[In the following essay, Bonadeo discusses Leopardi's concept of death in the Zibaldone, maintaining that the poet was more concerned with life and its purpose than with death.]

“What meaning and significance can be attached to the fact that man must die?”¹ What meaning and significance, consequently, can be attached to life in view of its extinction? These are the questions that may help to understand Leopardi's concept of death embodied in the prose of the Zibaldone. If one bears in mind the pessimism and the unhappiness that pervaded the life and work of the poet from Recanati, one would be inclined to think that he held life into little account, and viewed death as a welcome and liberating event. The glorification of death is indeed said to be part and parcel of romantic thought and sensibility;² death was Ugo Foscolo's answer to the narrowness and emptiness of life as conceived in Le ultime lettere di Jacopo Ortis. For Leopardi, however, contrary to what one may surmise from his somber vision of life, neither the fact nor the idea of death bears negatively upon his evaluation of human existence nor do they constitute a desirable escape from life. The idea of death brings Leopardi's mind back constantly to the idea of life and to a search for its meaning and purpose; in the end only after the poet has succeeded in imparting positive values to human existence, will mortality become acceptable as a natural occurrence, inspiring neither fear nor attraction.³

According to contemporary views there are different ways “in which human beings have sought to reconcile themselves to the fact of death.” Three of these ways are: the endeavor on the part of man to make himself “the master of death” by committing suicide; to deny “the reality of death through the belief in … immortality”; to conquer “the reality of death through the immortality of the world” man leaves behind.⁴ To understand the meaning of life in relation to mortality, and the meaning of death itself, and certainly to reconcile himself to it, Leopardi explored the three approaches to the problem: suicide, immortality of the soul, and immortality of man's work and achievements.

In 1823 Leopardi noted that man, due to “un sentimento naturale della sua propria eternità e indestruttibilità,” always “mira alla posterità.” This goal, however, Leopardi dismisses as a manifestation of an egotistic and escapist tendency, namely the “desiderio dell'infinito.” This desire derives “dal continuo ricorrer che l'uomo fa colla speranza al futuro, non potendo esser mai soddisfatto del presente, né trovandovi piacere alcuno.” There is also a practical reason for man's wish to survive death: it lies in the “esperienza già fatta, che la memoria degli uomini insigni si conserva, dal veder noi medesimi conservata presentemente e celebrata la memoria di tal uomini.” As a result of this human experience, the concept of, and yearning for, the “fama superstite alla morte” has been introduced among men, and they have avidly sought lasting fame. But this aspiration and search Leopardi finds unnatural to man for the precise reason that nature had not created in man that desire. In fact, in the early times of society, when nature still prevailed among men, “non v'era esempio di rammemorazioni e di lodi tributate ai morti.” In those times men were less egotistical, and “neppur gli uomini coraggiosi e magnanimi, quando anche desiderassero la stima dé loro compagni e contemporanei, pensarono mai a travagliare per la posterità, nè molto meno, a trascurare il giudizio de' presenti per proccurarsi quello de' futuri, o rimettersi alla stima de' futuri.”⁵ Thus, these thoughts do not seem to reveal on the part of Leopardi any particularly keen interest or concern about man's survival through achievements and fame; furthermore, human aspiration to immortality carries in this context the stigma of egotism and unnaturalness.

But if one turns from this detached, cold assessment to the meditations on immortality of four years later, one finds that the problem of death and survival through man's achievements on earth has become a matter of personal concern to the poet from Recanati. The problem is approached by considering the present and the future value of books and writers in Leopardi's times. The considerations evoke a note of pessimism, but they also embody a firm denial of the belief and hope for man's survival through work and fame. The starting point of the Zibaldone's entry dated 1827 is a reflection on the relationship between the intrinsic and the extrinsic value of books, ancient and modern. “Quanto lo stile peggiora, e divien più vile, più incolto, … di meno spesa; tanto cresce l'eleganza, la nitidezza, lo splendore, la magnificenza, il costo e vero pregio e valore delle edizioni.” Many works of his time, Leopardi recognized, seemed to be perfect, as far as external workmanship such as printing, is concerned. The emphasis on the external value of modern printed works was intended to compensate for the scarcity of internal worth. In fact, “l'arte e lo studio son cose oramai ignote e sbandite dalla professione di scriver libri,” and “gli stili moderni” answer only the passing needs of the moment. But there is a more cogent and deep seated reason for modern neglect in writing: modern books are destined to have a very short life because “troppa è la copia dei libri o buoni o cattivi o mediocri che escono ogni giorno, e che per necessita fanno dimenticare quelli del giorno innanzi, sian pure eccellenti.” No doubt, the works of the classics will retain the fame, hence the immortality that they have deservedly acquired, but it is utterly impossible for contemporary writers to gain immortal fame, exclaimed dishearteningly Leopardi. Thus, “se mai fu chimerica la speranza dell'immortalità, essa lo è oggi per gli scrittori. … Tutti i posti dell'immortalità … sono gia occupati.” As for modern books in particular, their fate is “come quella degl'insetti chiamati effimeri … : alcune specie vivono poche ore, alcune una notte, altre tre o quattro giorni; ma sempre si tratta di giorni.” Man's fate is the same as that of the books he writes, and this fate precludes immortality: “Noi siamo veramente oggidi passeggeri e pellegrini sulla terra: veramente caduchi: esseri di un giorno: la mattina in fiore, la sera appassiti o secchi: soggetti anche a sopravvivere alla propria fama, e più longevi che la memoria di noi.” There is a final reason that to Leopardi's mind renders the achievement of immortality and hopeless endeavor and goal: the conviction that, no matter how important the single event and individual might have been, they will, in the course of time, be drowned by the complexity and vastness of the perennially unfolding history of human civilization: “Non ai soli letterati ma ormai a tutte le professioni è fatta impossibile l'immortalità, in tanta infinita moltitudine di fatti e di vicende umane, dapoi che la civiltà, la vita dell'uomo civile, e la ricordanza della storia ha abbracciato tutta la terra.” Leopardi had in fact no doubt that within “dugent'anni non sia per essere più noto il nome di Achille … [e] quello di Napoleone, vincitore e signore del mondo civile” (Z, II, 1102-1104).⁶ Thus, even though these reflections were certainly erroneous, at least as far as the place in posterity that the name and work of Leopardi himself were to occupy, they nonetheless reveal an extremely skeptical attitude toward man's survival through his achievements after physical annihilation. But, as it will be seen, this negative and hopeless attitude was perhaps due to a solution on much different terms that Leopardi had given to the problem four years earlier.

The idea and belief in the immortality of the soul as an explanation and reconciliation to the impermanence of human existence held some interest and positive value in Leopardi's early life, but they were in the end rejected. In 1820 the poet compared man's immortality and unhappiness with that of the beasts. Whereas the latter are able to achieve a degree of happiness in the course of their lives, man, the most perfect animal, the master of his own world and of all the animals, cannot. Yet, the fulfillment of human existence lies precisely in man's happiness. Then, the fact that man “racchiuda in sè una sostanziale infelicità, è una specie di contraddizione colla sua esistenza al compimento della quale non è dubbio che si richieda la felicità proporzionata all'essere di quella tale sostanza.” To Leopardi the way out of this tragic contradiction must be that “la nostra esistenza non è finita dentro questo spazio temporale come quella dei bruti, perche ripugna alle leggi seguite constantemente in tutte le opere della natura.” Thus Leopardi grants the human soul immortality as a compensating factor for man's earthly unhappiness: “Una delle grandi prove dell'immortalità dell'anima è la infelicità dell'uomo paragonato alle bestie che sono felici o quasi felici.” The happiness that was denied man on earth would be achieved by that part of his being that was to survive him after the destruction of the body. To Leopardi the thought that man would not be able to enjoy at least the same degree of happiness that beasts did enjoy must have been wholly incomprehensible and terrifying; man had to be able to be happy in some way, sometimes. Thus, he reiterated that same year: “L'infelicità nostra è una prova della nostra immortalità, considerandola per questo verso, che i bruti e in certo modo tutti gli esseri della natura possono essere felici e sono, noi soli non siamo né possiamo” (Z, I, 61-62, 68).

But such rationalizations were not deeply and lastingly convincing to Leopardi's sensibility and intellect. Why would man have to wait for the otherworldly life to achieve happiness? If this were true, then it was necessary to explain what was man doing in this life, what was the meaning of earthly life, if there was one. The rejection of immortality on the part of Leopardi is partly due to his interpretation of the development of Christian ideas on the subject. The belief in the life of the spirit appeared to him rather shaky, for it was the product of reason, hence artificial. That belief was thoroughly unacceptable to a thinker who deeply believed that man's excellence was based on nature and that reason was its enemy number one. After the original sin, which according to Leopardi consisted precisely in the acquisition and use of an exorbitant amount of reasoning power on the part of Adam (Z, I, 338-339), man found himself in a condition where “la ragione aveva preso il disopra sulla natura: e quindi l'uomo era divenuto … infelice.” Man had become unhappy because the supremacy of reason had made his “natura primitiva … alterata e guasta, ed egli era decaduto dalla sua perfezione primigenia” (Z, I, 342). Most ironically, however, to show mercy for man's fall and unhappiness God perfected his reason, which then became the tool that substituted nature in the government of man's existence. There followed two consequences. First, since the perfection of reason is not “la perfezione dell'uomo assolutamente, ma bensì dell'uomo tal qual è dopo la corruzione,” and since the original essence of man “supponeva e conteneva l'ubbidienza della ragione, in somma tutto l'opposto della perfezione della ragione,” man was hopelessly de-naturalized. Secondly, and most important, “la perfezione della ragione consiste in conoscere la sua propria insufficienza a felicitarci, anzi l'opposizione intrinseca ch'ella ha colla nostra felicità.” Therefore, the perfection of reason could not but lead man to the conviction that “non poteva essere la sua felicità in questa vita,” that “la sua felicità” was “in un'altra vita.” It is thus understandable why unhappiness became, and still is, the ideal and a style of life among Christians, why “il Cristianesimo chiama beato chi piange, predica i patimenti, li rende utili e necessari; in una parola suppone essenzialmente l'infelicità di questa vita.” God's revelation, finally, disclosed to man his divine nature and predestination. But man's destiny, Leopardi objected, was to achieve happiness on earth by following nature's dictates (Z, I, 342-344). Thus, according to Leopardi, Christianity has in a sense taken advantage of man's fall from the state of nature in that it has not endeavored to lead man back to nature where he could recapture his primitive essence and happiness; Christianity seized instead upon man's weakness and unhappiness to persuade him through reason that the fulfillment of his destiny and his happiness lay in a world outside his earthly existence.

Without the expectation of a future, happy life, approaching death cannot be conceived of as the imminent beginning of eternal bliss; hence Leopardi regards it as an agonizing and terrifying event. Let us consider, Leopardi suggested, the situation of an eighty-year-old man; he positively knows that “dentro dieci anni al più egli sarà sicuramente estinto, cosa che ravvicina la sua condizione a quella di un condannato.” But even from the point of view of a younger man, the knowledge that some day he will find himself in that situation “basterebbe per istupidire di spavento, e scoraggiare tutta la nostra vita” (Z, I, 128). The poet, however, pulls his thoughts out of that bleak picture by envisioning life after death among the ancients. These supposed that the dead “non avessero altri pensieri che de' negozi di questa vita, e la rimembranza de' loro fatti gli occupasse continuamente, e s'attristassero o rallegrassero secondo che aveano goduto o patito quassù, in maniera che, secondo essi, questo mondo era la patria degli uomini, e l'altra vita un esilio, al contrario de' cristiani” (Z, I, 147).⁷ Thus, the ancients placed “la consolazione, anche della morte, non in altro che nella vita,” and judged death “una sventura appunto in quanto privazione della vita, e che il morto fosse avido della vita e dell'azione, e prendesse assai più parte, almeno col desiderio e coll'interesse, alle cose di questo mondo” (Z, II, 183).⁸ These reflections seemed to provide some comfort to Leopardi's mind and sensibility by conjuring up an immortality of sort, so much more believable because it was entertained by the deeply admired ancients, and because it was wholly independent from the “reasoned” tenets of the Christian religion.

But Leopardi was unable to escape the thought of death and immortality as shaped by Christian thought; in fact he was haunted by it, and to it he reacted in painful disbelief. In 1827 he approached the problem again from a practical and emotional standpoint. A person, he pondered, feels tenderness and sorrow for his fellow men who pass away, in a natural and impulsive manner: “Gli stimiamo infelici, gli abbiamo per compassionevoli, tenghiamo per misero il loro caso, e la morte per una sciagura.” But, Leopardi argued, “se l'uomo è immortale, perchè i morti si piangono? …

Perchè aver compassione ai morti, perchè stimarli infelici, se gli animi sono immortali?” In truth, man's sorrow and compassion for the dead rest on the instinctual assumption that they have truly lost “la vita e l'essere; … le quali cose, pur senza ragionare, e in dispetto della ragione, da noi si tengono naturalmente per un bene.” Those who outlive the deceased believe that “i morti sieno morti veramente e non vivi; e che colui ch'è morto, non sia più”; they grieve him because “ha cessato di vivere, perchè ora non vive e non è. Ci duole … che egli abbia sofferta quest'ultima e irreparabile disgrazia … di essere privato della vita e dell'essere. Questa disgrazia accadutagli è la causa e il soggetto della nostra compassione e del nostro pianto.”

What bearing do the grief and compassion of the living for the dead have on the idea of immortality? If immortality implies the survival of the individual soul in the other world, this means that the souls of the living and those of the dead will eventually be reunited in that world. Death would, then, be a temporary separation of the souls, and as such only a slightly painful event, in view especially of the eternity that men's souls will live together. But has any man ever been consoled by the thought of an eternal life in the company of the soul who had been taken away from him in this world, asks Leopardi. On the occurrence of death, he replies, “le nostre opinioni, la natura e il sentimento in simili occasioni ci portano senza nostro consenso o sconsenso a giudicare e tenere per dato, che il morto sia spento e passato del tutto e per sempre.” In conclusion, when men are bereft of those who are close to them, “nel fondo del loro cuore, piuttosto consentono in credere la estinzione totale dell'uomo, che la immortalità dell'animo” (Z, II, 1111-1113).⁹ Death means man's total extinction.

The idea and act of suicide drew considerable attention from Leopardi. The vanity and unhappiness of human life are the causes of modern man's desperation and yearning to end his own life. The ancients “si uccidevano e disperavano … per l'opinione e la persuasione di non potere, a causa di sventure individuali, conseguire e godere quei beni ch'essi stimavano ch'esistessero.” Modern man, on the other hand, has acquired the notion that nothing good and valuable can be achieved in life; the idea that “la vita nostra per sè stessa non sia un bene, ma un peso e un male” prevails in him (Z, I, 389); hence, modern man tends to disparage, and even to hate, his own life. “Che cosa dimostrano tante morti volontarie,” Leopardi asked himself in 1820 (or 1823), “se non che gli uomini sono stanchi e disperati di questa esistenza?”¹⁰ In adversity the ancients conceived “odio e furore contro il fato, e bestemmiavano gli Dei, dichiarandosi … nemici del cielo, impotenti bensì, e incapaci di vittoria o di vendetta,” but did not turn against themselves. Modern man, on the other hand, rages against, and hates, himself; we conceive, wrote Leopardi of contemporary fellow men, “contro la nostra persona un odio veramente micidiale, come del più feroce e capitale nemico, e ci compiaciamo nell'idea della morte volontaria” (Z, I, 399).¹¹ Of his personal sense of emptiness and desperation he said: “Concepiva un desiderio ardente di vendicarmi sopra me stesso e colla mia vita della mia necessaria infelicità inseparabile dall'esistenza mia, e provava una gioia feroce ma somma nell'idea del suicidio” (Z, I, 400).

It would seem, then, that the misery of this life, as Leopardi saw it and experienced himself, wholly explained and justified a clear cut and final solution to human existence, suicide. Yet, the number of suicides, Leopardi must have realized, was not such as to support this extremely pessimistic conclusion. To explain this contradiction he argued that reason, that is religion and related ideas and feelings about the “incertezza della nostra origine, destino, ultimo fine, e di quello che ci possa attendere dopo la morte,” were restraints to the suicidal impulses of modern man. It was distressing that man could not achieve what under the circumstances was the best solution to his life, Leopardi added; indeed, what “maggior miseria che il trovarsi impediti di morire e di conseguire quel bene che è sommo,” that is, self-destruction. It is true that “la natura ripugna con tutte le sue forze al suicidio”; however, since “la natura è del tutto alterata, da che la nostra vita ha cessato di esser naturale, da che la felicità che la natura ci aveva destinata è fuggita per sempre,” and since “quel desiderio della morte, che non dovevamo mai, secondo natura, neppur concepire, … e per forza di ragione, s'è anzi impossessato di noi,” man ought to be able to choose death freely. Thus religion with the moral inhibitions it imposed upon man's determination appeared to Leopardi as “un'idea concepita dalla nostra misera ragione, … la più barbara cosa che possa esser nata nella mente dell'uomo: è il parto mostruoso della ragione il più spietato; … il più gran male dell'uomo” (Z, I, 555-557).

To the conflict between what Leopardi regards as modern man's plausible and logical inclination, self-destruction, and self-preservation owing to reason's restraint, the poet returns time and again in the course of his meditations without, however, reaching a solution. “Il suicidio,” he wrote in 1821, “è contro natura. Ma … non l'abbiamo del tutto abbandonata per seguir la ragione? Perche dunque dovendo vivere contro natura, non possiamo morire contro natura? … La presente condizione dell'uomo obligandolo a vivere e pensare ed operare secondo ragione, e vietandogli di uccidersi, è contraddittoria” (Z, I, 1240). He acknowledged a year later with more logical and positive certainty that the only possible denouement to life is indeed suicide. Nature forbids it, but human nature is altered; this second nature that governs modern man's life “invece d'opporsi al suicidio, non può far che non lo consigli, e non lo brami intensamente; perchè anch'ella odia sopratutto l'infelicità, e sente che non la può fuggire se non con la morte … Dunque la vera natura nostra, … permette, anzi richiede il suicidio” (Z, I, 1446-1447). Leopardi's firm conviction does not, however, succeed in explaining why most men, after all, prefer to live an unhappy life rather than eliminate their sufferings by an act of the will. “Intorno al suicidio. È cosa assurda che … si possa e si debba viver contro natura … e non si possa morir contro natura. E che sia lecito d'essere infelice contro natura (che non aveva fatto l'uomo infelice), e non sia lecito di liberarsi della infelicità in un modo contro natura” (Z, I, 1494). Elsewhere, meditations on human suffering seem to carry a decisive weight in favor of suicide: “La questione se il suicidio giovi o non giovi all'uomo … si restringe in questi puri termini. Qual delle due cose è la migliore, il patire o il non patire? … E si conchiude ch'essendo all'uomo più giovevole il non patire che il patire, è matematicamente vero e certo che l'assoluto non essere giova e conviene all'uomo più dell'essere” (Z, I, 1521-1523).¹² Not suffering would be better than suffering, and suicide would, therefore, be the best alternative to life. But this choice could not provide a meaning to life, nor support an attitude toward death.

Thus, Leopardi could not reach a definite conclusion, neither practical nor ideological, about the problem of death even though his meditations stood on some well defined assumptions and beliefs. Death for him, on the one hand, was truly the end of physical and spiritual man, for the immortality of man's work and soul had no place in his intellectual and sentimental world. Death through suicide clearly held interest for Leopardi, but not as a final solution; rather, it raised uncertainties and doubts about the human condition. This kind of death was a most suitable way to get rid of the unhappiness and suffering that he saw inexorably associated with modern man's condition. It did not, however, in any way insure the survival, intellectual or spiritual, of the human being; it ultimately meant the total rejection of man's life and value. The authentic reason Leopardi could not accept suicide was not reason's restraints, moral or religious tenets, but a deep-seated, albeit tenuous, faith in the inherent value of human life.

In 1820 he stated that old men love life and fear death much more than young men do. With old age the former experience a decrease in the intensity and vitality of existence; hence, “si estingue o scema il coraggio, e quindi a proporzione che l'esistenza è meno gagliarda, l'uomo è meno forte per poterla disprezzare” (Z, I, 274). However, two years later, when he returned to that theme, Leopardi added that craving for life among old men increases “quasi come l'amor del denaio, e, … cresce in proporzione che dovrebbe scemare.” Thus, they dread death “sommamente e sono gelosissimi della propria vita, ch'è miserabilissima, e che ad ogni modo poco hanno a poter conservare,” and they accumulate and preserve as many goods as possible, as if they had to provide for a lengthy existence (Z, II, 19-20). Old men's excessive love for life has a more universal reason: “Il timor dei pericoli è tanto maggiore quanto maggiore è l'infelicità e il fastidio di cui la morte ci libererebbe, … quanto è più nullo quello che morendo abbiamo a perdere.” Paradoxically enough, yearning for life and fear of death have increased everywhere proportionately as the significance of life has decreased. This strange relationship between life and death was borne out, according to Leopardi, by those countries and classes which were under political oppression. These were the least brave, the most fearful of death, and clung desperately to life. The explanation of the phenomenon on the part of Leopardi was that modern man's life, devoid of worthwhile endeavors and purpose, is unhappy; such life is very much like living death, it bears a close resemblance to real death, and it gives man a sharp presentiment of death itself. Thus, “quanto più la vita dell'uomo è simile alla morte, tanto più la morte [è] temuta e fuggita, quasi ce ne spaventasse quella continua immagine che nella vita medesima ne abbiamo e contempliamo” (Z, II, 229).

Young men, on the other hand, are perhaps no less unhappy than the old, but they hold the potential for a much more meaningful and purposeful existence; hence, they have no fear of death. For one thing, young people are “più facili a disprezzar la vita, coraggiosissimi nelle battaglie e in ogni rischio.” Since the goods of this life “si disprezzano quando si possiedono sicuramente, e si apprezzano quando sono perduti,” the young are in this sense the true “possessor della vita”, and are more willing to sacrifice it (Z, I, 274-275).¹³ In fact, they “disprezzano e prodigano la vita loro, ch'è pur dolce, e di cui molto avanza loro, e non temono la morte”; they are willing to sacrifice everything they hold almost as if they were going to die shortly (Z, II, 19-20). More importantly, young people possess “più vita o più vitalità” than old ones; they are irresistibly led to use their “forza vitale, di darle sfogo e uscita, … di versarla fuori.” Unfortunately, the “presente stato degli uomini” and “questa presente mortificazione della vita umana, che contrastano colla vitalità ed energia della giovinezza,” cause a stagnation of young men's sentimental and intellectual life, and prevent the potential energy and vitality of the young from being transformed into actual accomplishments (Z, II, 68-69).¹⁴ The significance of these reflections lies in this implication: if the conditions of life during Leopardi's time had been favorable, the young people could have lived a purposeful, meaningful existence, the expression of an exuberant and generous vitality. Were the manifestation of such a favorable condition present, the meaning of death for man would, according to Leopardi, be completely altered in such a way that the intense existence allowing for self-expression and purposefulness would nullify to a large extent that fear of death entertained by old men and oppressed people that lead a precarious, worthless existence. It is in the name of an existence that man loves that he is willing to sacrifice his life; a meaningful existence is not only worth living for but also worth dying for. “La vita non fu mai più felice che quando fu stimato poter esser bella e dolce anche la morte”; for instance, “mai gli uomini vissero più volentieri che quando furono apparecchiati e desiderosi di morire per la patria e per la gloria.” Thus, “quando gli uomini avevano pur qualche mezzo di felicità o di minore infelicità ch'al presente, quando perdendo la vita, perdevano pur qualche cosa, essi l'avventuravano spesso e facilmente e di buona voglia, non temevano, anzi cercavano i pericoli, non si spaventavano della morte, anzi l'affrontavano tutto dì o coi nemici o tra loro, e godevano sopra ogni cosa e stimavano il sommo bene, di morire gloriosamente” (Z, II, 229).¹⁵

With these considerations Leopardi has, at least partially, solved the problem of human death in terms of the value of existence. Death becomes a less fearful and agonizing eventuality in proportion as life acquires intensity, meaning and purpose, and as death serves to preserve and better that style of life. On these terms death becomes acceptable because it is viewed as an integral part of the living process and it no longer constitutes one final irreversible step into infinite nothingness, it does not evoke a sense of uselessness about life and despair of the mind. If it is a worthwhile existence that makes death acceptable, then it is easy to understand why Leopardi was unable to embrace suicide: the act was to his mind and sensibility simply the expression of a sterile and useless existence. In the poet's conception, then, the attitude and ideas about death depend largely upon the value man places upon existence. The statement of a critic cited at the beginning to the effect that even though Leopardi was convinced that “pain and suffering predominate in life,” he was unable to overcome his fear of death¹⁶ should be, first, reversed in this sense: it was Leopardi's fear of living a worthless existence that led him to foreknow the excruciating pain of dying. Then, it should be rejected, because Leopardi, by holding out the ideal of an intense, meaningful life, successfully aimed to suppress fear in man and thus to help him to master death.

Notes

1. J. G. Gray, “The Problem of Death in Modern Philosophy,” in N. A. Scott, ed., The Modern Vision of Death (Richmond, 1967), p. 47.

2. Jacques Choron, Death and Western Thought (New York, 1963), p. 156. This author states that Leopardi, like Byron, was convinced that “pain and suffering predominate in life,” but he was unable “to overcome … fear of death.” Ibid., p. 298.

3. Except for the inconsequential work of Antonio Borriello, La visione della morte in Giacomo Leopardi (Napoli, 1937), no systematic treatment of Leopardi's concept of death is available. But useful observations are scattered throughout critical works on Leopardi. See, for instance, Francesco De Sanctis's remark, based however on works other than the Zibaldone, to the effect that Leopardi's intellect longed for death, but sentiment rejected it: Leopardi, ed. C. Muscetta, A. Perna (Torino, 1960), pp. 271-272; Eugenio Donadoni, Scritti e discorsi letterari (Firenze, 1921), p. 32, stated that “da tutta l'opera del Leopardi non emerge l'apoteosi della morte; si la brama dolorosa della vita.” Contrarywise, Sergio Solmi, Scritti leopardiani (Milano, 1969), pp. 88-89, sees the idea of death in Leopardi as “l'ultimo rifugio, la suprema valvola di sicurezza, … aspirazione al riposo.” According to G. A. Levi, “Il suicidio nelle meditazioni del Rousseau e del Leopardi,” Humanitas, II (1947), 1122-1127, the poet from Recanati rejected the idea of suicide. Raffaele Giolli, “L'occhio di Leopardi,” in La disfatta dell'Ottocento (Torino, 1961), p. 117, has this interesting observation: “Della morte, Leopardi ebbe solo il ribrezzo, sentendola così vivergli attorno, minaccia del mondo ostile.” On Leopardi's deeply disturbing feeling about the ephemeral nature of human things and life see Bruno Biral, “Il sentimento del tempo: Leopardi, Baudelaire, Montale,” II Ponte, XXI (1965), 1156-1160. On death as a loss of the “amante compagnia” for the individual, see Umberto Bosco, Titanismo e pietà in Giacomo Leopardi (Roma, 1965), p. 84, and Sebastiano Timpanaro, Classicismo e Illuminismo nell'Ottocento italiano (Pisa, 1965), p. 162. Finally, on the Christian character of Leopardi's concept of death see Bruno Biral, La posizione storica di Giacomo Leopardi (Venezia, 1962), p.38.

4. Arnold Toynbee, “Traditional Attitudes Towards Death,” in A. Toynbee et al., Man's Concern with Death (New York, 1969), pp. 69, 72, 75-77, 84; Hans Morgenthau, “Death in the Nuclear Age,” The Modern Vision of Death, pp. 69-70.

5. Zibaldone di pensieri, in Tutte le opere di Giacomo Leopardi, ed. F. Flora (Milano, 1937), II, 227-228. All quotations from the Zibaldone are from this edition and are referred to in the text by Z, followed by the number of the volume, and page.

6. Cf. further the reciprocal relationship between neglect in writing and want of immortality: “Come la impossibilità di divenire immortali giustifica la odierna negligenza dello stile nei libri, così questa negligenza dal canto suo, inabilita, e fa impossibile ai libri, il conseguimento della immortalità.” Z, II, 1104.

7. Cf. Z, II, 265-266: “… non supponendo gli antichi maggiori beni che quelli di questa vita, fino a credere che i morti, anche posti nell'Elisio, s'interessassero più della terra che dell'Averno, e che gli Dei fossero più solleciti delle cose terrene che delle celesti.”

8. Leopardi supports this view by referring to the meaning of funereal games among the ancients. The games were “le opere più vivaci, più forti, più energiche, più solenni, più giovanili, più vigorose, più vitali che si potessero fare.” It seems as if the ancients wanted “intrattenere il morto collo spettacolo più energico della più energica e florida vivida vita, e credessero che poich'egli non poteva più prender parte attiva in essa vita, si dilettasse e disannoiasse a contemplarne gli effetti e l'esercizio in altrui” (Z, II, 183). Cf. Z, II, 1224: in death “le consolazioni degli antichi non erano che nella vita; i loro morti non avevano altro conforto che d'imitar la vita perduta.”

9. Leopardi had indirectly attacked the idea of immortality by representing the aberrant attitude of a mother “saldissima ed esattissima nella credenza cristiana, e negli esercizi della religione.” She felt no compassion for those parents who lost their children; on the contrary, “gl'invidiava intimamente e sinceramente, perchè questi erano volati al paradiso senza pericoli.” Diseases and deaths among the young did not affect her in the least “perchè diceva che non importa l'età della morte, ma il modo: e perciò soleva sempre informarsi curiosamente se erano morti bene secondo la religione” (Z, I, 309-311).

10. Frammento sul suicidio, in Tutte le opere di Giacomo Leopardi, Le poesie e le prose, ed. F. Flora (Milano, 1940), I, 1082. In 1821 Leopardi wrote: “Noi desideriamo bene spesso la morte, e ardentemente, e come unico evidente e calcolato rimedio delle nostre infelicità, in maniera che noi la desideriamo spesso, e con piena ragione, e siamo costretti a desiderarla e considerarla come il sommo nostro bene” (Z, I, 555).

11. In the Frammento sul suicidio Leopardi differentiated suicide among the ancients and modern men thus: “Anticamente gli uomini si uccidevano per eroismo per illusioni per passioni violente … e le morti loro erano illustri. Ma ora che l'eroismo e le illusioni sono sparite, e le passioni così indebolite, che vuole dire che il numero dei suicidi è tanto maggiore?” It means that wherever people use reason a great deal “senza immaginazione ed entusiasmo, si detesta la vita; vuol dire che la cognizione delle cose conduce il desiderio della morte.” In conclusion, in antiquity “si viveva anche morendo, e ora si muore vivendo.” Le poesie e le prose, I, 1082, 1084.

12. On the contrast between nature and suicide see further Z, I, 1360: “Se la natura è oggi fatta impotente a felicitarci, … perchè dev'ella essere ancora potente ad interdirci l'uscita da quella infelicità che non viene da lei, non dipende da lei, non ubbidisce a lei, non può rimediarsi se non con la morte? S'ella non è più l'arbitrio né la regola della nostra vita, perchè dev'esserlo della nostra morte?” Cf. substantially identical reflections in the “Dialogo di Plotino e di Porfirio” (1827), Operette morali, in Le poesie e le prose, I, 1008-1010. On Leopardi's apparent yearning for death and powerlessness to embrace it see his Lettere, ed. F. Flora (Milano, 1949), pp. 301, 310.

13. The young, however, are likely to experience the same fear of death as old men do, if their life is weakened by diseases; this disability causes a “minor forza del corpo, e quindi dell'animo” (Z, I, 274).

14. Contrarywise, cf. Leopardi on the ancients, their vitality and death: “La vitalità negli stati antichi era tanto maggiore che nei presenti, non solo da compensare abbondantemente ogni cagione o principio di mortalità, ma da preponderare, e far pendere la bilancia dalla parte della vita … Così che non è vero che le cagioni di morte … fossero maggiori anticamente, anzi all'opposto sono maggiori oggidì” (Z, I, 463).

15. On self love leading to a selfish death, see Z, I, 101: “Effetto dell'amor proprio che preferisce la morte alla cognizione del proprio niente, … onde quanto più uno sarà egoista tanto più fortemente e costantemente sarà spinto in questo caso ad uccidersi.”

16. Choron, Death and Western Thought, p. 298.