutta senza interruzioni … nel Novembre e Decembre del 1816” (Op. I, p. 281). Feeling death close to him, Leopardi is suddenly, and for the first time in his life, faced with the emptiness of his existence and with the total shattering of his childhood illusions of love and glory. In order to leave a testimonial of his erudition, the poet earnestly sets out to write the cantica.

The poem, written in the Dantean terza rima, is divided in five cantos and is allegorical in content. Finding himself in a delightful field too beautiful even to describe (Op. I, p. 256), the young poet is caught by a sudden and terrifying storm. An angel appears to him announcing his imminent death and beckoning him to contemplate a vision whereby the poet sees those who are damned because of love, avarice, errors, war, and tyranny. In the fourth canto the poet watches a procession during which oblivion mounts an obscure cart pulled by turtles, followed by those who in life strove for fame and glory. Before the final admonishment of the angel, the poet sees the blessed souls among whom are: Dante, Petrarch, Tasso, and finally Christ Himself. The last canto, which contains the inspirational motive of the poem, presents Leopardi in a state of continuous despair. Even though he has been shown by the symbolic vision how vain the acquisition of earthly ideals or substances really is, the poet cannot help but despair: his life has passed so swiftly and he will soon die without having created any literary masterpiece.

The poem has little poetic value, and perhaps this is the reason why Pietro Giordani, to whom Leopardi had sent a copy, after praising the poetic composition, discouraged his young friend from publishing it. Commenting on the same poem, inasmuch as it is the first original poetic composition of Leopardi, Piero Bigongiari states that it is on account of the very presence of illusion that poetry is born in Leopardi, “col sentimento dell'illusione nasce proprio quella presentita illusione che è la poesia.”⁴

As for the many places in the poem where Leopardi imitates directly Dante, Petrarch, or Tasso,⁵ we wish to relate at least one example. From the Dantesque episode of Paolo and Francesca, Leopardi draws the episode of Ugo d'Este, in which Ugo's father Niccolò kills his wife and Ugo, who had fallen into incestuous love:

Ma un dì fui sol con quella in muto loco
e bramava in lontano e non volea,
e palpitava, e 'l volto era di foco,
e al fine un punto fu che 'l cor non resse,
tanto ch'i' dissi: T'amo, e 'l dir fu roco.

(Op. I, p. 263, 11. 116-120)

Yet, unlike the Dantean episode where it is a woman who speaks, namely Francesca, here it is a man who narrates his tragic adventure. In addition, the double murder committed by the husband is a much more cruel and deplorable action since the real act of love had never taken place,

Poi nulla i' fei, ma tanto più che pria
divampò 'l foco al soffio di speranza,
ch'arder le vene e i polsi i' mi sentia.

(Op. I, p. 263, 11. 124-126)

Clearly, one cannot speak of a sin that has been committed as in the episode of Paolo and Francesca; if anything, if we wish to consider one, it would be the sin of hope or of illusion; whereby the lover deludes himself in believing that perhaps soon he will have the love of his lady, “divampò 'l foco al soffio di speranza.”

Returning to the theme of illusion, we may conclude by stating that the poem marks the first momentous step in Leopardi's development of the “illusion” motif. The poet, who at this time still retains much of his childhood Christian beliefs, is suddenly faced with the picture of his true existence; that is, the shattering of all his juvenile illusions, his desire for glory, love, happiness, and calls out to them:

Addio speranze, addio vago conforto
del poco viver mio già trapassa: …
E tu pur Gloria, addio, che già s'abbassa
mio tenebroso giorno e cade omai,
e mia vita sul mondo ombra non lassa.

(Op. I, p. 280, 11. 79-80; 82-84)

An attentive reading reveals that the above is not to be considered a desperate call; on the contrary, the above verses show the sincerity of the poet, as do the following ones with which he calls on his Creator and his Virgin Mother for help and comfort:

A te mi volgo, O Padre, o Re supremo
o Creatore o Servatore o Santo.
Tutto son tuo …
O Vergin Diva …
deh tu soccorri lo spirito lasso.

(Op. I, p. 281, 11. 95-97; 106; 109)

Thus, Leopardi accepts death but only because man is powerless against it; for in the end, as Chiarini also noted, he still prefers the miseries of this world to the beatitudes of the next, “Si sente che il poeta anche dopo la visione, preferisce le miserie di questo mondo alla beatitudine celeste. Verrà tempo, e non lontano, ch'egli invocherà la morte sinceramente ma allora ahimè non crederà più nella vita futura.”⁶

With the partial return of his health, Leopardi realizes that his life is not over, as he had feared, and that once again he must find the strength to face the bitter reality of existence. Just as he had been in his childhood, Leopardi is aware of the fact that the only possible way out is the return to illusions for, “l'avvenire è come le cose lontane, bello nell' incertezza, misero nella realtà.”⁷

Having come face to face with the bitter reality, which he calls “l'arido vero,” from this moment on Leopardi finds that his existence, and the strength and will to continue this wretched and miserable life of his, rest purely on a paradoxical concept which will govern the remainder of his days, namely, the vanity of illusion as contrasted with the harshness of reality.

Il più solido piacere di questa vita è il piacere vano delle illusioni. Io considero, le illusioni come cosa in certo modo reale stante ch'elle sono ingredienti essenziali del sistema della natura umana, e date dalla natura a tutti quanti gli uomini, in maniera che non è lecito spregiarlo come sogni di un solo, ma propri veramente dell'uomo e voluti dalla natura, e senza cui la vita nostra sarebbe la più misera e barbara cosa ec. …”

(Zib. I, p. 78)

This, I feel, is the most exalted and refined statement that the poet leaves us in all of his works with regard to the importance of illusion in man's life. If we analyze more closely the above citation, we find that his thought rests basically on the paradox “solido piacere—piacere vano.” It is precisely in that word vano where lies all the misery and unhappiness of the poet. Up to this moment, Leopardi had found in illusion a true escape and has believed in its existence and importance in life. At the present, however, although he still considers illusion necessary to his survival and does still believe in it, how different is this belief! Contrary to the past, the poet is fully conscious of himself. In short, we might say that Leopardi has reached a point when his ragione is certainly overshadowing his sentimento. The poet knows that the only possible pleasure left to mankind is the illusion of that pleasure; however, and this is the dreadful paradox, he is also conscious of the fact that this illusion is vain because in itself it is nothing but illusion within an illusion.

Here lies the tragedy of Leopardi's life: All of his pleasures stem from a knowledge of the nonexistence of these pleasures; all of his optimism stems from an utter acceptance of a pessimistic reality of things. It would be true to say that from this time on, ironically enough, the more the poet comes to realize the vanity of a certain illusion, the greater pleasure this illusion will bring him.

Using the above statement as a basic premise, we can almost⁸ arrive at the formulation of a logical system in Leopardi's thought: Illusions become indispensable for man if he is to achieve any great deeds, for as we saw already, without illusions there will never be greatness of thought nor great deeds—“senza le quali non cisarà quasi mai grandezza di pensieri, nè forza e impeto e ardore d'animo, nè grandi azioni che per lo più son pazzie” (Zib. I, p. 31). Indeed the absence of illusions coupled with the progress of reason generates barbarism in man: “E però non c'è dubbio che i progressi della ragione e lo spegnimento delle illusioni producono le barbarie” (Zib. I, p. 32). Not only are illusions necessary to keep mankind from becoming barbarous, but they are inherent to the natural system of the world: “Le illusioni sono in natura, inerenti al sistema del mondo, tolte via affatto o quasi affatto, l'uomo è snaturato” (Zib. I, p. 32). As a part of the system of the world, illusions are necessary for the happiness and perfection of mankind: “Vengo a dimostrare ch'elle appartengono sostanzialmente al sistema naturale, e all'ordine delle cose, e sono essenziali e necessarie alla felicità e perfezione dell'uomo” (Zib. I, p. 728). Thus Leopardi concludes by saying that, since pleasure cannot be found in reality, one turns to imagination, which is the source of both hope and illusion: “Il piacere infinito che non si può trovare nella realtà si trova così nella immaginazione, della quale derivano la speranza, le illusioni” (Zib. I, p. 183). Man lives only because of religion and illusion, for if we were to take these elements away from him, the human race would willingly destroy itself, a concept which Leopardi will once again take up when he writes his first Operetta Morale, “Storia del Genere Umano.” “L'uomo non vive che di religione o d'illusioni … tolta la religione e le illusioni radicalmente, ogni uomo, anzi ogni fanciullo alla prima facoltà di ragionare … si ucciderebbe infallibilmente di propria mano, e la razza nostra sarebbe spenta nel suo nascere per necessità ingenita, e sostanziale” (Zib. I, p. 223).

Leopardi sees himself as an integral part of mankind and his suffering as part of the universal suffering of man. In fact, like the shepherd of one of his later poems, Leopardi goes as far as to say that life is full of sorrow and anguish:

Questo io conosco e sento,
che degli eterni giri,
che dell'esser mio frale,
qualche bene o contento
avrà fors'altri; a me la vita è male.

(Op. I, p. 106, 11. 100-104)

As the above quoted poem ends, the poet becomes ever more aware that his suffering is not at all different from that of any other man and that perhaps even the gregge towards which the poet had felt envy before, “quanta invidia ti porto!” is not really free of pain and toil. Realizing all this, the poet not only joins his suffering to that of every other human being but also to that of every living creature to be found in nature. Thus he concludes pessimistically, but still preserving a ray of hope masterfully expressed by the word forse:

Forse in qual forma, in quale
stato che sia, dentro covile o cuna,
è funesto a chi nasce il dì natale.

(Op. I, p. 108, 11. 141-143)

It is on account of the poet's constant and complete awareness that “è funesto a chi nasce il dì natale” that illusions acquire an even more extraordinary value and importance for man, and even though they may be only vanity, the poet will incessantly strive to defend them and to keep them alive.

Thus in speaking to the garzoncello scherzoso of “Il Sabato del Villaggio” and realizing that life will certainly not be as beautiful nor as free from toil and pain as it is at this moment, the poet wishes to hide the bitter truth of reality from the boy and therefore tells him to enjoy himself: “Godi, fanciullo mio; stato soave, / stagion lieta è cotesta” (Op. I, p. 113, 11. 48-49). The poet urges the child to enjoy his world, thus keeping illusions alive in his mind: “Altro dirti non vo'; ma la tua festa / ch'anco tardi a venir non ti sia grave” (Op. I, p. 113, 11. 50-51).

Perhaps the example which best shows us Leopardi's concern for humanity and his heartfelt desire to keep illusions alive in man, since they are his only salvation, can be found in one of his Operette Morali entitled “Dialogo di un venditore d'almanacchi e di un passaggero,” which he wrote in 1832, five years before his death. Leopardi draws the material for his operetta from his own reflections on a passage of the Zibaldone.⁹ When the dialogue begins, we find a vendor of almanacs who is in a happy frame of mind mainly because he remains in his natural and primitive state of a “nonthinker.” This relates to a passage in the Zibaldone where the author, speaking on the nature of man, says that, “ci sono tre maniere di veder le cose” (Zib. I, p. 128). In other words, there are in this world three different kinds of men: the genius, the vulgar man and the philosopher, or man of sentiments (Zib. I, p. 129).

It is to the second group, or to the vulgar men, that the vendor of almanacs belongs. This group, according to the poet, is the most natural of all and the most happy, although doomed to accomplish no great deeds (Zib. I, p. 129).

The dialogue may be divided into three distinct parts. The first, shows us the vendor in his “natural state of contentedness”; the second part may be called the “shattering of the illusions,” brought about by the questions of the passerby; and the third, “the return of the illusions” and of happiness itself.

As long as the vendor does not reason or think about his existence, he is relatively happy, and optimism reigns in all of his answers: “Più, più assai,” he answers, for instance, to the passerby's questions on whether the coming year is going to be happier than the one just ended.

The second stage of the dialogue occurs when the vendor is forced to use his ragione in answering the question: “Non vi piacerebb'egli che l'anno nuovo fosse come qualcuno di questi anni ultimi?” In fact, through the use of reason, activated by the questions of the passerby, the vendor of almanacs is forced to see more and more clearly how unhappy the past has been, not only for himself, but probably for all of mankind as well. It is at this point that we reach the nadir of the once optimistic outlook of the vendor.

The passerby, who undoubtedly represents Leopardi himself, begins to feel pity and compassion for this man once he has succeeded in casting him into such a wretched state of mind. At this point he advises him to do what he will counsel other men to do in his Ginestra, that is, to join in sorrow with his fellow man and do his utmost to comfort and to aid him against the adverse blows of nature. Thus the passerby renders to the vendor his previously lost illusion:

Quella vita ch'è una cosa bella, non è la vita che si conosce, ma quella che non si conosce; non la vita passata, ma la futura. Coll'anno nuovo, il caso incomincerà a trattar bene voi e me e tutti gli altri, e si principierà la vita felice. Non è vero?

(Op. I, p. 662)

It is not necessary to ask ourselves if the passerby truly believed in the above statement for, if forced to answer, he would probably answer negatively. What matters at this point is that he does succeed in his intentions. The vendor in fact does answer with the word speriamo, which is all we desire to hear.

For a moment we seem to be present at the opening of Pandora's box—all evils have been cast loose all over the world—but at the sight of hope, which lingers helplessly behind, we too utter that one word: speriamo.

In Leopardi we see therefore the clear distinction between two realities: the true reality, or the world in which we live (nature), and the false reality, which is the world of illusion. The first is characterized by the life of man, who is doomed to suffering and pain; the second is characterized by our aspirations and ideals which, even though they will never be fulfilled, at least bring to man temporary joy and relief from the never ending noia.

In the end, even though “religione, natura o l'esistenza medesima” might be considered evil forces by Leopardi, he remains an apostle of optimism precisely because of his strong faith in illusions.

In fact, illusions, especially le grandi illusioni of love and glory, remain in the end the element which not only will give the poet the strength to go on living, but will also endear him to us. Through them he leaves us a ray of hope, even though the darkness of l'arido vero, the true barrenness, is all around us.

Notes

1. As Chiarini states in his book, Vita di Giacomo Leopardi (Firenze, 1921), p. 131; “Leggendo lo Zibaldone, noi assistiamo giorno per giorno agli studi dell'autore, all'erudirsi della sua mente, allo svolgersi del suo pensiero, e per affetto di esso, alla trasformazione della sua coscienza.”

2. Giacomo Leopardi, Zibaldone di Pensieri (Verona, 1945), I, p. 19. Hereafter cited in the text as Zib.

3. “O natura, natura, / perchè non rendi poi / quel che prometti allor? Perchè di tanto / inganni i figli tuoi?” Giacomo Leopardi, Opere (Milano—Napoli, 1956), I, p. 94. Hereafter cited in the text as Op.

4. Piero Bigongiari, Leopardi (Firenze, 1962), p. 37.

5. This may recall to our mind what Galimberti once wrote: “Il Leopardi raccolse assai presto l'eredità dei poeti che lo precedettero, prima ancora di formulare una sua teoria dello stile.” Cesare Galimberti, Linguaggio del vero in Leopardi (Firenze, 1959), p. 156.

6. Chiarini, Vita, p. 31.

7. Lino Lazzarini, Storia della crisi di Giacomo Leopardi (Padova, 1941), p. 113.

8. I have said “almost” because Leopardi never did arrive at a formulation of this system or any other logical deductive or inductive correlated system. For this reason Leopardi cannot be considered a philosopher. The thoughts that I have here tried to collect do not logically follow each other in the Zibaldone but were expressed at random by the poet without any intentional connection with each other.

9. “Io ho dimandato a parecchi se sarebbero stati contenti di tornare a rifare la vita passata, con patto di rifarla né più né meno quale la prima volta. L'ho dimandato anche sovente a me stesso. Quanto al tornare indietro a vivere, ed io e tutti gli altri sarebbero stati contentissimi; ma con questo patto, nessuno … Vuol dire che nella vita che abbiamo sperimentata e che conosciamo con certezza, tutti abbiamo provato più male che bene; e che se non ci contentiamo ed anche desideriamo di vivere ancora, ciò non è per l'ignoranza del futuro, è per una illusione della speranza, senza la quale illusione e ignoranza non vorremmo più vivere, come mai non vorremmo rivivere nel mondo che siamo vissuti.” (Zibaldone, II, p. 1118). Underlining in text is mine.