[In the following essay, Bonadeo explores the two phases of Leopardi's views on nature; the poet originally considered nature a benign force, but later began to see nature as hostile toward humanity.]

The concept of nature in Leopardi's work has been, and still is controversial. Nature, and fate in Leopardi's poetical works were interpreted by De Sanctis as «due persone poetiche sotto le quali si nasconde una concezione del mondo essenzialmente materialista»¹. This materialistic view of nature as an impersonal force governing blindly man's life met with great favor among future critics, and was also applied to Leopardi's prose, specifically to that part that is said to represent the last phase of his thought. Recent and current criticism does in fact refer to two phases in the development of Leopardi's concept of nature: an earlier one representing nature as beneficial to man, and a later one representing it as hostile to mankind². This second phase has considerably exercised the imagination of the critics. According to Blasucci, for instance, in the Dialogo della natura e di un Islandese (1824) «natura rivela finalmente il suo volto malefico, assumendo definitivamente su di sé … attributi di crudeltà o indifferenza»³. The type of nature represented by Leopardi's meditations between 1825 and 1829 has been defined as «un meccanismo inconsciente e non-provvidenziale,» responsible for the «inevitabile vicenda biologica che condanna gli esseri viventi o alla morte immatura … o ad una sopravvivenza non più allietata dalla speranza»⁴. Nature's antagonism toward man has been characterized not only as a physical entity, but also as a negative social force⁵. Very recently a critic, Sergio Solmi, has sought to break down the prevailing stark chronological dichotomy between the concept of a benevolent nature shaped by Leopardi during the years preceding the composition of the Operette morali and a malevolent one emerging first from the Operette and again in the later entries of the Zibaldone. This critic suggested that two dissimilar notions of nature are indeed detectable, but that they do not belong to separate chronological phases because they are traceable throughout the whole development of Leopardi's thought. One notion, defined by Solmi as «principio informatore» of life, represents «lo sviluppo vitale nella sua spontaneità»; the other is the «inesplicabile potenza creatrice e distruggitrice.» Solmi's hypothesis seems to be the most valid and fruitful among those advanced so far by the interpreters of Leopardi's thought. One reason, the critic explains, for the relevance of the thesis is the following: if two opposite concepts of nature, one belonging to an early phase and the other to a later one, are postulated, then the tacit assumption that Leopardi in his later years had repudiated the idea of a «natura provvidenziale, fondamentalmente benigna» has to be made. To make this assumption it would in turn mean to conclude that the whole Leopardian system had broken down: that Leopardi eventually repudiated the superiority of the primitive condition of man, that he rejected the importance of the «illusioni» nurtured by nature, that he had given up his fundamental idea of man's decadence due to the relinquishment of his natural condition⁶. Thus, an interpretation postulating a negative concept of nature following chronologically a positive one entails an unjustifiable mutilation of Leopardi's thought.

The two meanings of «natura» that can be traced in Leopardi's prose are the following: nature as the ideal complex of man's moral and sentimental energies that, when operative, allow him to lead a relatively happy life; implicit in this meaning is the idea that since modern man has abandoned his original nature to adopt a spurious one, he has relinquished the essential means to happiness. The second meaning of nature consists in the actual negative impact of those physical forces that act upon man in an impersonal and random manner, such as diseases and the environment. The two concepts cannot be separated by a chronological criterion; even less, the second meaning cannot be regarded as a modified extension of the first. The two concepts originate and develop wholly independently throughout Leopardi's work.

The first connotation of nature is already present in the Discorso di un italiano intorno alla poesia romantica (1818). Nature was here identified as the indispensable source of poetical inspiration and power, and defined as «invariata e primitiva, … schietta e inviolata,» the kind that appears in children and among primitive men. However, the forces of this nature, Leopardi proceeded, no longer operate among modern men, because they have been overcome by reason and civilization. Therefore, he added, in a world where everything that once existed according to nature has been altered by men, that inner primitive and genuine nature appears only «a somiglianza di lampo rarissimo, dovunque coperta e inviluppata come nel più grosso e fitto panno che si possa pensare»⁷. That original nature with which man was endowed, so vitally important to his feeling and imagination, has become corrupt and useless to him. The distinction between a nature originally benign and a corrupt one reappeared in a note of the Zibaldone of 1820 devoted to the subject of human happiness and to man's responsibility in nature's corruption. It should not be assumed, the poet cautioned, that unhappiness is a condition congenital to man, determined «dalla natura assoluta dell' uomo»; on the contrary, unhappiness is the product of our own present nature, «rispettiva e corrotta.» Many circumstances supporting this secondary, corrupt nature were not willed by original nature, but by man himself⁸. The corruption of nature is partly a reflection of the degeneration of reason. That year Leopardi declared that nature and reason had become enemies since the latter had lost its natural primitive character. Man in his natural and pristine condition availed himself of a reason given to him by «la stessa natura, e nella natura non si trovano contraddizioni. Nemico della natura è quell'uso della ragione che non è naturale, quell'uso eccessivo ch'è proprio solamente dell'uomo, e dell'uomo corrotto: nemico della natura, perciò appunto che non è naturale, nè proprio dell'uomo primitivo» (Z, I, 324). The passage from a primitive, wholesome inner human nature to a corrupt one is thus underscored by the transformation in the character of human reason. «In proporzione che l'uomo si allontana dalla natura,» the poet again observed, the power of reason increases as the force of natural instinct, the essential means to happiness, decreases. But why does man tend to abandon that condition in which nature had originally placed him? Because he erroneously believes that he is destined to reach a condition incomparably more perfect than that in which he finds himself in his primitive state. To this Leopardi retorted that human beings need not seek perfection simply because nature had made them perfect already; «l'uomo aveva naturalmente tutto il necessario.» It is precisely the belief in, and vain search for, a phantomatic perfection that caused man to experience a sense of inadequacy of his condition; hence a constant, unappeased yearning for a goal that will forever elude him. Thus, man «ha perduto la perfezione, volendosi perfezionare»; «si allontana dalla natura,» and in the process he his «alterato, cioè divenuto imperfetto relativamente alla sua natura» (Z, I, 363-364, 366-367)⁹.

Some considerations on the problem of suicide bring out again the significance of the distinction between a benign, primitive nature and a spurious one acquired by man in the course of civilization. It is said, Leopardi noted, that nature forbids suicide; but, he asked, which nature is one referring to? It must be «questa nostra presente» nature, for «noi siamo di tutt'altra natura da quella ch'ervamo.» Men are now subject to the dictates of a «natura che … non è nostra.» This corrupt nature Leopardi defines as a «seconda natura, ch'è veramente nostra e presente,» thus distinguishing it once more from the primitive, congenital one. Nature in the latter sense truly forbade suicide, but because the fictitious «seconda natura» is the source of the corrupt, unhappy condition of modern man, he is led to attempt escaping that undesirable condition through self-destruction (Z, I, 1446-1447). Even the problem of «noia» finds, according to Leopardi, its origin in man's surrender to the dictates of a fictitious, inferior nature. Why do animals, who toil much less than man, and who would seem therefore exposed to the curse of «noia» to a larger extent than man, not experience ennui, he asked somewhat paradoxically. The answer was that «l'uomo si annoia e sente il suo nulla ogni momento» because «fa e pensa cose non volute dalla natura» (Z, I, 1351). The impact of the change for the worse in man's inner nature is reflected in his outward features. In discussing the changing physical characteristics of mankind through time Leopardi cited the «gran differenza fisica che s'incontra fra gli uomini da individuo a individuo,» especially among those individuals living in a same country and climate. No other animal species, he observed, exhibits the staggering variety in physical traits as the human species does. Since nature, Leopardi argued, had originally assigned to each and every species certain uniform physical traits, the extreme physical irregularities discernible nowadays among individuals belonging to the same species points to a decline in humanity's physical quality; it reveals «quanto gli uomini sieno allontanati dalla loro vera natura» (Z, I, 1525-1526).

The relinquishment of man's original nature was not due to some obscure force beyond his control; the responsibility rests with man himself. Nature has shown a studied generosity toward man in placing many carefully designed obstacles to his decadence; so much so that the fall of mankind to the present calamitous condition has taken place only through the exercise of extreme violence upon nature itself and the primitive order of things. Thus, no matter how serious and universal the fallen condition of mankind, corruption and unhappiness cannot be considered evils inherent in what Leopardi calls «il sistema della natura» (Z, I, 726). Progress and civilization have created new needs in man and society which the natural environment is unable to satisfy. Those «stesse cose che la natura aveva destinate al suo [man's] uso» are no longer of any use to man in the civilized state. Therefore, in order to fulfill the wide range of modern needs, man sought to modify those «cose» to render them serviceable again; but in doing so, he has only succeeded in reducing them «a una condizione diversissima e anche opposta alla naturale.» The fact that man has experienced needs that the available means in his environment were unable to satisfy, and therefore had to resort to the manipulation of the available resources in order to meet the increased requirements, was, according to Leopardi, an unmistakable symptom of his incipient decadence. It did not mean, as it might seem to imply, that man's natural environment was imperfect; rather, it signifies that «l'uomo non è qual doveva,» for man, having himself changed, was compelled to seek to modify external nature; hence «è ridotto a tale stato che non gli basta più la natura di gran lunga; e ciò prova che questo stato non gli conviene.» This condition does not fit him because his natural environment no longer suits his needs; man «trova la natura renitente, ripugnante, mal disposta a' suoi vantaggi, a' suoi piacere, a' suoi desiderii, a' suoi fini, e gli conviene rifabbricarla,» but with little success and much grief (Z, I, 1022-1023). Because man's life style has changed in an unnatural manner, he has elicited nature's hostility. The responsibility for humanity's sunken state belongs to man: nature has not endowed man with any quality that would render him corrupt and unhappy, and that hindered his welfare; on the contrary, he was given the ability to preserve himself in the «stato suo primitivo puro» (Z, II, 159)¹⁰. It is true, Leopardi conceded in the course of some meditations on society, that nature placed in men the tendency to hate one another; nature, however, also willed that men should live in «società larga,» that is, in a loosely organized society allowing for considerable individual autonomy and little reciprocal interference. Therefore, the poet concluded, perhaps stretching somewhat the argument, the tendency to hatred that exists among men is to be considered only as unrealized potential, not as an actual evil; hence, «come tanti altri mali, che essendo sempre, o secondo natura, solamente in potenza, la natura non ne ha colpa alcuna» (Z, II, 768).

The distinction between an artificial nature that man has allowed to develop within himself and the primitive one he has relinquished became sharper as time went by. In the Operette morali (1824), for instance, the poet from Recanati attributed the inability on the part of mankind to find a modicum of peace and happiness to an «inquieta, insaziabile, immoderata natura umana.» Men, Leopardi further asserted, have gone «in perdizione» on account of wars, idleness, and knowledge because they did not follow the path set by nature: they studiously tried «tutte le vie di far contro la propria natura e di capitar male»¹¹. A counterpart to this reflection can be found sometime later in a meditation concerned with emotional life. Modern men, Leopardi argued, have lost the ability to rid themselves swiftly of sorrow. The ancients well knew how to do it: when oppressed by pain they cried aloud, rolled on the ground, banged their heads on the walls. Through these impulsive, uninhibited physical reactions they let pain and sorrow out, relieving themselves, because such acts, taught man by «natura medesima, … sono a chi li pratica naturalmente un conforto grandissimo.» Such primitive animal-like reactions are repressed in modern man who, unable to find an outlet for his grief and suffering, is oppressed by these painful feelings within his being. Whereas nothing else could have helped him endure human suffering better than that nature man once possessed (Z, II, 1074-1075), now his nature has changed to such an extent that he can no longer alleviate his suffering. «Tanto è mutata, vinta cancellata in noi la natura dall'assuefazione.» Modern man no longer retains his primitive nature, but is governed by a corrupt one. The differentiation between these two types of human nature finds perhaps its thorough expression in the Dialogo di Plotino e di Porfirio (1827). Here Leopardi aptly distinguished a «natura primitiva degli uomini antichi, e delle genti selvagge e incolte,» which, however, «non è più la natura nostra,» from a «nostra natura nuova.» The poet used the distinction, as he had done a few years earlier, to discuss anew the problem of suicide. Whereas among the primitive and ancient peoples both the desire for, and the act of, suicide was uncommon because it was not natural, among modern peoples it is common and natural. The difference in outlook depends on the different character of human nature: ancients' nature was supported by «illusioni,» but moderns' nature is sustained by reason. When brought to bear on the condition of modern life the ruthless power of reason inexorably leads to the conclusion that the only efficacious remedy to the unhappy life of civilized man is death. Modern man's nature, Leopardi gloomily acknowledged, «noi abbiamo, ed avremo sempre, in luogo di quella prima»¹².

The idea that in the course of progress mankind has sunk to a state in which those qualities and energies, with which it had naturally been endowed, were muted owing to man's deviation from the life style set by nature, finds a counterpart and substantiation in the conviction that man's life, in the progress of time and civilization, will again be lived according to the tenets of primigenial nature. Leopardi had already defined man's return to nature in the first pages of the Zibaldone as «ultrafilosofia»¹³. Since the shrinkage of natural life is a condition of barbarity, the mankind's regeneration, the poet admonished as early as 1820, «dipende da una … ultrafilosofia, che … ci ravvicini alla natura» (Z, I, 140). The «ultrafilosofia» would aim at overcoming the harmful consequences of the «filosofia,» by bringing man to the realization that he was indeed wise and learned when he was living according to his original condition, and that he should never have relinquished it. The «ultrafilosofia,» then, will help «a rimetter l'uomo in quella condizione in cui sarebbe sempre stato» before philosophy sidetracked him (Z, I, 280). Reason itself will unwittingly assist mankind in its journey back to nature, for reason will eventually reach the stage where it will have to acknowledge «che quanto ella ci ha insegnato al di là della natura, tutto è inutile e dannoso, e quanto ci ha insegnato di buono, tutto già lo sapevamo dalla natura» (Z, I, 924)¹⁴. In this context knowledge and civilization shaped up in Leopardi's mind as a force capable of amending the errors committed by humanity, and of bridging the extant breach between man and nature. Learning's most useful function, he asserted with unusual force, consists «nel ricondurre l'intelletto umano … appresso a poco a quello stato in cui era prima del di lei [knowledge] nascimento,» that is, back to the stage of natural life (Z, I, 56). An entry of 1823 confronts the reader with this stupefying statement: «Non è dubbio che l'uomo civile è più vicino alla natura che l'uomo selvaggio e sociale.» The assertion is unsettling because Leopardi's prevalent claim is that civilized man is farther from the natural condition than the savage. But this thought becomes clear when one considers the rationalization on the cycle of humanity's corruption and healing that the poet derived from it: «Che vuol dire questo? La società è corruzione. In processo di tempo e di lumi l'uomo cerca di ravvicinaris a quella natura onde s'è allontanato. … Quindi la civiltà è un ravvicinamento alla natura» (Z, II, 665). Finally, a letter of 1829 predicted a hard and long way yet ahead before humanity could reacquire the condition of the ancients; but there was an unmistakable glimmer of optimism in the presage. If the poet could write to Pietro Colletta that «resta ancora molto a ricuperare della civiltà degli antichi,» this meant that some of the ancients' condition had already been regained, and that the return of man to nature had begun and was in the process of unfolding¹⁵.

Leopardi's other concept of nature as an external material force hostile to mankind is traceable throughout the development of the poet's thought, not merely in a later stage. In an early, famous page of the Zibaldone the author analyzed the change that in 1819 had occurred in his physical condition; to this corresponded a modification in his moral and poetical outlook. «La mutazione totale in me, e il passaggio dallo stato antico al moderno, seguí si può dire dentro un anno, cioè nel 1819 dove privato dell'uso della vista, … cominciai a sentire la mia infelicità in un modo assai più tenebroso, cominciai … a riflettere profondamente sopra le cose (in questi ho scritto … sopra materie appartenenti sopra tutto alla nostra natura, a differenza dei pensieri passati, quasi tutti di letteratura), a divenir filosofo di professione (di poeta ch'io era), a sentire l'infelicità certa del mondo, in luogo di conoscerla, e questo anche per uno stato di languore corporale, che tanto più mi allontanava dagli antichi e mi avvicinava ai moderni» (Z, I, 162). The impact of physical deterioration led Leopardi to meditate assiduously on nature, a nature manifestly no longer benign, as it was toward the ancients, but hostile; he came then to recognize that unhappiness was no longer a strictly personal experience, but universal. The poet admitted in that same page that he had «stato sempre sventurato,» but, whereas before the impairment of the vision, he believed that unhappiness was a condition peculiar to this being¹⁶ while everybody else enjoyed happiness, after the onset of the disease he became convinced that unhappiness was the common lot of men¹⁷.

The working of a malefic nature as an external force affecting the physical condition of both man and his world reappears throughout the meditations of the Zibaldone and other works time and again. It will be sufficient to indicate here a few significant occurrences. As early as March 1821 he observed that a great many individuals were exposed to considerable health hazards due to the nature of their work; this, he added, was ordinary work, performed to produce ordinary things indispensable to modern life. In this respect, then, production and consumption amounted to the subsistence of certain individuals, the consumers, at the expense of others, the producers. Leopardi was dismayed at the price exacted by the exigencies of modern life. What do you think about this, he sardonically asked the reader. It is understandable that it is nature's plan to have one species survive at the expense, and even destruction, of another, he conceded. But that nature «abbia disposta ed ordinata precisamente la distruzione di una parte della stessa specie, al comodo, anzi alla perfezione essenziale dell'altra parte …, questo chi si potrà indurre a crederlo?» (Z, I, 582-583). In the progress of time the poet's awareness of nature's hostility became more intense. The peculiar condition of man, to exist unhappily, Leopardi wrote in 1824, is mind-boggling. No more anguishing a contradiction is conceivable than that of existence and unhappiness. «L'essere, unito all'infelicità …, è cosa contraria direttamente a se stessa … Dunque l'essere dei viventi è una contraddizione … con se medesimo.» The poet regarded this cruel antithesis as one of the «contraddizioni che sono in natura,» and as part of the «orribile mistero delle cose e della esistenza universale.» To explain unhappiness in this context Leopardi referred the reader to the Dialogo della natura e di un islandese (1824) (Z, II, 924). In order to escape the evils of civilization a man withdrew from society to Iceland. He lived isolated, in a condition very close to nature. Leopardi's concern, however, is not with any romantic notion of man's return to his natural state and to a wholesome mode of inner existence. On the contrary, he dwells on the unenduring physical pain the man from Iceland underwent owing to his exposure to the elements. His body was afflicted in various ways, by «la lunghezza del verno, l'intensità del freddo, e l'ardore estremo della state … e il fuoco» near which he was forced to spend a great deal of his time. Diseases oppressed his «corpo e l'animo con mille stenti e mille dolori.» Exasperated and extenuated by the excruciating experience, the man from Iceland turned to nature, accusing it of deliberately denying humankind even short periods of physical wellbeing. You, the poet addressed nature, «ora c'insidii, ora ci minacci ora ci assalti ora ci pungi ora ci percuoti ora ci laceri, e sempre o ci offendi o ci perseguiti.» Nature replied to confirm the accusation and to claim responsibility for the character of existence: «La vita di quest'universo è un perpetuo circuito di produzione e distruzione»¹⁸.

The year following the Operette morali Leopardi wrote again about the cycle of creation and destruction of animals and things as the «fine della natura universale.» He concluded then that «la natura tutta, e l'ordine eterno delle cose non è in alcun modo diretto alla felicità degli esseri sensibili o degli animali. Esso vi è anzi contrario» (Z, II, 956, 959). In a page which exceeded all others in somberness and despair one year later Leopardi brooded: «Il fine dell'universo è il male … ; le leggi, l'andamento naturale dell'universo non sono altro che male. … L'esistenza, per sua natura ed essenza propria e generale, è un'imperfezione, un'irregolarità, una mostruosità.» He sought to minimize the annihilating force of these meditations by surmising that man's world was only one of the many worlds of which the universe is composed, but his thought had apparently lost the ability to lift a profoundly demoralized being out of the depression created by his own rationalizations. He continued in the same page: «Non gli uomini solamente, ma il genere umano fu e sarà sempre infelice di necessità. Non il genere umano solamente ma tutti gli animali. Non gli animali soltanto ma tutti gli altri esseri al loro modo. Non gl'individui ma le specie, i generi, i regni, i globi, i sistemi, i mondi.» Evidently inspired by the previous idea of the process of creation and destruction inexorably ordained by nature, Leopardi concluded by explaining the nature of unhappiness with the memorable passage on the garden in a perennial state of souffrance. The prosperous aspect of plants and flowers, he meditated, is only apparent. They are certainly living, may be growing, but to do so they fiercely compete among themselves for air, sun, and space; they are also exposed to damage wrought by winds, insects, birds, and to the wounds of the gardener that prune them; «ogni giardino è quasi un vasto ospitale (luogo ben più deplorabile che un cemeterio)» (Z, II, 1004-1006). The quality of life given living organisms by a remote, impersonal nature could not be considered as a gift, but a curse. The same type of transformation, Leopardi observed, prevails among animals; some of them are endowed with great aggressive drive and power to offend, others only with the art of defense. Because «la natura ha dato agli uni la tendenza a distruggere, agli altri la tendenza a conservarsi,» a ceaseless struggle accompanied by an unending production and destruction process occurs among them. At this point Leopardi asked with a note of anguish: «Qual'è il fine, qual'è il voler sincero e l'intenzione vera della natura?» Nature is responsible for the cruelty inherent in the ruthless contests for life and death, he replied. Was it not in nature's power «il non crear queste tali offese?» Yet nature chose to make these offenses a part of life; it is «l'autrice unica delle difese e delle offese, del male e del rimedio» (Z, II, 1032-1033). The working of nature with regard to the physical existence of its creatures seemed to have become incomprehensible to the author of the Zibaldone.

Six months later Leopardi turned his attention again to the fate of all living creatures, and in particular to the process of destruction which they are ineluctably subjected to: «Tutte si distruggono scambievolmente, tutte periscono, e, quel ch'è peggio, tutte deperiscono, tutte patiscono a lor modo.» Is, then, «il gran magisterio della natura, l'ordine incomparabile dell'universo» to be praised? Let us admire nature's order, he urged with bitter irony: «io l'ammiro più degli altri: lo ammiro per la sua pravità e deformità, che a me paiono estreme» (Z, II, 1090-1091)¹⁹. Nature's way in the process of production and destruction struck Leopardi as being particularly profligate: «La natura è come un fanciullo: con grandissima cura ella si affatica a produrre e a condurre il prodotto alla sua perfezione; ma non appena ve l'ha condotto, ch'ella pensa e comincia a distruggerlo, a travagliare alla sua dissoluzione. Così nell'uomo, così negli altri animali, ne' vegetabili, in ogni genere di cose» (Z, II, 1.233)²⁰. The last pages of the Zibaldone on the relationship between nature and the physical condition of man follow the pattern outlined above, but also reveal some reluctance to holding nature completely responsible for mankind's suffering. The process of material creation and destruction among men and animals attracted Leopardi's attention again in 1829. He recognized it as a horrible disorder, «che fa fremere, [e] tende dirittamente e più efficacemente d'ogni altro alla distruzione della specie.» It is impossible, he concluded, to ascribe such frightening operation to nature's intention, for, he argued, if nature proceeded this way mankind would have ceased to exist long ago (Z, II, 1269). But only two months later the poet seemed to have already changed his mind; he wrote then: «La natura, per necessità della legge di distruzione e riproduzione, … è essenzialmente regolarmente e perpetuamente persecutrice e nemica mortale di tutti gl'individui d'ogni genere e specie, ch'ella dà in luce; e comincia a perseguitarli dal punto medesimo in cui li ha prodotti» (Z, II, 1293)²¹.

Leopardi's meditations upon the ceaseless cycle of physical creation and destruction willed and carried out by nature do not reveal anything new and different from what he had written many years before. Nature, he noted in 1820, has denied men the possibility to coexist peacefully, has placed no restraint upon their inclination to harm one another. Nature «non ha dettato nessuna regola di onestà e di rettitudine, perchè l'uomo non prova nessuna ripugnanza nel far male agli altri animali. … Ma eziandio nella propria specie l'uomo … non sente ingenitamente nessuna colpa a far male a' suoi per suo vantaggio, come non la sentono gli altri animali, che maltrattano, combattono» (Z, I, 246). The closeness of this early view to the later ones just examined is such as to show again that Leopardi's thought on that particular aspect of nature flowed with remarkable consistency throughout time.

The importance of Leopardi's concept of nature as a complex of laws and forces hostile to the material and moral happiness of mankind is revealed by the vigorous and emotional response it inspired in his writing, and especially in his most celebrated poem La ginestra. In 1823 he noted that in the beginning man's mortal enemies were the wild animals and the elements; these made the primitives' life extremely precarious. Instead of spawning pessimism and despair, the primitive, but extremely vulnerable condition acted as an incentive for men to form a brotherhood in a common defensive cause. Leopardi saw the emergence of this fellowship as coinciding with the golden age. Then man «amò e ricercò lo scontro, la compagnia, l'aiuto del suo simile, senz'odio alcuno, senza invidia, senza sospetto. … Quella fu veramente l'età dell'oro, e l'uomo era sicuro tra gli uomini: non per altro se non perch'esso e gli altri uomini odiavano e temevano de' viventi e degli oggetti stranieri al genere umano; e queste passioni non lasciavano luogo all'odio o invidia o timore verso i loro simili» (Z, II, 40). But, even though the golden age and primitive life are things of the past, the defensive struggle against a malevolent nature goes on. Who will carry on the fight? Men, of course, men united by the common bond of an ever expanding civilization. This «tende naturalmente a propagarsi, e a far sempre nuove conquiste, e non può star ferma, nè contenersi dentro alcun termine, … finchè vi sieno creature civilizzabili, e associabili al gran corpo della civilizzazione, alla grande allenza degli esseri intelligenti contro alla natura, e contro alle cose non intelligenti» (Z, II, 1114). In this sense civilization with its ability to bring humanity together in a common endeavor became in Leopardi's eyes the substitute for the mythical and unreachable state of nature. In La ginestra (1836), finally, nature reappeared in its function of wicked generator. It was, the poet sarcastically meditated, our «amante natura» that has placed the frail ginestra, symbol of the precariousness of the human condition, defenseless on the barren slope of the «formidabil monte / Sterminator Vesevo.» There the lonely reed exists in wait of certain death, and as such, it indeed reflects the «aspra sorte e … depresso loco / Che natura ci diè.» The nature that has presided over the birth and existence of the ginestra is the same entity that through volcanic eruptions has brought about destruction of lives and things, a devastation extensive both in time and space. It was the most diabolic and vicious nature represented by Leopardi so far. Yet, to the work of this fiendish generator the poet reacted at the same time with uncommon vigor and optimism. With the last cited passage of the Zibaldone evidently in mind, Leopardi again represented the fellowship of primitive man for defense against a hostile nature as an example to be imitated by the moderns. This solidarity no longer would take shape under the terror of the unleashed forces of nature, but through a conscious and concerted effort springing from a civil and social organization, to bring about and maintain the material and moral welfare of its members:

E quell'orror che primo
Contro l'empia natura
Strinse i mortali in social catena,
Fia ricondotto in parte
Da verace saper, l'onesto e il retto
Conversar cittadino,
E giustizia e pietade, altra radice
Avranno allor che non superbe fole.

The conclusions drawn from two different concepts of nature justify the legitimacy and usefulness of the distinction made on the basis of an ideological, rather than a chronological criterion. Man must return to nature to recapture the tone and rhythm of life the primitives and ancients enjoyed. Man must protect himself against a perfidious nature that gave him life, but denied him happiness by endowing him with an insidiously vulnerable and insecure physical existence. To accept the prevalent, undifferentiated interpretation of Leopardi's idea of nature, an entity inimical to man over which he has no control, means to deny man's responsibility in the shaping of his own moral and physical existence²². That interpretation does Leopardi and his work a grave injustice because it attributes to them a pessimism and fatalism that make the poet's outlook deathlike²³. Beyond any doubt the issue in Leopardi's concept of nature is whether man does, or does not, have power over his own existence. By appealing to a beneficial nature to whom man must return to improve the quality of his life, and to a common human cause against a malefic nature, Leopardi resolved the issue by squarely placing the responsibility for mankind's destiny upon man, and rejecting, conversely, resignation to fatalism.

It should be noted, finally, that the reason for conjuring up the notion of a cruel, hostile nature with whom man must contend, precisely as Leopardi himself had to contend for most of his life, was perhaps not due solely to his intent of asserting the ideal of a humanity united in a common cause. It was possibly due in part to the poet's disguised ambition to enhance his own fame. Leopardi achieved the stature of a genius in the course of only a brief life and in the face of overwhelming odds. What was to appear more heroic and worthy of admiration to posterity than the success and fame that that physical ruin of a man was able to reach by defying and overcoming the staggering pain and suffering that nature had placed in his way? What greater victory than defeating that very nature that the poet had once designated as an invincible enemy?

Notes

1. Francesco De Sanctis, Leopardi, ed. C. Muscetta, A. Perna (Turin, 1960), p. 263.

2. See Michele Losacco, Indagini leopardiane (Lanciano, 1937), p. 311; G. A. Levi, Storia del pensiero di Giacomo Leopardi (Turin, 1911), p. 123; Lorenzo Giusso, Leopardi e le sue ideologie (Florence, 1935), pp. 57, 207, 208; Giulio Reichenbach, Studi sulle Operette morali di Giacomo Leopardi (Florence, 1934), p. 81; Manfredi Porena, Scritti leopardiani (Bologna, 1959), pp. 157-158; Antonello Gerbi, La disputa del nuovo mondo (Milan-Naples, 1955), p. 429; Bruno Biral, «Il significato di'natura’ nel pensiero di Leopardi,» Il ponte, XV, (1959), 1271, states that nature according to Leopardi completely ignores the destiny and happiness of mankind. Ferdinando Neri, «Il pensiero del Rousseau nelle prime chiose dello Zibaldone,» in Letteratura e leggende (Turin, 1951), p. 270, refused to acknowledge a positive concept of nature whatsoever in Leopardi's work: «La natura non è mai stata considerata davvero dal Leopardi come buona in sé: … la natura è malvagia.» See, finally, Piero Bigongiari, «Leopardi e il senso dell'animo,» in Leopardi e l'Ottocento. Atti del II convegno internazionale di studi leopardiani (Florence, 1970), p. 39.

3. Luigi Blasucci, «La posizione ideologica delle Operette morali,» in Critica e storia letteraria (Padua, 1970), I, 663.

4. Sebastiano Timpanaro, Classicismo e Illuminismo nell'Ottocento italiano (Pisa, 1969), pp. 401, 403.

5. Michele Kerbaker, Scritti inediti (Rome, 1932), I, 146-148; Cesare Luporini, «Leopardi progressivo,» in Filosofi vecchi e nuovi (Florence, 1947), p. 222. Conversely, that nature that Leopardi saw as beneficial to mankind embodies values opposite to those of the society in which the poet lived: Biral, «Il significato di'natura’ nel pensiero di Leopardi,» p. 1226.

6. Sergio Solmi, Scritti leopardiani (Milan, 1969), pp. 109, 116-121. But see Timpanaro's objections to Solmi's hypothesis in Classicismo e Illuminismo, pp. 387, 401-403.

7. Leopardi, Discorso di un italiano intorno alla poesia romantica, in Tutte le opere di Giacomo Leopardi: Le poesie e le prose, ed. F. Flora (Milan, 1940), II, 481-482. On nature as a source of poetical imagination see Leopardi's very significant letter of March 1820 in Lettere, ed. F. Flora (Milan, 1963), p. 246.

8. Leopardi, Zibaldone di pensieri, in Tutte le opere di Giacomo Leopardi, ed. F. Flora (Milan, 1937), I, 193. All quotations from the Zibaldone will be from this edition and referred to in the text by Z, followed by the volume's number and page.

9. Cf. Z, I, 393: «La natura era quella che noi sentivamo senza studiarla, trovavamo senza cercarla, seguivamo senza osservarla, ci parlava senza interrogarla.» Humanity, however, has painstakingly sought «quella condizione conveniente a noi … : e non s'è trovata»; it could only realize that the superior condition believed to befit man was precisely «quella che avevamo prima di pensare a cercarla,» that is, the primitive one.

10. In this entry Leopardi mitigated the responsibility of man by pointing out that nature made him «il più mutabile e quindi il più corruttibile di tutti gli esseri terrestri,» hence the most prone to relinquish his natural state. Since man is like a perfect machine with a very complex and delicate mechanism, he, like the machine, tends to break down easily, that is, he possesses «una disposizione maggiore … a perdere il suo stato primitivo e la sua perfezione naturale» (Z, II, 159-160).

11. Storia del genere umano. Dialogo di un folletto e di un gnomo, in Le poesie e le prose, I, 820, 840.

12. Operette morali, in Le poesie e le prose, I, 1010-1011. Five years later Leopardi returned to the problem of suicide in the Frammento sul suicidio, and noting that suicides have multiplied with the development of civilization and the corresponding decline of happiness, he concluded that «la felicità che la natura ci ha destinata, e le vie d'otternerla … immutabili e sole» have been abandoned. The poet underscored the responsibility of man by adding that nature's ways had not changed: Le poesie e le prose, I, 1082-1084.

13. A negative, but biased interpretation of the term «ultrafilosofia» was offered by Romano Amerio. According to him the term means «riduzione della ragione alla natura»; but since to Amerio «natura» means a primeval state without morals and religion, the return to nature advocated by Leopardi is seen as an «inversione del Cristianesimo,» for man «adeguandosi alla pura esistenzialità … rifa la natura, cioè il nulla»; «L'ultrafilosofia di Giacomo Leopardi,» Filosofia, IV (1953), 455, 482.

14. Even earlier Leopardi assigned to reason, corrupt however it may be, the task of leading man back to nature. He was not, however, very sanguine about the outcome. Such a return, he admitted, «essendo fatto mediante quella ragione stessa che ha corrotto l'uomo, ed avendo il suo fondamento in questa medesima corruttrice, non può più equivalere allo stato naturale, nè per conseguenza alla nostra perfezion primitiva, nè quindi procurarci quella felicità che si era destinata» (Z, I, 344).

15. Lettere, p. 906.

16. On nature affecting Leopardi's life in particular rather than humanity as a whole, see Lettere, p. 290. In retrospect he will represent himself being old and decrepit even before being young; this, he will argue, was the sure indication that nature had destined him to be a nonentity: Lettere, p. 449.

17. Timpanaro, Classicismo e Illuminismo, p. 389, stated that in the period between 1819 and 1820 Leopardi was still far away from the «concezione della natura nemica dell'intero genere umano.» The evidence in the passage just cited of the Zibaldone suggests, however, that the hostility of nature toward the physical well-being of mankind as a whole is to be dated from 1819. The early, cosmic character of nature's negative impact is also detectable in the poetry. In La sera del dì di festa, for instance, the poet recognized the working of «l'antica natura onnipossente, / Che mi fece all'affanno.» This nature has denied the poet even hope in a better future, and condemned him to tears. The representation of this personal condition of sorrow, however, merges, and finds an explanation, in a much more universal predicament, the natural cycle of life and death:

    E fieramente mi si stringe il core,
    A pensar come tutto al mondo passa,
    E quasi orma non lascia …

18. Operette morali, in Le poesie e le prose, I, 883, 885, 886, 888. Cf. Z, I, 1351 (1821), where the poet is already aware, but still indifferent, to nature's process of production and destruction.

19. This decisive turn in Leopardi's attitude toward nature as the entity responsible for mankind's physical existence is doubtlessly tied to the rapid decline in the poet's personal condition, a further deterioration of the eyesight: Lettere, pp. 763, 764, 778. He defined the illness as «la più grave ed ostinata che … abbia sofferto da otto anni in qua»: Ibid., p. 783. For the progress and effects of the disease in the following years, see Ibid., pp. 897, 904, 927, 933. On the impact of Leopardi's infirmity upon his «morale», see generally Bonaventura Zumbini, Studi sul Leopardi (Florence, 1902), p. 111, and Timpanaro, Classicismo e Illuminismo, p. 156.

20. Cf. the Palinodia al marchese Gino Capponi (1835):

    La natura crudel, fanciullo invitto,
    Il suo pariccio adempie, e senza posa
    Distruggendo e formando si trastulla.

21. Cf. Ad Arimane (1833): «Produzione e distruzione ec. per uccider partorisce ec. sistema del mondo, tutto patimen. Natura è come un bambino che disfa subito il fatto.» Le poesie e le prose, I, 434.

22. This is what Eugène Anagnine implies in «Giacomo Leopardi et Jean-Jacques Rousseau,» Annales de la Société Jean-Jacques Rousseau, XXVIII (1939-1940), 68, 72.

23. Francesco De Sanctis already warned against an interpretation of this sort: Leopardi, p. 466.